

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT



A Primer for the Global Standing Joint Force Headquarters (GSJFHQ)
and the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)

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Background¹

One of the challenges faced by most Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders when establishing a JTF headquarters (HQ) during a crisis has been the need to form a cohesive and informed *joint* organization that is often built upon an existing single Service headquarters. The very nature of most crisis operations demands that the JTF transition quickly from a Service-centric headquarters, which might have been completely unfocused on the emerging crisis, to a smooth running joint organization fully prepared to participate in the combatant commander's (CCDR's) planning effort and the deployment/employment of the joint forces under its control.

In fact, a National Defense University study of recent JTF formations found that 81 percent of the JTFs had less than 30 days of planning time before their forces were engaged. As one can imagine, this challenge has proven to be problematic. Figure 1 reflects the increasing frequency of the requirement to form a JTF and Figure 2 offers a perspective of the performance lag experienced by most JTFs as individual augmentees—from a variety of Services and specialties—trickle into immature headquarters that are simultaneously attempting to plan for the deployment/employment of its joint forces.

Historically, some geographic combatant commands (GCCs) developed ad hoc teams from




Figure 1. Requirements for JTF HQs from 2001-2009

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


Figure 2. Legacy JTF Performance vs. Desired Performance

¹ A special thanks to Mr. Raymond Bradbury, Chief of the Plans and Programs Division, JECC, USTRANSCOM. He and his team provided the bulk of the information on the current state of play for the JECC.

their respective commands' staffs that could temporarily join a JTF HQ as it was forming in order to assist in the maturation process. Frequently, these subject matter experts from the theater commander's staff would only remain at the JTF HQs for a short time since their billets were gapped at the combatant command during their absence.

During MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, a combination joint field training exercise and experiment, USJFCOM experimented with a concept to mitigate this lag in JTF performance through the employment of a small cadre of officers deployed from the combatant command to the JTF headquarters in a more formalized manner. This provisional concept was named the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)-Prototype. As one of the successful outcomes of this event, the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year 2004-2009, May 2002, directed all GCCs to establish SJFHQs no later than FY 2005. On 16 December 2003, The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the GCCs to reprogram 58 billets to establish their SJFHQs. Later, to avoid confusion over capability, CJCS Manual 5125.01, "Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ)-Core Element (CE) was published. It clarified the small element's true capacity—an SJFHQ-Core Element; not a full JTF HQ.

SJFHQ-CE History

The SJFHQ-CE provided the GCC with a trained, standing joint element specifically organized to accelerate the transition of Service operational headquarters to a JTF HQ.² SJFHQ-CE personnel provided knowledge of the combatant command headquarters, as well as expertise in JTF HQ planning and execution processes. They were trained in a joint environment. The SJFHQ-CE enabled quick establishment of a JTF HQ, capable of increasing the core staff's (normally a single Service headquarters) ability to conduct joint operation planning. The SJFHQ-CE also provided a rapid infusion of that knowledge, based on situational awareness and understanding, into the core staff's headquarters. When appropriately augmented, an SJFHQ-CE could form a small, short-duration JTF HQ. If the SJFHQ-CE became the core for the JTF, it already had situational awareness and understanding of the crisis. However, regardless of the option employed, the SJFHQ-CE personnel would remain linked to those agencies and organizations involved in pre-crisis planning.

While the SJFHQ-CE concept appears clear-cut, its actual implementation in the field did not result in a homogeneous organizational structure. Initially envisioned as a stand-alone organization led by a flag officer within the combatant command headquarters, each CCDR ultimately tailored the SJFHQ-CE to meet the unique needs of the command. In some cases, the members of the SJFHQ-CE were fully integrated among the remainder of the CCDR's staff, while in other cases they were found to be a semi-autonomous organization within the combatant

² The following description is an extract from U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Chapter 17. Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element," in *Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure*, 12 Jan 2009 (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index.htm accessed 16/03/2009).

command headquarters. With that said, SJFHQ-CEs have been employed multiple times since the implementation of the concept. Figure 3 offers a partial list of past SJFHQ-CE deployments.

- **USEUCOM JTF Odyssey Dawn: March 2011**
- **USPACOM Operation Tomodachi: March 2011**
- **USSOUTHCOM Joint Task Force Haiti: Jan 2010**
- **USPACOM Joint Task Force Caring Response (Burma): May 2008**
- **USCENTCOM Crisis Resource Alert Order: Feb 2007-present**
- **Combined Joint Task Force -Horn of Africa: Mar–July 2005**
- **Task Force Paladin: Apr–Jun 2006**
- **ISAF, Afghanistan: Jun–Nov 2006**
- **Doha Asian Games, Doha, Qatar: Oct-Dec 2006**
- **Joint Task Force Lebanon: Aug -Sep 2006**
- **Multinational Corps Iraq: Mar 2005–Jan 2006**
- **Combined Disaster Assistance Center Pakistan: Oct–Nov 2005**
- **Multinational Forces Iraq: May–Jul 2005**
- **Joint Task Force Katrina: Sep–Oct 2005**

Figure 3. Sampling of Previous SJFHQ-CE Deployments

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command History

USJFCOM, while not a GCC, maintained its own pair of SJFHQ-CEs as a means for augmenting deployed SJFHQ-CEs and/or backfilling multiple JTF requirements within a single AOR. For instance, U.S. Central Command, which never established its own SJFHQ-CE, relied heavily upon USJFCOM's SJFHQ-CE capabilities to establish, organize, and operate JTF HQs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operational experience proved that combatant commands frequently requested specific capabilities (often found in various parts of USJFCOM) rather than SJFHQ-CE augmentation. Accordingly, in October 2008, USJFCOM reorganized its SJFHQ directorate into a more agile Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), and its two SJFHQ-CEs into Joint Deployable Teams (JDTs). The JECC provided USJFCOM the ability to tailor a JDT to meet the particular needs of a GCC or JTF, specifically with Joint Enabling Capabilities (JECs) in four critical functional areas: Operations, Plans, Knowledge Management / Information Superiority, and Logistics. Three other unique joint enabling capabilities were available from the JECC:

- **Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)** (Located at MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL) provided command, control, communications and computer support to joint task forces and joint special operations task forces worldwide.
- **Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)** deployed joint media and communications capable forces for enhanced, ready public affairs capability to support combatant command operations and contingencies.
- **Intelligence - Quick Reaction Team (I-QRT)** provided an eight-man team composed of collection managers and targeteers who could deploy within hours of notification. Note: The JECC lost the I-QRT capability following the decision to disestablish USJFCOM.

A JEC is a joint element that provides a critical, non-organic³ capability designed to facilitate the establishment, organization and operation of a JTF HQs. A JEC is employed for crisis response missions and trains for employment while in garrison. A JEC is subject to Global Response Force (GRF) execution, has a unit identification code, a joint mission-essential task list, and reports its readiness in the Defense Readiness Reporting System. As directed, a JEC transfers operational control or tactical control of deployed forces to the gaining command. The JECC's subordinate elements all meet the criteria of this JEC definition.

Creation of the Global Standing Joint Force Headquarters (GSJFHQ) Mission

The decision to disestablish USJFCOM and the pressing requirement for efficiency in DOD provided the impetus for a review of both the SJFHQ-CEs at the GCCs and USJFCOM's JECC. At issue was whether DOD really needed so many SJFHQ-CEs in a resource-constrained environment?

Following an initial Joint Staff review of actual SJFHQ-CE deployments, which determined that seldom would more than two SJFHQ-CEs be deployed at any given time, SecDef Memorandum, *Resource Management Decisions (RMD) for the FY 2012 Budget Request*, dated January 25, 2011, directed the disestablishment of the SJFHQ-CEs at U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command and the return of most corresponding military billets back to the Military Services. SecDef's RMD further directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish an SJFHQ and facilitate the standup of a second SJFHQ by using the resources that transition from the JECC effective 1 October 2011 (FY 2012) due to the disestablishment of USJFCOM.


The *global SJFHQ* (GSJFHQ) term arose within the context of describing the global nature of the mission⁴, in contrast to the regional focus of the combatant commands' SJFHQs. The JECC currently uses the acronym GSJFHQ to describe a capability and mission set, not for the naming or designation of any organizational element. As described below, the JECC now provides GSJFHQ capabilities to supported commands in the form of the JEC Package.

In order to meet the SecDef's intent, the Joint Staff and JECC initiated in February 2011 a second and more comprehensive study of the GSJFHQ mission requirements of the combatant commands, so as to better determine the design and employment of the two RMD-directed SJFHQs. Combatant command-submitted data on SJFHQ-CE activities reflected six Lines of Effort (LOEs): (1) Emergent Operational Events, (2) JTF HQ Readiness Exercises, (3) Operationalize Joint Force HQ, (4) Other Combatant Command Exercises (5) JTF HQ Training, and (6) Theater Specific Activities. There was broad consensus on the first three LOEs being the

³ "Non-organic" refers to a capability not normally possessed by most Service organizations that form a JTF HQW.

⁴ The term GSJFHQ was first used in the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) Action Memorandum for SecDef, *COCOM Below-the-Line Baselineing*, in which the VCJCS recommended "reducing from seven SJFHQs at COCOMs to two **global** SJFHQs in FY12" (bold added).

top priorities for the global SJFHQ mission set. The GSJFHQ Requirements Study also showed that emergent operational events, such as large scale humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) and other rapidly emerging crises, can occur in multiple combatant command areas of responsibility simultaneously. Understanding that manpower efficiencies can be realized when performing tasks from multiple LOEs, and that the emerging requirements will take precedence, the study data supported a force generation model of three SJFHQs to meet 90 percent of combatant command requirements worldwide; approximately three SJFHQs on an on-going basis, with the capability to generate a fourth SJFHQ for periods of high demand.



Emerging Operational Data:

Max Single Peak Surge: 145 PAX (Jan 10)
 Average Peak Surge: 116 PAX
 Day to Day Average: 47 PAX

■ Emerging Operational Events
 ■ Non-Emergent Activities

Figure 4. Historical Planner Deployments Sourced from SJFHQs/JDT

It also became evident that JECC was best prepared to assume the global SJFHQ mission set and needed to remain a Flag-officer (1-Star) command, not under the CJCS but instead under a combatant command for proper command and control of forces in the field for Global Response Force (GRF) execution and emerging operational requirements approved by SecDef. After due consideration, SecDef approved, on 27 April 2011, the reassignment and realignment of JECC from USJFCOM to the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) effective July 1, 2011 and further directed that JECC be assigned to USTRANSCOM in the Forces For Unified Commands Memorandum (Forces For). JECC retained the Joint Deployable Team (JDT), Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) and Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) as

subordinate commands and assumed the global SJFHQ mission set on 1 October 2011 in support of all the GCCs.

JEC Package

While specific organization designs of the JECC headquarters and JDT are not yet finalized, the employment concept has crystallized. JECC will continue to utilize the Tailored Mission JEC Package—based upon the JTF’s need—which stands ready to quickly deploy to support a forming JTF headquarters (see Figure 5 below).




Figure 5. Formation of JTF HQ

The *JEC Package* is a general term for a capability package provided to joint force commanders (JFC). For force management and planning purposes, there is a *Standard JEC Package* configuration that consists of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces and may include elements from one or more JECs. As the name suggests, this is the standard capabilities package available to JFCs. It may consist of 79 personnel and be resourced with all individual equipment to include weapons, survival/personal protection, and a basic load of subsistence rations, as required. The Standard JEC Package is also resourced with a standard suite of information technology (IT) equipment. The Standard JEC Package: 1) provides a baseline model to promote a common understanding amongst the customer population regarding the scope and scale of available JECC support; 2) facilitates pre-crisis planning at both the JECC and potential gaining commands; and 3) serves as a point of departure to tailor JEC packages for specific missions/requirements during pre-deployment planning and preparations. The *Ready JEC Package (RJP)* is a Standard JEC Package that is alert-postured for deployment. Its personnel and equipment can deploy at the port of embarkation ready to board air/land/sea transport, within hours of notification. The RJP has specific personnel assigned to each battle-

roster position; each person is deployable, trained and available. A RJP that has been tailored and scaled to meet the specific mission requirements of the gaining command is referred to as a Mission Tailored JEC Package, as depicted in Figure 5 above.

Once the new JTF has reached sufficient maturity and its permanent manning is in place, the JECC Mission Tailored Package would redeploy (understanding that mission priorities and availability of resources will dictate specific employment timelines). Mission Tailored JEC Package deployments are planned for 90-120 days.

In order to maintain currency with combatant commands, the JDT personnel maintain theater focus cells concentrating on each of the AORs as well as participate in CCDRs' training exercises and support other training and operational activities within CCDRs' AORs as requested.

Process for Requesting JECC Support

There are two methods for combatant commands to request JECC support:

- a. The conventional Global Force Management Request for Forces (RFF) process will normally be used for operational requirements and is required for longer-term (>120 days) operational requirements.
- b. The GRF Execute Order (EXORD) process is used for GRF execution or other emergent/crisis operational requirements. The principal difference between the RFF and GRF processes is response time: based upon prior authorization for GRF execution, the USTRANSCOM Commander can deploy JEC Packages without additional SecDef approval. SecDef notification must follow, however, after the fact and is required for employment of the forces. Figure 6 below provides a synopsis of the GRF process.




Figure 6. GRF Request Process

Summary

Based upon the experiences of the previous SJFHQ-CEs and its own extensive history of deployments, JECC is fully capable of performing the global SJFHQ mission set and will endeavor with existing resources to support combatant commander requirements. While JECC’s new structure will likely continue to evolve with maturity, the JECC remains relevant to today’s ever changing and complex operational environment and will continue to provide future JTF Commanders with an immediate infusion of joint talent and capability.