

BOOK REVIEWS

HOW AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CAN THRIVE IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Heymann, Philip B., and Juliette N. Kayyem, eds. *Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. 194pp. \$30

In the midst of a cacophony of charges and countercharges concerning recently revealed warrantless U.S. government wiretaps of American citizens, this compact book strikes a refreshing note—calm, balanced consideration of the tension between security and liberty in the post-9/11 world. The editors, a Harvard Law School professor and an acting executive director for research at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, convened a group of experts in a variety of professional terrorism-related fields to explore "how American democracy can thrive best" in the war on terror. Over eighteen months, the experts (from both ends of the political spectrum and many with previous U.S. or British government service) developed specific criteria to guide future decisions concerning the law and practice applicable to combating terrorism at home and abroad.

Happily, the book's detailed recommendations for the executive branch and Congress reject extremes in favor of a thoughtful balance between the president's need for extraordinary powers and Congress's duty to provide

oversight. The recommendations cover ten major areas that include coercive interrogations, indefinite detention, targeted killing, intercepting communications of U.S. persons, information collection, and identification of individuals. Any bias in the approach is, as the authors acknowledge, toward accountability, transparency, and accurate reassessment. On the other hand, the recommendations refrain from suggesting guidelines or restrictions on the commander in chief's broad war powers in zones of active combat outside the United States.

This work is particularly useful for readers who are or will be addressing terrorism-related issues within the executive or legislative branches. The recommendations provide a possible path to broad consensus on these contentious topics. Readers ideologically committed to an extreme viewpoint (in favor of either maximum security or maximum liberty) will find much to criticize, while those who seek a balanced approach, though they will also take issue, may find that adopting the moderate viewpoint of the recommendations will

enhance more rapid agreement among the various stakeholders in the government.

The work's one drawback is a lack of detail, in that it reflects a "distillation of views and opinions" based on "honest and difficult discussions" in a series of closed-door meetings. Accordingly, the reader must speculate on the rationale underlying the specifics. Those seeking to implement these recommendations would benefit by a clearer understanding of the viewpoints analyzed and why they were resolved in a particular way. For example: What indicators of reliability were presumed to prohibit the introduction of information obtained through "highly coercive interrogation" techniques in a trial of the informing detainee but to allow the information in the trial of other detainees? What value is served by providing an individual captured in a zone of active combat a hearing before a competent tribunal when there is no doubt as to his/her status as a prisoner of war? What competing legal rationales were considered when concluding that an al-Qa'ida leader located in Yemen was not engaged in "active" combat against the United States?

This criticism is minor, in any event, since executive and congressional leaders must answer these questions for themselves and on behalf of the American public, if the recommendations are implemented. The book's value lies in modulating the shrillness of the discourse and in proposing a reasoned, rational way forward for the ultimate benefit of the nation.

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Purkitt, Helen E., and Stephen F. Burgess. *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2005. 322pp. \$24.95

North Korea's prime motive for developing and possessing nuclear weapons is probably regime security. Leader Kim Jong-II's rationale would be that absent weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the international community would find some way to dismantle a repressive, autocratic regime that is completely out of phase with twenty-first-century norms. Authors Helen Purkitt and Stephen Burgess argue in their analysis of South Africa's weapons of mass destruction programs that in the latter part of the twentieth century the white ruling elite made similar calculations, premised on idiosyncratic political ideology and national emotions as much as on rational neorealist power assessments. South Africa's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities (unilaterally abandoned by the mid-1990s, after majority rule was established and Cold War threats had receded) arose from its white leaders' alarm over rising regional threats unleashed by decolonization, détente, and corresponding American timidity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in Africa, and growing international opposition to apartheid.

The book is analytically sound if somewhat inelegantly written. The authors—Purkitt, a professor of political science at the U.S. Naval Academy, and Burgess, an assistant director of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center as well as an associate professor at the U.S. Air War College—systematically illuminate South Africa's furtive route to clandestine WMD know-how and arsenals. Steps included exploitation of South Africa's own natural resources

(uranium), dual-use technology, porous arms-control regimes, and technologically advanced states that perceived themselves as comparably besieged (for instance, Israel and Taiwan). Careful not to oversimplify, the authors also note the organizational, personal, and cognitive factors that enforced this effort. Pertinent circumstances included, respectively, the desire of the Defense Ministry and military to maintain maximum control over the national industrial base; the friendship between chemical and biological weapons czar, Dr. Wouter Basson, and Prime Minister P. W. Botha; and the Afrikaners' conception of themselves as "God's chosen people."

Marring the book's narrative flow is an awkward structure whereby overlapping themes are examined discretely. This produces considerable redundancy and, occasionally, the obtuse presentation of old information as new material. More aggressive editing would have remedied the problem, which in any case is ameliorated by an appendix of policy lessons. Despite its faults, however, *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction* embodies an assiduous and authoritative marshaling of facts about one country's secret enterprise in acquiring weapons that, without benefit of hindsight, few might have expected it to covet. Purkitt's and Burgess's work also contrasts the halcyon days of nonproliferation immediately after the Cold War ended—when South Africa was a "trendsetter" for wider disarmament—with the present dysfunction of nonproliferation regimes. South Africa's conversion to a majoritarian democracy facilitated benevolent neorealist behavior. Grimly, the authors note, however, that "today's states that have weapons of mass destruction are not likely to

replicate South Africa's democratic disarmament." Dutifully, they sketch how nonproliferation incentives and measures will have to change in order to stop the spread of WMD. The book, then, has more than just historical relevance; it should be considered a timely as well as an accomplished contribution to the nonproliferation literature.

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Kaplan, Robert D. *Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground*. New York: Random House, 2005. 421pp. \$27.95

Robert Kaplan's book *Imperial Grunts* is an account of a war journalist cum travel writer visiting U.S. military commands worldwide. Kaplan travels through "barracks and outposts of the American Empire," from Yemen to Colombia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa, introducing readers to "imperial grunts" (U.S. Marines and Army troops and the Navy and Air Force personnel who support them) at these forward-deployed locations. His ten previous books include foreign affairs accounts (*Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan*, Vintage, 2001) and travelogues (*Surrender or Starve: Travels in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea*, Vintage, 2003). Kaplan is currently a correspondent for the *Atlantic Monthly*.

Kaplan lauds the personal initiative of midlevel commissioned and noncommissioned officers he meets in his travels, and he champions them as, collectively, a superior source for operational knowledge

and force mentorship. A recurring theme is the failure of a top-heavy bureaucracy of “big military/Army/Navy” that is “organizationally miscast for dealing with twenty-first-century insurgencies,” versus smaller, more efficient Marine, special forces, and civil affairs units. One example is the transformation of “big military” control over the Afghanistan battlefield. In 2001, master sergeants were empowered to call in B-52 airstrikes that arrived within minutes; by 2003, approval of task force concepts of operations required three days of paperwork and senior-officer authorization.

Kaplan holds out the ethnic composition and language skills of U.S. Southern Command personnel as exemplary. He posits that, for the twenty-first century, “indigenous culture must be appreciated before anything can be accomplished with its inhabitants” and that “cultural and historical knowledge of the terrain is more likely than technological wizardry to dilute the so-called fog-of-war.” Kaplan states that in Afghanistan the “American Empire . . . was weakest” because of an absence of linguistic skills among deployed military personnel. “This . . . neglected part of . . . defense ‘transformation’ . . . had nothing to do with the latest weapons systems.”

According to Kaplan, future military operations should optimally leave small footprints. In the Philippines, he observes, Army civil affairs teams, part of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, functioned like relief charities or nongovernmental organizations—they built schools, dug wells, and provided medical assistance. These personnel “represented the future reality of Special Operations: the Peace Corps with

guns, the final articulation of unconventional war.”

Contrary to media reports of poor military morale due to overdeployment, Kaplan states that “with Army Special Forces and the Marines I had met only two kinds of troops (from 2002–2004): those who were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, and those who were jealous of those who were” and “those in the Special Operations community whom I had met (in the Philippines) and in eastern Afghanistan were having the time of their lives.”

Imperial Grunts is intended to be the first of several books on “imperial maintenance on the ground, and seeking a rule book for its application.” The strong opinions of the author notwithstanding, those desiring to learn about military personnel deployed worldwide in the war on terror can benefit from reading this account.

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Parrish, Thomas. *The Submarine: A History*. New York: Penguin, 2004. 576pp. \$17

In this excellent and rather lengthy book, Thomas Parrish uses detailed vignettes to illustrate how submarines, the men who operated them, and the organizations that produced them changed naval warfare between great powers during the twentieth century. The author does this with a deft hand, providing a wealth of details concerning many notable personalities and technical facts of his arcane subject in a way that both informs and entertains. One has only to read the first three pages, which quickly discuss the short and

tragic life of the Confederate submarine *CSS H. L. Hunley*, to get an accurate feel for how the rest of the book will progress. Parrish maintains this fast pace as he relates the legend of David Bushnell's Revolutionary War submersible vessel, the *Turtle*; Robert Fulton's submarine efforts; and those of other early inventors. His discussions on World War I are more substantial, and his penchant for detail emerges in his short biographies of some of the major figures of the time. He ties their careers to submarine technology, not only describing Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz's rise to high command in the German navy but quoting the admiral's observation that his success was bound to the development of the torpedo. Parrish then traces the development of both the German and British fleets and the grand strategies that led to their acquisition. For the next ten pages, we are told the riveting story of how Lieutenant Otto Weddigen, commanding the six-hundred-ton submarine *U-9*, with a crew of twenty-six men, sank the British cruisers *Aboukir*, *Cressy*, and *Hogue* with just three torpedoes in less than two hours in the early days of the war. In that battle 1,459 British men died, which at the time represented the worst butcher's bill, and arguably the most stunning defeat, in the history of the Royal Navy. As Parrish later observes, the century of the submarine had arrived.

Parrish treats his discussion of World War II equally well. He relays, among other things, Admiral Karl Dönitz's rise, *U-47* commander Lieutenant Günter Prien's attack in Scapa Flow, the U.S. Navy's participation in convoy escort duty before the official declaration of war, and the second Battle of the Atlantic. He discusses the parallel Allied

and German code-breaking efforts and the action/reaction technology cycle between submarines and those who hunted them. Readers with an interest in the U.S. submarine force's contributions to victory against Japan will be pleased with the author's treatment of that important campaign and of the major figures involved.

If the book has a weakness, it is that some important points receive scant coverage. All told, nearly four hundred pages of the book discuss the history of diesel-powered submarines, while only eighty-four pages are dedicated to nuclear boats. Yet even here the author does a creditable job in describing the development of American nuclear submarines, evenhandedly discussing the rise, behavior, strengths, and weaknesses of Admiral Hyman Rickover. Oddly, Russian submarines receive little attention, most of it devoted to peacetime losses of the *Komsolomets* (the Mike-class submarine) in 1989 and that of the *Kursk* (an Oscar II) in 2000.

Submarine accidents also present the few stumbling points. Parrish states that all hands were lost when HMS *Thetis* sank in 1939, when in fact three members of the crew and a shipyard worker escaped from the stricken submarine. Similarly, he describes the USS *Scorpion* as "shabby and seedy" and "rickety," citing these alleged characteristics as contributing to its loss. However, these oversights are relatively minor and do not significantly detract from what is otherwise a fine treatment of a complex subject. The book will appeal to the interested layman, naval professional, and, especially, to current and former submariners.

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Showalter, Dennis E., ed. *Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st Century*. Chicago: Imprint, 2005. 236pp. \$24.95

Dwight D. Eisenhower's greatest achievement as president came in the area of foreign policy and related defense matters. In the making and managing of strategic policy he was a strong, active, and effective leader. This book is an uneven collection of essays devoted to Eisenhower's presidential influence on foreign policy and national security, essays that were presented at a symposium held in January 2005 at the National Defense University.

The lead paper, "Reflections on Eisenhower, the Cold War, and My Father," by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an interesting recollection of Nikita Khrushchev's attitude toward Eisenhower and the United States. According to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown University professor and himself a veteran of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his father, like many veterans of the "Great Patriotic War," viewed Eisenhower as a former comrade in arms and thus welcomed his election as president. The elder Khrushchev was highly respectful of the danger posed by potential nuclear war and sought only equality in relations with the United States and the Eisenhower administration. Questions emerge as to how much new information Sergei Khrushchev's memoir-analysis reveals, and how much is a son's defense of a father. However, to a large segment of students, Professor Khrushchev's reflections provide an interesting look at the key foreign power's opposing viewpoint during the Eisenhower presidency.

The collection's strongest work is Alan Millet's "Eisenhower and the Korean

War." It was a conflict that Eisenhower inherited when elected and one that he knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike's indirect involvement from the period when he was chief of staff after World War II until his pledge in the 1952 campaign that if elected "I shall go to Korea," a pledge that Eisenhower understood needed rapid redemption.

With considerable insight Millet traces Eisenhower's efforts to end the war and provide a defense policy for the long haul, based on concepts that Ike later set forth in his memoir. These concepts relied on deterrence, stressed the role of nuclear technology, placed heavy reliance on allied land forces around the Soviet periphery, and emphasized economic strength through reduced defense budgets. The outcome was the New Look strategy of the 1950s.

R. Cargill Hall's essay, "Clandestine Victory," is a competent account of the development of increasingly sophisticated aircraft and early satellites tasked with aerial surveillance and of the intelligence they provided, as well as of their influence on decision making. However, the paper deteriorates into an argument for further eye-in-the-sky commitments to counter twenty-first-century terrorism. Hall's argument seems more public relations for an institutional constituency than a reasoned scholarly analysis and conclusion. Terrorism, at its most effective and frightening, depends on surreptitious individual initiatives that in general defy large-scale overhead surveillance.

One area that perhaps could have been developed more explicitly is Eisenhower's role and technique in controlling the defense budgetary process and strategic dialogue within his administration. His principal secretaries of

defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one of keeping the Pentagon programs within the budget, which was important for carrying out his conservative fiscal goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower dealt directly with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped an important portion of the secretary of defense's role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of defense.

Thematic throughout this collection is a focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing Eisenhower's response to grand strategy, relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, the book ignores the twenty-first-century challenges posed for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.

For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, *Forging the Shield* likely contains little new information, but it will prove valuable to defense policy and military history students needing exposure to the Eisenhower era.

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Schencking, J. Charles. *Making Waves: Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1868–1922*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. \$57.95

Charles Schencking, in charting Japan's creation of the world's third-largest navy by 1922, illuminates the workings

of the Japanese political system and the evolution of both interservice rivalries and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases his history on an impressive reading of Japanese and English-language primary and secondary sources to produce a story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.

When the Meiji reformers took power in 1868, their minimal naval forces were part of their land forces. In 1871, over the objections of the army, the Military Ministry was subdivided into two ministries, army and navy. In order to secure funding to create a modern fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from Chōshō were already allied with the army.

Together these clans brought the Meiji reformers to power. The opening of the Diet in 1890 brought fears among the clans that democracy would erode their power. Therefore, they solidified their ties with the army and navy. Thus highly politicized interservice rivalries were inherent in the Japanese political system.

Initial Diets were hostile to military funding. War with China in 1894–95, however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial burden into a service vital to Japan's national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of the home islands to command of the sea and defense of the empire. The navy continued to press for a combat mission independent of the army, which retained responsibility for national defense and command over naval forces in wartime. Interservice

rivalries intensified. The navy assiduously cultivated popular support among politicians, journalists, disenfranchised former samurai, and entrepreneurs who dreamed of an empire in the South Seas.

The navy used World War I to seize German colonies and implement its “southward advance” strategy for expanding the empire in the Pacific region. The war also transformed Japan from a debtor into a creditor nation. These changed circumstances finally allowed a Seiyūkai-navy alliance to deliver greatly increased postwar naval budgets. Previously, the naval budget had occasionally exceeded the army budget, but from 1917 to 1922 it did so consistently and massively.

In response to those who believe that Japan’s military muzzled its civil leaders in World War II and that this accounts for Japan’s rampage through the Pacific, Schencking’s book shows that the political parties had always worked closely with the military and that, conversely, the military had always been deeply involved in politics. This meant ever-deepening interservice rivalries, and also incomplete and incompatible war plans that would spell disaster for Japan and much of Asia and the Pacific in World War II.

For nonspecialists, additional allusions to political and budgetary issues beyond naval appropriations would have put the subject of the book into a broader context. Nevertheless, Schencking provides one of the best descriptions of the inner workings of the Japanese political system that I have ever read. It details the creation of the modern Japanese navy, the civil-military politics necessary for its development, the consequent army-navy rivalries, and the implications for the

Japanese political system and for future Japanese military strategy.

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Black, Jeremy. *The British Seaborne Empire*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2004. 420pp. \$40

Jeremy Black deliberately titled his book to link it with two classics, works that every maritime historian knows: C. R. Boxer’s *The Dutch Seaborne Empire* (1965) and J. H. Parry’s *The Spanish Seaborne Empire* (1966). The planned volume in that series that would have provided an overview of the British Empire was never completed, although nearly twenty years later D. B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan filled the gap for the early phase with their *England’s Sea Empire, 1550–1642* (1983). Black’s contribution shows a significantly different approach as well as a much broader and more nuanced view of the general theme.

Jeremy Black is a prolific writer who has become widely known for his broad, sweeping histories of British foreign policy in the eighteenth century and of the history of European and world warfare, as well as for his insightful studies of maps and cartography. He is fully experienced and eminently well qualified to attempt a broad-based study such as this.

Although Black’s title suggests a general history of the British Empire, his detailed focus is not on the earliest period but on the three hundred years from the Union of Scotland and England in 1707 to the present. To provide linkages,

however, he has written a hundred pages that describe the origins of the empire, racing from pre-Roman times to the mid-eighteenth century. From that point forward, Black expands out into his larger study, tracing both the British Empire's rise and its decline. In this Black is careful to give weight to the three elements of his title: the "Britishness" of that empire, the complexity of its maritime basis, and the distinctive differences with other types of imperial powers. The book is a dense collation of factual detail, but the picture that Black paints and the perspective that he presents are interesting. He links maritime exploration, trade, migration, and naval affairs in a broad context while at the same time bringing in the wide range of cross-cultural issues involved. Even beyond that, Black characterizes the British Empire as the power that gave indirect rise to America and was America's immediate predecessor as a global superpower. This linkage, as Black reminds us, allows a reader to begin to think about the connections between consecutive global powers.

Imperial history has largely been ignored until recently in academic circles, but Black's work clearly succeeds in underscoring the importance of the British Empire's maritime nature in its distinctive contribution to the development of the modern world. Black concludes that "if the British Empire is blamed for many of the aspects of modernization and globalization, it also serves as a way of offering historical depth to a critique of American power, and, in part, this is at issue when British imperialism is criticized."

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Budiansky, Stephen. *Her Majesty's Spymaster: Elizabeth I, Sir Francis Walsingham, and the Birth of Modern Espionage*. New York: Penguin, 2005. 235pp. \$24.95

For many years the U.S. intelligence community has been dominated by a subculture enraptured with intelligence collected by technical means. Despite the wealth of intelligence these means provide, they do not always lead toward an understanding of how an opponent thinks. Many current and former intelligence officers have argued for over a decade that the United States must improve both its human intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities; events since 9/11 have reinforced that view with a vengeance.

History provides many examples of effective intelligence organizations in the days before technical means, and Stephen Budiansky, a journalist and military historian, has chosen for his subject one of the best for his latest book. Budiansky describes the intelligence successes of Sir Francis Walsingham, first as ambassador to France and later as Principal Secretary to the Privy Council of Queen Elizabeth I. In the latter role (at the time, akin to a chief of staff) Walsingham not only coordinated domestic and foreign policy but ran the kingdom's primary secret service.

Walsingham was a legend in an era filled with men of legendary stature. Where others were self-promoting, he was unobserved. Where many bragged of power and connections, he wielded power quietly and subtly, but always effectively. His painstaking attention to detail and his deep understanding of human nature made him the ideal spymaster.

The focus of “Mr. Secretary” (as he was known) was maintaining England’s independence from the maneuverings of Spain, France, and Rome. Budiansky describes how Walsingham’s skill in gathering and analyzing information complemented (if not always easily) Elizabeth’s talent for political and diplomatic intrigue. England, at the time a small fringe state tottering between Protestantism and Catholicism, was vulnerable to the machinations of the great powers of the day. Walsingham played critical roles in countering plots against Elizabeth, the most famous being that of Mary, Queen of Scots.

Walsingham’s role in the defeat of the Spanish Armada provides a textbook example of what intelligence can and sometimes cannot provide. He developed a comprehensive collection plan and employed a network of agents throughout Europe to gather information. He never blindly trusted any one source, using multiple agents against the same target. As the Armada preparations came to a head, Walsingham commissioned naval reconnaissance missions of key Spanish ports, and although his work provided strategic warning to the crown and the Royal Navy, contrary winds prevented tactical warning.

Walsingham understood that intelligence must support decision making—after all, he was a major player in both domestic and foreign policy—and ensured that the information he provided was focused on those ends. Upon becoming Principal Secretary, he was informed that the job required him to know everyone and see everything. By the time of his death, both his supporters and enemies believed him unsurpassed in this regard.

While Walsingham’s network did not survive him (he left no written legacy for his successors to follow), the memory of his effectiveness lives on.

If this book has a fault, it is the lack of discussion on Walsingham’s impact on later incarnations of the British secret service. Nonetheless, several maxims attributed to him remain sound guidance for today’s intelligence and policy professionals. “Knowledge is never too dear” speaks for the value of good intelligence. “An habit of secrecy is both policy and virtue” reminds us that success requires constant effort. Finally, “See and keep silent” remain watchwords for today’s intelligence professionals, as they were in the past.

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Berube, Claude, and John Rodgaard. *A Call to the Sea: Captain Charles Stewart of the USS Constitution*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005. 299pp. \$35

Charles Stewart was one of the preeminent officers of the early sailing navy. He is best remembered for the brilliant victory he gained over HMS *Cyane* and *Levant* as captain of USS *Constitution* during the War of 1812. Less well known, however, are the significant contributions Stewart made to the sea service over the remainder of his career—a career that witnessed the birth, growth, and evolution of the Navy during its first six decades of existence. As a central figure of the formative period in the Navy’s history, Charles Stewart has long merited greater scholarly attention than he has heretofore received.

In *A Call to the Sea*, Claude Berube and John Rodgaard redress this neglect with the first book-length study of Charles Stewart's life. Both Berube, a Brookings Institution LEGIS Fellow, and Rodgaard, an intelligence analyst, are Navy Reserve officers with numerous historical publications to their credit. Their portrait of Stewart is drawn from a range of secondary sources, as well as research in manuscript collections that document the public and private dimensions of the 1812 hero's career.

A Call to the Sea examines the major personalities, places, and events that shaped and defined Charles Stewart's life, from his birth in Philadelphia on 28 July 1778 to his death ninety-one years later at Bordentown, New Jersey. Among the career highlights that Berube and Rodgaard explore are Stewart's participation in three wars (the Quasi-War with France, the Barbary Wars, and the War of 1812); his service as commander of the Mediterranean, Pacific, and home squadrons; his role as a naval administrator, first with the Board of Navy Commissioners and later as commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard; and his consideration as a presidential candidate in the elections of 1840 and 1844. The authors also shed light on Stewart's private life

and relationships, in particular his troubled marriage to Delia Tudor of Boston, which ended in divorce in 1828.

Berube and Rodgaard have produced a biography that is highly favorable to its subject. The authors give Stewart high marks as a combat commander, as a mentor influential in shaping the Navy's junior officer corps, and as an administrator receptive to the technological and social changes that were altering the face of the Navy during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.

A Call to the Sea is an informative biography of one of the antebellum Navy's most intriguing and distinguished officers. As such, it should appeal to a wide general audience. Naval historians, however, may well be disappointed with this work. Berube and Rodgaard have failed to exploit fully the large body of official papers that document Stewart's sixty-two-year naval career, some of which are readily available in print. This, coupled with the authors' overreliance on secondary sources in assessing Stewart's life, has resulted in a biography lacking in critical rigor and fresh interpretive insights. For this reason, the definitive biography of Charles Stewart remains to be written.

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