Strategic Communication—State of Play
17 June 2009
by
Prof. Douglas N. Hime, JMO

Although it has been nearly eight years since the tragic events of 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and six years since coalition forces ended the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the U.S. government continues to face criticism for its habitual failures to provide consistent information on issues of vital concern to its public and the world community at large. Unfortunately, examples of national-level communications misfires are plentiful—statements about the imminent threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, inconsistencies about when and how the abuses at Abu Ghraib were discovered, and, more recently, judicial and administration differences regarding due process for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Such inconsistency undermines confidence in America's leadership as the world's lone remaining superpower—frustrating and confusing friends while encouraging those seeking to undermine U.S. efforts.[1]

At the heart of these national-level instances of miscommunication lies an inherently dysfunctional 'interagency' process that lacks the bureaucratic mechanisms necessary to force agreement among the administration's various departments and branches on the substance and urgency of what the United States wishes to convey to the rest of the world. Some argue that beneath this inability to agree is a more fundamental problem— lack of agreement on *what* the United States believes—that is, its national values.[2] Evidence of the on-going confusion over values is reflected in the debates about whether the English language is an accepted American value, whether homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the military, whether same-sex marriages should be recognized, objections to references about God in state documents and pronouncements, and about where to place the line of acceptability regarding religious tolerance and religious extremism. Complicating the confusion over American values is the government's need to address a variety of prospective audiences, each of whom hears different inferences in the mixed messages being sent out. Moreover, there is reluctance on the part of U.S. government officials to challenge religious or cultural extremes lest they be accused of ethnic, cultural, or racial insensitivities. We continually assert the superiority of American values over those of our adversaries, yet "we cannot agree among ourselves what we view as those cultural values of our own we are willing to openly assert are superior and preferable to those championed by our enemies. . . ."[3]

Though there are those who would argue that until consensus is achieved on national values there is little hope for uniformity in our strategic communications, such a defeatist attitude serves little purpose. While there are certainly perceived disparities in American

---

[1] Mari K Eder, "Toward Strategic Communication." *Military Review* (July-August 2007), 62. For an alternative but more candid view that places equal blame on key White House personalities, specifically, Karen Hughes, see Daniel Gallington, "Failure to Communicate," *Washington Times*, March 2, 2008, http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080302/COMMENTARY/124704977/1012. Accessed: March 5, 2008.

[2] Darley, William M. "The Missing Component of U.S. Strategic Communications." *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 47 (4th Qtr. 2007), 109.

[3] Ibid., 112.

values just as there are more often political differences sometimes packaged as value differences, there are arguably fundamental American values and viewpoints that can be found in various touchstone documents, such as the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, as well as more current U.S. national strategy documents. Moreover, differences among various U.S. governmental agencies have always existed and will always exist, and a variety of viewpoints is not necessarily bad. Rather than lament these disparities as inherent weaknesses of the U.S. governmental system, I would argue that in such diversity of opinion lies one of our greatest strengths—an openness to cultural diversity and new ideas that has served us well for over 230 years. Structural, political, cultural, and value differences will always plague the U.S. national governing process, and while no perfect solutions to these differences has appeared on the horizon, the U.S. government is nevertheless taking actions aimed at improving the strategic communication process.

Many of the U.S. government's on-going actions were no doubt driven by harsh rebukes from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which in a series of reports criticized the Bush Administration and its departments for their failure to develop strategic guidance, "which would serve to promote the effective coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts."[4] And, while the GAO acknowledged attempts by the Department of State to engage the private sector in international exchange programs and other outreach efforts, overall, it chastised the White House Director of the Office of Global Communications for failing to implement the role for which its existence was envisioned, "including the development of a national communications strategy."[5] With regard to the actions of the State Department, the GAO noted in its report that none of State's "suggestions was acted upon due to a lack of resources, bureaucratic resistance, and inadequate management commitment."[6] In a subsequent 2007, post-strategic-communications-strategy assessment that noted continued government shortfalls, the GAO criticized U.S. government agencies for their lack of feedback mechanisms in assessing both the reactions of foreign audiences and the needs of policymakers and agencies, noting that "the government lacks interagency protocols for sharing information and a forum to periodically bring key research staff together to discuss concerns across all topics of interest."[7] This same report praised DoD's earlier Strategic Communication Roadmap process, and it formally endorsed and recommended that all government agencies adopt a campaign-style approach to thematic communications planning similar to the processes used by both the Department of Defense and USAID. It also noted that developing a strategic communications strategy without addressing the *content* of its public diplomacy and strategic communications efforts would be fruitless.[8]

While the Obama Administration has only been in office for a few months, President Obama has nevertheless recognized the need for greater transparency and accountability, and recently established the Office of Public Engagement (OPE), whose mission is serve

---

[4] U.S. Government Accountability Office, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*. GAO-05-323. Washington, DC: April 4, 2005, 3.

[5] Ibid., 4.

[6] Ibid.

[7] U.S. Government Accountability Office. *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*. GAO-07-904. Washington, DC: GAO, July 2007, 22.

[8] Ibid.

as a point of coordination for speaking engagements among various Executive branch offices in an effort to improve transparency and public awareness. In addition to appointing a Director for OPE, the President also has a Senior Advisor and Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Engagement. [9]

Among the most notable of efforts to engage the private sector in international exchange programs has been the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent federal agency responsible for "all U.S. government and government-sponsored, non-military, international broadcasting." [10] The BBG was established under the International Broadcasting Act in 1994 (Public Law 103-236), which created both it and the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB)—the latter under the auspices of U.S. Information Agency. [11] The BBG became an independent, autonomous agency as a result of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277). With a charter to promote American values of freedom and democracy along with accurate and objective news to overseas audiences, with the assistance of the IBB, day-to-day broadcasting activities are carried out by its individual international broadcasters—Voice of America, Alhurra, Radio Sawa, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Radio and TV Marti. [12] Additionally, the BBG conducts surveys on audience preferences, using focus groups and topics in various language audiences to evaluate the effectiveness of its broadcasting efforts. According the GAO, however, the sharing of that information with other government agencies tends to be informal and ad hoc, which undermines its utility in measuring the BBG's success in concert other government pubic diplomacy and strategic communication efforts. [13]

Paralleling the GAO's assessments of Strategic Communication, though three years prior to the most recent GAO report on SC, the September 2004 Defense Science Board's Task Force on Strategic Communication also made several recommendations based upon noted shortfalls in the ability of the United States to credibly communicate its national objectives and policies to the rest of the world. In particular, the Task Force recommended that the President issue a directive to "coordinate all components of strategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and military information operations" [14]; appoint a Deputy National Security

---

[9] "Office of Public Engagement," http://www.whitehouse.gov.ope/about/. Accessed: June 17, 2009.

[10] "Broadcasting Board of Governors." http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.cfm. Accessed: February 2, 2008.

[11] The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was integrated into the Department of State on October 1, 1999 and ceased to exist as an independent agency. The International Broadcasting Bureau subsequently became an independent agency, receiving policy guidance from the Secretary of State. See U.S. Department of State, *The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999.

[12] Broadcasting Board of Governors, 1.

[13] GAO-07-904, 15.

[14] U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2004), 6. This is the second (of three, to date) DSB reports on Strategic Communication; the first report on Managed Information Dissemination was released in October 2001. In its most recent report, the DSB Task Force on SC reiterated some of the recommendations in its 2004 report, changing the recommended name of the Center for Strategic Communication to the Center for Global Engagement. It also encouraged increased policy, budget and personnel authorities for the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; a review of the mission, structure, funding, and performance of the BBG; and creation of a permanent Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic Communication, who would report to the Undersecretary of Defense Policy. See U.S. Department

Advisor for Strategic Communication; establish a permanent Strategic Communication Committee within the National Security Council; and that the President work with Congress to create legislation establishing and funding an independent, non-partisan Center of Strategic Communication, whose purposes would include providing information and analysis on strategic communication to government decision-makers. The Task Force report also admonished the President to direct the development plans, themes, products, products, and programs that would help enhance implementation of U.S. strategic communication strategies; and to foster cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people and information as well as maintain knowledge management systems, language and skills inventories, and procedures to recruit private sector augmentation of U.S. government SC activities. [15]

Just what is strategic communication? There is no U.S. governmental-wide definition that is embraced by every agency. A variety have been offered, considered, and used by different agencies, but they all share some commonality, the essence of which is perhaps captured best in the following observation, "strategic communication means massing information among all agents of public information at a critical time and place to accomplish a specific objective."[16] Criticism of this definition would argue that there is more to strategic communication than "public information," but the need to keep all agencies on a consistent message is clearly a necessity.

Despite the lack of an agreed-upon U.S. government definition of strategic communication, in June 2007 the Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) of the National Security Council (NSC) released a long-awaited "U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication."[17] In addition to restating the eight national security objectives of the March 2006 *National Security Strategy*, this new strategy stated that "public diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support our nation's fundamental values and national security objectives" and that "all communication and public diplomacy activities should:

---

of Defense, *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication,* (Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2008).

[15] Ibid., 7-9.

[16] Eder, 62. A similar definition can supposedly be found in a 2006 draft of Enclosure B, "Strategic Communication," JOPES, Volume 1: "transmission of integrated and coordinated US Government themes, messages, and actions that advance US interests and policies through a synchronized Interagency effort." See Stephen P. Perkins and Gary T. Scott. "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands." *IO Sphere* (Spring 2006), 26.

[17] That this document was released by a Policy Coordinating Committee rather than the White House undoubtedly sends a message of its own regarding our inability to obtain departmental-level agreement. Nevertheless, this is arguably a small step in the direction of progress. For the sake of brevity, I will henceforth refer to this document as the 'Strategic Communication Strategy.' As with Strategic Communication, there is no U.S. government-wide, approved definition of "public diplomacy." However, JP 1-02, *The DoD Dictionary*, defines public diplomacy as: "Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. 2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community. Source: JP 3-07.3."

- Underscore our commitment to freedom, human rights and the dignity and equality of every human being;
- Reach out to those who share our ideals;
- Support those who struggle for freedom and democracy; and
- Counter those who espouse ideologies of hate and oppression."[18]

This document also establishes three strategic objectives governing the U.S. government's public diplomacy and strategic communication activities with foreign audiences:

I. America must offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity that is rooted in our most basic values.
II. With partners, we seek to isolate and marginalize violent extremists who threaten the freedom and peace sought by civilized people of every nation, culture an faith.
III. America must work to nurture common interests and values between Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures and faiths across the world.[19]

Additionally, the strategy establishes a Counterterrorism Communications Center to be headquartered at the Department of State (DoS) and an Interagency Crisis Communications Team, the latter of which will coordinate U.S. government agency communications responses in response to breaking news of violent terrorism. It also directs each "agency and embassy" to develop agency-specific plans for implementing the strategy's public-diplomacy (PD) and strategic communication (SC) objectives.[20]

Preceding the June 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, the February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) included a Strategic Communication Execution Roadmap for all Department of Defense (DoD) elements and commands in support of Department of State efforts to improve overall USG integration of information. In addition to establishing a plan of action that assigns objectives, tasks, and offices with primary responsibility (OPRs), along with milestones, this document acknowledges that the U.S. military is not sufficiently trained, organized, or equipped for effective support to USG SC processes. Capabilities shortfalls are recognized in both Public Affairs (PA) and in aspects of Information Operations (IO)—specifically, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Diplomacy (MD), and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). In providing strategic direction, the QDR established a goal of increasing DoD's SC effectiveness by "developing a culture that recognizes the value of communication and integrates communication considerations into

---

[18] National Security Council, Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, "U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication," (June 2007), 2. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf. The Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee is chaired by the Department of State Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who at the time this document was issued was Karen Hughes.
[19] Ibid., 3.
[20] Ibid., 8-9.

policy development, operational planning, execution, and assessment to advance national interests."[21] Three objectives are stated for achieving the DoD goal:

> **Objective #1.** Institutionalize a DoD process by which principles of Strategic Communication are incorporated in the development of strategy, policy formulation, planning and execution.
>
> **Objective #2.** Define roles, responsibilities and relationships, and develop doctrine for Strategic Communication and its primary communication supporting capabilities: Public Affairs (PA); aspects of Information Operations (IO), principally PSYOP; Visual Information (VI), and the DoD activities of Military Diplomacy (MD) and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD).
>
> **Objective #3.** Properly resource Military Departments and Combatant Commands to organize, train and equip DoD's primary communication supporting capabilities.[22]

It also offers the following relatively cogent definition of SC: "Focused United States Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power."[23]

The QDR SC Execution Roadmap's Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) also lays out a list of specific DoD activities with specific milestone dates for completion—all to have been completed by September 2007. Among these many planned activities were some key tasks that have a direct impact on war fighters: incorporating DoD strategic communications guidance into all combatant command Operations Plans (OPLANs) and Concept Plans (CONPLANs), updating and issuing new DoD Directives on Strategic Communication, Military Diplomacy, and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy; developing operational concepts that provide guidance to war fighters on how to best employ Joint Public Affairs Support Elements (JPASE), PSYOP Capabilities, and Combat Camera organizations, as well as Theater Security Cooperation Strategies and Implementation programs; identifying requirements that will enhance strategic communications capabilities in terms of organizational structure, composition, career paths, and leadership positions within related communications communities; building capacity for communication and information environment assessment, cross-cultural communication and language expertise, foreign media analysis, long-term public affairs planning, and collaborative command and control tools; and improving training and

---

[21] Secretary of Defense, "2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Strategic Communication (SC) Execution Roadmap." (Washington, DC), 25 September 2006, 2-3. Despite the seeming clarity of this definition, it has not been universally accepted throughout the USG, as evidenced by its absence from the U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.

[22] Ibid., 3.

[23] Ibid. A slight variation on this definition is offered in both Joint Pub 1-02 and JP 5-0: "Focused United States Government *efforts* to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable *for the advancement of United States Government* interests, *policies,* and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, *messages, and products synchronized with the actions* of *all* instruments of national power [differences emphasized]."

education on key strategic communications activities and components. Additionally, the Execution Roadmap acknowledged DoD's establishment of a Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) whose main tasks are to facilitate the integration of SC across DoD, streamline Department and interagency coordination of SC processes, and improve integration with USG and Allied/Coalition SC processes.[24]

As other government agencies and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) continue in their attempts to codify a strategic communication process and achieve a coordinated message, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen responded with a memorandum on strategic communications to the Deputy Secretary offering several suggestions. In particular, the Chairman suggested that the Secretary: make the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs the chairman of the Executive Committee and lead agent of the SCIG, so that there's one clear leader in charge and accountable for SC; "repurpose" the SCIG to develop major DoD themes and messages, advise senior leaders and coordinate the delivery of those themes and messages across the interagency, and serve as the "one stop" point of contact for combatant commander and service SC plans, staffing those plans through OSD, the Joint Staff, and other U.S. government agencies as necessary—particularly, with DOS. He also urged that the SC Executive Committee be restructured so that it operates as an advisory group, not a decision-making body, broadening its charter, establishing clear expectations and setting firm deadlines for action. For the long term, CJCS suggested the Secretary reestablish the Plans and Policy Division, tasking it to serve as the SC planning function, providing more specific guidance to subordinate commands and activities. He concluded by acknowledging what he called "two essential truths": we need to be better listeners—as focused on receiving as well as transmitting, while emphasizing consistency, truthfulness, and transparency in our strategic communications.[25]

For the war fighters—the combatant commanders and their subordinates—clear U.S. policy guidance is a prerequisite for dealing with specific regional issues and objectives. To that end, our track record is inconsistent, though a policy implementation process has been established for the coordination and dispersal of agreed-upon U.S. policy, at least to the level of the combatant commanders. At the national level, both DoD and the Joint Staff participate in interagency discussions on national security, as do the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. After U.S. government policy is developed and coordinated among necessary executive branch departments, the Secretary issues his guidance—ideally, providing context for theater-specific public diplomacy and public affairs themes to be communicated by the

---

[24] Ibid., 4-9. Copies of SCIG-drafted SC Plans for Iran and Afghanistan are provided at attachments 1 and 2. In March 2008 the SCIG was disestablished, though a planning capability for integrating communications was being picked up by DoD Public Affairs. Details of how that will work, as well as composition of the planning group will be forthcoming. Christopher J. Castelli, "DoD Public Affairs Restores Planning Role to Steer Communication," *InsideDefense.com*, April 10, 2008. http://insidedefense.com/secure/insider_display.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docid=PENTAGON-24-15-3.

[25] Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense: Strategic Communication," CM-0087-07, 14 December 2007. Subsequent to the Chairman's Memo and despite the issuance of two SC strategies, the SCIG has been viewed by some as another unnecessary bureaucratic layer, and as of mid-February 2008, the Joint Staff was reportedly pulling back all of its SC billets.

combatant commanders—specifying the target audience, the effect desired, and the required timeline.[26]

The DoD Strategic Communication Plan for Iraq, produced by the Strategic Communications Integration Group and signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England on March 9, 2007 offers one of the first examples of the process outlined above (Attachment 1). Though a single-page document, it offers a skeletal roadmap for tailored SC efforts for the subsequent 18 months with a goal of "an educated domestic, coalition, and international audience that understands the New Way Forward and the importance of achieving success in Iraq." [27] "The New Way Forward" to which the strategy refers was outlined in a speech given by the President on 10 January 2007 and is based on the President's "New Iraq Strategy," and its "Six Fundamental Elements":

1. Let the Iraqis lead;
2. Help Iraqis protect the population;
3. Isolate extremists;
4. Create space for political progress;
5. Diversify political and economic efforts; and
6. Situate the strategy in a regional approach.[28]

Ensuring "the targeted audience" fully understand the "New Way Forward" seems like a fairly daunting challenge, and the strategy offers little additional guidance other than some very general "lines of operation"—policy, ops, interagency leader communication, legislative outreach, public information, and public diplomacy—each accompanied by an agency lead (note *all* are OSD entities). Additionally, it provides a Narrative Description/Strategic Context, Goals, anticipated Obstacles and Constraints, Primary Audiences, Key Assumptions, an Assessment Methodology, and a cryptic, bulletized "Way Ahead."[29]

A second, more robust effort was produced a few months later by the SCIG for Afghanistan and signed by the Deputy SecDef on September 12, 2007 (Attachment 2, pages 12-20 of this paper). This plan omits Lines of Operation and Assumptions, but includes a stated Purpose, Desired End State, Audience (12 entities), Background, Themes, Execution Matrix (20 pages in length), a listing of Tools and Enablers, and Assessments of the Measures of Effectiveness (part of the Execution Matrix). The Execution Matrix (the first page of which is offered at Attachment 2, [page 20]) provides for each audience a listing of desired effects, constraints, methods, tasks, lead agency, partners, and measures of effectiveness.[30] The cover letter from the Deputy SecDef notes

---

[26] Stephen P. Perkins, and Gary T. Scott. "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands." *IO Sphere* (Spring 2006), 27.

[27] Secretary of Defense, *Strategic Communication Plan for Iraq*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCIG Secretariat, March 9, 2007), 1. The "New Way Forward" to which this plan refers was outlined in a speech given by the President on 10 January 2007 associated with the Iraq Strategy Review (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html).

[28] U.S. President, "Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq." (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 10, 2007). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/print/20070110-3.html.

[29] *Strategic Communication Plan for Iraq*, 1.

[30] U.S. Department of Defense, *Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*. (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCIG Secretariat, March 9, 2007), Annex B, 1-21.

that implementation of this plan supports and complements NATO's International Security Assistance Force operations, directing all DoD organizations to begin execution immediately.[31]

As with mission-type orders, the guidance, by design, avoids telling combatant commanders and other DoD agencies *how* to implement the strategy, leaving actual implementation details to their direction. The challenge then for combatant commanders becomes synchronizing their efforts with other government agency planners and implementers, and each of the combatant commands does it differently.[32] U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) established a PACOM Influence Working Group (PIWG) that employs a pre-established planning process and brings together regional and cultural experts from its own staff, public diplomacy experts from the State Department, and personnel from the Joint Information Operations Center to work Strategic Communication issues.[33] In response to Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, the Asian Tsunami relief efforts in 2004, the PIWG coordinated themes and messages that both provided necessary safety warnings while also highlighting U.S. and international relief efforts.[34] U.S. European Command (EUCOM) has a Strategic Effects and Communications Council (SECC) through which it synchronizes its "theater influence activities" to define and validate its theater strategic effects in support of its Theater Security Cooperation and Counterterrorism objectives. The SECC also determines measures of effectiveness and assesses the success of its SC activities, so that adjustments to SC activities and operations can be made, as necessary.[35] Within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), SC coordination occurs and is monitored in the Strategic Effects Division, originally under the J5 (Plans). It has subsequently been relocated under the J3, and its tasking is to ensure SC concerns are addressed and included in the planning process. Its location, however, at the far reaches in one of the many temporary buildings surrounding CENTCOM headquarters could be interpreted as sending a signal about how important its mission is considered. The other combatant commands have developed similar approaches to SC as those of PACOM, EUCOM, and CENTCOM, though their structures, organization, and activities vary.

With regard to combatant command SC activities, each geographic combatant commander has a Security Cooperation Plan (SCP) through which he shapes his area of responsibility to implement U.S. national security policies, and strategic communication is an integral part of SCP planning process. Security cooperation involves building relationships with partner nations, enabling access for U.S. forces in order to build partner capacity, deter forward, and respond to future crises. Each combatant command

---

[31] Ibid., cover letter.

[32] Synchronization always involves lateral coordination among the combatant commands. In particular, Strategic Command is tasked in the Unified Command Plan to integrate and coordinate DoD information operations (IO), military psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception that cross AORs. U.S. President, *Unified Command Plan* (Washington, DC: White House, 5 May 2006), 14.

[33] The Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) came into being in 1998 as a result of the Defense Reform Initiative, which realigned the former Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) and expanded its mission, re-designating the JC2WC as the JIOC, a subordinate command of USSPACECOM. Shortly thereafter it was transferred to USSTRATCOM and was later re-designated as the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC). See "Joint Information Operations Warfare Command," at http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_jiowc.html. Date accessed: 5 March 2008.

[34] Perkins and Scott, 28.

[35] Ibid., 29-30.

ideally should have a theater strategic communication strategy as an integral part of its overall theater security cooperation strategy. That SC strategy should focus on activities such as attenuating potential sources of conflict, assisting nations transitioning to democracy, emphasizing the proper role of the military in a democracy, discouraging provocation between disputing neighbors as part of easing regional tensions, and promoting more dialogue among regional nations as collaborative approaches to regional problems are addressed. Two recent example of examples of SCP activities that were tied to theater strategic communication objectives were the well-publicized hospital ship visits of USNS *Mercy* to various nations in the Pacific in 2006 and USNS *Comfort* to several South American ports in 2007. Both visits were designed to encourage regional partnerships while fostering goodwill, solidifying existing partnerships with key nations, and encouraging the establishment of new ones between and among nations, non-governmental (NGOs), and international organizations.[36]

For contingency and crisis action planning, JOPES provides process and format guidance for combatant commanders, sub-unified commands, Defense combat support agency directors, joint task force commanders, and component commanders tasked to build contingency plans. A recent change to JOPES, Volume II, now tasks commanders to include an Annex Y to address how Strategic Communication will be included in all Operation Plans (OPLANs). Unfortunately, what is offered is simply the standard, five paragraph SMEAC format—Situation, Mission, Execution, Administrative and Logistics, and Command and Control. And, under Command and Control one can find the following subheadings: a. Identify requirements, and b. Identify relationships, under which are additional subheadings, (1) Public Diplomacy, (2) Public Affairs, and (3) Military Information Operations.[37] So, beyond a stated requirement and a simple format, combatant commanders and their subordinate components have been given little else upon which to build their SC annexes.

The national, departmental, and war fighter processes just described, though imperfect, nevertheless reflect progress toward more effective strategic communication—as long as there is time to plan ahead and coordinate that planning. The real challenge, however, lies in dealing with the unexpected. As crises develop and escalate, early, effective strategic communications can be critical in containing and effectively addressing a crisis in its early stages. The current U.S. interagency response approval process as noted earlier, however, is insufficiently agile to facilitate quick action, and as a crisis becomes more volatile, rapid, coordinated, pervasive engagement of multilateral and international partners with the collective power and necessary communications' conduits to influence is simply not going to occur as fast as it is needed. As Jeffrey Jones, former Director for Strategic Communication and Information on the National Security Council, notes:

> There is need for face-to-face engagement instead of the increasing
> tendency to rely on demarches delivered by others, telephone calls, cables,

---

[36] See U.S. Pacific Command. *Humanitarian Assistance Deployment 2006*. PowerPoint Briefing. Camp Smith, HI: Pacific Command, August 28, 2007, and U.S. Southern Command. *Initial Impact Assessment: USNS* Comfort *Deployment*. PowerPoint Briefing in .pdf format. Miami, FL: Southern Command, November 1, 2007.

[37] Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats*, CJCSM 3122.03B (Washington, DC: CJCS, 28 February 2006), E-Y-2.

and interlocutors that do not convey the same national purpose. . . .As combat operations appear imminent, we must finalize information planning with both the interagency community and with allies. Country-specific, regional, and transnational strategic communication requirements should have already been identified and expertise deployed to key information nodes in the region. . . . Moreover, while planning is indeed done in phases, there must be simultaneous informational and operational planning for the post-conflict period, which can clearly prove more complex, challenging, and of longer duration than force-on-force operations.[38]

While we now have Department of Defense SC strategies for both Afghanistan and Iraq (but *not* national strategies), they emerged nearly six and four years, respectively, after the United States and its coalition partners launched Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Not having strategies in place prior to execution is unacceptable, though for the situation in Afghanistan such a failure is understandable. With regard to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, however, the United States government, to include U.S. Central Command, had over ten years of planning prior to execution. One can only hope that the processes laid out in the both the "U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication" and the QDR SC Execution Roadmap will improve both the overall quality of SC coordination efforts as well as the speed of those efforts.[39]

The United States clearly needs a more consistent and responsive approach to Strategic Communication—maintaining peace and defusing crises are certainly preferable to committing forces. But, if military forces are committed, their efforts need to be synchronized with other U.S. government and coalition activities and communications to include public affairs, pubic diplomacy, and information operations. Whether the recently-established White House Office of Public Engagement will have a significant impact upon this challenge remains to be seen. The American people, however, and our international allies deserve nothing less.

---

[38] Jeffrey B. Jones, "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States," *Joint Force Quarterly* 39 (4th Qtr. 2005), 112.

[39] In all fairness to USCENTCOM, Gen Franks did attempt to address strategic communication earlier in the planning process for IRAQI FREEDOM by hiring former White House Deputy Communications Director Jim Wilkinson in November 2002 to serve as the CENTCOM Director of Strategic Communication. Wilkinson is both fluent in Arabic and a student of Islam, and he coordinated all of CENTCOM's SC activities including those related to both Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM as well as SC activities related to the Horn of Africa. While considered very effective in working SC issues and coordinating information—from the components to the Joint Staff—Mr. Wilkinson returned to the White House in December of 2003 to become Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications. See his official biography at http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/wilkinson-bio.html. Date accessed: 3 March 2008.

Inform Coalition, International and Domestic Audiences on Iraq Strategy

Narrative Description/Strategic Context

The President's New Way Forward calls for tailored efforts over the next 12-18 months to provide security, governmental development, economic support, and training of the ISF to stabilize and secure key areas of Iraq. The President, the American people, and our coalition partners have been dissatisfied with our progress in Iraq. What remains to be achieved will take considerable time, money and commitment. The USG needs a coordinated strategic communication (SC) plan to educate and inform select audiences of the importance of success in Iraq and to communicate progress on the President's New Way Forward in Iraq.

Goal

An educated domestic, coalition, and international audience that understands the New Way Forward and the importance of achieving success in Iraq.

Obstacles and Constraints

- Obstacles:
  - Real or perceived lack of progress in Iraq
  - Audience skepticism of some statements of progress
  - Waning Congressional support for new Iraq strategy
  - Lack of comprehensive USG SC Plan for Iraq
  - Apparent USG inability to rapidly respond to strategic events in Iraq
  - Apparent USG inability to communicate positive progress in Iraq
  - Lack of visible, sustained interagency commitment to SC
- Constraints
  - Charged political climate in which Iraq communication occurring

Primary Audiences

- U.S. Public
- U.S. Decision Makers
- Coalition Partners
- International Community

Lines of Operation (Lead)

- Policy (OSD-P/JS)
- Ops (OSD-P/JS)
- Public Information (OSD/JS PAO)
- Public Diplomacy (OSD-P SPD)
- Interagency Leader Communication (OSD-P/J-5)
- Legislative Outreach (OSD LA)

Key Assumptions

- The New Way Forward in Iraq can succeed in a measurable way
- GOI will meet its commitments
- Other USG Departments and agencies will broaden involvement
- DoD will be given sufficient resources and authority to execute plan

Assessment Methodology

- Measures of Performance (MOP) monitored to ensure communications tasks are done (was message transmitted)
- Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) will be developed for each audience to assess if message of actual success in Iraq security, governmental development, economic support, and training of the ISF is being accurately received and understood (was the message received)

Way Ahead

- JS/OSD draft para 1 of the SC plan
- Secretariat develop synchronization matrix
- Strategic Integration and Analysis Division (SIAD) develop MOEs for each audience
- Draft SC plan. Identify required resources. Implement SC Plan
- Secretariat tracks and reports progress monthly to EXCOM
- Pursue interagency commitment through Deputies Committee

☐ Proceed as written ☒ Proceed IAW guidance ☐ Adjust   09 MAR 07

DSD Guidance: *Approved;*
- *"Should focus not just on the fight and the strategy; include the broader perspective – why Iraq is important."*
- *Include U.S. military as an audience.*

DOD SCIG Secretariat   v070313 1230hrs

1

Attachment 1: U.S. Department of Defense. *Strategic Communication Plan for Iraq*. Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCIG Secretariat, March 9, 2007.

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010

SEP 12 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
    DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
DIRECTOR, NET ASSESSMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Implementation of the DOD Strategic Communication Plan for
    Afghanistan

In order to augment our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, the Department of
Defense has developed the attached DOD Strategic Communication (SC) Plan for
Afghanistan. This SC plan supports and complements NATO's International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) operations.

This SC plan directs all DoD organizations to begin execution immediately
according to their specified duties and responsibilities. The plan is dynamic, and will
continue to be updated and modified as Coalition efforts in Afghanistan evolve. To
ensure the successful execution of this plan, DoD leaders are requested to provide the
appropriate support to the designated lead organizations. Please review the attached SC
plan to identify your responsibilities.

The DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group (SCIG) Secretariat stands
ready to work with you and your staff on this important effort. The Acting Director of
the DoD SCIG Secretariat is Captain Hal Pittman, hal.c.pittrnan@osd.mil, (703) 697-
3357.

Attachment:
As stated

Attachment 2: U.S. Department of Defense. *Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Office
of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCIG Secretariat, September 12, 2007.

Department of Defense
Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan

I. (U) Purpose: The purpose of this Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan is to identify messages and tasks for strategic communication efforts in support of U.S. objectives in Afghanistan. This plan will help identify how SC efforts can help advance USG strategic goals for Afghanistan, including by complementing, shaping, and supporting:

   1. the "Afghanistan Strategic Review" Way Ahead;

   2. interagency activities and the State Department Bureau of South and Central Asia's draft "Afghanistan Strategic Communications Implementation Strategy for 2007;"

   3. the SC component of ISAF's "Proposed 2007 Action Plan;"

   4. the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and leverage its programs and products to advance USG strategic goals; and

   5. relevant regional and GWOT objectives.

II. (U) Desired End State: The Afghan people and people in Allied and partner countries recognize and support the efforts of the Afghan government, the U.S., its Allies and partners in stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan. The Afghan people strongly support their government and reject insurgency, terrorism, and the narcotics trade.

Achieving desired effects on audience perceptions are critical to achieving the end state. For supported goals, see Annex A. For desired effects, see "Desired Effects" column of the Execution Matrix in Annex B.

III. (U) Audiences:

    A. Afghan Population
    B. Afghan Government
    C. Government and Military of Pakistan
    D. Pakistani Population
    E. Governments of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)
    F. Populations of ISAF Troop-Contributing Nations (TCNs)
    G. Enemy Leadership (AQ, AQAM, Taliban, criminal networks)
    H. Taliban Rank-and-File
    I. Governments of Central Asia
    J. Central Asian Populations
    K. IGO and NGO community
    L. U.S. domestic audiences

IV. (U) Background:

    1. Obstacles and Constraints are listed in the "Constraints" column of the Execution Matrix at Annex B.

    2. The Plan calls for the development and regular updating of Audience Analyses, which are derived from both open source and classified information. These classified Audience Analyses should be used to understand current perceptions and measure progress toward the Desired Effects.

V. (U) Themes: The following themes support USG goals and are consistent with the NATO-ISAF Master Narrative and NC3 top-line messaging. Messaging should be tailored for specific audiences, but because audiences do not exist in isolation, all messages should remain consistent with these themes.

    1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, NATO-ISAF, and the U.S. are committed for the long term to ensuring a democratic, stable, peaceful Afghanistan that is inhospitable to terrorism. The Afghan people can rely on its allies, including the U.S. government and NATO, to stay the course.

    2. Success in Afghanistan over insurgency, terrorism, violent extremism, and trafficking in narcotics is critical to the security of the Afghan people, the United States, our NATO allies, its regional neighbors, and the international community.

3. Afghanistan's security, reconstruction, and development needs remain large but the country has come a long way since the overthrow of the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to make progress.

4. Success requires a comprehensive approach that includes security and stability as well as reconstruction and development.

5. The Taliban are a destructive force that targets innocent Afghan civilians. They engage in criminal activity and brutal tactics for their own gain and cannot offer long-term security, stability, or development for the people of Afghanistan.

VI. (U) Execution: See Annex B.

VII. (U) Tools and Enablers: Several tools are critical to the success of the strategic communication effort, and may require additional USG resources to support demands on capacity:

1. Senior Afghan Government, USG, and NATO officials as strategic communicators

    i. Requires coordination of event calendar and public affairs efforts

2. DoD Regional Centers as strategic communicators

    i. Assess current efforts to determine need for additional guidance and funding

3. NATO Media Operations Center as a strategic enabler

    i. Assess benefit and availability of U.S. PAOs for assignment to billets

4. State-maintained Internet portal as a strategic enabler to share messaging and a unified calendar of upcoming dates

    i. Assess need for DoD mechanism based on State's progress

5. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as a strategic communicator and listener

    i. Assess availability of DoD resources and personnel to support USAID's plans to improve the Government's communication capacity

      ii. Determine plan and requirements for supporting the Afghan Government's strategic communication and public affairs capabilities at the provincial and local levels

  6. PRTs as strategic communicators and listeners

      i. Assess benefit and availability of Afghan, U.S., Allied, and coalition PAOs for assignment to PRTs

      ii. Assess requirements to expand PRT Executive Steering Committee into an effective coordinating body

      iii. Assess cost and feasibility of incorporating/adjusting PA/SC pre-deployment training and in-theatre distance learning for basic, tailored public affairs training for U.S. and non-U.S. PRT officers

  7. Funding communications infrastructure in Afghanistan

      i. Determine need for equipment to enable the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's strategic communication capacity in the context of overall USG efforts

  8. Studying messaging networks and feedback

      i. Fund contracts for polling of target audiences and identifying key Afghans and ideal communications methods

      ii. Increase intelligence community reporting on messaging networks and Afghan perception

VIII. (U) Assessment: The execution of this plan includes an assessment based on Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), listed in the "Measures of Effectiveness" column of the Execution Matrix at Annex B.

Annexes

A. <u>Supported Goals</u>. This annex restates the goals in several U.S. Government and NATO documents that pertain to strategic communication.

B. <u>Execution Matrix</u>. The Execution Matrix identifies the audiences with whom we hope to improve our communication efforts, and includes our desired effects, constraints that currently limit the effectiveness of our communication; the efforts designed to inform each audience; assignments of lead and supporting U.S. Government organizations and agencies to execute those tasks; and ways to measure effectiveness of these efforts.

The tasks identified in the Execution Matrix are designed to regularly assess the attitudes of key audiences, synchronize messaging with the governments of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and our NATO-ISAF Allies, provide resources to increase the communication capacity of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and NATO, and enable the Department of Defense to better disseminate information on a timely basis.

C. <u>Points of Contact</u>. This annex is unclassified.

A. Supported Goals

USG GWOT goals

(National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, NCTC, 26 June 2006)

1. Protect and defend the homeland and US interests abroad.

2. Deter/mitigate terrorist activity and their capacity to operate effectively in the United States and abroad.

3. Counter violent extremism.

4. Prevent terrorists' acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction.

5. Institutionalize domestically and internationally the strategy for the war on terror and violent extremism.

6. Continue to nurture and expand foreign partnerships and partner capacity to defeat violent extremism.

USG Theater Mission

(US Central Command unclassified website)

1. Attack, disrupt, and defeat terrorism.

2. Deter and defeat adversaries.

3. Strengthen regional stability.

4. Build the self-reliance of partner nations' security forces.

USG Goals for Afghanistan

(Afghanistan Strategic Review for Principals – approved 1 February 2007):

1. A reliable, stable, geo-strategically placed ally in the War on Terror;

2. Moderate, democratic, with a thriving private sector economy;

3. Capable of effectively governing its territory and borders; and

4. Respectful of the rights of all citizens, including minorities and women.

NATO ISAF Goals for Afghanistan

(NATO in Afghanistan: Master Narrative – 08 June 2007)

1. The extension of government authority across Afghanistan;

2. The development of the Afghan government structures necessary to maintain security across the country without the assistance of international forces;

3. The establishment of a stable and secure environment in which sustainable reconstruction and development has taken hold; and

4. The promotion by the Afghan government of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

5. NATO-ISAF provides indirect assistance to the Afghan authorities' counternarcotics operations through training and logistic, and in-extremis support, as appropriate. NATO/ISAF also helps the Afghan government to explain its counter narcotics policy to its people.

USG Counter-narcotics Goals in Afghanistan

(U.S. Counternarotics Strategy for Afghanistan – August 2007)

1. Support the Government of Afghanistan's eight pillar National Drug Control Strategy, with emphasis on the first five pillars: public information, alternative development, elimination/eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement/justice reform.

2. Increase development assistance to incentivize licit development while simultaneously amplifying the scope and intensity of both interdiction and eradication operations.

3. Increase coordination of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations.

4. Encourage consistent, sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Afghan government, our Allies, partners, and international organizations.

B. Execution Matrix

AUDIENCE: All Audiences

Desired Effects	Constraints	Methods	Tasks	Lead	Partners	Measures of Effectiveness
• Accurate understanding of international community's efforts in Afghanistan • Comprehensive understanding of progress country-wide • Comprehensive understanding of the long-term challenges • Recognition of the strategic importance of Afghanistan to international security	• Multiple actors means multiple voices • NATO is a consensus-driven body made up of sovereign governments • Media attention tends to be drawn to kinetic operations • Enemy exploits any perceived dissonance among Allies • Difficult to develop a consensus strategic response to crisis events in such a fast-paced media environment • Extremely complex modern media environment	• Message coordination within USG, with NATO, ISAF, Government of Afghanistan	• Create and update quarterly a Master Narrative, synchronized with NATO's Master Narrative and Government of Afghanistan messages, to provide high-level messaging to all levels of command.	• PA • USD(P)	• CENTCOM • EUCOM • JS • State • NATO MOC • Government of Afghanistan	• Greater clarity on OEF and ISAF missions • Greater understanding of progress, and increased appreciation of Afghanistan's strategic importance to international security
			• Develop, coordinate, disseminate, and regularly update talking points and supporting materials/fact sheets on key issues related to Afghanistan	• PA • SPD	• USD(P) • State • CENTCOM • SOCOM • NATO MOC • Govt of Afghanistan	
			• Quarterly update of Audience Analyses to reflect current attitudes, prioritized list of methods by which audience receives messaging (e.g. TV, traditional communication, etc.), and assessment of shifts in attitudes.	• JIOWC	• PA • USD(P) • USD(I) • JS • State • Intel Community	
			• Regular operational coordination to deconflict and synchronize messages and activities	• CENTCOM	• SOCOM • State • USD(P) • PA	

* Cells with a gray background represent non-DoD leads.

Selected Bibliography

Broadcasting Board of Governors. *Annual Report 2005.* Washington, DC: Broadcasting
     Board of Governors, 2006.

"Broadcasting Board of Governors." http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_aboutus.cfm. Accessed:
     February 2, 2008.

Caldwell, William B., LTG, USA. "Strategic Communications: The Information
     Battlefield." Address to the Combat Studies Institute Symposium, Fort
     Leavenworth, KS, September 12, 2007.

Castelli, Christopher J. "DoD Public Affairs Restores Planning Role to Steer
     Communication." InsideDefense.com, April 10, 2008. http://insidedefense.com/
     secure/insider_display.asp?f=defense_2002.ask&docid=PENTAGON-24-15-3.
     Date accessed: April 11, 2008.

Eder, Mari K. "Toward Strategic Communication." *Military Review* (July-August 2007):
     61-70.

Gallington, Daniel. "Failure to Communicate," *Washington Times*, March 2, 2008,
     http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20080302/COMMENTARY/124704977
     /1012. Accessed: March 5, 2008.

Goldman, Emily. "Strategic Communication: A Tool for Asymmetric Warfare." *Small
     Wars Journal* (October 6, 2007). http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007
     /10/strategic-communication-a-tool/. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

Goodall, Bud, Angela Trethewey, and Kelly McDonald. "Strategic Ambiguity,
     Communication, and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and
     Practices." Report #0604. Tempe, AZ: Consortium for Strategic Communication,
     Arizona State University, June 21, 2006.

Gregory, Bruce. "Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls,
     and Imported Norms." Presentation at the American Political Science Association
     Conference on International Communication and Conflict, George Washington
     University and Georgetown University, Washington, DC, August 31, 2005.
     www.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

Jones, Jeffrey B. "Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States." *Joint
     Force Quarterly* No. 39, (4th Qtr. 2005): 108-14.

Lord, Carnes. "On the Nature of Strategic Communications." *Joint Force Quarterly* No.
     46 (3d Qtr. 2007): 83-85.

McClelland, Kyle M. "Strategic Communications and the Geographic Combatant
     Commander: Are They Receiving Enough National Level Guidance to

Accomplish Their Mission?" Unpublished research paper. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2007.

Perkins, Stephen P. "Strategic Communications: An Expanded IO Role?" *IO Sphere* (Winter 2006): 5-6.

Perkins, Stephen P., and Gary T. Scott. "Enabling Strategic Communication at the Combatant Commands." *IO Sphere* (Spring 2006): 26-30. www.maxwell.af.mil /info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_spring06_perkins.pdf. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

Robinson, Linda. "The Propaganda War: The Pentagon's Brand-New Plan for Winning the Battle of Ideas against Terrorists." *U.S. News and World Report*, May 21, 2006. http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060529/29propaganda _print.htm. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

Shea, Timothy C. "Transforming Military Diplomacy." *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 38 (3d Qtr. 2005): 49-52.

Siddiqui, Habib. "What's in a Name: Strategic Communication or Deception?" *Media Monitors Network*, December 3, 2004. http://usa.mediamonitors.net/headlines/ what_s_in_a_name_strategic_communication_or_deception. Accessed: February 11, 2008.

Smith, Amanda. "Strategic Communication: Interagency Rhetoric and Consistent Interpretation." In *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles*. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, eds. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2007, 337-86.

Sprenger, Sebastian. "Congress Balks at DoD's 'Strategic Communication' Plans." *Federal Computer Week*. August 14, 2007. http://www.fcw.com/online/ news/103494-1.html. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

Thorp, Frank IV. "Strategic Communication in the Department of Defense." *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 45 (2d Qtr. 2007): 2-5.

_____. "Strategic Communication in the Department of Defense: A Continuous Process." *Sightings* 13, No. 4 (November 2007): 3-6.

The National Security Archive. "Iraq: The Media War Plan." May 8, 2007. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

United Nations. General Assembly. "Strategic Communications, Enhanced Use of Information Technology Among Issues as Information Committee Meets at Headquarters 30 April – 11 May." Background Release. PI/1768. New York: Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, April 27, 2007.

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/pi1768.doc.htm. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

U.S. Congress. House. *Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World. Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World.* 108th Cong., 1st sess., October 1, 2003.

_____. *Strategic Communication and Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism: Hearing before the U.S. Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats*. 110th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 2007.

_____. *Strategic Communications and the Battle of Ideas: Winning the Hearts and Minds in the Global War against Terrorism: Hearing before the U.S. Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., July 11, 2007.

_____. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 6, 2006.

_____. *Final Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication.*

_____. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination*. Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, October 2001.

_____. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, September 2004.

_____. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, January 2008.

_____. *Strategic Communication Plan for Iraq*. Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, SCIG Secretariat, March 9, 2007.

_____. *Strategic Communication Plan for Afghanistan*. Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, September 12, 2007.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. *U.S. Public Diplomacy—Time to Get Back in the Game: A Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*. 111th Congress,1st sess., February 13, 2009.

U.S. Department of State. "Public Diplomacy Update." 2, No. 4 (December 2007). Washington, DC: Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

_____. "Public Diplomacy Update." 2, No. 3 (September 21, 2007). Washington, DC: Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.

_____. "Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Coordination." Remarks by Karen Hughes, Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at Department of Defense Conference on Strategic Communication, July 11, 2007. Washington, DC: Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. http://www.State.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm. Accessed: February 8, 2008.

_____. *The United States Information Agency: A Commemoration*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1999.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research*. GAO-07-904. Washington, DC: GAO, July 2007.

_____. *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges.* GAO-06-535. Washington, DC: GAO, May 2006.

_____. *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*. GAO-05-323. Washington, DC: April 4, 2005.

U.S. National Security Council. *U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication*. Washington, DC: Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC), December 14, 2006.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume II, Planning Formats*, CJCSM 3122.03B. Washington, DC: CJCS, 28 February 2006.

_____. "Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense: Strategic Communication," CM-0087-07, 14 December 2007.

U.S. President. "Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq." Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 10, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2007/01/print/20070110-3.html. Accessed: 26 February 2008.

_____. "Office of Public Engagement," http://www.whitehouse.gov.ope/about/. Accessed: June 17, 2009.

_____. *Unified Command Plan.* Washington, DC: White House, 5 May 2006. [FOUO]

U.S. Pacific Command. *Humanitarian Assistance Deployment 2006*. PowerPoint Briefing. Camp Smith, HI: Pacific Command, August 28, 2007.

U.S. Southern Command. *Initial Impact Assessment USNS* Comfort *Deployment*. PowerPoint Briefing in .pdf format. Miami, FL: Southern Command, November 1, 2007.