

SUMMARY REPORT

2023 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination Workshop



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FOREWARD

On behalf of the Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Studies (CHRHS) at the Brown University Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, the Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program (HRP) within the College of Maritime Operational Warfare at the U.S. Naval War College, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Civil-Military Coordination Service, and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP), we are delighted to share the final summary from the 2023 Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination Research Symposium and Workshop.

The seventh annual symposium took place from 22-24 May 2023 at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island. Our research symposium on 22 May was the largest in the series yet, featuring ten presentations of recently completed empirical studies and six poster presentations analyzing a range of contemporary challenges in global humanitarian action. This year's presentations covered several timely topics, including civilian-military interaction during the US evacuation of Afghanistan, humanitarian access in the era of strategic competition, humanitarian action in the age of climate change, and civil-military relations in public health emergencies.

The theme of this year's workshop was "Adaptive Planning and Crisis Response: Opportunities and Challenges for Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination in Future Conflict." This event brought together 110 international leaders and representatives, from UN agencies, humanitarian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), the U.S. Armed Forces and allied militaries, and academia to explore current and future challenges in humanitarian response. There was representation from every continent except Antarctica.

Five working groups met over the course of the two-day workshop, focusing on substantive topics in civilian-military humanitarian coordination: Aid Worker Security, Climate Change and Coastal Resilience, Protection of Civilians, Humanitarian Access, and Outbreaks. Their insights, outputs, and recommendations are summarized in this report.

On behalf of the Brown University and U.S. Naval War College leadership, we would like to express our most sincere gratitude to the R. Dudley Harrington, Jr. Charitable Foundation, the US State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, the U.S. Naval War College Foundation, the Widgeon Foundation, UN OCHA, and UN WFP for their generous support of this year’s Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination Research Symposium and Workshop.

2023 COMMUNITY STRAW POLL RESULTS

For the first time, attendees were invited to participate in a real-time, 10-question straw poll as a concluding exercise. The straw poll was designed to encourage dialogue, help summarize participant experience of the event, and tentatively gauge the attitudes of a purposive sample of the civilian-military humanitarian community on a variety of topics related to the theme of the event. A selection of these questions will be asked at future workshops to create a longitudinal dataset the community can reflect on.¹ Five of the straw poll questions are summarized below, while the remaining five straw poll questions are included at the end of each working group summary chapter.

The first question asked of participants was what three issues were important to consider in future civilian-military humanitarian interaction. Trust, coordination, communication, and relationships were some of the most regularly mentioned issues by all types of participants (Figure 1). This could show that there exist areas of commonality between military and humanitarian actors, despite differences in approaches.

WHAT ARE THE 3 MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR FUTURE CIVILIAN-MILITARY HUMANITARIAN INTERACTION?



Figure 1. Question 1 and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

¹ It is recognized there is significant limitation in using a straw poll based on closed questions that was not methodically designed to assess perspectives. The event used the Mentimeter web application to track participant responses.

The second question attempted to gauge participants' perceptions on the trajectory of civilian-military collaboration, as it regards environmental disasters and conflict settings. Results from the straw poll showed that participants from both military and civilian backgrounds agreed that civilian-military interactions in environmental disasters were improving. On the other hand, participants do not perceive an improvement of civilian-military collaboration in conflict settings (Figure 2). The poll question ultimately highlights the potential focal areas in need of stronger civilian-military collaboration.




Figure 2. Question 2 and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop

The third poll question “What keeps you up at night with regards to the future of humanitarian-military interaction?” was an open-ended attempt to gauge the specific issues participants were more concerned about (Figure 3). Most answers to this question can be grouped into four response categories: Failure to Reach People in Need Because of Lack of Resources or Will, Lack of Communication & Cooperation Between Militaries & Humanitarians, Loss of Distinction Between Military & Humanitarian Action, and Lack of Preparedness for Strategic Competition & Large-Scale Combat Operations (Figure 3).

Participants highlighted several more specific concerns within each response category. Notably for the first category, participants worry that the increasing number of people in need, as illustrated in the UN Global Humanitarian Overviews of 2021, 2022, and 2023, might become a longer-term trend that the civil-military ecosystem will struggle to curtail. The failure to provide necessary resources post-US withdrawal of Afghanistan in 2021 and during the ongoing invasion of Ukraine are two of the causes underscored by participants.

As per the second response category, respondents expressed concerns about a lack of coordination and understanding between humanitarian and military actors. Specifically, participants flagged the inconsistent use of language and definitions between the military and humanitarians, as well as competing priorities between both sets of actors. Humanitarians also noted a disinterest to collaborate on the part of governments and militaries.

The third response category highlights participants' fears of blurred humanitarian and military roles, risking a greater politicization of humanitarian aid. This is especially worrying as an increasing number of armed actors, including assertive states like Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC), have been involved in direct humanitarian assistance.

Lastly, respondents expressed concerns about humanitarian-military actors' lack of preparedness in strategic competition and large-scale combat operations. Respondents pointed to the possibility of overwhelming the humanitarian response system, especially given the increasing risk of 'forever conflicts,' displacements, and natural disasters. At a particularly high risk are the protection of civilians (PoC) and civilian harm mitigation (CHM) response mechanisms, which can be manipulated by both sides of a conflict.

WHAT KEEPS YOU UP AT NIGHT WITH REGARDS TO THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN-MILITARY INTERACTION?



Figure 3. Question 3 and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

Answers to the fourth poll question "What could the other side do better to make humanitarian-military interaction easier in future humanitarian responses?" are best grouped into three areas (Figure 4).

The first response area focuses on the need for more proactive communication and education to understand and appreciate the other's capacity, political and operational constraints, and culture. The second response area focused on the need to improve humanitarian-military information-sharing. A notable response from this area underscores the need for both sides to shift from a 'need to know' to a 'need to share' mindset.

The final group of answers focused on the need to increase joint military and humanitarian participation in training, exercises and education. A considerable number of respondents suggested that more humanitarians should be invited to military exercises, and that more military actors should be invited to humanitarian training. The use of scenario-based exercises and table top simulations was also mentioned as an area to explore to improve humanitarian-military interaction and understanding.

WHAT COULD THE OTHER SIDE DO BETTER TO MAKE HUMANITARIAN-MILITARY INTERACTION EASIER IN FUTURE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES?



From Civ to Mil:

- "Reciprocate info sharing"
- "Do not do direct assistance"
- "Share information & allow access"
- "Be coordinated in goals & perspectives, don't put your organization first, come together in a unified way"
- "Value Civ-Mil expertise/function/role"
- "Support more joint civ-mil courses & exercises"
- "Be friendlier, erase automatic fear of humanitarians, be in touch more with civilians."
- "Provide more funding for humanitarians"
- "Military should have greater understanding of humanitarian security"
- "Military should better understand the diversity in the humanitarian sector when engaging"
- "Military should have more conversations around roles and responsibilities of each actor present in a context"
- "Military must respect humanitarian mandates"
- "Military must engage more with civilians to reduce civilian harm"
- "Military should understand more that humanitarians do not have political / military objectives like they do"
- "Military should increase their level of transparency"
- "Military should recognize when expertise is present. Too many alphas"
- "Military should have more self awareness"
- "Trust us more. We are here to help people"
- "Military should operate on a need to share, not need to know basis"
- "Military should prioritize training and workshops and table-top exercises with humanitarians"

From Mil to Civ:

- "Follow protocols, keep communications open, be patient with us"
- "Humanitarians should be more open minded about what military do"
- "Humanitarians should consider political & operational constraints military has & how this limits coordination."
- "Civilians must improve understanding of military role & capabilities in humanitarian responses"
- "Civilians should be more transparent and direct with communications"
- "Civilians should understand that military is comprised of human beings who often need more education on humanitarian principles"
- "Let's talk more to each other to work together and reduce suffering"
- "We need to know what humanitarian organizations are actually doing to improve coordination"
- "Could help out job if civilians understand our mandate".
- "Civilians should communicate with each other and share information more so they can highlight major concerns (in a more unified way).
- "Talk to us before there is an issue. Help the commander or planner understand your needs in an area"
- "Civilians should understand more what militaries can contribute in a setting"

Figure 4. Question 4 and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

The final question that will be highlighted in this section asked participants about the value of research and academic partnerships in humanitarian–military interaction. Answers could be grouped into three areas (Figure 5).

The first group of responses underscores the importance of conducting research relevant to real-world scenarios at the operational and tactical levels. Case-based research has more relevance to strategy decision making.

Second, academic partnerships hold the potential to become safe, effective vehicles for humanitarian and military actors to come together and share ideas. Humanitarian and military actors alike would benefit from engaging in a community devoid of the daily tensions common on the field.

The final response cluster emphasizes the need for data-driven research focused on identifying policy and procedural gaps. This type of evidence serves as a helpful guide at the policy and field levels.

HOW CAN RESEARCH AND ACADEMIC PARTNERSHIPS CONTRIBUTE TO BETTER PRACTISES AND OUTCOMES?




Figure 5. Question 5 and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

The remaining five questions and responses of the community straw poll session are provided at the end of each working group summary chapter.

SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS

AID WORKER SECURITY

Leads: Jonathan Robinson (Contracted Humanitarian Operations Specialist Supporting the U.S. Naval War College's Humanitarian Response Program and CHRHS Global Fellow)¹

Rapporteur: Lucie Smith

Summary of Outputs

On 23 and 24 May 2023, the aid worker security working group convened an in-person meeting at Brown University, Providence, RI. The group drew together military, academic, humanitarian, and other civilian practitioners to discuss key operational trends, challenges, and responses in aid worker security planning for future crises, be it large scale combat or from the growing climate crisis. Through these discussions, it was aimed that the group could provide a snapshot into the current state of aid worker security, strengthen collaboration between humanitarian and military practitioners, and suggest areas of collaboration or research. This document summarizes key observations made during nearly six hours of discussion from the aid worker security working group.

Key Trends Impacting Aid Worker Security Planning Considerations for Future Crisis

Similar to previous years, discussions started by summarizing outputs from previous working groups in 2020, 2021, and 2022 before setting the scene with an overview of the history of and trends in aid worker security since 1990. Following this, wide-ranging discussions brought to light five key concerns for aid worker security planning for the next crisis. These have been listed below in no particular order:

1. Concerns Around The Erosion of Operating Norms

Participants highlighted their concern around the growing erosion of normal behaviors seen in crises and suspect this could impact planning for future disasters or conflicts. Behaviors of this nature include, but are not limited to: increasing attacks against aid workers, the failure or reduction in potency of certain protection systems (i.e. humanitarian notification systems (HNS), deterrence strategies like threatening to abandon programming if attacked), the increasingly siloed approaches to and tolerances of security by humanitarians and military actors and between UN and non-UN humanitarian actors, and the growth in assertive states and other actors often disregarding international humanitarian law (IHL) with seeming impunity. Participants also highlighted their perceived lack of agency in responding to the growing erosion of norms in aid worker security and highlighted how this factor will likely impact how an organization operates safely in the future. Indeed, it was identified that the geopolitical shifts, slowing funding projections, and multipolar power dynamics in the humanitarian response environment are affecting how aid worker security is conducted and how it adapts to increasing exceptional events.

2. Concerns Around What Constitutes an Acceptable Risk for Humanitarians

Participants also discussed that future contexts might force humanitarian security managers to strike a balance between meeting the humanitarian imperative of delivering aid and risking aid worker security when planning for a response.

¹ The views and opinions provided in this summary do not represent any official views of Jonathan Robinson's former or current employers such as Netsimco, The U.S. Naval War College, the Department of Defense etc.

In particular, participants felt that humanitarian organizations will soon have to weigh a number of questions when providing aid. For example, what is too much risk (i.e. when to suspend an operation), what is an acceptable level of loss of personnel in a future crisis (i.e. during a large-scale combat operation), what is the cost and benefit of an intervention (opportunity vs risk analysis), and what happens when there is a fractured response environment that impacts security (e.g. when one humanitarian group chooses to abide by an armed actor's rules to gain access, how does that impact the wider community)? Some participants also highlighted the challenge of planning aid worker security in an environment where actors have different views on what that means.

3. Concerns Around The Disconnect Between Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels

At several points during the discussions, it was clear there were differences in what participants felt was priority when considering future planning in aid worker security. Some participants focused on tactical level concerns (i.e. humanitarian notification systems or increasing attacks against aid workers), others on operational level concerns (i.e. policies around the use of armed escorts), while some prioritized strategic level concerns (i.e. violations of IHL and humanitarian principles). It was clear that differing priorities could impact planning considerations for a future crisis, especially if there is a breakdown or failure at a certain level. Indeed, it was highlighted that there is little planning done for this type of scenario (i.e. if strategic level decision makers are not able to direct operational and tactical level personnel). In this vein, some participants even suggested that more adaptation is needed to encourage tactical and operational level autonomy in aid worker security. Other participants highlighted the need for more touch points between the different levels, such as those provided at this symposium.

4. Concerns Around the Mandate of Humanitarian Security Advisors in Future Planning

Participants discussed the current tension between a security advisor's role to counsel about security risks versus making operational decisions about programming. Participants felt increasingly pressured to do the latter, and that such pressures would likely only increase in a future crisis. Additionally, participants felt that there does not exist a consistent method of planning for aid worker security for both military and humanitarian actors. Rather than seeing these entities come together for forecasting or scenario planning activity, the prevailing perception is that each other's actions are often siloed, results are not shared (especially from the military side) and there is skepticism with learning from each other's experiences.

5. Concerns Over Security Planning With and For Partners In The Future

Participants highlighted that current approaches to aid worker security are often heavily skewed towards UN or international organizations, who also have the luxury to focus on adherence to humanitarian principles as part of their security planning. In an overwhelming future crisis, international organizations and the UN may not have time to consider a principled approach towards humanitarian intervention, and existing security processes perceived as adequate or appropriate may be strained. In particular, the different approaches, funding, and support received by national-level organizations vis-à-vis international organizations will likely become more pronounced. This is especially the case if there is a similar increase of grassroots, activist humanitarian organizations less well-versed in humanitarian principles or security practices, as was the case at the beginning of the Ukraine conflict. These grassroots organizations compete with international NGOs and UN agencies despite having different risk tolerances, values towards mitigation measures, working cultures, and funding streams. Security managers will have to better understand how their actions can close the gap between national and international approaches to aid worker security in the future, perhaps by regularly conducting opportunity and cost-benefit analyses of potential interventions.

Fictional Tabletop Scenario Exercise

The second portion of working group discussions used a fictional tabletop scenario to compel participants to think about planning for a future crisis (Figure 6).² The scenario was not designed to be 100% accurate, but instead intended to encourage participants to forward-think about how they would approach planning for aid worker security in the environment. It was also hoped that discussions would reinforce or contrast discussions had in the first portion of the session: The following four concerns were highlighted in discussions:

1. Concerns Around Tactical-Level Issues and Short-Term Planning

Much of the discussion focused on practical, tactical-level issues and their security implications. In particular, participants identified logistics (i.e. travel and transport of aid items in and out of Royth), internal communication within the organization, digital security concerns, situational analysis and information sharing, and long-term operation resilience as difficult areas for planning. Notably, no participant with the exception of discussing exit strategies.

2. Concerns Around The Erosion of Norms

Several participants raised the point that the type of scenario itself impacts humanitarian operating norms, the wellbeing of staff, and, more broadly, the choice to deploy to Royth. For example, respect for IHL by the parties involved, the presence of international counterterrorism and sanctions measures, and the types of humanitarian programs available affect humanitarian operating norms.

The examples highlighted were: did the different parties to the conflict have respect for IHL; were there international counter terrorism or sanctions measures in place; or do certain types of humanitarian programs create risk in Royth (e.g. cash programming)?

3. Concerns Around Communications Between Humanitarians and Armed Actors

Several participants highlighted that they would prioritize establishing or strengthening communication with armed actors in order to discuss humanitarian concerns. Armed actors could be leveraged for actor mapping, engagement strategies, humanitarian access, civilian-military coordination, the use of armed convoys for humanitarians, humanitarian notification systems, and information sharing. It is important to note that humanitarians would be at the forefront of these efforts in order to maintain the focus on humanitarian concerns, though efforts would remain short-term, and tactical or operational in nature.




Figure 6. Map Used Figure 6. Map from used to encourage participants in the aid worker security working group to forward-think about key planning considerations for this environment. (Source: The NWC's Humanitarian Response Program).

² The fictional scenario was based on open sources and arranged around a large-scale combat operation on the island nation of Royth. Tens of thousands of Bardiyian troops had invaded the north and west of the island, while tens of thousands of Galan troops had also arrived to support its ally Royth. It was recognized there were many assumptions with the scenario. Indeed, during the working group it was highlighted that there were several assumptions in the discussions such as: the lack of non-state armed group perceptions; the lack of diverse perspectives particularly from Africa and Asia; the lack of national level voices, with western global north personal often controlling strategic level decision making; and that sustainment of aid worker security is often not factored into discussions.

4. Concerns Over Local Partner Security

Participants raised concerns over local partner security. Namely, factors such as Royth conscription policies for citizens and community reactions to a spontaneous increase in lesser-trained grassroots aid workers could significantly affect the safety of local partners. Participants generally agreed that it is the role of humanitarians, rather than governments or militaries, to protect local partners at risk. However, national governments should continue to communicate desirable practices for new humanitarian groups.

Key Opportunities to Explore to Improve Aid Worker Security Planning Considerations for Future Crisis

During the course of discussions, participants identified five areas to address aid worker security planning challenges:

Review and Update Key Guidance Documents – Several participants emphasized the need to update key guiding documents, such as the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines on the use of armed escorts, and other documents key to aid worker security planning.

Establish a body to specifically advise spontaneous humanitarian groups on aid worker security practices – Several participants highlighted the need to explore creating an advisory body tasked with providing information, training, and advice for grassroots organizations, given their possible lack of training and understanding of aid worker security practices. Participants pointed to the International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) and the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) as examples to follow. Alternatively, strengthening UNDSS's role at the strategic and operational levels could serve to improve civilian-military coordination for non-traditional humanitarian organizations.

Explore the linkages between digital and physical risk in future conflicts – Participants highlighted that digital and physical risks are often siloed from each other in the security risk management process. Analyzing both types of risks holistically would allow for an understanding of how they might amplify each other and better inform mitigation measures. Some participants underscored the benefits of identifying digital risks, potentially through the creation of an additional symposium working group.

Develop more lessons learned and best practices based on case studies – Several participants highlighted the need for greater transparency regarding past failures, both from militaries and humanitarians.

Encourage more shared training between humanitarians and military actors – Participants encouraged further developing humanitarian-military trainings at the theoretical and practical levels (i.e. scenario-based exercises and planning sessions), specifically prioritizing risk perception and commonalities with cyber challenges.

Key Question To Spark Discussion About Aid Worker Security Planning Considerations for Future Crisis

Following discussions, participants created four closed questions to explore asking the wider group of event participants during the plenary session at the end of the conference. These were:

1. Do you think your organization is investing enough in aid worker security?
2. Are you satisfied with the aid worker security arrangements in your organization?

3. Do you think that an aid worker security voice matters in decision making in your organization?
4. Aid worker security is less valued than staying and delivering - agree/disagree?

The group almost unanimously decided that the first question would be used to encourage discussion about aid worker security concerns for future planning. The results of this question from the community straw poll question are given below in Figure 7.

Mentimeter

Do you think your organization investing enough in aid worker security?




Figure 7. Question from the Aid Worker Security Working group and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

Individuals interested in learning more about or assisting with the Aid Worker Security Working Group can contact the team lead at jonathan.robinson.ctr.uk@usnwc.edu.

CLIMATE CHANGE & COASTAL HAZARDS

Leads: Dr. Kristie Barrow (Humanitarian Advisor for Asia Pacific, United Nations Environmental Programme), and Col. Theodore Shanks (Director, USAF Air University Liaison Office)

Rapporteur: Marzia Giambertoni

Summary of Outputs

On March 23rd and 24th, the Climate Change Working Group met for its sixth annual iteration to further discuss the effects of climate change on the workings of civil-military humanitarian assistance and to continue the dialogue and research begun in previous workshops. The working group consisted of representatives from the U.S. and foreign governmental defense, academia, local, government, public safety, and medical fields, and met three times over two days. This year's session began with a textual examination and critique of the U.S. Department of the Navy (DoN) Climate Action 2030 strategy, released on May 24th, 2022. The review of this document was used as a framing tool for the working group to define key terms surrounding climate security, examine and critique prominent ideas, and identify gaps and opportunities for future work within this document. This report, commissioned and certified by Honorable Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Navy, offers a high-level conceptualization of the DoN's current approach to climate change. Dr. Kristie Barrow, Humanitarian Advisor for Asia Pacific, United Nations Environmental Programme, and Lt. Col. Theodore Shanks, Director, USAF Air University Liaison Office, co-led this working group and provided an overview of climate security and infrastructure resilience based on their professional and/or academic work. The working group began its discussion with a review of both the role of climate change in overall humanitarian operations, and continued with a discussion around the definition of terms used by various organizations to discuss climate change. After a review of the US Navy Climate Action 2030 strategy, the Climate Change Working Group also led to a rigorous discussion around why understanding the climate strategy of a governmental organization was important to non-governmental or neutral humanitarian actors. Understanding the need for some organizations to maintain independence and/or neutrality, the working group reviewed the importance of mutual understanding (at a minimum) and cooperation or collaboration (when possible) during humanitarian operations occurring in the same region. Over the course of later discussions, the working group emphasized the need for shifting the focus of Civ-Mil action planning to focus not only on climate change response, but to also consider and prepare for prevention and preparedness.

Project Goal and Methods

The group facilitated a collaborative discussion using previous working structures and the aforementioned strategy to work through future climate security challenges and propose future actions and research. The working group sessions were broken into three focused areas of dialogue:

Session I: Based on the DoN Climate Action 2030 strategy, where are the current research gaps or opportunities for investigation surrounding the confluence of climate change and civil-military action?

1. Does the strategy consider both conflict operations and humanitarian response?
2. Does the strategy consider multinational or multi-organizational objectives?
3. What is missing in the strategy?
4. Does the strategy address the future?
5. Which elements apply to or address humanitarian assistance and disaster relief? Which areas do not?

Session II: What does the humanitarian community suggest or want to see in the DoN Climate Action 2030 strategy?

Session III: How can the military community better foster climate change preparedness through Civ-Mil cooperation?

Key Ideas and Issues

At the conclusion of each session, working group members summarized key takeaways and thoughts from each discussion. A summary of those key ideas, comments, and issues are summarized below:

1. Members felt the DoN strategy should better distinguish between strategy and implementation, with an operational and tactical level appendage to the DoN strategy. This includes well-sourced concept definitions, additional background on climate change's socioeconomic impacts around the world, and detailed actionable items that also focus on engaging international humanitarian stakeholders.
2. U.S. national security ecosystem and humanitarian organizations must increase the quality of their communication and collaboration. Levelling, shared understanding of key concepts, and baseline settings must be established across organizations. The scarcity of effective communication regarding differing language and agendas contributes to the slow progress in responding to the impacts of climate change.
3. The DoN strategy would benefit from a more forward-facing approach, extending the timeframe to include realistic short-, medium-, and long-term climate action, while specifying measures undertaken by DoN that directly contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation.
4. The DoN strategy should integrate capacity-building opportunities for localization, modeling of climate-related impacts and disasters, and quantitative data on present carbon usage, expected carbon emissions reductions, impact, and projected increases in the severity of extreme weather events, into its approach.

Future Actions and Research

After the synthesis of participant discussions, the working group created several future actions and research proposals for consideration. Among the most prominent are:

Speaking the Same Language

- Establish common definitions, mutual understandings and accepted frames of reference.
- Increase the accessibility and discussion of the projected frequency, intensity of work, and funding that will be required for military, humanitarian, and development stakeholders.
- Focus on how the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other reliable analyses can inform climate mitigation and adaptation measures.

Situating Climate Strategy within Larger Frameworks

- Identify gaps in current planning and guidance, address risk profile and strategic exposure, taking into account climate change.
- Cooperate with partners and allies to build organizational resilience and preparedness to respond to climate challenges.
- Expand stakeholder engagement. Communicate and coordinate with local, regional, national, and international stakeholders, as well as public and private actors.

Forward-Facing Scenario-Planning

- Shift mindsets of the military and humanitarian communities to align with intensifying climate patterns.
- Distinguish between roles and responsibilities: Who engages in adaptation and who engages in mitigation?

Operationalizing the Climate Change Response

- Specify budget and resource allocation, including human capital. For example, identifying lines of effort within different UN agencies, sourcing donor support, and the creation and expansion of loan programs and investment.
- Mainstreaming climate change across all humanitarian work, so that mitigation and adaptation measures are integrated in initial planning and conceptualization.
- Increase the quality of strategic communication through information-sharing by:
 - Including academic institutions to assist and create dialogue through the distribution of their research
 - Converting military analyses into palatable products that can be used by on-the-ground-actors
 - Quantifying indicators and agreeing upon success thresholds and standard metrics
- Shift climate action focus from response to preparedness and mitigation. Place greater emphasis on anticipatory action, both from donors and delivery partners, and at a political level.

Coastal Resilience

- Recognize the importance of conceptualizing local communities in a local resilience response. Leverage DoN for educational purposes among local communities by creating a platform for civil-military engagement and by incentivizing locally-driven climate resilience activities.
- Leverage DoN for R&D in disaster risk reduction (DRR) in coastal areas, including technical advising and support.
- Expand and frame DoN's potential scenarios for a broader audience.

Final Questions and Gaps in Research

1. Who is the best source of authority to lead the way in establishing common language and definitions around climate change (i.e. governmental, international, academic, civil society)? Should organizations align around a common understanding?

2. How should climate change inform our understanding of risk? How might different organizations conceptualize their exposure to strategic risk, based on the implications of climate change (i.e. land use, climate migration, infrastructure vulnerability, societal fragility)?

3. What scenario planning/gaming tools exist in the military and humanitarian communities and do they adequately reflect the first and second order challenges of climate change? 4. How can operationalizing the effects of climate change impact resource allocation or organizational priorities? How might this help or hinder organizational efforts to address preparedness vice resilience?

5. How could we leverage DoN's expertise to facilitate preparedness and resilience in local coastal communities?

Next Steps

- Consult 2023 Working Group members for report inputs. (June, 2023)
- Brown University Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs finalizes and publishes Working Group report (August, 2023)

- Present findings to DoN and offer the option of a working group presentation (September/October, 2023)
- Engage in mid-year consultations with 2023 Working Group members. (November, 2023)
- Discuss possibility of a SEED Grant to continue the work.
- Identify other stakeholders to engage with (i.e. think tanks, non-governmental organizations, etc.). (January/ February, 2023)
- Establish the objectives of the next working group.

The straw poll question that the climate change and coastal hazards working group asked was “in the age of climate change, do humanitarians and civil-military actors have a responsibility to adjust their response, coordination, and capacity?” The results of this question from the community straw poll question are given below in Figure 8.

In the age of climate change, do humanitarian and civil-military actors have a responsibility to adjust their response, coordination, and capacity?




Figure 8. Question from the Climate Change and Coastal Hazards Working group and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

Individuals interested in learning more about or assisting with the Climate Change and Coastal Hazards Working Group can contact the team leads at theodore.shanks@us.af.mil and kit.barrow.uk@gmail.com.

OUTBREAKS

Leads: Samuel Boland and Emily Chapman

Rapporteurs: Annie Schwerdtfeger and Kethural Manokaran

Summary of Outputs

The ongoing mission of the outbreaks working group is to explore challenges and identify good practice in humanitarian civilian-military coordination during pandemics, outbreaks, and other public health emergencies, both in conflict and peacetime. Since 2016, this working group has sought to develop action and research plans, foster transatlantic growth and cooperation, and foster a community of experts in the field.

The focus of this year's working group was to continue discussions from the September 2021 workshop, in defining and discussing policy and guidance for practitioners operating in domestic and international public health emergencies, including where the emergency is overlaid on top of an existing conflict (i.e., a complex emergency). Participants in this year's Outbreaks Working Group included representation from academia, the medical field, civilian governmental, transnational, and intergovernmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and military.

This year's discussion built off working group discussions by presenting the provisionally titled 'Practical Considerations for civil-military interaction during outbreaks and public health emergencies.' The document was introduced with its broad purpose to bring together guidelines, standards, and practice into a single source with the aim of facilitating safe, principled, and pragmatic civil-military interaction in outbreak and public health settings. The document draws on previous analyses of existing humanitarian civil-military engagement policies and guidance documents as they apply to disease outbreak response (including the WHO guidance document (2021) on national civil-military health collaboration and the Oslo Guidelines). This was supplemented by evidence collected during a project on Australian, US, and New Zealand use of military and National Guard during national responses to COVID-19.

The Need for Context-Specific and Flexible Guidance

Participants discussed the orientation of the document towards humanitarian practice and supporting practice through the provision of information that assists them tailor interaction to the uniqueness of outbreak and public health emergency responses. Its purpose to support context-specific dialogue, understanding, and interaction was discussed, and the Working Group Leads highlighted that humanitarians and the humanitarian coordination community were the primary intended audience of the document. The intent of the document to complement what already exists was highlighted, with it bringing extra depth to the specific context of outbreaks.

Participants further discussed that civil-military relationships need to adapt when context or dynamics change, which is a characteristic of outbreak responses identified from the 2022 Working Group. Part of this is that militaries will often have 'redlines' that need to be considered, and that while they have a dedicated mission, 'mission creep' may occur to meet needs on the ground. This necessitates a flexible document rather than a binding policy so that organizations can weigh considerations and adapt according to the situation while still having guidance to draw upon.

Baseline Principles for Outbreak and Epidemic/Pandemic Settings

Participants discussed that there are baseline civil-military interaction principles that need to be clearly outlined in the document to bring clarity to its purpose and use. The key one discussed was the principle that the military is subservient to civilian leadership in many nations, with any consideration of military involvement in outbreaks being in adherence with this principle (i.e., military should always be present in a supporting role to civilian leadership). Further discussion highlighted how any military in leadership roles should be in adherence with international law, human rights, and civil liberties, and that political oversight may mean a different risk tolerance for use of military between domestic and international settings.

Framing Domestic Response Settings

Participants emphasized the need for any function/activity typology to make a clear distinction between domestic and international settings due to variances in the sovereign use of militaries domestically. It was noted that foreign militaries will likely have different civil-military interfaces and be asked to complete tasks in a different way than domestic militaries. Political willingness and expectations, and domestic legislation will inform the likelihood and nature of military involvement in domestic outbreak responses and these nuances need to be captured to support variances in humanitarian engagement across domestic and international settings.

In domestic settings, military involvement in administering vaccinations was raised by participants as this occurred in many nations. For civil-military partnerships, a key takeaway was that this should be community-driven and include messaging to ensure that communities understand the nature of the partnership – “All in this together.” This approach recognises that the military has expertise or a workforce not resident in civilian agencies which can be rapidly drawn upon. Participants agreed that there is a need to better frame how the military is activated in a domestic context, the likely capabilities that will be present in a domestic setting, and the balance of health versus security issues that can be political in nature.

Participants subsequently noted that consideration needs to be given to outbreak responses in areas without a strong central government or where the government is party to a conflict. Conversation centered on the opportunity for the document to include broader considerations for readers and participants agreed on the need to draw important distinctions between domestic and international militaries because of their different characteristics and how these characteristics inform civil-military interaction.

Military Function and Capability Typology

Resources were shared by participants that have alternative typologies to describe the nature of activities conducted during an outbreak or pandemic. This moved the discussion towards the types of tasks militaries have conducted in recent outbreaks (e.g., COVID-19 and Ebola), and that while they may have relevant capabilities and a workforce, there needs to be clear considerations given to their use. Policing was raised and discussed by participants because military forces do not engage in policing in some nations. The norms for militaries serving in police functions should be understood so they are not infringed. The threat faced by militaries during an infectious disease response, differences in eligibility for medical treatment provided by military forces, and military personnel in response leadership positions are often political-level considerations that also inform practice. It was agreed that it would be useful for humanitarians to understand what capability militaries may be able to contribute and what their strengths are across the functions/activities within an outbreak response.

A deep dive was conducted into three areas under examination for inclusion in the ‘Practical Considerations’ – social cohesion, enforcement of public health measures and logistics/supply and engineering. Discussion on social cohesion centered on the bounds of military involvement and ensuring clear completion (‘end state’) and expectations. Participants shared their perspectives on military involvement in public health measures. Participants felt that any guidance document should account for differences in medical and political perspectives based on the dynamic nature of public health emergencies, and their impact on community safety. Participants

also agreed that when messaged and conducted effectively, public health can serve as a bridge between medical and military perspectives.

Lastly, on logistics/supply and engineering, participants considered likely military capabilities for outbreak responses, and agreed that any use of military capabilities should be considerate of the risk of using the capability. These risks include cost, reducing humanitarian access to sites, and not being able to meet core military roles. In international settings, further considerations include the history of the country and broader civil-military relations and ensuring local markets are not bypassed by foreign militaries bringing in medical, logistical, or military supplies.

Future Action

The 'Practical Considerations' were agreed as a first step in the development of context-specific civil-military interaction guidance for outbreaks. Participants agreed that an evidence base is needed to support ongoing discussions on sustainability, capacity, and expectations for militaries in domestic and international settings. Participants further agreed that modifications are required and a timeline for progression was discussed, with team leads working to provide a revised draft of the document to be disseminated for comments and contributions. Revisions of the document will focus on issues around community resilience and external interventions (bilateral and multilateral interventions), the inclusion of baseline principles, and identifying any redlines/ boundaries of military involvement and how these will inform interaction.

Individuals interested in learning more about the Outbreaks Working Group can contact the team leads at boland.sam@gmail.com and emily.chapman@defence.gov.au.

Mentimeter

Do humanitarian agencies have a role in supporting the process of state-driven domestic outbreak responses when including national militaries?




Figure 9. Question from the Outbreaks Working group and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Leads: Jules Frost (Australia Civil-Military Centre) and Michael Marx (UNWFP)

Rapporteur: Tevah Gevelber

Summary of Outputs

Although there have been significant improvements in humanitarian civil-military coordination as it regards humanitarian access, the Working Group identified a range of contemporary political, security and logistical constraints or challenges that continue to hinder humanitarian access. Relationships, trust, and shared understanding of mission, principles and redlines among stakeholders remain vital to overcoming bureaucratic impediments. It is important to identify decision-makers and the formal and informal channels for information-sharing. The Working Group agreed that humanitarian diplomacy is an important tool in the toolbox for obtaining humanitarian access. Identifying stakeholders who have influence with those controlling access is important. This led to the articulation of this research question: Should humanitarian organizations encourage more military-military engagement in support of achieving humanitarian access?

Key Themes

- **Channels for communication and information-sharing.** Formal and informal communication channels are required for building trusted relationships. Enabling information-sharing between stakeholders is vital. Breakdown in communication or lack of communication can lead to distrust and unproductive assumptions. Identify decision-makers and their preferred ways of communicating. This requires more than a surface-level understanding of the actors in a conflict.
- **Continued lack of shared understanding among stakeholders.** There continues to be a lack of shared understanding of each other's mission, principles, and red lines at both the strategic and operational levels. Lack of coherence and/or command and control structures as well as divergent voices among humanitarians impedes military actors' understanding and can result in discounting the humanitarians' perspectives.
- **Disparities or differences between military and humanitarian actors** such as resources, personnel, information, and motivation (voluntary vs deployed) can also be a barrier to effective civil-military coordination. The lack of awareness or understanding of the relevant legal frameworks and how they impact operations also can hinder access. Critical to this is the military's understanding of principle-based humanitarian access.
- **Lack of understanding of what security means to each other and the various strategies for security risk management among stakeholders remains.** This can lead to tensions and further misunderstandings regarding motivation. For the military, security is about force protection. For humanitarians, security is primarily focused on the population's protection. Humanitarian principles, especially independence and neutrality, are essential in obtaining and maintaining security and delivering humanitarian action.
- **Bureaucratic impediments remain and constrain access.** Bureaucratic barriers often stem from political and legislative decisions. Counterterrorism, designations, sanction regimes pose barriers/constraints on humanitarian access. It is important to ask ourselves if the current framework we use is effective in mitigating or overcoming these constraints for humanitarian access? Can humanitarian diplomacy assist?
- **Localisation or locally led humanitarian action.** The Working Group briefly discussed what impact the trend towards increased locally led humanitarian action is this having on access in general and more specifically on principled access? Does solidarity trump the principle of neutrality?

Rapid case studies of Myanmar and Nigeria

The Working Group used the OCHA Access Monitoring and Reporting Framework (AMRF) to review two situations – Myanmar and Nigeria. This tool is used to collect and analyze data on the impact of access constraints on humanitarian response. The AMRF consists of nine types (or categories) of access constraints.

The overarching question the Working Group explored is, “What is the role of civil-military coordination when assertive states are involved?” Highlights from this rapid exercise illustrated that humanitarians need to understand the distinctions between military and/or the government constraining humanitarian access. For example, in Nigeria many of the constraints are understood to be more closely related to the civilian government and not related to the military specifically. This is not the case in Myanmar. It is also important to understand intent, which requires conducting informed analyses of the actors involved, and subsequently using this analysis to assist in identifying interlocutors to facilitate humanitarian access. This interlocutor may be working at the strategic and/or tactical level and could be civilian or military. The key point is to identify who matters in practice, who can make the decisions, and who has the influence to affect the access constraints.

The Way Forward

Relationships, relationships, and relationships. Establish and nurture relationships before crises occur. Increase dialogue within the appropriate civil-military networks and build trust in advance. Understand roles and responsibilities, create awareness of channels for communication and influence.

Exercise together. Military exercise planners may see humanitarians as liabilities and not essential stakeholders. Increased awareness and understanding about humanitarians’ unique and important contributions is required.

Perhaps more should be invested in humanitarian diplomacy, which involves persuading decision-makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interests of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles. This strategy of influence involves the interaction with a wide variety of players for an exclusively humanitarian purpose.

Identify leverage points and the right interlocutor(s). Identifying the right interlocutor is critical to success in obtaining humanitarian access. Could military-military interaction and dialogue be an effective pathway to obtaining humanitarian access?

Future Action - Potential Research Agenda

The working group decided upon the following question for the community straw poll: Should humanitarian organizations encourage more military-military engagement in support of achieving humanitarian access? The results of this question from the community straw poll question are given below in Figure 9.

Individuals interested in learning more about or assisting with the Humanitarian Access Working Group can contact the team leads at jules.frost@acmc.gov.au and michael.marx@wfp.org.

Should humanitarian organizations encourage more military-military engagement to support humanitarian access and objectives?




Figure 10. Question from the Humanitarian Access Working group and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Leads: Geoffrey T. Gillespie (Department of Defense/Defense Institute of International and Legal Studies) and Katherine Kramer (InterAction)

Rapporteur: Elliot Winoker

Summary of Outputs

This year's session focused on exploring how civil-military exchanges can prevent and respond to civilian harm, with the objective of producing practical recommendations for research and action. The working group was conducted in three parts. First, participants shared personal experiences and lessons learned in efforts to protect civilians, with key themes identified across the stories. Second, two stories were selected for analysis of two questions: 1) If NGOs and military organizations had met in advance to share assessments about risks to civilians, how might outcomes have changed? and, 2) What form of engagement, and among whom, would have improved outcomes? Third, the group used the themes and analysis to develop practicable recommendations for future steps to protect civilians through military-civilian cooperation and coordination.

The group's primary recommendations were:

- Hold regular table-top exercises with military and civil society participants to develop mutual understanding, communication, and improve planning; and,
- Conduct research and analysis of military planning doctrine focusing on whether protection of civilians is adequately incorporated.

The group also issued several secondary recommendations, summarized below.

More broadly, the working group stressed the importance of managing human capital, especially to manage and mitigate the stress, trauma, and burnout experienced by humanitarian and military actors. Participants viewed this as critical to maintaining a high-quality, operationally-ready community, and to prevent mistakes, avoid degradation to organizational culture, reduce staff turnover, and improve morale. Joint research and public discussion of these factors may improve coordination, reduce stigma, improve culture, and increase understanding, thereby improving protection outcomes.

Key Themes

The group identified key themes and trends relating to protection of civilians among the groups' diverse experience in humanitarian and military operations. The following themes emerged:

Varied approaches to Civ-Mil Coordination

Efforts to enhance the protection of civilians have been undertaken among various combinations of military and civilian organizations at the local and international level.

- It was generally agreed the best starting point for such efforts was to understand and document protection risks in conflict areas, to map which actors are responding to the different protection risks, then establish communication among those actors.
- Common approaches included rehumanizing security issues, including through principled leadership, legal and compliance discussions, and education/trainings.
- Participants found other practical staff management measures useful. For instance, in one case, integrating more women into the forces was found to decrease sexual violence; and in others, improving internal organizational discipline and performance with systematic rewards and penalties benefitted protection outcomes.

Contextual challenges in dynamic environments:

There are many aspects outside of an organization's control that can impact protection of civilians efforts including:

- Intensity of the conflict
- Political views and competition for power or resources
- The level of awareness and/or stigma attached to any protection issue
- Economic & market forces, such as financial gains from peacekeeping troop presence
- Domestic legal considerations

Internal organizational challenges

Several internal civilian and military organizational challenges were identified that negatively affected the ability to protect civilians, particularly:

- Organizational structure, including leadership and political will, can either drive or be a barrier to the protection of civilians. Organizational culture, such as whether there is resistance to prioritizing protection, and/or if local staff are empowered to engage on protection topics, can also affect the protection of civilians.
- Prioritization of civilian protection may be perceived to hinder mission objectives, develop tension, and exacerbate risk. Concerns over losing resources or support may drive decisions to ignore civilian protection issues. Moral implications of deprioritizing civilian protection may contribute to staff trauma, burnout, and turnover. Lastly, priority on civilian protection varies across operational contexts, hindering consistency and driving divergent outcomes.
- Participants considered understanding operational context and local area culture as imperative to strategic planning for civilian protection and to mitigate harm arising from activities or operations.
- Participants often cited staff personality and turnover as drivers of success or failure when protecting civilians. Staff selection, experience, and longevity, and effective handover in transition are critical. Formalizing processes can preserve institutional knowledge and progress.

Challenges inherent to the civilian-military community

- Civil society organizations and militaries do not share the same terms of reference or doctrinal concepts, inhibiting communication. This results in incomplete contextual and risk awareness, and insufficient real-time knowledge of available resources.
- Civilian and military organizations are structured very differently, complicating understanding or organizational processes and hindering communication networks.
- Fractionalization among civilian and military groups can be a barrier to generating consensus to force change or effective labor allocation according to capacity and expertise.
- Overcoming these cross-organizational challenges to achieve protection outcomes requires good will and understanding across the civilian-military community.

Improving protection outcomes

Having identified themes relating to protection of civilians, the group analyzed two cases in greater detail to consider what might have improved outcomes. The first case involved the sexual and labor exploitation of children by local forces in a conflict zone. This abuse was often observed by humanitarian actors, but for years resources and efforts were not allocated to reduce the ongoing harm. The second case involved tragic, unexplained homicides of local children in a conflict zone who had recently received medical care from coalition medical staff for disabling injuries incurred from the armed conflict. In this case, information was lacking to determine the cause of the killings or whether they could have been predicted and avoided.

Based on this analysis, participants agreed on several ways in which protection outcomes can be improved:

- Making deliberate prioritization decisions for efforts and resources, with a focus on complete information through communication and coordination.
- Increasing contextual awareness in an operating area to best understand interplay of actors and the local community.
- Undertaking mission-specific planning, pre-deployment training, and long-term assessment to improve awareness and build communications and referral networks.
- Developing means to document, share, publish, and report on civilian harm risks.
- Increasing breadth and regularity for coordination and communication between civilian and military actors, especially outside of ongoing conflicts and emergencies.
- Establishing an ongoing means of liaison with local groups. And,
- Establishing a means to share and integrate hard lessons and best practices within the civilian-military community.

Future Action

Considering the analysis of what might have improved outcomes in two specific cases, the group developed two primary and several secondary recommendations to develop and implement the identified means of improving civilian protection outcomes.

Recommendation 1: Conduct regular tabletop exercises– including civil society and military personnel focused on civil-military coordination for protection in conflict and relief operations– based in different hypothetical contexts and organizational levels. These exercises should provide open, unclassified space for multi-party exchanges to foster coordination and cooperation between military (including partners) and civil society organizations. Hypothetical exercises avoid real-world limitations on cooperation, including classification of actual military operations or violations of humanitarian principles such as relief operation neutrality. Exercises will inform and develop doctrine and training, improve mutual familiarity with organizational structures and processes, and develop professional and communications networks in advance of conflicts or emergencies. This exercise model will address several themes the working group identified, including a lack of mutual understanding of organizational structures, processes, and doctrines; and several challenges relating to communication in advance of, and during, an emergency or conflict. Regular exercises will enable better communication, improve mutual understanding, and test and refine operational concepts in advance, while a table-top format requires minimal resources.

Recommendation 2: Conduct a review of publicly available military planning and stabilization doctrines, with a focus on processes to address civilian harm reduction and engagement with humanitarians. Use this research to write discrete recommendations for modification to military doctrine to more effectively account for protecting civilians and coordination with humanitarian and civil society organizations. The working group also noted that military plans and operations naturally tend to focus on warfare objectives, possibly at the expense of focus on protection of civilians in the early planning phases. This may potentially worsen outcomes for civilians. In addition, civilian population issues may significantly impact military operations and even undermine objectives if not fully considered early in the planning phase. This recommendation is thus expected to benefit the protection of civilians, ensure that military plans are based on complete information, and better provide for humanitarian access and protection of civilians in a conflict zone.


Secondary recommendations:

- Every humanitarian and military operation should include a means to report, document, share, and publish human rights violations and concerns, even in the absence of resources for humanitarian and military actors to effectively protect civilians or mitigate harm. This supports transparency, enables awareness to encourage future resource allocation, and allows humanitarian and military actors to fulfill legal, ethical, and moral obligations to act or report (in turn partially mitigating trauma, stress, and burnout).
- Relevant humanitarian, military, civilian government, and academic organizations should examine successful cases of civil-military coordination to protect civilians, to compile lessons learned and best practices.
- Propose new U.S. statutory authority to allow rule of law training and human rights-focused institutional capacity building, even when human rights concerns preclude other military aid (as opposed to existing structures which tie such activities to military aid cases).
- Consider if our working group method can be a model for further analysis of other topics, specifically by using participants' experience as a basis for analysis of key themes and developing practicable recommendations for improvement and change.
- Pursue a collaborative effort to establish common definitions & terms throughout the civil-military humanitarian aid community.

The results of the straw poll question from the Protection of Civilians Working Group are given below in Figure 11.

Mentimeter

Is proactive civil military engagement a reasonable and effective means to mitigate of civilian harm?



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Figure 11. Question from the Protection of Civilians Working group and results for the straw poll session at the end of the workshop.

Individuals interested in learning more about or assisting with the Protection of Civilians Working Group can contact the team leads at kkramer@interaction.org & eliot_winoker@brown.edu.

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS) AFTER-EVENT

For the first time in the event's seven-year history, CSIS and CHRHS collaborated on an after-event hosted at CSIS's Washington DC headquarters. The event consisted of two segments: a public panel discussion titled "Opportunities and Challenges in Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination" and a closed roundtable event called "Assessing Civilian-Military Humanitarian Coordination." The public discussion focused on the key findings of the workshop, while the closed event contended with the significant operational and access challenges the humanitarian community faces in large-scale combat operations.

The closed roundtable discussed wide ranging issues in civilian-military coordination in humanitarian operations, including the need for increased access to trainings for civilian and military personnel, a desire for more systematic knowledge retention across responses, and the development of more context specific guidances for using military assets in specific settings. Regarding training, military and humanitarian actors agreed that early career education in civilian-military coordination is critical to avoid starting a complex discussion after a disaster has already occurred. Members of the group noted that while trainings based in the US and Europe are important, they believe that more Global South military participation in trainings would be beneficial. Some members from the civilian side of the conversation reminded the group of the necessary pluralism that exists in civil society, and that not all actors who are on the ground share the same goal but still need to effectively coordinate with one another. Another important theme to arise in the conversation was the need to focus on the perspectives and input of affected communities and recipients of humanitarian assistance.

