U.S. Naval War College faculty members publish their learned opinions on diverse topics and time periods in various media outlets including academic journals, online publications, scholarly texts, and popular editions.
One of the key concerns of naval strategists and planners today is the nature of the Chinese geostrategic challenge. Conceding that no one can know for certain China s intentions in terms of future conflict, the editors of this hot-topic book argue that the trajectory of Chinese nuclear propulsion for submarines may be one of the best single indicators of China s ambitions of global military power.
A variety of viewpoints is offered in this timely analysis of China's economy and the future shape of Beijing's energy consumption. The authors, all noted authorities in the fields of economics, diplomacy, energy, and defense, consider an unprecedented range of influences and factors to avoid the limitations of looking at the subject myopically or with political bias.
After a lengthy hiatus-lasting nearly six centuries—China is reemerging as a maritime power, this time with an emphasis on undersea warfare. Between 1996 and 2006, the Chinese navy took delivery of more than thirty submarines.
The familiarity of measures of effectiveness (MOE) in many areas of life suggests that in modern society quantification is irresistible. Batting averages, stock market figures, returns on investment, air passenger miles, and countless other common measures serve to distill vast amounts of data into relevant information.
Lyle Goldstein and William Murray of the U.S. Naval War College maintain that despite tangible improvements in the U.S.-China relationship, China continues to engage in the rapid military modernization of its forces, including its submarine capabilities.
The institutionalized contacts and increased transparency engendered by such cooperation in submarine rescue would fit with broader trends toward increasing openness and participation in international organizations by the Chinese military and could constitute an important confidence-building mechanism between China and the region.
Chinese naval and strategic planners fear, and their Western counterparts seem to believe, that a maritime blockade could interrupt or significantly impede China’s energy supplies in a limited war. But probably it could not, and thinking it could is dangerous for everyone.
Despite this ambivalence and its anemic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile systems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and diesel submarines.