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NATIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

What is nationalism? A famous, minimalist definition is that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1). But the concept has been used to describe a variety of phenomena. Its meaning can range from "a subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation" (Huddy & Khatib, 2007, p. 65) to an ideology that makes "assertions about the nation's claim to historical uniqueness, to the territory that the nation-state ought to occupy, and to the kinds of relations that should prevail between one's nation and others" (Haas, 1986, pp. 727–728). Others assign specific goals to nationalism, such as "a desire to mitigate the degree of foreign influence and exercise control over the members and perceived territory of a nation" (Woodwell, 2007, p. 16). Given this broad spectrum of definitions and the various conceptualizations of the term, we approach nationalism as "an umbrella term covering national identity, national consciousness, and national ideologies" (Greenfeld, 1992, p. 3). Moreover, nationalism is culturally thick, but politically thin, with "little to say about the balance between liberty and order, liberty and equality, and the distribution of resources within the nation" (Hutchinson, 2017, p. 170; see also Freeden, 1998).

The term "nation" is often conflated with the term "state," but this is unfortunate since these terms refer to distinct concepts. The "state"

refers to a political organization whose "administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (Weber, 1978, p. 54), whereas the nation is a group of people that recognize each other as forming a national unit with a claim to national sovereignty. The two do not necessarily coincide. The use of "state" refers strictly to the governing political unit, which can interact with the national as a separate unit. The term "nation-state" is reserved for instances where a state's authority is legitimated through the ideology of a particular nation.

The relationship between nationalism and foreign policy encompasses a wide range of possible causal pathways. This article does not present an overarching framework for this relationship but rather identifies how scholars have adopted distinct approaches to slice through this complex relationship. Firstly, the article examines different units/levels of analysis that theorists have used to build their causal models. The focus is on how nationalist beliefs help to explain political outcomes, particularly the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy (Rose, 1998) but also how foreign policy goals can affect nationalist beliefs and national identity. Second, this article considers a key topic in foreign policy analysis, namely the relationship between nationalism and war. The article examines the varieties of nationalist ideology, the emergence of the nation-state model, and the rise of the principle of self-determination. Finally, the article looks at another rapidly developing field in the literature: the role of nationalist or antiforeign protests in crisis diplomacy.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

Nationalism is an ideology, but the use of nationalism as a cause of other phenomena has been conceptualized in a variety of ways beyond merely an ideology. National identity carries with it prescribed behavior and perceptual biases, among other consequences; and the salience of national identity is not necessarily constant over time and space. National*ists* are key actors in many theories linking nationalism with foreign policy; however, again their influence and political goals can vary significantly between countries and over a country's history. The nation-state itself, as a sociopolitical unit, is also an actor in the international system. It usually implies a state that is motivated by a "homogenizing imperative" (Mylonas, 2012) along some type of a "constitutive story" (Smith, 2003) that also defines the national interest. Finally, nationalist ideologies are not uniform: scholars have identified different types of nationalism by examining the origin of the national identity or by tracing its political implications.

Nationalist ideology refers to the content or "type" of nationalism, which has a direct effect on decision making behavior when individuals, policy elites, or heads of state identify with this conceptualization of the nation. Scholars are either "lumpers" or "splitters" when it comes to nationalism. Among those who treat nationalism as homogeneous, it is the variation in the intensity or extremism that determines its effects (Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003; Mansfield & Snyder, 2002; Mearsheimer, 2014). National identification creates domestic harmony, but it also designates an outgroup; and this in-group/out-group boundary becomes a line of conflict when nationalism intensifies (Cottam & Cottam, 2001, p. 93; Schrock-Jacobson, 2012, p. 829). State and regional identities create negative images of other political units (Mercer, 1995). The belief that creating an in-group necessarily generates an "other" is based on social identity theory, which emphasizes group membership and positive in-group biases (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Brown, 2000; Brewer, 1999, 2001). Scholars who view nationalism as monolithic tend to emphasize nationalism's darker side and thereby imply that nationalism and international cooperation are at odds with each other.

In contrast, other scholars have argued that the *type* of nationalism matters more than the

strength of the ideology itself. For them, measuring variation in nationalism in terms of the intensity of national identification captures only one dimension of the phenomenon. But there are other bases of social identity that do not require a construction, let alone stigmatization, of an "other." For example, Hymans (2001, 2006) conceptualizes nonoppositional nationalism as producing national pride without loathing and fear of an external "other." The process of separating from an "other" also involves drawing closer to one's own (Lebow, 2012). Thus, different types of nationalism have varying effects on foreign policy.

Scholars have developed several typologies of nationalism. Hechter (2000) distinguished between state-building, peripheral, irredentist, and unification nationalism, all of which he argues are different from patriotism—a situation where nationalism has been fully successful. Another possible typology is official, social, ethnic, and integral nationalisms (Kellas, 1991; Furtado, 1994). Some typologies are created for specific countries, such as dividing Chinese nationalism into liberal, ethnic, and state variants (Zhao, 2004). The content of nationalism can also change over time. Chinese liberal nationalism changed into popular nationalism (Zhao, 2013) and Russian nationalism birthed an imperial version known as Eurasianism (Laruelle, 2010). Many scholars make a distinction between nationalism—which predicts hawkish foreign policy preferences and negative views of outgroup members—and other types of national affiliation such as patriotism or national attachment (De Figueiredo, Rui, & Elkins, 2003; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008; Federico, Golec, & Dial 2005).

The mechanisms that link nationalism or national identity to foreign policy are situated at different levels of analysis and even traverse these levels. This article categorizes these mechanisms linking nationalism and foreign policy: exogenous, interactive, and endogenous.

Units of Analysis: Masses, Elites, Nation-States. Nationalist ideology is often treated abstractly as exerting a broad influence on foreign policy. Nonetheless, several theories of foreign policy are explicit about the "ontological vehicle" that expresses nationalism or possess a national identity. We have identified at least three units of analysis: individuals/masses, policy elites, and nation-states. All three approaches confront structure-agency problems whereby nationalism has been theorized as much a cause as an effect.

Individuals to masses. Individuals can self-identify as members of a nation and act to express that identification through political behavior such as voting and protests. Individual identity results from both external socialization (e.g., civic education, child-rearing practices) and internal self-generation (Laswell, 1930, 1935; Mead, 1942; Gorer, 1948, 1950; Lasch, 1979; Riesman, Denney, & Glazer, 1950). The study of political socialization has focused on how external determinants and personality attributes lead to different modes of political attitude and behavior (Langton, 1969; Hyman, 1959). Although the focus has been on structurally determined national identity, individual agency is important because national identity is only one of multiple identities from which individuals mix and match (Lebow, 2012, chapter 1).

Individual identification with the nation can be analytically aggregated into "masses" that can mobilize, generate public opinion, and possibly exhibit a national character. But can we justify using national masses as a unit of analysis? Political socialization approaches argue that national character exists and embodies political-cultural norms passed down from generation to generation (Duijker & Frijda, 1960; Benedict, 1934, 1946). Psychological approaches focus on a psycho-biological imperative to internalize the same identity and, as a group, to jointly protect and enhance their shared identity (Bloom, 1990, p. 23). Collective memory is another source of national identity. National identity stems from interpretation of a polity's history, and national

identities can change when there are shifts in collective memory, which is often due to a transfer of the polity's collective consciousness from one group or level of a polity to another (Prizel, 1998, pp. 48–56; see also Lebow, 2016, 48–56). Miller (2013) argued that collective memory of trauma can be passed down intergenerationally by carrier groups who are either elites or survivors that have ideational and material interests in sustaining said memory as a society.

There are thus several bases for treating national masses as a unit of analysis. Nonetheless, national masses are not a constant. National self-identification must be performed. Nationalism only triggers identification "if it interprets and provides an appropriate attitude for an experienced reality" (Bloom, 1990, p. 52). Just as self-identification with the nation varies over time (Wedeen, 2009), the effects of nationalism wax and wane. National identity and national masses become important causal variables when a mass of people have identified with national symbols such that they can act as one group when these symbols are threatened or can be enhanced.

Policy elites. Policy elites include a whole host of actors with influence over foreign policy such as political parties, interest groups, civil society organizations, and individual decision makers (e.g., presidents, lawmakers). They can construct coherent national identities in order to achieve important goals, such as a state's strategic needs (Tilly, 1975; Weber, 1976) or the objectives of competing aristocratic and intellectual elites (Smith, 1991, pp. 95–96). Policy elites can self-identify as nationalists (e.g., leaders of nationalist parties), adopt policy platforms that appeal to nationalist sentiments, and justify certain behaviors by appealing to the national interest. They can also employ nationalism to compete for influence over foreign policy by supporting specific national self-images or visions of the national interest; and their influence can stem from which view gains dominance (Clunan, 2009; Mylonas & Shelef, 2014).

Policy elites may not be wholly strategic actors, however. Foreign policy decision makers, similar to average citizens, are members of social cognitive structures. Their understanding of other states is in relation to an understanding of their own state, which is a discursive formation constructed domestically out of multiple identities (Hopf, 2002, p. 37). Like other types of identity, national identity makes some actions more probable than others because, together with discursive formations, it makes the world intelligible and a "national interest" conceivable.

Nation-state. Kowert (1999) argued that states have "internal" and "external" identities. Internal identities provide state cohesion and external identities establish distinctiveness—the two are related and mutually reinforcing. States may adopt foreign policies that seem irrational but are consistent with a purported national character. Scholars have turned to inferring identity from behavior over time, from particular historical or geographical settings, and from perception of political, economic, or cultural differences between nations (see Kowert, 1999, pp. 21–23). Nation-states can also vary in degrees of nationhood, as Brubaker (1996) would put it. Cottam and Cottam (2001, p. 24) identify the key indicators of a nation-state's strength as: the existence of an elite trying to universalize the national identity, the level of mass participation, the feasibility of statehood, and the community's uniqueness.

The ontological security research program anthropomorphizes states as having a psychological need for identity and for keeping that identity stable. States need stable identities to cope with a threatening and unpredictable international environment. Officials invoke identities and related routines to justify foreign policies; and policies inconsistent with identities and the values they entail can elicit punishment (Huysmans, 1998; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2005). In brief, consistent self-identification is caused and maintained by foreign policy routines. The

notion of ontological security, however, has not gone unquestioned. Some argue that states lack an ontological basis for self-identification. Instead, national identities are imposed on states by competing domestic elites and by other members of international society. Thus states have multiple and possibly conflicting national identities (Lebow, 2016, chapter 2). And some states have more contested national identities than others (Shevel, 2011).

Mechanisms: Exogenous, Interactive, and Endogenous to Foreign Policy. Mechanisms that translate nationalism or national identity into foreign policy choices are legion. For example, general theories about social identities (Hopf, 2002), ideologies (Haas, 2005, 2012), and emotional diplomacy (Hall, 2011, 2015; Hall & Ross, 2015), among others, can subsume nationalism-related variables. We therefore limit ourselves to mechanisms described by scholars explicitly theorizing about *nationalism.*[1]

The relationship between identity and behavior is not unidirectional. It is tempting to assume that identity determines interests, which then determine behavior. In other words, nationalism is always an independent variable. But behavior can also shape interests and identities. When individuals, political parties, or states act in a way that violates their self-identification, recognizing this tension often prompts a redefinition of identities. The latter is as common as the former (Lebow, 2016, pp. 71–72), and thus foreign policy is as likely to cause nationalism and national identification.

Exogenous to Foreign Policy. Attitudes driven by nationalism and national identity can influence individual policy preferences, which can shape public opinion that in turn influences foreign policy. Scholars link nationalism and national identity to a variety of foreign policy attitudes: the use of force (Herrmann, Isernia, and Segatti, 2009; Kam & Kinder, 2007; Machida, 2017), international alignment (Shulman, 2004), and immigration and assimilation (Kunovich, 2009), to name a few (see also Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Nincic & Ramos, 2012). The form nationalism takes is also important. When a particular nationalist ideology takes the form of ethnocentrism, for example, or emphasizes superiority and cultural homogeneity, this increases the likelihood of militarism, anti-Communist sentiment, belief in the morality of warfare, and conflictual responses to foreign policy issues (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987, 1990).

The role of public opinion on political decision making is the subject of an entire literature and cannot be examined here. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that public opinion is not only influential in democratic polities but also in authoritarian ones. The growing influence of public opinion has long been recognized by scholars of Chinese politics (e.g., Lampton, 2001). A commercially driven press and a vibrant Internet have amplified popular nationalism (Fewsmith & Rosen, 2001; Christensen, 2011; Zhao, 2013, pp. 10–11). For both democracies and autocracies, nationalism always narrows the conceptual boundaries of foreign policy discourse, placing into question the patriotism of those who stray from the consensus (Furtado, 1994).

Nationalism can also influence foreign policy outcomes as nationalist factions within the government jockey for power. Policy preferences can be tied very closely to national identity such that policy debates are indistinguishable from debates over a country's national identity. For example, in Japan, next to groups such as pacifists, mercantilists, and normalists, we also find the nationalists (Hirata, 2008). In Russia, scholars have identified Westernizers, statist/pragmatic nationalists, and hardline/civilizationist nationalists (March, 2011, p. 190; Tsygankov, 2009). According to this line of thinking, when nationalist groups secure control or have an overriding influence on foreign policy, ideological objectives come to the forefront, whether it be irredentist policies, persecution of minorities, or redrawing state borders. Cottam (1977) argues that if nationalist influence is

strong, then concern for the prestige, dignity, and world respect for the nation-state can be a primary motivation behind foreign policy; however, if the state is multinational (e.g., India, Soviet Union) then identification with the state is less intense than in nation-states.

Different "types" of national identity support different foreign policy frameworks. For example, Prizel (1998) argued that national identities based on political institutions rather than mythologies tend to be both legalistic and endowed with a sense of mission (e.g., United States, Great Britain); cultural national identities lead to foreign policies that affirm the polity's status as a unique culture and a great power, often with few tangible benefits (e.g., France); and theocratic nationalism emerges in countries whose religion falls outside the mainstream of world religion and where religious uniqueness is used to define the "other" (e.g., czarist Russia, contemporary Iran).

A complementary approach looks specifically at ideological content rather than specific national identities per se. Nation-states formerly subjected to extractive colonialism can experience the effects of collective trauma, leading them to adopt a "post-imperial ideology" that defines their foreign policy behavior (Miller, 2013). Post-imperial ideology endows a sense of victimization, which in turn sets three foreign policy goals: to be recognized and empathized with as a victim by others in the international system, maximizing territorial sovereignty, and maximizing status. This ideology is also reflected in behavioral patterns: these nation-states adopt the position of victim and cast those it interacts with as victimizers, justify their international stances using a discourse of oppression and discrimination, hold stricter views on territorial inviolability, and are sensitive to perceived loss of face that relates to a desire to regain a "lost" status (Miller, 2013, p. 25).

Cottam and Cottam (2001) found that the more nationalistic a country, the more likely its citizens will respond to international events and perceive the international environment as hostile. Whether mass national publics directly perceive the international event or indirectly view it through frames proffered by policy elites, they are concerned primarily about national prestige. The concept of national prestige encapsulates the broad notion that national identity can be enhanced, harmed, and defended. Concern about national prestige and status can animate both domestic political competition (Bloom, 1990, pp. 83–84) and international politics (Gilpin, 1981; Renshon, 2017).

The relationship *between* national identities can also significantly influence foreign policy. Rozman (2012) views state dyads through the lens of relational identities in which past bilateral relations cast a long shadow, particularly when history is indispensable for regime legitimacy. National identity is an idealization of the in-group and a contrasting out-group that heightens the former's own distinctive identity. National identity "gaps" indicate how substantial and sensitive the contrast is: the narrower the gap, the easier it is for states to improve bilateral relations. Gaps can be widened by mutual obsession or narrowed by pragmatic approaches to diplomacy. In a similar vein, Lebow (2016, pp. 68–69) argued that the most enduring antagonisms are between peoples of postcolonial states because their post-independence identities are shaped by their conflicts with their neighbors.

Domestic-International Interactions. Nationalism's effects are not always exogenous. They are often triggered directly or indirectly by international events. A prominent model interacting domestic and international levels of analysis is Bloom's (1990) "national identity dynamic." International events are presented to the mass national public in such a way that they perceive a threat to their national identity or an opportunity to enhance it. The nation will then mobilize as one group to secure, protect, and enhance said national identity. In addition, the national identity dynamic is both an opportunity and a threat to incumbent political authorities. It is an opportunity because mobilizing mass national

sentiment "is the widest possible mobilization that is available within a state" (Bloom, 1990, p. 81). But it is also a threat because political factions within the domestic polity compete to appropriate the national identity dynamic and be perceived as the party whose policies and rhetoric most enhances national identity and protects it from foreign threat. Stoking national pride also makes de-escalation more difficult—territorial disputes when paired with national pride are incredibly hard to resolve (Horiuchi, 2014; Lai, 2013; Hassner, 2003).

The intuition behind the national identity dynamic remains visible in subsequent formulations. For example, in the case of irredentist foreign policies, Woodwell (2007, p. 18) conceives of a homeland state's leadership as caught between international pressures to respect sovereignty and domestic nationalist pressures to prioritize transborder national kin. If a diaspora community rebels, it increases the probability of conflict initiation by the homeland state due to a norm of reciprocal obligation among members of a nation. Interaction between domestic and international arenas is especially relevant for theories of irredentism and diaspora politics, which are discussed in more detail below.

Endogenous to International Factors and Foreign Policy. Foreign policy choices can trigger national self-identification. The endogeneity of nationalism is most visible during (or right after) war. Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth (2015) showed that winning wars can bring about higher levels of national identification. Darden and Mylonas (2016) argued that heightened territorial competition, particularly in the form of fifth columns, provides ruling political elites with incentives to engage in nation building. Posen (1993b) contended that Napoleon's choice to build a mass army and Prussia's defeat by France prompted the spread of nationalism. Finally, according to Mylonas (2012), whether a country has revisionist or status quo foreign policy goals has an impact on what nation-building policies it will pursue. These are all examples of how foreign policy choices and international conditions may affect the emergence, spread, and manifestation of nationalism.

National identities can be challenged by competing narratives from factions among policy elites, civil society, and collective memory. An alternative to the sociologically "thick" view of states possessing a single identity (e.g., ontological security research) is a role-based approach. National role theories conceptualize roles as carrying scripts that states follow (Holsti, 1970; Herrmann & Fischerkeller, 1995; Walker, 1987). Certain international roles heighten individual self-esteem by playing to the institutions, values, and accomplishments that allegedly make a culture and state superior. At the same time, leaders seek high-status roles that build solidarity and strengthen their political position (Lebow, 2016, p. 105).

EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS

In this section we take a closer look at social science research addressing two important topics in foreign policy analysis, namely war onset and the role of nationalist or antiforeign protests in crisis diplomacy. The literature is vast but we focus on these topics because the former is at the heart of foreign policy analysis since its birth and the latter is a rapidly developing part in the literature.

Nationalism and War. Without wading into debates about the ontological basis for adjectives attached to wars (e.g., ethnic, religious), we understand nationalist wars to be militarized conflicts "fought in the name of the identity, territorial integrity, and political autonomy of the nation" (Hutchinson, 2017, p. 161). This definition is agnostic about the causal relationship: nationalism may lead to war, but war may also lead to nationalism. The goal is not to settle the question of whether nationalism causes war, or vice versa, but to survey the existing literature and present the main arguments.

This section organizes the various approaches to the nationalism-war relationship into three:

varieties of nationalism, the nation-state model, and international order.[2]

Varieties of Nationalism. It is easy to forget that nationalism can be considered a pacifistic ideology that brings stability to the inter*national* system. In the late 18th century, Johann Gottfried von Herder's *Letters on the Advancement of Mankind* (1793–1797) argued that nations do not fight one another but in fact help each other. Gellner (1964) described nation-states as the foundation of the liberal international order. In contrast, most of the literature on nationalist war either assumes or tries to explain why nationalist ideology is inherently prone toward war. Kedourie (1966) penned the seminal work defending the conceptualization of nationalism as a war-prone ideology. He argued that nationalist leaders follow utopian dreams that lead to totalitarian dictatorships, civil wars, persecuted minorities, and mass mobilization against imperialism in the non-Western world.

National identification creates an in-group/out-group boundary that can become militarized when nationalism intensifies (Schrock-Jacobson, 2012). National identification can take several forms. Domestically, security dilemmas between ethnic groups (Posen, 1993a) can result from elites using the emotional power of ethnic myths and symbolic politics to drive chauvinistic political mobilization (Kaufman, 2006, 2015). Nationalists use historical myths to justify power grabs (Mayall, 1990, pp. 57–64). And elites that use nationalist myths to justify expansionist policies can experience ideological blowback such that they become convinced of their own propaganda (Snyder, 1991). Similarly, Kaldor (2004) describes the Balkan Wars as driven by "backward looking" nationalism. Hutchinson (1994) traces the settlement movement in the West Bank to belief in a divine mission to regain biblical lands. Moreover, several empirical studies conclude that nationalism influences individual attitudes about the use of force (Herrmann et al., 2009; Kam & Kinder, 2007; Machida, 2017).

Theories of international security incorporate nationalism as a source of misperception in the decision making process leading to war (Van Evera, 1990–1991, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1990).[3] Hyper-nationalism generates aggressive foreign policies as states misconstrue others' intentions and their own capabilities. Nationalist revolutionary movements tend to "portray their enemies as evil, victory as certain, and their own goals as pure and idealistic" (Walt, 1996, p. 29). And hyper-nationalist countries approach war recklessly because they are overconfident in their own innate superiority. Given these perceptual biases, a state assumes that its own actions are unambiguously benign while imputing hostility and unlimited revisionism to the opposing side's behavior. This negative spiral can eventually result in war.

Rather than treating nationalism as inherently war prone, other scholars investigated how the effects of nationalist ideology vary according to the type of nationalism, its combination with other ideologies, or permissive conditions. Not all nationalist ideologies have the same content, so it is possible that the content of nationalism, not its intensity, determines the likelihood of violence. Kohn (1944) famously distinguished between civic nationalism and ethno-organic nationalism, the latter being more prone to violence than the former.[4] But several other categorizations exist. For example, Powers (2015) distinguishes between communities based on shared history and "we-feelings" versus social identities based on equality. The former constitutes a single collective and extends equality and value only to in-group members, whereas the latter is characterized by tit-for-tat interactions and in-kind reciprocity. Put another way, communities based on a "we-feeling" promote aggression and conflict by stigmatizing the outgroup, but equality-based social identities only lead to violence in response to violence. Similarly, studies that separate patriotism from nationalism describe the former as an expression of love toward one's state without referring to other states, whereas the latter

entails a sense of superiority (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

Nationalism's varied effects can also be attributed to combinations with other ideologies. For example, ethnic nationalism turned into fascist ideologies when mixed with social Darwinist ideas (Viroli, 1997). Civic and ethnic nationalism are arguably compatible with both authoritarianism and liberalism; and the trigger for violence is in fact the security of nationalist elites (Brown, 2000, chapter 3). In sum, since the core nationalist goal is political independence of a national homeland, nationalist ideology might only become violent when this goal is opposed by other belief systems.

Even if we accept nationalist ideology as inherently violent, its influence over foreign policy may be conditioned by institutional openings and incentives for elites to harness nationalism for political purposes. Mansfield and Snyder argue that the democratization process or partial democratization interacts with nationalism to produce aggressive foreign policies (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2005; Snyder, 1991, 2000). While stable democracies exhibit pacifist tendencies, states in a democratic transition are more bellicose. Incumbent elites threatened by an incoming democratic order will resort to nationalist rhetoric and belligerent strategies to shore up popular support and to compete in democratic politics. Depending on their skills and assets and the strength of the democratic institutions, elites will appeal to distinct types of nationalism (ethnic, civic, revolutionary, counter-revolutionary) that carry different visions of the collective good and criteria for identifying group members (Snyder, 2000).

The Nation-State Model. Nation-states may be inseparable from militarism because—more often than not—they are established through war and subsequently carry adversarial memories of their neighbors. Nationalism might drive states to make war, but war has historically also made the nation-state (Tilly, 1975). In the European context, nation-states combined nationalism with a civilizing mission in their imperial possessions, while competing with other European states over national prestige (Howard, 2011; see also Bell, 2007, 2016).

War and insecurity are important drivers of nation-building. Posen (1993b) argued that Prussian nation-building was a deliberate type of military technology in response to Napoleon's mass armies. Material and ideational instability create situations where new ways of war, such as a growing reliance on citizen armies, can emerge and spread (Avant, 2000). Countries in geopolitically unstable regions invest more in nation-building through mass schooling with national content in order to bolster citizen loyalty in the face of external dangers (Darden & Mylonas, 2016). Citing the case of German unification after the Franco-Prussian war, Sambanis, Skaperdas, and Wohlforth (2015) argued that political leaders may fight wars to enhance national prestige because the elevation of status that follows victory can strengthen national identification among citizens. And the spoils of war can increase state capacity that reduces internal conflict. In contrast, the absence of security competition between African colonies, for example, led to weak postcolonial states with few incentives to invest heavily in nation-building (Herbst, 2000; see also Jackson, 1990).

Combining war-prone nationalism with the bellicist origin story of the nation-state, Wimmer (2013) explained how war within and between states resulted directly from the historic shift from empires and theocracies to states based on the principles of national self-determination and popular rule. He identifies three reasons for this violent outcome: (1) the colonial struggle for independence from empires led to wars of secession, (2) newly created nation-states fought irredentist wars over ethnically mixed territories or to annex territory populated by co-ethnics in neighboring countries, and (3) civil wars erupted in multiethnic states where dominant ethnic

elites excluded minorities. Nationalist violence, however, is seldom (if ever) the result of ancient ethnic hatreds. It almost always stoked by elite factions for domestic political gain, such as silencing the opposition (Gagnon, 1994–1995).

Self-Determination and the International Order. Nationalism has also caused conflict by destabilizing an international system once dominated by empires, which in turn created power disequilibria ripe for war (Hutchinson, 2017, chapter 3). According to Hutchinson, first, when legitimacy is based on popular rule rather than divine right, previous treaties and existing territorial order are threatened. Second, mobilizing popular masses to support economic and military development increased the power of nation-states relative to their dynastic-imperial neighbors: this, in turn, forced them to respond, often by pursuing their own nation-building policies. Third, the rising powerful nation-states in the international system envisioned the world order in national terms. And fourth, nationalist revolutions and decolonization movements transformed the territorial division of the globe by creating over a hundred new nation-states, often through peace treaties following violent conflict.

But, what qualifies a people to establish a sovereign state has changed over time. Although some scholars view sovereignty norms as progressing through different "revolutions" (Philpott, 2001), others argue that sovereignty norms are cyclical (Barkin & Cronin, 1994). Despite disagreement over historical timing, spatial reach, and the specific content of changing sovereignty norms,[5] there is broad consensus that in the post–World War II era we observe a contradiction between norms of self-determination and territorial integrity (e.g., Dallmayr & Rosales, 2001). The very term "nation-state" reflects this tension: national sovereignty emphasizes the role of self-determination in legitimizing the independent political existence of a national people, whereas state sovereignty is founded on the norm of territorial integrity (Zacher, 2001; Griffiths, 2016). National self-determination and state sovereignty are both central for a nation-state. Different major or great powers, however, emphasize one or the other at different points in time with important consequences for the international system as well as the shape of borders. The decision to admit new sovereign states into the international system can arise from parochial interests of the strongest incumbent members (Coggins, 2014). Recognition of new sovereign states can also stem from expectations about what kinds of foreign policy roles the aspirant sovereign state is expected to adopt. From a role theory perspective on state socialization, an aspirant's adoption of the sovereign role is necessarily implicated in the substantive foreign policy roles played by existing states (Beasley & Kaarbo, 2017).

Accepting the principle of national self-determination introduced fundamental tensions in the international system (Mayall, 1990). The principle of nationalism allowed national minorities to justify secession, while the principle of territorial integrity gave dominant nations the right to defend the boundaries of existing states (Mylonas & Shelef, 2014). National self-determination is incomplete because there is a state-to-nation imbalance, with more nations than states (Connor, 1978, pp. 382–383; Gellner, 1983, p. 44). According to Miller (2007), this imbalance is a basic motivation for war and explains why some regions are more prone to war than others. The principle of national self-determination has also introduced domestic conflict: Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) argued that the uptick in intrastate wars is being caused by the appropriation of the state by ethnic groups who then identify themselves with the nation and exclude other politically significant groups from power and resources. Although interstate war has declined since 1945, intra-state war has increased and it often takes an ethnic character (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Another modality through which nationalism and territorial integrity clash with each other is through irredentism—the situation where a state makes territorial claims based on shared ethnic ties to a kin group residing within another state (Hechter, 2000). Saideman and Ayres (2008) focused on why irredentism emerges in some cases but not in others and argued that internal forces drive irredentist policy even at the risk of a country's self-destruction. In other words, they see nationalism as a force influencing domestic politics that then in turn impacts foreign policy decision making. Mylonas (2012) took issue with this line of argument highlighting that often nation-states act as homelands for *some* of their co-ethnics but not for others. Thus, according to Mylonas, we need to understand the conditions under which a state decides to intervene in another country on behalf of its co-ethnics. In fact, it is even possible that a state's foreign policy goals lead to the "cultivation of co-ethnics" abroad in order to justify their revisionist interventions. In this framework, irredentism is a special form of revisionism and leads to interstate warfare among contiguous states either through military interventions or tit-for-tat retaliation coming from the neighboring state (2012, p. 43).

States have often tried to use their diasporas to exert international influence, both by engaging them abroad (King & Melvin, 1999–2000; Shain & Barth, 2003) and sometimes by attracting them back "home" (Tsuda, 2009; Mylonas, 2013). More often than not, the justification for such policies rests on the principle of nationalism. These populations are construed as belonging to the nation and as such they have responsibilities and special rights relative to people who are *not* co-nationals. Diasporas have been conceptualized as actors influencing foreign policy at the country of origin (Csergo & Goldgeier, 2004) and at the country of residence (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). Smith (2005) focuses on the influence of ethnic lobbies on U.S. foreign policy, raising questions about the compatibility between the pluralism of ethnic preferences and U.S. national interests. But in Shevel's (2011) work on post-Communist refugee policies the direction of causality is reversed; here it is the domestic contestation over the appropriate boundaries of a nation that have a direct impact on the options relating to refugee and diaspora policies. According to Shevel, countries where national identity issues are settled will pursue favorable treatment of co-ethnic refugees, while those with unresolved identity debates are more likely to pursue neutral policies toward all groups. Regardless of the direction of causality, the increased importance of diaspora policies in the contemporary world is manifested in the exponential growth of diaspora institutions across states (Gamlen, 2014).

Nationalist Protest and Diplomacy. The study of nationalist or anti-foreign protests has brought up important implications for the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. Especially among autocratic regimes, where autocratic elections, if they exist, are an ineffective mechanism for accountability, protests become an important way to express public opinion (Beissinger, 2002). Similar to nationalism and war, nationalist protests and crisis diplomacy are not straightforwardly related. For instance, swelling popular nationalism might exogenously drive China's behavior during a crisis or even push China into one. At the same time, nationalist protest may be endogenous to China's bargaining strategy: Beijing may manufacture demonstrations to gain bargaining leverage over an opponent.

Theories that emphasize the agency of nationalists generally downplay the power of the state and highlight the power of societal actors. Nationalist protests occur because the state is unwilling or unable to prevent or contain them. Often a state's legitimacy is based in part on its nationalist credentials; therefore, state weakness is married to state reluctance to crack down on protests for fear of undermining its own position (Gries, 2004). In such situations, the state chooses to adopt

the protesters' foreign policy demands rather than risk domestic unrest. Although China is commonly portrayed as a competent and strong state, Susan Shirk argues that Beijng's foreign policy is vulnerable to popular nationalism and takes public opinion seriously (Shirk, 2007). Progress in communication technology and growing access to the Internet enhances public expression and coordination, which can further constrain the state's diplomatic room to maneuver (Wu, 2007). This line of argument does not disregard the empirical evidence that popular nationalism derives historically from elite mythmaking. China's patriotic education campaign that negatively portrayed Japan and enshrined Chinese victimization with the phrase "century of humiliation" is well documented (Wang, 2012). But even if elite mythmaking generates anti-foreign, nationalist sentiment, the government can find itself entrapped by its own domestic strategy and feel genuine pressure from mass opinion (Zheng, 1999; Zhao, 2004). At the same time, studies of national protests in the context of the Soviet Union have shown how rapidly a state can collapse when a tipping point is reached (Kuran, 1991).

The endogenous, state-centered models assume that the authoritarian state has secure dominance over society. Nationalism is an instrument of the state used to pursue state preferences, whether it be enhancing influence in international affairs (Zhao, 2000, pp. 21, 23), bolstering legitimacy (Zheng, 1999; Whiting, 1995), or creating narratives of victimization against foreign rivals (Wang, 2012). Nationalist protests are used to distract the public from more serious domestic problems (Rubin, 2002; Chang, 2006; He, 2007), function as a pressure valve for aggrieved citizens, create a rally-around-the-flag phenomenon against an external enemy, or used by elites to pressure moderates to adopt tougher policy positions (Ijiri, 1990). In all these scenarios, there is an expectation that the state can use nationalism for domestic benefits without being constrained by it (Shen, 2004).

But can the state actually "unleash" nationalist protests without sacrificing some policy autonomy? A third approach interacts state and society variables and treats nationalist protests both as genuine mobilization and as a tool of the Chinese state. Fewsmith and Rosen (2001) modeled the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in China using three dimensions: elite cohesion, opinion mobilization, and bilateral relations (i.e., China and the United States). They predict that the government is more likely to tolerate nationalist protests when elite cohesion is low, opinion mobilization is high, and bilateral relations are tense. The likelihood of protest suppression increases when each of the dimensions are flipped. Reilly (2012) described cyclical waves of public nationalist sentiment. The Chinese government responds to these waves with repression, persuasion, and censorship to divert nationalist mobilization away from targeting the regime. And in response to public outrage, Beijing finds ways to change foreign policy tactics while remaining true to its general strategies.

The state can also actively resist domestic nationalist impulses, particularly in authoritarian regimes. For instance, Russian imperial and Soviet foreign policy elites tried to insulate foreign policymaking from nationalist aggression, which was seen as useful for domestic consolidation but dangerous in the foreign policy realm (Tuminez, 2000). This is evidence of the potency of nationalist ideology and its mobilization potential. Strong states, however, have effectively channeled nationalist sentiment. China's increasingly assertive foreign policy is arguably not a concession to popular nationalism but a convergence of Chinese state nationalism and popular nationalism based on China's growing wealth and military capacities (Zhao, 2013).

Weiss (2014) applied credible signaling and audience costs (concepts from international relations theory) to the study of nationalist protest. She argues that Beijing uses anti-foreign protests to signal resolve or reassurance to opponents in a crisis (see also Weiss, 2013;

Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016). On the one hand, permitting nationalist protests to occur can credibly signal resolve because protests can mobilize previously passive groups, cascade to a critical size, and expose weaknesses and divisions in the government. By allowing the protests, Beijing is generating audience costs that make it hard to back down. On the other hand, the government also has the capacity to repress protests as a signal of reassurance.

The effects of nationalist protest on China's foreign policy remains an open question. China scholars have questioned Weiss's notion that Beijing is willing to prioritize foreign policy over domestic stability, given China's well-known obsession with "stability maintenance" (*weiwen*). Chen (2016) argued, for example, that the decision to tolerate, discourage, or repress nationalist protests at either the initial stage or escalated stage will depend on domestic factors such as elite cohesion, level of public support for protests, and whether protest demands are spilling over to issues other than anti-foreign concerns.

CONCLUSION

Foreign policy analysis exists at the intersection of international relations and domestic politics, between interstate behavior and the behavior of individuals, groups, and governments within individual countries. In other words, "the study of foreign policy serves as a bridge by analyzing the impact of both external and internal politics on states' relations with each other" (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2012, p. 2). The role of nationalism in shaping foreign policy, however, has been more systematically studied in domestic politics than at the international level. One cause may be semantic confusion: seminal texts conflate the term "nation" and the concept of the "state" when describing politics among nations (Morgenthau, 1968), taking the nation-state as a given category (Waltz, 1979), and labeling state interests as *national* interests even where nationalism is not the principle for legitimating authority (Finnemore, 1996). Several of the theories described in prior sections are in fact developed by international relations scholars, but, for whatever reason, the main paradigms of international relations theory treat nationalism in a largely ad hoc manner.

Realists began to incorporate nationalism more systematically as a causal variable in the 1990s (e.g., Van Evera, 1994; Mearsheimer, 1990), in part driven by the growing influence of neoclassical realism and a desire to explain foreign policy behavior using domestic variables (e.g., Snyder, 1991). Constructivists have focused on national identity variables, but such identities have included strategic identities (e.g., ally, enemy) in addition to more cultural-historical identities (e.g., defender of the faithful). Some securitization scholars can be seen as theorizing the construction of national identities through narratives and framing (Krebs, 2015). Recently, Lebow (2016) developed a framework that attempts to incorporate national identity more systematically into international relations theory. Finally, liberal institutionalists have mostly ignored nationalism, focusing instead on international organizations and regimes that erode the sovereignty of nation-states and reorient their identities and interests away from the "nation." Liberal institutionalists are implicitly aligned with liberal internationalism's broader normative project of constructing a liberal order, in contrast to conservative internationalism's vision of great power politics that seeks to preserve robust nation-states (e.g., Nau, 2015; Miller, 2016).

Explaining foreign policy is challenging because foreign policy decision making processes look different in different countries. In this effort, it is imperative to turn to both comparative politics and international relations theory. Variables that are prominently featured in international relations, such as interstate war and the balance of power, have significant effects on the development of nationalism in the domestic sphere and should inform comparative politics theorizing. And international relations research can benefit from a more

robust understanding of nationalism and its underpinnings, which have been a more closely studied in comparative politics. This cross-fertilization will benefit foreign policy analysis.

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NOTES

1. For example, this article does not discuss the role of mass national publics in the foreign policy decision making process except when the demands of the masses are theorized as being driven by national identification. For a discussion of mass national publics, see Morgenthau, 1968, pp. 547–548; Rosenau, 1961; and Almond, 1950.
2. Hutchinson (2017, chapter 5) adds a fourth approach, which is to look at the nation as distinct from the state. This approach views nationalist war from a functionalist perspective in that violent sacrifice produces and reproduces the nation. Neo-Durkheimians describe how blood sacrifice performed by soldiers develops a cult of martyrdom, a sense of national cohesion, and a moral obligation to maintain the social order that the martyrs died to protect (Mosse, 1990; Marvin & Ingle, 1999). Feminists point to the performance of collective violence by male soldiers in defense of the feminized "motherland" as asserting or reclaiming masculinity in culture and societal roles (Sluga, 1998; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1989; Bracewell, 2000; Aslam, 2012).
3. Nationalist ideology can also lead to violent domestic policies as nationalists fulfill a homogenizing imperative. Mann (2004) argues that democracy provides majoritarian justification to persecute minorities in an attempt to make the boundaries of *demos* congruent with *ethnos*. Strategies of "pathological homogenization" can lead to mass displacement, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Rae, 2002). The internal divisions that drive civil wars after countries achieve independence are expressed as competing conceptions of the national myth, whether it be secular-religious distinctions or class-based perspectives (Kissane, 2013). Nationalist ideology may also affect the character of war by glorifying unlimited war such that the distinction between the military and civilians is blurred (Shaw 2003; Cederman, Warren, & Sornette, 2011) or national freedom is elevated as a principle above all others (Nabulsi, 1999).
4. The distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism has been heavily criticized; see Brubaker, 2004; Kreutzer, 2006; Calhoun, 2007; Zimmer, 2003.
5. One such debate is whether state sovereignty began with the Westphalia Treaty of 1648; see Osiander, 2001; Bartelson, 1995; Teschke, 2003.

Harris Mylonas and Kendrick Kuo

NEGOTIATION IN FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

International negotiations have long been seen as one of the two centerpieces of international relations, representing the cooperative counterpart to the study of war. The daily execution of foreign policy itself is often characterized by the diplomatic back and forth between countries that starts with differences in interests and then ends with reaching peaceful agreements that result in compromise satisfying the political and security needs of the relevant parties. In fact, cooperation is often defined as the mutual adjustment of policy to account for the preferences of other actors for mutual benefit (Keohane, 1984). So, while the shadow of war is a constant concern of world leaders and is ever present in international politics, most interactions between most countries on most days are peaceful. In these peaceful and cooperative interactions, implicit or explicit negotiations are at play.

In the last 30 years, this fact has led to the development of a significant set of findings regarding how foreign policy operates and how to think about the problems that arise. Drawing on ideas articulated by Schelling (1960, 1966) at the height of the Cold War, modern international relations has focused on the bargaining framework for thinking about