STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

FOREWORD

This syllabus for the Strategy and War Course for the College of Naval Command and Staff and Naval Staff College, August 2024—November 2024, provides both an overview and a detailed, lesson-by-lesson description to assist students in their reading and preparation for seminar. Administrative information is also included.

Submitted:

Marybeth P. Ulrich
Chair,
Strategy and Policy Department

Approved:

HODGES.DOYLE.KENDALL.1043685798

Digitally signed by HODGES.DOYLE.KENDALL.1043685798
Date: 2024.06.24 16:05:16 -04'00'

Doyle K. Hodges
Dean of Academics,
U.S. Naval War College

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASE STUDIES

STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE DESCRIPTION

Course Introduction

The opening of the 2022 National Security Strategy asserts, "Our world is at an inflection point. How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come."[1] The objective of the Strategy and War Course is to impart the habits of strategic thought and the strategic literacy necessary to confront this challenging, uncertain, and dangerous national security environment.

The thought processes and core concepts presented in the Strategy and War Course serve as a foundation for Naval War College students and especially supports the program learning outcome for graduates to: "*Apply theory, history, concepts of sea power, and doctrine through critical thought in professional communication*." To obtain this outcome, the Strategy and War Course employs a combination of theoretical frameworks, case studies, and course themes to enhance skills in judgment, character, diplomacy, and communication that Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro, identified in April 2024 as necessary for developing "the best critical and analytical thinkers to fight the wars of today and tomorrow."[2]

Strategic literacy begins with theoretical frameworks. These are derived from several sources including the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Stafford Corbett, and Mao Zedong. The influence of these classic works on current strategic thought cannot be denied. Reflecting on his war college education, General Colin Powell wrote, "Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries."[3] Though these voices from the past have enduring value, they require amplification and discussion to translate their ideas to the contemporary environment; thus, the course includes additional theoretical concepts as well as the special insights from our distinguished faculty.

These theoretical foundations are applied to historical case studies and ultimately to the contemporary environment. The historical cases provide opportunities to evaluate and discuss how strategic planners and military leaders in real-world circumstances have addressed the challenges associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The historical case studies chosen for the course allow students to examine three distinct types, or "boxes," of war. The first box comprises major, protracted wars fought between great power coalitions in multiple

---

[1] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), forward. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf

[2] Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy, Remarks for Navy Education for Seapower Advisory Board Open Forum, Newport, Rhode Island, 4 April 2024. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Speeches/display-speeches/Article/3730567/secnav-delivers-remarks-for-navy-education-for-seapower-advisory-board-open-for/

[3] Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 207.

theaters and often for high stakes. The second type of war refers to regional conflicts fought within single theaters, perhaps involving coalitions, typically for shorter durations, and often for lesser stakes. The third box encompasses insurgencies, or internal conflicts, fought within single countries against failing, emerging, or well-established states. Like boxes, wars may nest within one another, resulting in "wars within wars." During the Vietnam War, for example, an insurgency raged in South Vietnam within the context of a regional war between South Vietnam, with the support of the United States, and North Vietnam. Both the insurgency and the regional war occurred within the Cold War, a global competition with very high stakes.

We will study multiple historical cases involving each box of war to develop an understanding of what tends to occur in analogous situations and why. Strategy and War's nine course themes guide us in such explorations. For example, understanding what normally draws coalition partners together and what drives coalition members apart is essential to course theme number seven, "The Multinational Arena." This theme is applied to multiple case studies that involve coalitions and more formal alliances. The application of all course themes continues with the final two contemporary cases which allow students an opportunity to apply the wisdom of past experiences as distilled through the course themes to more ambiguous future environments.

The first six course themes follow a process to identify the relationship of policy, strategy, and operations. The process draws together intelligence, involves assessments, and requires the development of plans. The next theme then considers the available instruments of war. Strategy does not end there. Forces must be employed to obtain strategic effects. Myriad reasons will force leaders to reassess and adapt. The process themes seek successful war termination. The final three course themes address the broader strategic environment including the multinational arena, institutional context, and cultures and societies. Environmental themes tend to impact all of the six process themes.

To prepare for operational and strategic leadership, students in the Strategy and War Course analyze the leadership of some of history's most famous admirals and generals. Studying these historic figures provides insight into recurrent problems that have confronted senior leaders when seeking strategic effects from operations. However, the need for skilled leadership extends beyond senior military leaders. Their staffs—not to mention interagency and coalition partners—must be prepared in intellect, temperament, and doctrine to assess and fight a diverse array of enemies, obtain strategic effects, and make transitions between phases of war as well as between war and its aftermath.

Critical strategic thinking constitutes the hallmark of the Strategy and War Course. We achieve this through a graduate-level interdisciplinary approach integrating a diverse array of academic disciplines, including history, economics, political science, international relations, and security studies. Together, these provide students with the opportunity to grapple with the complex relationship among policy, strategy, and operations, lifting perspectives above the tactical-level while sharpening critical thinking about joint warfighting. In-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies relating to the use of force prepares students to meet the challenges of both the current and future strategic environments. Thus, the course encourages the application of knowledge gained in the case studies, guided by strategic theory and course themes, to provide tools to more critically, creatively, and effectively confront the complex problems that

leaders will encounter in the future. The course does not provide answers to those problems, but empowers students to ask more effective questions and critically reason.

In conclusion, we can look back to another perilous time in U.S. history during the waning days of the Vietnam War when Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner served as President of the Naval War College. Rather than train officers, he demanded the education of leaders:

> If you attempt to make this a prep school for your next duty assignment, you will have missed the purpose of being here. If we trained you for a particular assignment or type of duty, the value of this college would be short-lived. We want to educate you to be capable of doing well in a multitude of future duties…. Your objective here should be to improve your reasoning, logic, and analysis.[4]

The Strategy and War Course embodies Turner's mission to place education over training by challenging students to hone their "reasoning, logic, and analysis" with the objective of developing productive habits of thought crucial for identifying solutions to complex problems in uncertain environments.

Course Methodology

The course comprises eleven case studies. The first exposes students to foundational theoretical tools to build strategic literacy and a common vocabulary that can be applied in subsequent case studies and ultimately the joint warfighting environment. The next eight case studies address historical wars to allow students to develop a diverse knowledge set. Studying what occurs in a wide variety of conflicts and why, allows students to develop judgment, reasoning, logic, and analysis to more effectively approach contemporary and future challenges. The final cases provide students with an opportunity to apply knowledge obtained earlier in the course to the contemporary environment.

Each case study includes expansive readings. Though the amount of reading may be daunting, analyzing vast amounts of evidence and identifying the most salient points is an essential skill when engaging with the complex problems of the contemporary warfighting environment. Lectures in each case study go beyond the scope of the readings. They also provide tools to structure the evidence found in the readings while illustrating theory and common themes. Finally, the lectures provide students with an opportunity to engage with subject matter experts.

During the trimester students will write three essays informed by the readings, lectures, and engagement with seminar moderators: each essay requires students to communicate in a detailed, critical, analytical, and structured manner about a strategic problem. Though one rarely has time to think in such detail in the joint warfighting environment, structured and detailed

[4] Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education," *Naval War College Review* vol. 25, no. 2 (Nov-Dec 1972), p. 6.

thinking serves as an educational prerequisite to prepare students for addressing complex, real-world problems and communicating potential solutions.

The readings, lectures, and student essays empower graduate-level, discussion-based seminars. It is in seminar that the case studies culminate with small groups of students critically and analytically interacting with their colleagues and their military-civilian teaching teams. The seminar is the laboratory where students can challenge one another and themselves. In the tradition of Clausewitzian critical analysis, students will develop strategic arguments by investigating leadership decisions, considering alternative courses of action, and identifying better alternatives.

Course Purpose and Requirement

The Strategy and War Course examines Intermediate-Level Education Joint Learning Areas and Objectives for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff via the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP), CJCSI 1800.01G, signed April 15, 2024. Apart from meeting OPMEP objectives, the Strategy and War Course addresses additional areas of emphasis put forward in the U.S. Navy's guidance on Professional Military Education, the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College, and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. Lastly, the course reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

Learning Outcomes

The Department of Defense has adopted outcomes-based assessment of student learning. To that end, the Naval War College has developed the following College of Naval Command and Staff/Naval Staff College (JPME I) Program Learning Outcomes:

1. Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition.
2. Create theater and national military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments.
3. Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to decision-making in theater-level, joint, and multinational operations.
4. Apply theory, history, concepts of sea power, and doctrine through critical thought in professional communication.

In support of the overarching program learning outcomes, the Strategy and Policy Department has defined the following Course Learning Outcomes, and expects that students who successfully complete the Strategy and War Course will be able to:

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of action within wars.

2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.

STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE THEMES

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes are neither a checklist of things to do, a set of "school solutions," nor conventional wisdom. The conduct of war can never be reduced to formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply questions to provoke thought and discussion. They are used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness in contemporary war. They furnish overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes constitute a starting point for critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the process of matching strategy and operations and those concerning the environment in which that process takes place. All of the course themes are present in each of the case studies; however, beginning with the second case study, several themes are especially highlighted through each case's readings, lectures, and questions.

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE PROCESS

1. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations

2. Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans

3. The Instruments of War

4. The Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations

5. Interaction, Reassessment, and Adaptation

6. War Termination

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT

7. The Multinational Arena

8. The Institutional Context

9. Cultures and Societies

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

Did the belligerents understand and spell out political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to reconsider the effort if it became too costly? Did leaders anticipate and manage costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth its likely costs and risks? How well did the belligerents build support for their aims and strategy at home and abroad?

Did the political leadership provide the military with strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict the use of force, and, if so, with what impact on chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent's political and military objectives? What assumptions did political and military leaders make about how attaining military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent believe its operations would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and operations support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? How available was intelligence to leaders who needed it? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions? Was intelligence collection and assessment shaped by social, ideological, or racial biases?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the character of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic and operational plans informed by the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did plans rely upon intelligence, deception, surprise, psychological operations, and strategic communication? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? To what degree did preconceived ideas about the adversary distort intelligence and planning? Did the initial plans consider problems of war termination?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders consider operational, logistical, or other constraints on the deployment and employment of instruments of war?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common assumptions about how force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations hindered integration of different forms of military power?

How did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation or changes in information technology? What role did influence operations and strategic communications play?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a vision of the desired end-state, an accurate assessment, and understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander's intent? Were operations joint and combined? Did operational leaders exploit opportunities, parry or counter enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations maximize the campaign's strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force? To what degree did information operations and strategic communications affect the outcome of the campaigns?

5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

How well did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the character of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its enemies fight on its own terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents

react to enemy operations and adjust to fog and friction? How did information operations affect the process of reassessment and adaptation?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater, did its decision signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a new opportunity created during the war? Did it make sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

How did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational reassessment of political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander opportunities to bring an end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side's operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did any antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory or attack to maintain pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor's political objectives? Did the closing operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? To what degree was the defeated state reincorporated into the international system?

To what extent did the relationship among the political and military leaders contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the character of the war affect the durability of the settlement? How did the populations of the victor and the defeated affect the peace settlement? Did the victor maintain sufficient strength and resolve to enforce the peace?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from allies? How successful were these efforts, and why? Did belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations while sharing burdens, and what were the consequences if not? How did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify or degrade the coalition? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the actions of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? Did their organizations facilitate planning, training for, and executing joint and combined operations? Did a process exist to coordinate military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities? If there was rivalry among military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy?

How did civil-military relations contribute to strategic success or failure? Were relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and with what consequences? How did the lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect the civil-military relationship? How did political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk? Did the actions of civil and military leaders result in the erosion of the institutions that underpinned their political system?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence strategy, operations, and military organization? Did a contender display a "strategic culture," or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? How did ideology affect the war's course and outcome? If the war involved competition for political

allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage? How did social divisions affect force structure and military operations?

Was the relationship among a belligerent's government, people, and military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations, and were they founded on the psychology and culture of target audiences? Did each belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes—to maintain support among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war? Was either side able to exploit social divisions in the opposing population?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership's effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?

COURSE PROCESS AND STANDARDS

1. Methodology. Each case study will be examined through a combination of lectures, readings, tutorials, student essays, and seminars.

2. Seminar Assignments. Each student will be assigned to a seminar for the duration of the course. Each seminar will be led by a faculty team composed of a practitioner and a civilian academic.

3. Lectures. Students will attend lectures relating to each case study. Lectures impart knowledge about the case studies, provide content to inform student essays, offer insights into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and discussion in seminar. There will be an opportunity for the students to address questions to each lecturer and students are highly encouraged to use this opportunity. The arguments expressed in Strategy and War Course lectures reflect the lecturer's expertise and do not necessarily represent the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government.

4. Readings. Before seminar, students are expected to read the books and articles assigned for that week, as well as the student essays prepared for that week. These assigned texts are the only readings required to prepare for seminar, write essays, and prepare for the final examination. Books must be returned upon completing the requirements for the course.

5. Course Requirements. In addition to viewing lectures, completing the assigned readings, and contributing to seminar discussions, students will write three essays: two seminar essays and one final examination. In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

Essays—25 percent for each of two essays
Final Examination—25 percent
Seminar Preparation and Contribution—25 percent

A final course grade of B- or above is required to earn a master's degree and a C- or above for JPME I credit. Grading takes place in accordance with the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*.

6. Seminar Essays. Each student will submit two essays, each ranging from 2,600-3,200 words (the word count does not include citations), on questions assigned from the syllabus. Essays should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font, double-spaced. The seminar moderators will assign students their two essay questions at the beginning of the term. When preparing an essay, the student will find all information required to answer the question in the readings and lectures for that case study. Students shall not consult sources outside of those listed in this syllabus without obtaining written permission from their moderators. For matters relating to the format for documentation, students should use either footnotes or endnotes. Since all readings are assigned in the syllabus, a bibliography is optional. Students should consult *The Chicago Manual of Style.*

All Strategy and War essays will be submitted to their moderators electronically through Turnitin Assignments set up in each Blackboard seminar course. Students may assess their papers through the Turnitin Student Workbooks in Blackboard to benefit from Turnitin's Similarity Report prior to final paper submission. For students, this will highlight areas that require additional consideration. For the similarity score in Turnitin, there is no percentage that means "all clear" and no percentage that means "big trouble." Papers with as low as a 10% similarity score may have serious plagiarism concerns. Turnitin requires students to go through the markup line by line to identify and correct any problems. When submitting papers through the Blackboard seminar course, students are still able to revise and resubmit the assignment in their student Turnitin folder up to the assignment deadline. However, submitting papers for evaluation to moderators through Blackboard is final. If there are Turnitin issues identified by a student after submission, the student should immediately contact the seminar moderators.

The student will submit the completed essay to each moderator, following the instruction in the previous paragraph, normally no later than 0830 on the day before the seminar meets. If seminars meet on Monday or immediately following a Federal Holiday, the student will submit their essays no later than 0830 on the day the seminar meets. Essays submitted late without permission from the moderators will receive severe deductions in grading. Please see the section titled "Grading Standards for Written Work" for a more complete explanation of penalties for late work. In addition to submitting the essay to the moderators, the student will distribute a copy to each member of the seminar. Students shall read all essays prepared by their seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake strategic analysis. A good essay is an analysis in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the assigned reading and lectures. There are five elements to a good essay: it answers the question; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, a counterargument to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does all of this in a clear and well-organized fashion.

These five elements serve as the foundation for a grading rubric that articulates expectations for the essay, sets criteria for grading, clarifies standards for a quality performance, and guides feedback about progress toward those standards. The ability to compose a succinct thesis, marshal evidence to prove the thesis, and rebut the most important counterarguments to it are the hallmarks of analytical thinking that allows students to communicate ideas with clarity and precision.

7. Final Examination. Students will take a comprehensive final examination at the end of the term. This examination draws upon the entire course. This exam is to be completed in 24 hours. The work must be entirely the student's own without any discussion or consultation with others. This is an open book exam: as such, students are permitted to use the readings assigned for the course as well as the course lectures. Students are not permitted to use other sources, including those available in print, electronically, or on the internet. The exam must be typed and double-spaced. Answers are not to exceed 2,600 words, double-spaced (12-point, Times New Roman font). The exam will be evaluated on the basis of the coherence and aptness of its argument, and the manner in which it draws on a broad range of evidence from the course case studies. A good

final examination will demonstrate the same five elements as an essay: it answers the question asked; it has a thesis; it marshals evidence to support that thesis; it considers, explicitly or implicitly, the counterarguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence; and it does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

8. Grading Standards for Written Work. All written work in the Strategy and Policy Course will be graded according to the following standards:

> **A+ (97-100):** The essay answers the question in a way that offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported, while the counterargument and rebuttal are addressed completely. The writing is clear throughout and exceptionally well-organized. The essay indicates brilliance and is ready for publication.
>
> **A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. The essay intelligently answers the question, the thesis is clearly articulated and focused, evidence is relevant and purposeful, consideration of arguments and the counterargument is comprehensive, and the organization is especially clear throughout the essay.
>
> **A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work and does not have major flaws. The essay skillfully answers the question, the thesis is articulated, evidence is significant throughout, arguments and the counterargument are presented effectively, and the essay is coherently organized and very clearly written.
>
> **B+ (87-89):** A graduate-level essay that meets all five elements of a seminar essay though with varying degrees of success. It answers the question, a thesis is clearly stated, the supporting evidence, the counterargument, and the organization has strong points, and the essay is clearly written.
>
> **B (84-86):** An essay that is a satisfactory consideration of the topic and demonstrates acceptable graduate performance. The essay generally answers the question; the thesis is stated and generally supported with relevant evidence; a counterargument is presented; and problems with organization and clarity may exist.
>
> **B- (80-83):** Slightly below the expected graduate-level performance. The essay may partially answer the question. The thesis is presented, but the evidence does not fully support it. The analysis and counterargument are not fully developed, and the essay may have distracting organizational flaws or significant problems with clarity.
>
> **C+ (77-79):** Below acceptable graduate-level performance. The essay was turned in late or is generally missing one or more of the five elements described above. The essay may not effectively answer the question, the thesis may be vague or unclear, evidence may be inadequate, analysis may be incomplete, the treatment of the counterargument may be

deficient, or the organization may be poor, making the other four elements of an effective essay difficult to identify.

C (74-76): The essay generally fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it fails to adequately answer the question, develop a thesis appropriate to the question, make adequate use of evidence, include a counterargument purposeful to the overall argument, have a coherent structure, or demonstrate the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the assigned question adequately.

C- (70-73): The essay conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or the essay may lack a counterargument. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay. The essay expresses an opinion more than it provides a critically argued response to the question.

D (56-69): Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. It fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis and lacks evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. It may not consider a counterargument and the organization is critically unclear.

F (0–55): Conspicuously fails to meet graduate-level standards in every area. The essay has no thesis or does not address the question; the essay suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic; the essay lacks a counterargument; and the essay displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

Late Work: Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous permission from the moderators—will receive a grade no greater than C+ (78). Student work that is not completed will receive a numeric grade of zero. Please see the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook* for further information on grading.

9. Pretutorials and Tutorials. Faculty moderators confer outside of class with students preparing seminar essays. A pretutorial is required for every essay, generally two weeks before the due date for the essay, to ensure that the student understands the essay question. A formal tutorial session follows, approximately one week before the due date. At the tutorial, the moderators and student scrutinize the essay's thesis and outline and identify ways to improve it. Students should view these sessions as an aid in preparing their essays, and students are ultimately responsible for the shape of the final essay. Either students or moderators may request additional meetings as necessary.

10. Faculty Office Hours. Each faculty teaching team in the Strategy and Policy Department will schedule a weekly office hour either virtually or in-person**.** Faculty will also meet for scheduled tutorials for writing assignments with each student and by appointment either virtually or in-person as requested.

11. Seminar Preparation and Contribution. Student contribution to seminar discussions is an essential part of this course. This begins with preparation that requires significant time to read and think. Preparation should also include the consideration of lesson plans provided by seminar moderators and even assignments such as discussion boards. Such preparation creates conditions where each member of the seminar is better able to contribute to seminar discussion. Only then, can the seminar group fully understand the strategic problems examined by the case study, apply the course themes to the material, and thus fulfill the course's objectives.

The seminar contribution grade does not measure the number of times a student speaks, but how well the student understands the material, enriches discussion, and contributes to fellow students' learning. In other words, the grade reflects the quality—not quantity—of class contributions. To take part in discussion, students must absorb the reading, listen attentively to lectures, and think critically about what they read and hear. The seminar is a team effort. Declining to contribute or saying very little undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar, whereas advance preparation enhances the seminar's quality. Seminar contribution helps students demonstrate that they comprehend and can synthesize the course material and communicate their thoughts with clarity and precision.

Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of the term according to the following standards:

A+ (97-100): Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of the topic. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between "listening" and "contributing."

A (94-96): Contribution is always of superior quality. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Displays attentive listening skills. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before commenting. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding, and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts.

A- (90-93): Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues through the insightful quality of contributions and ability to listen to and analyze the comments of others. Above the average expected of a graduate student.

B+ (87-89): A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

B (84-86): Average graduate-level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought but may not adequately consider others' contributions.

B- (80-83): Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or

present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation for seminar.

C+ (77-79): Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Content to allow others to take the lead. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure, or clarity to merit graduate credit.

C (74-76): Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight are insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually, content to let others conduct the seminar discussions.

C- (70-73): Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

D (56-69): Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

F (0-55): Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

12. Grade Appeals. After discussing feedback and the grade on an assignment with his or her seminar moderator, a student may request a grade review by submitting a written justification for the review to the Department Executive Assistant no later than one week after the grade has been received. The Executive Assistant will then appoint two faculty members other than the original graders to conduct an independent review. Anonymity will be maintained throughout: the second team of graders will not know the student's identity, the seminar from which the essay came, or the grade originally assigned. They will grade the paper independently as though it had been submitted for the first time, providing full comments, criticisms, and a new grade. The new grade will replace the old one. The student may request an additional review of the work in question no later than one week after the new grade has been received, whereupon the Department Chair will review the appeal and either affirm the grade assigned on appeal or assign another grade (higher or lower), which then replaces any previous grade assigned. In exceptional circumstances the student may, within one week of receiving the results of the appeal from the Department Chair, make a further appeal to the Dean of Academics, whose decision in the matter will be final.

13. Academic Honor Code. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation of work will not be tolerated at the Naval War College. The Naval War College enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to properly cite materials they have consulted for written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code (defined in the U.S. Naval War College *Faculty Handbook*) prohibits cheating, as well as presenting work previously completed elsewhere as new work. Plagiarism, cheating, and

misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products as one's own. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the College. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to:

a. Verbatim use of others' words without both quotation marks (or block quotation) and citation.

b. Paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.

c. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when using another's words or ideas. While extensive quoting or paraphrasing of others' work with proper attribution is not prohibited by this code, a substantially borrowed but properly cited paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work. Submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

Artificial Intelligence Software. According to PNWC 19 February 2023 Policy Memorandum on Permissible and Impermissible Uses of ChatGPT and Similar Artificial Intelligence Software states that ChatGPT and other AI tools may not be used "To produce drafts or final submissions of assignments instead of original student work product. Students may not use ChatGPT or other AI tools to produce written, video, audio, or other work assigned to be developed originally and independently and submitted or presented to satisfy required coursework, regardless of whether it is graded or ungraded." The policy memorandum also states, "Students who resort to AI-generated research and writing lose the unique opportunity the NWC provides to engage deeply with issues, reflect on and analyze information, develop compelling arguments and counterarguments, and write coherent and convincing work that expands learning and broadens expertise. After all, that is precisely the reason why students are enrolled at NWC, and it is their primary duty."

Cheating is defined as giving, receiving, or using unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts or the efforts of another student. (Note: Naval War College reference librarians, Strategy and Policy Department faculty as well as those from the Writing Center are authorized sources of aid in the preparation of class assignments, but not exams.) Cheating includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Gaining unauthorized access to exams.

b. Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other sources (including the internet) in the preparation of written assignments or during tests (unless specifically permitted).

c. Using unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during tests.

Misrepresentation is defined as using a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes but is not limited to the following actions:

a. Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission from the instructors.

b. Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

14. Student Survey. Student feedback is vital to the future development of the Strategy and War Course. Responses are treated anonymously and are used only to create standardized reports. The survey is designed to provide lecture feedback on a weekly basis and overall feedback at the end of the course.

Lecture surveys do not require a password, but for the course survey student seminar leaders will distribute randomly generated passwords to each student. Use this password for the end of the course survey and please do not share it with others. Thank you in advance for your time and effort in completing this important assessment of the Strategy and War Course.

15. Online Resources. Blackboard is the main repository of online resources for the Strategy and War Course. On Blackboard, students can access the most current versions of the syllabus, course calendar, lecture schedule, and selected readings. Moreover, lecture handouts and video links will be posted on Blackboard along with other supplemental information, including material specific to individual seminars.

Readings identified as “Selected Readings” or “Leganto” are available electronically through Blackboard. The best way to access such readings is to log into Blackboard for your seminar, select the “Case Studies” tab, and then the relevant case. The words “Selected Readings” serve as a hyperlink to take you to the PDF of the correct reading. The word “Leganto” also serves as a hyperlink to take you to the library electronic reserve reading list. The words “E-book/Leganto” will provide you with access to the entire electronic version of the book, however only the pages listed in the syllabus are required for reading.

Please refer any questions to Laura Cavallaro (Academic Coordinator, Strategy and Policy Department), Laura.Cavallaro@usnwc.edu; (401) 856-5363; Strategy and Policy Department, Office H-333.

I. THE THEORISTS: CLAUSEWITZ, SUN TZU, MAHAN, CORBETT, AND MAO

General: One of the desired outcomes of Professional Military Education is to "demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills, … to support the development and implementation of strategies and complex operations."[1] Those seeking to hone their critical thinking skills can do so either through first-hand experience or study. For the military professional, first-hand experience tends to entail real-world trial and error during combat operations. The Strategy and War Course uses case studies to impart critical habits of thought in the classroom, where learning does not have the possibility for such catastrophic results. Though each case is unique, the sequence of cases is designed toward a cumulative outcome through the integration of theorists, course themes, and historical examples. To this end, the first case promotes strategic literacy by exposing students to several key strategic theorists. These theorists establish a common vocabulary for effective communication, provide foundational course concepts, and introduce the course themes.

This case study is unlike any of the others in the Strategy and War Course. While subsequent cases address historical and contemporary conflicts, this case presents many of the course's theoretical foundations. This will be accomplished through a two-part structure. Part A, presents Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as foundational theorists. Part B expands our theoretical studies to present more focused advice on naval strategy as well as revolutionary, protracted, irregular warfare through the writings of Alfred T. Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung).

To fully utilize these strategic thinkers as guides in real-world decision-making, it is important to grasp the value of theoretical writing. These sometimes-complementary, sometimes-contradictory works do not provide standardized answers. Instead, theorists impart common frames of reference and useful concepts for civilian and military leaders to draw upon when integrating instruments of war in the pursuit of political ends. The theorists explanatory power sparks thought, stimulates debate, and promotes creativity.

The theorists provide methods of thinking through difficult problems. Book 2 of Clausewitz's *On War* is particularly suggestive. In these pages, Clausewitz applies concepts such as the purpose of theory and critical analysis to war. Rather than rules and laws, the theorists provide no more than aids in judgment. Students should, however, understand that these methods of thinking can be applied to issues beyond the use of force and can assist with problem-solving in nearly every aspect of life. After all, Clausewitz's critical analysis entails "the application of theoretical truths to actual events." It requires "not just an evaluation of the means actually employed, but of *all possible means*."[2]

---

[1] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy," CJCSI 1800.01G, April 15, 2024, p. A-3.

[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 156, 161.

Additionally, every theorist in the Strategy and War Course contends that war must serve a rational political purpose. This commonality does not occur by happenstance; rather, it is a conscious decision within the course design. Strategy involves linking the "ways" to attain "ends" with available "means." One cannot understand strategy without an appreciation of all three factors. The objective of strategy is to apply strategic concepts (or ways) using the available means to obtain a desired political outcome.

The theorists, moreover, present an expansive array of concepts. Their ideas and frameworks provide tools for analysis and ways to expand the student's mental aperture. Though the theorists presented in the course wrote many years ago, their concepts remain relevant today. For example, Sun Tzu's injunction to know the enemy and know oneself lives on in our contemporary concept of "the estimate of the situation." Moreover, Sun Tzu's emphasis on advantageous positioning, superior speed, and surprise foreshadows many aspects of what is now called "maneuver warfare." Likewise, Clausewitz's emphasis on concentrating forces against the enemy's "center of gravity" still lies at the heart of U.S. joint military doctrine and planning processes.

Finally, each theorist describes an overarching way of war grounded in the context of the theorist's time and unique circumstance. Each wrote for a specific type of belligerent, with definite instruments of power, and in a certain strategic environment. Clausewitz, for example, served Prussia, a continental great power on the European mainland. The state's primary instrument of war was its army. His writings grapple with changes in warfare that occurred during the Napoleonic Wars. Sun Tzu's writings reflect the instruments of power and conditions specific to the warring states of ancient China. Though the insights of the theorists have relevance beyond their type of state and the character of war they encountered, students of strategy should keep in mind the context in which each theorist wrote. Understanding context allows us to better conceptualize the strengths and limitations of their theories. We must not twist and distort the theorists into things they are not. Each theorist provides specific tools, and as students of strategy, we must seek to employ the proper tool.

In keeping with the cumulative nature of the course, this case provides critical frameworks for evaluating complex problems of strategy and war presented in the subsequent case studies. Rather than answers, the theorists presented in this case leave us with questions and concepts that allow us to fulfill the expectation for "the development of strategically minded joint warfighters who think critically and can creatively apply military power to inform national strategy, conduct globally integrated operations, and fight under conditions of disruptive change."[3]

[3] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Officer Professional Military Education Policy," CJCSI 1800.01G, April 15, 2024, p. 1.

PART A: THE THEORISTS: CLAUSEWITZ AND SUN TZU

Introduction: Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* and Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* serve as foundational theoretical readings in the Strategy and War Course; as a result, these writings serve as the principal topics of study in Part A of the Theorists Case. Although technology has revolutionized warfare, many of the basic strategic principles remain unchanged. This is why the writings of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu remain relevant as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war.

Clausewitz provides a critical point of departure by clearly describing war as "*nothing but the continuation of policy with other means*."[4] As the title of his book suggests, he writes extensively on war. In some respects, his focus is the narrowest among all the theorists in the course, yet he provides a carefully reasoned definition and description of war in its various parts. Unlike Clausewitz, who developed complex arguments, Sun Tzu addresses strategy in concise, yet profound statements. His writings tend to stretch beyond the actual fighting. He emphasizes winning without fighting and his menu of options addresses the value of attacking an opponent's strategy and alliances, supporting his argument that victory is possible without bloodshed.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss the relationships between national objectives and the strategies that will help to secure their objectives. At the same time, these theorists recognize that the pressures political elites and military commanders invariably face give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best ways and means to achieve political ends.

Both texts explore ethical tenets of the profession of arms, including the value of education in the art of war. They considered the intellectual development of leaders as essential for the security of the state and demanded that those in positions of military leadership learn the concepts and skills essential for rigorous critical analysis through the study of theory and military history. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu continue to aid today's leaders when devising and evaluating alternative courses of action to achieve future strategic success. The expectations of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are the same as those of the Naval War College. *On War* and *The Art of War* therefore constitute natural points of departure as we begin thinking critically about strategy and war.

Discussion Questions:

1. What is the value of studying theoretical writings such as those developed by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu?

2. What does Clausewitz mean by critical analysis?

[4] Clausewitz, *On War*, Note of July 10, 1827, p. 69.

3. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu define war? For what purposes would Clausewitz and Sun Tzu assert that a nation should go to war?

4. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. How does Clausewitz's view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and political leaders compare with that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of *On War* along with Chapter III of *The Art of War*.)

5. While Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that war can be studied systematically, the conduct of war more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this contention?

6. Among Clausewitz's most important concepts are culminating point of victory, center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point at the critical time. How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders as they strive to comprehend, assess, and reassess their environment?

7. Sun Tzu wrote, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" (Chapter III:31 of *The Art of War*). Why is the ability to develop an accurate assessment so important?

8. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring decisive superiority in the information domain to make timely, bold, and effective decisions in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can build up such a decisive information edge against a competent adversary?

9. Compare how Clausewitz and Sun Tzu present the role and value of intelligence in war. Which theorist provides better advice on intelligence for leaders in the contemporary environment?

10. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and chance. What role does each play in war? What challenges do these aspects, particularly passion, present for ethical leadership and the profession of arms?

11. Sun Tzu argues, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Chapter III:3 of *The Art of War*). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, "Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction" (Book 8, Chapter 3B of *On War*). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

12. Clausewitz recognizes that war can be fought for either a limited or an unlimited objective. How do these types of war differ from each other?

13. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz's most important insights. Do you agree?

14. In Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a commander mitigate these challenges?

15. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu address the role of ethical considerations in wartime decision-making?

16. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu assign to military and political leaders in strategic decision-making?

17. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu suggest that a nation can secure successful war termination?

18. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, how can we apply *On War* and *The Art of War* to ongoing conflicts and to great power competition?

Readings:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. **(Book)**

Please note, *On War* is divided into eight books, each of the eight books is subdivided into chapters. The following are the assigned readings:

- The Front Matter to *On War*: Preface by Marie von Clausewitz and Two Notes by the Author (pages 65-71).
- Book One: All Chapters.
- Book Two: Chapters 1-3 and 5-6.
- Book Three: Chapters 1-9
- Book Four: Chapter 11.
- Book Five: Chapter 3.
- Book Six: Chapters 1, 5, 6, 26, and 27.
- Book Seven: Chapters 2-5, and 22.
- Book Eight: All Chapters.

[While much of *On War* focuses on technical questions of warfare in Clausewitz's era, the assigned selections emphasize the enduring contributions of Clausewitz's book. The preface by Marie von Clausewitz describes her editing of the work after her husband's death and explains the influence of his career on the book as well as some of its stylistic features. This translation of *On War* was much heralded when it appeared in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz's work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Paperback edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pages 63-149. **(Book)**

[Brigadier General Griffith's experience in the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as his deep understanding of Asian languages and cultures, makes his translation of this important text on war both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer and civilian leader.]

3. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. Third edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-40, 155-164. **(Book)**

[Handel, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that despite differences in emphasis and substance, a universal or unified strategic logic transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience that separate nations. Students are encouraged to challenge Handel's thesis and assess the extent to which culture might influence planning and operations.]

PART B: THE THEORISTS: MAHAN, CORBETT, AND MAO

Introduction: In Part A of the Theorists Case Study, the foundational strategic theories of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu took centerstage. This next part of the case study addresses Alfred T. Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Mao Zedong. Each developed more focused strategic theoretical advice. Mahan and Corbett focused on warfare at sea while Mao emphasized protracted, revolutionary war to provide a pathway for weaker states and non-state actors to achieve strategic success.

Mahan served as professor and second president of the Naval War College. His first book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, was heralded by his contemporaries as groundbreaking in its arguments about sea power and its effects. Writing in the decades before the First World War, Mahan developed the concept of sea power in an era of rapidly advancing technology and rising naval powers challenging the status quo.

His theories range from the level of grand strategy to that of naval tactics. His grand strategic analysis explored the interrelationship of naval power, geography, social structure, economic organization, and governmental institutions. In the process, he developed the concept of sea power—a combination of naval might and financial and economic strength. He argued that creating and sustaining sea power requires favorable geographic, economic, social, and political conditions. When addressing naval strategy, operations, and tactics, Mahan emphasized the aggressive employment of the fleet. Central to Mahan's theory is a critical operational decision with enormous strategic importance: under what circumstances does it make strategic sense to risk one's fleet? This necessitates exploring the ways sea power can influence a war's outcome. Specifically, Mahan believed sea power could have a decisive effect on the outcome of war.

Julian S. Corbett was not so sure about the decisiveness of sea power. He drew heavily upon Clausewitz's *On War* to develop a distinctive analysis of how maritime powers fight and win wars. At sea, Corbett believed the key objective from which all other effects flowed was obtaining "command of the sea." However, he considered command of the sea as only a means to an end. Victory at sea did not generally win wars; instead, it enabled states to gain more decisive effects ashore. The navy enabled and magnified the effectiveness of other instruments of national power.

Corbett, like Mahan, wrote his most significant works in the years immediately preceding the First World War at a time when technological change was revolutionizing the tools of maritime power. Corbett's theories focus on how Britain, then the dominant, global naval power, should most effectively seek political objectives in war. Especially important among his theories were his thoughts on the advantages that maritime powers have in conflicts for limited political objectives.

Mao is the third major strategic theorist examined in Part B of the Theorist Case. He is the premier strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings draw on other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao studied both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. As a result, his work represents an important synthesis between

On War and *The Art of War*. Mao developed a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength by mobilizing the population to defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao's writings, as does the possibility of relying on marginalized populations—in Mao's case the peasantry—as a path to victory.

Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and subsequently wage a global ideological struggle. Mao's success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements including al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Mao's writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft and have great relevance for understanding contemporary extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

Discussion Questions:

1. What does Mahan mean by "sea power"? How can countries possessing sea power influence the international environment?

2. What are Mahan's six elements of sea power? How were these elements relevant at the time of his writing and how are they relevant today?

3. What does Corbett mean by "maritime strategy"? How is this different from Mahan's concept of "sea power"?

4. Corbett argued that wars are in almost all cases decided on land. Based on your own knowledge or experiences, was he correct in this conclusion?

5. According to Mahan and Corbett, what is the role of the sea lines of communication in naval strategy?

6. What does Corbett mean by "command of the sea"? Is he correct in asserting that this should be the object of naval warfare?

7. How do navies enable the other instruments of national power?

8. What are the major similarities and differences between the theories of Mahan and Corbett?

9. How did Mao modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu's ideas for the circumstances of revolutionary war in the twentieth century?

10. What are the three stages of Mao's theory of revolutionary, protracted warfare? How can weaker adversaries use this three-stage model to defeat stronger adversaries?

11. Beyond Mao's three stages, what are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao's writings that weaker actors must consider to defeat more powerful adversaries?

12. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?

13. Why did Mao emphasize the role of the peasantry as a marginalized group in revolutionary warfare? How does this compare to the role of marginalized groups in Clausewitz's and Sun Tzu's thinking?

14. The phrase "the enemy gets a vote" is commonly used in today's discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, Corbett, and Mao address the role of the enemy in strategy and war?

15. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, Corbett, and Mao believe that nations win wars?

16. As we strive to understand the contemporary security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power, how can we apply the writings of Mahan, Corbett, and Mao to ongoing conflicts and to great power competition?

Readings:

1. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Introductory" and "Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power." In *Mahan on Naval Strategy*. Edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pages 1-96. **(Book)**

[This selection from Mahan's writings examines sea power and its elements. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* has been called the most influential nonfiction book published in the United States during the nineteenth century and is widely read by aspiring sea powers such as China and India today. The author was the first strategy professor at the Naval War College and later served as its President.]

2. "Strategical Terms and Definitions used in Lectures on Naval History." Included as an appendix following Julian S. Corbett. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 307-325. **(Book)**

[This writing can be found at the end of *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. It is provided here as a brief overview of some of Corbett's most important theoretical concepts. Often referred to as the "Green Pamphlet," it was designed to provide Corbett's students with an overview of critical terminology relating to naval strategy. Corbett wrote this document with the assistance of Captain Edmond Slade, of the British navy, who was then serving as president of Britain's naval war college.]

3. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988. Pages 12-87. **(Book)**

[Corbett shows how a maritime state can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes maritime strategy and contrasts this with how continental land powers wage war.]

4. McCranie, Kevin D. *Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2021. Pages 209-246. **(Selected Readings)**

[The first of the assigned chapters provides a brief overview of Mahan's most salient theoretical arguments while the second assigned chapter does the same for Corbett. Each of these chapters describe how their theoretical concepts form distinctive ways of war.]

5. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. **(Selected Readings)**

[This reading provides selected extracts from Mao's writings on political revolution and irregular warfare. The reading includes Mao's "On Protracted War." Bradford Lee, Professor Emeritus in the Strategy and Policy Department, edited this reading and provides introductory comments about each excerpt.]

II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR: POLICY, STRATEGY, AND SOCIETY IN A LONG WAR

Introduction: The first historical case study involves a war potentially unfamiliar to many students. Set in ancient Greece, the Peloponnesian War was a decades-long conflict between a rising Athenian empire and the region's traditional hegemon, Sparta. Thucydides, a participant in the war and author of our main text for this case, intended for his history to be "a possession for all time." He succeeded. Political and military leaders from John Adams to George C. Marshall considered its lessons applicable to the security challenges of their own day, and contemporary pundits even talk of China and the United States being caught in a "Thucydides Trap."

The origins of this war appear trivial. A dispute between Corcyra and Corinth over control of Corcyra's colony Epidamnus eventually drew two peacetime alliances—the Peloponnesian League, led by Sparta, and the Delian League, dominated by Athens—into the ancient equivalent of a great power conflict. Yet as his account unfolds, Thucydides makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. Uneasy allies during the earlier Persian Wars, over the next fifty years Athens and Sparta interacted along a continuum of competition from economic sanctions to outright conflict. Sparta's allies, especially Corinth, also played a role in persuading Sparta to act before Athens' power became preponderant. Still, when this war began in 431 B.C., leaders in both Athens and Sparta expected a relatively short conflict and a low-cost victory, even though the prize was hegemony over the Greek world. The high value of that political objective and the asymmetry between Athenian sea power and Spartan land power made a quick, decisive victory unlikely. As the war protracted, the human, material, and political costs increased. Nevertheless, both sides repeatedly rejected each other's peace overtures, and many, including Thucydides, viewed the peace treaty midway through the war as little more than a strategic pause.

Relying on its strengths as Greece's greatest land power, Sparta began the war with an offensive strategy. Spartan armies deployed repeatedly to the Athenian homeland in attempts to force a decisive land battle. In contrast, Athens chose a more defensive approach championed by its leader, Pericles. This involved integrating sea-borne raids around Sparta's periphery with a defensive posture at home to exhaust Spartan will. Neither belligerent, however, was able to achieve its policy aims through these strategies.

Strategic frustration, changes in leadership, and the play of chance forced a shift in approaches. In Athens, a devastating plague brought a new leader, Cleon, to the fore. He sought to apply sea power more aggressively and found unexpected success in a peripheral operation on the island of Sphacteria where he captured a group of Sparta's elite citizen-soldiers. Emboldened by this stroke of fortune and holding valuable hostages, Cleon expanded the war and increased Athens' political demands. Unwilling to accept these terms, but unable to strike directly at Athens for fear of endangering the captives, Sparta embarked on a peripheral campaign of its own. Transforming a secondary theater in northern Greece into the primary theater, the Spartan general Brasidas succeeded in capturing Amphipolis, a key city along Athenian sea lines of communication. Still, neither Athens nor Sparta could come to terms until the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas empowered the peace parties in both cities.

During the pause in the fighting that followed, called the Peace of Nicias after its Athenian broker, some in Athens looked to expand the conflict rather than enjoy a "peace dividend." Motivated by a brash, new leader named Alcibiades, a modest contingent of the Athenian army joined with that of Argos in a land battle designed to decisively defeat Sparta once and for all—the very type of battle Athens had avoided for the past thirteen years. Political intrigues by the peace party in Athens undermined these plans, resulting in a humiliating defeat for Argos, a reputation-restoring victory for Sparta, and a lost opportunity for Athens.

Soon after, the Athenians voted to open a new theater by invading Sicily, an island halfway across the Mediterranean. After more political intrigues forced Alcibiades, one of the expedition's three commanders and its architect, to flee to Sparta, his new hosts saw an opportunity. Sparta capitalized on Athens' overextension and the protracted siege of Syracuse by developing local alliances in Sicily and deploying large numbers of forces to the island. In the end, their combined militaries destroyed or captured the bulk of the Athenian army and navy in Sicily. News of the disaster plunged Athens into despair.

Remarkably, Athens fought on for nine more years—even driving Sparta to sue for peace twice. Sparta, however, was beginning to reap the fruits of its string of victories. The Spartans uncharacteristically chose to contest two theaters simultaneously and to integrate operations across them. First, the Spartans established an expeditionary base at Decelea, less than twenty miles from Athens, and were finally able to bring Spartan land power to bear more effectively. This garrison did not just threaten Athens' physical security; it posed several economic threats. Second, Sparta opened a new theater in Ionia in the eastern Mediterranean, as far from Sparta as Sicily had been from Athens. Unlike Athens, however, Sparta fought in friendly territory with extensive support from Persia, an offshore superpower that had been watching from afar until either Athens or Sparta appeared to gain the upper hand. Persian ships allowed Sparta to rapidly integrate sea power on an unprecedented scale. Athens still scored two stunning naval victories at Cyzicus and Arginusae, but refused peace offers from Sparta after each. Athenian luck did not hold, and a combination of poor Athenian leadership and wily and opportunistic leadership by Sparta's naval commander, Lysander, culminated in the decisive defeat of the Athenian navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C. Its empire crumbling, its navy destroyed, and its people starving, Athens surrendered unconditionally less than a year later.

The Peloponnesian War is especially rich for illustrating many of the concepts presented in the Strategy and War Course, especially the course themes of the Interrelationship of Strategy, Policy, and Operations; Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment; and Cultures and Societies.

Both Athens and Sparta were continuously modifying their policies and strategies to better match ends and means, and to achieve their war aims. Reassessment followed failures as well as unexpected successes. Further complicating this process was the inherent difficulty each faced in bringing its power to bear against the other. Athens looked to both preserve its sea power and ally with a strong land power, while Sparta tried to "rent" a navy. Victory came to the side able to solve its strategic dilemma first.

Thucydides also provides a window into the role of ethics within the profession of arms. He presents political and military leaders making decisions not only based on policy and

strategy, or ends, ways and means, but also based on personal ambition and political calculation. Students should pay particular attention to the speeches of the key leaders such as Pericles, Archidamus, Cleon, the Spartan generals at Plataea, Alcibiades, Nicias, and the Athenian delegates to Melos for insights into the role all of these factors in decision-making play when balancing wartime necessity with societal norms in protracted conflict.

Finally, Thucydides' account of the political and strategic failures of Athenian democracy is a mirror for us. How closely do biological catastrophe, partisanship, and insurrection map onto America's recent experiences? To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens a worthwhile starting point for understanding the problems modern democracies might experience in protracted conflicts?

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Which leader, Pericles or Archidamus, did a better job of assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War?

2. Did it make strategic sense for Sparta to embark on a war with Athens before Sparta had acquired a more powerful navy?

3. How well did the sea power, Athens, and the land power, Sparta, compensate for their weaknesses and exploit their strengths in fighting against each other?

4. How would you characterize the evolution of Athenian and Spartan strategy before the Peace of Nicias?

5. Should Athens have accepted higher risk on land by sending a larger force to support their ally Argos in the Battle of Mantinea?

6. Was the Sicilian expedition a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?

7. What alternative course of action for the Sicilian Expedition offered the greatest potential strategic rewards?

8. Given their strategic situation after the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition, how should Athens have reassessed?

9. Which operation produced greater strategic effects, Athens' successful operation at Pylos and Sphacteria, or Sparta's successful operation in Sicily?

10. In light of the Athenian operation at Pylos and Sphacteria, the Spartan operation in Thrace, the Athenian operation in Sicily, and the Spartan operations at Decelea and in the Aegean, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an ongoing conflict.

11. Why did Athenian leaders often accept high risk when employing their naval forces in the battles of Syracuse, Arginusae, and Aegospotami given that they could not afford to suffer a catastrophic loss at sea?

12. Who was the most effective military leader for Athens and Sparta? Who came closest to fitting Clausewitz's definition of a military genius?

13. Sun Tzu states that attacking the enemy's strategy and allies should take precedence over attacking either their army or their cities. How well did Athens and Sparta follow this advice?

14. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C. and 406 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Why did these efforts at durable war termination fail?

15. When was the optimal time for Athens to make peace—after the successful operation at Pylos and Sphacteria, after the inconclusive Battle of Amphipolis, or after the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition?

16. "Sparta and its allies did not defeat Athens so much as Athens defeated itself." Do you agree?

17. Are democracies more likely than other systems of government to commit the "blunders" Pericles was so concerned about and Thucydides highlighted?

18. What moral and ethical dilemmas confronted the people and leaders of Athens and Sparta in their decision-making?

19. Past students have found Thucydides critical for making sense of their experiences in Vietnam as well as Afghanistan and Iraq. To what degree does Thucydides help you understand the current strategic challenges that confront the U.S.?

Readings:

1. Strassler, Robert B., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides*. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Books I-VIII (pages 3-548). (**Book**)

[Thucydides covers all nine Strategy and War course themes in his account of this war, compelling his readers to think through the interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations and the integration and application of naval power.]

Key passages:

Book I	Origins of the conflict, pages 3-85. With particular emphasis on the evolution of sea power and the speeches.
Book II	Outbreak of the war, pages 89-107.
	Pericles' Funeral Oration and the plague, pages 110-128.
Book III	Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.
	The Mytilenean debate, pages 175-184.
	The Plataean debate, pages 185-193.
	Civil war in Corcyra, pages 194-201.
Book IV	Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.
	Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.
	Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.
Book V	Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.
	Alliance between Athens and Argos and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.
	The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.
Book VI	Launching the Sicilian expedition, pages 361-379.
Book VII	Athenian disaster in Sicily, pages 427-478.
Book VIII	Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.
	Athenian coup, pages 508-512, 517-525, and 532-540.

2. Roberts, Jennifer T. *The Plague of War: Athens, Sparta, and the Struggle for Ancient Greece*. London: Oxford, 2017. Pages 237-294. (**Book**)

[This selection from Roberts picks up the narrative of the war where Thucydides leaves off to explain the final stages of the Peloponnesian War. Central to the story and the eventual Athenian defeat are the crucial naval battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami.]

3. Nash, John. "Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 71, no. 1 (Winter 2018). Pages 119-139. (**Selected Readings**)

[Nash describes how both Athens and Sparta used sea power during the Peloponnesian War, from diplomatic initiatives to trade interdiction to sea control. He focuses on the second half of the war from 413-404 B.C., commonly called the Ionian War. Students should pay special attention to his characterization of Athenian maritime strategy under Pericles as compared to under his successors.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Mahan on Naval Strategy*. Edited by John B. Hattendorf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015. Pages 198-207. (**Book**)

[In this selection from a published series of lectures, Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for the campaign in Sicily by his own theoretical standards and provides insightful critical analysis of how the campaign might have been better executed.]

III. THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: SEA POWER, JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS, AND IRREGULAR WARFARE

Introduction: In June 1776, the British Empire launched the largest maritime expedition in European history to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. This case study focuses on the events leading up to the American Revolution and the conduct of that war in the Thirteen Colonies. Britain's inability to terminate the initial rebellion quickly and the successes of the American Patriots, especially their victory at Saratoga in 1777, resulted in France, Spain, and Holland joining the war against Britain. Now caught in a global conflict, Britain fought for the survival of its empire. The American and French combined efforts culminated in a military victory in 1781 at Yorktown and a final peace settlement in 1783. This case explores why the British failed and how the Americans, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war.

The War of American Independence allows one to study the evolving competition between the rebels and their British colonial rulers. The initial uprising was primarily a battle for the allegiance of the American people executed by the Sons of Liberty's sophisticated information campaign to incite rebellion against the Crown. The conflict eventually turned violent, as irregular and conventional warfare broke out between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy. After the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, the war expanded into a great power competition among the European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America as the British were forced to mount globally integrated operations far from American shores. Battles occurred in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War of American Independence to more recent insurgencies. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence differed from the ideologies animating more recent revolutionary movements. In the early 1770s, rebel leaders in Boston laid the groundwork by crafting a compelling political narrative based mainly on traditional British legal and political principles to justify the uprising. Using pamphlets, newspapers, and committees of correspondence, the Patriots exploited overt and covert communication networks to dominate the information environment and quickly spread the rebellion across the Thirteen Colonies. Meanwhile, the British found it difficult to respond effectively to the motives and strategies of their enemy, even though they enjoyed a similar language and culture. This blind spot was a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their political support.

The Patriots relied on all elements of national power including a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy that prioritized decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island preferred to exhaust the enemy. Greene coordinated regular and irregular forces during a strategically effective operation in the southern colonies. Each approach had political implications. American support for the revolution was far from unanimous, especially at the outset of the conflict. Insurgents and their enemies had to earn support and deny it to their adversaries. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents

sustain the loyalty of their followers, win the support of neutrals and the undecided, and undercut support for their adversaries. The War of American Independence allows us to evaluate how well both sides understood this environment and the instruments of national power available to them.

This case also invites us to appraise foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges that come with multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed by Spain in 1779 and the Netherlands in 1780. The expansion of the war made the conflict in the colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain. As the war expanded, the British had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India came under threat. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of developing the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The conflict at sea focused on controlling the sea lines of communication connecting Europe with overseas colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict allows us to consider the strategic uses of sea power presented in the theories of Alfred T. Mahan. We confront enduring strategic issues when examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war. These issues include geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness; asymmetries between land power and sea power; joint operations; naval concentration; calculations governing when to risk a fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; the integration of maritime power with other elements of national power; and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of applying sea power in joint and combined operations. Successful British joint operations at New York in 1776 and Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet, the only significant French and American combined and joint operation, the siege of Yorktown by land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. “Jointness” is not an end, but one means among many to achieve strategic success. Understanding why the British failed to attain their desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and those that do not.

Both major protagonists, but especially the Patriots, grappled with surprise and uncertainty. Assessing how well they anticipated and responded to unexpected events helps us understand the eventual outcome. Yet, many other factors also deserve attention, such as the character of the war, the availability of local support and intelligence, control of sea lines of communication, civil-military and intra-military relations, command structures, coalition leadership, and the need to keep pressure on the enemy without overshooting the culminating point of attack.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War of American Independence, when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Patriots, to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for American victory to his strategic and operational leadership, understanding of the profession of arms, and capacity for making ethical decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted enough to deny the British a quick victory and sought a decisive battle only when opportunity allowed. He employed a “Fabian” strategy as much by necessity as by choice,

foregoing high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British. Although this approach required the Continental Army to stay on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the army to survive. Tactical offensives yielded incremental dividends until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. Even during the war, however, some questioned Washington's skill as a strategist. Many thought the outcome of the war owed more to British blunders than American generalship. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and British failures thus helps us understand the nature of strategic leadership.

It is imperative to consider the political and institutional context in which the Patriot military strategy developed since Washington did not lead alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress, Washington knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in using information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. Congress employed the Declaration of Independence as a means of strategic communication and a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the Americans' political organization complicated efforts to win the war. Congress brought together a coalition of thirteen independent states wary of any central authority that might endanger their liberty. Many wondered whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and mutinies in the army posed a greater danger to American independence than the British. Congress often found supporting Washington's army in the field challenging because it lacked the authority to raise troops and revenue.

The War of American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, and the British. The role of women, Native Americans, and enslaved people demonstrate the critical impact that all sectors of American society had on the initial uprising and subsequent war. These viewpoints allow us to grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and highlight the importance of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making opens a window into the British war effort while helping to explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

The American Revolution case study is especially effective for considering the course themes of Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment; the Multinational Arena; and the Institutional Context. Moreover, the case offers four critical Strategy and War takeaways. First, it presents a lucid and well-documented study of how insurgencies develop and are nurtured by skilled leaders. Second, it demonstrates how the cunning use of information operations and strategic communication allowed the revolt to grow, attract allies, and gain legitimacy. Third, the case delivers vital strategic lessons for naval warfare. Mahan's critique of British maritime strategy presents a powerful framework for assessing the relative utility of naval power in a multipolar environment. Finally, the case provides an example of how internal conflicts often attract outside intervention, altering the character of the war and turning it into a regional and global conflict.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. How likely was it that the Americans could win their struggle with Britain when they resorted to force of arms in April 1775?

2. Was the British decision to pacify American resistance by force of arms counterproductive to Britain's overall objectives?

3. Assuming the War of American Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies and operations of American and British commanders were suited to the character of the war.

4. Why did British military successes in North America in 1776 fail to produce a decisive victory over the Americans?

5. Did the British still have a chance to win after France entered the war in 1778?

6. How could the Americans have won their independence without assistance from France?

7. Why did British leaders find it challenging to reassess and adapt their strategy during this conflict?

8. Why was Britain unable to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War of American Independence?

9. Why did British joint operations in the southern colonies between 1778 and 1781 fail to win the war for Britain?

10. Was the Patriots' success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or British operational and strategic mistakes?

11. How well did Washington and his British counterparts anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of war?

12. The American colonies fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of separate states and in a foreign alliance with France, Spain, and the Netherlands. How did the coalition effort affect war termination?

13. How well did the Patriots use information operations, deception, and intelligence during the War of American Independence?

14. How well did the British use divisions within the colonies to attract support and undermine the Patriot cause during the War of American Independence?

15. Was George Washington's decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaigns of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?

16. In *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree with his critique?

17. Who would rate George Washington better as a general: Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao?

18. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire after the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War destroyed the Athenian Empire?

19. What lessons highlighted by Mahan's critique of British naval power during the American Revolution can be applied to America's use of maritime power in the contemporary environment?

Readings:

1. Ferling, John. *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015. Pages 4-318. **(Book)**

[Ferling provides an overview of the American War for Independence in this core reading. He argues the war's outcome was contingent on leadership and strategy and remained in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts at war termination.]

2. Genest, Marc. "The Message Heard' Round the World." In *Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates about War and Revolution*. Edited by Andrea J. Dew, Marc A. Genest, S.C.M. Paine. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2019. Pages 7-23. **(Leganto)**

[Genest examines the strategy the Sons of Liberty used to win the battle of ideas against the British in the early years of the colonial uprising in Boston. Rebel leaders designed a marketable message to justify the revolt and implemented a communications network that dominated the information environment.]

3. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence." In *Revolutions in the Western World 1775–1825*. Edited by Jeremy Black. New York: Routledge, 2016. Pages 539-557. **(Leganto)**

[Mackesy explains the rationality of the British government's strategy, including decisions made by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

4. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 83-122, 320-352. **(Book)**

[O'Shaughnessy offers a red-team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers. The assigned chapters cover

General William Howe, Admiral Richard Howe' and the First Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich.]

5. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890. Pages 505-541. **(Selected Readings)**

[Mahan analyzes where Britain went wrong with its naval strategy and what its miscues reveal about the proper use of navies in wartime.]

6. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal." *Naval War College Review*. vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3353&context=nwc-review

[Pritchard examines the French decision to go to war, the French alliance with the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

7. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution." **(Selected Readings)**

[These readings help understand the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war. The first document dates from 1775 and provides Edmund Burke's British assessment of a war with the Thirteen Colonies. The following document is the Declaration of Independence. This is followed by documents essential for comprehending Washington's Fabian strategy. The final two documents provide short responses to the Declaration of Independence from Loyalists.]

IV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: MARITIME STRATEGY, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND WAR TERMINATION IN A LIMITED REGIONAL CONFLICT

Introduction: This case examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). During China's "century of humiliation" (1839-1949), the decline of China created opportunities for outside powers to extract concessions at Chinese expense. By the end of the nineteenth century, Russian and Japanese interests clashed as they expanded their influence in Manchuria (northeast China) and Korea. Seeing no diplomatic solution with Russia, the Japanese government decided on war. Japan sought to use speed, surprise, and skilled tactical and operational execution to compensate for Russia's far greater resources. The Japanese military quickly achieved sea control and landed forces on the Asian mainland. Russia struggled to bring its massive military might to bear over extended land and sea lines of communication. Japan's initial successes did not end the conflict, however. Instead, the war lasted for almost nineteen months. Fighting on land revolved around the siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria, notably at Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither army proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Instead, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan's supply lines and limited manpower. The Battle of Tsushima (May 1905)—at which the Japanese Combined Fleet annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet after it had steamed 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia—finally convinced Nicholas II of the need for peace. Despite this, Russian forces in the theater substantially outnumbered the Japanese, and Japan was desperately short on manpower. With both sides near the breaking point, Japan managed to achieve most of its war aims in the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.

This was a remarkable feat for a resource-poor island state. While Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. Only a generation later, it defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 before fighting Russia in 1904-1905. Japan's strategy reveals many key elements necessary to prosecute a regional war: coordination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, integration of land and sea operations, and foresight in war termination. At the same time, Japan took an enormous risk in challenging a power possessing resources on a continental scale. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand an adversary's culture and military potential. Despite Japan's success, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights enduring problems in strategy and war. This conflict shows the interrelation of land and sea operations. Despite advantages in resources, manpower, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost to a rising power whose military transformation it had grossly underestimated. The Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur, allowing its armies to land in Korea and China. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) slowed the buildup of Russian ground forces in the theater. This bottleneck allowed the Japanese to achieve numerical superiority early in the war. The Russo-Japanese War demonstrates how a weaker antagonist can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences should a stronger

power fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Naval operations loom large in this conflict. While Japanese naval and land forces understood their interdependent relationship, Russian naval forces coordinated neither within their service nor with Russian ground forces. The squadron at Vladivostok caused consternation among the Japanese when it briefly ventured out to sea and disrupted commercial traffic. The Japanese kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Russian mines sank two of Japan's six battleships and Admiral Stepan Makarov commanded sorties that threatened Japanese sea communications. The Port Arthur squadron reverted to inactivity after Makarov went down with the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* in April 1904. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor by taking Port Arthur. In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies unimpeded on the Asian mainland.

This war also illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. Japan suffered from exhaustion by spring 1905, having used up its financial and manpower reserves. Although Russia managed to overcome transportation bottlenecks, reversing Japan's numerical superiority in the theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked revolutionary outbreaks throughout the empire. Russia's will to fight evaporated even as it overcame its logistical deficiencies. War-weariness induced both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's mediation to end the war. Roosevelt won the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The Russo-Japanese War provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, societies, and cultures of Northeast Asia, and for understanding how they mold planning and operations to this day. While the Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War, rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan later shaped the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949). Conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953), a clash whose aftereffects continue to shape the contemporary security environment.

Additionally, the case shows the disruptive influence of rapid technological change. Before the war, many naval experts maintained that torpedoes would revolutionize war at sea. Torpedoes' erratic performance and ineffectiveness during the war deflated such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing artillery, and machine guns yielded important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the ground battles—in particular the carnage of Port Arthur and Mukden—foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare in the First World War. Yet, neither the belligerents nor most foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or their implications.

The engagements on land and sea also raise important questions about the interaction between land and sea power and about combining different kinds of military power to produce strategic outcomes. For example, the Russians' stubborn defense of Port Arthur imposed hard choices on Japanese army and navy commanders. Until they took Port Arthur, army leaders

faced hostile forces on two fronts: besieging the port while also fighting the Russians in Manchuria. The Japanese navy, furthermore, had to maintain its blockade of Port Arthur as long as the Russian squadron there survived. Had Tōgō's fleet withdrawn to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, it would have permitted Russian warships to escape—endangering the sea routes connecting Japanese expeditionary forces with their sources of supply in the Japanese home islands, and thus placing the land campaign in jeopardy. Joint operations ultimately allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered from endemic problems with army-navy cooperation.

The case affords an opportunity to apply the writings of Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. The conflict allowed both Mahan and Corbett to test and adapt their theories of naval war. They analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War was a laboratory for ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. Although Russian forces could reach the front by land or sea, they had to traverse vast distances to do so. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication but depended on its navy to deploy and sustain troops on the Asian mainland. Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy; Japan had no such option. In addition, Russia could rebuild its navy at its own shipyards, while Japanese yards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise strategic questions. When should Russia or Japan have risked its fleet? Was it better for Russia to preserve the Port Arthur squadron or to employ it actively and risk its destruction?

Finally, the war's end sheds light on how military achievements translate into political results. Tokyo went to war only after using diplomacy to improve its chances of success. Japan shaped the international arena, concluding an alliance with Great Britain to isolate Russia while planning in advance for American mediation. It carefully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments into all phases of the war. During the closing phase, military leaders seized Sakhalin Island as a bargaining chip for peace negotiations, and coordinated with political leaders to terminate the conflict before the military balance swung toward Russia. By contrast, St. Petersburg's handling of the conflict suffered from dysfunctional civil-military relations and a leadership incapable of integrating elements of national power.

The case has numerous contemporary resonances in addition to those noted above. It was a conflict between Russia, an established great power, and Japan, a rising challenger seeking to overturn the regional order in an era of intensifying great power competition. The case explores the geopolitics of Asia, the coordination of land and sea power, and the particular problems of fighting a limited war. The Cultures and Societies; the Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations; and the War Termination course themes are especially salient for analyzing and thinking critically about the Russo-Japanese War.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was Japan's success due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?

2. Would better strategic and operational leadership on the Russian side have allowed Russia to prevail in the land campaign in Manchuria?

3. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?

4. Would either side have benefitted from taking greater risk in its fleet operations?

5. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?

6. How did the land and sea operations around Port Arthur affect the conflict's outcome?

7. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?

8. Did the Japanese exceed Clausewitz' culminating point of attack in their operations in Manchuria?

9. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

10. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?

11. How did Imperial Japanese Navy operations contribute to the war's outcome?

12. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary's costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work for Washington but not for the Russians?

13. What alternative course of action for the employment of Russian naval forces offered the greatest potential strategic rewards?

14. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?

15. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan's geographical advantages?

16. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?

17. Did Japanese or Russian military leaders better exploit the transformation of naval warfare?

18. The Russian experience in this conflict, the British experience in the War of American Independence, and the Athenian experience in Sicily suggest how difficult it is to wage war in a distant theater. How can states best deal with this problem?

19. What are the most important implications of the Russo-Japanese War for the contemporary strategic challenges the United States and its allies face in East Asia?

Readings:

1. Paine, Sarah C. M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pages 49-75. (**Leganto**)

[Paine, a Naval War College Distinguished University Professor, provides a brief overview of Japanese strategy before and during the war, an approach mirrored by Professor Fuller's discussion of Russian strategy.]

2. Fuller, William C., Jr. *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*. New York: Free Press, 1992. Pages 362-377, 397-407. (**Book**)

[Fuller, a professor emeritus and former chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, describes the Russian diplomatic situation and state of the empire on the eve of the war, along with the evolution of Russian strategy during the hostilities.]

3. Connaughton, Richard. *Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Jap*an. Third edition. London: Cassell, 2003. Pages 9-356. (**Book**)

[Connaughton provides a general and comprehensive overview of the war, offering the background necessary for the more focused or theoretical readings on the case.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia." In *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1918. (**Selected Readings**)

[Mahan discusses a number of strategic questions raised by the Russo-Japanese War, including the perennial tradeoffs in designing military platforms between speed, protection, range, firepower, and cost, as well as the importance of thinking clearly about the missions those platforms are intended to fulfill. He asks whether Russia and Japan were correct to commit as many resources as they did to Port Arthur. He also looks at vital and enduring questions of basing and fleet concentration, whether within a particular theater or globally.]

5. Corbett, Julian S. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis and Newport: Naval Institute Press and Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (**Leganto**)

[Corbett outlines Japanese naval strategy, drawing on Tōgō's own testimony of his intentions. He compares Japan's strategy in the Russo-Japanese War to how Japan operated in 1894 against

China. He also sketches an alternative Russian strategy. The appendix presents the specifics of Russian war planning prior to the war. Students writing papers on Russian naval strategy will find this particularly useful.]

6. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 91, 94-116. (**Book**)

[This study of the Imperial Japanese Navy covers Japan's naval operations during the war. In addition, it provides a useful order of battle for understanding the naval balance in the Far East.]

V. THE FIRST WORLD WAR: PREWAR PLANNING, WARTIME REALITIES, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

Introduction: On 28 June 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist. This event triggered a broader European crisis and the outbreak of the First World War. Initially pitting the Triple Entente (Britain, France, Russia, and their allies) against the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary), the war revealed a profound gulf between political objectives and the military mechanisms to achieve them. Military operations seemed incapable of achieving strategic results. All parties at war sought to break this stalemate, whether through new instruments of war, improved tactics, greater resources, or additional allies. Naval power was employed for commerce warfare and amphibious operations, as well as to bring global resources to the European fronts. In the end, the war drove its belligerents to the brink of collapse. The Russian Empire disintegrated in 1917. This allowed Germany, hard-pressed by Allied economic blockade, to gamble on a final offensive against Britain and France in spring 1918. By that point, however, the United States had joined the Allied coalition. Increasing American troops and materiel tipped the balance against Germany, which had to accept defeat in November 1918.

In many respects, the First World War was the defining event of the twentieth century. The conflict brought the deaths of some sixteen million people, saw the collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires, and hastened Europe's geopolitical decline. The war also launched the United States as a global power, bringing American industrial capacity, financial power, and military might to bear against Germany. It conjured the Soviet Union from the ashes of the Russian Empire, setting the stage for a coming age of Soviet-American bipolarity. Staggering military casualties, normalized targeting of civilians, and a global pandemic left profound demographic scars and fostered radical politics that left further ideological ones. The lack of a coherent war termination process, the enduring tragedy of this "war to end all wars," spawned a yet more horrible sequel twenty years later.

The trigger for the First World War was a clash of Russian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans that spiraled out of control. Germany supported Austria-Hungary because it feared Russia's growing power and because Russia's alliance with France meant Germany faced an unacceptable strategic encirclement. Germany's war plan, the so-called Schlieffen Plan, hoped to knock France out of the war before Russia could mobilize and overrun Germany's eastern frontier. The plan prized speed: France had superior global market access it could use to outlast Germany if the war became protracted. It also carried risk: the fastest westward invasion route was through neutral Belgium, a provocation that could, and did, bring Britain and its empire into the war on the side of France. German strategy thus gambled on both time and space.

Timely intervention by British forces in support of the French stalemated the war across a vast Western Front by the end of 1914. Industrial-age firepower and mass armies created deadlocked battlefields of unprecedented lethality, requiring a reassessment of political objectives and wartime plans. As the war protracted, military and civilian leaders grasped at novel instruments of war such as submarines, tanks, poison gas, and airplanes. In their desperate search for operational advantage, ethical norms that distinguished between combatants and

noncombatants evaporated, making the conflict a war of entire societies. The war's Eastern Front, while much more dynamic than its western counterpart, featured the same brutality. The increased costs of the conflict in blood and treasure only served to increase the efforts and political demands of the warring powers.

Like the ground war, the war at sea proved stagnant. While this more clearly favored the Royal Navy's strategy of distant blockade, many naval leaders had expected to see the application of sea power in a decisive battle between the British and German main surface fleets. Although the British and German fleets did fight a major sea battle off the coast of Jutland in 1916, it proved indecisive. It also failed to answer many of the strategic questions about the proper use of navies that had remained unanswered since the war's beginning. Were the capital ships of the main fleets too costly to risk? Was there any other way to bring sea power to bear?

Questions like these had been addressed before the conflict by thinkers such as Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. Their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Indeed, Mahan's theories gained widespread acceptance among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power in the years before the First World War. Corbett's writings, meanwhile, focused on British strategic and operational problems, emphasizing the importance of joint operations and peripheral strategies targeting adversaries' geographic and coalition weaknesses. The war served as a dramatic test for both thinkers' ideas that remains valuable as an object of study for maritime strategy.

Conservative strategies on both sides—Britain's blockade and Germany's restraint of its surface and undersea fleets—proved politically difficult for both leaders and their populations to accept. In 1915, Winston Churchill launched a British-led Dardanelles Campaign to attack Germany's ally Ottoman Turkey, force its capitulation, and open a vital supply line to allied Russia. It failed, along with smaller peripheral operations in the Baltic, Balkans, and Middle East. Meanwhile, Germany was again driven to riskier strategies, opting to repeatedly escalate its U-boat campaign against British shipping. Like the Schlieffen Plan, this gambled on the possibility of crippling Britain's food and materiel supply against the possibility of bringing the United States into the war. That gamble failed in April 1917 when the United States declared war on Germany.

By early 1918, both sides prepared offensives on the Western Front with the goal of ending the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant American forces reached France. The Germans almost drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench stalemate before their offensives exceeded their culminating point of attack and ground to a halt. The sustained Allied counteroffensives beginning in July brought the collapse of the German army and urgent requests for an armistice.

Understanding the relationship between national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination is an indispensable part of strategic theory and practice. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war, particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, contributed to postwar instability as the victors sought gains commensurate with the price that they had paid but were unwilling and unable to enforce the peace. Meanwhile, the Germans soon convinced

themselves that they had not been defeated militarily and had been cheated out of victory by domestic subversives—a powerful myth that stripped the postwar Weimar Republic of much of its legitimacy. To complicate matters even further, the only power with the means to stabilize the postwar international order, the United States, decided to disengage politically and militarily from affairs outside the Western Hemisphere.

Did these actions doom the peace? As Clausewitz argued, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Today, the United States is concerned about the possibility of war with China. What insights and warnings does the First World War offer for this challenge? To this end, it is especially helpful to consider the following course themes: Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans; the Instruments of War; Interaction, Adaptation, and Reassessment; and War Termination. For example, in what ways did the planners of 1914 succeed, and fail, to use the wars in their immediate past to prepare themselves? How can we learn from the First World War's naval strategists as they tried to address the changing character of their war at sea? What do the challenges of coalition management in that conflict tell us about how to fight and win a great power war today? And how can we learn from the First World War's catastrophic failure to imagine and execute effective war termination?

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed or a bad strategy?

2. Did Britain commit a strategic error in carrying out major ground offensives on the Western Front in France and Belgium between 1915-1918?

3. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battlefleets?

4. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what alternative strategies should the Allies and Germany have adopted?

5. Judging from the Dardanelles Campaign, the British campaign in the American south, and Brasidas' campaign in Thrace, when is opening a new theater worthwhile and what are the costs and hazards of doing so?

6. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance so difficult to follow?

7. How did the British blockade of Germany contribute to the success of the Allied and Associated Powers?

8. Did the Allies waste resources on peripheral theaters to the detriment of operations against Germany?

9. The United States warned Germany not to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare. Why, then, despite these warnings, were Germany's leaders not deterred from adopting a strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917?

10. Were military leaders too slow to learn from combat experience and adapt to the changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?

11. In the Peloponnesian War, the American War for Independence, and the First World War, the warring parties adjusted their political demands during the conflict when conditions on the fighting fronts changed. When the costs of war escalate, how should leaders adjust their policy goals to reflect the increased cost?

12. Were the German offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918 a strategic mistake?

13. Throughout the war, the Allied Powers (plus the United States after 1917) enjoyed at least a fivefold population advantage and threefold superiority in gross domestic product over the Central Powers. Why were they unable to translate this immense quantitative advantage into victory sooner?

14. Could the Allies have defeated Germany without the economic and military contributions made by the United States?

15. How well did the Allied and Associated Powers address the problem of war termination during the First World War?

16. Did the First World War's conduct and outcome lend more support to the views of Corbett or Mahan?

17. Did the First World War show that the strategic theories of Mahan were largely irrelevant?

18. How did the naval arms race leading up to the First World War between Britain and Germany resemble the modern naval buildup between the United States and China in the South China Sea and beyond?

19. How did the breakdown of diplomatic relations and the failure of diplomacy contribute to the outbreak of the First World War, and what lessons can be drawn from this in managing the great power competition between the United States and China?

Readings:

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 145-205, 285-307. **(Book)**

[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war while also showing that negotiation between great powers was possible despite conflicting interests. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace. Students should delay reading pages 285-307 which describe the end of the war until after they finish reading no. 2 by Hew Strachan.]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 35-64, 99-340. **(Book)**

[Strachan presents a general overview of the actual war, providing essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war's technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]

3. Holborn, Hajo. "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff" and Gunther E. Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." In *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Paret, Peter, ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325. **(Book)**

[The assigned chapters provide an invaluable introduction to the evolution of Germany's General Staff system and Germany's operational doctrine.]

4. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 239-265. **(Book)**

[Kennedy provides a broad overview of Britain's naval operations during the First World War.]

5. Hough, Richard. *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983. Pages 144-168. **(Leganto)**

[Hough examines the Dardanelles Campaign, focusing on the leadership in the British war office.]

6. Baer, George. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993. Pages 64-82. **(Book)**

[The First World War witnessed a huge buildup of American naval power. A former professor and chair of the Strategy and Policy Department, George Baer provides an account of the U.S. Navy's development, strategy, and operations during the war.]

7. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. **(Leganto/E-book)**

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

8. “In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents.” **(Selected Readings)**

[This compendium of primary-source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war of movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point of reassessment involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war-termination planning by the Allied powers in 1918.]

9. Hull, Isabel. *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. Pages 199-225. **(Leganto)**

[Hull argues that German military culture, with a focus on tactical and operational military expedience, affected and often undermined its strategic decision-making.]

10. Burk, Kathleen. “Great Britain in the United States, 1917-1918: The Turning Point.” *International History Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1979). Pages 228-245. **(Selected Readings)**

[Burk examines British-American relations in the crucial period of 1917-1918 with a focus on the role of American financing of the war and Britain’s loss of freedom of action.]

VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE: INTERDEPENDENCE OF SEA, AIR, AND GROUND OPERATIONS

Introduction: The Second World War in Europe case study is rich with lessons relevant to contemporary issues. Although all course themes are represented, four have particular significance to this case. The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations; Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans; the Instruments of War; and the Multinational Arena themes provide a starting point for analysis, critical thinking, and discussion of key lessons applicable to contemporary issues.

The Second World War was a global great power conflict. Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany overran much of continental Europe in the war's opening stages in 1939 and 1940, leaving the United Kingdom fighting alone against Hitler and the Axis alliance. Germany could not, however, compel British surrender as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill continued to fight and played for time. Driven by economic and ideological imperatives, Hitler in June 1941 turned against Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, previously Germany's de facto ally. In addition, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 brought the United States into the war. Hitler now faced a coalition of massive potential. Though the Allies had overwhelming resources, they also had divergent political objectives and were fighting a determined adversary. The United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and a host of smaller allies had to mobilize their economies for war, skillfully wield massive armies, navies, and air forces, convince their peoples to endure immense sacrifices, and manage their coalition's internal divisions to roll back German conquests and destroy the genocidal Nazi regime in 1945. This was a fight to the death between societies animated by irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France. Germany's only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Britain to make peace, Hitler faced a stark strategic choice. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping in an effort to starve it into submission. Additionally, Germany could have supported its coalition partner Italy by carrying out a peripheral strategy against Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Another option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact that had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941 without terminating Germany's war against Britain. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition in the West, the Mediterranean and North Africa, and the East against the Soviet Union.

Hitler's aims in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state and the enslavement of Slavic peoples in addition to the extermination of the Jews. He considered the vast natural resources of Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain's leaders to make peace and accept German domination in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the British Empire's survival. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became world history's largest theater of land operations.

Codenamed Operation BARBAROSSA, the initial German assault on the Soviet Union made dramatic gains. By late 1941, German forces had pushed to the gates of Moscow, laid siege to Leningrad, and overrun Ukraine. Yet these gains did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year toward the oil-rich Caucasus, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. The Red Army pushed the Germans back from 1943 onward. Defeating Germany came at an enormous cost to the Soviet Union, which suffered the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany—between twenty and thirty million Soviet soldiers and civilians perished—while inflicting an overwhelming majority of German military casualties.

The existential threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Defeating the Nazis required both hard fighting and strategic cooperation as part of globally integrated operations across multiple theaters. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance, which held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and its Axis partners Italy and Japan. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating "Germany first," the Allies argued over the proper timing for opening a second front—a large-scale invasion of German-occupied Europe—and the exact role that front should play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. Not until a summit meeting at Tehran in late 1943 was the second-front controversy resolved, with an agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

Nor did American and British leaders always agree, even when Stalin was not part of their deliberations. They faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. Given available resources, one should consider whether leaders made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives.

In the Atlantic, the British and Americans fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain's dependence on imports made potential defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in the Second World War. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence instruments to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic remains open to dispute, as does the degree to which each belligerent successfully integrated naval power with other elements of national power.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive's actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this week include an assessment of Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing's efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air-power strategy and nuclear deterrence.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy evaluate the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat of Nazi Germany? Moreover, top political leaders had to agree on the scope and timing of the invasion. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

D-Day was one of the most complex and intricate amphibious operations in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First, the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. Germany's dwindling air power, overextension on multiple fronts, exhausted fuel stocks, and inferior numbers allowed the Allies to break out of Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by the year's end.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while managing a joint and combined environment rife with uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals and politicians with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer serious resistance. American combat deaths were as high in April 1945 as in any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than three hundred thousand. Did less costly options exist to terminate the war, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute ideological opponent facing what seem to be hopeless circumstances?

This case study remains relevant to contemporary military and political leaders who must contend with a host of security challenges across multiple theaters and domains. How to adequately resource global lines of effort is among the most pressing concerns facing the United States today. Moreover, the ideologies on display in this case study still animate some states and non-state actors, as communist totalitarianism persists in places like Cuba and North Korea, and as the rise of fascism worldwide threatens the institutions and legacies of liberal democracy.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in 1940. Why did Germany fail to win a quick victory over Great Britain and the Soviet Union?

2. “The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance.” Do you agree?

3. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?

4. Could the Allies have opened the second front in France without succeeding in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive?

5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the Allied victory in the submarine campaign?

6. “Mahan’s strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany.” Do you agree?

7. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, many predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next great-power war. To what extent did Allied air power in the European theater of operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?

8. Given the differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were U.S. and British leaders at developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?

9. How well did Eisenhower manage the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war?

10. Judging from this case, the First World War, and the War of American Independence, what elements make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?

11. How effectively did Allied leadership manage risk when planning and executing OVERLORD?

12. Which contributed more to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945—the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of German leaders?

13. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

14. Germany launched major offensives to obtain a quick military victory over France in 1914 and again in 1940. Why did Germany fail in 1914 but succeed in 1940?

15. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?

16. How well do Clausewitz’s concepts of the culminating point of attack (CPA) and

culminating point of victory (CPV) explain the war on the Eastern Front?

17. To what extent were the policy objectives and strategies of the main belligerents in the European theater shaped by their ideologies?

18. Based on the historical case studies to date, which of the two naval theorists—Corbett or Mahan—better explain the course, conduct, and outcome of war?

19. Based on this case, the Peloponnesian War, and the First World War, what are the major challenges of war termination in conflicts fought by rival multinational coalitions?

20. What lessons does this case study hold for contemporary policymakers and strategists seeking to manage efforts across multiple theaters of conflict?

Readings:

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. *A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 262-335, 374-483. **(Book)**

[Murray and Millett's narrative history of the Second World War focuses on the operational level of war. The selections assigned cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Biddle, Tami Davis. "Democratic Leaders and Strategies of Coalition Warfare: Churchill and Roosevelt in World War II," in Hal Brands, ed., *The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), pp. 569-592. **(Book)**

[Biddle explores key differences between totalitarian and democratic states and examines Anglo-American strategic debates as well as disagreements over war termination and the desired political end-state of the war in Europe.]

3. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 412-508. **(Book)**

[Larrabee provides an assessment of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies surrounding the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

4. Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1959. Pages 71-106. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commercial_books/CB137-1.html **(E-book)**

[Brodie provides an assessment of the thinker he deems the most original air-power mind,

Brigadier General Giulio Douhet. Brodie analyzes Douhet's strengths and weaknesses while assessing why his writings have been so influential among air-power strategists.]

5. Wilson, Evan, and Ruth Schapiro. "German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941. *Journal of Military History*. vol. 85, no. 2 (2021). Pages 369-398. **(Selected Readings)**

[Wilson and Schapiro examine the German strategic dilemma of the submarine campaign and demonstrate the German Naval War Staff's awareness of it.]

6. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." **(Selected Readings)**

[These primary documents—a proposed strategy from the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counterargument in effect written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion between American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943—illustrate the critically different strategic concepts held by the British and Americans and show how their dispute was finally resolved.]

7. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-113. **(Selected Readings)**

[O'Brien challenges the view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He highlights the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and the powerful effects of the Anglo-American bombing of the German homeland.]

8. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 59-94. **(Book)**

[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring American anti-submarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement in the Second World War.]

9. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231. **(Book)**

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy. This reading helps students evaluate the Navy's allocation of resources across multiple theaters and the efficacy of the "Germany First" strategy.]

VII. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN THE PACIFIC: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION, THEATER COMMAND, AND JOINT OPERATIONS IN A MAJOR MARITIME WAR

Introduction: The Pacific War is the most recent and consequential example of warfare in the maritime domain between two major industrial powers (Japan and the United States). The theater of operations is similar to today's Indo-Pacific Command, with joint and coalition operations waged in locations from eastern India and the Bay of Bengal across the Pacific to Alaska and south to Australia. This case merits specific attention because of technological and military innovation by both combatants, the emergence of new military domains, the failure of deterrence, the importance of joint operations, the enormous logistic burdens placed on both navies, the industrial demands of modern war, mobilization challenges in protracted war, the impact of the war on societies and civilian populations, and the creation and use (for the only time to date) of atomic weapons. Both the United States and China closely study this case for parallels in the current strategic competition. Though all nine of the Strategy and War Course themes are present in this case study, the following four are emphasized: the Interrelationship of Strategy, Policy, and Operations; the Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations; War Termination; and the Institutional Context.

In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had acquired a substantial empire in northeast Asia. Japan remained, however, an unsatisfied power. It sought still further imperial possessions in Asia to provide it with markets, key resources, and security. Japan undertook operations against China with its 1931 invasion of Manchuria and massively escalated operations throughout China in 1937. The United States and its allies responded to Japanese expansion in China with increasingly harsh economic sanctions.

Seeing no alternative to war, in December 1941 Japan simultaneously attacked Hawaii, Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, Midway, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Wake Island. Japan intended its attacks across the Pacific to cut off the international aid sustaining Chinese resistance and create a self-sufficient and defensible Pacific Empire. The United States responded with a massive air, land, and sea campaign in conjunction with its allies. This first halted the Japanese advance at the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway in 1942, and then pushed Japan back towards its home islands and the heart of the Japanese empire. The war ended with the devastating U.S. bombing of Japan, a massive Soviet invasion of Manchuria, and the American use of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense maritime conflict ever fought. By the end of the conflict, it featured the main types of naval platforms upon which the U.S. Navy still relies: aircraft carriers, surface combatants to protect them, and submarines. Aviation also emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, moreover, Japanese leaders resorted to kamikaze tactics, which foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strike. U.S. application of naval power against Japan continues to shape U.S. force structure today, but are the “lessons” of the Pacific War—the centrality of naval aviation, the effectiveness of unrestricted blockade, and the decisive role of atomic weapons— still applicable to the current operational environment?

The Pacific War presents a rich source for exploring the Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations course theme. Despite the bitter inter-service rivalry between the Japanese army and navy, from December 1941 into the spring of 1942, Japan's military forces executed a brilliant series of joint operations across Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Students can study that campaign for insights into the effective integration of land and naval forces.

Japan's successes allowed it to acquire territory rich in strategic resources. It seized the initiative through surprise, but operational successes came with strategic costs. Could Japan defend the new empire it had won? More importantly, Japan added formidable great powers to the ranks of its enemies, even as it remained bogged down fighting Nationalist China. Japan had gone to war repeatedly since the 1890s to secure its dominance of Northeast Asia, but like Germany, every effort it took to overcome strategic challenges through escalation only made its strategic environment more threatening. When Japan's rulers attacked the United States in December 1941, they went to war without any clear conception of how to achieve victory. Students might consider the risks of relying on tactical and operational excellence without a viable strategy linking military plans to political outcomes.

While three-quarters of the Japanese army was deployed in Northeast Asia fighting in China or deterring the Soviet Union, the Japanese navy bore the brunt of the war against the United States in the Pacific. The pivotal battles occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942-1943. The former shows how important technology and intelligence can be to the outcome of an operation, while the latter is particularly useful for studying the prerequisites for a Corbettian peripheral operation. Ultimately, these successes enabled the United States to regain the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe, managing the difficult tradeoffs involved in globally integrated operations. As the war progressed, the United States executed a combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies degraded Japan's war-making potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. Sequential strategies, meanwhile, centered on American offensives in Southeast Asia and across the Pacific. Students should ask whether this was an efficient application of U.S. resources, and whether U.S. inter-service rivalry (like that of Japan) hindered effective prosecution of the war.

The Pacific War also provides examples of distinct approaches to operational and strategic leadership. Isoroku Yamamoto on the Japanese side along with Douglas MacArthur, Chester Nimitz, and William Halsey on the American side had very different relations with their political leadership and their subordinates. Students should seek to understand the qualities that proved effective or ineffective in managing complex operations.

Despite U.S. operational successes by 1944-1945, successful war termination proved difficult to engineer. After the loss of the Marianas, the Japanese ruling elite realized that defeat was inevitable, yet Japan continued to fight. Before August 1945, the emperor refused to confront military leadership directly, and the Japanese army was determined to fight one final battle in the defense of the home islands. It anticipated that, by inflicting heavy casualties on American forces invading Kyushu, Japan could compel the United States to abandon its demand for unconditional surrender. An enemy on death ground is always dangerous, and strategists ought to recognize how even a battered enemy might still turn the tide of a war despite having

lost repeatedly on the battlefield, or raise the cost of victory beyond an adversary's willingness to pay.

Within the U.S. government, there was tense debate over how to terminate the war against Japan. What operations would elicit surrender from Japan most expeditiously, with a minimum of American casualties, and without Soviet assistance? The use of the atomic bomb to terminate the war ushered in a new nuclear age but raised important new questions about this new weapon's utility and morality. The swiftness of the Japanese capitulation and the ceremony on the U.S.S. *Missouri* in September 1945 has shaped American thinking about war termination. The end of the Pacific War was far more complex than commonly believed. U.S. strategy for war termination devoted little attention to the fate of the Japanese and European colonial empires, or how the war had affected events within China. The Pacific War's end did not bring peace to the region; rather, it created new geopolitical arrangements and ideological antagonisms that remain relevant to decision-makers in the contemporary security environment.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely character of the war?

2. In December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was a formidable fighting force. Why did Japan's initial naval superiority fail to secure victory in the Pacific War?

3. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was obsessed with winning decisive naval battles?

4. Why did Japan fail to seek a feasible policy objective?

5. Should Japan have pursued a "Strike North" strategy focused on the Soviet Union rather than the "Strike South" strategy focused on the Southern Resource Area?

6. Which of Corbett's insights are most explanatory to the outcome of the Second World War in the Pacific from the U.S. and Japanese perspectives?

7. Did it make strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

8. What alternative strategies could Japan have pursued to achieve a more favorable outcome in its war against the United States?

9. Did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces among multiple theaters of advance from 1942 to 1945?

10. How efficiently did U.S. military commanders combine sequential and cumulative operations during the Pacific War?

11. To what extent did changes in aviation and naval warfare make Mahan's strategic theories irrelevant?

12. How well did leaders in the Pacific War balance risk and reward compared to those in the previous cases studies?

13. What do the experiences of the United States and Japan during the Second World War suggest about the dangers posed by interservice rivalries?

14. Were the strategic benefits of targeting civilian populations commensurate with the political, ethical, and moral costs?

15. Based on this and previous case studies, what are the prerequisites for a strategically effective peripheral operation?

16. What was the relative importance of the firebombing and mining of Japan, the dropping of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet invasion of Northeast Asia in bringing about Japan's unconditional surrender?

17. How did Japan's campaigns in China affect the course of the war against the Allies in the Pacific?

18. How could the Japanese have exploited the most important U.S. mistakes during the Second World War in the Pacific?

19. How did the ways Japan and Germany fought in the Second World War reflect their previous wartime experiences in the Russo-Japanese War and First World War respectively?

20. Are there substantive ethical differences between unrestricted submarine warfare by the United States in the Second World War and Germany in the First World War that justify evaluating them differently?

21. What are the most salient operational and strategic lessons that leaders should take from the Pacific War for today's security challenges in the Western Pacific?

Readings:

1. Kuehn, John T. *Strategy in Crisis: The Pacific War, 1937-1945.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2023. Pages 34-168. **(Book)**

[Kuehn provides a comprehensive narrative overview of the Pacific War by illustrating the strategies and operations of the United States and Japan. The book compares these operations with those on the Eastern Front in the Second World War and highlights the significance of the

Allied planning conferences, demonstrating the connections between the two theaters in Allied planning and strategy.]

2. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 146-189. **(Book)**

[The United States spent much of the interwar period preparing for what appeared to be an inevitable war against Japan. In this reading, Baer assesses the U.S. Navy's role in developing policy, strategy, and operations for the war against Japan in the late 1930s.]

3. Wylie, J. C. Appendix A, "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific.'" In *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1967. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. **(Leganto)**

[The United States adapted to strategic challenges of war in the Pacific that had not been anticipated in the interwar planning process. Wylie, a veteran of naval battles in the Pacific and a former Naval War College faculty member, identifies two different types of military strategy that were highlighted in the campaign—sequential and cumulative strategies.]

4. Paine, Sarah C. M. *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pages 3-11, 123-204. **(Book)**

[Like the United States, Japan fought a war in multiple theaters from 1937-1945. Japan's struggle to occupy China absorbed enormous resources, disrupted Japan's economy, and exacerbated tensions with the United States. Paine, a Naval War College University Professor, provides an overview of the Second World War in Asia, addressing the critical importance of Japan's broader war in Asia and particularly its war with China.]

5. Warner, Denis and Peggy. "The Doctrine of Surprise"; Miller, Edward S. "Kimmel's Hidden Agenda"; and Cohen, Eliot A. "The Might-Have-Beens of Pearl Harbor." *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*. vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). Pages 20-25, 36-43, 72-73. **(Leganto)**

[These articles offer three different perspectives on Pearl Harbor. The Warners, specialists on the Russo-Japanese War, explain the Japanese proclivity for surprise; Cohen analyzes why American military leaders were surprised; and Miller presents an analysis of the operational plan that Admiral Husband Kimmel intended to execute had his fleet not fallen victim to the surprise attack.]

6. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Reprint, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004. Pages 354-411. **(Book)**

[Larrabee chronicles Nimitz's role in the Central Pacific theater. He analyzes the choices made in this theater, leaders' motivations, and the interaction between political and military decision-makers. Additionally, he details the impact of intelligence on the Battle of Midway, the strategic

effects of operational decisions made by Japan and the United States, and the significance of the battle's outcome.]

7. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific.” In *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*. Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. **(Leganto)**

[Interwar planning envisioned a single major offensive through the island chains towards Japan. It did not consider the utility of secondary or peripheral operations, or the need to provide support to allies and coalition partners. In this reading, Lee, professor emeritus of the Strategy and Policy Department, discusses the U.S. decision to contest Japanese operations at Guadalcanal and highlights its strategic effects.]

8. O’Brien, Phillips. *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pages 374-429. **(Leganto)**

[Japan entered the war knowing that it needed to win quickly, before American industrial and logistical capabilities altered the military balance. O’Brien examines the impact that heavy attrition had on both militaries from 1942-1944, and how this impacted the American’s multi-pronged advance across the Pacific.]

9. Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. “The Atomic Bombs and the Soviet Invasion: Which was more important in Japan's decision to surrender?” In *The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals*. Edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007. Pages 113-144. **(Leganto)**

[The reasons for Japan’s surrender in August 1945 continue to be actively debated. This essay argues that the Soviet invasion of Northeast Asia in August 1945 was the decisive factor behind Japan’s decision to sue for peace.]

10. Garon, Sheldon. “On the Transnational Destruction of Cities: What Japan and the United States Learned from the Bombing of Britain and Germany in the Second World War.” *Past and Present*. no. 247 (2020). Pages 235-271. **(Selected Readings)**

[The seizure of the Marianas Island chain allowed the U.S. to begin a strategic bombing campaign against Japanese cities and infrastructure. This article compares this campaign with strategic bombing in Europe, and demonstrates that the aerial bombing of Japan was far more effective than previously believed. Students should compare this reading with the Hasegawa piece.]

11. “The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War.” **(Selected Readings)**

[Primary sources provide key insights into the thinking of wartime leaders. This compendium includes an important speech from President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz’s operational plan and “Letter of Instruction” to his subordinate commanders for Midway, the

minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary-source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

VIII. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953: IDEOLOGY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND FIGHTING AND TERMINATING A MAJOR REGIONAL WAR

Introduction: The aftermath of the Second World War left devastated and divided societies across Europe and Asia. Japan's defeat ended its imperial rule over Korea but did not resolve Korea's future. The Soviet Union occupied the half of the Korean peninsula north of the 38th parallel where the Soviets engineered a one-party communist dictatorship under Kim Il-Sung. U.S. occupation south of the 38th established a Western-leaning state under the presidency of Syngman Rhee. Most Koreans were committed to the idea of a unified Korean nation-state; the question was what form would it take. As North and South Korea built new states, Kim repeatedly petitioned his patrons—Mao Zedong in China and Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union—for permission and resources to invade the South and reunify Korea under his rule. Stalin eventually agreed, and in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. The North's initial attack was wildly successful, driving South Korean and U.S. forces into a small perimeter around the city of Pusan. U.S. General Douglas MacArthur carried out an extraordinarily risky amphibious landing at Inchon to cut off the North's forces and enable a rapid breakout from Pusan. The United States and its allies, acting under United Nations auspices, liberated South Korea and overran most of the North. MacArthur's very success became catastrophic, as it triggered Chinese intervention on behalf of North Korea. The Chinese sent U.N. forces reeling back down the peninsula. The front finally stabilized near the original line of division, but political debates over MacArthur's insubordination and frustrations over a stalemated war continued unabated. Though major fighting ceased in 1953, U.S. and South Korean troops still face North Koreans across a tense demilitarized zone.

This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges the United States confronted while fighting a major regional war as leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 caught the United States unprepared materially, strategically, institutionally, and intellectually, and to this day shapes the current operational environment in Northeast Asia. To more effectively explain the background, course, and attempts to conclude the Korean War, the following course themes are emphasized in this case study: the Interrelationship of Strategy, Policy, and Operations; War Termination; the Multinational Arena; and the Institutional Context.

In response to North Korean aggression, the United States immediately decided to intervene under the auspices of the United Nations. The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests as leader of a coalition, as well as the limits of that capability.

The U.N. forces suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Their breakout from the Pusan perimeter and landings at Inchon in September 1950 (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not end the conflict. The war became even more difficult to end as U.N. forces sought to exploit their victories and keep pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. China's intervention embroiled the United States in a major regional war. American failure to grasp China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities contributed to one of the worst

battlefield reverses that U.S. armed forces have ever suffered. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end as was hoped in summer 1951. Instead, a costly two-year stalemate proved immensely frustrating to the Americans, who had come to expect that their wars would produce decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated assessments, operational planning, strategic choices, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the U.S. intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first major war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leadership in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting theater military commanders to follow that intent. The result was a failure to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy aligned with policy, and isolate adversaries. President Harry Truman's administration failed to agree on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe suffered political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability was complicated by Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945, the return of colonial powers to places such as Vietnam and Malaya, and indigenous communist movements. Because peace arrived unexpectedly—at least a year before many had anticipated—war termination in Asia was a more ad hoc affair than in Europe. At the close of the Second World War, Korea, as a former Japanese colony, was divided between U.S. and Soviet forces at the 38th parallel. Attempts to form a single government to unite a fractured people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a dividing line between Stalin's proxy Kim Il-Sung and the U.S.-supported government of Syngman Rhee. Each wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his influential "X" article and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68 helped shape U.S. strategy for the great power competition of the Cold War. The broader international environment molded the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. This required globally integrated operations as part of a continuum of competition between two global coalitions to prevent fighting in Korea from expanding into a regional or even global conflagration involving nuclear weapons. The leaders of both coalitions made decisions at the operational and even tactical levels with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexity of thinking critically and strategically when applying joint warfighting principles to complex multinational operations. The physical accessibility of the Korean theater played to U.S. strengths in naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many of its advantages in ground fighting. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of integrating naval power with other instruments of war—air, land, and nuclear—for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded character of this conflict further

provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, reassessment, adaptation, and innovation in wartime. In particular, this case highlights the difficulties in determining both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is also valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China's intervention represented, along with Pearl Harbor and 9/11, one of the most dramatic intelligence failures in U.S. history. Whether the failure to understand China's intentions and actions stemmed from simple ignorance, the difficulty of assessing an adversary from a different culture, willful disregard of clear warnings, hubris among key leaders, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of China remains an issue hotly debated among historians.

The Korean War also highlights the problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The war-termination process frustrated American civilian leaders and military commanders alike, leaving a legacy that directly affected the U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the 1990-1991 Gulf War. While the United States ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and protracted negotiations with the communists greatly increased the war's costs. U.S. leaders also found that trying to reach a settlement with adversaries created vexing problems with managing coalition partners whose priorities and preferences did not always align with that of the United States.

Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed part of the complex strategic problem of war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The ethical challenges associated with the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military relations. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. Korea was the first conflict the United States fought under this organizational framework. Furthermore, General MacArthur acted as both a multinational and a joint commander, serving concurrently as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Command. MacArthur's dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including British concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

General Matthew Ridgway took command of U.N. forces following MacArthur's dismissal. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling; Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway understood the administration's goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet material aid. The result was stalemate from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Fear of escalation—specifically, fear that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe while U.S. forces were occupied in East Asia—reinforced the stalemate, calling into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel in mid-1951, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of

Stalin in 1953. U.S. troops remain in South Korea more than seventy years after the armistice to help defend against a renewed communist onslaught.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. Did allies drag the United States and China into a war that neither the United States nor China wanted?

2. Did the United States make a mistake by going to war in Korea?

3. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that "the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must" in international relations. Were they right, judging from the Korean War and the world wars?

4. Which of the theorists in the Strategy and War Course best explains the outcome of the Korean War, and why?

5. Who did a better job in the Korean War of adapting and reassessing? United States and its allies or the communists?

6. Which side—the U.N. forces or the Communist forces—was most effective at taking advantage of the other side's strategic and operational mistakes during the Korean War?

7. How do Clausewitz's concepts of the culminating point of attack and culminating point of victory (Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22 of *On War*) help explain the course of the Korean War?

8. Consider the relationship between civilian and military decision-makers. Which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea: military leaders' failure to comprehend the political objective or civilian leaders' failure to comprehend what can and cannot be achieved by force?

9. The Korean War was the first major U.S. conflict fought after the advent of nuclear weapons. What role did nuclear weapons play in determining choices made by the belligerents?

10. During the war-termination phase of the Korean War, 1951-1953, the Americans and Chinese needed to address two key issues: how far to go militarily and what to demand politically. Who did a better job?

11. Preconceived ideas about an adversary can distort intelligence and planning; how did these preconceived ideas affect the Korean War?

12. It took two years of stalemated fighting from 1951 to 1953 to achieve an armistice in the Korean War. Were there missed opportunities to end the war sooner?

13. What factors hampered the belligerents' efforts to achieve optimal integration of the different forms of military power?

14. How well did U.S. military and civilian leaders manage risk during the Korean War?

15. Why did the United States accept a stalemate in Korea while five years earlier in the Second World War it achieved its basic political objectives when operating on a much larger scale?

16. The X article and NSC-68 presented two very different approaches to strategy in the early Cold War. Did the Korean War support one of these strategic approaches better than the other?

17. How is the Korean War best understood: as a civil war, as a regional war for dominance in Northeast Asia, or as a theater in a global Cold War?

18. What mattered more to Washington and Beijing in the Korean War, the cultural and ideological differences or the logic of military power and national interests?

19. What is the biggest takeaway from the Korean War Case Study as it pertains to contemporary events, specifically great power competition?

Readings:

1. Jager, Sheila Miyoshi. *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2013. Pages 13-286. **(Book)**

[Jager provides a general overview of the Korean War including its origins, foreign intervention on the peninsula, war termination, and the war's effect on Cold War alliances and U.S.-Korean relations.]

2. Brodie, Bernard. *War and Politics*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. Pages 57-112. **(Leganto)**

[Brodie analyzes the major American policy and strategy choices in the Korean War. He is especially provocative on what he sees as a missed opportunity for war termination in mid-1951.]

3. Shen Zhihua and Yafeng Xia. "Mao Zedong's Erroneous Decision During the Korean War: China's Rejection of the UN." *Asian Perspective*. vol. 35, no. 2 (April-June 2011). Pages 187-209. **(Leganto)**

[This article provides a red team analysis of a missed opportunity for the Chinese to terminate the war in 1951. This should be read as a red-team counterpoint to Brodie.]

4. Fang Zhu. *Gun Barrel Politics: Party-Army Relations in Mao's China*. New York: Routledge, 1998. Pages 1-16, 19-58. **(Leganto/E-book)**

[This chapter provides more detailed information on how to understand Chinese civil-military dynamics, laying out various institutions and discussing Party-institutional issues. This reading discusses Mao Zedong's relationship with his chief military leader Peng Dehuai. The civil-military tension can be compared with the Truman-MacArthur controversy.]

5. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. **(Leganto)**

[Osgood analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the Korean conflict while addressing some problems that waging a limited war posed for the United States and its Clausewitzian trinity.]

6. "North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15." In *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, vol. 7: Korea. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. **(Leganto)**

[These documents illuminate the pre-Inchon debate within the American government over whether the U.S. political objective in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]

7. Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 115-129. **(Leganto)**

[Gaddis explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Korean War. This reading will help students think about how U.S. policy and strategy may be constrained even if the other side has a small weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) capability at its disposal. Gaddis is a former member of the Strategy and Policy Department and now a professor at Yale.]

8. Crane, Conrad C. "To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War." *Journal of Strategic Studies*. vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 72-88. **(Leganto)**

[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders toward the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

9. "X" [George F. Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs*. vol. 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987). Pages 852-868. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043098

[In this article, originally published anonymously in July 1947, State Department official George Kennan argued that the United States needed to follow a strategy aimed at containing Soviet expansion. This article is often seen as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]

10. NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 7, 1950. Sections I-IV, IX, Conclusions, Recommendations. **(Selected Readings)**

[This report from an ad hoc interdepartmental committee, headed by State Department official Paul Nitze, painted a stark picture of the emerging superpower conflict and forcefully recommended a major buildup of military and other resources to confront the communist threat. Like reading no. 9, NSC-68 can be viewed as a blueprint for U.S. strategy during the Cold War.]

11. General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of Defense George Marshall. "Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees." In *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*. Edited by Allen Guttman. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. **(Leganto)**

[This reading provides the explanation General MacArthur offered for his actions in the conflict with President Truman, along with the administration's rationale for relieving him of command.]

12. Ulrich, Marybeth P. "A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders." In U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues. Volume II: National Security Policy and Strategy. Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012. Pages 306-316. **(Selected Reading)**

[The Ulrich article provides an introduction to civil-military relations theory which will be applicable throughout the remainder of the course. The article's emphasis on the distinct roles and responsibilities that political and military leaders have in the formulation of strategy and its implementation in a theater of operations is particularly relevant in the Korean War Case Study. The civil-military relations theory presented in this article provides a tool for analyzing the dispute between General MacArthur and President Truman over political objectives and the conduct of the war.]

IX. THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975: INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY, AND CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Introduction: This case examines the Vietnam War, from its origins as a colonial war through its transformation into a conflict that drew in great powers engaged in a global, ideological Cold War. From 1945 to 1954, the United States supported France with money and munitions in French efforts to restore control over the former colony of French Indochina. When the insurgent Viet Minh defeated France in 1954, the French government conceded full independence to North Vietnam, or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), where Ho Chi Minh's Communists solidified their rule. South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), remained non-communist. The United States replaced France as South Vietnam's key patron. From 1954 to 1975, the United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam against internal and external aggression. South Vietnam faced a hybrid threat: internal Viet Cong insurgents backed by the North, as well as North Vietnam's conventional forces, both enjoying the backing of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

After the French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role to develop South Vietnam's capabilities and its armed forces. In 1965, the United States launched ROLLING THUNDER, a large-scale air offensive against North Vietnam to convince the North to end its campaign against the South. In the same year, the United States introduced large numbers of combat troops for the first time into the South. By 1968, the United States had some 550,000 troops in South Vietnam aimed at reducing enemy capacity and providing internal security. Air operations attempted to slow the infiltration of soldiers and supplies from the North while also convincing Hanoi to abandon its goal of reunification. In the wake of the February 1968 Tet Offensive, the United States accelerated its pacification efforts to quell the Viet Cong insurgency and gain more support from the population of South Vietnam for the government in Saigon. The Nixon Administration, in office from January 1969, increased the intensity of the air war and expanded the war to include ground operations in Laos and Cambodia. Even while expanding the war geographically, Nixon began "Vietnamization": withdrawing U.S. troops and transferring responsibility for the ground war to RVN military forces.

The Easter Offensive of 1972 was a major test of Vietnamization. A massive conventional North Vietnamese invasion was halted by the RVN military, supported by American air power. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, more aggressive bombing of North Vietnam in Operation LINEBACKER II, and concessions by the United States at the bargaining table persuaded the North to agree to a negotiated settlement. At the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the North capitalized on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the waning commitment of the United States. Even with these advantages, the North Vietnamese needed to agree to major concessions in return for a temporary peace. After the American troop withdrawal, a second, massive conventional attack by the North in 1975 was successful. The South's army collapsed rapidly, and the United States chose not to provide further political or military support to the South. The Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist.

The Vietnam War highlights several enduring dilemmas inherent in nested wars: in this case an interrelated set of conflicts comprising an internal conflict in South Vietnam, a regional war in Indochina, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although

all the course themes apply in this case study, the case specifically highlights the following: Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans; the Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations; the Multinational Arena; and Cultures and Societies.

In the realm of assessment, the readings underscore the difficulty and the degree of effort required to understand the character of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. At various critical junctures after 1965, U.S. leaders also had opportunities to reassess the problem and their strategic options. Strategists continue to debate whether a more accurate assessment or reassessment would have produced a better outcome.

The United States confronted major problems when designing and executing operations to obtain the desired effects on the ground and in the air. The Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency. Beginning in the early 1960s, the CIA worked in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military to launch a series of pacification and unconventional-warfare programs. U.S. military advisors also pressed South Vietnamese civilian and military officials to serve popular interests in the countryside, as analyzed in the Hazelton reading. Before 1965 and after 1969, the United States focused primarily on training, advising, and assisting the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to gain the support of the southern population and resist insurgent and Northern conventional forces. In many of these operations, the United States achieved tactical and operational success, yet the United States was unable to translate those successes into strategic results.

The air campaign represented another failure to turn operational success into desired strategic results. Challenges arose at all levels of U.S. political and military leadership. While President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the air campaign did not completely alienate domestic opinion or lead to unwanted expansion of the war, the military saw the operation from a different perspective. The resulting Operation ROLLING THUNDER highlights challenging command relationships in the theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the role of political guidance. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority made the campaign difficult to coordinate. The case addresses how air operations translated (or failed to translate) into battlefield and strategic effects against a mostly pre-industrial nation.

Subsequent air campaigns including Operations LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II during 1972 presented different obstacles. The first aimed at interdicting the supply lines supporting the Easter Offensive and then continued to attrite conventional enemy forces through the summer and fall. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation in December 1972 featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was intended to compel the North to sign the agreement it had already accepted in October 1972. While the communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, the impact of LINEBACKER II on their acquiescence remains controversial.

As with later wars, this case raises questions about achieving a productive and ethical relationship among allies, and between patrons and clients, during wartime. The readings demonstrate that the relationship between the United States and its South Vietnamese allies was

far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. At the same time, U.S. forces demonstrated serious failures to understand Vietnamese culture and society. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate the direction of the war during peak U.S. involvement, only to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization.

This case also considers the broader consequences of withdrawal from protracted conflicts. The U.S. decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often stemmed from concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (under the "domino theory") and damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide, including the main Cold War theater in Europe. Opponents of the war argued that withdrawal was unlikely to damage U.S. credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos in 1975 and the nightmarish civil wars in Cambodia might appear to support the hawks' fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand's successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam appear to support more dovish arguments. This debate, in turn, forces one to consider the second- and third-order effects of opening, developing, and closing theaters of operation.

Students should consider the parallels between the dilemmas the United States faced in Vietnam and more recent challenges. For example, images from Kabul in 2021 echo with those of Saigon in 1975. In Vietnam, the United States supported the weak South Vietnamese government while fighting the Viet Cong and the regular North Vietnamese Army. Looking back on Afghanistan, we can see a similar dynamic where the United States supported a government with limited popular support while fighting a complex insurgency. Is it significant that in both Vietnam and Afghanistan the last U.S. personnel departed from U.S. embassies rather than its military bases? The U.S. experience in Vietnam also forces us to consider what leaders should do when there are serious problems with civil-military relations and the attainability of political objectives. Thinking ahead, is it reasonable to believe the United States is unlikely to enter a similar conflict given our experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan, or is it just as likely to happen again?

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

2. Were sanctuaries critical to the outcomes of the Vietnam and Korean wars?

3. What effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and on the outcome of the war?

4. To what degree do Mao's theories of revolutionary warfare explain the course of insurgency in South Vietnam?

5. What would an effective counter to the enemy's dau tranh strategy have required?

6. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

7. Did the U.S. armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

8. Why did the United States achieve its objectives in Korea but, despite mounting a greater effort, fail to achieve them in Vietnam?

9. Krepinevich argues that the United States lost in Vietnam because it applied the "Army concept" of conventional operations to an insurgency. However, the South Vietnamese army fell to a conventional invasion in 1975, not to a popular uprising or insurgency. How important was the failed U.S. counterinsurgency effort in the final outcome in 1975?

10. Judging from the Vietnam War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the War for American Independence, what are the most important factors that work against outside great powers fighting regional wars across vast geographic distances?

11. Stansfield Turner saw the Peloponnesian War, and specifically the Sicilian Expedition, as crucial to making sense of America's experience in Vietnam. To what degree does Thucydides help us understand the strategic challenges the U.S. faced in Vietnam?

12. During the war, General William Westmoreland was reading and re-reading Mao and Sun Tzu, and he also had his staff and subordinates read these books. Was this a waste of their time?

13. Did the United States have a viable strategy in Vietnam, or did the United States focus on tactics and operations in the place of strategy?

14. There was no unified command in Vietnam. Would a theater commander in Vietnam with command of all assets from all services have made a difference in either the way the United States fought or in the final outcome?

15. Was the U.S. strategy in Vietnam ever capable of achieving U.S. political objectives?

16. While there were cultural issues in Vietnam, the logic and use of military power cuts across time, technology, and culture. The cultural issues were not important in Vietnam. What mattered was that the United States had a bad strategy. Do you agree?

17. The weakness of the South Vietnamese government and its lack of legitimate support from the people was a major factor in the war. Was there any way U.S. military power could compensate for these issues?

18. Was air power used effectively by U.S. military leaders in Vietnam?

19. The peace of Nicias and the Paris Peace Accords were short-lived agreements. What common factors explain their failures?

20. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu have very different assessments about the importance of intelligence. Which view does the Vietnam War validate?

21. In what ways is studying the U.S. experience in Vietnam useful for understanding strategic and operational challenges of the twenty-first century?

Readings:

1. Millet, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter, and Feis, William B. *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012*. Third Edition. New York: The Free Press, 2012. Pages 507-568. **(Leganto/E-book)**

[These two chapters from a major study of U.S. military history offer a broad overview of the U.S. war in Vietnam.]

2. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-214. **(Book)**

[Krepinevich provides an overview of U.S. Army strategy in Vietnam by showing how the U.S. Army attempted to apply its conventional doctrine that was successful in the European Theater of World War II to the irregular fight in Vietnam. Krepinevich argues that more soldiers and more weapons would not have changed the outcome and that the U.S. failure to adapt and reassess played into North Vietnamese strategy.]

3. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 117-210. **(Book)**

[Clodfelter discusses the air war. This reading includes considerations of doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and the strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER and LINEBACKER I and II.]

4. Haun, Phil and Jackson, Colin. "Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II." *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/16). Pages 139-178. **(Leganto)**

[Two former professors in the Strategy and Policy Department offer a rejoinder to Clodfelter. They argue that air power was quite effective in direct attacks on the North Vietnamese Army.]

5. Hazelton, Jacqueline. “The Client Gets a Vote: Counterinsurgency Warfare and the U.S. Military Advisory Mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965.” *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol. 43, no. 1 (2020). Pages 126-153. **(Leganto)**

[Hazelton, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that U.S. military officers in the advisory period believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. This article identifies the client state’s ability and will to resist reforms as an important, overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns. Further, it challenges Krepinevich’s argument that U.S. advisors did not understand what successful counterinsurgency required.]

6. Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. Pages 87-256. **(Leganto/E-book)**

[Approaching the Vietnam conflict from the North’s perspective, Nguyen researched in Hanoi to complete this book that provides detailed accounts of political posturing, strategic disagreement, and reactions to American attacks by the North Vietnamese leadership.]

7. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308. **(Book)**

[Focusing on one key province, Bergerud discusses the overall effects of U.S. and communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.]

8. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam*. Novato: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 213-252. **(Leganto)**

[This critical chapter focuses on dau tranh, or struggle, the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy.]

9. Herring, George C. “‘Peoples Quite Apart’: Americans, South Vietnamese, and the War in Vietnam.” *Diplomatic History*. vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1990). Pages 1-23. **(Leganto)**

[This study from the leading historian of the war contends Americans did not understand the character of the war, Vietnamese culture, the needs of South Vietnam, and the enemy they were fighting.]

10. Paris Peace Accords, January 1973. **(Leganto)**

[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. It offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

X. THE NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE OF TERRORISM: INSURGENCY, BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND IRREGULAR WARFARE IN MULTIPLE THEATERS

Introduction: The United States has spent more than two decades fighting terrorist organizations and insurgencies on a global scale. The story of how the conflict began and how it has evolved is full of numerous twists and turns that defy a linear narrative. In many ways, two decades of the United States and its allies fighting violent extremist organizations and employing irregular warfare laid the foundation for today's security environment. The conflicts against al-Qaeda (AQ) and associated movements (AQAM), the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have presented deep and complex challenges for both the United States and its allies. This case study also marks the transition from studying completed historical cases to studying contemporary cases. It highlights four course themes: The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations; Interaction, Reassessment, and Adaptation; War Termination; and Cultures and Societies.

The events of 11 September 2001, paved the way for the period commonly identified as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). At this critical juncture, the U.S. leadership had two options: either fight a campaign of limited aims, that is, disrupt AQ networks across the globe and punish the Taliban, or to launch a more ambitious war of unlimited aims with the intention of defeating global terrorism. The latter prevailed. As a first step, the United States invaded Afghanistan in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and his transnational terror organization, AQ. The interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations played a significant role in the U.S. response. The initial U.S. strategy in Afghanistan refrained from committing a substantial number of ground troops, and instead focused on employing air power, special operations forces, and partnering with local actors against the Taliban. While the United States and its partners failed to capture bin Laden, the United States decided to pursue more unlimited objectives including the overthrew of the Taliban. The U.S. attention in Afghanistan then turned to stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

In 2003, imbued by the success of swiftly overthrowing the Taliban, the United States pivoted away from "hunting" bin Laden and turned to Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein's regime over fears that it possessed weapons of mass destruction. The United States pursued the unlimited objective of regime change. While the United States swiftly overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, war termination proved far more challenging. U.S. operations, some of which were based on faulty assessments of the nature of local cultures and societies in Iraq, created a power vacuum that violent extremist organizations rushed to fill. As the invasion became an occupation, Iraq slid into a state of exceptional volatility, marked by insurgency, sectarian tensions between the Sunnis and Shiites, terrorism, and chaos writ large. By late 2004, a destabilized Iraq also attracted countless jihadists, and AQ formally emerged in Iraq. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), in turn, played a crucial role in fueling the sectarian divide. At the dawn of 2006, Iraq seemed to be heading for a full-scale sectarian civil war.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, both the United States and a resurgent Taliban adapted and reassessed with varying degrees of success. The remnants of the Taliban regrouped to launch a persistent insurgency. The United States reassessed the situation and determined that military

operations could only achieve limited success to stabilize and secure the country unless the United States and its partners addressed failures in governance. The U.S.-led coalition poured significant resources into the region without fully addressing the rampant corruption among Afghan officials. As a result, the United States found rebuilding Afghan governance while fighting an insurgency especially challenging. The United States and its coalition partners struggled in an entirely foreign cultural terrain, and the Taliban fought on its own home turf, with most of its networks still intact. Moreover, the United States faced difficulties in managing forces between Afghanistan and Iraq.

At nearly the same time in Iraq, the United States sought to prevent a full-scale civil war while undermining AQI. Similar to Afghanistan, interaction, reassessment, and adaptation emerged as the key dynamic that shaped the course of the conflict. The new U.S. strategy was in line with Sun Tzu's teachings: first, attack the enemy's strategy; second, attack the enemy's alliances. Recognizing that AQI benefited greatly from having access to safe havens in Sunni-majority provinces, the United States adopted two complementary measures to attack the enemy's strategy, namely the Surge (2007), and increased emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. In terms of attacking the adversary's alliances, the United States brokered a deal between the central Iraqi government and the Sunni tribes, an initiative commonly referred to as the Anbar Awakening. When combined, the Surge and the Anbar Awakening effectively undermined AQI. These measures heavily degraded AQI by 2008-2009. As a result, Iraq seemed to have reached a degree of security and normalcy that would enable more effective governance. The U.S. military presence in Iraq eventually came to an end by the late-2011 except for a small number of advisors.

The conflict in Afghanistan, in the meantime, evolved into a war of attrition. The Taliban demonstrated resilience while adapting strategically over the course of this protracted conflict. In 2009, the United States decided to initiate a troop surge, modeled after the successes in Iraq. The surge sought to deny AQ networks safe haven in Afghanistan, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the Afghan government and its security forces. Between 2009 and 2012, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations helped stabilize the most important cities and districts. Through numerous reconstruction projects and security assistance efforts, the United States and its partners sought to strengthen the Afghan army and police, while also rallying support for the government. Despite all of these efforts, the association between interaction, reassessment, and adaptation and cultures and societies still favored the Taliban, and, consequently, the resources poured into Afghanistan failed to create an economically self-sustaining, politically stable environment.

With Afghanistan devolving into an "endless war," what Clausewitz referred to as the "value of the object" took precedence for both the Taliban and the United States. For the members of the Taliban, the conflict was not only over what they considered to be their ancestral homeland, it was also a matter of organizational life and death. For the United States, almost two decades of fighting with no end in sight, when combined with the return of great power competition, caused both the Trump and Biden administrations to reassess the costs of remaining in Afghanistan. When the United States announced its impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, the balance of resolve between the Taliban and the Afghan government decisively shifted in favor of the former. As the United States withdrew, the Afghan government and security forces

rapidly collapsed. The Taliban swept into power, marking the end of two decades of U.S. involvement in the country. This also raised questions about whether the United States could have approached war termination differently, allowing the outcome to be more beneficial and less disruptive from the U.S. point of view.

While the U.S. political and military leaders were struggling to find a way to conclude the conflict in Afghanistan, operations in Iraq (and eventually Syria) took a different turn. The remnants of AQI first went into hiding, and then, through dedicated attention to interaction, reassessment, and adaptation, devised and executed a series of operations that took advantage of the existing divisions and tensions among different cultures and societies in the broader region. Most notably, when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, remnants of AQI branched into Syria, once again exploiting existing political instability and sectarian tensions. By mid-2014, the group captured Iraq's second biggest city, Mosul, and rebranded itself as ISIS and declared itself a "caliphate," in reference to the Islamic empires of the past. Simultaneously, ISIS consolidated its gains in both Iraq and Syria. At its peak, the organization controlled a collection of territories that rivaled the size of Britain. The fact that the group controlled large swaths of territory, in turn, served as an unprecedented recruitment tool, attracting countless foreign fighters.

The United States responded by launching OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE while also forming a multinational coalition against ISIS. However, defeating ISIS required liberating the territories that the group had captured and committing combat troops in both Iraq and Syria. This dynamic challenged the United States in two ways. First, public opinion in the United States did not favor yet another large-scale military intervention in the Middle East. Second, the dwindling U.S. military presence in the region and the outbreak of the Arab Spring had both allowed and incentivized regional actors such as Iran, Turkey, and (eventually) Russia to amplify their influence as well as presence in Iraq and Syria. Under the circumstances, the United States turned to local partners to do most of the fighting against ISIS.

In Iraq, the United States worked with both the central government and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to undermine ISIS. The Shiite militia groups, some of which were backed and trained by Iran, also played an important role in the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In Syria, where regional actors like Turkey or the Syrian regime were unwilling to directly engage ISIS, the United States, partnering with local actors, especially the Kurdish-dominated militia known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, took the lead. Drawing from the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States combined numerous elements of conventional and irregular warfare, and, as of 2019, defeated ISIS in both Iraq and Syria.

In sum, this case study offers a detailed analysis of the United States' most recent and longest war, with an emphasis on not only the ways in which violent extremist groups can threaten regional and global security, but also how to fight and degrade such organizations. More than two decades of continuous conventional and irregular warfare against violent extremist organizations around the globe, not to mention the qualified successes of the United States and its allies in their efforts, have slightly eased but in no way divested the necessity of paying very close attention to the enduring nature of terrorism and insurgencies. As the United States shifts its attention to great power competition, civilian and military leaders should carefully analyze the lessons of the past two decades, with an eye on both the risk of yet another threat from violent

extremist groups and the unconventional challenges that its peer competitors can pose in the near future.

Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. To what extent did irregular warfare operations support the United States and its allies' strategy and ultimately their policy?

2. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we evaluated the wisdom of the Sicilian expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening a theater in Iraq similar to that ancient expedition?

3. How would Clausewitz evaluate American strategy and execution of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

4. Could a better counterinsurgency strategy have achieved U.S. political objectives in Afghanistan?

5. Did the "Surge" in Iraq (2007) help the United States achieve its policy objectives?

6. To what degree do Mao's theories of revolutionary warfare explain the actions of ISIS in Iraq and Syria?

7. Who did a better job in Afghanistan of adapting and reassessing? United States and its allies or the Taliban?

8. Would Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, or Mao provide the best guidance for strategic reassessment and operational adaptation in Iraq and Afghanistan?

9. In the context of the GWOT, did it make sense for the United States to open the Iraq theater?

10. Why did the United States find it so difficult to successfully terminate its conflict in Afghanistan?

11. In which theater did the United States do the best job in terms of war termination?

12. As far as war termination is concerned, what are the most important lessons to draw from the United States experiences in this case?

13. Sun Tzu advised that the second-best way to win is to attack the enemy's alliances. To what extent does that insight apply to this case study?

14. How did existing cultural and societal fractures in Iraq and Syria affect the outcome of the conflict against ISIS?

15. In which theater, Iraq or Syria, did the United States fare better in terms of understanding the cultural and societal dynamics and turning the cultural-societal terrain to its advantage?

16. Considering this case and the Vietnam War, under what circumstances can local partners contribute to success in counterinsurgency campaigns?

17. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy's strategy. To what extent does that insight apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

18. How well did the U.S. operations and diplomacy support its policy in Afghanistan?

19. How does irregular warfare in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters compare to other examples of irregular warfare that you have studied in this course?

Readings:

1. Brian Glyn Williams, *Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. Pages 1-320. **(Leganto/E-book)**

[Williams offers an overarching and forthright narrative overview of the War on Terror, providing a comprehensive baseline for the more focused readings in the case.]

2. Douglas, Frank, Heidi Lane, Andrea Dew eds. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*. Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2019. Parts I and II. Pages 1-77. **(Leganto)**

[This reading includes translated speeches and documents from al-Qaeda leaders, highlighting their strategic vision, ideology, version of history, and image of the United States. The focus is on actual pronouncements made by Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, which represent key strategic communications efforts by al-Qaeda's senior leadership, and on the letters exchanged between Zarqawi and Zawahiri, which suggest tensions between al-Qaeda's strategic leaders and its theater commanders, as well as the efforts of al-Qaeda to cope with the competing vision of the "Islamic State."]

3. Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 25-April 2018", Validated 30-April 2021, Chapter III-1 – III-21. **(Selected Readings)**

[This U.S. Joint Publication explains counterinsurgency—fundamentally an armed political competition between a government and its partners and insurgents and their supporters—as a blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.]

4. Malkasian, Carter. “How the Good War Went Bad: America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan.” *Foreign Affairs*. vol. 99, no. 2 (2020). Pages 77-91. **(Leganto)**

[Malkasian spent years in Afghanistan as an adviser to the U.S. military and a State Department representative. This excerpt from Malkasian's comprehensive analysis of the war in Afghanistan provides the context for the United States' longest war. According to Malkasian, Americans can best learn its lessons by studying the missed opportunities that kept the United States from making progress. Ultimately, the war should be understood neither as an avoidable folly nor as an inevitable tragedy but rather as an unresolved dilemma.]

5. Carter Malkasian, *The American War in Afghanistan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pages 404-447. **(Selected Readings)**

[This excerpt from Malkasian’s comprehensive analysis of the war in Afghanistan provides the context for the American exit from Afghanistan.]

6. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). *What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction*. August 2021. Interactive Summary. Pages 1-42, 71-80, 95-97. **(Selected Readings)**

[This reflection on twenty years of American efforts in Afghanistan is highly critical of the strategy behind American involvement and the execution of American military and nation-building efforts. It identifies a number of strategic and conceptual errors that had pernicious effects throughout coalition operations.]

7. *The US Army in the Iraq War Vol. 2: Surge and Withdrawal 2007-11*. U.S. Army War College Press, 2019. Chapter 17, “Conclusion: Lessons of the Iraq War.” Pages 615-626. **(Selected Readings)**

[Part of a massive two-volume history of the war in Iraq, the assigned concluding chapter attempts to draw broader lessons from the American experience.]

8. Whiteside, Craig. “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016).” *Perspectives on Terrorism*. vol. 10, no. 4 (August 2016). Pages 4-18. **(Selected Readings)**

[Whiteside, a retired Army officer with multiple combat tours in the Middle East and currently a professor at the U.S. Naval War College, highlights the parallels between ISIS’ strategic vision and Mao’s revolutionary warfare framework. Whiteside makes the case that once we move beyond ISIS’ bombastic rhetoric and analyze the group’s evolution in Iraq and Syria in detail, it becomes easier to observe those parallels, especially Mao’s concept of three stages of conflict. Whiteside provides an examination of the group’s evolving strategies and ideology over more than a decade.]

9. Arnold, Bo, and John Nagl. “A Light Footprint in Syria: Operational Art in Operation Inherent Resolve*.” Small Wars & Insurgencies*. vol. 34, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1032. **(Leganto)**

[This article explains the conflict with ISIS in Syria, examining the elements of what they refer to as “operational art,” which, according to the authors, had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The article highlights the role that special operations forces played in Syria, while also arguing that the application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the friendly center of gravity—the Syrian Defense Forces—by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources.]

10. Stein, Aaron, *The US War against ISIS*. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. Pages 211-219. **(Leganto/E-Book)**

[Stein provides a conclusion to the story of the American side of the war against ISIS. In this brief chapter, Stein offers a number of insights about the extremely complex geopolitical environment affected by the American war efforts, highlighting the roles that numerous actors, including Russia and Turkey, played in the outcome. The chapter concludes with Stein’s analyses on the relationship among the ways in which the United States and its partners chose to fight the group, war termination, the consequences of the war efforts for transatlantic relations, and how the U.S. experience in Iraq and Syria may shape future wars.]

XI. THE RETURN TO GREAT POWER COMPETITION: THE CHINA CHALLENGE AND BEYOND

Introduction: This concluding case study of the Strategy and War Course is ripped from the headlines. It provides an opportunity to apply the theories, concepts, and course themes presented in the previous case studies to the contemporary, real-world security environment. Though all the course themes are present in this final case study, Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans; the Instruments of War; and the Multinational Arena are especially relevant when considering the developing competition with China.

The case challenges students to consider why China aspires to be a great sea power, how its ambitions might lead to conflict with the United States, and how conflict might be deterred. A useful point of departure is to recall Thucydides' emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motives for waging war. How might these three motives shape China's quest for capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? And will its quest succeed? Aspiration is one thing, fulfilling aspirations quite another.

The October 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy pronounces the People's Republic of China "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world's leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values." The strategy vows that the United States will "outcompete" China while "constraining" Russia and managing other challenges.[1]

As if to highlight the challenge posed by a return to great-power competition, China's President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called on his country to build itself into a maritime power. In April 2018, most strikingly, Xi praised China's navy for making a "great leap in development" while exhorting officers and crewmen to "keep working hard and dedicate ourselves to building a first-class navy." He made these remarks at a naval parade in the South China Sea. Some 48 surface warships and submarines passed in review before the president, including the aircraft carrier *Liaoning*, while 76 fighter aircraft streaked overhead. China's communist rulers see this display of naval power—the largest in China's modern history—as boosting the party's influence, power, and prestige.

President Xi's words echo calls to national greatness from past naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that his country must construct a large navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the imperial navy as a symbol of Germany's standing in the world and a tool to fire the passions of the German people for national endeavors. The German naval buildup, however, challenged Britain's position as the world's leading sea

[1] White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: White House, October 2022), 23, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf.

power. The antagonism stemming from that rivalry set loose a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. The rise of Japan as a major naval power affords another example of a challenger whose actions precipitated war. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Pacific War of 1941-1945, Japan attacked stronger great powers in an effort to achieve regional hegemony. These past conflicts should give us pause as we contemplate the emerging dangers highlighted by recent editions of the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

Mahan's six elements of sea power remain useful measures for determining whether a country has the prerequisites to make itself a great seafaring state. To these Mahanian elements, we might add such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. Our historical case studies amply illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward-oriented countries confront when they turn seaward. Mahan helps us fathom whether China can overcome these difficulties. We should also ponder whether new technologies and ways of fighting have transformed geopolitical and strategic axioms that have long governed contests between land powers and sea powers in the maritime domain. It may be that technological advances and novel war-making methods have muted the disadvantages continental powers encounter when they venture out to sea—or canceled them out altogether.

This case study requires us to gauge the likelihood of armed conflict with China. Will geography, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalry and conflict? Or will the past repeat itself in the twenty-first century, with rising great powers posing challenges to the international order that result in war? Does China's rise as a sea power make the outbreak of war more likely? Assuming China seeks to win without fighting, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, how will it go about it? Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as other adversaries of the United States have done? Could coalition partners embroil the United States and China in war—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra spiraled into system-shattering war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter other countries from resorting to war?

These troubling questions bring to the fore the prospect of war with China. In thinking about how the United States might wage a future war, students can look back to the course's strategic theories, to the course themes found at the beginning of this syllabus, and to case studies in which maritime power loomed large. Along with Mahan's teachings, this case study offers an opportunity to revisit Corbett's principles of maritime strategy, Mao's concept of active defense, the prewar assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding the First World War, and Imperial Japan's adventurism. Students should reconsider navies' warfighting missions through the lens of the past. Now, as ever, these missions include winning command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea or maritime bases onto land using ground or air forces; and waging economic warfare by preventing enemy shipping from using the sea while assuring friendly use of nautical thoroughfares.

Although traditional missions endure, the character of future warfare will be shaped by uncrewed vehicles, artificial intelligence, and actions in outer space and the cyber domain. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform the execution of naval missions in twenty-first-century warfare, make them prohibitively expensive, or even supersede them altogether. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, a domain, or a type of war. And they should mull the strategic implications of assigning it a category. One certainty is that China and other potential adversaries will harness new war-making technologies in their search for strategic advantage.

Of course, it is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start but also how it might end. War termination forms an essential part of this case study's readings. In exploring the contours of a contest with China, from its origins to its end, political and military leaders must keep in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action developed by strategic planners deliver the political goals desired at a cost and risk commensurate with the value policy-makers and society place on those goals? The answers to questions about rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. To understand interaction in wartime, we must obey Sun Tzu's injunction to know the enemy and know ourselves. We must try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may harness to fulfill their policy goals, assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own, and think ahead to how they might work around our future moves. We cannot predict the future, but we must prepare for it.

Finally, of special importance is the role that nuclear weapons might play in a conflict between China and the United States. The readings challenge us to consider the paths whereby a conventional conflict might escalate to involve nuclear attacks on the combatants' homelands. Decisions to escalate will demand searching moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberations. How does the ultimate weapon fit into the rational strategic calculations that Clausewitz demands we undertake? As we grapple with such questions, Sun Tzu admonishes us across the centuries: "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

Discussion Questions:

1. Thucydides chronicled a conflict pitting a democratic sea power against an authoritarian land power. What strategic guidance should U.S. leaders draw from Thucydides as they confront the China challenge today?

2. What policy and strategy guidance might China's political and military decision-makers draw from Thucydides as they manage their country's rise?

3. Looking back to Pericles' and Archidamus' assessments on the eve of war, what should be the main elements of a U.S. assessment for a contest against China? What kind of assessment might Chinese strategic analysts present to China's rulers?

4. It is often said that coalition partners "dragged" Athens and Sparta into war against each other. Might coalition partners entrap China and the United States into war, and if so, how?

5. Henry Kissinger calls on U.S. and Chinese leaders to avoid conflict by practicing prudent diplomacy and showing mutual respect. Are these recommendations realistic considering the sources of friction in U.S.-China relations?

6. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined long-term strategic competitions among great powers in his books exploring *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. What strategic guidance should American leaders derive from Mahan for great-power competitions?

7. Margaret Sprout maintains that "no other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy as Alfred Thayer Mahan," and that "his writings affected the character of naval thought" in major seafaring states across the globe. Mahan is now an object of study in China. What lessons should, and will, China's political and military decision-makers derive from studying his works?

8. Sun Tzu asserts that to win without fighting constitutes the summit of strategic skill. How can China win without fighting in a contest with the United States? How might the United States win without fighting?

9. Can the United States retain command of the maritime commons as China's strength grows?

10. What strategic guidance would Julian Corbett offer to U.S. and Chinese naval leaders?

11. In what ways are Mao's strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

12. Which case studies in the Strategy and War Course are most relevant for understanding a future conflict with China?

13. What strategic role could ground, air, and space forces play in a conflict with China?

14. What strategic role could nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What factors would discourage decision-makers from ordering nuclear escalation, and which factors would provoke them to escalate? What would be the most likely outcome?

15. What guidance do the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain?

16. How would a protracted conventional conflict between China and the United States be fought? Is such a conflict likely, or would the fighting soon escalate to include major attacks on the combatants' homelands employing nuclear or cyber weapons?

17. What role might America's major allies or coalition partners play in a hegemonic war against China?

18. What role might Russia play in a conflict involving China, the United States, and American allies or coalition partners?

19. In one of the readings for this case study, Oriana Skylar Mastro concludes: "China has demonstrated a preference only to talk to weaker states, to rapidly escalate any conflict to quickly impose peace, and to use third parties not as genuine mediators but to pressure its adversaries to concede—all of which work against war termination." What are the strategic implications of her findings for a war fought by China against the United States and its allies?

20. Clausewitz advises rational leaders to seek ways to end the fighting when the cost of waging war comes to exceed the value of the object. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

Readings:

1. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy*. Second edition. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Chapters 1, 4, 6-8. **(Book)**

[This is the core reading for the case. Professor Holmes of the Strategy and Policy Department and Toshi Yoshihara, a former Strategy and Policy professor now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States. This reading shows how Mahanian ideas have shaped Chinese maritime strategy and explores the strategic contours and capabilities of the Chinese and U.S. armed forces.]

2. Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. New York: Penguin, 2011. Pages 514-530. **(Leganto)**

[Much as we look to history for insight into the present and future in this course, the late scholar-statesman surveys the outbreak of the First World War to ask whether China and the United States are destined to clash as great powers did in the past. He urges leaders on both sides of the Pacific to consult with one another and show mutual respect as a way to avoid conflict.]

3. Sprout, Margaret Tuttle. "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, Edward Mead Earle, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pages 415-445. **(Leganto)**

[Sprout, who authored and coauthored seminal works on American sea power, reviews Mahan's ideas through a grand-strategic lens. By reviewing her work at the close of the Strategy and War Course, we can ask what Chinese strategic leaders should learn from reading Mahan, what they may not learn, and what false lessons they may learn. This edition of *Makers of Modern Strategy* can be downloaded for free online and is excellent from cover to cover.]

4. State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. "Document: China's Military Strategy." Beijing: State Council, May 2015. **(Selected Readings)**

[This official statement from China's party leadership reveals how Beijing sees its strategic surroundings and will attempt to manage them. The document strikes a Maoist note by proclaiming that "active defense" remains the "essence" of Chinese military strategic thought even as China makes itself into a maritime power of note.]

5. China Aerospace Studies Institute. *In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 2020*. Montgomery: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 2022. Pages 28-52, 132-155. **(Selected Readings)**

[This is a translation of an authoritative work compiled periodically by a team of coauthors from China's National Defense University. It complements the previous reading in particular. The selections here review the Chinese armed forces' general approach to active defense for deterrence and conventional warfare while explaining how party officials and military commanders apply this Maoist strategic concept to such emerging warfare domains as outer space and cyberspace.]

6. U.S. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2023. Pages 1-116. **(Selected Readings)**

[This annual report out of the Pentagon provides a rich assessment of China's goals, strategies, and capabilities across its various tools of national power. If knowing potential opponents is crucial to operational and strategic success, this document is a must read for anyone in the U.S. fighting forces and the national security apparatus at large.]

7. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. *Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations*. Second edition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps, May 2023. Chapters 1, 2, 6, and 7. **(Selected Readings)**

[This manual lays out the U.S. Marine Corps leadership's vision for operating on and around islands, chiefly in the Pacific theater, to help the Navy fleet deny antagonists control of the sea, balking their strategies until the sea services and joint force can win sea control for the United States and its allies.]

8. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. *Archipelagic Defense 2.0*. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, September 2023. Pages 91-158. **(Selected Readings)**

[This recent work from Krepinevich, the author of *The Army and Vietnam*, probes the advantages, disadvantages, costs, and dangers of operating along Asia's first island chain. It makes an excellent companion for reading no. 1, *Red Star over the Pacific*, and for reading no. 7 above. *Archipelagic Defense 2.0* sets forth a course of action worth critiquing in the same way we have evaluated courses of action in previous case studies.]

9. Talmadge, Caitlin. "Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States." *International Security*, vol. 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017). Pages 50-92. **(Selected Readings)**

[Talmadge posits scenarios in which China might escalate a conflict with the United States by resorting to nuclear weapons, the ultimate instruments of war. Think about what she says in terms of the value of the object and kindred concepts from the classics of strategy.]

10. Mastro, Oriana Skylar. "How China Ends Wars: Implications for East Asian and U.S. Security." *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 1 (Spring 2018). Pages 45-60. **(Selected Readings)**

[How would a war between China and the United States end? Mastro explores this provocative question. Her article's conclusions regarding war termination in the Western Pacific make for troubling reading.]

11. O'Rourke, Ronald. *Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2024. Pages 1-36. **(Selected Readings)**

[This regularly updated report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service explores the nature and dynamics of great-power competition, highlighting issues relevant for congressional deliberations. O'Rourke takes account of the China challenge while also widening the aperture to encompass related challenges from Russia, a "no-limits" partner of China, as well as other competitors such as Iran and North Korea.]

STRATEGY AND POLICY DEPARTMENT FACULTY

Marybeth P. Ulrich serves as professor and chair of the Strategy and Policy Department. She has also taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the U.S. Air Force Academy, where she founded the Academy Oath Project. Her publications include a book, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (University of Michigan Press). Her articles have appeared in *Armed Forces and Society, The Journal of Military Ethics, Parameters, Aether, Strategic Studies Quarterly, and Joint Forces Quarterly* and she has published other monographs, book chapters, and policy pieces on strategic studies, national security democratization, Eurasian security, NATO, and civil-military relations. She served 34 years in the U.S. Air Force, including 15 years in the Air Force Reserve where her last assignment was the Air Reserve Attaché to the Russian Federation. Dr. Ulrich's appointments as the Scowcroft National Security Senior Fellow at the U.S. Air Force Academy and Senior Fellow at West Point's Modern War Institute focus on education for military service in a democracy. Dr. Ulrich received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois and is a Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. She is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and is a recipient of the U.S. Army Superior Civilian Service Award for her long service at the U.S. Army War College.

Captain Jeffrey M. DeMarco, U.S. Navy, Executive Assistant of the Strategy and Policy Department, graduated The Citadel with a BS in business administration and computer science, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School with an MA in Homeland Security and Defense, and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. CAPT DeMarco is designated as an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Officer, Diving Officer, Surface Warfare Officer, and Naval Parachutist. Sea duty and operational assignments include USS CORMORANT (MHC-57), EOD Mobile Unit FOUR (EODMU-4) in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Naval Special Clearance Team ONE/EODMU-1 in San Diego, CA., Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula in Balad, Iraq, Executive Officer for EODMU1, Commanding Officer for EODMU8 in Rota, Spain, and Commander Task Group 68.3/Sixth Fleet Mine Countermeasures Detachment Rota, Spain. During these assignments he has conducted EOD, underwater and surface naval mine countermeasures, and special operations in Central America, Central and East Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Shore assignments include Flag Aide to the Commander, Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command (NMAWC), Aide-de-Camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Branch Chief, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device and Identity Activities, J34, U.S. Africa Command.

Captain Everett Alcorn, U.S. Navy, is a 1998 graduate of the United States Naval Academy with a degree in Computer Science. He is also a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, Marine Corps University and the NATO Defense College. A career Naval Aviator, he completed tours with Helicopter Combat Support Squadron Six (HC-6), Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Three (HSC-3), *John C. Stennis* (CVN 74) and Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Eleven (HS-11). Staff tours include Helicopter Sea Combat Wing Atlantic, U.S. European Command, and as a Military Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval War College. He commanded Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Two Eight (HSC-28) and Officer Training Command Newport, where he oversaw the Navy's Officer Candidate School,

Officer Development School, and the LDO/CWO Academy. He has flown over 2,800 flight hours, in the CH-46D, SH-60F, HH-60H, and MH-60S.

Colonel Joshua D. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in the summer of 2024, previously serving as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, G-3, 3d Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa, Japan. He graduated from the University of Richmond with a BA in Political Science and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. Additionally, Colonel Anderson is an Olmsted Scholar who studied International Relations at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade (Serbia), and a distinguished graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He is a career logistics officer with additional occupational specialties as a Eurasian foreign area officer and foreign security force advisor. Previous assignments include various staff and command positions in the operating forces and positions in the service supporting establishment and Joint Staff. His combat assignments include deployments in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Vanya E. Bellinger is an Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. She earned a Ph.D. in History at King's College, London, UK. Bellinger is the author of *Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War* (Oxford University Press USA, 2015). She is the winner of the 2016 Society for Military History Moncado Prize for her article "The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz." Bellinger is the first scholar to work with the complete correspondence between the Clausewitz couple. Previously, Bellinger taught as a Visiting Professor at the U.S. Army War College (2016-2018) and Assistant Professor at the Air University (2018-2022). Her scholarly articles have appeared in The Journal of Civil War Era and Military Strategy Magazine and in popular outlets such as The Strategy Bridge and War on the Rocks. She holds a BA in Journalism and Mass Communication from Sofia University, Bulgaria. Before transitioning to academia, Bellinger worked as a journalist and international correspondent for various European media.

Shahin Berenji is an Assistant Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department. He earned his Ph.D. and MA from the University of California Los Angeles and his BA from the University of Southern California. Before arriving at the Naval War College, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A & M University. From 2020 to 2022, he worked at Southern Methodist University where he served as a Visiting Assistant Professor and Colin Powell Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science and the John G. Tower Center for Public Policy and International Affairs. He studies foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy and has a specialization in the Cold War and regional expertise in the Middle East. His research has been published in such academic journals as *International Security* and *Security Studies* and his commentary and op-eds have been featured online with West Point's the Modern War Institute, *the National Interest*, and *E-International Relations*.

Commander Scott E. Brickner, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of San Diego with a BS in business administration and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. A career Surface Warfare Officer, he has made several deployments to the

North Atlantic, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, Western Pacific, and Arabian Gulf. Commander Brickner's operational tours include USS THE SULLIVANS (DDG 68) as Auxiliaries Officer, USS HUE CITY (CG 66) as Navigator, USS CHAFEE (DDG 90) as Operations Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) as Operations Officer and most recently USS IWO JIMA (LHD 7) as Operations Officer. As the Air Defense Liaison Officer assigned to COMCARSTRKGRU 2, he deployed aboard USS GEORGE H W BUSH during a ten-month combat deployment in support of OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. Additionally, he has served at Surface Warfare Officers School as a Fleet Training (N72) instructor and a Maritime Warfare (N73) instructor.

Reed Chervin is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He received his PhD in International History from the University of Hong Kong in 2019. His research focuses on East and South Asian foreign relations during the 1950s and 1960s. Reed's most recent publication, *The Cold War in the Himalayas* was published by Amsterdam University Press in February 2024. His other work has appeared in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *The China Quarterly*, and the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, among other venues.

Captain Craig H. Connor, U.S. Navy, graduated from Ohio University with a BS in Environmental Geography and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. A career Naval Aviator, he has executed 4,000 flight hours and 600 carrier landings in the E-2C, EA-6B, and EA-18G, as well as several training aircraft. His operational tours include five deployments to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf with Airborne Early Warning Squadron ONE SIX (VAW-116), Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE SEVEN (VAQ-137), and Electronic Attack Squadron ONE THREE FOUR (VAQ-134). Additionally, he deployed to the Western Pacific as the Operations Officer onboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71). While assigned to VAQ-137 and VAQ-134, CDR Connor flew multiple combat missions supporting OPERATION NEW DAWN, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, and OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE. His shore duty assignments include Deputy Director, Plans Division (J5) at Joint Electromagnetic Preparedness for Advanced Combat (JEPAC), USSTRATCOM, and Commanding Officer for Training Squadron TWO (VT-22).

Michael A. Dennis is an Associate Professor who received his doctorate in the history of science and technology from the Johns Hopkins University in 1991. After postdoctoral fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum, as well as the Science Studies Program at the University of California, San Diego, he served as an Assistant Professor in Cornell University's Department of Science and Technology Studies and in the Peace Studies Program. After Cornell, he worked as an adjunct at several universities in the Washington, DC area, including Georgetown University's security studies, and its science, technology and international affairs programs; he also taught courses on technology and national security in George Mason University's BioDefense program. His research focuses on the intersection of science, technology and the military with a special emphasis on World War II and the Cold War. He is currently completing a book manuscript entitled, "A Change of State: Technical Practice, Political Culture and the Making of Early Cold America." His 2013 article, "Tacit Knowledge as a Factor in the Proliferation of WMD: The Example of Nuclear Weapons," won a prize from the

Editorial Board of Studies in Intelligence. In 2018, he and Professor Anand Toprani received a grant from the Stanton Foundation to develop a course, "The Political Economy of Strategy," for both NWC and Brown University students.

John F. Garofano is a Fulbright Scholar (2020) who previously served as Dean of Academics from July 2009 to July 2015. Previously, he taught in the Department of National Security Affairs and held the CAPT Jerome Levy Chair in Economic Geography. Garofano's research interests include military intervention, Asian security, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Publications include *The Indian Ocean: Rising Tide or Coming Conflict*, *The Intervention Debate: Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment*, *Clinton's Foreign Policy: A Documentary Record*, and articles in *International Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Orbis*, and the *Naval War College Review*. In 2011 Dr. Garofano deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to support the First Marine Expeditionary Force in assessment and red-teaming. Prior to joining the War College, Garofano was a Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He has taught at the U.S. Army War College, the Five Colleges of Western Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California. He received his PhD and MA in government from Cornell University, an MA in security studies from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (Bologna/Washington), and a BA in history from Bates College.

Marc A. Genest is the Forrest Sherman Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Strategy and Policy Department and is Area Study Coordinator for the Insurgency and Terrorism electives program. From 2008-16, he served as the founding Co-Director of the Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. In 2011, Professor Genest was a civilian advisor at Division Headquarters for Regional Command—South in Kandahar, Afghanistan where he assessed the division's counterinsurgency strategy. In 2009, Genest received the Commander's Award for Civilian Service from the Department of the Army for outstanding service as a Special Adviser to the Commander of Task Force Mountain Warrior while stationed in Regional Command-East in Afghanistan. Dr. Genest earned his PhD from Georgetown University in international politics. Before coming to the Naval War College, Professor Genest taught at Georgetown University, the U.S. Air War College, and the University of Rhode Island. While at the University of Rhode Island, Professor Genest received the University's Teaching Excellence Award. He is also a political commentator for local, national and international radio news and television stations as well as for local and national print media. In addition, Genest worked on Capitol Hill for Senator John Chafee and Representative Claudine Schneider. His books include *Negotiating in the Public Eye: The Impact of the Press on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations*; *Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations*; and *Stand! Contending Issues in World Politics*. He is the co-editor of *From Quills to Tweets: The Evolution of American Wartime and Revolutionary Communication Strategies*. He has also written articles dealing with international relations theory, strategic communication, American foreign policy and public opinion.

Lieutenant Colonel David C. Gorman, U.S. Air Force, commissioned through Officer Training School after earning a BS in Business Management from Marist College. After attending undergraduate air battle manager training at Tyndall AFB, he was assigned to Tinker AFB and completed operational deployments as the US Liaison Officer to the Royal Australian

Air Force Kandahar Control and Reporting Center (CRC), and flying deployments in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM and Caribbean Counter Narcotics Operations (CNO). During this assignment, Lt Col Gorman earned his MBA from Oklahoma State University and was then reassigned to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson where he flew northern sovereignty operations in defense of Alaskan airspace. His follow-on assignments include positions as an E-3 formal training unit instructor and evaluator, chief of future capabilities at Headquarters Pacific Air Force, then as a student at the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College where he earned an MA in Military Operational Art and Science. Following staff college, he remained at Maxwell AFB as an Air Force Officer Training School Instructor before returning to Tinker AFB as the Deputy Commander, 964 Airborne Air Control Squadron, and Director of Operations, 965 Airborne Air Control Squadron. Most recently, Lt Col Gorman commanded the 429 Expeditionary Operations Squadron, Curacao. Lt Col Gorman is married and he and his wife, Barbara, have two children together.

Commander Joshua A. Hammond, U.S. Navy, graduated from the University of Michigan with a BA in classical languages and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. While at the NWC, he received the Adm. Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize for professional writing and research. A career naval flight officer, he has over 2,300 hours and 500 carrier landings in the F-14D and F/A-18F in support of operations in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Other assignments include air operations officer on USS CARL VINSON and an exchange assignment with the Royal Navy in carrier doctrine development.

Michael Hicks is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy. He graduated with a PhD in modern Chinese history and African Diasporic Studies from Penn State University. Dr. Hicks is working on his first book manuscript, which examines how Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party linked revolution in China with decolonization in Africa. Dr. Hicks has lived and worked in China and Taiwan for a total of six years and has extensive travel experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

James R. Holmes is the inaugural J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy. He is a graduate of Vanderbilt University, Salve Regina University, Providence College, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Holmes graduated from the Naval War College in 1994 and earned the Naval War College Foundation Award as the top graduate in his class. He previously served on the faculty of the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. A former U.S. Navy surface warfare officer, he served as engineering and gunnery officer on board USS WISCONSIN (BB-64), directed an engineering course at the Surface Warfare Officers School Command, and taught Strategy and Policy at the Naval War College, College of Distance Education. His books include *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*; *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*; *Indian Naval Strategy in the 21st Century*; *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon*; two editions of *Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy*; *A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy*; and, most recently, *Habits of Highly Effective Maritime Strategists*. His books appear on the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Indo-Pacific Command professional reading lists.

Timothy D. Hoyt is the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism Studies and serves as Academic Director and Senior Mentor for the Advanced Strategy Program. Hoyt earned his undergraduate degree from Swarthmore College, and his PhD in international relations and strategic studies from the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Before joining the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, he taught at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Dr. Hoyt's research interests include South Asian security, irregular warfare in the 20th and 21st centuries, national security policy in the developing world, nuclear proliferation, and the relationship between insurgency and terrorism. He previously served as Co-Director of the Indian Ocean Regional Studies Group at the Naval War College. He is the author of *Military Industries and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel* and over fifty articles and book chapters on international security and military affairs. He is currently working on a book on the strategy of the Irish Republican Army from 1913-2005, and on projects examining the future of the U.S.-Indian security relationship, the strategy of the African National Congress in the South African freedom struggle, Israel's defense industry, and the relationship between irregular warfare and terrorism in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Jonathan R. Hunt is an Assistant Professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department's Deterrence Studies Institute (DSI) in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS). He is an international historian whose scholarship comprehends U.S. foreign relations, nuclear security, international trade, and great-power competition, and has taught at Stanford University, Emory University, the University of Southampton, and the U.S. Air War College, arriving at the U.S. Naval War College in the summer of 2024. He received his Ph.D. in History and a B.A. in Plan II Liberal Arts Honors, History, and Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. He has held fellowships or been a visiting scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), RAND Corporation, Emory University, Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian Studies, the University of Oxford's Rothermere American Institute, and the Nuclear Security Program of International Security Studies at Yale's Jackson School of Global Studies. From 2019-2022, he was principal investigator on a Carnegie Corporation of New York grant, "Rewriting the Constitutional History of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." He is the co-editor, with Dr. Simon Miles, of *The Reagan Moment: America and the World in the 1980s* and the author of *The Nuclear Club: How America and the World Policed the Atom from Hiroshima to Vietnam*. He has written for, among other outlets, *Foreign Policy*, *War on the Rocks,* and *The Atlantic*.

Burak Kadercan is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD and MA in political science from the University of Chicago and a BA in politics and international relations from Bogazici University in Istanbul, Turkey. Dr. Kadercan specializes in the intersection of international relations theory, international security, military-diplomatic history, and political geography. Prior to joining the Naval War College, he was Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Reading (United Kingdom) and Assistant Professor in International Relations and Programme Coordinator for the MA in international security at Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI). In addition to Reading and IBEI, he has taught classes on the relationship between war and state-formation, privatization of military power, research methods, international security, diplomatic history, foreign policy, and nations and nationalism at the University of Chicago, University of Richmond, and Bogazici University. He is currently working on three projects. The

first scrutinizes the relationship between territory and interstate conflict, with an emphasis on nationalism's place. The second explores the conceptualization of empires in international relations theory and historiography with a special focus on the Ottoman Empire. The third project examines the association between civil-military relations and the production and diffusion of military power. Dr. Kadercan's scholarly contributions have appeared in *International Security*, *Review of International Studies*, *International Studies Review*, *International Theory*, and *Middle East Policy*. Dr. Kadercan is the author of *Shifting Grounds: The Social Origins of Territorial Conflict* (Oxford University Press, 2023).

Heidi E. Lane is a Professor of Strategy and Policy and Director of the Greater Middle East Research Study Group at the Naval War College. She specializes in comparative politics and international relations of the Middle East with a focus on security sector development, ethnic and religious nationalism, and rule of law in transitioning societies. Her edited book *Building Rule of Law in the Arab World and Beyond* was published in 2016 with co-editor Eva Bellin. She is currently completing research for a book on counterterrorism and state liberalization in the Middle East. Dr. Lane has served as a visiting research affiliate with the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a U.S. Fulbright scholar in Syria, and as a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. She is currently a senior associate at the Center for Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups (CIWAG) at the Naval War College. She holds an MA and PhD in Islamic Studies from the Center for Near Eastern Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, and a BA from the University of Chicago, and is trained in Arabic, Hebrew, and Persian and is proficient in German.

John H. Maurer serves as the Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Sea Power and Grand Strategy. He also holds the title of Distinguished University Professor. He is a graduate of Yale College and holds a MALD and PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. He is the author or editor of books examining the outbreak of the First World War, military interventions in the developing world, naval competitions and arms control between the two world wars, a study on Winston Churchill and British grand strategy, and the great-power contest in Asia and the Pacific that led to Pearl Harbor. He served for eight years as Chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department. He teaches in the advanced strategy program and an elective course on Winston Churchill and the history of the two world wars. Before coming to the College, he held the positions of research fellow and executive editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs* at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He served on the Secretary of the Navy John Lehman's special advisory committee on naval history. In recognition of his contribution to professional military education, he has received the U.S. Navy's Meritorious Civilian Service Award and Superior Civilian Service Award.

Kevin D. McCranie is the Philip A. Crowl Professor of Comparative Strategy. He earned a BA in history and political science from Florida Southern College, and an MA and PhD in history from Florida State University. Before joining the faculty of the Naval War College, he taught history at Brewton-Parker College in Mount Vernon, Georgia. In 2001, he held a fellowship at the West Point Summer Seminar in Military History. Specializing in warfare at sea, navies, sea power, and joint operations, he is the author of *Admiral Lord Keith and the Naval War against Napoleon* as well as *Utmost Gallantry: The U.S. and Royal Navies at Sea in the War of 1812*.

His recent writing compares the sea power and maritime strategic theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett in a Naval Institute Press book titled *Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought*. His articles have appeared in *War on the Rocks*, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Online*, *Naval History*, *Journal of Military History*, *Naval War College Review*, and *The Northern Mariner*.

Joshua M. Meeks is an Associate Professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, College of Distance Education. He earned is PhD from Florida State University as part of the Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution. Prior to joining the faculty at the Naval War College, he taught at Florida State University, Seminole State College, University of South Florida, and Northwest University. His first book, adapted from his dissertation, was entitled *France, Britain, and the Struggle for the Revolutionary Western Mediterranean* (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017). He also wrote *Napoleon Bonaparte: A Reference Guide to His Life and Works* (Rowman Littlefield, 2020) and contributed a chapter on socio-ecological resistance in Corsica to an edited volume, *Entire of Itself? Towards an Environmental History of Islands* (White Horse Press, 2024). He is currently finishing a manuscript examining the global dimensions of the Napoleonic era, and is particularly interested in neutrality and small-state agency during great power competition.

Kenneth L. Meyer is a Department of State Faculty Advisor to the U.S. Naval War College. Most recently, he served as Management Officer at the U.S. Tri-Mission in Rome, Italy, where he headed logistical operations, led the Covid-19 Task Force, and coordinated closely with military colleagues on Operation Allies Refuge. His Foreign Service career has taken him across several continents in a variety of capacities. Prior to Italy, Meyer served overseas in Cambodia, China, the Czech Republic, Iraq, Japan, and Slovakia. His primary specialization in the Foreign Service is logistics and resource management. He has published three papers on pandemics and climate change and their implications for U.S. national security. He graduated from the U.S. Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare in 2019, and also has a BS in Mechanical Engineering from The Ohio State University, an MS in Management from Purdue University, and an MA in History from the University of Cincinnati. He has received several Department of State awards and, while a student at the Naval War College, received Honorable Mention for the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize.

Captain James P. Murray, U.S. Navy, graduated from Fordham University in 1984 with a BA in History. He received his commission through Officer Candidate School in 1985. He earned an MBA from the University of Washington in 2001 and an MS in National Security Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in 2011 where he also received the Mashburn Leadership Award from his graduating class. A career Surface Warfare Officer and a Joint Qualified Officer, his operational tours include USS HERMITAGE (LSD-34), Harbor Defense Command Unit 113, Inshore Boat Unit 12, Naval Central Forces Command, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. His ashore tours include Navy Recruiting District New York, OPNAV N3N5, and the U.S. State Department as the Senior Military Advisor on the Pakistan Desk. He most recently served on the Navy Faculty at the German Armed Forces Staff College in Hamburg, Germany. He proudly served overseas in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and as a member of the AFPAK Hands program in FREEDOM'S SENTINEL.

Lieutenant Colonel Brendan R. Neagle, U.S. Marine Corps, graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 2006 with a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering. An Infantry Officer and Operations and Tactics Instructor, his assignments include Rifle Platoon Commander, Company Executive Officer, Rifle Company Commander, Battalion Landing Team Operations Officer, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Operations Officer. His operational experience includes two tours in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, seven Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments to the European, African, Central, and Indo-Pacific theaters, and a deployment to Djibouti, Italy, and Spain as a mission commander and assistant operations officer for the Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response – Africa. His previous assignment was as a planner for Task Force 76/3, a combined Navy and Marine Corps littoral warfare staff in Okinawa, Japan. He is a graduate of the Republic of Korea's Joint Forces Military University.

Colonel Matthew P. Nischwitz, U.S. Army joined the U.S. Naval War College in 2020 as a member of the Strategy and Policy Department. He commanded at the battalion level and served in various staff positions. His past assignments included the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, U.S. Army Transportation School, 17th Field Artillery Brigade and U.S. Military Academy. He received his B.S. from Indiana University and M.A. from Columbia University and the United States Naval War College.

Commander Timothy D. O'Brien, U.S. Navy, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 2002 with a BS in history and holds a MS in operations management from the University of Arkansas and a MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. A career helicopter pilot, he has flown over 2,000 flight hours, chiefly in the SH-60B and MH-60R. Commander O'Brien's operational tours were with west coast squadrons: Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Light FOUR THREE (HSL-43) and Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron FOUR NINE (HSM-49). He deployed multiple times to the southern and western Pacific on board frigates and cruisers, and with aircraft carrier strike groups. A designated Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor, CDR O'Brien served as an instructor at the Helicopter Maritime Strike Weapons School Pacific, and as the Tactics Officer for Helicopter Maritime Strike THREE SEVEN (HSM-37). Additionally, prior to his assignment at the Naval War College, he served a staff tour with Navy Personnel Command.

Sarah C. M. Paine is the William S. Sims University Professor of History and Grand Strategy. She earned a BA in Latin American studies at Harvard, an MIA at Columbia's School for International Affairs, an MA in Russian at Middlebury, and a PhD in history at Columbia. She has studied in year-long language programs twice in Taiwan and once in Japan. She wrote *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier* (winner of the Jelavich prize), *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895*, *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949* (winner of the PROSE award and Leopold Prize), and *The Japanese Empire*, and edited *Nation Building, State Building and Economic Development*. With Bruce Elleman, she co-edited *Naval Blockades and Seapower*, *Naval Coalition Warfare*, *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare*, *Commerce Raiding*, and *Navies and Soft Power*; and co-authored *Modern China, Continuity and Change: 1644 to the Present* (2nd ed.). With Andrea Dew and Marc Genest, she co-edited *From Quills to Tweets: How America Communicates War and Revolution.*

Michelle D. Paranzino an Associate Professor and the director of the Latin America Studies Group. She earned her PhD in history at the University of Texas at Austin and also holds a BA in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz and an MA in history from California State University, Northridge. Her research areas include Latin America, U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, and the international Cold War. She has been a Dickey Center and Dean of the Faculty Postdoctoral Fellow in International Security and U.S. Foreign Policy at Dartmouth College, and a Summer Research Fellow at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She is the author of *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents* and is currently writing a book about Ronald Reagan and the drug wars.

Michael F. Pavković is the William Ledyard Rodgers Professor of Naval History at the College and also serves as Senior Historian for the John B. Hattendorf Center for Maritime Historical Research. He received his BA in history and classics from Pennsylvania State University and his PhD in History from the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an Associate Professor of History at Hawai'i Pacific University, where he also coordinated graduate and undergraduate programs in Diplomacy and Military Studies. He has published a number of articles, book chapters, and reviews on topics relating to ancient, early modern, and Napoleonic military history. He is co-author of *What is Military History?* which in now in its 3rd edition. He is currently completing a book on sea power in the ancient world.

Captain Joseph A. Pommerer, U.S. Navy, graduated from the United States Naval Academy with a BA in Systems Engineering and the U.S. Naval War College with an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies. A career Naval Flight Officer, he has over 2,750 flight hours and 600 carrier arrested landings in the F-14D Tomcat and F/A-18F Super Hornet. His operational tours include multiple deployments to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf with Fighter Squadron THREE ONE (VF-31), as Operations and Safety Officer with Strike Fighter Squadron ONE ZERO THREE (VFA-103), and as Executive Officer and Commanding Officer of Strike Fighter Squadron NINE FOUR (VFA-94) flying combat missions in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR), and Operation FREEDOM SENTINEL (OFS). Other assignments include flight instructor at Strike Fighter Squadron ONE ZERO SIX (VFA-106), assistant operations officer at Carrier Air Wing SEVENTEEN (CVW-17) where he deployed in support of JTF-Haiti during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE and Operation SOUTHERN SEAS 2010, as Strike Syndicate Lead for Carrier Strike Group FIFTEEN (CSG-15), and as operations officer and prospective commanding officer course lead at the Naval Leadership and Ethics Center.

Katrina Ponti is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. She earned her Ph.D. in history from the University of Rochester in 2022. Before joining the Strategy and Policy Department, she was an Ernest May Postdoctoral Fellow at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Her research is supported by fellowships from Fulbright Canada, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Notre Dame International Security Center. Dr. Ponti has published on topics related to the diplomatic and maritime history of the early United States. Her forthcoming book Virtuous Emulations of Liberty charts the creation of U.S. diplomatic culture after the Revolution. In addition to her interests in history and policy, she is a trained historical archaeologist. During the summer, she can be found in Bermuda helping to excavate Jamestown's sister colony with the Smith's Island Archaeology Project.

Commander Daniel R. Post, U.S. Navy, joined the Strategy and Policy department in fall 2021 as a Permanent Military Professor fellow. He received a BS in mathematics from the United States Naval Academy (with Honors), an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College (with Highest Distinction), an MA in Political Science from Brown University, and his PhD in Political Science (International Relations) from Brown University. His research focuses on nuclear strategy and policy, deterrence, escalation dynamics, limited nuclear war, and conflict termination. This includes studies of past wargaming and military exercises to explore potential escalation dynamics in limited nuclear wars. Additionally, he conducts experimental survey work and interview-based research centered on nuclear deterrence strategies and escalation dynamics. He is a former Navy Helicopter Pilot, and his most recent assignment was as Nuclear Strike Advisor and the Chief of Strike Advisor Training, Global Operations Center at U.S. Strategic Command.

Lieutenant Colonel Luis R. Rivera, U.S. Army, joined the Strategy and Policy Department in 2022. LTC Rivera has commanded at the company and battalion level. Additionally, he has served tours as a member of the general staff at the strategic, operational, and tactical level commands. His combat and operational deployments include Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Poland, and Germany whilst supporting U.S. Army and joint named operations throughout the Middle East. He is a graduate of the Sistema Universitario Ana G. Mendez (B.S. in Biology) and the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (M.S. in Global Logistics and Supply Chain Management). LTC Rivera's professional military education includes the Combined Logistics Captain's Career Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Command and General Staff School for Command Preparation – Battalion Pre-Command Course.

Nicholas E. Sarantakes is an Associate Professor who earned a BA from the University of Texas. He has a MA from the University of Kentucky and holds a PhD from the University of Southern California, all in history. His first three books dealt with the Pacific War: *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*; *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. and Joseph Stilwell*; and *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan*. His fourth book *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* is a diplomatic history of the 1980 Olympic boycott. His fifth book *Making Patton: A Classic War Film's Epic Journey to the Silver Screen* used film history to look at public opinion towards defense and foreign policies. His sixth book looked at political communications and social policy in *Fan-in-Chief: Richard Nixon and American Sports, 1969-1974*. He is currently writing two World War II books: one on the battle of Manila, which is a study of urban warfare, and another on the home front. He has written a number of articles in journals and publications such as *Diplomatic History*, *English Historical Review*, *Journal of Military History*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and ESPN.com. He is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and has received five writing awards. He previously taught at Texas A&M University—Commerce, the Air War College, the University of Southern Mississippi, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

George D. Satterfield is an Associate Professor who holds a PhD in history from the University of Illinois. Before joining the Naval War College, he served as an assistant professor at Morrisville State College, and as an associate professor at Hawaii Pacific University. Dr.

Satterfield is the author of *Princes, Posts, and Partisans: The Army of Louis XIV and Partisan Warfare in the Netherlands, 1673-1678*, which received a distinguished book award from the Society for Military History. Dr. Satterfield is also the author of articles on several topics in military history, including irregular warfare and revolutions in military affairs.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. Shaw, U.S. Army, is a 21-year Army Aviator with combat deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Inherent Resolve. LTC Shaw is a qualified attack helicopter pilot (AH-64 C/D/E) and is instructor pilot-rated. He holds a MS and PhD in Human Resource Management with special emphasis in Leader Development from Louisiana State University and is a graduate of the Army War College. LTC Shaw collaborates with Louisiana State University's Leader Development Institute, where they are exploring the domain of self-development and retention among professionals.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Sieben, U.S. Air Force, commissioned through Officer Training School after earning a BA in Political Science from St. Cloud State University. He attended pilot training at Columbus AFB and was assigned to fly the C-17 at McGuire AFB. He then volunteered for unmanned flying in the MQ-1B and stood up a new squadron at Whiteman AFB. During this time, he completed his MBA with a concentration in conflict management. His next assignment was as instructor and evaluator pilot in the formal training unit at Holloman AFB, finishing as Chief of Group Stan/Eval for the MQ-1. He then went to the University of Hawaii for an MA in English before proceeding to the USAF Academy, where he was an instructor in the Department of English and Fine Arts. While teaching at the academy, he deployed to CENTCOM as an Air Defense Liaison in Bahrain and earned his JD from Mitchell Hamline School of Law. Lt Col Sieben is married, and he and his wife have six children.

David R. Stone serves as the William E. Odom Professor of Russian Studies. He received his BA in history and mathematics from Wabash College and his PhD in history from Yale University. He taught at Hamilton College and at Kansas State University, where he served as director of the Institute for Military History. He was also a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. His first book *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933* won the Shulman Prize of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies and the Best First Book Prize of the Historical Society. He has also published *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, and *The Russian Army in the Great War: The Eastern Front, 1914-1917*. He edited *The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945*; *The Russian Civil War: Campaigns and Operations*; and *The Russian Civil War: Military and Society*. He is the author of several dozen articles and book chapters on Russian / Soviet military history and foreign policy. Professor Stone also has two lecture series with The Great Courses on *Battlefield Europe: The Second World War* and *War in the Modern World*.

Cavender S. Sutton is a Postdoctoral Teaching and Research Fellow in the Strategy and Policy Department. He received his BA in History from the University of Georgia, his MA in History from East Tennessee State University, and his PhD in Military History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Before beginning his undergraduate studies, Dr. Sutton served four years in the United States Marine Corps, during which time he deployed to Afghanistan

twice, participated in a variety of combat operations, and advised Afghan National Security Forces personnel. His research focuses on the relationship between small unit culture and military adaptation to assess how armed forces learn and change over time, with a particular emphasis on the U.S. military during the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. His dissertation and forthcoming book use the U.S. Marines' Combined Action Platoon program as a window into how Marines understood insurgencies during the Cold War and how that knowledge, in turn, influenced their operations in Vietnam.

Anand Toprani is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in diplomatic and military history, energy geopolitics, and political economy. He is a graduate of Cornell, Oxford, and Georgetown, and he has held fellowships at Yale and Harvard as well as from the Stanton and Smith Richardson foundations. He is the author of *Oil and the Great Powers: Britain and Germany, 1914-1945*, which received the 2020 Richard W. Leopold Prize from the Organization of American Historians, and the co-author with RADM Dave Oliver (USN-ret.) of *American Defense Reform: Lessons from Failure and Success in Navy History*. He is currently co-editing a book on the strategy of sanctions and embargos with S.C.M. Paine for University of Michigan Press and writing a book about Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. Dr. Toprani previously served as an historian at the U.S. Department of State, an intelligence analyst at U.S. Central Command, and as a Term Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, a member of the Planning Board of the City of Newport, RI, an affiliate of the William R. Rhodes Center for International Economics and Finance at Brown University, and a visiting associate professor at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

Jesse C. Tumblin is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy specializing in political and military history, conceptions of security, and the current and former British world. He earned his PhD and MA from Boston College and his BA from the University of Tennessee. He is a past Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. He is the author of *The Quest for Security: Sovereignty, Race, and the Defense of the British Empire, 1898-1931*, as well as an article on Britain's attempts to secure its Indo-Pacific empire that won the Saki Ruth Dockrill Prize for International History from the Institute for Historical Research, University of London.

Andrew R. Wilson is the Naval War College's John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. After majoring in East Asian studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara he earned his PhD from the History and East Asian Languages Program at Harvard University. Before joining the War College faculty in 1998, he taught introductory and advanced courses in Chinese history at Harvard and at Wellesley College. Professor Wilson lectures on Chinese history, Asian military affairs, and the classics of strategic theory at military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world and has worked on curriculum development with command and staff colleges in Latin America and Africa. He has written several pieces on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power, and the Art of War, including a new introduction for Lionel Giles' classic translation of Sun Tzu. His books include *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant-Elites in Colonial Manila, 1885-1916*; *The Chinese in the Caribbean*; and *China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force*. Professor Wilson is also featured on The Great Courses with lecture series including *The Art of War, Masters of War: History's Greatest Strategic Thinkers*, and *Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life, and Cultures*.