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Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Workshop

Mahan Reading Room | Oct. 26–27, 2016

Working Papers &
Reference Information



Welcome from the Workshop Chairs

David P. Polatty IV, MA and Albert J. Shimkus Jr., BSN, MA
U.S. Naval War College

Welcome to the U.S. Naval War College and Newport, Rhode Island! We are deeply honored to host you for two days of important and intensive discussions on civilian-military coordination and engagement in the humanitarian response arena. Ongoing complex emergencies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, along with recent natural disasters including Hurricane Matthew in Haiti and Super Typhoon Haima in the Philippines, highlight our responsibility as global citizens to do everything in our power to advance and improve civilian-military engagement to better aid vulnerable people around the world. This workshop brings together humanitarian practitioners and leaders, academicians, and military leaders to explore present and future challenges in international military support to humanitarian responses, including natural disasters, complex emergencies, and routine security cooperation activities.

This humanitarian-focused event is designed to help the United States Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and international maritime forces, as well as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), humanitarian organizations, and academia collaboratively develop robust research, professional education, training, and development agendas. Each of these entities plays a vital role in helping to improve civilian-military coordination during humanitarian responses.

This workshop intends to improve international military support to humanitarian responses by meeting the following four objectives:

1. Enhancing the response capacity of UN OCHA, USAID OFDA, humanitarian NGOs, Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international militaries, and other key organizations through supporting a Community of Practice in civilian-military issues and promoting information sharing that can inform policy and processes during humanitarian crises.
2. Expanding and strengthening a network of practitioners, academics, and leaders who routinely work civilian-military engagement in the humanitarian space.
3. Highlighting key opportunities for professional education, training, and development for key decision makers to identify the best practices associated with overcoming cultural, policy, technical, and legal challenges for coordination and information sharing.

4. Developing a comprehensive research agenda focused on civilian-military coordination considering international approaches to effecting solutions.

We hope that you will find our discussions timely, relevant, and meaningful, and that you are able to expand your network of leaders from the humanitarian community, academe, and militaries, so we can all work more effectively together to help vulnerable people. Our keynote addresses, panel, and working group discussions are carefully devised to help improve trust and confidence with one another when international militaries conduct routine security cooperation activities and are called upon to respond to natural disasters and complex emergencies. The ability for our governments and organizations to respond to humanitarian crises is strengthened through the trust we build here and the lessons we share.

The following working papers and reference information are included to help stimulate thinking, begin the exchange of ideas, and provide valuable background information for our diverse and multidisciplinary audience. We hope you share these papers with your colleagues throughout the humanitarian space.

Thank you very much for participating and please enjoy your time in Newport!

This event is supported by the U.S. Naval War College Foundation (NWCF), specifically through the generosity of NWCF Life Member, Mr. Edward Polk, and the U.S. Naval War College EMC Chair, Dr. Derek Reveron. This workshop would not have been possible without the amazing work of our Protocol & Events Department, Visual Communications Department, incredible cross-college coordination between the College of Operational & Strategic Leadership, National Security Affairs, and Joint Military Operations faculty; and a strong and enduring commitment to academic excellence by the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Naval War College.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Improving Military Integration and Use of Civilian Information Communication Technologies during Disaster Response

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In accordance with the Oslo guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief operations, military forces should be used only as a last resort. However, military forces have been widely used as first responders to temporarily support an affected nation during international humanitarian efforts as a result of complex emergencies and natural or man-made disasters. Current trends suggest that the frequency of such emergencies is increasing worldwide, generating more pressure on an already stressed international humanitarian system. At the same time, from a governmental perspective, any unnecessary employment of duplicate assets can cause misuse of resources and the lost opportunity to apply those resources to other missions. Given these developments, it is rational to extrapolate an increased likelihood of employing military capabilities to provide additional capability and capacity to affected nations and the international humanitarian system, when necessary.

Considering the current economic strain on many nations, it is imperative for militaries around the world to improve their effectiveness and efficiency in the conduct of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations. Militaries who routinely respond to natural disasters and complex emergencies must make greater strides to improve synergy and work more effectively with the United Nations, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and an affected nation's government and military in order to improve crisis response and save lives. One area where militaries should focus on improving their understanding and ability to integrate into international humanitarian responses is through the use of civilian information communication technologies (ICTs).

Why should militaries have better access, participation, and coordination into the information and communications domain?

- Improving response effectiveness. First responders need accurate, reliable, and timely information to conduct their initial assessment; this will provide the basis for proper initial planning and response. Effective initial response to a humanitarian crisis will save more human lives in the opening days of the crisis. This will then allow for better employment of limited resources during the days immediately following the initial lifesaving efforts. Enhanced collaboration through the use of key ICTs, properly defined,

authorized, organized, and trained, will be a factor that dramatically increases the capability to find the signal (information) from the level of noise generated at these emergencies.

- Digital Humanitarian Network support for data management and conversion into actionable information. Global population connectivity trends allow us to extrapolate that during a near term future crisis the volume of data that will be generated and the ability to convert it into actionable information, will be unmanageable for a single organization without the cooperation of formal and informal groups. In only one of many social media platforms, the total number of tweets posted in four recent emergencies exceeded 53 million.¹ HADR operations have quickly evolved from data scarcity to data overload.

Since the Haiti earthquake in 2010, Volunteer & Technical [humanitarian] Communities (VTCs) have effectively supported organizations working on the ground during HA/DR operations. VTCs have helped in many important areas such as digital map construction, extraction of actionable information from social media, translation of population data from SMS texts, production of crisis maps and dashboards, generation and analysis of digital imagery from commercial satellites and aerial drones, support to health professionals from remote locations through the internet, and use of ICTs to assist in finding missing people.

Also, these communities are working on numerous innovative projects to introduce machine learning techniques that should improve the filtering process of relevant information from social media during disasters or complex emergencies. Initiatives such as “Artificial Intelligence for Digital Response” (AIDR)², partnered with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, are powerful tools to improve the understanding of the situation on the ground before the first responders reach the emergency response area.

Statements like those of a U.S. Marine involved in the 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster relief operations highlight the benefits of cooperation with civilian VTCs: *“I cannot overemphasize to you the work of the Ushahidi/Haiti [Crisis Map] has provided. It is saving lives everyday.... Your site saved these people’s lives... The Marine Corps is using your project every second of the day to get assistance to the people that needed it most...”*³

¹ Haiti Earthquake, 2010; Hurricane “Sandy”, 2012; Boston Marathon Bombing, 2013; Typhoon “Haiyan”, 2013. Tomer Simon, Avishay Goldberg & Bruria Adini, “Socializing in emergencies—A review of the use of social media in emergency situations,” *International Journal of Information Management* 35, no.5 (Oct 2005): 613. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401215000638>

² See: <http://aidr.qcri.org/>

³ National Geographic, Voices, Ideas and Insights From Explorers, “How Crisis Mapping Saved Lives in Haiti,” accessed 20 August 2016, <http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/02/crisis-mapping-haiti/>

- Information sharing improves coordination and better coordination enhances effectiveness and efficiency. There is extensive empirical evidence detailing coordination problems between military forces and humanitarian aid organizations in HA/DR operations. Military organizations, based on the systematic study of history, are keenly aware of the importance of organized command and control in the effectiveness of their operations.

Normally, non-military international aid organizations are operational on the scene long time before governments decide to use military assets in HA/DR operations. Typically, NGOs and IGOs possess a high level of understanding of the local situation in numerous dimensions, such as political, infrastructure, security, cultural practices, logistics, and government capabilities.⁴ Respecting the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, this type of knowledge enables assessment that is crucial to creating synergy among first responders. Therefore, military responders must balance their doctrinal command and control expectations with the local expertise of the civilian professionals on the ground before the military forces arrive.

- Practicality. The entry of military forces into a humanitarian operation is usually a temporary condition, a last resort decision duly pondered by respective governments. In this sense, the military organization must be integrated into the humanitarian ICT system in place; it is easier for the military to integrate into an unclassified, open, in place system than for the humanitarian community to try to integrate into a military's classified, closed system. Additionally, once the military leaves the area, the humanitarian ICT system must continue to function without military support.
- Humanitarian systems are better adapted for HA/DR operations. The temporary integration of military forces into HADR operations is preferred compared with employment of a military ICT system, designed mainly for combat operations. The level of adaptation, expertise, and specification of a dedicated operating system, which operates 365 days a year, is hard to match.

In any organization or system, open or closed, duplication of effort involves loss of synergy and efficiency, which can also lead to errors in execution, with varying degrees of consequence. In this regard, and in times of tremendous stress and scarcity of resources, instead of introducing more ICTs into responses, all actors in the humanitarian space should make efforts to better optimize the use of the current operational ICTs, as well as well-defined doctrine, procedures, and ethical standards in order for all entities to operate in an integrated and synchronized manner for the good of humanity and to better serve affected people.

⁴ James McArthur et al, "Interorganizational Cooperation II of III: The Humanitarian Perspective," *Joint Force Quarterly* 80, 1st Quarter (2016): 147. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-79/jfq-79_106-112_McArthur-et-al.pdf.

Private Military and Security Companies and NGOs: The Role of NGO Security Contracting for Civil-Military Interaction

Birthe Anders, PhD

Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

Civil-military interaction in humanitarian emergencies and (post-)conflict settings can be extremely challenging, partly due to different mandates, missions and short-term goals of the various actors involved. Among them are the civilian population of state, local civilian institutions and the local military, as well as international military and civilian actors, such as employees of international organisations or non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, if managed successfully, communication, coordination and sometimes cooperation between military and civilian actors can be crucial to the success of a mission. In recent years, another actor has become a familiar sight in these settings: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), that is private companies providing military and/or security services to a range of clients. PMSCs and particularly their work for the U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan have received significant public and scholarly attention in the past 15 years.¹ A less publicized aspect of the industry is that NGOs also contract for security services.² This is a daily reality in many operational environments around the world. This working paper thus focuses on a particular subset of civil-military interaction: on NGOs and PMSCs.

NGO Security and Private Military and Security Companies

NGO security, meaning the safety of staff and assets, has been a growing concern for aid agencies. While there were always challenges to working in zones of war, conflict, and natural disaster, security incidents have risen significantly in recent years.³ A security incident is one in which an aid worker is wounded, killed or kidnapped. For example, in 2013 attacks on aid workers were reported to have increased by 48% compared to the previous year, with the

¹ See e.g. Krahmann, Elke (2010): *States, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Dunigan, Molly (2011): *Victory for Hire. Private Security Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness*. Stanford: Stanford University Press; Avant, Deborah D./ Sigelman, Lee (2010): *Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq*. *Security Studies* 19(2), 230-265.

² Anders, Birthe (2016): *What Role do Private Military and Security Companies Play in Securing Humanitarian Organizations?*, ATHA/ Harvard Humanitarian Initiative Blog, 4 July 2016. Anders, Birthe (2013): *Treehuggers and Babykillers: The relationship between NGOs and PMSCs and its impact on coordinating actors in complex operations*. *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24(2), 278-294.

³ For a discussion of reasons for increased attacks on aid workers, particularly on why the traditional acceptance strategy has become more challenging to implement, sometimes due to actions by aid agencies themselves, see Stoddard, Abby/ Harmer, Adele/ Haver, Katherine (2006): *Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations*. HPG Report 23. September 2006. London: Overseas Development Institute.

number of victims up by 66%.⁴ These developments have led some NGOs to either accept military protection or, if this is not available, to contract PMSCs - a very controversial decision within the NGO community.⁵ This is especially so as PMSCs work with what can be called 'hard' security measures such as armed guards and armoured vehicles. In contrast to that, most NGOs prefer to rely on the acceptance of the local community for their safety rather than on physical protection. In addition, contracting PMSCs might enable an NGO to continue working in a high-risk environment, but it has been argued that contracting for armed services might actually decrease security - by distancing NGO staff from the local population and making it more likely for aid workers to be attacked. While there is no conclusive data to prove this argument it is a concern from an NGO perspective. Now, it should be pointed out that armed security, the service for which PMSCs are most known is only one part of NGO contracting. Much more frequently NGOs contract for unarmed security, intelligence, security training, kidnap and ransom advice and response, travel tracking as well as medical evacuation.

Implications for civil-military interaction

How then is the interaction between NGOs and PMSCs relevant in the broader context of civil-military interaction, particularly in humanitarian operations? PMSCs add another layer to an already complex web of interactions. First, actions by PMSCs could be attributed to the client, in this case the NGO. This is particularly a concern regarding any unlawful actions by PMSCs, but also relates to simpler matters such as which roads are used and the appropriate treatment of local customs. Which other customers a PMSC works for can also be relevant, as not only actions by the PMSC but also by other clients might be attributed to the NGO. This often matters in warzones where parts of the local population might be hostile to international military presence (including their contractors) and then by extension might be hostile to the NGO, but should matter a little less in humanitarian operations. Second, not only security services contracted in the field, such as armed and unarmed guards are relevant here. As said above, NGOs contract for a range of services, including security training and intelligence. How NGOs are trained on security and which approach to staff security an organization takes can influence where they go and how they behave there. Third, it is also possible for NGO security contracting to have clear positive effects for military partners, in particular by freeing up military capacity that would otherwise have been needed to secure NGO operations. Almost all PMSC employees have a military or law enforcement background, meaning they will likely be well-versed in a military's approach to operations. At the same time PMSC employees will now approach their job from a business perspective, meaning they will want to fulfill their particular contract with a client and not necessarily think about the overall mission of their clients or their partners. Now, as said above from an NGO perspective, it is not proven that contracting for armed services increases staff security in all cases, particularly in the long term. However, once

⁴ This was especially due to worsening situations in Syria and South Sudan. Stoddard, Abby/ Harmer, Adele/ Ryou, Kathleen (2014): Aid Worker Security Report 2014. Unsafe Passage: Road attacks and their impact on humanitarian operations. Humanitarian Outcomes, August 2014, 2.

⁵ The UN has also contracted PMSCs, which cannot be discussed in detail here due to space constraints. See Østensen, Åse Gilje (2013): In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping, *International Peacekeeping* 20(1), 33-47.

contracted, PMSCs (and the intelligence they provide) will need to be included into communication where appropriate. From a military perspective, this might make communication and information sharing more challenging, but knowing who your partners' contractors are and how to deal with them can be crucial to successfully managing civil-military interaction.

Evaluating Military Engagement in Disaster Response

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With the world focused on terrorism, conflict in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, it is easy to forget about the threat posed by natural disasters. Natural disasters pose as great a threat as conflict does to the wellbeing of millions of people across the globe and undermine livelihoods by wreaking havoc on property and natural resources. Current and anticipated sea level rise and changing patterns in and increasing severity of weather-related events pose significant threats to populations globally. These large disasters impact lives and property alike, and at times, are too much for affected states to manage on their own.

When disaster-affected states are unable to cope with the response and recovery to disasters on their own, they often turn to other states and the international humanitarian community to help manage the disaster response and to provide resources and know-how to ensure a quick recovery. Increasingly it is foreign militaries that are called to assist in the early days of disaster response, raising dilemmas about how long to use them and in what capacity. In circumstances where natural disasters hit crisis-affected areas (for example, the Pakistan floods in 2010), the stakes are high for humanitarian agencies.

Arguably, far more attention needs to be paid to disaster preparedness, both to reduce vulnerability to disasters by following building codes, building in safe areas not prone to repeated flooding), but also to be better prepared to respond through better training, professionalization of humanitarian response and greater coordination between national and international humanitarian actors. Yet, many disasters today are so large that states lack capacity to manage the immediate response using civilian capacity alone. This is where national militaries, and at times, foreign militaries have come to play a critical role. Because militaries' primary function is war fighting, this begs questions about their involvement in aiding humanitarian response to natural disasters. How effective are militaries in providing assistance? What are the benefits/costs to humanitarian agencies of coordinating with militaries? How do we measure the impact of militaries involvement in humanitarian response? How do local populations view military engagement in relief efforts? When multiple foreign militaries respond, how can their activities be most effectively synchronized and coordinated to complement relief efforts being led by the international humanitarian system? There is scant empirical evidence to answer these questions fully. Yet, militaries are increasingly being called to respond. Governments, humanitarian aid agencies, militaries and donors need to pay more attention to these dynamics and begin funding empirical research in this domain.

The growing importance of militaries in humanitarian response

In recent years, humanitarian needs have grown steadily, with an increased number of resources needed to meet the needs to people directly affected by disaster. Earthquakes like the one in Haiti (2010) and Nepal (2015) or massive super typhoons like Haiyan which hit the Philippines in 2013, underscore the dangers of failing to prepare. While the first responders to any disaster are always the local communities directly affected by the disaster, these communities are often overwhelmed by large disasters and require the support of neighboring communities domestically, and many times by a diversity of both domestic and international humanitarian organizations. Yet, international humanitarian organizations themselves are often unable to provide immediate relief in the days following a disaster. It takes these organizations time to get on the ground, gain access to heavily damaged areas and vulnerable populations, conduct assessments to identify needs, and bring in or locally hire the resources needed to provide relief to those impacted by the disaster.

In many instances it is the national military of the affected state, often aided by foreign militaries that provide life-saving aid in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Militaries have the unique capability to move thousands of people and critical supplies and equipment needed, for example, to clear and open airports, sea ports and roads, and to restore essential infrastructure that would otherwise take weeks or months for other agencies to organize. In short, militaries have a pivotal role to play in the early days of relief from major disasters that surpass the capacity of the affected state. At the same time, the introduction of foreign militaries complicates matters, as these militaries have to be integrated into an already operational domestic response. (Take for example the Philippines in response to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 where more than 23 foreign militaries provided assistance across a wide geographic area). This means scarce domestic military resources needed for the response have to be used to coordinate foreign militaries.

Disaster response is not typically a military's primary mission (though indeed, in a number of countries, the national military is in fact mandated to provide disaster relief), and unsurprisingly, many states are hesitant to request aid from foreign militaries. There are a number of challenges associated with the engagement of militaries in disaster response. First, militaries often send materials that they happen to have available as opposed to what is needed or requested on the ground. Resources should be "pulled" into the theater of operations based on need, not "pushed" based on availability. Second, where militaries do participate in disaster relief, there may be conflicts of interest, particularly in complex emergencies where one or more of the militaries may be simultaneously engaged in the conflict. In complex emergencies, there is the added challenge of safety and security of humanitarian aid workers; as a result, many humanitarian aid agencies will seek to mitigate risks to their staff by curtailing their involvement with militaries. Finally, in large responses where multiple foreign militaries and aid agencies are all descending to provide aid at the same time, there can be competition for flight rights coming into an airport, for storage facilities, and for domestic transport to get resources from the airport to dispersed areas of need. These challenges make it paramount to have clear guidelines that govern the circumstances under

which militaries and aid agencies coordinate their activities and it points to the importance for education and training so that both sets of actors are prepared to engage in the field.

Increasingly, foreign militaries are called to respond to major disasters. In these cases, foreign militaries will provide assistance both in line with bi-lateral agreements between states and in conjunction with the international humanitarian system, coordinated by the United Nations Resident Coordinator, supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The rules governing the use of foreign military assets for international disaster response are known as the Oslo Guidelines (formally the Guidelines on The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief). These guidelines stipulate whether, when, how and under what circumstances foreign military assets may be used in the provision of disaster relief and govern how foreign militaries engage with international humanitarian agencies.

A series of humanitarian reforms that started with United Nations General Assembly 46/191¹, led to changes to the structure of the international humanitarian system and how its constituent parts are organized and coordinated. The intent of these reforms is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of aid delivery, to improve coordination among humanitarian agencies, and to make the agents of aid responsible and accountable to its recipients. Two correlates of these reforms were essential to ensuring that the reforms had teeth, namely: professionalization of the field, and the increased adoption of evidence-based approaches to aid delivery.

Expanding the evidence base

Despite years of reforms that have made evidence-based programming with monitoring and evaluation integral to the practice, this has rarely been applied to evaluating humanitarian civil-military engagement. There is little evidence available to answer even the most basic questions. What are the factors associated with effective civil-military coordination? What are the reputational costs/benefits of humanitarian agencies coordinating with foreign militaries? How do recipients of aid perceive foreign militaries and humanitarian agencies' roles in aid delivery? Does the use of foreign militaries to deliver aid lead to dependence on militaries for this kind of service? Does humanitarian civil-military engagement save more lives than would have been saved absent this engagement?

David Polatty, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College's Humanitarian Response Program, which works closely with UNOCHA and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, recently noted that "Militaries typically do a very thorough job analyzing their responses to natural disasters and publishing detailed lessons observed. Most humanitarian organizations do the same. What we haven't seen often enough, though, is a cross-functional approach where academics, humanitarians, and militaries come together to make an effort to comprehensively

¹ <https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r191.htm>

examine civil-military engagement and attempt to measure its effectiveness with respect to positive and negative impacts on the affected state and its population.”

Developing an empirical evidence based on how international militaries and humanitarian agencies perform in the delivery of aid and the impact of their engagement with each other is essential for informing the development of policy, as well as improving training and ultimately, reducing frictions and increasing effectiveness in emergency response when it is needed most. There is good movement in this direction with trainings being offered routinely by UN OCHA as well as the United States Agency for International Development’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFEDMHA). But humanitarian civil military training should be expanded through greater partnerships, especially with academic institutions, where professionals can be trained not only on the guidelines and practice of humanitarian civil military engagement but on the critical methods required to evaluate its outcome.

This paper originally appeared on the Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action (ATHA) blog, a program of the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative.

Improving Civil-Military Coordination and Protecting Aid Workers

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A number of important developments and trends are forcing us to rethink humanitarian response in general, and civil-military engagement in particular. These include: the increased frequency and impact of natural disasters and complex emergencies, exacerbated by the effects of climate change; rapid urbanization and population growth, and with it, urban poverty, violence and instability;¹ and the increased involvement of international militaries in responding to these crises, alongside humanitarian actors.

To this list of trends, I'd like to add several more concerning ones: First, while large-scale killing in violent conflicts is decreasing, volatility and low-intensity conflicts are increasing.² Second, forced displacement is at record levels, with over 60 million people currently displaced around the globe, the majority of whom, 38 million, are not refugees but rather internally displaced.³ If the population of forcibly displaced were a country, it would reportedly be the world's 24th largest.⁴ Displacement is also contributing to urbanization in two ways: first, the majority of the world's refugees and displaced persons now end up in cities and towns, not refugee camps;⁵ and second, as people remain longer in displacement, some of today's largest refugee camps – such as Dadaab camp in Kenya or Zaatari camp in Jordan – are likely to become tomorrow's cities.⁶

¹ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "OCHA in 2014 & 2015: Plan and Budget," accessed March 1, 2016, <http://www.unocha.org/ochain/2014-15/field-activities>.

² See Human Security Report Project, "Human Security Report 2013: The Decline in Global Violence: Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation" (Vancouver: Human Security Press, 2013), http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2013/HSRP_Report_2013_140226_Web.pdf.

³ "Global Overview 2015: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence" (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 2015), <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201505-Global-Overview-2015/20150506-global-overview-2015-en.pdf>.

⁴ "Forced Displacement: A Growing Global Crisis FAQs," *World Bank*, December 16, 2015, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/brief/forced-displacement-a-growing-global-crisis-faqs>.

⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Urban Refugees," accessed March 1, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4b0e4cba6.html>.

⁶ "Refugee Camps Are the 'Cities of Tomorrow', Says Aid Expert," *Dezeen*, November 23, 2015, <http://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/23/refugee-camps-cities-of-tomorrow-killian-kleinschmidt-interview-humanitarian-aid-expert/>.

The third trend is growing disrespect for international law and humanitarian norms, and with it, a staggering increase – nearly four-fold – in the number of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers over the last decade.⁷ In many of the world’s conflict zones – especially Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, Central African Republic and Pakistan – the Red Cross or Blue Shield, once designed to distinguish and protect humanitarians from attack, is increasingly becoming a bull’s-eye. The urban dynamic is also important here, since discrimination in targeting becomes even more difficult in complex emergencies in big cities, given the density of population and complexity of actors. While some of these attacks against aid workers occur as a result of indiscriminate or mistaken targeting, the majority appear to be deliberate.⁸

Moreover, we know all too well that threats and attacks on humanitarian aid workers do not only emanate from non-state armed groups. Following the US airstrike on Médecins San Frontières (MSF) trauma center in Kunduz, Afghanistan on October 3rd of last year, for example, separate MSF facilities were hit by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen on October 26th and December 2nd, and by airstrikes in Syria on November 21st and 28th.⁹ And MSF is by no means the only organization to suffer from the recent incidents of violence against aid workers and facilities. As a result, some aid organizations now consider conventional armed forces to pose a greater threat to the security of their staff than insurgent groups in certain environments.

And while devastating in their own right, attacks against aid workers have had even more devastating consequences for the populations they serve, curtailing access and depriving vulnerable populations of life-saving assistance. The result is a critical challenge for civil-military coordination and the humanitarian sector: How to provide the best assistance possible to populations in need, marshaling all the resources at our disposal – both humanitarian and military – to respond to crises? How to create a “new model of civil-military humanitarian coordination”, as many have appropriately called for, without jeopardizing the essential neutral, impartial, independent, and ultimately, humanitarian nature of emergency response, and with it, secure access for aid workers?

Many have already called for increased education and training, and these are critical. Military and humanitarian communities must get to know each other better, and participation in joint trainings and simulations is a great start. There is also a need for better means of communication and information sharing to ensure that this dialogue continues during

⁷ “Aid Worker Security Report 2015: Figures at a Glance” (Humanitarian Outcomes), accessed January 11, 2016, https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/HO_AidWorkerSecPreview_1015_G.PDF; for full dataset, see “The Aid Worker Security Database (AWSDB),” *Humanitarian Outcomes*, accessed January 10, 2016, <https://aidworkersecurity.org/>.

⁸ Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer, and Kathleen Ryou, “Aid Worker Security Report 2014 - Unsafe Passage: Road Attacks and Their Impact on Humanitarian Operations” (Humanitarian Outcomes, August 2014), <https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/Aid%20Worker%20Security%20Report%202014.pdf>.

⁹ See Julia Brooks, “Amidst Kunduz and a Year of Violence, Protecting Humanitarian Staff,” *Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action*, December 22, 2015, <http://www.atha.se/blog/amidst-kunduz-and-year-violence-protecting-humanitarian-staff>.

operations, when it is needed most.¹⁰ And more research is clearly needed to inform policy-making, as much of it remains anecdotal or experiential today.

But militaries must also know when *not* to engage in humanitarian response. This also requires research, training and informed policy-making. We need to be wary of the militarization of humanitarian aid, as much as the humanitarianization of military operations. We need to recognize when the needs of vulnerable populations and affected communities are best served by civil-military cooperation, such as in certain large-scale natural disasters, and when they are best served by a clear separation between military and humanitarian action, such as in many conflicts and complex emergencies. This is important not just in terms of joint operations, where militaries engage alongside humanitarian actors. We must also question situations where militaries provide aid on their own, especially in the course of counterinsurgency or “hearts and minds” campaigns. Humanitarian agencies have frequently cited such operations as contributing to perceptions of them as legitimate targets of attack in countries like Afghanistan, now among the deadliest for aid workers.¹¹

Improving civil-military coordination calls for us to work better together, and there are many circumstances in which that can make a real difference. Yet especially in conflicts and complex emergencies, protecting aid workers also calls for us to learn to work better apart. In some cases, this is because military involvement in humanitarian operations may pose an inherent risk to aid workers and beneficiary populations, especially when militaries are also belligerents in a conflict. In other cases, this is because experience demonstrates that both parties have not yet learned to work together effectively, and disregard for the implications of their actions are putting aid worker and civilian lives at risk.

¹⁰ David Polatty, “Overcoming Hurdles to Information Sharing and Technological Coordination in Civil-Military Engagement,” *Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action*, April 6, 2015, <http://www.atha.se/blog/overcoming-hurdles-information-sharing-and-technological-coordination-civil-military-engagement>.

¹¹ Alex Whiting, “Attacks on Aid Workers Worldwide Hit Worst Levels on Record,” *Reuters*, August 19, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-foundation-aid-attacks-idUSKBN0GJ07S20140819>.

The Evolution of the Strategic Importance of Humanitarian Response

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In less than a century, the notion of humanitarian assistance evolved from a global rarity to a significant component of international relations. The symbiotic rise of humanitarianism and foreign aid since World War II fundamentally altered the international system where achieving strategic objectives could be done by other means than force. The convergence of international responsibility to the world order, significant economic interests, and the global humanitarian values provides strategic motivations for continued U.S. involvement in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations. The Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) lead these humanitarian efforts from development through relief. However, the military can bring significant capability to a humanitarian crisis beyond the host nation and international community's capacity. While all services can and do play a role in HA/DR, the Navy and Marine Corps are uniquely positioned for this mission. Largely self-sustainable, forward deployed, flexible, and trained for mobilization of sea-to-shore assets, the maritime services can provide assistance fast, on location, and without exacerbating the ashore capacity constraints. Additionally, strategic lift, medical support, construction battalions, air traffic controllers, and maritime pre-positioning ships all contribute to HA/DR. From 1970 to 2000, the U.S. military was diverted from its regular schedule to conduct HA/DR operations 366 times.² Military involvement has escalated so much so, particularly after the 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami, that a brief mention in early strategy documents has evolved into entire sections and mission areas dedicated to the subject. This paper captures why HA/DR rose to such a high place in national and military strategy and why the military will most likely increase involvement in HA/DR missions in the future.

With the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw the rise of naval presence as a mission set in and of itself. The Navy and Marine Corps evolved as the key crisis responder in a variety of military-operations-other-than-war. Planning and conducting HA/DR was included in this broader category, but typically only given a sentence or two of recognition in national strategy documents.³ HA/DR also provided an opportunity to work military-to-military relationships with joint and coalition partners to improve operational cohesion and mutual trust. While HA/DR

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² W. Eugene Cobble, H.H. Gaffney, Dmitry Gorenberg. *For the Record: All U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations, 1970-2000* (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses Corporation, 2005).

³ *Naval Warfare* (Naval Doctrine Publication 1) reprinted in *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s*, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2006) p 115-116.

was by no means predominant, it was routinely mentioned in naval guidance as one of the operational capabilities of the services.

The events of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami significantly altered the role of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief in U.S. strategy. On December 26, 2004, a 9.15 magnitude earthquake occurred off the western coast of Indonesia in the Indian Ocean. In total, there were over 225,000 reported dead or missing and nearly 1.2 million displaced people.⁴ While the State Department and USAID led foreign disaster relief, Pacific Command (PACOM) immediately supported them by authorizing ship movements toward the region.⁵ Soon thereafter, PACOM established Operation Unified Assistance.⁶ By December 28, before President George W. Bush publically announced the first proclamations of U.S. support, PACOM already established Joint Task Force 536 and appointed Lieutenant General Robert Blackman from 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force to lead the efforts. On January 3, the JTF evolved to Combined Support Force 536 to include and coordinate the assets brought forth from other states. By January 5, a week and a half after the event, the United States had 25 ships, 45 fixed-wing aircraft, and 58 helicopters and a total of over thirteen thousand military personnel supporting the HA/DR mission.⁷

President George W. Bush made the first public commitment of support three days after the earthquake and tsunami.⁸ Even with the massive mobilization to support relief efforts by state, USAID, and defense department to assist the overwhelmed host nations, United Nations, and governmental and non-governmental organizations, the perception of delayed global leadership put President Bush on the defensive. The United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, openly accused the United States of being stingy with respect to the global crisis.⁹ The political handling of the situation signaled strategic weakness in global leadership, holes in the security umbrella, diminished willingness to come to the assistance of allies, gaps in forward presence supporting the economic system, a compromise of U.S. values, and general lack of respect for human life abroad. A significant lesson learned by the United States was to better manage the politics and public diplomacy. Ultimately, the United States government donated \$950M and American citizens donated \$700M to charities, but the appearance of diminished global leadership permanently altered the U.S. perception of the strategic importance of the proper handling of humanitarian missions.¹⁰

⁴ Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2005. (Washington, D.C., U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005), 15. Retrieved from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH800.pdf on 18 October 2014.

⁵ Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, p 28.

⁶ Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, p 28.

⁷ Wall of Water: U.S. Troops Aid Tsunami Victims. Department of Defense Year in Review 2005. Retrieved from <http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2006/2005yearinreview/article2.html> on December 17, 2014.

⁸ Bruce A. Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2007), p 22.

⁹ Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, p 21.

¹⁰ Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, p 101.

After this event, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief emerged as a noteworthy component of U.S. national strategy. President George W. Bush's 2006 National Security Strategy shifted humanitarian assistance from the occasional recognition that the mission-set existed to a stand-alone section at the end of the document addressing international engagement, globalization, and environmental destruction.¹¹ The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review also expanded on several humanitarian assistance related items.¹² But it was the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, signed by the service chiefs of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, that fully elevated HA/DR to one of the six core capabilities of the sea services.

In 2010, President Barack Obama's National Security Strategy broadly addressed both climate change and humanitarian assistance. Not only did this reflect the change in leadership, but also the devastating effect of the 2010 Haiti earthquake that resulted in over 222,000 fatalities. Follow-on strategy documents continue to reiterate the humanitarian assistance mission in a wide variety of contexts. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review connected HA/DR with climate change and energy security as well as regional destabilization as a result of climate change. The 2011 National Military Strategy addressed HA/DR in strengthening international and regional security—focusing on the joint, interagency, and theater security cooperation aspects before, during, and after an event.¹³ The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance includes HA/DR domestically in support of civil authorities and internationally to provide military response options to major events.¹⁴ Within the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, HA/DR had interestingly shifted to be part of the power projection capability of the military.¹⁵ In President Obama's 2015 National Security Strategy, HA/DR is further mentioned in the context of building our national defense, building partner capacity, and confronting climate change.¹⁶ Finally, the 2015 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower continues to include providing HA/DR as a core naval function.¹⁷ While the continued justifications for military involvement in HA/DR vary greatly, the increasing emphasis on this subset of the mission has undeniably grown.

Understanding the early military contributions to humanitarian assistance, studying what happened in 2004, and examining the various strategic guidance afterward reflects the monumental strategic shift of using hard power assets for this soft power mission. As learned after 2004, if the United States is going to protect strategic, political, economic, and ideological interests abroad, then we must employ all instruments of national power including the military

¹¹ National Security Strategy 2006, signed by President George W. Bush, p 47-48

¹² Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, signed by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, p 12-13.
<http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf>

¹³ National Military Strategy 2011, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, p 15.

¹⁴ Defense Strategic Guidance 2012, signed by President Barack Obama, p 6.

¹⁵ Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, signed by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, p 60-61.

¹⁶ National Security Strategy 2015, signed by President Barack Obama, p 7.

¹⁷ Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower-2015, signed by Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, and Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, p 19.

to support HA/DR missions. The number of large scale natural disasters continues to escalate since the 2004 earthquake/tsunami and climate change scientists predict increased incidences and severity of natural disasters. Whether disasters are labeled environmental destruction or climate change—the evidence shows that HA/DR will remain a mission for the armed services no matter who is leading the country. Whatever the justification for doing HA/DR operations, it will continue to support U.S. interests and the strategic consequences of getting it wrong are too great. Within this context, NWC looks forward to improving humanitarian response.

Theater Security Cooperation and Global Health Engagement: Measuring Success at Different Levels of Analysis

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Understanding the effect of US Department of Defense's (DoD's) security cooperation (SC) activities around the world has never been as important as it is today. When considering the rebalance to the India-Asia-Pacific area and the need for continued engagement in many strategic areas of interest to the US government, the use of SC offers military personnel an important way to engage prospective partners under the aegis of collegiality and collaboration. Determining the impact and effect of SC engagements remains a challenging proposition however. How can this be done in a cogent manner that maintains relevance to military personnel, the inter-agency, our Partner Nations (PNs) and, of course, good stewardship of taxpayer's money? Understanding the ongoing efforts and matching their planning and execution to the strategic, operation and tactical levels of analysis is a good place to start.

Impact assessment of activities in the field has recently seen a great increase in the quantity and quality of its tools and products, with organizations such as the World Bank and India-based International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) organization often leading the way. The US Government (USG) has not been isolated from these developments and many organizations in the Interagency, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department, have likewise begun to integrate assessment, monitoring and evaluation (AME) into their projects and programs. Spurred by the 2013 "Global Health Policy Cable" from Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which mandated that future global health engagement (GHE) activities must have an AME component, and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2013 Section 715, which specified that health engagements must be "effective and efficient in meeting the national security goals of the United States,"¹ the DoD has followed suit and has increasingly sought the means to determine the policy efficacy of its activities, particularly in the domains of SC and GHE.

In order to catch up to the level of maturity of the assessment efforts undertaken by other USG agencies and international organizations, while maintaining relevance to military personnel, SC and GHE assessment must address a number of definitional and conceptual

¹ Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, 2013. *Global Health Policy (Cable)*. Washington, DC: The Department of Defense.

issues. For example, even the newly coined term, “AME,” risks conflating two very different evaluative practices: (impact) assessment and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). While the two are clearly closely related, M&E is limited to defining desirable end-states and determining whether the US or the PN has realized or is advancing towards them. On the other hand, impact assessment not only measures progress towards goals, but also determines the degree to which particular US projects and programs contribute towards their realization; because impact assessment measures activities’ effectiveness, it can be used to calculate DoD’s return on investment (ROI) for its SC and GHE activities as well. These differences suggest that A-and-M&E not only have distinct goals, but also that the analytic methods appropriate to one may not be equally well-suited the other.² Likewise, selection from among the research methods available for SC and GHE evaluation is a similarly fruitful area for future exploration. Case studies and process-tracing, quantitative methods and experimental methods each offer significant advantages to analysts—but each also suffers from certain problems as well. Military personnel conducting assessments or M&E activities should be aware of both the benefits and pitfalls of the methods available and should ensure that the chosen methods are appropriate to the problems with which they have been tasked.³

Military personnel further need to consider another foundational issue concerning the effective execution of military AME—the appropriate levels and units of analysis. Consistent with existing Joint Force doctrine, this paper argues that there are three principal levels at which military assessments may take place: the Strategic, the Operational and the Tactical levels of analysis, respectively. It further suggests that the level of analysis should be intimately related with the unit of analysis and notes that many of the problems currently observed in SC and GHE assessment come from mismatches between levels and units of analysis, such as when strategic goals are matched with tactical units of analysis. Not surprisingly, disagreements between the level of assessment and the level at which the data are collected gives rise to confused and ambiguous assessment products.

The AME literature and assessment experience in the field has repeatedly shown that matching the level of analysis with the level of the activity whose efficacy was to be gauged serves as a critical first step in getting subsequent analyses “right.” The correct choice of level of analysis infers that one must also make a parallel choice in units of analysis: strategic and operational programs can generally be assessed by observing PN activities and their progress towards desired end-states, whereas tactical engagements should focus their AM&E efforts at the sub-national level.

Although there is oftentimes a desire to directly connect “success” in Tactical level engagements to Operational or Strategic level outcomes, we argue that linking these together

² Glendon Diehl and Solomon Major, “MOE vs. M&E: Considering the Difference Between Measuring Strategic Effectiveness and Monitoring Tactical Evaluation,” *Military Medicine* 180 (2015), 77-82, accessed October 22, 2015, <http://publications.amsus.org/doi/abs/10.7205/MILMED-D-14-00171>.

³ Shahidur R. Khandker, *Handbook on Impact Evaluation: Quantitative Methods and Practices* (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2009).

is fraught with methodological challenges. While tactical engagements do impact the larger, strategic picture, observing this impact means first aggregating and rolling up these efforts to the program and country levels. Without doing this, one risks the potential of mistakenly generalizing a local success to an entire province, region or nation. The DoD should develop a holistic approach to AME, similar to Admiral (Retired) Stavridis' call for a holistic approach to national and regional security.⁴ AME offers the DoD the opportunity to be at its best in understanding the impact of its activities, its ROI for SC, and the value proposition for our partners, allies, and across the USG.

⁴ James G. Stavridis, *Partnership for the Americas: Western Hemisphere Strategy and the US Southern Command* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), 26.

Using Women to Create a More Stable Society through Animal Production and Health

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The 2011 United States National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security advocates that women must be empowered as equal stakeholders in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and instability. The plan provides five key objectives: 1) national integration and institutionalization; 2) participation in the peace process and decision-making; 3) protection from violence; 4) conflict prevention; 5) and access to relief and recovery.¹ Women's roles and responsibilities in building stable societies and participating in these key objectives vary across the globe. Conflict, insecurity, and political violence are most prevalent in Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia as demonstrated by the Global Economy Index measuring political stability,² where women are often not afforded the same opportunities as their counterparts in more developed parts of the world. The integration of women into these processes is often complex, and largely based on culture and tradition. Therefore, it is essential to identify areas where women can make significant strides in roles that are already recognized. Livestock are often considered a venue for encouraging gender balance in developing countries, because women are recognized as livestock keeper.^{3 4 5} Thus women have established competency in the field of livestock production, and have the inherent capacity to succeed to help build more stable communities. Engaging women, and farmers in general, in the area of livestock disease control and prevention can improve animal production and sustain livelihoods and the food supply.

The Value of Livestock

Economic growth and poverty alleviation generated by agricultural productivity has been well documented.^{6 7 8} Agriculture is consistently the largest source of livelihoods for rural

¹ House T.W. (2011). – United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. *In*, The White House, Washington DC.

² Economy.Com T.G. (2014). – Political Stability Index *In*, Ed: T.G. Economy.Com, The Global Economy.Com.

³ Gueye E.F. (2005). – Gender Aspects in Family Poultry Management Systems in Developing Countries. *World's Poultry Science Journal*, 61 (1), 39-46.

⁴ Anon. (1994). – Women Livestock Managers in the Third World: A Focus on Technical Issues. *In*, IFAD, Rome.

⁵ FAO (2012). – Livestock Sector Development for Poverty Reduction: An Economic and Policy Perspective - Livestock's Many Virtues. *In*, FAO, Rome.

⁶ Gallup J., Radelt S. & Warner A. (1997). – Economic Growth and the Income of the Poor: CAER II Discussion Paper 36. *In*, Institute for International Development, Washington DC.

⁷ Datt G. & Ravallion M. (1998). – Farm Productivity in Rural Poverty in India. *In*, International Food Policy Research Institute Washington DC.

households in the developing world, and agricultural productivity reduces poverty better than growth in other sectors. Recent studies show that livestock production can promote even broader economic growth.^{7 8 9} Moreover, governments and international donor organizations are beginning to recognize that agriculture and livestock are the foundation of livelihoods, economic growth, and food security.¹⁰ This is especially true in regions of the world where a significant portion of the population relies on agriculture and livestock production for food and resources.

Livestock make important contributions to sustainable rural development through securing assets of the poor, improving small farm and pastoral productivity, and increase the market participation of the poor.¹¹ This is especially relevant, given the demand for animal-source food (ASF) and animal products is growing rapidly.¹² Livestock contribute to approximately 40 percent of the global value of agricultural output and livelihoods and food security for nearly a billion people.¹³ Moreover, livestock are critical assets that store wealth, are collateral for credit, and reduce the vulnerability of families during crises.¹³ Agriculture is consistently the largest source of income and livelihoods for rural households in the developing world, providing more than 50 percent of household revenue.^{12 14}

The Role of Women in Livestock Production and Health

Women make essential contributions to agricultural sectors worldwide through livestock rearing, production of animal based products, and promotion of animal health.¹⁵ Approximately 752 million of the world's poor have livestock for food, income, work, and/or societal status, and women comprise two-thirds of this population.⁵ Women participate in both crop and livestock production, with 43 percent of the agricultural labor force of developing countries consisting of women.¹²

The Food and Agriculture Organization for the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, and other international organizations widely recognize the value of women in agriculture. However, comprehensive assessments of women's productivity in the agricultural and livestock sectors show that gender inequalities and

⁸ Irz X., Lin L., Thirtle C. & Winning S. (2001). – Agricultural Productivity Growth and Poverty Alleviation. *Development Policy Review*, 19 (4), 449-466.

⁹ Pica G., Pica-Ciamarra U. & Otte J. (2008). – The Livestock Sector in World Development: Re-assessing the Policy Priorities. *In*, FAO, Rome.

¹⁰ FAO (2011). – Women in Agriculture: Closing the Gender Gap. *In*, FAO, Rome.

¹¹ IRIL (2007). – Markets that Work - Making a Living from Livestock. *In*, IRIL.

¹² Otte J., Costales A., Dijkman J., Pica-Ciamarra U., Robinson V., Ahuja D. & Roland-Holst D. (2012). – Livestock sector development for poverty reduction: an economic and policy perspective. *In*, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Rome.

¹³ FAO (2009). – The State of Food and Agriculture: Livestock in the Balance. *In*, FAO, Rome.

¹⁴ Jayne T.S., Yaman T., Weber M.T., Tschirley D., Benfica R., Chapoto A. & Zulu B. (2002). – Smallholder income and land distribution in Africa: implications for poverty reduction. *Food Policy*, 253–275.

¹⁵ Okali C. (2011). – Notes on Livestock, Food Security, and Gender Equity. *In*, FAO, Rome.

challenges significantly reduce the productivity of women farmers globally.¹⁶ Their roles and responsibilities vary based on region; however, it has been well documented that women tend to work primarily with poultry, sheep, goats, manage dairy production, and often help support animal health.^{11 17}

As the primary caretaker of herds, flocks, and/or individual animals, women not only serve as producers, but also play a significant role in animal health and biosecurity.¹⁶ In the developing world, approximately 30 percent of livestock production, in the form of milk, meat and eggs, is lost because of animal diseases.¹⁸ Engaging women, and farmers in general, in the area of livestock disease control and prevention can improve animal production and sustain livelihoods and the food supply. Additionally, women are often called upon to care for and watch over livestock, and are therefore, skilled at identifying livestock diseases. Engaging women on issues related to animal diseases can help animal health sectors rapidly identify disease outbreaks and prevent diseases transmission. Doing such, could significantly increase livestock production capabilities and output. Women are increasingly entering into fields associated with livestock production and disease prevention; however, they are extremely underrepresented. It is estimated that only 15 percent of the world's extension agents are women.¹⁹ Providing women with educational opportunities in husbandry and animal health and facilitating access to extension and financial services would improve their production capabilities, and consequently garner more food and income, and would likely foster stability.¹⁷

Summary

Strengthening women's roles in livestock production and animal health by providing essential inputs and training to bridge the gender gap would improve animal productivity and food security, provide sustainable livelihoods and economic drivers, and improve overall animal and public health.¹⁰ FAO reported that if women were afforded the same resources as their male counterparts in agriculture (in general), they could increase the yield on farms by 20 – 30 percent, which would raise total agricultural output in developing countries by 2.5 – 4 percent; this would reduce the number of hungry people by 12 – 17 percent.¹⁰ Such gains would enhance food security, economic development, and thereby improve community stability.

¹⁶ Anon. (2009). – Gender in Agriculture. *In*, The World Bank, Washington DC.

¹⁷ FAO (2013). – Understanding and Integrating Gender Issues into Livestock Programmes and Projects. *In*, FAO, Rome.

¹⁸ Upton M. (2004). – The Role of Livestock in Economic Development and Poverty Reduction *In* Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative Working Paper 10, FAO.

¹⁹ Department E.a.S.D. (2009). – Gender and Livestock *In* Gender in Agriculture The World Bank Washington DC.

²⁰ Ayele P. & Peacock C. (2003). – Improving Access to and Consumption of Animal Source Foods in Rural Households: The Experiences of Women-Focused Development Program in the Highlands of Ethiopia. *Journal of Nutrition*, **133** (11), 3981S-3986S.

The Employment of Naval Forces in Humanitarian Response

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On December 26, 2004, a powerful underwater earthquake just west of Sumatra set off tsunamis that swept across the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Thirty-foot high waves crashed ashore, causing widespread death and destruction throughout much of southern Asia and even reaching the shores of east Africa. This was one of the worst natural disasters the world has ever seen.

The island of Sumatra, and particularly its northernmost region, Aceh Province, was worst hit. Estimates are that over 120,000 people died in Aceh Province alone. The interior of Aceh Province is very mountainous. Large sections of the coastal road became impassable, leaving air and sealoft as the primary means of getting aid to survivors. Within days of the disaster, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln was ordered to sail with her escorts to Sumatra, arriving on January 1, 2005. A seven-ship amphibious group was sent from Guam at the same time.

By January 5, the US Navy had 25 ships, 45 airplanes, and 58 helicopters participating in the Sumatra relief effort. The Royal Australian Navy sent an amphibious ship, HMAS Kanimbla, as well as medical and engineering personnel, cargo planes, and helicopters. Two Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force ships joined the relief effort. Singapore also contributed an amphibious ship, while Germany, the United Kingdom, and China each sent medical teams.

Nearly nine years later, on Friday, November 8, 2013, the strongest storm on record to make landfall – Super Typhoon Haiyan - hit the Philippines. The storm generated sustained winds of 195 miles per hour with gusts to 235 mph and landfall waves of 50 feet, leading to estimates that Haiyan was “probably the strongest tropical cyclone to hit land anywhere in the world in recorded history.”¹ As of early 2014, the death toll from Haiyan was estimated to be 6,201, with an additional 1,785 people still missing.

Fifty-eight nations provided relief to the Philippines in the wake of this disaster, and 20 of those nations deployed military assets. The US military’s participation in the Haiyan relief effort was spearheaded by Joint Task Force (JTF) 505, a composite organization created for this specific mission. The USS George Washington carrier group and Marines of the 3rd Marine

¹ Mullen, Jethro. “Super Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest storms ever, hits central Philippines,” CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/07/world/asia/philippines-typhoon-haiyan/> Nov. 8, 2013. Accessed 10/17/2016.

Expeditionary Brigade (many transported on the U.S. Navy amphibious ships USS Ashland and USS Germantown) comprised the majority of the JTF's assets. The USS George Washington, accompanied by three other US Navy ships, arrived on station in the Philippines on November 14. At its peak, the JTF had 66 aircraft and twelve naval vessels. JTF aircraft reconnoitered damaged islands, searching for survivors and contributing to damage estimates as well as delivering relief supplies and aid workers, and evacuating typhoon victims as needed.

As evidenced by these examples, naval forces can be effective responders to humanitarian crises. Frequently, they are among the first responders. Naval crews are trained to operate in chaotic, uncertain environments, to face significant risk, and to take effective and appropriate action under difficult circumstances. The open seas can provide access from many directions. Naval vessels are mobile and relatively quick - a ship traveling at 25 knots covers 600 nautical miles in 24 hours. Many naval vessels are multi-purpose platforms, flexible and adaptable by design, and are able to switch nimbly from one mission to another. Many ships, built for lengthy deployments, can carry enormous quantities of supplies and produce large amounts of potable water. They may carry helicopters, small boats, and landing craft that can provide access to remote locations ashore. Prepared for combat and other emergencies, many vessels have medical facilities staffed by trained professionals. Large ships built for amphibious operations are especially prized for humanitarian response because most have all of these attributes.

Helping others in times of crisis, alleviating suffering, and saving lives has intrinsic value. Countless Sailors and Marines who have responded to humanitarian crises have testified how rewarding the experience was to them. But the nation-states sending those forces into disaster zones seek other rewards as well.

Naval diplomacy, or "showing the flag," has long been a naval mission. Thucydides wrote of the Athenian fleet: "they would ... pass along the coast before the eyes of the other cities and display the visible power of Athens." Showing the flag can be relatively benign, as when Theodore Roosevelt sent the "Great White Fleet" around the world to demonstrate America's arrival as a global power.² Alternatively, showing the flag can take the more aggressive approach of "gunboat diplomacy." This need not entail violence, as when President Clinton deployed two carrier strike groups in 1996 in a show of force to respond to Chinese threats against Taiwan. But it can - as in 1896 when five Royal Navy warships bombarded the

² The Great White Fleet responded twice to humanitarian crises during its voyage, diverting from its pre-assigned mission. The first time came when the Fleet pulled into San Francisco to provide aid after the 1906 earthquake. In 1908, after an earthquake and tsunami devastated Sicily and southern Italy, the Fleet again stopped to render assistance. Elleman, Bruce A. *Waves of Hope: The US Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Naval War College, Newport Paper # 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press (2007), p. 5.

Sultan's Palace in Zanzibar to induce the pro-German occupant to abdicate in favor of a candidate more acceptable to the British.³

"Gunboat diplomacy," especially when it includes real, physical attacks, is redolent of the colonial era, of forceful coercion of the weak by the strong, and is therefore rarely regarded as acceptable now. In recent years, numerous factors, to include the UN Charter and the fear of major, possibly nuclear, war, have led to the promotion of "soft power" initiatives rather than the blunt instrument of military might. Consequently, the more benign aspects of showing the flag are now far more firmly entrenched in naval doctrine and accepted in practice than was true a century ago.

Joseph Nye, perhaps the best-known proponent of the soft power concept, has written:

A country's soft power can come from three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).⁴

Similarly, scholar Amitai Etzioni has noted "the merits of soft power and the role legitimacy plays in commanding such power."⁵ Nations that are respected for their legitimacy generally find it easier to gain allies and partners, and to achieve their goals.

Providing aid to countries shattered by disaster can thus be attractive to other nations for the very pragmatic reason that it demonstrates appealing political values and foreign policies (and perhaps, even, culture), thereby enhancing national legitimacy, power and prestige.

Diplomacy also means lending a helping hand where that can be efficient and effective. Disaster relief is one such opportunity. Although not a magic wand, the US military's relief efforts after the Asian tsunami on December 26, 2004, seem to have been somewhat effective in developing more positive views of the United States, although similar efforts in Pakistan did not produce similar results.⁶

³ Speller, Ian. *Understanding Naval Warfare*. New York: Routledge (2014), p. 75. The bombardment lasted only 38 minutes before the Sultan recognized the error of his ways. The *Guinness Book of World Records* honors this as the shortest war in history.

⁴ Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "Think Again: Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power>. Accessed 10/15/2016.

⁵ Etzioni, Amitai. *Security First – For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy*. New Haven: Yale University Press (2007), p. 33.

A well-known Pew Research study showed that, while the 2003 invasion of Iraq soured the opinion many Indonesians held of the U.S., their perceptions of the U.S. improved as a result of the 2004 tsunami relief effort. However, this eroded somewhat over time. Pew studies of the 2005 US relief efforts in Pakistan showed no such improvement in Pakistani popular opinion of the US. The conclusion reached was that the beneficial response in public perception required a pre-existing reservoir of goodwill toward the US, something that had existed in Indonesia to a far greater degree than it had in Pakistan for some time.⁷

Nonetheless, naval foreign disaster relief operations do tend to bolster military-to-military and government-to-government relations and they can add to the perceived legitimacy of the responding nations. Responsive relief operations also contribute to maintaining international order and preserving stability in the affected nation. The Indian Navy thus looks to establish itself as a regional leader in humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HADR) operations, while the Brazilian Navy highly values their marines and amphibious forces for their ability to conduct “soft” security operations, such as HADR. Regularly beset by natural disasters, Indonesia designed and built five large amphibious ships, with disaster relief one of their primary missions. In fact, the Indonesian Navy has converted one of these to a hospital ship. One rationale the Royal Australian Navy gives for building a new class of amphibious warfare ships is their suitability for humanitarian operations.

When the Chinese Navy commissioned the hospital ship *Daisha Dao* (translated as “Peace Ark”) at the end of 2008, many Western observers concluded that the ship had been developed in the wake of the 2004 tsunami relief effort and Beijing’s inability to participate in a more significant - and visible - way to that effort. Qu Zhaowei, a Chinese naval analyst, has described the ship as a “new means to influence developing countries.”⁸ But when Haiyan hit the Philippines, China – in the midst of territorial disputes with the Philippines - pledged a comparatively small sum of funds for typhoon relief, and the Peace Ark stayed in port. Only after China was criticized for its paltry response did the hospital ship finally get underway for the Philippines, almost two weeks after the typhoon had hit. Even where there is capability, political considerations may affect the decision how and whether to respond to a foreign nation’s crisis.

Countries recognize - in part based on the Pew studies of Indonesian attitudes following the tsunami response - that to maximize the benefits they gain with affected-nation populations by conducting disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations they must

⁶ Posen, Barry R. *Restraint: A New Foundation for US Grand Strategy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (2014), p. 86.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 203 fn # 37, citing Pew Global Attitudes Project, March 6, 2012.

⁸ Averett, Leah. “China’s Growing Maritime HA/DR Capabilities,” Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol. 10, Issue 12. June 11, 2010. <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-growing-maritime-hadr-capabilities/>. Accessed 10/15/2016.

follow up and maintain regular contact. Forward deployed naval forces are useful, visible assets to execute these missions.

Thus, the US Navy returns regularly to the Philippines and other Asian nations as part of its Pacific Partnership Program, said to be “the largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the Asia-Pacific region.”⁹ Pacific Partnership 2014 included port visits in Vietnam and Cambodia as well as the Philippines. US Navy and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force Sailors, and Australian soldiers participated in the mission, which featured the offering of veterinary and medical clinics, engineering projects, and professional medical exchanges and seminars. Such deployments feature prominently in US regional commanders’ theater security cooperation plans for building goodwill.

Last year found Peace Ark, the Chinese hospital ship, conducting Harmonious Mission - 2015, in which the ship visited Malaysia, Australia, French Polynesia, the U.S., Mexico, Barbados, Grenada, and Peru for “military diplomacy, medical exchange and cultural communication” including the provision of “free medical and humanitarian services.”¹⁰

Naval assets can bring unique capabilities to humanitarian response operations that greatly enhance the effectiveness of those operations. But they do not come without a price tag, for the commitment of forces to foreign disaster relief is always a political act, always an expression of the responding government’s foreign policy - and those governments will generally hope to garner rewards for their efforts, those principally being enhanced legitimacy and stronger ties with the affected nation and within the region. It is this that distinguishes naval or military units - or any governmental organization - from humanitarian organizations. Sailors, Marines and relief workers from NGOs might work side by side to deliver medical supplies and food to stranded victims of an earthquake, but the sailors and Marines are not humanitarians. Humanitarian organizations and their personnel are governed by four principles - humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.¹¹ Even if a nation’s armed forces could, in some circumstances, demonstrate humanity, if, in some environments, they could be neutral and impartial, they can never be independent as defined in these principles.

⁹ Oseguera, Karolina A., PO2, “Pacific Partnership Completes Philippines Mission,” http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=82223, July 15, 2014. Accessed 10/15/2016.

¹⁰ “Chinese Hospital Ship Peace Ark set out for ‘Harmonious Mission – 2015,’” http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-09/25/content_4622247.htm, Sept. 25, 2015. Accessed 10/18/2016.

¹¹ Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings. Neutrality: Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Impartiality: Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions. Independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented. “OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles,” docs.ocha.org.

An Agenda for Military-Humanitarian Innovation and Knowledge Exchange

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Much of the debate around military-humanitarian coordination focuses on the operational issues around military contributions as an ‘option of last resort’ in humanitarian emergency response. Far less attention has been paid – in policy, practice or research – to the exchange and diffusion of dual-use innovations and good practices both communities share between crises.

This is a missed opportunity. Humanitarians can learn a tremendous amount from military innovation – and visa-versa. As the British Red Cross NGO Military Contact Group recently noted, ‘[t]here is clearly a lot of research and development that originates in the military community that could provide real benefit to the humanitarian community and populations on the ground’ (2015: 6). The King’s College Humanitarian Futures Programme (2011: 34) likewise point out that ‘crisis management could potentially be enhanced by exposing humanitarian organisations to military communities that regularly meet the challenge of innovation’.

The topic of military-humanitarian knowledge exchange is extremely timely for the humanitarian sector, which has recently come to embrace innovation as a key priority. A growing network of innovation units based across leading humanitarian NGOs and the UN system, including a number of UN innovation labs, funding mechanisms like the Humanitarian Innovation Fund, and academic initiatives such as the Oxford Humanitarian Innovation Project and the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, are seeking to improving the humanitarian sector’s collective capacity for innovation and rapid iterative change management by facilitating and foster promising new products, processes, and innovation management approaches (Betts and Bloom, 2015).

As part of this **humanitarian innovation agenda**, there is a new interest across the humanitarian sector in borrowing transferable models, inspirations and good practice from outside the ‘closed loop’ of established aid sector thinking. Increasingly, humanitarian innovators are reaching out to non-traditional innovation learning partners, primarily the private sector, for new thinking. There has been very little concerted thinking to date, however, about how military actors and the wider defence sector might (or in fact, already do) intersect with this rapidly-evolving humanitarian innovation ecosystem.

Over the last two years, our team at the Oxford Humanitarian Innovation Project (HIP) has sought to develop a holistic research agenda for better understanding these under-explored opportunities – and risks – which militaries represent for the humanitarian innovation agenda. (For a fuller discussion, see Kaplan & Easton-Calabria 2016). We argue there are major gains to be made from both communities working closer together – both in catalysing the diffusion of useful lessons-learning, and at the same time, offering a novel conceptual space for civil-military engagement.

Military-Humanitarian Innovation Learning: Identifying Opportunities....

As militaries are drawn with increasing frequency into humanitarian and development missions, their own large, well-resourced and optimised innovation systems are increasingly confronting design challenges with significant overlap to those facing the aid community. This evolving military innovation ecosystem, Kent and Ratcliffe (2008: xii) write, already contains ‘numerous projects [that] could be adapted to humanitarian purposes’.

A necessary first step for such synergistic learning agendas is to thus map the most relevant points of transferable learning. Within these areas of overlap, specific defence-sector products, processes, and approaches to innovation management can invite evidence-based field research and detailed case studies, which explore respective strengths and weaknesses in their past or future adaption to humanitarian use.

Such synergistic learning is by no means a straightforward exercise. As Ramalingam et al. (2015: 64) warn, while humanitarian innovators ‘might look to military innovation (...) as a source of useful ideas’, such lessons-learning must first account for major fundamental ‘differences in goals, cultures, incentives and mind-sets’ between military organisations and their humanitarian counterparts, alongside ‘considerable difference in available resources’, ‘emphasis placed on training and skills’, and ‘relative maturity and awareness of innovation as a concept and a practice’.

These are important considerations. One clear starting point, however, is to first focus on areas in which military innovation have *already* been adopted by humanitarians in their day-to-day work. Indeed, multiple examples of civil-military innovation diffusion already exist across the humanitarian sector, from products and processes to models of innovation management itself. For example:

- **Product Innovations:** The defence sector is directly responsible for the foundations of many of modern **information communication technologies** (ICTs) that are a primary focus of humanitarian innovation discussions to date. Defence R&D is invested heavily in the development of emerging technologies with obvious and potentially disruptive implications for natural disaster response, such as Terahertz-range communications, improved geo-location technology using the Earth’s magnetic field instead of expensive

satellite infrastructures¹, and remote-controlled robotics for natural disaster environments.² In the area of remote-sensing, UAVs are rapidly entering mainstream practice as NGOs increasingly rely on ‘drones’ for crisis mapping, search and rescue and, more recently, logistics.

Such civil-military innovation synergy is also well-evidenced in the area of **emergency medicine and humanitarian public health**, where military biomedical research has further contributed to major innovations in parasitology, key anti-malarial drugs, and the development of a wide range of vaccines against communicable diseases. For example, during the West African Ebola response, vaccine development drew upon knowledge accrued through significant US military biomedical research on Ebola (Kaplan and Easton-Calabria 2015). The US government’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently initiated the Rapid Threat Assessment (RTA) program, a five-year initiative to create new technologies for accelerated diagnosis of biological and chemical threat agents.

- *Process Innovations:* At the same time, many of the most relevant and transferable innovations militaries possess for informing humanitarian organisation’s own practices are not physical products and technologies at all, but rather **process innovations** which are scalable to smaller, resource-constrained civilian organisations.

Humanitarian planning processes, for instance, remain inconsistent, limited by pervasive reactivity, short planning horizons, a lack of commonality between various organisational planning processes, and unclear end-state objectives in both strategy and programme design. Such approaches contrast strongly with **military approaches to planning**, which tend to leverage similar frameworks, large-scale information networks, strong institutional support for strategic planning, defined, proven processes and models for establishing clear goals. Indeed, although rarely acknowledged, several of the most widely-used tools in humanitarian planning – including the ubiquitous logical framework and after-action reviews, have military origins. (Hummelbrunner, in Fujita, ed. 2010: 1). This suggests another area wherein the adaptation of principles underlying military processes, particularly around strategic planning, horizon-scanning and risk planning hold strong relevance for humanitarian practice.

Other learning opportunities exist, for instance, in **military simulation and gaming** approaches, are often done at a scale and sophistication far beyond humanitarian organisations (Kent and Ratcliffe 2008: 33). Militaries are also extremely creative in strategies for rebuilding disrupted supply chains and circumventing **logistical challenges** in conflict and natural disasters (Pettit and Beresford 2007). Process innovations can

¹ DARPA (2015) ‘Quantum-Assisted Sensing and Readout’. <http://www.darpa.mil/program/quantum-assisted-sensing-and-readout>. (accessed 26/10/2015).

² DARPA Robotics Challenge (2015) ‘DARPA Robotics Challenge’. <http://www.theroboticschallenge.org/>. (accessed 26/10/2015).

also use military methodologies for streamlining and fusing different intelligence sources – geospatial, human, signals, open-source – for real-time analysis and better situational awareness of the humanitarian space (HHI reference).

- *Innovation Management*: Lastly, military approaches to *managing* innovation processes themselves hold valuable lessons for humanitarian innovators. In a recent report for the World Humanitarian Summit, for instance, Deloitte (2015a: 8) notes the ‘high’ relevance of US military’s approaches to innovation management for humanitarian innovation lessons-learning, particularly its ‘strong centralized governing body processes to source and disseminate innovations’ and ‘rigorous training institutions, systems, and doctrine’.

Models for new innovation and lessons-learning management include, for instance, the US Navy Centre for Excellence in Disaster Management and the US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). For product innovation management, DARPA’s unique approach to innovation management clearly shows returns that risk-friendly spaces bring. In the field, the US Army Rapid Equipping Force (REF) offers a new model for rapid design, testing, and scaling of product innovations.

...and Risks

There is an equally important need to critically engage with **the risks and implications** innovation diffusion may pose to humanitarian principles, particularly neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence. The rapid and often disruptive impact of new products and processes diffused from military to humanitarian space raise important considerations and real challenges for humanitarian principles. These issues, however, are under-addressed by most humanitarian innovation discussions to date.

Many principle-based issues are concretized in the evolving application of specific military-derived ICT innovations in the humanitarian space. Real and perceived risks to data confidentiality, and increasing reliance by humanitarian organisations on ‘data philanthropy’ from government and military intelligence pose growing challenges to humanitarian impartiality (Raymond and Card 2015: 7). Humanitarian organisations must also understand the political economy of dual-use products which suppliers market to both military and humanitarian markets, a contentious issue recently raised by proliferation of humanitarian ‘drones’ (Sandvik and Lohne 2014).

Work on professional principle-based frameworks for humanitarian innovation has recently begun, and require much further conceptual development (HIP 2015). It will be essential for this valuable emerging critical discourse to fully confront the implications of militaries operating as brokers of ICT assets, capabilities, and data to humanitarian organisations, and that this debate is underpinned by solid research and evidence.

Steps Forward

Moving forward, we argue need for greater action, through collaborative dialogue and debate, around opportunities, challenges, and critical implications of innovation diffusion and exchange between military and humanitarian space. There is greater potential than is currently realised for military, humanitarian and academic innovation experts to directly engage through active co-learning, with military actors sharing good practice, technical expertise and insights into military innovations with potential dual-use value for humanitarian adoption.

At the same time, it is essential that such learning engagement adhere strictly to established civil-military coordination guidance and clear boundaries which respect and maintain humanitarian neutrality. For this reason, military contributions to humanitarian innovation learning should occur at times and places well away from active emergency response. Utmost care must be taken in addressing sensitivities around information-sharing and data privacy between both communities, even in such informal lessons-learning exchange (Metcalf et al 2012: 27).

Leading convenors of civil-humanitarian dialogue – such as InterAction, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the British Red Cross NGO-Military Contact Group (NMCG), the Center for Civil-Military Excellence (CCOE), and, most critically, UN OCHA CMCoord – already bring together civilian, military, government, and academia for collaborative knowledge-exchange through trusted networks. They are natural starting points for hosting conversations around innovation diffusion and exchange between militaries and humanitarians, through workshops, seminars, and conferences. **Academia** also can convene military-humanitarian dialogue around innovation in a neutral, safe environment, moderated under a format which permits anonymity and frankness (i.e. Chatham House rules).

Given the diversity of military actors worldwide, it is also essential to consult with as wide a diversity of military stakeholders as possible, and notably national militaries from the Global South and middle-income countries. As the most frequent first responders to humanitarian natural disasters, these forces possess unique perspectives that may provide some of the most innovative new ideas for humanitarian practice.

Active co-learning between military actors and humanitarians will never be easy, but the challenge is well worth facing. Military-humanitarian innovation represents a gap in broader civil-military research agendas, and potentially offers a novel opportunity for constructive dialogue between two communities regularly stymied in other traditional arenas of engagement.

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Operational Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination

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Coordination between humanitarian and military actors in large-scale natural disasters has improved significantly over the last decade. The lessons from recent large-scale disasters, starting with the Asia Tsunami response in 2004, have led to marked improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of natural disaster response. Response operations in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines has demonstrated that military assets, in particular Foreign Military Assets (FMA), can provide timely, unique, and critical capabilities, especially in the early phases of a response operation.

However, there still exists the need for better coordination between humanitarian and military actors, particularly in the areas of information sharing, gaining common situational awareness, and deploying assets based on identified needs on the ground. When decisions are made to accept and deploy FMA, there has rarely been a shortfall in the number of assets that are deployed; however, increased focus should be on deploying the right types of assets to produce the desired impact on the ground. Two common challenges to a coordinated response are in the ability of the affected country to receive, integrate, and coordinate the FMA that is arriving, and for assisting nations to deploy the right capacity to provide effective and rapid assistance to the affected people. Part of the challenge is related to problems in assessment methodology and in gaining a common situational awareness quickly enough to assist decision makers in deploying the appropriate military capacity. There is a tendency for nations to deploy FMA because it is available or in the proximity of the disaster – to push assets from overseas rather than to pull assets forward based on the assessed needs on the ground. The number of nations deploying FMA in response to large-scale natural disasters – often 25 to 35 nations responding in each of the major disasters over the last decade – can create significant problems and competition on the ground, especially when there are limited ports of entry into the affected area. This is further complicated by the deployment of hundreds of humanitarian organizations from the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

There are military capabilities that are commonly needed in many large-scale disaster response operations, including: air lift and ground transportation, production of potable water, logistics planning and execution, engineering and the restoration of the humanitarian infrastructure (repairing and clearing roads, restoring bridges, ports, airports, and removing rubble and other debris in order to open up lines of communication), specific medical/surgical capability, information technology, and operational planning. Several nations have organized

their military disaster response to meet these common needs, utilizing a modular approach that can be tailored to meet the needs on the ground.

Naval services often have many or all of these capacities within their organizational structure. The U.S. military sea services, because of its global presence, ability to project capability and tailor its organization, and rapid decision making by the national command authority, is often critically positioned to respond quickly with many of the right capabilities to meet the needs on the ground. Maximizing this effect requires preparation that includes dedicated training and exercising to meet this mission set, improving disaster response doctrine, establishing and maintaining networks and contacts – both within the military communities and with humanitarian response organizations, and developing relevant standard operating procedures, plans, and agreements (military to military and military to humanitarian).

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) is mandated by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 to coordinate the overall relief effort, in support of the affected nation, and to serve as the focal point for humanitarian civil-military coordination, both for the United Nations system, as well as for the broader humanitarian community. UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors which is essential to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursue common goals. OCHA is also one of the few humanitarian agencies with dedicated civil-military capacity within its organization, with humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) officers at headquarters and deployed in relief operations.

OCHA's role in humanitarian civil-military coordination is to facilitate effective coordination between humanitarian and military actors in both the preparedness and response phases, bringing together policy and guidance, operational support, and a training program for the humanitarian and military communities. OCHA also serves as the custodian for the various sets of global and country specific guidelines, operational guidance, and handbooks, including the *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief*, or the "Oslo Guidelines". For military actors, OCHA can serve as the "front door" to the humanitarian community, providing information, contact points, and operational coordination on the ground. OCHA is currently leading a humanitarian community-wide effort to develop an updated set of Humanitarian Civil-Military Standards, that will serve as a commonly agreed approach to humanitarian-military interaction, decision-making, information sharing, employment of assets, and the transition of military capacities back to civilian and humanitarian led capabilities. The overall aim is to improve the predictability, effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence in deploying and employing military assets, and to ensure a clear distinction between the humanitarian and military communities is maintained in line with principled humanitarian assistance. The Standards will also help reduce the burden on the affected Member State in receiving, integrating, and coordinating FMAs.

OCHA's UN-CMCoord Training Program provides various levels of training for humanitarian and military actors. The UN-CMCoord Course brings together humanitarian and military practitioners to familiarize participants with humanitarian civil-military coordination concepts and principles and its practical applications in the field. Because it is conducted at the regional level, it assists in addressing regional-specific challenges and contexts, brings together practitioners who work or will work together, and establishes effective operational networks. OCHA also provides other levels of training, including the Supporting Humanitarian Action in Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) Course and the SHARED Training of Trainers (ToT) Course, both of which are designed specifically for a military audience and can be tailored to meet operational or geographic needs. Another advantage of the training program is that it provides access to an existing network of close to 4,000 military and humanitarian disaster practitioners, both on the ground in disasters and virtually through several on-line platforms.

While improvements in coordination between humanitarian and military actors have certainly been made, there remains a requirement to improve the efficiency of humanitarian civil-military response operations. Much of this can be realized through collaborative training, realistic exercises, cultivating operational networks, and establishing the substantive dialogue and information sharing platforms that are needed to respond more effectively in future emergencies.

Civil-Military Coordination in a World with Interlocking Threats: Why Urbanization and Climate Change Require a More Sophisticated Approach

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Two of the most recognized trends in humanitarian discourse seem to be that of climate change and urbanization, but their multiple interactions with each other as well as displacement, pandemics and conflict are less discussed. These more complex threats, their ramifications and the changing nature of humanitarian response necessitate new examinations of civil-military coordination. The following note briefly introduces these complexities to inform the workshop discussion.

Global average temperature is projected to rise between 2 to 3 degrees Celsius by 2100 if current commitments are kept. Even keeping it below 2 degrees by the end of the century would require the most aggressive measures, which are unlikely to be adopted (IPCC, 2014). This contributes not only to heat islands that affect particularly urban populations, but also alters atmospheric moisture content leading to more frequent and more severe extreme weather events (NASEM, 2016). As the global population of coastal cities grows, with two thirds of the world's population living within 100 miles of a coast by 2030, so too does the risk to urban populations grow due to climate change.

Along with temperature rises, current forecasts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predict a global mean sea level rise of 0.4 meters by 2100 in the lowest and best case scenario, and up to a meter in some regions (Church et al, 2013). Achieving this best case scenario requires urgent and drastic action by policy makers that has yet to materialize. New projections with unabated global emissions could lead up to a two meter sea level rise by the end of the century (DeConto RM, Pollard D. 2016). Low lying coastal zones, those below 10 meters are naturally the most vulnerable. Recent projections in even the lowest population growth scenarios place the global population at over 1 billion with the greatest exposure in Asia and Africa (Neumann et al. 2015). The majority of this population is and will increasingly be urban with most of the world's megacities occupying this vulnerable geography (Brown et al. 2013).

Extreme weather events are the more directly identifiable humanitarian consequence through weather related disasters. Yet gradual sea level rise and warming temperatures in and

of themselves have equally destructive consequences as they contribute to food insecurity, drive population displacement and in some cases, conflict. The changing climate will impact food production and water availability through drought, flooding, salinization and decreased rainfall, leading to infertile land causing multiple dimensions of food insecurity (FAO, 2008). Furthermore, changing climate will drive displacement. Projections vary widely from 25 million to one billion but most predict that hundreds of millions of people will migrate due to environmental change (IOM, 2014). While much of this may be predictable, slow, and adaptive, for most of the world's poor it will be unpredictable, sudden, and maladaptive displacement within and across borders.

This displacement alone has obvious imperatives for humanitarian action but it can also cascade into conflict. Although the causal links between climate displacement and conflict have yet to reach scientific certainty, the pathways are becoming clear and more evident as migrants can demographically and economically stress host populations exacerbating and igniting political and ethnic conflict (Werz, Conley, 2012). Even temperature increases, as described above, have been associated with conflict in Africa's civil wars with a one-degree increase in Celsius linked to a 4.5% increase in civil wars in the same year. (Burke et al. 2012). The protracted conflict in Darfur has been cited as a prominent example of a modern climate change conflict as the displacement and violence have been driven by drought (Mazo, 2009). These complications of climate change exemplify how future threats will be ever more entangled.

Climate change will also alter environments across the globe with consequences for diseases and the vectors that carry them. Research shows that climate change with increasing temperature and greater humidity has increased the altitude and range of Anopheles mosquitoes with greater risk for Malaria (McMichael, A. J. et al, 2004). While rates of Malaria have fallen due to concerted anti-Malaria campaigns, climate change has spread the actual risk. The Zika outbreak represents another threat posed by spreading mosquito range. Climate change induced warming waters have also highlighted the risk for Cholera's to spread beyond its endemic environments in the Bay of Bengal and a few other spots (Rita, R. 2009).

The Zika outbreak and indeed Ebola as well highlight a further risk with displacements spreading viruses that were once isolated or self-limiting diseases now reaching larger urban population centers and threatening pandemics. Displacements into urban areas specifically and those rapidly growing with large slum populations more particularly compound the risks for pandemics. As the capacity of cities to maintain adequate basic services apply to the health care system, including disease surveillance and early warning, they will become centers of outbreaks. With inadequate capacity to respond, small outbreaks may go unnoticed and even when identified, the ability to effectively respond in places such as urban slums poses a grave threat. The disastrous attempt to quarantine the entire Liberian slum of West Point exemplifies the types of practices to which some cities may resort. This quarantine not only led to increased violence and a spike in food prices, among other obvious limitations, for residents to access basic services (Eba, PM 2014). The threat posed by pandemics is now more daunting than ever

conceived. This most recent experience has shown the future of pandemics may be a terrifying one which local governments, the humanitarian community, and the world, are ill-equipped to contain, let alone extinguish.

These interwoven threats raise the complexity of humanitarian response and require sophisticated and bold thinking. As resilience becomes a driving principle in humanitarian assistance to address these challenges, coordination is paramount. With the multitude of actors now involved in humanitarian emergencies along with the drive towards locally driven processes, civil-military coordination will become ever more challenging. But this new state of play may also open opportunities for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) work, specifically in HA, that is strategically valuable and contributes to building resilience for local populations. South East Asia presents a prime opportunity to better understand and address these merging threats while using military resources in a manner that is consistent with national interests.

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Crisis Affected Populations as Digital Sensors and Sensemakers: Implications for Civil-Military Coordination During Humanitarian Disasters

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Civilians affected by natural disaster, armed conflict, and political unrest are traditionally the most valuable sources of situational awareness and sensemaking about the crises that impact them. Crisis-affected people now have at their disposal previously unprecedented capabilities for collecting, analyzing, and sharing information with each other and the world in real-time during disasters in many cases.¹

The implications of crisis-affected populations themselves becoming both digital sensors and sensemakers during crisis is altering the very nature and meaning of “humanitarianism” in the 21st Century.² What’s more, this trend is fundamentally transforming how and why crises occur and unfold across geographic regions and operational contexts. This transformation is also resulting in the emergence of a humanitarian data ecosystem.³

No longer are journalists, governments, NGOs, and private sector entities alone the primary generators of publicly available situational awareness during disasters. Affected populations, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) - often through the utilization of diaspora networks and instant messaging apps - are establishing sensemaking networks amongst themselves and direct two way communications with responders.

This trend is also creating new risks and liabilities for all members of the humanitarian data ecosystem as well. The increasingly prevalent use of information communication technologies (ICTs) and the data they produce may, in fact, be producing a new type of crisis: “Big Data Disasters”.⁴

¹ Gilman, D., Noyes, A. (2013). *Humanitarianism in the Networked age*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. OCHA Policy and Studies Series. Pgs. 14-15.

² Raymond, N., Card, B. (2015). *Applying Humanitarian Principles to Current Uses of Information Communication Technologies: Gaps in Doctrine and Challenges to Practice*. Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. White Paper.

³ Berens, J., Raymond, N., Shimshon, G., Verhulst, S., Bernholtz, L. (2016). *The Humanitarian Data Ecosystem: the Case for Collective Responsibility*. Centre for Innovation. Insight Paper. Data for Policy 2016 Conference, University of Cambridge, UK.

⁴ Raymond, N., Al Achkar, Z. (Forthcoming). *Data preparedness: Connecting data, decision-making, and humanitarian response*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Think Brief.

The ever increasing volumes of social media and other data generated by affected populations, in some cases, is overwhelming the capabilities of both civilian and military actors to digest and make sense of it. This phenomena can be referred to as “data deluge”.⁵

In other cases, the use of ICTs on affected populations in experimental and unregulated ways by responders can cause harm to the physical security and human rights status of crisis-affected populations. This phenomena can be referred to as “data damage”. Both the 2015 West Africa Ebola Outbreak⁶ and the use of satellite imagery to document human rights abuses in Sudan reportedly causing specific attacks on villages in Darfur are examples of “data damage”.⁷

Rather than simply a new set of tools and techniques in new hands, the emergence of affected community-based sensors and sensemakers creates both transformational challenges to, and opportunities for civil-military (civ-mil) coordination. These issues have been left relatively unstudied to date and are generally poorly understood - both within military and civilian communities alike.⁸

Those engaged in communications with affected populations in the context of the civ-mil space can no longer view telecommunications use by crisis-hit communities as only a technical issue alone: The use of ICTs and digital data by affected populations and responding institutions alike is a legal, ethical, and human rights-related one now, too.

How these challenges and opportunities are addressed has implications for the present and future of all aspects of civ-mil coordination, exemplified by the following problem areas:

Challenges Applying International Humanitarian Law to Networked Age: International humanitarian law (IHL) currently has serious gaps related to when telecommunications infrastructure, online platforms and environments, and shared civ-mil networks constitute protected “humanitarian space”.⁹ Additionally, there is an equal lack of clarity about what types of information provision, infrastructure-related activities, and other information communication technology (ICT) supported activities constitute humanitarian aid. Addressing these gaps is essential to the development of IHL compliant rules of engagement (ROE) by military actors, as well as ensuring the protection of humanitarian actors and affected populations.

⁵ *Ibid* 4.

⁶ McDonald, S. M. (2016). *Ebola: A Big Data Disaster*. Center for Internet and Society.

⁷ Gordon, G. (2016) *Monitoring Conflict to Reduce Violence: Evidence from a Satellite Intervention in Darfur*. Columbia University, Department of Political Science. Available from: <http://grantmgordon.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/GG-EoD.pdf>

⁸ Raymond, N., Harrity, C. (April, 2016). *Addressing the ‘doctrine gap’: professionalising the use of Information Communication Technologies in humanitarian action*. Overseas Development Institute. Humanitarian Practice Network.

⁹ Gilman, D. et al. (2014). *Humanitarianism in the Age of Cyberwarfare*. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Policy and Studies Series.

Lack of Clarity on Civ-Mil Roles and Restrictions around Connectivity and Communication Infrastructure Provision: Governmental actors, including military organizations, are increasingly involved in the provision of telecommunications connectivity and infrastructure both during and after crisis events. Examples of this role include military operations in support of reestablishing telecommunications after natural disaster events in Nepal, Philippines, and Haiti. This often vital role for military organizations has complicated traditional civ-mil coordination issues due to a lack of clarity about when, where, how, and why these roles should be performed by local communities, NGOs, private sector industry, and/or military actors.

Need for Common Methodologies and Indicators for Data Analysis in Specific Crisis Contexts: Across both NGO and military communities there exists an urgent need for common methodologies and indicators specific to regularly repeating disaster contexts to structure and make sense of digital information from the crisis-affected populations. These common methodologies and indicators, including common priority information requirements (PIRs) from public digital sources, are essential for making sense of increasingly massive deluges of social media, remote sensing-derived data, and other forms of digital data. Most of all, they are essential for accurately assessing the humanitarian needs of affected populations.

No Best Practices for Matching Response Tasks to Data Tools: Neither civil society actors nor military organizations have common agreement about what PIRS specific to certain disasters can best be met with which specific data source or ICT approach. This capacity can be referred to as “task-to-tool-match”. Without best practices for performing task-to-tool-match, civ-mil coordination with affected populations and each other around the use of ICTs and digital data will likely continue to be highly challenging.

The four gaps in current practice presented above are not intended to be comprehensive nor exhaustive. However, they are examples of potential starting points for identifying what doctrine, methods, and governance regulations may be required to ensure that civ-mil coordination related to information collection and data infrastructure can recognize, respect, and include the affected populations themselves.

Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE: A Case Study in Civilian-Military Coordination

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The humanitarian response to the Ebola crisis in West Africa and, more specifically, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)'s part in the international effort was unprecedented for several reasons. Operation UNITED ASSISTANCE (OUA), DoD's operational term for the response, presents as a unique case study in joint medical operations and civilian-military coordination. While OUUA did demonstrate how capabilities from military and civilian agencies can synergistically work together, the crisis also brought to light for the international community how inadequately prepared for a large-scale contagious outbreak we likely all are.

On August 8th 2014, the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa stated in a formal World Health Organization (WHO) declaration that "It was the unanimous view of the Committee that the conditions for a Public Health Emergency of International Concern [had in fact] been met."¹ This represented a significant moment in the epidemic which contributed greatly to the change in the international community's response to the crisis. Of even greater note, in early September of 2014, in an unprecedented plea to governments around the world, the head of the largest, and arguably most experienced, non-governmental organization (NGO) fighting Ebola for decades, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), implored United Nations (UN) member states to deploy civilian and military teams. The crisis had reached unmanageable proportions by the late summer and was predicted to escalate exponentially in the ensuing months. The international community realized alternative and expanded approaches to the epidemic had to be brought to bear, including applying military capabilities to the unprecedented disaster born from an infectious disease.

The UN Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has established, detailed guidelines on how and when militaries should be engaged in disaster relief.² Boiled down, there are three basic concepts that have to be entertained when foreign militaries are utilized in most humanitarian crises. First, they are leveraged as a means of last resort under urgent conditions when other civilian assets are not readily available. Second, the engagement of militaries must be time-bound and of limited scope. Lastly, militaries will always conduct humanitarian assistance operations under the auspices of civilian authorities; namely the U.S.

¹ WHO declaration; <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/>

² UNOCHA guidelines; [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20\(November%202007\).pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Oslo%20Guidelines%20ENGLISH%20(November%202007).pdf)

Agency for International Development (USAID) and its operational arm, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), in the case of U.S. military efforts. While military involvement in more familiar disaster scenarios (such as earthquakes or complex crises related to civil unrest) are outlined in some detail in the U.S. DoD's Joint Publication (JP) 3-29 on Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, response to epidemics is only discussed to a limited degree.³ In Appendix E of JP 3-29 where they are referenced, epidemics are defined as secondary to other types of disasters and ought to be prepared for accordingly. The request for DoD assets during the Ebola disaster turned this planning consideration on its ear, as the epidemic was the predominant disaster consideration, itself, and only secondarily precipitated the other multi-sectoral dimensions of the disaster.

The U.S. DoD has a broad spectrum of engagement activities under the umbrella of Global Health Engagement that encompass both emergent response capabilities and a wide variety of capacity-building endeavors in partnership with other nations. While the activities of building partner capacity and interoperability as well as cooperative threat reduction may enable more effective disaster response in many instances, these activities are normally defined within the context of security cooperation engagement for the DoD as enabling tools for our military and do not represent a separate declared mission set. Of all U.S. military global health-related tasking, only humanitarian assistance/disaster response is set in policy as a true mission for the DoD. However, the elements of the Ebola response defined in OUA overlap several domains of Global Health Engagement and fall well within the purview of the DoD in its mission to deliver humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, when called upon.

The rate of spread of Ebola was alarming by any measure and, towards the end of the summer of 2014, it was realized by the international community that much more needed to be done to curb the epidemic in West Africa and avoid further spread globally. It was at this point in the epidemic that foreign militaries were acknowledged as being necessary in order to help fill the gaps in civilian capabilities. The newly appreciated requirement for a much larger contingent of foreign humanitarian aid necessitated an expanded capacity for international coordination that was addressed through the UN establishing UNMEER, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response, itself an unprecedented event. Prior to the Ebola epidemic, the UN had never before stood up a Mission for the purposes of managing a health-related crisis. When UNMEER was established on September 19, 2014, the complex international emergency response had expanded to involve sectors well beyond health, including governance, communications, food security and an enormous logistics element. Typical of more common major disasters, such as typhoons or earthquakes, the UN cluster system of international humanitarian response became employed in West Africa by the fall of 2014 in order to ensure essential services were made available to those impacted by the epidemic.

³ JP 3-29; www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf

On September 16, 2014, President Obama gave a speech to the American public and the world which defined the epidemic in grave terms of global security and outlined the plan for an enhanced U.S. Government (USG) relief effort going forward.⁴ He clearly and in a rather unprecedented fashion stated the Ebola crisis was now considered a “national security priority” for the U.S. Inherent in the President’s declaration was an implied shift in the posture the USG would be taking and the types of resources, including the military, which would be brought to bear to mitigate the growing security threat.

By September 24th, the number of confirmed cases had reached 7,178 with 3,338 deaths. Nearly half of all confirmed patients were dying of the disease. As dire as the situation was, predictions for further spread of the disease were even more ominous. There were differences in estimates for the epidemic’s expansion but none were acceptable and most agreed the epidemic would become impossible to control unless significant changes were made to the level of international response. There were many elements to the response that were required in the fall of 2014, but it was widely believed that a greatly enhanced number of Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU) beds and commensurate number of trained healthcare workers were imperative. At the same time, second and third order effects of the epidemic also became more apparent and worrisome. Given the growing lack of trust in governance systems, not to mention the fear of the disease and misunderstanding about its spread, civil unrest grew. Security became a paramount issue in some regions, which reflected back on how humanitarian aid was able to be provided. As well, and possibly of even longer-lasting consequence, the collapse of healthcare systems across the region lead to morbidity and mortality from otherwise manageable medical conditions.

USAID/OFDA stood up a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) in August of 2014 and had already obligated millions of dollars of U.S. aid to a variety of partners in order to support NGO and multilateral organizations on the ground. Those USG-funded partners, at the time, included the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Global Communities, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), International Medical Corps, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the UN World Food Program (WFP), the WHO and the UN Humanitarian Air Service. With regards to the plan for a greatly expanded level of military support to the humanitarian response efforts in West Africa, President Obama indicated the establishment of a Joint Force Command initially to be led by U.S. Army Africa, which oversaw the rapidly deployed follow-on military assets. Over the ensuing weeks and into October, roughly 3,000 American servicemen from a myriad of DoD activities were deployed to the region. There were multiple lines of command and control in the military’s engagement in West Africa, one which followed traditional lines of authority for military units, within the hierarchy of the DoD and the other that respected the civilian authority over all USG activities in the region, reporting to the USAID/OFDA lead and to the U.S. Ambassador in Liberia.

⁴ President’s speech on Ebola; <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/remarks-president-ebola-outbreak>

OUA was the first such operation planned for and executed by the U.S. military in support of an epidemic-driven humanitarian mission. The operation was in support of the broader USG commitment to the crisis and most of what was being asked of the military was directly tied to a number of different USG, host government, NGO, and international partner lines of effort. There were four main areas that the military was asked to focus on including: 1) Command and Control for all U.S. military forces in theater; 2) a robust engineering presence; 3) massive logistics support (both in the upfront delivery of supplies and personnel as well as ongoing sustainment); and 4) a medical training assistance capability. These nested lines of effort mapped to higher and higher order strategic objectives of the USG response as well as that of the Liberian Government and the entire international community. Those overarching objectives ultimately were defined in terms of stopping the outbreak, treating those infected, ensuring essential services, preserving stability, and preventing additional outbreaks of the disease.

Deliverables from OUA were four conditions as defined in the Execution Orders issued in mid-September 2014: 1) Construction and supply of an Ebola Treatment Unit (modified from a U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Medical System and staffed by the U.S. Public Health Service); 2) Expanded laboratory capacity across the region; 3) Construction and supply of multiple ETUs (originally planned for as many as 17 separate sites and intended to be staffed by indigenous or NGO personnel); 4) Construction of, staffing and curriculum development for a training platform designed to train non-USG personnel in appropriate personal protective equipment wear and infection control, in order to safely manage patients in ETUs. Very specifically, the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff stated in a “red line” directive that U.S. military personnel would not under any circumstances provide medical care or evacuation to suspected or confirmed Ebola Viral Disease (EVD) patients. From the standpoint of strategic interests entertained at the highest levels of DoD, this was a clear-cut decision. It was a less clear and well-understood decision, however, by the military medical community. Future discussion of the implications of U.S. military medical personnel providing direct clinical care in the midst of a large-scale, communicable disease outbreak should be entertained in light of OUA’s planning considerations. Given the expertise and clinical capacity that exists across the military services, any larger scale epidemic event may very well demand application of that medical capacity in concert with civilian responders.

If one were to consider the four areas that the U.S. military was asked to support in OUA, there is little room for argument that the mission was successful. The logistics support to a wide array of humanitarian partners, most of which were civilian entities, was unmatched and proved invaluable. The establishment and sustainment of a high-level care facility staffed by U.S. Public Health Service officers for the treatment of EVD patients, who themselves were healthcare providers that fell ill, was made evident. Laboratory capacity to diagnose patients and help quantify the extent of the epidemic and, by extension, help with contact tracing and control of the spread of the disease, would not have been possible without OUA. As well, hundreds of civilian volunteers were trained and made ready to expand the healthcare

workforce in order to further provide EVD care. Beyond these four major components of OUA and the specific deliverables of the operation, there were also demonstrated successes of the manner in which the military could integrate, collaborate and support a variety of partners across the spectrum of such a humanitarian response. By leveraging the U.S. military via the USAID/OFDA response management system, civilian responders were bolstered in their efforts.⁵

Later reflection by the international community is studying the utility of foreign militaries in general during the crisis, given the eventual timeline of the Ebola epidemic. Recent analysis suggests the epidemic had turned in a more positive direction, likely in response to community-level interventions leading to favorable human behaviors limiting the disease's spread, at about the time militaries were called upon to provide additional support.⁶ As well, much of the expanded bed-capacity in ETUs delivered by the militaries' support was never utilized. This has raised some question as to whether military engagement in West Africa, in fact, helped alter the course of the epidemic. Whether the role that the U.S. military and other foreign militaries played contributed to the epidemic's fruition necessitates deeper scrutiny, however, and will likely be debated for some time.

⁵ OUA JCOA; http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ebola/OUA_report_jan2016.pdf

⁶ Nevin, Remington L (01/01/2016). "The timeliness of the US military response to the 2014 Ebola disaster: a critical review". *Medicine, conflict, and survival* (1362-3699), 32 (1), p. 40.

Reference Information



Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program

The U.S. Naval War College's Civilian-Military Humanitarian Response Program (HRP), led by the College of Operational & Strategic Leadership, was formally established in December 2015 after four years of collaborations with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) and other key universities. HRP's mission is to partner and network with leading universities and humanitarian organizations in order to advance civilian-military coordination during complex emergencies and natural disasters, and improve the U.S. Navy's effectiveness in conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations through innovative education, research, and simulation activities.

Through extensive partnerships and networking with the humanitarian response community, the HRP aims to:

- ***Improve the coordination*** between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and U.S. and international militaries during natural disasters and complex emergencies.
- ***Improve the U.S. Navy's effectiveness*** in conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations.
- ***Foster educational opportunities*** for leaders and practitioners across the humanitarian response community.
- ***Advance the understanding*** of rapidly evolving frameworks and information communication technologies used in humanitarian responses.

To achieve these objectives, the HRP engages in the following activities:

- ***Network and partner*** with leading universities and organizations in the humanitarian community.
- ***Conduct evidence-based research*** on civilian-military engagement and coordination during complex emergencies, natural disasters, and exercises.
- ***Develop and teach innovative educational programs*** for U.S. and international militaries, civilian universities, NGOs, and IGOs.
- ***Develop innovative training through humanitarian exercises and simulations*** for U.S. and international militaries, civilian universities, NGOs, and IGOs.
- ***Convene various forums*** to assist a network of international partners and key stakeholders to explore challenges and opportunities in civilian-military humanitarian coordination.

During academic year 2016-2017, HRP will accelerate and expand on its existing partnership with Harvard University and collaborations with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Brown University's Humanitarian Innovation Initiative, DoD's Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Oxford University's Humanitarian Innovation Project, and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences Center for Global Health Engagement, to other universities, NGOs, and IGOs who have expressed an interest in working together in the humanitarian space.

For more information please contact Professor David Polatty at david.polatty@usnwc.edu or 401-841-1784.

OCHA on Message: Civil-Military Coordination



What is United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination?

When an emergency or natural disaster creates humanitarian needs, many countries deploy their military or civil defence organizations to respond. Bilateral support to disaster-affected States can also be provided through the international deployment of foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA). When local and international humanitarian organizations are also involved in that response, it is essential that they can operate in the same space without detriment to the civilian character of humanitarian assistance.

It is for this reason that United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors—essential for protecting and promoting the humanitarian principles, avoiding competition, minimizing inconsistency and, when appropriate, pursuing common goals.

UN-CMCoord delivers a coherent and consistent humanitarian approach to military interaction, enhancing a broad understanding of humanitarian action, and guiding

political and military actors on how best to support that action.

It helps to develop context-specific guidance based on internationally agreed guidelines, and it establishes humanitarian civil-military coordination structures, ensuring staff members are trained to make that coordination work. UN-CMCoord is essential in complex emergencies, where the involvement of MCDA in humanitarian assistance may have serious consequences, and could impact the perceived or actual neutrality, impartiality and operational independence of the overall humanitarian effort.

UN-CMCoord in natural disasters

The Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines) were developed through an intergovernmental and inter-agency process. They seek to ensure that foreign MCDA, such as helicopters and ships, bilaterally deployed in response to a natural disaster can support

and complement the relief operation. However, such assets must not be used in a manner that may compromise principled humanitarian action.

With military assets frequently used by Governments to support relief efforts, OCHA and its humanitarian partners work with Member States to incorporate the possible use of military

assets in contingency-planning activities. OCHA also engages military actors early in emergency response operations to assist their understanding of the humanitarian environment, and to ensure coherence and consistency in relief efforts to avoid inappropriate assistance or duplication of effort.

UN-CMCoord in complex emergencies

In an armed conflict or high-risk environment, using military assets to support humanitarian action becomes more complicated, particularly if military actors are party to the conflict.

The Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines) explain that even greater consideration should be given to the use of MCDA to support humanitarian operations in a non-benign environment. They seek to preserve the impartiality, neutrality and

operational independence of humanitarian actors and humanitarian action.

In complex emergencies, the interaction facilitated by UN-CMCoord aims to facilitate humanitarian access, the security of humanitarian aid workers and operations, and the protection of civilians. In certain circumstances, mobilizing MCDA to support humanitarian assistance may be necessary. This can take the form of engineering support, transport or the provision of armed escorts for humanitarian convoys. If the security environment prevents

humanitarian access to certain areas, military actors may be asked to provide direct life-saving support, but only until safe humanitarian access is restored.

Some Governments adopt strategies that include military activities to engender acceptance and support from the local population. This can form part of a comprehensive or whole-of-Government approach aimed at achieving post-conflict stability. Without proper coordination, this approach can undermine the core principles of humanitarian action and reduce humanitarian operating space.

The absence of a clear distinction between military activity and humanitarian assistance can hamper aid delivery, create access problems and threaten the security of humanitarian personnel. Effective UN-CMCoord ensures humanitarian

action is seen as distinct, while also identifying areas where humanitarian civil-military interaction is possible. When UN peacekeeping forces are present, the UN integrated-mission model creates a way for peacekeeping contingents and humanitarians to

work alongside each other (see *OCHA on Message: Integration*, and the *IASC Reference Paper on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies*).

What is OCHA's role?

UN-CMCoord is a key component of OCHA's core function: coordinating humanitarian response. In humanitarian operations with a military presence, OCHA leads the establishment and management of interaction with military actors. This relationship will change depending on the type of emergency and the roles and responsibilities of the military. OCHA supports humanitarian and military actors through training and advocacy on the guidelines to achieve timely and appropriate use of MCDA in support of humanitarian operations and humanitarian civil-military

interaction. OCHA also seeks to establish a predictable approach to the use of these assets by considering their use during preparedness and contingency-planning activities.

OCHA's Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) supports relevant country-, regional- and headquarter-level activities. As custodian of UN-CMCoord-related guidelines, CMCS helps humanitarian actors develop context-specific guidance tailored to a particular emergency. CMCS runs a global training programme that equips humanitarian and military actors with the skills and knowledge

necessary to communicate and, where appropriate, effectively interact with each other. It also prepares and deploys personnel to act as dedicated UN-CMCoord experts in the field.

CMCS advises the international community on humanitarian needs related to deploying foreign MCDA in support of relief operations or humanitarian assistance. This takes place through an advocacy strategy that complements and supports discussions up to the Under-Secretary-General/Emergency Relief Coordinator level, coupled with the publication of operational guidance to the international community.

What does OCHA say?

1. Militaries can contribute to humanitarian action through their ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy unique assets and expertise in response to specifically identified requirements.

2. While military action supports political purposes, humanitarian assistance is based on need and is provided neutrally without taking sides in disputes or political positions on the underlying issues.

3. Humanitarians must be aware of the issues emanating from working with the military to ensure that their neutrality, impartiality, operational independence and the civilian character of humanitarian assistance are not compromised.

4. Coordination between humanitarians and military forces can range from cooperation to coexistence. OCHA manages the interaction through UN-CMCoord and by applying related guidelines.

5. Effective and consistent humanitarian civil-military coordination is a shared responsibility, crucial to safeguarding humanitarian principles and humanitarian operating space.

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November 2013

To find out more

- www.unocha.org/uncmcoord
- Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines), Rev. 1.1, November 2007
- Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (MCDA Guidelines), Rev. 1, January 2006
- Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies - an IASC Reference Paper, 28 June 2004
- IASC Non-Binding Guidelines on the Use of Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, 27 February 2013
- United Nations Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, 2008 (under revision)

OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Principles

What are Humanitarian Principles?

All OCHA activities are guided by the four humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These principles provide the

foundations for humanitarian action. They are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people, whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed conflict.

Promoting and ensuring compliance with the principles are essential elements of effective humanitarian coordination.

Origins and implementation

The humanitarian principles are derived from the core principles, which have long guided the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies.¹

The principles' centrality to the work of OCHA and other humanitarian organizations is formally enshrined in two General Assembly resolutions. The first three principles (humanity, neutrality and impartiality) are endorsed in General Assembly resolution 46/182, which was adopted in 1991. This resolution also

established the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). General Assembly resolution 58/114 (2004) added independence as a fourth key principle underlying humanitarian action. The General Assembly has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of promoting and respecting these principles within the framework of humanitarian assistance.

Commitment to the principles has also been expressed at an institutional level by many humanitarian organizations. Of particular note is the Code of Conduct

for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and non-governmental organizations in disaster relief. The code provides a set of common standards for organizations involved in humanitarian activities, including a commitment to adhere to the humanitarian principles. More than 492 organizations have signed the Code of Conduct.² Also of note is the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response elaborated by the Sphere Project.³

Humanity	Neutrality	Impartiality	Independence
Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.	Humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.	Humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.	Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

¹ These are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality. See the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, proclaimed in Vienna in 1965 by the 20th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

² The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct includes principles beyond the core four principles endorsed by the General Assembly. In addition, humanitarian organizations may find that some of these additional principles have particular meaning in certain contexts (for example, "participation" is often cited as an important humanitarian principle). Conceptually, many other principles can be linked back to the four endorsed by the General Assembly.

³ See: www.sphereproject.org/handbook/

“The moral authority of the United Nations depends on its ability to help people most in need, and it must do so with the highest ethical standards and professionalism.”

- Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon,
Council on Foreign
Relations,
New York,
May 2006

The humanitarian principles have practical operational relevance. Humanitarian action almost always takes place in complex political and militarized environments. Adherence to the principles is therefore critical in order to distinguish humanitarian action from the activities and objectives of political, military and other actors. Promoting

humanitarian principles and, importantly, ensuring that humanitarian organizations act in accordance with them are key to gaining acceptance by all relevant actors on the ground for humanitarian action to be carried out. This acceptance is critical to ensuring humanitarian personnel have safe and sustained access to affected people.

Sustained access is, in turn, crucial for strengthening the implementation of the humanitarian principles. For example, it allows humanitarian actors to directly undertake and monitor the distribution of assistance to people, thus ensuring that aid is distributed impartially and reaches those most in need.

What is OCHA's role?

OCHA's mission is to mobilize and coordinate principled humanitarian action. OCHA promotes the humanitarian community's compliance with humanitarian principles in

every humanitarian response. It does this by promoting practical compliance measures within a Humanitarian Country Team through its engagement with State and

non-state actors at all levels, and by undertaking and contributing to policy development within the United Nations.

What does OCHA say?

1. Humanitarian principles govern humanitarian actors' conduct.

2. Humanitarian actors must engage in dialogue with all parties to conflict for strictly humanitarian purposes. This includes ongoing liaison and negotiation with non-state armed groups.

3. Our compliance with humanitarian principles affects our credibility, and therefore our ability to enter into negotiations with relevant actors and establish safe access to affected people. However, it is not enough to repeatedly recite humanitarian principles. Rhetoric must be matched by leadership and practice. In other words, humanitarian actors must “walk the talk”.

4. There are multiple pressures on humanitarian actors to compromise humanitarian principles, such as providing humanitarian aid as part of efforts to achieve political ends. Maintaining principled humanitarian action in the face of these pressures is an essential task, but not an easy one.

To find out more

- United Nations resolution 46/182: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r182.htm
- The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct: www.ifrc.org

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June 2012

The United Nations System

UN Principal Organs

General Assembly

Security Council

Economic and Social Council

Secretariat

International Court of Justice

Trusteeship Council⁵

NOTES:

¹ UNRWA and UNIDIR report only to the General Assembly.

² IAEA reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly.

³ WTO has no reporting obligation to the General Assembly (GA) but contributes on an ad-hoc basis to GA and ECOSOC work inter alia on finance and developmental issues.

⁴ Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations working with the UN and each other through the coordinating machinery of ECOSOC at the intergovernmental level, and through the Civil Executives Board for Coordination (CEBC) at the inter-secretariat level. This section is listed in order of establishment of these organizations as specialized agencies of the United Nations.

⁵ The Trusteeship Council suspended operations on 1 November 1994 with the independence of Palau, the last remaining United Nations Trust Territory, on 1 October 1994.

This is not an official document of the United Nations, nor is it intended to be authoritative.

Programmes and Funds

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

- ITC International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO)

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

- UNCDF United Nations Capital Development Fund

- UNV United Nations Volunteers

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

Subsidiary Bodies

- Main and other sessional committees
- Disarmament Commission
- Human Rights Council
- International Law Commission
- Standing committees and ad hoc bodies

Subsidiary Bodies

- Counter-terrorism committees
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
- International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Functional Commissions

- Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
- Narcotic Drugs
- Population and Development
- Science and Technology for Development
- Social Development
- Statistics
- Status of Women
- Sustainable Development
- United Nations Forum on Forests

Regional Commissions

- ECA Economic Commission for Africa
- ECE Economic Commission for Europe
- ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
- ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
- ESCSA Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

Other Bodies

- Committee for Development Policy
- Committee of Experts on Public Administration
- Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
- Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
- United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names
- Other sessional and standing committees and expert, ad hoc and related bodies

Departments and Offices

- EOSG Executive Office of the Secretary-General
- DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs
- DFS Department of Field Support
- DGACM Department for General Assembly and Conference Management

DM Department of Management

- DPA Department of Political Affairs
- DPI Department of Public Information
- DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSS Department of Safety and Security

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

OLA Office of Legal Affairs

OSAA Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

OSRSG/CAAC Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict

UNODA Office for Disarmament Affairs

UNOG United Nations Office at Geneva

UN-OHRLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States

UNON United Nations Office at Nairobi

UNOV United Nations Office at Vienna

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNRWA¹ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UN-Women United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

WFP World Food Programme

Research and Training Institutes

UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

UNIDIR¹ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNITAR United Nations Institute for Training and Research

UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development

UNSSC United Nations System Staff College

UNU United Nations University

Other Entities

UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services

Related Organizations

CTBTO PrepCom Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

IAEA² International Atomic Energy Agency

OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

WTO³ World Trade Organization

Specialized Agencies⁴

ILO International Labour Organization

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

WHO World Health Organization

World Bank Group

• IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

• IDA International Development Association

• IFC International Finance Corporation

• MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency

• ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes

IMF International Monetary Fund

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IMO International Maritime Organization

ITU International Telecommunication Union

UPU Universal Postal Union

WMO World Meteorological Organization

WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization

IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development

UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization

UNWTO World Tourism Organization

COORDINATION SAVES LIVES



UN Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord)

Range/Continuum of Strategies of Approaches

COOPERATION

Co-location

Liaison Exchange


Limited Liaison

Interlocutor

COEXISTENCE

UN-CMCoord Officers facilitate the establishment and maintenance of all possible interfaces.

- Access to affected population
- Humanitarian negotiation
- Sharing the same operational space
- Military support for humanitarian tasks
- Protection of Civilians
- **SECURITY:** Creating a safe and secure environment is one of the primary humanitarian expectations.



What is UN-CMCoord ?

Definition

United Nations humanitarian civil-military coordination (UN-CMCoord) is the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to:


- protect and promote humanitarian principles
- avoid competition
- minimize inconsistency
- when appropriate, pursue common goals

Coordination is a shared responsibility facilitated by liaison and common training.

5 objectives of UN-CMCoord

- Preservation of humanitarian space
- Appropriate relationship between humanitarian & military or armed actors.
- Coherent & consistent humanitarian approach to military actors
- Appropriate & timely use of foreign and/or national military assets in support of humanitarian operations
- Consistency of relief efforts

UN-CMCoord & other perspectives on civil-military relations in humanitarian emergencies



Range of Civil-Military Relationships &

UN-CMCoord Strategy

Basic strategies range from coexistence to cooperation. In either side of the spectrum and in between, coordination (i.e. the essential dialogue & interaction) is necessary in order to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize inconsistency and when appropriate, pursue common goals.



UN-CMCoord focuses on improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined effort

UN-CMCoord focuses on minimizing competition and de-conflicting

3 key coordination elements

The three key coordination elements are information sharing, task division and planning.

Planning

- * varies according to the phase of an emergency.
- * entails a common operational picture, regular information sharing and a clear understanding of who is doing what, where and until when.

Information sharing

- * is effective when proactive
- * helps validate plans and/or adjust priorities.
- * is critical for the safety and security of humanitarian workers and the affected population.

Task division

- * ensures consistency and avoids duplication.
- * helps assess 'capacities versus needs' supporting the forward planning process of organizations on the ground.

UN-CMCoord Guidelines and References

Natural / Technological / Environmental Disasters

Oslo Guidelines: The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (May 1994; Rev 1.1 November 2007)



Complex Emergencies

- ***MCDA Guidelines:*** The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies (Rev. 1, January 2006)
- IASC Reference Paper on **Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies** (June 2004)
- Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies

All contexts

- Guidelines on Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys (2013)
- Country / Situation Specific Guidelines
- **UN-CMCoord Officer Field Handbook (2015)**
- **Guide for the Military (2014)**

UN OCHA - To Find Out More

ReliefWeb.....<http://www.reliefweb.int>
Humanitarian Response.....<http://www.humanitarianresponse.info>
UN Logistics Cluster.....<http://www.logcluster.org>
Humanitarian Early Warning System.....<http://www.hewsweb.org>
Global Disaster Alert & Coordination System.....<http://www.gdacs.org>
Humanitarian news and analysis.....<http://www.IRINnews.org>
Humanitarian Information Centres.....<http://www.humanitarianinfo.org>
OCHA.....<http://www.ochaonline.org>
UN-CMCoord.....<http://www.ochaonline.org/cmcs>

<https://sites.google.com/a/dialoguing.org/humanitarian-military-dialogue>

USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance



Photo Credit: USAID

Fulfilling more than 50 years of its mandate to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of disasters, USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance responds to the needs of people affected by natural disasters and complex emergencies around the world. This includes the 2015 Nepal earthquake, the West Africa Ebola outbreak, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, as well as ongoing crises in countries such as Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and Yemen.

Responding in Times of Crisis

When a natural disaster or conflict destroys communities, or when hunger and disease threaten to spread, people caught in the midst of these crises are concerned with survival. Helping them is at the core of what USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) does every day, all over the world.


USAID/OFDA leads and coordinates the U.S. government's humanitarian assistance efforts overseas. The Office responds to an average of 65 disasters in more than 50 countries every year, ensuring that aid reaches people affected by natural disasters, including earthquakes, volcanoes, and floods, as well as slow-onset crises, such as droughts and conflicts.

USAID/OFDA has more than 520 staff worldwide, working from its Washington, D.C., headquarters and at six regional and more than 20 field offices. Its team of humanitarian professionals, policy advisors, and technical experts—including infectious disease specialists, nutritionists, logisticians, entomologists,

and hydrometeorological advisors—identify the most urgent humanitarian needs, working alongside local governments to assist tens of millions of people and save countless lives. USAID/OFDA's strategically located warehouses in Miami, Florida; Pisa, Italy; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and Subang, Malaysia are stocked with essential relief supplies, such as emergency shelter materials, warm blankets, water treatment systems, and hygiene kits. These critical commodities can be transported rapidly to disaster-affected areas around the globe. USAID/OFDA also works with the international humanitarian community to give vulnerable people resources to get back on their feet and strengthen their own ability to respond to emergencies.

USAID/OFDA's speed and flexibility contribute to the effectiveness of its response to international crises and help the Office lead the U.S. government's efforts to provide humanitarian assistance—on behalf of the American people—in some of the world's most dangerous regions.

USAID/OFDA's Major Disaster Responses 2008 – Present



Disaster Response Teams


When the size or scope of a disaster requires it, USAID/OFDA sends a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to crisis-affected areas. Deployable within hours of an emergency, this team of humanitarian experts and technical advisors is on the ground to assess the situation firsthand, identify the most urgent needs, and pull in other federal agencies if needed—all to coordinate an effective U.S. government response. In addition, USAID/OFDA has partnerships with internationally certified urban search-and-rescue teams, allowing for their swift deployment anywhere in the world.

While the DART works overseas, a Response Management Team (RMT) is activated in Washington, D.C., to provide leadership and operational support. RMTs are the center of strategy and planning for a disaster response, liaising with other U.S. government agencies in the nation's capital so that the DART can focus on providing assistance in the field.

Crisis Response and Technical Expertise

USAID/OFDA is staffed by crisis response experts with vast regional and technical knowledge who continually monitor global hazards, provide guidance, and prioritize programs for funding in the following sectors:

50 COUNTRIES
receive USAID/OFDA disaster support on average each year.



65 DISASTERS
require USAID/OFDA response each year.



Agriculture and Food Security

USAID/OFDA supports the distribution of seeds and tools, agricultural training, implementation of pest control programs, provision of veterinary medicine for livestock, and partnerships with farmers to strengthen local agricultural infrastructure.



Natural and Technological Hazards

USAID/OFDA works closely with local communities to identify, manage, and reduce vulnerability to disasters by supporting programs such as disaster response training, hazard analysis, and early warning systems to move people out of harm's way.



Economic Recovery and Market Systems (ERMS)

Economic recovery is vital to the longer-term rehabilitation of communities following a disaster. USAID/OFDA's ERMS programs restore livelihoods, provide grants to support small business development, and create short-term employment opportunities.



Health

USAID/OFDA works to address the major causes of illness and death during disasters by supporting primary care and mobile health facilities, prevention and treatment of disease, mental health services, and immunizations for children.



Humanitarian Coordination/Information Management

USAID/OFDA supports activities that enhance international and local coordination mechanisms and strengthen needs assessments and information management to ensure the timely and effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.



Humanitarian Studies/Analysis

Through data collection and analysis, USAID/OFDA can systematically identify program objectives, monitor their progress, and assess outcomes. This helps establish best practices for improved and successful humanitarian programming.



Logistics

USAID/OFDA responds quickly to disasters by coordinating the distribution of emergency relief supplies, including plastic sheeting for emergency shelters, family hygiene kits, blankets, kitchen sets, and water purification equipment and containers.



Nutrition

USAID/OFDA is at the forefront of the humanitarian community's efforts to prevent and treat acute malnutrition, supporting infant and young child feeding programs, nutrition education, and research that builds local communities' capacity to treat malnutrition on their own.



Protection

Disaster-affected populations face risk of harm, exploitation, and abuse. USAID/OFDA funds activities that minimize and respond to these risks, such as programs focused on child protection, psychosocial support, prevention of and response to gender-based violence, and advocacy activities.



Shelter and Settlements

USAID/OFDA supports programs that advance the construction of safer, disaster-resistant structures and settlements, utilize local building materials, re-use rubble and debris in the building process, and reduce risks to future disasters.




Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH)

USAID/OFDA helps reduce morbidity and mortality associated with water- and sanitation-related diseases as well as poor environmental conditions. WASH interventions include latrine construction, hand-washing promotion, sanitation education, and the provision of safe drinking water.




Humanitarian Coordination and Partnerships

USAID/OFDA works strategically with international responders and other donor governments to maximize resources to save more lives. The Office taps into a vast international network of humanitarian partners through its funding of and engagement with UN agencies, donor governments, other international and non-governmental organizations, local governments, community organizations, and other entities. USAID/OFDA can call on other U.S. government agencies to assist with response efforts, whenever needed.



Financials

Approximately 1 percent of America's federal budget is allocated for foreign assistance, and USAID/OFDA's budget is a mere fraction of that. Humanitarian action can mean the difference between life and death for tens of millions of people every year. In fiscal year 2015, USAID/OFDA responded to 49 disasters in 45 countries, providing \$1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance.



Saving lives is becoming more difficult as crises increase in complexity and magnitude. In just over a decade, the number of people in need of humanitarian aid has more than doubled. Attacks on aid workers are at record highs with nearly 330 relief workers killed, injured, or kidnapped in 2014. In many parts of the world, conflict is the new normal, and it shows no sign of ending. USAID's disaster experts are working with humanitarian partners around the world to overcome these challenges and navigate shifting conflict lines to deliver life-saving aid.

History of USAID/OFDA

USAID/OFDA was created in 1964 to lead and coordinate the U.S. government's disaster response efforts overseas. Following a massive earthquake in the former Yugoslavia that killed more than 1,000 people and a volcanic eruption in Costa Rica that destroyed large parts of the country, the U.S. government determined a need for a lead agency to coordinate disaster assistance offered to foreign governments and affected people. Rooted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, the President designated the USAID Administrator to lead foreign disaster response for the U.S. government through USAID/OFDA.



@theOFDA



Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance




ofdainquiries@ofda.gov




USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

OFDA Military Liaison Team (MLT)

- Civ-Mil and CBRNE expertise
- OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Advisors to the Military (HAA/Ms) at Combatant Commands
 - AFRICOM
 - EUCOM
 - CENTCOM
 - PACOM
 - SOCOM
 - SOUTHCOM (covers NORTHCOM)
- Staff rotations at Joint Staff and State Department
- Surge staff on call



U.S. Military Combatant Commands



ST. LOUIS, MO
1107
ON 9 NGA

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Map information as of 2011
MAP EFFECTIVE 06 APRIL 2011

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1:60,000,000
MILLER CYLINDRICAL PROJECTION


* West Bank and Gaza Strip - "Israel-occupied with current status" - "Permanent status to be determined through future negotiations."

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U.S. Navy Fleets and U.S. Marine Expeditionary Forces





U.S. Navy Fleets:

U.S. Fleet Forces Command – Norfolk, VA
 U.S. Pacific Fleet – Pearl Harbor, HI
 U.S. Third Fleet – San Diego, CA
 U.S. Fourth Fleet – Mayport, Florida
 U.S. Fifth Fleet – Manama, Bahrain
 U.S. Sixth Fleet – Naples, Italy
 U.S. Seventh Fleet – Yokosuka, Japan
 U.S. Tenth Fleet – Ft. Meade, MD

U.S. Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF):


I MEF – Camp Pendleton, CA
 II MEF – Camp Lejeune, NC
 III MEF – Okinawa, Japan

EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE FORCE



CARRIER STRIKE GROUP

+



EXPEDITIONARY STRIKE GROUP or
AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP

Carrier Strike Group (CSG)

COMPOSITION:

1x Aircraft Carrier (CVN) with Carrier Air Wing (CVW)

1x Destroyer Squadron Staff (DESRON)

5x Surface Combatants

Rotary Wing, of those:

- 2-4 surface Helicopter Detachments with SH-60s
- 2-4 Helicopter Detachments sourced by CVN squadron (MH-60s)

1x Attack Submarine (SSN)



Mission: The Carrier Strike Group is a principal element of US power projection and control of the sea lines of communication. It conducts the core naval missions of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security and humanitarian assistance world wide.

THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER: MORE THAN A WARSHIP

While the sailors themselves make America's Navy the best in the world, the aircraft carrier has always been and continues to be the backbone of this "global force for good."

With unprecedented technology and unmatched capabilities, the United States carriers deliver a one-of-a-kind mix of combat

power and humanitarian relief to every corner of the globe. Steeped in historical significance for nearly 90 years, our aircraft carriers have served the nation's interests in times of war and in times of peace, adapting to the immediate and ever-changing nature of our increasingly global community.

150+10



During normal operations, a Nimitz class aircraft carrier can accommodate up to 150 hospital beds, a 3 bed ICU and 2 Outpatient Rooms. The Medical Department has 10 officers assigned: a Senior Medical Officer, General Surgeon, Anesthesiologist, Nurse, physical therapist, psychologist, and 30-35 corpsmen. All of this is can be augmented for humanitarian relief.

400,000



A nuclear powered aircraft carrier's desalination plants can produce more than 400,000 gallons of fresh water from sea water per day, providing a source of one of the most critical life-saving resources necessary in most relief operations – fresh drinking water.

100's



Carriers are uniquely suited to provide the command and control necessary to deliver humanitarian assistance to disaster victims coordinating 100's of daily flights carrying much needed food, water, supplies and medical assistance.



30kt



With nuclear propulsion and a thirty plus knot speed capability, carriers can move rapidly to the area of concern and provide a sustainable support base for immediate relief operations.

90



Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers normally carry enough supplies to remain at sea for 90 days without resupply.

70



A dental clinic with five dental officers capable of caring for as many as 70 patients per day.

18k-20k



The food services department is capable of serving 18,000 to 20,000 meals each day.

Sources: acibc.org | Leveraging America's Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet.
by John Gordon IV, Peter A. Wilson, John Birkler, Steven Benaz, Gordon T. Lee




Mission: Power Projection and provides Geographic Combatant Commanders other core naval capabilities of forward presence, deterrence and humanitarian assistance.

ARG/MEU COMPOSITION:


- 1x Amphibious Assault ship, multi- or general purpose (LHA / LHD)
- 1x Amphibious Transport Dock ship (LPD)
- 1x Amphibious Dock Landing ship (LSD)
- 1x Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)



NAVY U.S. Marine Corps Organization



Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)



Marine Expeditionary Unit / Amphibious Ready Group

Notes

Notes



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
— *Est. 1884* —
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND