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The Next Decade: Amplifying the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

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Working Papers



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OPTIMIZING WORKFORCE SUCCESS THROUGH IMPROVED LEADERSHIP: LEADING BEYOND THE BIAS BARRIER

Lena Kaman

Women, Peace, and Security Conference 2017

INTRODUCTION

Diversity is a defining attribute of a successful organization. Corporate America and the United States military alike realized that what began as an ethical effort to curb discrimination led to a key talent management tool in creating a flourishing business model.¹ While a homogenous all-white, all-male demographic dominated the professional setting a few decades ago, current corporate and government organizations are now reflective of a much broader demographic in their employee populations.² Industry leaders value greater diversity in age, race, culture, religion, and gender identity groups for providing increased productivity, enhanced morale, and improved organizational effectiveness.³

In recognizing the strategic importance of diversity management, organizational leaders reshaped and redefined diversity policies. For example, Apple's diversity policy advances the company's belief that "individual backgrounds, perspectives, and passions help us create the ideas that move all of us forward."⁴ As for the government sector, Department of Defense (DoD) policy states, "We gain a strategic advantage by leveraging the diversity of all members and creating an inclusive environment in which each member is valued and encouraged to provide ideas critical to innovation, optimization, and organizational mission success."⁵ However, a specific area of diversity management across private and public sectors requiring greater attention is gender diversity. One barrier preventing the gender gap from closing completely is the unconscious gender bias. Formally defined as, "mental shortcuts based on social norms and stereotypes," unconscious biases are innate to peoples' thought patterns.⁶ They influence behavior without conscious knowledge. In addition to gender, biases can involve race, weight, religious preference, nationality, a name, an accent, marital status, and any other defining attribute of a

1 David Thomas and Robin Ely, "Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity," *Harvard Business Review*, accessed January 30, 2017, <https://hbr.org/1996/09/making-differences-matter-a-new-paradigm-for-managing-diversity>.

2 Ibid.

3 Lena Buettner, "An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator Career Decision Choices," (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master's graduate capstone requirements, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 1.

4 "Inclusion & Diversity," *Apple Inc.*, accessed June 30, 2017 at <https://www.apple.com/diversity/>.

5 Department of Defense, "Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017", 2012, accessed January 30, 2017 at http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%20of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf.

6 Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 2.

person. Biases cause people to inadvertently favor one demographic group over another.⁷ Unconscious gender biases sneak into the workplace environment, causing leaders, both male and female, to make decisions that positively influence men to the detriment of women counterparts.

Organizations, both corporate and military, have identified leadership support of workforce diversity, including gender diversity, as necessary for operational success. Unconscious gender biases undermine organizational progress that has been achieved through federal legislative action and diversity policy initiatives. Therefore, it remains incumbent upon leadership to recognize and confront the unconscious gender bias barrier as one means of maintaining a viable, high-quality, diverse workforce where women can thrive and contribute their maximum potential to the organization. Examining gender bias inequalities, understanding their consequences and limitations on the workforce, and implementing effective solutions begin with an organization's leaders.

THE UNCONSCIOUS GENDER BIAS

In striving to achieve gender inclusion, leaders must first fully understand and recognize the psychology behind unconscious biases. Unconscious biases are rooted in the brain to serve the purpose of providing people with an immediate safety mechanism to counter fear and threats. During ancient times, beings who were different were perceived as life-threatening. Thus, forming a quick judgment against a being with dissimilar attributes and deciding to fight or flee was a matter of life or death.⁸ However, in modern day life, the context of making organizational leadership decisions does not involve an immediate life or death risk. People do not face the same challenges as they did during prehistoric times. Yet, gender biases are inherent and ingrained patterns of brain activity; through recognizing their existence and taking proactive steps to halt automatic brain processing, leaders can work toward eliminating the harmful effects.

Leaders need to be aware of another psychological aspect of biases. Based on pre-conceived ideas and experiences, the human brain organizes people of other identity groups under certain categories. For instance, the brain can assign a person to any of the following types of category tags based on his or her age, race, culture, religion, and/or gender: good or bad, safe or unsafe, lazy or productive, assertive or bossy, intelligent or foolish, strong or weak, and so on.⁹ Biases function to streamline the thought process by grouping people together for our brain to quickly sort out.¹⁰ However, gender inclusion is jeopardized when biases influence leaders to automatically categorize males as having positive characteristics and females as having neutral or negative characteristics instead of forming decisions based on objective measurements.

With an understanding of the basic theory behind the unconscious gender bias, leaders can benefit from examining specific bias tendencies leading to gender inequality. An example of a gender bias experienced during infancy illustrates the point. Emily R. Mondschein, Karen E. Adolph, and Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda of the New York University researched the impacts

⁷ Ibid., 2.

⁸ Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 5.

⁹ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰ Ibid., 5.

of gender bias on infant motor development. The authors submit that while boys tend to surpass girls in physical growth and activity skills during early childhood, boys do not outperform girls during infancy. Infants develop equally, regardless of gender.¹¹ Gender biases, however, sway mothers' estimations of their babies' crawling ability. Through test questions such as "What is the steepest slope your baby can really crawl down successfully, without any help and without falling or sliding?" and "What is the steepest slope your baby will attempt to crawl down, regardless of whether he/she will fall or require assistance?" the researchers found that mothers overestimate boy infants' ability to crawl while underestimating girl infants' ability to crawl.¹² Mothers incorrectly expect the genders to differ. Biases can persuade leaders to conclude similar expectations. Inherent preconceptions and expectations of gender abilities can detrimentally affect female development, beginning at an early age in the home and continuing through adulthood in the workplace.

CONSEQUENCES AND LIMITATIONS OF GENDER BIASES

Organizations have embraced a top-down approach to gender diversity management. For example, as emphasized in a report from the McKinsey Global Institute prepared for commercial, public, and social sector leaders, "\$12 trillion could be added to global [Gross National Product] GDP by 2025 by advancing women's equality."¹³ Leaders recognize that developing and including gender facts and insights into business decisions could have positive economic impacts. In supporting a Presidential Executive Order, the DoD Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan states, "We are in a 'Battle for Talent' to ensure we are able to recruit and retain the best our nation has to offer."¹⁴ Female backgrounds bring different experiences and perspectives to the boardroom and to the battlefield, giving leaders a wider knowledge base when making decisions in support of the mission. The ability of an organization to seize full economic potential and achieve mission goals is weakened without gender inclusion.

Unconscious gender biases serve to stymie leaders' best diversity policy and management efforts by inhibiting females from achieving their full potential. Similar to mothers underestimating their female babies' ability to crawl, unconscious gender stereotypes can cause leaders to underestimate their female members' ability to perform. A specific example is the potential for leaders to possess the inherent notion that women do not welcome a challenge.¹⁵ Often, leaders automatically offer demanding positions and tasks to men. Conversely, women must either

11 Emily R. Mondschein, Karen E. Adolph, and Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda, "Gender Bias in Mothers' Expectations about Infant Crawling," *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 77, (2000): 305, doi: 10.1006/jecp.2000.2597.

12 Ibid., 207.

13 Jonathan Woetzel, Anu Madgavkar, Kweilin Ellingrud, Eric Labaye, Sandrine Devillard, Eric Kutcher, James Manyika, Richard Dobbs, and Mekala Krishnan, "The Power of Parity: How Advancing Women's Equality Can Add \$12 Trillion to Global Growth," *McKinsey Global Institute*, September 2015, file:///C:/Users/Lena%20Kaman/Downloads/MGI%20Power%20of%20parity_Full%20report_September%202015.pdf.

14 Department of Defense, "Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan 2012-2017", 2012, accessed January 30, 2017 at http://diversity.defense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/DoD_Diversity_Strategic_Plan_%20final_as%20of%2019%20Apr%2012%5B1%5D.pdf.

15 Julie Indvik, "Women and Leadership," in *Leadership Theory and Practice*, ed. Peter Northouse (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 2001), 228.

specifically ask for and express an interest in challenging assignments or remain silent.¹⁶ Similarly, an unconscious bias can compel leaders to categorize females as less competent than males. In this case, leaders develop male careers by affording them job experience. Again, females must either choose to repeatedly prove themselves and earn trust by performing well in a specific role before being given added responsibility or remain stagnant in job opportunity.¹⁷ When a certain demographic is underutilized and not provided equal opportunities to achieve its full potential, the entire organization suffers.

In addition to unrealized potential, another consequence of unconscious gender biases is a lack of gender diversity in top leadership positions. According to a June 2017 report, only 6.4 percent of Fortune 500 companies were run by a female Chief Executive Officer in 2016.¹⁸ Military statistics display a comparable shortage. As of May 2017, every service had 10% or less female representation in the active duty flag and general officer wardrooms. The Navy led the services with 10% of admirals, while Marine Corps females only comprised 1% of its general officer corps. The Army and Air Force had 6% and 8%, respectively.¹⁹ All too often, achieving gender diversity in senior management and senior military ranks becomes difficult due to biased perceptions among women themselves of how they can fit into the organization. They do not see a large complement of other women in upper leadership positions and thus assume climbing the organization's ladder is not a viable option for them. They may exit the organization and leave promising careers, thinking it will be too challenging for them to reach a senior level position.²⁰ By confronting unconscious biases, leaders can minimize female talent drain, set the bar higher for achievement, and foster a culture of limitless potential for females.

Overall, a lack of diversity caused by gender bias consequences may result in an unwillingness to challenge practices and procedures that no longer optimize the organization's goals.²¹ If the employees have similar backgrounds, they will tend to think alike because they are drawing upon similar experiences. People with a broad array of experiences offer diverse communication styles and different methods of solving problems, managing assets, and tackling obstacles.²² Gender diversity produces these options for new solutions and development which can increase

16 Ibid., 228.

17 Ibid., 228.

18 Jena McGregor, "The Number of Women CEOs in the Fortune 500 is at an all-time high – of 32," *The Washington Post*, June 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/06/07/the-number-of-women-ceos-in-the-fortune-500-is-at-an-all-time-high-of-32/?utm_term=.aca7bc4c3fbd.

19 Daniel Sagalyn, "Report: U.S. Military Leadership Lacks Diversity at Top," *PBS Newshour* (blog), March 11, 2011 (5:11 p.m.), <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/military-report/>.

20 Julie Indvik, "Women and Leadership," in *Leadership Theory and Practice*, ed. Peter Northouse (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 2001), 227-229.

21 Lena Buettner, "An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator Career Decision Choices," (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master's graduate capstone requirements, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 8.

22 David Thomas and Robin Ely, "Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity," *Harvard Business Review*, accessed January 30, 2017, <https://hbr.org/1996/09/making-differences-matter-a-new-paradigm-for-managing-diversity>.

the likelihood of positive results and growth.²³ Therefore, when leaders confront biases, the organization can achieve more success than if leaders ignore biases.

EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS TO GENDER BIASES

After recognizing gender biases and understanding their consequences and limitations, implementing effective workforce solutions is another step for leaders in the continuous process of challenging the unconscious gender bias to create positive organizational outcomes. Research indicates that even when people believe prejudicial and stereotyping behaviors are wrong and harmful, they still fall prey to harboring unconscious biases.²⁴ Gender biases must be unlearned by slowing the brain's automatic processes.²⁵ First and foremost, the unconscious must become conscious through training and education efforts. Organizations can take a cue from industry leaders such as Google who have incorporated unconscious bias training into their employees' toolkits. Google offers training workshops and hands-on sessions to arm employees with productive ways to tackle unconscious gender biases.²⁶ According to Brian Welle, Google's Director of People Analytics, "Now it's part of the daily conversation at Google with employees owning it and challenging each other all the time."²⁷ In response to the DoD decision in December 2015 to allow women to serve in all roles, the Marine Corps has already taken this first step by dispatching mobile training teams to educate the Corps on unconscious prejudices and presuppositions.²⁸ The other military services can follow suit in electing to provide education to their members.²⁹ Training opens the aperture to begin instilling positive techniques for leaders.

Inclusive resolutions also begin with open dialogue between top leaders and members of demographic groups. For example, focus groups, surveys, and online networking sites are valuable methods for leaders to begin a discussion with women and learn first-hand examples of gender biases they have experienced.³⁰ Facebook groups, such as the Female Navy Officer group, exemplify social networking sites that cultivate discussion between junior and senior membership. Often, feedback from junior members highlighting experiences of unconscious bias in the workplace results in leaders acting to promote awareness of the behavior. Thus, leadership turns the experiences into teaching points for the benefit of the wholistic organization moving forward.³¹ Additionally, corporate organizations, as well as the military, have embraced

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 2.

²⁵ Ibid., 8.

²⁶ Ibid., 3.

²⁷ Jessica Guynn, "Google's 'bias-busting' Workshops Target Hidden Prejudices," *USA Today*, May 12, 2015, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/05/12/google-unconscious-bias-diversity/27055485/>.

²⁸ Tyler Main, "All Marines to Get 'Unconscious Bias' Training as Women Join Infantry," *military.com*, March 18, 2016, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/03/18/all-marines-unconscious-bias-training-women-join-infantry.html>.

²⁹ The author acknowledges that the Marine Corps is the service branch with the lowest percentage of female representation in the flag and general officer ranks, making its efforts to educate the Corps on the unconscious gender bias even more meaningful.

³⁰ Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 9.

³¹ Facebook, *Female Navy Officers*, social networking group, accessed June 30, 2017, <https://www.facebook.com/groups/femalenyavofficers/>.

networking groups patterned after Facebook Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg's "Lean In Circles."³² In September 2015, the Lean In circles began occurring at the Pentagon with DoD buy-in to encourage women to hold similar networking groups across the force.³³ While obstructions caused by biases will not be resolved in one linear step, continual monitoring by leaders can create a culture change that recognizes the difference between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Having the ear of senior leaders to inculcate change is a crucial measure to eliminate unconscious biases.

Another step in solving unconscious bias problems is to view leadership qualities as gender neutral. As asserted in the study *The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership: Damned if You Do, Doomed if You Don't*, men are inherently viewed to have more "take charge" characteristics and women are inherently viewed to have more "take care" characteristics. Leaders view "take charge" behaviors as more effective in activities such as delegating, influencing superiors, and problem-solving.³⁴ The misconception that females do not possess "take charge" skills becomes problematic for females; they not only have to perform their job, but also have to concentrate on disproving the biased theories. To complicate the situation, when women do violate the expected behavior and display desirable "take charge" skills, leaders may then unconsciously penalize them for being too masculine and unconventional. Hence, women experience the double-bind, defined by the research organization Catalyst as, "a psychological impasse created when contradictory demands are made of an individual so that no matter which directive is followed, the response will be construed as incorrect."³⁵ Leaders may view women as too soft and incompetent or too masculine and unlikeable, but rarely view them as both competent and likeable.³⁶ Moreover, a study of Swedish government venture capitalists conducted by the Harvard Business Review observed similar patterns of leaders assigning gendered leadership qualities to entrepreneurs. The leaders routinely questioned the females' "credibility, trustworthiness, experience, and knowledge" while labeling males as "assertive, innovative, competent, experienced, knowledgeable, and having established networks." Specifically, a male was described as "young and promising" while a female was described as "young, but inexperienced."³⁷ Leaders will serve to strengthen their organizations by removing preconceived gendered notions of employees' leadership qualities. Valuing the broad range of characteristics women possess and refraining from punishing those who violate entrenched normative traits are critical behaviors for leaders to follow to institute culture change.

32 Lisa Ferdinando, "Carter: DoD Provides 'Unconditional' Support for 'Lean In Circles'", accessed January 30, 2017, <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/618037/carter-dod-provides-unconditional-support-for-lean-in-circles>.

33 Ibid.

34 Catalyst, "The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership: Damned if You Do, Doomed if You Don't," last modified 2007, http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Double_Bind_Dilemma_for_Women_in_Leadership_Damned_if_You_Do_Doomed_if_You_Dont.pdf, 5.

35 Ibid., 1.

36 Ibid., 19.

37 Malin Malmstrom, Jeaneth Johansson, and Joakim Wincent, "We Recorded VCs' Conversations and Analyzed How Differently They Talk About Female Entrepreneurs," *Harvard Business Review*, May 17, 2017, <https://hbr.org/2017/05/we-recorded-vcs-conversations-and-analyzed-how-differently-they-talk-about-female-entrepreneurs>.

In preventing the unconscious gender bias from hindering an organization's optimal talent management, leaders can also seek to gender neutralize human resource activities, such as interviewing and hiring.³⁸ First, gender neutral standardization precludes leaders from asking gender biased questions during an interview.³⁹ For example, a military leader may be concerned about employees' childcare plans during deployments and periods of extended work hours; an unconscious gender bias could cause the leader to associate characteristics of childcare provision with only female employees but not male employees.⁴⁰ A standard interview question posed indiscriminately to all members of the command, regardless of gender, of their childcare plans stifles the bias. Second, gender neutralized hiring practices ensure impartiality and thwart leaders from selecting candidates based on gender, rather than qualifications. A study by Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rose illustrates how gender-blind auditions, an audition with a screen between the musician and hiring director, helped orchestras overcome the unconscious bias when hiring musicians. From the data, the authors conclude that a blind audition "increases the probability a woman will be advanced and hired," accounting for a 50% increase in probability the female will advance from a preliminary round and for a 30% increase in the proportion of female new hires.⁴¹ Another data point underscored in a *Lean In* discussion guide shows the odds of getting hired are improved by 61 percent if a female name is replaced with a male name on a résumé.⁴² While not practical in all settings, particularly those requiring final face-to-face or phone interviews, companies should not pre-screen applicants by gender. Implementing gender neutral and gender blind procedures in human resource processes promises success in hiring and retaining the most qualified and talented candidate, regardless of gender.

Finally, leadership needs to actively promote mentorship of female members. As the culture changes and more women remain in industry, there will be more female role models and mentors from whom potential new hires and recruits may glean knowledge and experience. A group mentoring environment where females feel comfortable seeking advice and support is ideal.⁴³ Professional women's leadership conferences, such as the private sector's Global Women's Leadership Summit and the military's Joint Women's Leadership Symposium, offer an excellent venue for women to connect with, learn from, and mentor each other. Leadership endorsement of conference attendance, mission permitting, is imperative. A formal social support system with buy-in from top leadership would allow females to flourish and minimize the number of females who leave the business.

A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE OF GENDER DIVERSITY

Some may argue that seeking gender diversity approaches is not as inclusive as it purports to be. For example, by eliminating biases to empower the minority gender, leaders could disempower the majority gender. When men witness an organization's continual focus on the inclusion of

38 Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 8.

39 Ibid., 8.

40 A female military officer reported her experience of being asked about childcare plans on a post in the Female Navy Officer Facebook group.

41 Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rose, "Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" Auditions on Female Musicians," *The American Economic Review* 90, no. 4 (2000): 715, 738.

42 "Tips for Managers," *Lean In*, accessed June 30, 2017 at <https://leanin.org/tips/managers>.

43 Horace McCormick, "The Real Effects of Unconscious Bias in the Workplace," 9.

women, they could feel excluded or marginalized.⁴⁴ Consequently, males may become resentful and not serve to their full potential, negating diversity's goal of increasing productivity and improving morale. Diversity, however, is about integration and inclusion. Leaders need to approach diversity discussions and situations as an opportunity to bring together the two genders to form a better organization for everyone's benefit. Through supporting an un-biased perspective, leaders embolden both genders to maximize the skills they need to succeed. Leaders are cautioned against pitting one gender over the other.⁴⁵ Likewise, organizations need to apply integration principles beginning at the foundational level of recruitment. Instead of employing a recruiter or human resource manager to specifically hire females, for instance, organizations need to incorporate recruiters and managers who canvas the nation's population pool looking for a diverse mix of merit-based talent.⁴⁶ Through leaders' appropriate actions, they can instill a culture of integration in the members of the military instead of an adversarial culture of one gender being superior to the other.

CONCLUSION

Organizations benefit from properly incorporating diverse cultures into their workforce. Corporate America and the military recognize that diverse populations, including females, are vital to mission success. Organizations aim to create and sustain a culture that fully values and leverages a diverse workforce. Diversity management plans ensure industry leaders not only implement, support, and encourage diversity out of fairness and equality but also out of necessity to achieve organizational goals and missions.⁴⁷ Leaders' endorsement of team diversity is critical for an organization to function at its peak and to capitalize on increased and sustainable results.

Unconscious gender biases can permeate the minds of workforce leaders however, counteracting the benefits of diversity policies and causing adverse effects to talent management decisions. The biases impede development, retention, and advancement of women in the workforce. Leadership can break the barriers of biases and instill improvements to the workplace by consciously identifying their existence, understanding their harmful effects, and applying meaningful solutions to combat them. Organizations will prosper in ways never thought possible through the enriched creativity, innovation, and teamwork that gender diversity brings to the organization.

44 Ruth Mayhew, "Pros and Cons of Diversity Management in the Workplace," *Chron* (blog), accessed February 5, 2017, <http://smallbusiness.chron.com/pros-cons-diversity-management-workplace-3028.html>.

45 David Thomas, "Making Diversity Part of the Organization," *Yale Insights*, accessed February 6, 2017, <http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/what-do-leaders-need-to-understand-about-diversity>.

46 Ibid.

47 Lena Buettner, "An Exploratory Analysis of Professional and Lifestyle Factors Influencing Female Aviator Career Decision Choices," (unpublished manuscript to fulfill master's graduate capstone requirements, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, 2011), 12-13.

THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF WOMEN: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE

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INTRODUCTION

Though the collapse of the Soviet Union is often attributed to the arms race under President Reagan that economically strained the Soviet economy, the Human Rights agenda started by President Ford with the Helsinki Accords and continued under President Carter, had a significant impact that holds its own place in ending the Cold War.¹

In 1975, the Helsinki Accords was initiated by Russia to settle border disputes in Europe and, under the Ford Administration, the U.S. decided to include the protection of human rights as part of the accords, not knowing what impact it would have, if any. However, dissidents throughout Eastern Europe used the Helsinki Accords to hold their governments accountable for human rights abuses. The Human Rights Campaign changed the atmosphere in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia. In the late 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev instituted glasnost (political freedoms) and perestroika (economic reforms) in the Soviet Union. Also in the late 1980s, a series of demonstrations across Eastern Europe started and, unlike the previous typical response by the USSR – the rolling of tanks across the lands, the governments of Eastern Europe were encouraged to reform. One of the culminating moments was when millions of Eastern Germans were allowed to cross the Berlin Wall and stream into West Berlin, guards choosing not to fire into the crowds. There was no going back – 9 million East Germans visited the West within the first week, eventually leading to the end of the German Democratic Republic and eventually to the end of the Soviet Empire.²

Human rights as a strategy was not the sole cause of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, nor did it address the immediate concerns of “hot crises” around the world where Soviet aggression manifested itself. However, it did lay the foundations for some of the eventual proximate causes that contributed to the end of the communist hold on Eastern Europe. It was a cause of unrest in the populations of the Warsaw Pact nations and a basis for Glasnost and Perestroika within the Soviet Union.

With the current resurgence of an aggressive Russia and the destabilization Russia is fomenting in Ukraine, addressing the physical security of women is a similar means of indirectly influencing the course of events to lay the foundations for stability in Ukraine.

THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE:

Today, in what began as a protest against Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich when he dropped plans for trade agreements with the European Union, Ukraine is in a crisis of open hostilities in the East Ukraine where pro-Russian separatists are fighting the pro-West Government of Ukraine. The separatists are actively backed by Russia, something Russia denies. Russia’s motivations, ostensibly, include not wanting to see the expansion of European influence into its former ally of the Soviet period. This is one of many aggressive actions that

Russia is conducting in Eastern Europe, such as the annexation of Crimea, invasion of Georgia, and the harassment of NATO forces in the Balkans.

The instability in Eastern Ukraine has many foundations, including the ethnic and language divide; political divisions (pro-Russian verses pro-European), and an overall poor economic situation and accusations of corruption in the government.³ This paper will also show that the poor physical security of women is a foundational factor to the instability in the region; an instability that Russia has easily exploited for its own agenda of maintaining influence in its former Soviet republic and maintaining distance between European influences and Russia's border.

DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS

Addressing the physical security of women in Ukraine is a human rights imperative in the short term, but is a foundation for stability in the region in the long term, similarly to how the Human Rights Campaign was a contributor though not the main effort in the fight against the Soviet Union. To ensure the security of women in the conflict-ridden areas of Eastern Ukraine is addressed, women must be actively sought out to participate in any negotiations that discuss the process for peace or reconciliation. Inclusivity in the peace process will improve the legitimacy of the final agreements and the stability of the government from addressing the needs of women will improve the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government, a necessary condition when fighting insurgencies.

Some may argue that, while the protection of women is a noble cause, it will not affect the security of the theater without willing cooperation from its major aggressor, Russia. This is true. Addressing the physical security of women, by itself, will not solve the current crisis in Ukraine. However, the security of women is a long-term foundational issue, and it can take generations for the culture to change enough for its effects to take hold.

IMPROVING STABILITY BY ADDRESSING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:

In a much-referenced study conducted in 2009, Valerie Hudson, Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University, and her colleagues have discovered that "The physical security of women...is strongly associated with the peacefulness of a state, the degree to which the state is of concern to the international community, and the quality of relations between the state and its neighbors."⁴ Hudson and colleagues compared the physical security of women to other known and accepted indices of stability in a nation (per capita gross domestic product, level of democracy) and found that the physical security of women was a stronger correlation. This study was one of the first, if not *the* first, to equate the security of women with the security of a state.

"If a scholar or policymaker had to select one variable – level of democracy, level of wealth, prevalence of Islamic cultures, or the physical security of women – to assist them in predicting which states would be the least peaceful or the most concern to the international community or have the worst relations with their neighbors, they would do best by choosing the measure of the physical security of women."⁶ Applying this finding to regional security, one can conclude that reducing the violence against women is a contributor to a longer-term goal of preventing future hostilities and is highly relevant to the shaping strategy of any theater campaign plan. Preventing the escalation of violence in a conflict can prevent the exacerbation of instability –

preventing the new norm of increased rate of violence against women, which would lead to a more aggressive nation-state.

To demonstrate the relationship of the physical security status of women in the current situation in Ukraine and Russia, Table 1 shows the status of women in those two states, as well as other example nations from other representative regions of the world. The source is the WomanStats Project, an academic database of statistics on women around the world, established by Valerie Hudson and colleagues to collect data on women and security. The data itself comes from a variety of sources, such as the United Nations or independent researchers. Table 1 uses a multi-variable scale created by Dr. Mary Caprioli that merges many different variables that describe women's security into a single factor that can compare the security of women in different nation-states, with "0" being the most secure and "4" being the least. There are no countries with a factor "0", and only eight countries at a factor of "1". This data comes from a collected dataset on 175 nation-states.⁷ A cursory review shows that known unstable or aggressor nations fall towards the higher end of the scale and the most stable at the lowest.

Physical Security of Women	1	2	3	4
Nations	Sweden France Switzerland Spain	United States Japan Germany Australia	Ukraine Philippines Ethiopia Brazil	Russia China Iran Venezuela
<p>0 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are enforced; there are no taboos or norms against reporting these crimes, which are rare. There are no honor killings or femicides (the targeted killing of females because they are female).</p> <p>1 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are generally enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which crimes are not common. Honor killings and femicides do not occur.</p> <p>2 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape; these laws are sporadically enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which are common. Honor killings and/or femicides are quite rare, occurring only in small pockets of the population, and are condemned by society.</p> <p>3 – There are laws against domestic violence, rape, but not necessarily marital rape; these laws are rarely enforced; there are taboos or norms against reporting these crimes (or ignorance that these are reportable crimes), which affect a majority of women. Honor killings and/or femicides may occur among certain segments of society but are not generally accepted within the society.</p> <p>4 – There are no or weak laws against domestic violence, rape, and marital rape, and these laws are not generally enforced. Honor killings and/or femicides may occur and are either ignored or generally accepted. (Examples of weak laws — need 4 male witnesses to prove rape; rape is only defined as sex with girls under 12 — all other sex is by definition consensual, etc.)</p>				
Table 1. Physical Security of Women in Ukraine, Russia and other sample nations. ⁸				

PHYSICAL SECURITY STATUS OF WOMEN IN UKRAINE:

Even before the conflict in Eastern Ukraine started, Ukrainian women were often victims of violence. In 2010, the United Nations reported a rate between 20-44% of Ukrainian citizens being affected.⁹ Another set of Ukrainian government statistics was that greater than 44% of women in Ukraine had experienced domestic violence at least once, in comparison to 25% average for European women.¹⁰ The Ukrainian national parliament has even held special hearings on the discrimination of and violence against women.¹¹

Ukraine is ahead of its peer nations on laws addressing violence against women. It was the first former Soviet nation to criminalize human trafficking and to pass laws targeting domestic violence, to include provisions for providing services to victims.¹² Ukraine has, at least in rhetoric and laws, recognized the need to address issues of violence against women, though much work is still necessary to ensure budgets are in place to make the laws effective in practice, and to ensure the culture at home changes to reflect the goals of the laws.

The UN Secretary General's Report on Women, Peace, and Security states, "where cultures of violence and discrimination against women and girls exist prior to conflict, they will be exacerbated during conflict."¹³ This trend is true in Ukraine as well. Due to the hostilities in Eastern Ukraine, domestic violence has increased. In 2014, International Women's Rights Center in Kiev (a national hotline for victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, and gender discrimination) received a total of 7,000 calls, 80 percent related to domestic violence. In the first three months of 2015, the center received more than 2,600 calls, one and a half times the rate of 2014.¹⁴ Women with husbands returning from the war are saying they don't recognize their husbands – they were never violent before. Men are also experiencing their own sexual assaults as a result of combat, including castration as a part of the torture and violence. Since the culture doesn't support the mainstreaming of therapy, men turn to alcohol instead, and ultimately to violence. Women who call the hotline from outside the conflict area can get support, but those that call from within the conflict zone can only talk with counselors over the phone; no police assistance is available to remove them from the situation.

Domestic violence was an issue before the war that has been exacerbated by the conflict. Other issues come from the nature of war itself. According to the United Nations Secretary General's report on women, peace and security, "during conflict, women and girls are vulnerable to all forms of violence, in particular sexual violence and exploitation, including torture, rape, mass rape, forced pregnancy, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution and trafficking."¹⁵ In Serbia, another former Eastern European communist state, rape was used as a weapon of war – often organized and in camps, with estimated numbers of around 20,000 to 50,000 women being affected. The tragedy in Serbia was also the first time that the rape and sexual enslavement were declared as crimes against humanity, "challenging [for the first time] the widespread acceptance of rape and sexual enslavement of women as intrinsic part of war."¹⁶ For Ukraine, the statistics are hard to gather due to the ongoing conflict and current lawlessness of the region. Reports and allegations for both sides of the conflict are being made, reported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.¹⁷ Rape is occurring, though it currently appears to be crimes of opportunity rather than an orchestrated tactic of war ordered by higher authority, such as what happened in Serbia. This does not mean it cannot change, especially as the violence continues.

Finally, though the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have varied between reports, all reports agree that women make up a large percentage of the IDPs. “The on-going conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk has increased insecurity and violence, deepened gender inequality and disproportionately affected women, who make up over 63% of the country’s estimated 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).”¹⁸ Women are often the ones forced to bear the burden of care for families with reduced resources, taking care of children and the elderly. Women in Ukraine already suffer discrimination in the workplace. Additionally, IDPs from the Luhansk and Donetsk are also being discriminated against when searching for employment elsewhere in Ukraine. These two factors coupled indicate that displaced women are at increased risk of being exploited as they desperately seek sources of income to take care of themselves and their families.

As conflict continues in Eastern Ukraine, these vectors of physical violence against women (and the violence against men) demonstrate the need to have a gendered perspective when addressing the human rights needs of the war-torn region. Additionally, as discussed with the study by Hudson et al, the physical violence against women needs to be addressed to ensure the escalation due to the conflict does not become a new norm. Since the physical security of women is a strong correlation with the stability of a nation (peacefulness, relations with neighbors), addressing the physical security of women in Ukraine as a whole and in the conflict regions, in particular, is a foundation for future stability.

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 1325:

In October 2000, the United Nations (UN) passed the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)¹⁹. The resolution recognizes that while women are affected by war, they are often not part of the decisions associated with war: its initiation, its conduct or its resolution. Women and children are often the primary sufferers as the collaterals of war, whether as unarmed civilians caught in the conflict, as displaced persons/refugees, or as victims of targeted attacks, such as rape when used as a tactic of war. As such, one of the primary tenets of the resolution urges signatory states to consider how war affects men and women differently, requiring a gendered perspective in decisions about the conduct of war, its aftermath and in peacekeeping operations. Gendered perspective is a consideration by both the men and women who are decision-makers. It is not the sole responsibility of women who participate.

The resolution also acknowledges the role that women need to have in “conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict recovery, and peace-building.”²⁰ While women suffer from war and are instrumental in bringing stability to post-conflict regions, they are often not included in decision-making roles in its resolution, due to the lack of representation in senior leadership positions, politically or militarily. Often, only the combatants are negotiators in peace settlements, though the discussions often have a vast impact on civilian matters of stability and governance. Without the presence of women in the negotiations, atrocities committed against women have often been given immunity without the consent of the victims. UNSCR 1325 argues that not only is a gendered perspective required, but the active inclusion of women is necessary to both ensure the needs of women are addressed, but to ensure lasting peace due to the unique perspectives on community, stability, and negotiations that women bring to the table.

Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are all signatories of UNSCR 1325. As of 2016, sixty countries have instituted National Action Plans in support of UNSCR 1325, including the United States and Ukraine. Though Russia is a signatory on the resolution, it does not have a National Action Plan to ensure its implementation within Russia.²¹ NATO is also committed to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and has claimed numerous benefits to their operations. “It has given us better access to the local population, more popular support, better information, better situational awareness, and smarter interventions with less risks and better outcomes.”²² NATO has appointed a Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security, who has actively engaged with Ukraine and with their adoption of their National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.²³

WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS:

The UN Secretary General report on Women, Peace, and Security, states that “peace negotiations and peace accords lay the foundation for rebuilding societies after conflict. They commonly determine the political, civil, economic and social structures in post-conflict situations. Concerns specific to women do not always reach the negotiating table. This is particularly so in the absence of women’s participation.”²⁴ When “UN Women²⁵ sampled 31 major peace processes between 1992 and 2011 and analyzed them for gender participation, [they] found that women made up only 4 percent of signatories, 2.4 percent of chief mediators, 3.7 percent of witnesses to peace agreement signings, and 9 percent of negotiators... In 2011, only 4 of 14 UN-supported mediation processes included any women as members of the negotiating parties.”²⁶ Without actively seeking out women for participation, they will most likely not be present at the negotiating table.

“Peace agreements that focus solely on ending the fighting fail to address the vital tasks necessary for sustaining a genuine peace, including: providing security and basic services, reintegrating combatants into society, building trust amongst opposing parties, fostering institutions that can uphold the rule of law, and promoting legitimately-elected leadership.”²⁷ A case study of women participating in North Ireland’s peace talks between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British government is a success story resulting in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The mediator, U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland, George Mitchell, suggested multiparty talks including the top 10 political parties by vote versus just the largest and main political parties – this enabled local political parties to participate. Women’s groups in Northern Ireland saw their opportunity to participate and formed a non-partisan party that spanned the IRA/British divide and ended up being the key negotiators between the two main opposing factions. Final hesitancy by the IRA to give up violence was eradicated when 9/11 tragedy of the United States proved the horrors of violence. In July 2002, in the spirit of the GFA, the IRA made a “first ever public statement of apology to the families of noncombatants that were victims of their attacks over the time period of the Troubles.”²⁸ “If [the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition] had not been at the table, there may not have been a chapter on reconciliation. It was the women’s coalition that put those words in [the agreement] and talked about paying attention to young people and resources for our youth in the future.”²⁹ Though there is still disagreement in Northern Ireland about the future, e.g. remain in the United Kingdom versus a United Ireland, the divergent parties have both agreed not to pursue violence to resolve their differences.³⁰

The Lusaka Protocol ending Angola's civil war is an example of peace negotiations that neglected women in the peace process. It was originally touted as "gender neutral" in that there was no discrimination against women in any provision of the agreement. However, there was no advocacy for women's issues either. Of the forty members of the talks, zero were women, and there was no discussion on addressing internal displacement, sexual violence, abuses by the government, or the rebuilding of social services. Amnesty was given to atrocities committed during the war, which included rape, and no thought was given for the reintegration of the male combatants back into their communities, causing increases in "alcoholism, drug abuse, divorce, and domestic violence."³¹ Society was not rebuilt, nor was true peace restored. These and other issues of instability all contributed to the even breakdown of the peace and violence erupted again. Though the conflict and the cultures in Angola and Ukraine are dissimilar, lessons can still be drawn. Reintegration issues causing increased domestic violence is a known issue in Ukraine, and amnesty given to human rights atrocities is something to ensure does not happen in Ukraine.

Evidence that women's participation in peace negotiations strengthens the peace process is currently empirical, i.e. there are plenty of case studies. However there is a lack of hard data and academic analytics – women's role in security has been neglected as a topic of interest in academia (one of the reasons why the 2009 Hudson study is considered groundbreaking). However, there is plenty of "hard data" on how women's involvement and gender equality improves the performance in other areas such as economics, agricultural productivity, food security, water and sewage services, and corruption in government.³² Additionally, there is research that "has found a correlation between more inclusive and open models of negotiations and a higher likelihood that the resulting agreements will hold, preventing a relapse into conflict."³³ Women who do participate tend to look towards their own interests, such as quotas for elections, land and property rights, redress for sexual and gender-based crimes, and equitable distribution of jobs. Nonetheless, complying with these demands not only addresses the atrocities committed against women but also improves the social stability of their communities. Women's employment in the public sector ensures greater access to services to the overall population.³⁴ Since women make up a significant percentage of heads of households during conflict, giving them access to jobs reduces their dependency on high-risk/low pay employment, which women are otherwise forced to seek. The money women do earn goes into the caretaking of their families, again improving the stability of the community.³⁵ "Countries with only 10 percent of women in the labor force are nearly 30 times more likely to experience internal conflict than states with 40 percent of women in the labor force."³⁶ These additional findings backed by academic research strengthen the empirical data regarding women's important role in negotiations.

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN UKRAINE:

If national level or military leadership is the source of participants for the peacemaking process in Ukraine, women may not be present. Women have a traditional role in Ukrainian society, and this traditional view of women's role in society manifests itself in low representation at higher levels of government and other senior leadership positions.³⁷ In a 2011 study by the Ukrainian Women's Fund, found no woman holding chairmanships posts in a variety of regional and national councils, Cabinet of Ministers or Parliament.³⁸ However, this is not due to a lack of women's interest in politics. At the local levels, women are 51% of village councils, 46% of town councils, and 28% of municipal councils.³⁹

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In the current political climate, Ukraine can be described as a nation in transition. There are examples of the Ukrainian government making progress towards gender equality, while at the same time evidence that there still remains a long road until it becomes real. Ukraine is ahead of its neighbor, Russia, in its rhetorical commitment to improving women's status and ahead in actual actions including protection under the law. "Faced with the foreign aggression, Ukraine, in close cooperation with its international partners, is making efforts to address gender imbalances and to modernize its national gender policies with the view to promoting the full-fledged and effective participation of women in public and politico-military life."⁴⁰ The government of Ukraine is, at least notionally, calling for the empowerment of women. "Ukraine was one of the first countries in the world to adopt a constitutional guarantee of gender equality,"⁴¹ and at least under the law, women have the same status and rights as men.⁴²

Lt Gen Victor Muzhenko, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, has called for the removal of barriers preventing women from serving in greater numbers and in a greater variety of roles within the military. Ukraine's military is currently 8.2% women, compared to a NATO average of 10.3%. He has appointed a Gender Advisor (though only at the rank of Army Captain) to the Minister of Defense to oversee the implementation of Ukraine's National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace, and Security.⁴³

Based on the Ukrainian government's previous actions to address gender equality, the inclusion of women in the peace process would most likely be met openly and willingly, though may not be independently pursued. When opportunities for peace present itself, women must be actively sought out to have a place at the negotiating table, with particular attention paid to local leadership who have insight into grievances of and have relationships with the local population. The separatists and their Russian backers would also have to be encouraged to include women at the negotiating table. The fact that Russia is a signatory on UNSCR 1325 can be used as leverage to remind Russia to bring women to the table.

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION:

Some may argue that Russia's aggressive behavior in Ukraine is a problem with roots much deeper than just how women are treated domestically. While the protection of women is a noble cause, it will not affect the security of the theater without the willing cooperation from Russia. Additionally, even with the inclusion of women into peace negotiations, creating a notable agreement, there is no guarantee that Russia will value the document anymore than the value of the paper it is written on. Russia has started a trend of ignoring past treaties and negotiations in its pursuit of regional hegemony.

The situation in East Ukraine is one that was exploited by Russia to foment unrest. However, negotiations with the separatists in Eastern Ukraine is not quite the same as negotiating with Russia itself. Since one of the tenets of counterinsurgency is the importance of legitimacy of the government, the role of the peace negotiations is to bring resolution to the grievances of the separatist Ukrainians. The aim is to reduce the instability that Russia was able to exploit. Bringing women into negotiations is about improving the likelihood that grievances of the local community are addressed and improving the legitimacy of the ensuing peace, reducing but not necessarily eliminating the likelihood of relapse.

Addressing the physical security of women is not being claimed as an immediate solution to the region's insecurity – it is a long-term foundational issue and can take generations to take hold. Addressing the security of women in Ukraine is important to improve the stability of Ukraine, but it is also necessary within Russia, as well. However, addressing Russia's issues will require finesse in the use of the diplomatic levers of national power since they are not actively seeking Western support. Russia's domestic violence is a serious problem – even with the prevalence of underreporting on domestic violence, official statistics from Russia show a staggering 17,000 women per year die as a result of domestic violence, compared to 1,300 women in the United States⁴⁴. Russia's laws are in desperate need of updating to make domestic violence a specific crime; they also need to implement a budget that can fund support to victims, such as call centers or shelters, and to prosecute crimes.⁴⁵ Addressing the physical security of women in the short term is a human rights concern, which is an end in and of itself. Like the human rights campaign in the Cold War, women's rights can be leveraged as a non-provocative issue when engaging Russia diplomatically.

CONCLUSIONS

As Senator Robert Menendez said to Secretary Kerry, urging him to implement the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, "...the ultimate long-term defense against Russian aggression is a strong, democratic Ukrainian government and civil society."⁴⁶ Ukraine is working to set itself up on the path towards becoming a stronger, democratic nation-state. While the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine continues, Ukraine and any foreign support must ensure that the tenets of UNSCR 1325 are included as one on the lines of effort for countering the insurgency, stabilizing the area and setting the foundations for a lasting peace.

The physical violence against women is a strong indicator of the aggressiveness of nations. Addressing this problem during the crisis and in the negotiations for peace will set foundational principles for long-term stability as well as the moral imperative of addressing any human rights abuses caused by the conflict.

UNSCR 1325 provides guidance on how to address the physical security of women in the situation in Ukraine. Based on its tenets, a gendered perspective is required during any operations in Luhansk and Donetsk, whether from external help (NATO, UN Peacekeeping, US Central Command) or by Ukraine itself as it seeks to resolve the crisis. Additionally, beyond just having a gendered perspective, women must be active participants during any discussion or negotiations for peace or reconciliation. Women's participation is strongly correlated with stability of the ensuing peace and brings legitimacy to the process. Due to the lack of women in senior political or military positions in Ukraine, they must be actively sought

out for participation. The fact that Russia is a signatory of UNSCR 1325, must be used as leverage to encourage separatists to also bring women to the negotiating table.

Addressing physical security of women is not a short-term fix for the aggressiveness in Russia. However, Russia does have a poor set of laws and weak support to women as victims of domestic violence. Leveraging diplomacy, getting Russia to address the physical security of women domestically should be a non-provocative means to sow the seeds for long-term stability for the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A gender advisor is necessary at the various levels of planning and execution (i.e. strategic, operational, tactical). The advisor is there to ensure that the different needs and experiences of men and women are taken into consideration when planning for and executing any counterinsurgency or peacekeeping operations.

In addressing physical violence of women, seek out support from civil authorities, international organizations and non-governmental organizations for their expertise.

In any opportunity for further negotiations for peace, ensure women are participants. Several options to increase inclusion include: seek out local women's groups that are familiar with the community and women's specific needs; require a quota for the negotiating parties; or increase the number of representative parties to increase the likelihood that local community leadership, including women, will be elected to participate in the negotiations.

Ensure rape as a weapon of war is treated as a crime against humanity, properly prosecuted and not included in any amnesty packages.

Provide advice and assistance to the Ukrainian armed forces and to the separatists who choose to discontinue fighting on how to repatriate combatants into society and how to address trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Ensure aid and programs targeting displaced persons and refugees understand the specific needs of women and provide adequate security to ensure their safety.

Encourage Ukraine to continue making progress in addressing women's issues: both gender equality in the government and military, and in addressing crimes against women.

Leverage the UNSCR 1325 as a means for diplomatic relations with Russia with regard to the crisis in Ukraine

Use diplomatic channels to encourage Russia to promote gender equality and improve laws targeting domestic abuse, prosecution of abusers and support for victims.

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NOT JUST ENABLERS ANYMORE: WOMEN IN SOF

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PAPER ABSTRACT

Not Just Enablers Anymore: Women in SOF

According to USSOCOM commander, the past decade of warfare has proven that women are necessary on the battlefield for our nation to achieve its objectives. This coupled with the fact that today's battlefields have no defined frontlines has contributed to the recent repeal of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. This action has opened all Special Operations positions up to women. Despite 98 percent of the U.S. military already being integrated, there still exists a significant hesitation to integrate combat units, to include Special Operations Forces. For integration to have the intended benefits to our national security posture, we must create an environment that reduces anxiety caused by change, fear of the unknown and unfamiliar, misinformation, mistaken perceptions and inaccurate stereotypes. Reframing expectations will help reduce these challenges and the reluctance to integrate. In order to efficiently and effectively integrate women into newly opened Special Operations Forces positions, expectation management must occur for leaders, existing unit members and the women entering these units reinforcing the following: women will meet or exceed the standards; gender is an Additional Skill Identifier; leadership will ensure good order and discipline; unit cohesion will not change; women bring increased diversity and collective intelligence.

Not Just Enablers Anymore: Women in SOF

*"I never saw a wild thing sorry for itself.
A small bird will drop frozen dead from a bough
without ever having felt sorry for itself."
-D.H. Lawrence*

Expectation management is defined as, "a formal process to continuously capture, document, and maintain the content, dependencies, and sureness of the expectations for persons participating in an interaction, and to apply the information to make the interaction successful."² The U.S. military has done a poor job in recent times accurately capturing and projecting the performance of women in service. The recent roles of women in service and the repeal of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (DGCDAR) have triggered the process of gender integration into Special Operations Forces (SOF). Through dissection of research, dialogue and events, it is clear that expectation management must be modernized to efficiently and effectively integrate women into SOF.

THE EVOLUTION

Women in Service

It is well accepted that the frontlines of today's battlefields are undefined. This has created a discrepancy in how the U.S. military traditionally maintains segregation between non-combat troops and the enemy. In 2005, Sergeant Leigh Ann Hester was the first female Soldier since WWII to be awarded the Silver Star with Valor for her actions in Iraq:

On 20 March 2005, in Iraq... While serving as the Team Leader for RAVEN 42B in the 617th Military Police Company, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), 18th Military Police Brigade, Sergeant Hester led her soldiers on a counterattack of anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) who were ambushing a convoy with heavy AK-47 assault rifle fire, PRK machine gun fire, and rocket propelled grenades. Sergeant Hester maneuvered her team through the kill zone into a flanking position where she assaulted a trench line with grenades and M-203 rounds. She then cleared two trenches with her Squad Leader where she engaged and eliminated 3 AIF with her M-4 rifle. Her actions saved the lives of numerous convoy members. Sergeant Hester's bravery is in keeping with the finest traditions of military heroism and reflects distinct credit upon herself, the 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), the 18th Military Police Brigade, and the United States Army.³

Though she was both a Military Police Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), which is considered a "combat support" Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), as well as a female, the enemy did not show regard to the U.S. 1994 Department of Defense Policy, the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, which excluded women from units and positions whose main mission was to engage in direct ground combat. Military Police units are fully gender-integrated and are often used for missions such as presence patrols, cordon and searches, convoy security and raids. One could argue that these missions are direct

ground combat missions in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. Sergeant Hester's experience was by no means an anomaly.⁴ As of 27 April 2016, the Defense Casualty Analysis System reported over 1,000 U.S. military women wounded in action, and 160 making the ultimate sacrifice in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).⁵ In addition, over 1800 Combat Action Badges have been awarded to women.⁶

In 2010 a Request for Forces (RFF) from Special Operations Command, Central Command (SOCCENT), solidified and officially documented the necessity for female support to Special Operations. The RFF specifically requested female screeners to support all-male Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan who were limited in their ability to accomplish mission requirements due to cultural sensitivities surrounding gender. This RFF had come after several similar requests by both Army conventional forces and Marine Special Operations Command Forces which respectively formed the Female Engagement Teams and the Lioness Programs operating in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The RFF from SOCCENT formed what became known as the Cultural Support Teams (CSTs).⁷

The Cultural Support Team program was actively providing female teams to SOF elements operating in Afghanistan from 2011 through 2014 before it was officially deactivated due to drawdowns. These female teams were assigned to U.S. Army Special Forces detachments, 75th Ranger Regiment elements, and Naval Special Warfare SEAL teams to enhance mission capabilities by gaining access, building rapport, conducting tactical questioning, conducting physical searches, and messaging, with a focus on women and children in theater. The teams supported the full spectrum of operations from Special Warfare to Surgical Strike.⁸

Though the CSTs fulfilled mission requirements and then some, the increase in capability by female enablers did not come without disadvantages. The teams were a hasty answer to a pervasive battlefield capability gap. They were thinly deployed on short timelines with minimal training and exposure to SOF. They often arrived with little to no forewarning to the units they were enabling and were initially received with hesitation. As outsiders, time was required for the CSTs to prove themselves a worthwhile capability. In addition, when a non-organic asset or enabler is embedded into mission execution, the gaining unit assumes a greater amount of risk. This increased risk is due to non-organic assets lacking experience with the gaining unit's operating procedures. Adding a CST to a small SOF unit meant the unit gained an additional person to protect, often compounded by losing a shooter due to maximum transportation capacity. Despite CSTs proving extremely beneficial, they could not always be included on every mission.

The SOF Truths state: Special Operations cannot be mass produced and they cannot be created after emergencies occur. SOF are rigorously assessed, carefully selected and exceptionally trained. There exists a small percentage of people who have the capacity to function in the environments demanded of SOF. In addition, it takes a lot of time to train mission ready SOF, deployable on nearly immediate notice. Undesirably, these SOF truths are explicitly contradictory to what the CST program was tasked to do. The CST program was forced to reactively develop a program to recruit, assess, select and train hundreds of

female Soldiers under extreme time constraints who would only be temporarily attached to SOF units.

DGCDAR REPEAL

After the initial wave of CSTs hit Afghanistan in 2011, COL Ellen Haring and SGM Jane Baldwin filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government in May 2012, challenging the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule. The lawsuit claimed violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause and requested military assignments to be made without regard to gender.⁹ In addition, during the same year, the Army opened up about 13,000 positions to women, shortly followed by another 36,000, including the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the U.S. Army Special Operations aviation wing.

On 24 January 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff announced the repeal of the DGCDAR which lifted the exclusion of women from units and positions whose main mission is to engage in direct ground combat. Many argue that over the past decade, the DGCDAR has become unenforceable and obsolete.¹⁰ Moreover, the DGCDAR also created an obstacle to combat units in meeting mission objectives by eliminating access to 50 percent of the population. On 6 January 2015, the Secretary of the Army approved the provisional opening and assessment of the U.S. Army Ranger School to begin with Ranger Class 06-15 on 20 April 2015.¹¹ In the fall of 2015, the first ever female Rangers, two West Point Military Academy graduates, Captain Kristen Griest and 1st Lieutenant Shaye Haver, earned their tabs. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command directed all SOF components to review current training standards and submit recommendations for gender-neutral standards with a suspense of 1 July 2015.¹² Based on recommendations by the military service secretaries, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter officially opened all combat jobs to women in January 2016. As of today, all the Special Operations specialties are open to women.

EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT

Despite successful gender integration of 98 percent of our military, there still exists a significant reluctance to complete integration particularly among all-male combat units. Research shows closed-gender units have a pervasive and overwhelmingly inflated expectation of increased risk associated with gender integration when compared to mixed-gender units.¹³ This inflated expectation of risk includes those members in our military's Special Operations units. Research also shows a "deep and wide" resistance to opening SOF specialties to women accompanied by high levels of "deep-seated and intensely felt" opposition across all SOF elements.¹⁴ Anxiety caused by change, fear of the unknown and unfamiliar, misinformation, mistaken perceptions, and inaccurate stereotypes are the foundations for reluctance to integrate. The media has bombarded the public with numerous reasons why women should not be allowed in combat units, why it is a bad idea, and why it won't work. There exists the perception that integrating women into Special Operations will change the elite culture. Arguments typically center on women's physical abilities, or lack thereof. Concerns proclaim that integrating women will degrade SOF's effectiveness as well as decrease cohesion and morale. Expectations create bias, and bias in this case creates an intolerant environment dissuading gender integration. In order to create an environment

where gender integration will have the intended benefit for our military, the military must update its expectations. It is clear our nation's top leadership sees gender integration as necessary, but it is our operational and tactical level leadership that need to embrace the concept for it to improve and advance our war fighting capability. In order to efficiently and effectively integrate women into newly opened Special Operations Forces positions, expectation management must occur for leaders, existing unit members and the women entering these units by reinforcing the following: women will meet or exceed the standards; gender is an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI); leadership will ensure good order and discipline; unit cohesion will not change; women bring increased diversity and collective intelligence.

MODERNIZING EXPECTATIONS

Women Will Meet or Exceed the Standards

First and foremost, Special Operations standards for assessment, selection and training will not change, period. The Commander, USSOCOM ensured validation of assessment and training standards based on operational requirements. A single gender-neutral standard will be enforced.¹⁵ A single standard is the fundamental and proverbial foundation on which every aspect of successful integration lays. Without it, existing unit members will not trust new unit members, and new unit members will not have the necessary credibility to be accepted.

Expect the standards will be enforced, and most likely, enforced with extreme rigor. Learning from the initial integration of Ranger School courses, research documented that standards were not only enforced, they were hardened. The data on Darby Phase pass ratings show a statistically significant anomaly between Go (passing) and No-Go (failing) ratings between all-male teams and integrated teams. Where 31 percent of all-male teams received a pass rating on patrol evaluations, only 16 percent of teams with a female on them received pass ratings.¹⁶ Whether the explanation for this is confirmation bias, pressure from non-supporters, or observer bias, data demonstrates that being female or having a female on your team decreased the likelihood of receiving a pass rating by 15 percent. When these Darby Phase patrol evaluation statistics are compared to peer evaluations, they become even more significant. Male and female peer evaluations were on par, as were the percentage rates of Ranger Assessment Phase (RAP) passes: 47 percent of men passed and 42 percent of women passed, the typical RAP week pass rate being 44 percent.¹⁷ Arguably, both peer evaluations and RAP week events were quantitatively graded equally whereas Darby Phase patrol evaluations, which potentially lend themselves to increased subjective biases, were (according to statistics) graded more rigorously. This comparison carries the connotation that the standards for women were potentially hardened.

Second, women will meet or exceed the standards. There are women capable of the requirements to effectively operate in SOF, and they are not an anomaly. Just as the top male contenders are drawn to the elite challenges of SOF, the top female contenders are as well. Research shows that training and experience are much more accurate predictors of physical performance than are gender generalities.¹⁸ In other words, one should remove gender from the equation because it creates faulty assumptions based on inaccurate stereotypes. This

flawed way of thinking submits individual abilities to the tyranny of averages and discounts an individual's potential before it can even be evaluated.¹⁹ What is traditionally seen in gender-integrated units is that overall performance levels increase because the women work harder to be accepted by the men and the men work harder not to be outdone by the women.²⁰ Expect that gender-neutral standards will be enforced and that women will meet or exceed those standards.

Gender is an Additional Skill Identifier

Integrating women will increase SOF's effectiveness. A historical review of warfare particularly of the past decade, illustrates the significant role of women on the battlefield. As mentioned earlier, programs such as the Female Engagement Teams, the Lioness Program, and the Cultural Support Teams, have illustrated both the requirement for and the advantage of women involved in combat operations. Our enemies have recognized and exploited our vulnerability of not having women in combat units. Reports indicate the enemy's use of women, and men dressed as women, to conduct attacks, conceal sensitive items, and hide persons of interest because of our inability to engage, search and speak to women.²¹ Only engaging half of the population on the battlefield is an extreme disadvantage in conducting operations. By including women in SOF we are gaining the opportunity to engage the "primary conveyor of norms: women."²²

Adding women to Special Operations will increase organic capability. Women provide access and placement that men alone simply cannot achieve. Women allow teams to engage an entire population which facilitates the ability to collect intelligence and increase situational awareness. Women increase security postures by conducting physical searches, and deescalating situations. Women allow for a lower profile when conducting sensitive operations. Women provide ample opportunity in elicitation, network development and low-level source operations. As Mullen points out, "the different perception matters."²³ Women are viewed differently than men, even when working side-by-side. Culturally, around the globe, women are viewed as less threatening which results in a lower profile and increased trust. In summation, women are force multipliers that can add an advantage in virtually every SOF activity, mission, or operation.

Having women organically assigned to units negates a vast majority of the disadvantages associated with female enablers as seen with the CSTs. Organic female operators have the added benefit of being a trusted team member with the same training and experience as their male counterparts. They are a primary trigger puller rather than an extra mouth to feed and outsider to protect. They will bring the expected skill sets of an operator first supplemented by the additional skill identifier of being female, capable of things a male simply cannot do. Steinberg provides the following wisdom:

If they want to know where the next rebel attack is going to occur, they should not just talk to regional governors or military commanders; they should ask the women in the marketplace, whose families' safety depends on having the latest information. If they want to know whether reforms of the justice and security sectors are working, they should not just talk to the judges or the generals; they should ask women in the community who are seeking justice

or who are asking the police and army for protection and safety. If they want to know whether their programs to reintegrate ex-combatants are effective, they should not just talk to the camp managers or demobilization organizers; they should ask the women who are the eyes, ears, and conscience of the communities where these fighters are being returned.²⁴

In Admiral McRaven's words, adding women adds diversity to a team and, "diversity begets diverse perceptions and observations; situational awareness is enhanced and the SOF operators become more effective."²⁵ Expect women to bring increased capabilities and increased effectiveness in conducting special operations.

Leadership Will Ensure Good Order and Discipline

Special Operations leadership is exceptional and will ensure good order and discipline. Special Operations Forces embrace the ethic and culture of being "quiet professionals." SOF is a values-based organization, always mindful that personal and professional conduct reflects upon themselves and the nation. They are focused on contributing to the mission at hand and being a well-integrated part of the team, unconcerned with who gets the credit, recognizing that much of what SOF does remains in the shadows.²⁶ This deep-seated morality and culture is what SOF leaders and SOF operators embody. This existing backbone of SOF culture as articulated by Special Operations Command lends itself to gender integration without change. Professionalism, discipline, mission-focus, teamwork and humility are the principle ideals crucial to effective integration and implementation of women in SOF.

Research shows that one of the top concerns of both existing SOF unit members as well as the women who would consider entering SOF are issues surrounding sexual harassment and sexual assault. Men are afraid of accusations and women are concerned with becoming victims.²⁷ This issue is not one to be taken lightly in that it has the potential to deter women from entering the ranks, and preventing effective integration of the women who do. Leadership must ensure a balance between discipline and professionalism while avoiding gender segregation or alienation. Leaders must pursue complete integration of all training and view all war fighters the same regardless of gender. Leaders must expect and demand open dialogue of any issues from the onset. Silence, segregation and sexual tension will kill a team. Leaders must demand co-respect and active, open dialogue. Expect SOF leadership to ensure good order and discipline.

Unit Cohesion Will Not Change

Cohesion is produced by common experience, not by gender. Studies show virtually no variation in task cohesion levels between integrated and non-integrated units.²⁸ Researchers make a distinction between task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion is the shared commitment group members have toward accomplishing a goal whereas social cohesion is the extent to which people like each other.²⁹ Time and shared experiences will build unit task cohesion. All members of the unit will have met the same elite standards to obtain a place on the team and will be working towards the same objective: mission accomplishment. "When the group has some history and members have gained information about each other's competence, sex differences in interaction style tend to disappear."³⁰ In other words,

research supports the fact that trust and cohesion increase with time as opposite-gender personnel work together.

Losing and replacing teammates before deployment has a significant impact on cohesion and unit effectiveness. Deployment readiness due to pregnancy or female specific issues will be of minimal significance. Statistics show that there are much higher rates of disciplinary issues among men affecting readiness such as unauthorized absenteeism and absence from actions causing legal detention.³¹ Percentage wise, military men lose 67 percent more work time than women even when including pregnancy.³² Pregnancy is the least of a unit's concerns and is unlikely to have impact on unit cohesion. Expect that unit cohesion will not change with gender integration.

Women Bring Collective Intelligence

Expect SOF to become more intelligent with the integration of women. Collective Intelligence theory holds that teams are more intelligent and make better decisions when women are included.³³ Research demonstrates a positive correlation between group intelligence and the percentage of women participating.³⁴ Research also shows clear links "between organizational success and the number of women in the most successful organization."³⁴ One study shows that civilian companies with more women on their boards outperformed rivals with 42 percent higher sales returns, 66 percent higher invested capital returns and 53 percent higher equity returns.³⁶ Research also demonstrates that including women in operations will create longer lasting solutions. This increase in performance is likely due to the fact that diversity enhances a team's effectiveness by bringing "different experiences, values, attitudes and cognitive approaches."³⁷ In addition, "varied knowledge and perspectives enhance the team's creativity and problem-solving ability," especially when it comes to complex tasks.³⁸ The Military Leadership Diversity Commission recognizes that "diversity can increase military agility and responsiveness."³⁹ Perhaps more so in SOF than anywhere else, this advantage in complex-problem solving ability is priceless. The human element in SOF operations makes nearly every mission a complex problem that requires solving. Success in SOF requires innovative approaches while considering multiple perspectives and second and third order effects, an environment in dire need of superior intelligence and decision making abilities. Expect the integration of women to bring increased collective intelligence.

CONCLUSION

Both academic research and current demands on the battlefield clearly illustrate the operational requirement for women at the front. Our leadership has recognized this and has taken actions to fill this vital capability gap. In order to provide our nation with the most effective military force possible, we must make integration a no fail mission. We must maintain an increased level of combat readiness during this critical time while our nation is facing a multitude of threats. Expectation management is a key element that will facilitate the integration process to occur efficiently and effectively. We must recognize, accept and be prepared for integration of women that will meet and exceed the SOF standards. We must optimize and exploit the capabilities organic female operators bring to the fight. Leaders must ensure professionalism to mitigate harmful distractions to the integration process.

Ensuring absolute integration will reinforce team cohesion and morale. And last, we must use the increase in diversity and collective intelligence to enhance SOF's effectiveness.

Contrary to some feminist arguments surrounding this topic, traditional gender roles and associated stereotypes are still relevant in the U.S. and around the world. However, at the same time, the U.S. has witnessed a dramatic cultural shift surrounding women's gender roles. Decades of trail blazers have shaped strong, capable women who have proven themselves as worthy warriors on the battlefield. In addition, simply by being women, female Soldiers bring a set of diverse and unique capabilities to combat operations which make them both invaluable and necessary to SOF's mission set. Fully integrating women into our military is an issue of national security. As members of the U.S. military, it is our responsibility to ensure our nation is armed with the most effective fighting force possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A historical review of women in combat clearly demonstrates that women serving in combat is nothing new. Women have participated in combat since the beginning of war in all female combat units, in mixed-gender units, as individual warriors and as military leaders.⁴⁰ Looking to history as well as modern lessons learned provides the overwhelming case that women strengthen military effectiveness in war and exposes how they have done it. Education is key to modernizing gender related expectations.

The Next Evolution

So where do we go from here? Do not change a single standard. This would be detrimental to successful integration. A single standard is the single most significant factor to mission readiness and successful integration. From identical packing lists, to field conditions and combat readiness requirements, warriors are warriors; be gender blind in enforcing standards. Educate and train employment of gender as an Additional Skill Identifier. Recognize when and where using female operators will create force multiplying effects. Exploit the value of diversity and collective intelligence in planning and mission execution. Reinforce professional standards of good order and discipline without making gender an issue. Use common sense and emphasize existing SOF values and culture; respect for a teammate is respect for the mission. Actively seek opportunities for team building to prevent segregation of team members. Building both social and task cohesion strengthens a team exponentially. And last, be cognizant of your expectations and the effects they create.

A Message to the Women

Understand the extremely skewed cultural dynamic into which you are entering. As Powell points out, you are going in as the "token" female. Because you are highly visible, you will face additional performance pressure. Your "differences" from the men are going to be exaggerated. As a female, you will be stereotyped in a distorted manner.⁴¹ Take note that the behavior of one "token" is perceived as representative of all tokens in an organization and that as a female you will likely, at least initially, have difficulty gaining trust of your male counterparts and may be excluded from informal networks.⁴² You will have to constantly demonstrate your competence to reaffirm your fellow Soldiers.⁴³ Be aware of the

phenomenon of "boundary heightening" where the dominate group will purposely exclude the minority tokens and leave you with few options to respond. Research articulates that tokens typically either accept isolation, opting for friendly but distant relations with the male members of the team, or they try to become insiders by defining themselves as exceptional members of their sex and turning against other women who attempt to join the group.⁴⁴ The challenge to you is to define a new response by setting the example that you are not an exception, and to become a mentor and role model for those who will undoubtedly follow you. Expect challenges in evaluations and promotions, and dismissal of capabilities despite meeting the same standards. Expect to have to exceed the standards to gain credibility. You are in for a hard road ahead in every way you can imagine. Be prepared physically, mentally, emotionally and spiritually. Though it may not feel like it at times, your nation thanks you for taking on this difficult, yet very achievable, challenge.

A Message to SOF Leadership

Women in our military are hungry for the opportunity to serve in SOF. They are extremely motivated and ready to train and fight hard. It would be a mistake not to use this momentum to exploit this untapped talent and mental drive to better your units. When gender is taken into account, it should only be done in the context of an added capability. In order for women to be effectively integrated it is critical that command teams up and down the chain of command echo the Secretary of Defense and USSOCOM Commander's mantra that women are essential to the mission and that the mission could not be accomplished without them.⁴⁵ As Schein points out, "it can be argued that the only thing of real importance that leaders do is to create and manage culture; that the unique talent of leaders is their ability to understand and work with culture; and that it is an ultimate act of leadership to destroy culture when it is viewed as dysfunctional."⁴⁶ In other words, reframing expectations to create an environment conducive to successful integration is your job. Our nation is depending on you to ensure our forces are the best in the world and remain ready to execute when called upon to do so. This is one of those times.

Remembering

Ashley White, CST - KIA 10/22/11 Kandahar,
Jennifer Moreno, CST - KIA 10/6/13 Zhari,
and those who have paved the way forward for our military
to be the greatest fighting force in the world.

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CURRENT TOPICS GLOBAL AND MILITARY

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DON'T MARRY A PIRATE: WOMEN'S GROUPS DETERRENCE OF PIRATE ACTION GROUPS IN SOMALIA

Ben Lawellin and Michaela Monahan

6/1/2017



Piracy in Somalia has been a problem for the Horn of Africa region, global shipping, seafarers from around the world, and for Somalis themselves. Billions of dollars have been spent on combatting piracy, and thousands of seafarers have suffered at the hands of pirates. On shore in Somalia, piracy is exacerbated by problems of illegal fishing and fears of violent extremism. In Oceans Beyond Piracy's seven years of experience confronting Somali piracy, we have understand that women in Somali coastal communities could have a deterrence effect on piracy by dissuading youth through familial aspects in Somali culture. Acknowledging that related activities to those discussed in this paper could be going on in Somalia and their sensitivities, this paper will not go into depth on these activities. This paper argues that applying Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) methods to combatting piracy could be effective, and that a likely course of action in CVE could be through engaging women and families in coastal communities in piracy prone regions.

BACKGROUND ON SOMALI PIRACY

Somali piracy leaped on to the world stage in 2008 with the hijacking of the MV Feisty Gas and has continued to draw global attention for years. Between 2008 and 2017 over 5,000 seafarers were held hostage by Somali pirates, many of them for several years at a time. Seafarer hostages were often subjected to both psychological and physical abuse at the hands of their captors. The thousands of seafarers who have returned to their regular lives after being held hostage have had significant challenges of reintegration and coping with the fear and the uncertainty of their experiences.¹

¹ After the Release: The Long Term Behavioral Impact of Piracy on Seafarers and Families. Conor Seyle June 24, 2016. <http://www.oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/after-release-impact-seafarers.pdf>

The State of Piracy Report by Oceans Beyond Piracy has tracked both the economic and human costs of piracy since 2010. At the height of Somali piracy in 2010 nearly 7 billion USD was spent on combatting piracy.² In the intervening years these costs have decreased, the 2016 economic cost was roughly 1.7 billion USD and the number of seafarers being held hostage is only 8 as of this writing.³

WHAT DOES PIRACY LOOK LIKE IN SOMALIA?

Somali piracy is organized crime which operates on a fairly complex business model that requires multiple elements for success. In a typical Somali pirate attack, pirate leadership organizes an attack team of pirates who set out to sea in a small boat searching for a vulnerable vessel. The vessel is hijacked first by shooting at it and then attempting to board the vessel. If successfully hijacked the pirates will subdue the crew, take over the vessel and steer it back to a safe anchorage on the Somali coast. The safe anchorage is a key feature in the business model as it allows the pirates to engage in long term negotiations with the intention of securing a ransom. Negotiations can range from months to years in some cases. Once concluded the vessel and crew is released. The safe anchorage is usually a secure harbor controlled by the pirate's clan. The negotiation phase is critical to whether the community supports or rejects piracy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOMALI COMMUNITIES

Community, and in particular clan affiliation, plays a strong role in the identity of Somalis. Somali communities exist in three broad forms, nomadic pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and urban communities. Coastal communities, which are the focus of this report are the agro-pastoralist as these communities are static and generally do not move around along the coastline. These communities' livelihoods largely depend upon fishing which have been significantly impacted by illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. In a 2016 survey conducted by Oceans Beyond Piracy in the Galmudug region of Somalia, a region prone to pirate activity, the survey indicated that "Members from the community provide support to piracy operations to gain more profit. They provide food, fuel, khat (miraa leaves), and ammunitions to pirates. Those members see this as a lucrative business. If they pay a loan of \$10,000 in food, khat, fuel, and etc, they may be re-reimbursed a \$100,000, when pirates receive the ransom."⁴ This dynamic exemplifies the relationship between the community and the pirates. As the success of the Somali piracy business model rests upon the need for a safe location to anchor the hijacked vessel, the acceptance of the community to piracy is critical. Below we explore why engaging with women's groups in these communities can be a good approach for leveraging community support against piracy and improving capacity of women's groups at the grassroots level.

WOMEN'S ROLE IN SOMALI SOCIETY

Life for women in Somalia is especially difficult. They endure an imbalanced burden of the conflict, poverty, and other problems that are present in the clan-based Somali culture. These women also face high rates of maternal mortality, rape, female genital mutilation, and child

² 2010 Economic Cost of Piracy. One Earth Future Foundation. Anna Bowden

³ 2016 State of Maritime Piracy Report. Oceans Beyond Piracy. Maisie Pigeon.

⁴ Somali Perspectives on Piracy and Illegal Fishing. Oceans Beyond Piracy. 2016. Peter Kerins.
<http://obp.ngo/publications/somali-perspectives-piracy-and-illegal-fishing>

marriage. The male hierarchy of this culture is intensified by the religious and cultural limitations of females in their society. Males tend to be the head of the household while women take care of the children. It is undesirable for a man not to be seen as the head of the house. Faced with the financial hardships that accompany war and conflict, many women work outside of the home. The women who work outside of their homes have a lot of support from the other women in their community when it comes to child care.

The family is one of the most important facets of life in Somalia. This emphasis on family makes marriage an essential step in a young Somali's life. The average Somali will journey into marriage at about 14 or 15. Although women are considered fit for marriage shortly after menstruation begins, typically because bearing children comes shortly after the wedding. Motherhood is highly celebrated in Somali culture, and a female's prestige in society is greatly enriched by the number of children she bears. It is within community norms for women to bear 8-9 children.⁵

Women and especially mothers are an essential part of Somali society. Somalis trace clan affiliation through the father. Women have an important role in their families as well as their clan structure. This clan affiliation remains true for women even after they are married, allowing women to have multiple clan associations.⁶ This unique role places them in an influential position for mobilizing civil society, by giving them the ability to link clans. Somali women can act as the first channel of dialogue between clans.

FAMILIES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO DETERRING PIRACY

Several surveys of prisoners convicted of piracy have found that the family is a key factor in individual's decision to exit piracy and to not return to it. In 2015 Oceans Beyond Piracy and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime conducted a survey of prisoners convicted of piracy in prisons in Bosaaso (Puntland), Hargeisa (Somaliland) prisons and the Seychelles. Prisoners were asked if they knew anyone who had stopped being a pirate. For those who did know someone who had left piracy, family and community pressure were identified as the primary reason. In Bosaaso prison "5 of the 10 persons identified by inmates as leaving piracy were reported to have left because of family or community pressure, including one prisoner reporting that the former pirate's family had physically taken the pirate out of the group and put him into a rehab center"⁷. In Hargeisa prison the interviewer noted that, "the communities are losing too many men [young men] to piracy, due to arrests, imprisonment, lost at sea, etc. So families are starting to fear the loss of their kin, and don't want them to go to sea."⁸ These two excerpts highlight the importance of families in regards to deterring piracy at the grassroots level. As mothers, as well as sisters and daughters, females are an integral part of the family unit, it stands to reason that

⁵ EthnoMED- Somali Cultural Profile <https://ethnomed.org/culture/somali/somali-cultural-profile>

⁶ The role of Somali Women in Peacebuilding and Decision making (2011)
<https://www.worldpulse.com/fr/node/2979>

⁷ Somali Prison Survey Report: Piracy Motivations and Deterrents. Oceans Beyond Piracy and UN Office of Drugs and Crime. 2015 <http://obp.ngo/publications/somali-prison-survey-report-piracy-motivations-deterrents-full-report>

⁸ Ibid

women would have an integral part in deterring young men from entering piracy or quicken their departure from piracy.

WOMEN'S ROLE IN COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Mothers are on the front line of defence in countering violent extremism (CVE) in persons 10-18 years of age. A mother can be vital to CVE through detecting early signs of radicalization or direct intervention. Women are more willing to act as champions of CVE mainly because they are more affected by its results. An EU workshop on effective programming for Countering Violent Extremism found that women speaking out about the hardships of violent extremism, such as insecurity, loss of income, and separation, provide a powerful narrative against terrorism.⁹

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) found that women's involvement as activists is crucial. They highlight that women can "provide essential feedback on the counter-terrorism efforts of the internal community."¹⁰ OSCE's recommendations for improving counter-terrorism interventions are to take into account women's role in the prevention. The recommendations emphasize engaging women in all stages of counter-terrorism or counter-radicalization strategies by providing platforms for women to share resources, experiences, and tools for facing radicalization. There is also a focus on the importance of supporting women's grassroots organizations and initiatives.

Over the years various initiatives have been started that aim to support women's role in the countering of violent extremism. In 2008 Women Without Borders started Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE). SAVE has several campaigns that all aim to help women, but more specifically mothers, in the battle against extremism. Mothers for Change is an applied research project which focuses on the matchless role mothers hold in their homes and communities. It studies the process of de-radicalization and seeks to not only identify but also to unlock mothers' capabilities. Mothers MOVE produces mothers' groups to participate in anti-extremism training. This project trains women to recognize the early warning signs of radicalization. The Women's Dialogue fosters dialogue to create strategies that combats extremism.¹¹

HOW ARE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND PIRACY RELATED?

There are many differences between violent extremism and piracy. However, there is a connection between the two. Both violent extremism and piracy can result in terrible sufferings for their families. Mothers are often the most affected by both violent extremism and piracy. A recent survey by MC and Saatchi of Somali pirate prisoners in the Seychelles emphasizes this point, "Piracy brought in inflation and breakdown of social order in our communities. Pirates

⁹ Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. (2012) EU Workshop on Effective Programming for Countering Violent Extremism. Final Summary Report
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/documents/20121217_eu_cve_workshop_summary_report.pdf

¹⁰ OSCE (2013). Women and Terrorist Radicalization. Final Report OSCE Secretariat- OSCE ODIHR Expert Round Tables. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
<http://www.osce.org/secretariat/33313?download=true>

¹¹ SAVE's Projects and Programs- sisters against violent extremism –women without borders
<http://www.women-withoutborders.org/save/>

brought with them shameful practices like drugs, alcohol abuse and prostitution in areas they operated.”¹² The bond mother and child have is in many ways boundless, and in many instances, this bond has given mothers the power to stop their children from joining such groups. This mother-child bond as is so strong that terror groups have published propaganda for new recruits on the topic which advises them to cut all ties with their families.

In 2012, the Dalhousie Marine Piracy project (DMPP)¹³ launched a report to study the causes and consequences of maritime piracy. Among many findings was an explicit problem with the involvement of children in pirate activity. DMPP found that children’s activity served as a practical entry point into the general problem of piracy worldwide. The same factors that lead a child to wrongdoing, will also render them vulnerable to piracy. “In 2011, the Indian Navy announced that 25 of 61 recently arrested pirates were under the age of 15”. And “The United Nations envoy for children and armed conflict has reported a trend showing increased use of children recruited to seize ships for ransom”.¹⁴ Mothers have more direct contact with children under the age of 15 giving them a unique role in combating Somali piracy. This points out the unique role that mothers can have in deterring Somali piracy as they can have a persuasive effect in deterring youth from becoming pirates. Engaging with mothers can be an effective method in building deterrence strategies.

Factoring in the success mothers have had in CVE, the mother’s role in Somali society, and the number of children being recruited for piracy, the campaigns which focus on the mother’s role in CVE could be implemented to counter piracy in Somalia. Women are advantageously positioned at the epicenter of families where they can diagnose the early warning signs of piracy intent. By empowering mothers with the necessary knowledge and tools they could be placed on front line of the battle against piracy. Spearheading grassroots campaigns to educate women and mothers on the early warning signs and the consequences of a life of piracy, would make mothers an active agent in preventing their children and husbands from going down a path to piracy.

KEY POINTS

Community support to piracy is critical to its survival.

Pressure from mothers can have a particular deterrence effect on young men entering into piracy and in their decisions to leave piracy.

Counter Violent Extremism strategies could have practical applications when applied to combatting piracy.

¹² MC & Saatchi. Somali Piracy Research Report 2017. Zamzam Tatu

¹³ Children in Marine Piracy: Our Work in 2013
http://www.childsoldiers.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Children_in_Marine_Piracy-Our_Work_in_2013-min.pdf

¹⁴ Keeping Children Out of Piracy (2017) <http://maritime-executive.com/features/keeping-children-out-of-piracy>

PRACTICAL GENDERED INTERVENTIONS FOR DETERRING SOMALI PIRATE GROUPS

Messaging of Dangers- Many young men have died while engaging in piracy, either due to the dangers of the ocean, while attacking vessels; or ended up in prison. Broadly educating piracy prone populations on the dangers of piracy would be an effective intervention. This education would seek to alter the risk/ reward dynamic of would-be pirates. Education on these dangers combined with additional training on recognizing the signs of extremism could have a positive effect on preventing men aged 10-18 years old from joining other violent extremist organizations as well. Distributing this message through the lens of mothers and local women's groups could be more effective as they would have direct access to sons, brothers and husbands who potentially could become pirates. Similar counter-piracy messaging campaigns sponsored by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime have occurred in the past with success, but they have not directly targeted women.¹⁵

Don't Marry a Pirate- While the ransom proceeds from piracy brought in large amounts of cash into coastal communities in Somalia this cash also brought in drugs, alcohol, prostitution and other elements which are at odds with the Islamic faith in Somalia. Highlighting these haram elements of piracy and encouraging the idea that pirates would make bad husbands or fathers could alter the decision making of young men to engage in piracy as becoming a husband and father is an important element of masculinity in Somali culture. Of course this intervention would rest upon the idea that women would have a choice in choosing their husband.

Discussion Groups- Sponsoring and facilitating women's discussion groups would lead to a better understanding of how piracy, and phenomena like illegal fishing, affect coastal communities. The information gained by better understanding the local effects of piracy, especially on women could lead to more tailored interventions, especially in support of women. This could additionally have a deterrence effect in Somali coastal communities more generally.

CONCLUSION

Piracy has shaped much of the modern narrative about Somalia and has impeded its path out of conflict and towards prosperity. Women and particularly mothers can have a positive effect on preventing piracy and other forms of violence. Furthermore connecting women into such piracy CVE campaigns could have a positive effect on the situation of women in Somalia, though in a small way. Considering the success of women oriented CVE campaigns in other situations, similar campaigns related to piracy in Somalia could have success as well.

¹⁵ UNODC Counter Piracy Programme. Somalia Beyond Piracy-Anti Piracy Advocacy Campaign. 2011

"THE NEXT DECADE: AMPLIFYING THE WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AGENDA," CYBER VIOLENCE, INTERNET RECRUITING AND LINKS TO FEMALE TERRORISM.

Selina Hayes

The landscape of conflict continues to look very different. Our enemy in this world of cyber can be any age, race, religion or gender, the traditional ways we are acquainted with winning hearts and minds are not always relevant and well received. The new “enemy” is a 15-year-old girl with a SnapChat or Twitter account, or a young woman deployed as a qualified recruiter trained to influence her counterparts equipped with creating the next terrorist attack.

Over the next decade the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda will need to recognize the world of cyber and how it can become a significant neutralizer in that its participants are not defined by physical geography or governed by one sovereign state. Rules are fluid and unclear, its language is universal, translation is instantaneous allowing for easy communication and the spread of messaging. Not only can women and girls operate freely and without the social boundaries that may exist in the physical sense, in the world of cyber the “hijab comes off” and the ability to create complex social networks that can be influential especially in recruitment techniques and influencing, allows for clear exploitation of women by other women or those appealing to women.

There is limited history or experience in how to operate in this new world of cyberspace however it adopts the practices and nuances of century old teachings. The ability to build social networks outside of our local communities and influence through narratives and images has given rise to terrorist groups targeting women. That said, women give rise to their own unique power bases, networks, and lines of influence within the cross-sections of these communities. Yet, this female perspective and influence are often under-represented in planning and executing decision-making even within WPS strategies. Often the title “Women Peace and Security” is an oxymoron in that the word “peace” associated with the words *women* and *security* can weaken a women’s involvement not only in terrorist acts but their significant role within conflict and conflict resolution. History shows us that women have not only been influential but involved with terrorist acts and inciting violence. However, the view of women’s involvement in these terrorist acts is often seen as an aberration and recognizing and understanding women’s role as sympathizers or support to combatants has been an elusive thought process. The presence of women during the most recent raid in Yemen highlights that women are not only present in the battlespace but they are now being recruited, trained and deployed as combatants, not just shields to male fighters.....in essence, “they fight back”. In the context of terrorist acts, women have long served as enablers to the mission or a pawn used in heinous ways to promote fear into society. In most situations, western society sees these women and girls as passive victims, however what goes unrecognized is their role as the active participant. This lack of

understanding has been deceptive to those developing effective counter strategies, as they have failed to recognize that women often provide critical support within insurgency and terrorist organizations in addition to being combatants themselves. Despite having both passive and active involvement in terrorist acts, women are often the last to be included within the counter-terror and security dialogue, thus an opportunity is lost in fulfilling campaign objectives meant to have positive and changing impact. It could be argued that women have disproportionately suffered the consequences of many conflicts through rape, death of their spouse or bread winner, their children, loss of their home and chaos within the community however they are also the last to be included at the solution table. Oddly enough, though, this indisputable female perspective and influence are under-represented in planning and executing decision-making even within WPS strategies.

Terrorist organizations like Boko Haram, Al Qaida and ISIS, have enhanced their ability to effectively use social media to their advantage, the speed at which their intentions can be deployed as a message or “tweet” to influence has also increased exponentially. Also within the cyber world there is an ability to move freely without social constraints and appeal to individuals that can be easily influenced. Although women are primarily a target it is women that are using the space most effectively. This new battle space which includes social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp, You Tube and now SnapChat are all playing a significant role as tools in radicalizing individuals through carefully created narratives. Tweets from insurgency groups may appear to be relevant and true however the accuracy of the information being transmitted and who is transmitting them cannot often be validated. This has created a new standard and set rules and appealed to a new population group of which the insurgency groups have taken advantage of “a spontaneous activity of a generation accustomed to using cell phones for self- publication”. This new medium serves to connect like-minded people and give them voice and potential for direct significant action in spheres of influence where individuals have traditionally been shut out of the decision-making process. For women, the cyber world is a vehicle as to which they can communicate and control the space while operating in a male dominated society.

Our response and WPS strategy in to the next decade needs to adapt to these new threats however we need to understand those we want to influence by engaging with and enabling positive influencers in these communities. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 called for the integration of gender perspectives into peace and security initiatives however rarely are women called upon during the most critical phases of military operations working with military planners to give that added perspective of the “other 50%” of the population. With the context of cyber violence and online recruiting it is only recently that focus has been placed on the tactics used by terrorist’s groups to recruit women either for passive roles or for combatants. There is no doubt that the most recent attacks we have seen in around the world have continued to raise the consciousness of the role of women to influence and recruit online through social media platforms. Our enemy has used gender as a weapon and most terrorist groups like Boko Haram and ISIS have used females in the local community to recruit and provide martyrs. Reports indicated that women were instrumental in converting female family members and in some cases, offered up their daughters to serve as martyrs. In Nigeria, three women were arrested in Abuja for attempting to recruit females to serve as members in what the military described then

as the “female wing” of the group. The use of social media for influence campaigns and marketing tactics only broadens the pool of potential recruits.

Over the next decade, the WPS agenda needs to be inclusive of providing solutions that can be more preemptive and inclusive of all gender roles, in addition to the post conflict solutions. Cyber violence and recruitment will only become more apparent and more effective as a tool for recruitment. Formulating a strategy on how to combat an ideology that sees itself as a quasi-state without borders or traditional rules of sovereignty will need to invoke a new thought process. An effective counter strategy involves understanding the enemy, not only their tactics but their mind set and perspective. Also, identifying what resources, they can implement to gain significant advantage. The problem however, is most problem sets are approached with a male perspective.

In doing so, an effective strategy for the role of women in maintaining peace and stability within their communities, not only in the physical sense but within the realm of cyberspace and within the social networks created online will need to be created and encouraged and implemented not from just one side of the equation but a more inclusive approach. Understanding how women receive messaging and what narratives appeal and influence. This will require more women at the solution table over the next decade.

Intentionally Blank

ADVANCING WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY BY TARGETING NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES

Chelsea B. Payne, Maj, USAF, MC; Andrew T. Allen, Lt Col, USAF, MC, SFS

FORWARD

“I am a business woman,” states a smiling Kagiso who wades in fresh water, where schistosomiasis is endemic, collecting reeds on the banks of the Chobe River in Kasane, Botswana. Like many women living near Chobe National Park, Kagiso weaves the reeds into baskets and sells them to tourists. In Botswana approximately 12% of the population¹ requires periodic medication to prevent schistosomiasis, a water-borne infection that can lead to genital infections, infertility, and cancer.

INTRODUCTION

As of May 2017, 66 nations have created national action plans on women, peace and security (WPS) under the framework of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1325. The United States (US) updated its national action plan in June 2016.² Through these strategic initiatives, gender inclusion has been advocated as a pathway for countries to enhance peace and promote political stability. Health is a major determinant of social and economic stability, and within the paradigm of WPS, advocacy and promotion of women’s health is crucial to ensure success of most gender inclusion programs. This paper asserts that optimizing women’s health is a core component of their ability to assume and maintain leadership roles in community development and security cooperation.

Furthermore, a subset of infectious diseases, known as neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), significantly impact women’s ability to reach milestones in education, employment, and ultimately to have an active voice in sustaining a peaceful society.

NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES


NTDs encompass 17 unique diseases which predominately impact people living in poverty and without adequate sanitation, in tropical and subtropical regions.³ Annually, an estimated 1 billion people are infected while another 1 billion are at risk of infection⁴, with the largest burden found in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.⁵ These infections are caused by a variety of organisms including bacteria, viruses, single-celled protozoa and parasitic worms (helminths). They can lead to long-term physical and mental disabilities such as blindness, cognitive impairment and death.⁶

Figure 1 lists the 17 NTDs as identified by the World Health Organization and summarized in the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010.⁷ Rabies, African trypanosomiasis and dengue hold the greatest burden in terms of mortality or years of life lost (YLL), whereas parasitic worm

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force, the US Department of Defense or the US government

diseases have a much greater impact on years of disability in a population (YLD) and result in less mortality. Another important measure of the burden of a disease is disability-adjusted life year (DALY). The DALY is calculated by adding YLL and YLD which yields a measure for both morbidity and mortality in a population. The five most common NTDs have a high rate of morbidity and include lymphatic filariasis, onchocerciasis, trachoma, schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminths (Figure 1).⁷

Figure 1. The seventeen NTDs and fractions of YLD and YLL (as components of DALY's)⁷



Historically NTDs have been underfunded and lacked prioritization in research and global health programs. However, the Global Burden of Disease Study in 2010 estimated that all NTDs combined result in over 18 million years of life with disability (YLD), 8 million years of life lost (YLL) and 152,000 deaths.⁷ In 2012 the World Health Organization (WHO) outlined a “Roadmap for implementation” of a strategy to combat NTDs, which was endorsed by the World Assembly Resolution of 2013.⁸ This plan calls for equitable access to care for

patients with NTDs, integration into existing programs and ensuring that essential services reach those who need them.⁸

THE IMPACT OF NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES ON WOMEN

Globally, females as compared to males are more disadvantaged in terms of poverty, lack of opportunity for education, land ownership and political voice.⁸ These factors can impede access to healthcare and ultimately put them at increased risk for NTDs and their complications.⁸

In sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that over one-third of pregnant women are infected with one or more NTDs.⁹ Soil-transmitted helminths, particularly hookworms, make the greatest contribution to years of life with disability.⁷ Hookworms can lead to moderate to severe anemia. In pregnancy, anemia can worsen the effects of excessive blood loss during childbirth and contributes to a higher risk for maternal death.⁹ According to the WHO, obstetric hemorrhage is the leading direct cause of material death worldwide and accounts for 27% of maternal deaths¹⁰ the majority of these deaths are preventable and occur in developing nations.¹⁰

Anemia during pregnancy can also contribute to low birth weight in infants which is associated with cognitive impairment and stunted growth.⁹ In one study of a helminth endemic area women treated during the second or third trimester with antihelminthic medication demonstrated infant birthweight rise by 59 grams (95% CI 19-98) and infant mortality at 6 months decreased by 41% (RR 0.59; 95% CI 0.43-0.82).¹¹

Helminth infections in children can also negatively impact growth, cognitive development and lead to recurrent school absenteeism.¹² School-based deworming programs in Kenya have shown a statistically significant reduction in school absenteeism by 25% and a year was added to the average duration of childhood education.¹² Another long-term study in Kenya demonstrated that after 10 years, females who were dewormed during primary education were 25% more likely to pass the secondary school entrance exam (9.6 percentage point increase, $P < 0.5$) and over one third more likely to enroll in secondary education than females who were not, thereby decreasing the gender-education gap.¹³

There is increasing recognition that certain NTDs are more likely to impact girls and women. For instance, in communities where females predominately perform household task, such as clothes washing and water collection, they are more likely to be exposed to water-borne illnesses including Schistosomiasis.⁸ Urogenital schistosomiasis is a common NTD in sub-Saharan Africa and causes urinary and renal tract infections.¹⁴ Chronic infection can lead to an increased risk of infertility, pregnancy complications and bladder cancer.^{8,14} Urogenital schistosomiasis is also associated with an increased risk of HIV. In rural areas of Zimbabwe female genital schistosomiasis was associated with a three-fold increased risk of vertical (mother-to-child) transmission of HIV/AIDS.¹⁵

Lymphatic filariasis (LF) lymphedema, which causes pain and swelling in the arms and legs, occurs more often in women compared to men and swelling can also occur in the breasts and genital area.¹⁶ Cultural restrictions on examining women can lead to these complications

being underdiagnosed and going untreated. A qualitative study in Sri Lanka demonstrated that LF can also lead to significant social stigma including loss of jobs, wages and family abandonment.¹⁶

Trachoma and onchocerciasis both affect vision and are the first and second most common causes of preventable blindness.¹⁷ Low vision and blindness significantly impact a woman's mental and physical wellness, ability to maintain employment, care for her family and contribute to her community at large. Trachoma is associated with insufficient access to clean water, poor sanitation and overcrowding.¹⁷ Children are also reservoirs of this infection.¹⁷ In sub-Saharan Africa women as compared to men are two to four times more likely to become infected with trachoma due to their close contact with young children.¹⁷ A longitudinal study in Sierra

Leone showed that women in rural areas who spend considerable time pregnant or lactating were also at risk for being continually excluded from treatment programs.¹⁸ The true burden of disease from trachoma has been estimated in DALY's and falls between 2.2-3.6 million annual DALY's with 72% of these DALY's taking place in sub-Saharan Africa and 80% lifetime DALY's occurring in women.¹⁹

Many other NTDs affect women and their ability to engage as key leaders. For instance, Chaga's disease is associated with severe organ damage and congenital infections.⁹ Another important NTD is cutaneous leishmaniasis (CL) which causes disfiguring facial scars associated with depression, anxiety and decreased quality of life.²⁰ Incidences of NTDs often rise during conflicts which compounds the cycle of disease and poverty. As civil war broke out in Syria, the incidence of CL rose to over 55,000 known cases in 2011 from an estimated 17,000 in 1995.²⁰ Women are at increased risk of becoming internally displaced or refugees during conflicts, and populations which become displaced are often excluded from the host nation's NTD control programs.²¹ This facilitates pockets of disease propagation and reintroduction of previously eliminated infections.²¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

The five most prevalent NTDs, lymphatic filariasis, trachoma, onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis and soil-transmitted helminths, can all be controlled or eliminated through programs of mass drug administration (MDA).⁵ The World Health Organization has set disease control targets for 2020 which were reaffirmed by the 2012 London Declaration.^{5,22} Safe and cost-effective interventions are projected to lead to significant economic and productivity gains. For every US dollar invested in MDA between 2011-2020 the net benefit is expected to be \$27 and then rise to \$42 between 2021-2030.⁵

Addressing NTDs is also an integral part of meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs are seventeen goals and 169 targets outlined by the United Nations on September 15th, 2015 which seek to "end poverty, protect the planet and ensure prosperity for all".²³ NTDs are relevant to all the SDGs but most consistent with goal three (SD3) and SDG five (SD5). SD3 is to ensure health lives and promote well-being for all. SD5 focuses on achieving gender equality and empowering all woman and girls.

There is evidence that women can play an integral role in surpassing socio-behavioral and structural barriers to treatment within communities.⁸ A study of community health workers in Uganda demonstrated that when Community Directed Distribution (CDD) was started women became actively involved as community implementers.²⁴ Another systematic review in sub-Saharan Africa showed that women were more patient, persuasive and committed in distributing NTD medications as compared to male CDD workers.^{8,25}

Leadership in CDD programs can be a pathway to empowerment for women. However, caution should be taken against asking for volunteers to care for the distribution of NTD medications. Women should be paid for their work or participation may reinforce traditional gender roles and add to the time poverty which can result from unpaid labor.^{26,27} Internationally, women spend two to ten times more time participating in unpaid work than men.²⁷ Gender inequality in unpaid work, such as cooking, cleaning and childcare, contributes to gender gaps in labor outcomes like labor force participation, quality of jobs and wages.²⁷

THE WAY FORWARD

The inclusion of women in security and peace operations starts with addressing the factors which impede meaningful participation. If women like Kagiso, living in northern Botswana, are to escape cycles of poverty and disease they must have better access to preventive and curative medicine. A woman's health, at all stages of life, is at the core of her ability to contribute to the betterment of her own welfare and society at large. NTDs have a significant negative impact on the lives of girls and women by impairing reproductive health, increasing the risk of acquiring sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and contributing to stigma and gender inequality.¹⁵

Key recommendations:

- When mapping NTDs and implementing programs, particular attention should be given to special populations including pregnant and lactating women.
- Women are part of the solution to NTDs and their work should be recognized and rewarded by just compensation.
- Further research, factoring in age and gender considerations, is needed to better understand how NTDs affect females and the value of programs such as MDA.¹⁶
- A “gender-transformative” approach, seeking to modify gender norms and work toward equality, should be pursued as we continue to support women, peace and security through the eradication and elimination of NTDs.²⁶

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PRESENCE AND ACCESS: WHAT WOMEN BRING TO THE CVE FIGHT

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INTRODUCTION:

The face of warfare continues to shift every day. No longer are battles fought only in warzones. No longer are soldiers confined to a nation-state. Terrorist organizations have no concrete borders to hold them; instead they shift constantly to evade eradication by global powers that hold significant advantages in manpower, money, and materials. The fight to counter violent extremism (CVE) must now operate across the political, military, and social spectrums. In short, we are waging war against a ghost-like enemy, one that is becoming ever more present but ever harder to confine.

The news of the day illustrates this perfectly. As I write, police in London rifle through the apartment of Salman Abedi, a 22 year old born in the United Kingdom, from Libyan parents who fled persecution in the 1990s. On May 21, 2017 Abedi conducted a suicide bombing in a concert hall in Manchester, ending his life along with the lives of 22 innocent civilians.¹ Intelligence analysts and investigators are working to trace the source of his radicalization and the terrorist network behind it. If attributed to ISIS, as the group claims, this would mark the group's first suicide bomb attack within the United Kingdom, a significant escalation in their lethality and reach.² Now more than ever, the line between who is and is not at war has never been more blurred. If the global community seeks to defeat terrorist organizations operating at this pace, every weapon and tool must be employed to maximum efficiency. Every asset at our disposal must be exploited in reaching at-risk populations before violent extremism takes hold.

While this may seem like a daunting task, a key weapon remains untapped that could open additional possibilities for countering violent extremism. Expanding this asset would widen our presence on the battlefield, provide access to the networks violent extremist organizations (VEOs) create, and allow us to touch at-risk populations and prevent them from going dark, or succumbing to extremism. Systematically employing women within Special Operations Forces would enable greater presence and access than all-male SOF units could ever hope to reach alone, strengthening efforts to target VEO key players.

¹ Katrin Bennhold, Stephen Castle, and Suliman Ali Zway, "Hunt for Manchester Bombing Accomplices Extends to Libya," *The New York Times* (New York, NY), May 24, 2017, Europe, accessed June 11, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/world/europe/manchester-bomber-salman-abedi.html>.

² Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, "Manchester Bomber met with ISIS Unit in Libya, Officials Say," *The New York Times* (New York, NY), June 3, 2017, Middle East, accessed June 11, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/03/world/middleeast/manchester-bomber-salman-abedi-islamic-state-libya.html>.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has made previous efforts to employ women, most recently through the Female Engagement Teams (FET) and Cultural Support Teams (CST) initiated during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. However, these programs have not reached their true potential due to a lack of investment. If we seek to reap the benefits of these programs, we need to invest the time, resources, and most importantly, risk, required to build a sustainable enabler package capable of shifting events on the ground. By standardizing the FET and CST training and deployment pipelines, we can build them into true enablers of Special Operations Forces, with the experience, authority, and trust they need to expand their current mission set. This will provide the DOD with a presence on the battlefield it currently lacks, offering increased access to at-risk populations, enabling disruption of terrorist networks, and countering violent extremism from the ground up.

WOMEN IN CONFLICT

Women have long been caught in the aftermath of atrocity and global conflict. Especially in patriarchal societies, women are often exploited first and considered last in the hierarchy of needs. According to the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, while “the desire of women affected by conflict situations to bring about peace and an end to violence may be universal...women have been largely excluded from peace processes, from negotiations, from efforts by warring parties to work out a settlement.”³ If we can overcome this stigma of silence, increasing the stability and quality of life among women can be an impetus for positive change and lasting peace. A study from the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) found that “women in civil society tend to seek transformative change in a way that conceptualizes peace beyond the cessation of hostilities and the disarmament of warring troops.”⁴ The challenge for global powers, those seeking to help rebuild these fragile states, is how to connect to the women that make up over half of the population. While it has been over twenty years since the United Nations recognized that “without the active participation and the incorporation of women at all levels of decision making, the goals for equality, development, and peace cannot be achieved” the challenge to incorporate them into stabilization operations and conflict resolution processes continues to this day.⁵

In October of 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) which recognized a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, made women a priority in the peace process, and sought to investigate the effect of armed conflict on women and girls.⁶ This marked the first time the Security Council expressly mentioned the particular effects of armed conflict on women and signaled a shift in global foreign policy to finally include women’s voices in the peacemaking process. According to the Resolution, “an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their

³ Ferris, Elizabeth. “Making the Difference: The Role of Women in Conflict Situations.” Contribution to the “Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement” symposium conducted at The Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, May 2, 2012.

⁴ Chang, Patty, Ph.D., Mayesha Alam, Roslyn Warren, Rukmani Bhatia, and Rebecca Turkington. “Women Leading Peace: A Close Examination of Women’s Political Participation in Peace Processes in Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Kenya, and the Philippines.” *Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security*, 2015

⁵ UNDOC/A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1

⁶ “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000)

protection, and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.”⁷ To that end, individual nations were tasked to implement UNSCR 1325, and outline the methods through which their security, defense, and diplomatic strategies will incorporate gender perspectives. While the 2016 policy update of United States’ National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security continues to promote key features of UNSCR 1325, specifically that “countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are afforded full and equal rights and opportunity,” many argue that our progress has not moved quickly enough.⁸ Since its inception, nations have implemented UNSCR 1325 in various ways, however its relevance on the global stage has only grown with time.

A key provision of the resolution stressed the need to increase the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution, and expand the contribution of women in field-based operations, especially among military, civilian police, human rights, and humanitarian personnel.⁹ This measure was written explicitly to affect security doctrine in the training of civilian and military personnel working in conflict zones. The Obama Administration sought to integrate WPS initiatives into the National Security Strategy and Joint Service Capabilities Plans.¹⁰ In addition, Geographic Combatant Commanders introduced WPS objectives into their Theater Campaign Plans, illustrating the relevance of these issues across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command. Several DOD programs initiated during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the FET and CST programs, would not have come about without UNSCR1325 and the subsequent National Action Plan.

USING FEMALES AS AN ASSET TO COUNTERINSURGENCY

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan shifted towards long-term nation building, the Department of Defense recognized the need to build relationships with the local population. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine advised leaders to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan public in the hopes of creating mutual trust, fostering information sharing, and thwarting the insurgency rhetoric from within each household.¹¹ This included females, as leaders recognized they could not achieve mission success if they were shut off from half of the population. According to the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, “when women support COIN efforts, families support COIN efforts.”¹² Female Engagement Teams were implemented by the U.S. Marine Corps to allow ground combat units to interact with women in Iraq and Afghanistan without violating cultural sensitivities and straining the very relationships upon which COIN was dependent.

⁷ “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000)

⁸ “The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” in *United States National Action Plan* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2016), [5]

⁹ “S/RES/1325 (2000)” (UN Security Council, October 31, 2000)

¹⁰ “The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” in *United States National Action Plan* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2016), [5].

¹¹ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” *Joint Information Operations Center*, Summer 2006, [5], PDF.

¹² Department of the Army Headquarters, “Field Manual 3-24,” in *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), PDF.

Designed to create lasting relationships with Afghan women, FETs deployed female Marines with ground troops in groups of two or three for patrols, engagements with village leaders, or shuras (councils) with local women. At times they were supplemented by female corpsmen to offer medical support to women and children in the area. They sought to act as battlefield enablers or force multipliers, influencing and interacting with the local population, men, women, and children, to achieve their COIN objectives and build enduring trust and confidence between local Afghans and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.¹³ While the United States established the program, other nations joined the effort and by 2014, fourteen NATO nations were providing female engagement team support (McNierney 2015).¹⁴

Cultural Support Teams also stemmed from a battlefield necessity. In 2011, Army Special Operations Forces conducting missions in Afghanistan recognized that they were missing key intelligence collection and interrogation opportunities by not engaging the host nation female and adolescent populations. Cultural sensitivities made it impossible for male commandoes to search or question women and children during their raids. Oftentimes, to avoid offending the local population, Afghan women and children were secluded in rooms and left unattended while SOF units conducted field level exploitation and interrogation. Insurgents quickly noticed this security gap and began to exploit the lack of female oversight; hiding evidence, weapons, and even personnel among the women and children.¹⁵ USASOC, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, knew that immediate action had to be taken to rectify this security and intelligence breach. They issued a force-wide call for female volunteers to break from their current occupational specialties for one year in order to screen, train, and serve alongside Army Special Operations Forces as cultural support specialists.

Cultural Support Teams were described as “female Soldiers who serve as enablers supporting Army special-operations combat forces in and around secured objective areas.”¹⁶ The language outlining their role was significant, as the combat exclusion principle had not been revoked at the time of their inception and women remained barred from combat oriented positions like Infantry, Rangers, or Special Forces. CSTs were divided into two distinct mission sets, direct action and village stability. Village Stability CSTs joined Green Berets on long-term stability missions in austere environments to build rapport with local nationals.¹⁷ Direct Action units accompanied Army Rangers and conducted searches and tactical questioning of any women and children. These missions usually occurred at night, with troops fast roping or conducting clandestine infiltrations onto targets under night vision before conducting surprise raids on key insurgents suspected of enemy activity. While their program had some similarities to the Marine Corps FET

¹³ Sheila Medeiros and Traci Swanson, "DoD's Combat Exclusion Policies Limit Commanders and Strain Our Current Forces," *Small Wars Journal*, November 20, 2011, digital file.

¹⁴ Dr. Brooke A. McNierney, "Female Engagement Teams: An Evaluation of the Female Engagement Team Program in Afghanistan," *Constructive Pathways: Stimulating and Safeguarding Components of WPS*, April 16, 2017, 85, PDF

¹⁵ Kristen Moores, telephone interview by the author, San Diego, CA, May 19, 2017

¹⁶ Department of the Army, "About the Cultural Support Program," US Army Special Operations Command, accessed June 10, 2017, <http://www.soc.mil/CST/about.html>.

¹⁷ Kristen Moores, telephone interview.

program, it was unique in that its arduous selection process sought to put potential candidates through the rigorous core skills required for ARSOF missions.¹⁸

GAUGING EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH FIRST HAND ACCOUNTS

Two officers who participated in FET and CST at the peak of their operating years, 2010-2013, sat down to provide interviews on their experience in each program. Several scholars have collected and analyzed data from FET and CST employment in Iraq and Afghanistan, most recently LTC Keravouri and Dr. Brooke McNierney's research for the 2015 NWC conference on WPS.^{19,20} While these studies provide relevant data and analysis, the information and insight provided by leaders at the tactical level is unique, and provides lessons on what could be improved upon from those who have worked to accomplish the mission. Seemingly small changes at the tactical level can have a large strategic impact when amplified across a force.

U.S. Marine Corps Captain Marissa Loya served as the First Marine Division FET Liaison Officer and Executive Officer for a Female Engagement Team that deployed to Afghanistan's Helmand Province from 2010 to 2011. She cited numerous instances where FET personnel enabled mission completion and saved the lives of U.S. Marines through intelligence offered only to them. U.S. Army Captain Kristen Moores served on a Cultural Support Team in Afghanistan from October 2012 to June 2013. She summarized the capabilities CSTs brought to the fight that Army Special Forces could not in just two words, placement and access. Both women serve as models for the ways the Female Engagement Team and Cultural Support Teams "are providing new avenues for female Marines and soldiers to support ongoing operations and engage women in local populations."²¹

Despite the success of these programs, each woman revealed points that stalled overall mission accomplishment. While their programs and experiences were different and very successful, each woman cited common reasons for slowed or degraded operational success, ways they could have been employed more efficiently to achieve maximum impact. The lack of a standardized training pipeline and a military occupational specialty (MOS) dedicated to FET/CST personnel inhibited the ability for women to grow in the community, share lessons learned, and train the next iteration. Lack of education on the part of the supported command on how to employ females wasted program resources. Finally, the combat exclusion principle forced supported units to modify their employment of FET/CST personnel in certain environments. Today, each of these problems has the capacity to be solved. Doing so will have an exponential impact on the battlefield in Operation Inherent Resolve.

"We made it work because the mission required us to make it work," Captain Loya's words summarized the spirit of the 48 Marines she helped lead in Afghanistan, the first FET created stateside.²² Prior to the establishment of the 1st Marine Division FET, Loya's unit, teams were

¹⁸ Department of the Army, "About the Cultural," US Army Special Operations Command.

¹⁹ Dr. McNierney, "Female Engagement Teams," 82, PDF.

²⁰ LTC Rose Lopez Keravouri, "The Instrumentalization of Femininity in U.S. Military Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan," *Constructive Pathways: Stimulating and Safeguarding Components of WPS*, April 17, 2015, 61, PDF.

²¹ U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, 2016

²² Loya, e-mail interview by the author.

banded together in country, pulled from other missions and given on the job training.²³ Captain Loya's team was one of the first to receive pre-deployment training. This consisted of four months of infantry tactics, language and cultural courses, patrolling, land navigation, tactical casualty combat care, and shooting. Captain Loya and her Marines were also able to conduct simulated missions at 29 Palms with the infantry units they would deploy with in Afghanistan. It is key to note that these integrated simulated missions, possibly the most important part of training, lasted two weeks and only exposed them to *some* of the units they would meet on deployment. Despite obstacles in training and in country, Captain Loya and her Marines made significant strides in Afghanistan, garnering support for coalition forces specifically attributed to their employment.

Once in country, Captain Loya oversaw the tactical employment of her teams and flew to various positions to brief 1st Marine Division leadership on the progress of Female Engagement Teams when not conducting missions herself.²⁴ Captain Loya proved the effectiveness of her team through specific measures of performance that were recorded after each mission. FET personnel maintained daily logs of the number of missions conducted, amount of enemy information passed through FET personnel, the number of engagements with Afghan locals, and the number of female only shuras (councils) they coordinated. These metrics were established and enforced by the unit, another testament to the creativity and determination of FET personnel to achieve, and prove, mission success. Captain Loya cited an example of the value of FET personnel describing a day in Marjeh province, when a village elder specifically sought out the female Marine in the patrol to pass information. After getting the Sergeant's attention, he proceeded to draw a terrain map in the sand, outlining the location of several improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, in the village. His information proved true, saving the lives of several Marines and enabling the collection of valuable intelligence and evidence.

Unfortunately, despite their proven success, Captain Loya felt that she experienced repeated pushback from Infantry Company and battalion commanders who did not know how or when to effectively employ FETs. Due to a lack of education and pre-deployment training between FET and Infantry units, commanders remained unsure of what the female Marines could handle, how worthwhile their presence could be, and lacked trust in their ability to perform in a potential combat situation. Captain Loya spent valuable time training not Afghan leaders but fellow Marines on FET employment. It was up to Captain Loya and her Marines to prove their counterparts' doubts about their assimilation to be "just flat out false."²⁵ Captain Loya stated there were no issues with her Marines' ability to conduct the mission with infantry Marines, no matter the austerity of the environment. Had there been more training stateside on the role and value of FET on missions, or more lasting integration exercises between the two units prior to deployment, this inefficiency could have been avoided.

Captain Kristen Moores deployed with a Cultural Support Team in October 2012 and operated throughout Eastern Afghanistan in Logar Province, supporting Ranger operations until June

²³ McNierney, "Female Engagement," [82].

²⁴ Loya, e-mail interview by the author.

²⁵ Loya, e-mail interview by the author.

2013.²⁶ She cited numerous examples where searches and tactical questioning of Afghan women by CSTs led to evidence collection directly related to highly sought after targets. Her experiences highlighted one of the principal capabilities of the CST program when she said, “while women there are not even treated as second class citizens, they are not given nearly enough credit for how much they know and understand the society around them.” While many of these women lack a basic education, Captain Moores noted that “these women know everything that is going on, who is doing it, and why.” A UN study researching women in conflict found that while Captain Moores assertions were true, “because women are usually seen as victims of conflict who are unaware of combat operations and other violent acts, they generally have nowhere to turn with their information.”²⁷ While some were more guarded than others with the information they shared, all of the women had information that could only be gleaned through the presence and access offered by female CSTs on the ground.

While Captain Moores’ service as a cultural support specialist highlights the success CSTs brought to the Ranger mission, her introduction to the program also underlines a problem with the Army’s current management of the capability. After graduating from the University of Virginia, Captain Moores was attending Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) with every intention of reporting to the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Fort Bliss, TX when she heard about the screening course to become a cultural support specialist. She quickly completed the required physical tests and requested permission to attend selection instead of reporting to her designated command. Upon being selected, Captain Moores essentially deviated from her military occupational specialty for one year in order to report to CST follow-on training, deployment, and turnover out of Ft. Bragg, North Carolina.²⁸ After Captain Moores returned she left the CST community, reported to her original unit and began working in her originally designated specialty, as an intelligence officer.

Captain Moores felt her time in the CST program was valuable in shaping her Army career and outlook as an intelligence officer, however it is atypical. This deviation from the intended path could be seen by some as a step back in an officer’s career progression, and would prevent some viable candidates from applying. Furthermore, without a career designation for cultural support specialists, there was no community for Captain Moores to return to in order to share lessons learned, keep knowledge within the CST field, and move the mission capability forward. Additionally, while former Army Rangers taught Captain Moores’ pre-deployment training, she did not meet the units she would operate with until deployment.

In both branches, if the FET and CST programs could be pursued as military occupational specialties, it would attract even more competitive candidates and retain their knowledge and expertise after deployments. Their corresponding Infantry and Special Forces units would learn to trust and value the capabilities of their programs over time, as they do with other enablers, including Pararescue, Communications, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal assets. In the cases of Captain Loya and Captain Moores, both women returned to their primary MOS after their FET

²⁶ Moores, telephone interview by the author.

²⁷ Brenda J. Opperman, “Hawks, Doves, and Canaries: Women in Conflict,” *Small Wars Journal*, August 13, 2014, [12], PDF.

²⁸ Moores, telephone interview by the author.

and CST tours, the members of their units returned to their previous commands, and their supported command deployed with another female asset on the next rotation.²⁹ If FET and CST units remained with ground combat or Special Forces for multiple rotations, as other enablers typically do, this would fulfill a vital principle of Special Operations, repetition.³⁰ Furthermore, it would allow for more integrated planning and preparation with all assets prior to mission execution, phases vital to an operation designed to achieve relative superiority.³¹ As it currently stands, this lack of continuity degrades the overall mission capability of both the female assets and the units they support.

The reversal of the DOD's combat exclusion policy allows for new openings and methods through which women can be employed to fight the global war on violent extremism. On January 24, 2013 Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, signed a memo reversing the 1994 policy excluding women from combat. Prior to this, the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment rule stated that "service members are eligible to be assigned for all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground."³² As women continue to break barriers on previously defined limits on their ability to serve-five women have passed the Army's rigorous Ranger School since 2015-the DOD should look to the FET and CST programs as the foundation upon which to build female presence on the battlefield.³³ Until enough females are present in Infantry and Special Operations Forces units to fulfill the unique role of FETs and CSTs, these programs can expand their current footprint in the combat environment.

MOVING FORWARD

As the war on terror continues, the global community has shifted focus, considering not only the aftermath of conflict on women but also how women can be instrumental in preventing violent extremism from taking hold of their community in the first place.³⁴ In 2015, Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE), published "Mothers Against Terror" recognizing that "mothers are strategically placed to serve as a buffer between radical influences and those targeted next." Their three-stage study conducted 200 in-depth interviews with women whose children had been radicalized by violent extremist organizations. They identified what mothers noticed, what

²⁹ Loya, e-mail interview by the author.

³⁰ Admiral McRaven served as commander of both United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and defined Special Operations as those "conducted by forces specifically trained, equipped, and supported for a specific target whose destruction, elimination, or rescue, is a political or military imperative." He defined six principles of special operations: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.

³¹ William H. McRaven, *Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Ballantine Books, Random House Publishing Group, 1996), 8.

³² David Vergun, "Secretary of Defense rescinds 'Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule,'" *US Army*, last modified January 24, 2013, accessed June 11, 2017, <https://www.army.mil/article/94932>.

³³ Meghann Myers, "Two women, the First Since October 2015, Graduate from Army Ranger School," *Army Times*, April 3, 2017, accessed June 11, 2017, <https://www.armytimes.com/articles/two-women-the-first-since-october-2015-graduate-from-army-ranger-school>.

³⁴ Women without Borders, an international, research based NGO, has established "Sisters Against Violent Extremism," the first research-based female counterterrorism platform to empower women with the tools to recognize violent extremism in their homes and take steps to prevent its escalation.

escaped them, who they felt comfortable sharing their concerns with, and whom they did not. They created the Mothers School model to “seek out mothers as an embedded security ally and arm them with the skills to be an effective foundation of community resilience.”³⁵ While the pilot project has been successful in Indonesia, Kashmir, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Zanzibar, it currently lacks the security infrastructure to be implemented in active warzones like Syria and Iraq.

The presence and access achieved by FET and CST programs would be instrumental in “co-opting neutral or friendly women” and building “networks of enlightened self-interest” that eventually undermine insurgents and terrorists alike. David Kilcullen, a chief architect of the current U.S. Counterinsurgency strategy, argues that eventually “you need your own female counterinsurgents...win the women, and you own the family unit. Own the family, and you take a big step forward in mobilizing the population.”³⁶ Unencumbered by the combat exclusion policy of 1994 and empowered with the standardized training of a Special Forces enabler package, FETs and CSTs could deploy in support of these strategic objectives.

As mentioned previously, the line between who is and is not at war has blurred, the borders of battlegrounds have become almost invisible, and the casualties and combatants have become ever harder to distinguish. Despite this global ambiguity, one thing remains clear, the presence of a very real enemy. General McChrystal’s words from 2006 hold true to this day, “This is a war. And this war will have a winner, and it will have a loser. We are not here to fight the war on terror. *We are here to win it*”³⁷ We can only hope to win it if we employ every asset at our disposal to maximum efficiency.

³⁵ Edit Shlaffer and Ulrich Kropiunigg, “Mother's Against Terror: Families are Best Placed to Address Radicalization Before it Escalates into Violence,” Women Without Borders, last modified December 2015, accessed June 9, 2017, http://www.women-without-borders.org/files/downloads/Mothers_Against_Terror_Per_Concordiam_Dec_15.pdf

³⁶ David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” *Joint Information Operations Center*, Summer 2006, [5]. PDF.

³⁷ Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir; [updated with a New Preface]* (New York, NY [u.a.]: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014), 135.

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MENTAL HEALTH AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

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INTRODUCTION

In any conversation about complete integration of women into all components of the military, the topic of mental health outcomes arises. As a whole, suicide is a major health problem in the military community with risk rates almost four times higher in the veteran population than in non-veterans (Bossarte, 2013). Conservative estimates indicate that numbers of suicide attempts and completions have increased since 1995, and are currently hovering at 22 veterans taking their own lives each day, along with one active duty service member per day (Department of Defense, 2015). Military deployment to a war zone elevates the risk of long-term physical, psychological, and social problems and reduces overall health status (Spelman, Hunt, Seal, & Burgo-Black, 2012) and reintegration after active service is a risky time for such outcomes (Friedman, 2015).

While in the general population, women are at less risk for suicidality than men, women in the military face the same risk rates as military male peers. Military male suicide rates are typically 25% higher than civilian male peers, and research has shown that female veterans are six times more likely to commit suicide than civilian women (Prupis, 2015). For both men and women in the military, stress injuries and depression are correlated with suicidality, and those conditions are exacerbated by low levels of self-reported social support (Brenner & Barnes, 2012; Thomas & Plummer Taylor, 2015).

Issues of social support are uniquely problematic for military women due to sexual trauma prevalence, lower levels of perceived unit cohesion, and institutional barriers to accessing health care. As this forum's second essay notes, a culture of misogyny and exclusion impact the experience of women in military service. Such entrenched gender bias, present at every level of the military woman's experience from entry-level to separated veteran, is a major contributor to the social factors that increase military women's risk of suicide. This bias can be seen in both the structures (or lack thereof) in place for helping service members through difficult periods, and as discussed in the Women, Peace, and Security forum, the informal language used to discuss women in the field of security studies. Both formal and informal biases have excluded women from conversations about how their changing role in the military has impacted mental health concerns. Increasing awareness of the behavioral health ramifications of lower levels of social support for military women can improve the resourcing and framing of population-specific programming that considers trauma history, unit cohesion issues, and institutional barriers in a more informed manner. In addition, as the following forum essay will argue, attention to the experiences of women who are sexual minorities is important to lower the rates of suicide seen in female veterans.

MILITARY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES – CAUSAL CONTRIBUTORS TO SUICIDE

Statistics on PTS in military-connected communities are uncertain, with estimates out of the Veteran's Administration sitting at 15-50% (Coughlin, 2012). A RAND corporation study reported numbers hovering at about 20% (Acosta, Adamson, Farmer, Farris, & Feeney, 2014). Suicide is positively correlated with depression, of which stress and anxiety are symptoms (Hoge & Castro, 2012). Depressive conditions are closely related to trauma and stress-related disorders like PTS; the two often co-occur (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) V, 2013; Hoge, 2010)). Depression in veterans can be categorized as both diagnosed and undiagnosed, and specific sub-populations of veterans are more likely to struggle with symptoms without diagnosis and the medical care that presumably would follow (Thomas, et al., 2015).

The nature of warfare today has added to mental health issues. High operational tempos and short garrison time between deployments means that service members frequently do not have the time to get the help they need. Additionally, a smaller percentage of the American public volunteers for service and deployment, leading to minority stress for military personnel as they reintegrate into a civilian society that may struggle to understand their experiences (Hendricks Thomas, 2015). These factors have led to much higher levels of undiagnosed PTS than in prior generations, and the problems are particularly significant for women. As women are more frequently involved in combat operations, they are more likely to experience events that can trigger PTS. However, since women have not been legally recognized as part of combat arms units, they frequently lack the structural support mechanisms to ensure they receive evaluation and care. This has made not only treatment of women extremely difficult, but obtaining reliable data particularly challenging.

Women constitute approximately 15% of the armed services (Murdoch et al., 2006), and represent a growing segment of the veteran population. Female service members and veterans have healthcare needs often unmet and misunderstood by Department of Defense and Veterans Administration providers (Carlson, Stromwall, & Lietz, 2013). Duhart (2012) indicated that female veterans returning from deployment were more likely than their male counterparts to report mental health concerns such as posttraumatic stress (PTS), depression, and suicidal thoughts. Research has also shown that women are more likely to screen positively for depression both before and after deployments (Koo & Maguen, 2014). These higher incidence rates have often been used to buttress arguments opposing the integration of women into combat arms specialties. Such simplistic reliance on the statistics misses the predictor correlates, misunderstands causes in context, and erroneously points to solutions of exclusion. Understanding mental health conditions in military women is a complex process, but knowing that low social support levels and poor unit cohesion are major predictors of both depression and stress injury, behavioral health researchers can place the issue in context and recommend solutions. Set standards and formal inclusion erase structural barriers that contribute to stereotype threats and lower levels of acceptance experienced by military women. In addition, because military women face issues of trauma prevalence and institutional barriers to health care that contribute to poorer mental health outcomes, health programming in targeted fashion to address these key contributors may go a long way to improving mental health for military women.

DEPRESSION

Depression is a diagnosis that covers a host of symptoms, which are categorized in The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) by duration of symptom presence. Mild depression involves symptoms manifesting for more than four days, moderate depression for slightly longer periods, and major depression involves symptoms present almost every day for one month. As with most psychological illnesses, symptoms manifest differently in every individual. Depression red flags include feelings of sadness, grief, worry, and tension, and possible interference with daily activities as a result of these feelings. Some people experience loss of appetite or sex drive, while others go the opposite route and overeat or engage in promiscuous or risky sexual behavior (Hendricks Thomas, 2015).

Highly variant, depression is often ignored or even misdiagnosed, particularly in milder forms where treatment is most effective but diagnosis hardest to pin down. Depression in some people looks a lot like stress injury, which is a normal and adaptive response to excess threats, whether those threats are present in the moment or are being re-experienced mentally in a flashback. In fact, stress and anxiety are symptoms of depression and in some patients both conditions occur at the same time. The diagnoses are different, however (Tanielan & Jaycox, 2008).

STRESS INJURY

Understanding stress injury requires understanding the absolutely normal way that human bodies respond to stressors. In response to stimuli, the brain triggers a bodily reaction, setting in motion a chain of physical reactions. The human endocrine system is artfully wired to fire off a series of hormones whenever the brain registers something as threatening. Threats can vary in terms of seriousness, but all trigger this exact same hormonal reaction in varying degrees of intensity.

The strongest reaction is the survival response known commonly as “fight or flight.” This reaction gets the body ready for physical exertion, sending energy and resources to systems that are needed in a fight or a footrace. Heart rate increases, respiratory rate increases, and major muscles tense. Intense alertness may save a life in an immediate threat situation, but in the long term, an excessively firing fight-or-flight stress response causes problems. When stressed to this degree, the body shuts down nonessential systems to give energy and attention to major muscle groups, heart function, and breathing. The body responding to stress hormones considers complicated thinking, muscle repair, reproductive functions, blood flow to fingers and toes, and digestion nonessential. Over time, problems arise as the body struggles to balance competing messages and maintain homeostatic balance (Thomas & Plummer Taylor, 2015).

If a given threat is overly traumatic or simply goes on for too great a time, the stress response keeps firing, sending the entire system into dysregulation. The elevated levels of cortisol and adrenaline present in the bloodstream of chronically stressed individuals directly impair the body’s ability to shut down into restorative states. The sympathetic nervous system aggressively stays on, resulting in hypervigilance, insomnia, and a host of emotional regulation problems (Hoge, 2010).

In addition to mental, stress injury symptoms can be physical, including among others: numbness in hands and feet, stomach problems, and high blood pressure. Though clinicians label it an

injury, the body is only responding naturally to the messages cortisol and adrenaline are sending. The overactive stress response becomes ingrained in a patient with PTS symptoms, and a constant state of reactivity and hyperarousal can begin to feel normal.

Both depression and stress injury cause mental and physical problems for military men and women struggling with symptoms, creating a challenge for the services to prevent and treat both in order to improve productivity, health indicators, and to prevent suicide (Bossarte, 2013; Hendricks Thomas, 2105; Hoge, 2010).

MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL SUPPORT

Not everyone exposed to trauma or combat suffers from reactivity issues afterward, and many mental health issues are not causally linked to trauma. Misconceptions and stigma are a problem for military personnel who view depression and stress injury as weakness, or believe that only very specific combat experiences create diagnosable emotional struggles (Malmin, 2013). In fact, combat exposure doesn't predict the likelihood that a veteran will commit suicide. Among younger veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, the greatest predictor of suicide is not deployment but rather a recent separation from service (Friedman, 2015).

Service separation stress points to the importance of social support as a predictor of mental health, because of the way human endocrine and nervous systems positively respond to socially-supportive relationships (Thomas, 2016; Egolf, Lasker, Wolf, & Potvin, 1992)). Humans are built to connect and commune with one another (Cohen, Underwood, & Gottlieb, 2000). When people cooperate and bond in close-knit groups, they increase levels of oxytocin and dopamine in their bloodstream. These hormones act in direct opposition to the stress hormones cortisol and adrenaline, and have the opposite effect on the body and mental state. This relaxation response is triggered whenever a close connection occurs, and loneliness and social rejection immediately set off the body's threat receptors (Friedman, 2015).

Social support is vital to mental wellness because it lowers stress levels. It is natural and adaptive for humans to seek connection with one another, and interruptions to those close connections are uniquely traumatizing. Loneliness and rejection feel like threats to life and future stability to human nervous systems, and the result is measurable impact on physical health. Strained social relationships only increase reactivity in a person already struggling with stress injury (Hendricks Thomas, 2015).

Scientists have studied social support from a variety of angles, looking at the size of networks, whether or not someone has a confidante, partnership status, and the perceived quality of support received (Cutrona, 1996; DiMatteo, 2004). Research examples validating the need for a trusted tribe abound; social support is a known contributor to health and longevity, with recent studies indicating that high levels add 7.5 years to the average American lifespan (Rankin, 2013).

Social support improves mental health in general, but studies have shown that specifically in military settings, high levels of perceived social support also independently predict coping self-efficacy post-deployment (Koo & Maguen, 2014; Hoge, 2010). Unfortunately, both male and female military-connected personnel are a numerical minority. Minority status creates

deleterious health effects. During the last twenty years, the American veteran population (both male and female) has steadily declined. What this means for today's veterans is that only about 12 percent of their male peers and 3 percent of their female peers served during the last decade of war. Women comprise 14.5 percent of the active component, with fewer in the Marine Corps and more in the Air Force (Department of Defense, 2015).

Historically, higher proportions of the American citizenry served at least one tour in the military. The significant majority of American men aged seventy-five and older are veterans, compared with no more than 12 percent of those younger than age thirty-five. The opposite is true for women, who are less represented in older eras of military service. Younger women are slightly more likely than older women to be veterans, but veteran status does not rise much above 3 percent in any female age group. Minority stress for female service members is even higher than that of male colleagues (Junger, 2015).

A qualitative study published in the *American Journal of Public Health* shared interviews with recently-discharged troops diagnosed with depression and conducted general surveys of separating service members who did not have a diagnosis. The study demonstrated that major issues for veterans were reintegration into new roles and the loss of community felt when leaving the military. Veterans described a sense of burdensomeness and extreme disconnect from civilians. These feelings linked to a failed sense of belonging and desire for death. Later studies focused specifically on female veterans and found that descriptions of symptoms and feelings of disconnect were markedly similar, though more pronounced and likely to be of greater severity, both practically and statistically (Seal, et al., 2009).

ISSUES IMPACTING UNIT COHESION IN MILITARY WOMEN – TRAUMA PREVALENCE & MINORITY STRESS

Targeting programs towards women must take into consideration several facets of the female military experience that differ from that of their male counterparts. As discussed in this forum, women are more likely to face issues of discrimination and belonging. They are at a disproportionately high risk for Military Sexual Trauma (MST), defined as sexual violence, sexual coercion, sexually threatening behavior, and/or sexual assault experienced during military service. MST is under-studied and under-reported, but between 20-40% of female veterans report experiencing MST during their time in service (Kelly, Skelton, Patel, & Bradley, 2011). During mental health screenings, one in five women report MST (Burns, Grindlay, Holt, Manski, & Grossman, 2014). Additionally, the majority of female veterans report having endured ongoing sexual harassment (Street, Vogt, & Dutra, 2009; Rogers & Kelly, 2011).

Historical discrimination against women in the service branches combined with cultural issues that linger in the present day can make issues of social support and unit cohesion uniquely salient for military women (Kline et al., 2013; Mitchell, 1989). Many servicewomen report feelings of alienation and decreased feelings of unit cohesion while serving (Meredith, et al., 2011). These women are at increased risk for mental health problems, including depression and stress injury (Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2013).

Institutionally, efforts to reduce barriers to unit cohesion for military women must be explored, researched, and critically analyzed. This forum argues that full inclusion and specialty-specific standards are a necessary step towards decreasing misogynistic and unhealthy culture faced by military women. Additionally, research on military women and mental health should seek condition correlates. If we know who is struggling, we can create specific programs led by stakeholder members of a specific subset of the population. Behavioral health research is useful in providing road maps for providers hoping to target military women by identifying variables, and in expanding our scope of understanding concerning how to reach servicewomen in culturally competent ways.

BARRIERS TO HEALTH CARE ACCESS FOR MILITARY WOMEN

Female servicewomen face unique health issues related to rampant Military Sexual Trauma rates and a host of issues related to access to health care through the Veteran's Administration, both stigma-related and structural (Bielawski, et al., 2014). Easing access burdens for Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) benefits and health care must be a top priority; female veterans do not need additional barriers. Some of the available services that are offered through the VA are psychological assessment and evaluations, psychotherapy, inpatient and outpatient care, and psychosocial rehabilitation (Elnitsky, et al., 2013). There are several VA facilities that have established women-only programs and specialized women's treatment teams to serve those female veterans that are not comfortable in a mixed-gender environment (Department of Veteran Affairs, 2015a).

Enabling care access for younger female veterans is important. Older female veterans are more likely to access VA health care than their younger peers from Afghanistan and Iraq (Bielawski, et al. 2014). The largest sub-population of women that use VA services are between the ages of 45 and 64; women veterans that are 65 and older make up 14% of those that use VA services (Department of Veterans Affairs, 2015b). With that said, more research is needed on mental health challenges, including depression, experienced by women across the life span (Bean-Mayberry et al., 2011).

THE WAY FORWARD – ASSETS-BASED APPROACHES

The challenge for health professionals looking to stem the tide of service suicides and improve quality of life for military women lies in shifting from a focus on problems toward a focus on capacity building. In this space, there is massive opportunity to make a positive impact. Focusing beyond post-incident therapy and relying on theories of resiliency are key. Military subculture is unique and requires culturally-palatable programming, and understanding the uniquely liminal space occupied by female veterans is necessary (Held & Owens, 2013; Thomas, 2016). Issues of social support are uniquely problematic for military women due to sexual trauma prevalence, lower levels of perceived unit cohesion, and institutional barriers to accessing health care (Naybeck-Beebe, 2010). These issues complicate the challenge for health professionals looking to stem the tide of service suicides and improve quality of life for military women (Malmin, 2013).

Resilience is the ability to become strong, healthy, or successful again after something stressful happens (Richardson, 2002). Case studies of existing programs that have worked to build

resilience in different populations provide the foundation upon which savvy programmers must build; and health promotion professionals working to prevent and treat mental health problems like depression and stress illness must understand the confluence of sex, social support, and mental health issues in the community (Kline, et al., 2013).

Resilience-training methods have been demonstrated to reduce stress and emotional reactivity and promote mental health and emotional well-being; framing this as promotion of combat fitness, resilience, and mental endurance may render it culturally-palatable to the military population (Greden, et al., 2010; Kobau, et al., 2011). Receiving training to cultivate resilience in the pre-deployment interval may help protect against the deleterious effects of the high-stress military context on physical and psychological health (Lee, et al., 2013; Sipe & Eisendrath, 2012).

This review suggests that targeted programming is needed for female veterans in treating and preventing depression and in select sub-populations of female veterans. A need exists for further research that explores the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of veterans toward programming that is focused on resilience-building, particularly in veteran populations in postsecondary educational settings given the high numbers of younger veterans attending postsecondary institutions and potential to introduce targeted interventions early in their life trajectories. The advancement of military mental health from a health promotion and education perspective could benefit tremendously from qualitative research, specifically case studies of successful resilience programming (Coughlin, 2012). This should involve rigorous program evaluation of culturally-sensitive content that focuses on predictor variables of interest, designing and validating program exemplars that provide the best opportunity to make a difference in the mental health of veterans.

Using information about social support as a significant predictor of depression in veterans to target programming is a needed first step. Tailoring programs for relevance in order to resonate with military women and rigorously evaluating them is the next (Thomas, Plummer Taylor, Hamner, Glazer, & Kaufman, 2015).

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MAKING CHANGE OUT OF SCANDAL

By Colonel Sheila M.Q. Scanlon USMC Retired
JUNE 1, 2017

Testifying before of Congress, Marine Commandant General Robert Neller stated “This issue of denigration of women, objectification of women, misogyny — however you want to articulate it — or just bad behavior, is tied to the way that some group of male Marines look at women in the Marine Corps. I think we can fix that....”¹ I thought to myself, I hope they aren’t reading this in Afghanistan, because, if so, gender integration may take a step backwards. I spent three years in Afghanistan working as a Senior Gender Advisor with both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. As part of our duties, we were encouraging both organizations to increase and integrate more women. The Afghan General Officers were always checking the internet looking at what is going on in the U.S. and questioning their U.S. advisors as to why we’re trying to change their culture on how they treat women when we have issues such as this in the United States.

A private Facebook group called Marines United, made up of about 30,000 active and former Marines, posted nude photos of women. This scandal not only included nude pictures of women on active duty in the Marine Corps, but also contained many lewd comments. This is reminiscent of 1991 and Tailhook. Tailhook was a Naval Aviators (Marines and Navy) Convention, held yearly in Las Vegas. In 1991, the 35th Annual Tailhook Convention was rocked by dishonor when 83 women and seven men were assaulted in degrading ways at what became a frat party gone badly.² Leadership had known for years that the Convention was out of hand with drunkenness and vulgar behavior and did nothing to stop it. This is no different than the Marine Corps knowing for years that the internet was being used to harass and denigrate women and doing very little to stop it.³

In response to the nude-photo scandal and the need to make change, the Commandant created a Task Force “to address cultural change and gender diversity Corps-wide.”⁴ Cultural change means addressing the cultural issue of military masculinity. Military masculinity does not have a clear definition but is described as “a combination of traits and attitudes that are hyper-masculine, hegemonic, and are associated primarily with the military.”⁵ Military

¹ Marine Corps Times Top Marine: Nude Photo-Sharing Scandal Shows ‘We have to change’ by Jeff Schogol March 14, 2017. <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/neller-testifies-on-photo-scandal>

² Newsweek “Tailhook: Scandal Time” by Newsweek Staff on 7/5/92. www.newsweek.com/tailhook-scandal-tine-200362.

³ Marine Corps Times Top Marine: Nude Photo-Sharing Scandal Shows ‘We have to change’ by Jeff Schogol March 14, 2017. <https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/articles/neller-testifies-on-photo-scandal>

⁴ USMC Update: Marines United Response <http://www.moaa.org/Content/Take-Action/Top-Issues/Currently-Serving/USMC-Update--Marines-United>

⁵ Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).

masculinity does not accept women as equal partners, making gender integration difficult. This means the ethos of the Corps needs to be changed to one of inclusiveness.

So how do you encourage a partner government, as directed by the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP-WPS), such as Afghanistan, to improve their recruitment and retention of women in their armed forces, if males in our armed forces treat women in this manner? If you can't treat women in your own armed forces with respect, how will you treat women in partner countries with respect? This paper will explore the implementation of the NAP-WPS by the Department of Defense (DoD) and give recommendations on how the DoD implementation of the NAP-WPS can go a long way to change the culture of the military when it comes to women.

The U.S. has one of the largest military force on earth and is considered the world's 911 force. It is also one of the world's most democratic and free nations. Our President is seen as the leader of the free world. As such, the rest of the world looks to the United States to set the example. As strong supporters behind the signing of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, empowering women in all aspects of conflict, peace, and security, when a scandal such as the USMC photo scandal occurred, the United States gets the proverbial black eye.

Signed in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 specifically discussed how women are disproportionately affected by conflict and need to be included in all the phases from conflict prevention to the peace process to post-conflict reconstruction, including stability operations, peace building and peacekeeping.⁶ In December 2011, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13595 - Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security. EO 13595 directs that not only will the U.S. have a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security but that the DoD would implement it. The goal of the NAP-WPS is to "empower half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence, and insecurity. Achieving this goal is critical to our national and global security."⁷ The DoD signed their Implementation Guide to the NAP-WPS in September 2013. In June 2016, the White House issued a revised NAP-WPS and the DoD is currently working on the implementation plan.

The 2016 NAP-WPS holds DoD "accountable for the implementation of the policies and initiatives endorsed" in the plan.⁸ The NAP-WPS specifies tasks for the DoD to accomplish some of which can only be taken by operational forces. How the DoD implements the NAP-WPS says a lot on how the military sees the role of women in conflict and how they recognize the need to include women's participation in conflict affected environments, especially when over half the world population is made up of women. There are many ways that DoD can comply with the NAP-WPS that could help change the culture of how women are seen by male service members. Below are recommendations on some specific objectives the DoD is responsible to implement with recommended Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) in Appendix A.

⁶ <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/>

⁷ The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security June 2016.

⁸ Ibid.

Outcome 1.1: Incorporating NAP-WPS objectives into appropriate DoD strategic guidance and planning documents.

Leadership starts at the top. One of the ways to change the culture of the military on how women are viewed is to implement the NAP-WPS through strategic direction. Strategic direction is “the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide strategic guidance to the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.”⁹ Strategic direction starts with the National Military Strategy (NMS) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The NMS gives the military objectives to the force. The JSCP is the “most specific tasking document affecting planning by the combatant commander”.¹⁰ From the JSCP, the Combatant Commanders (CCMDS) issue their Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs). The TCPs are plans that “focus on the command’s steady-state activities, which include operations, security cooperation, and other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states.”¹¹

Strategic direction or guidance is also given through DoD Instructions. After the first NAP-WPS was issued, the DoD issued its guidance through the “DoD Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security”. With the reissuance of a revised NAP-WPS in June 2016, the DoD should forego the Implementation Plan and instead issue a DoD Instruction (DoDI). A DoDI is a broad policy document used to instruct the forces on information required by the President, Legislature, and the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The Instruction regulates actions or conduct to be taken by Components of the DoD.¹² A DoDI on the Implementation of WPS would assign tasks and actions from the NAP. A DoDI would be much stronger and have more impact than an Implementation Plan.

Outcome 1.2: Ensure all relevant U.S. personnel receive appropriate training on Women, Peace, and Security issues, including instruction on the value of inclusive participation in conflict prevention, peace processes, and security initiative....

Training and education are the keys to changing the culture of the Services to be more inclusive of women in the military and women in conflict zones. Training starts at enlisted recruit training and Officer Candidate School (OCS). The USMC has the only gender segregated basic training among the Services, yet it is the Service at the core of the nude-photo scandal. Time needs to be carved out to teach inclusiveness to both enlisted and officers and respect for women as part of WPS. At Parris Island, SC the East Coast basic training for new recruits, and Quantico, VA for officers, there is no reason that men and women cannot be trained together to teach acceptance and inclusiveness.

Training and education is something that occurs throughout a military person’s entire career. WPS needs to be taught at all levels of one’s career, up to and including General Officer level. Most pushback comes from those military educators who say there are not enough hours in the

⁹ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/

¹⁰ Theater Strategy and the Theater Campaign Plan: Both Are Essential by William W. Mendel

¹¹ www.samm.dsca.mil/glossary/theater-campaign-plans

¹² ww.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/writing/DoD_Issuances.ppt

day to conduct mandatory training. The fact that WPS is “critical to our national and global security” as stated by General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff conveys that it is an important subject to be presented at all levels of training.¹³ It does not need to be an elaborate course and can be presented in less than an hours’ time. It also needs to be covered at senior service schools since leadership starts at the top.

Outcome 1.3: Designate one or more officers, including senior-level officials as appropriate to be responsible for coordination of implementation of the NAP....

As discussed above, DoD is responsible for coordinating and implementing the NAP-WPS. There are two directorates at DoD responsible for WPS. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy has had been a billet within the office of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs called Rule of Law and Detainee Policy. However, the position is a temporary billet that has been vacant since January 2017. The J-5, within the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy, Partnership Strategy Division, is responsible for WPS. The billet responsible has WPS as an additional duty. Both DoD positions, responsible for WPS need to be full-time billets which would go a long way to show the seriousness with which DoD views the inclusiveness of women.

To maintain a ready and capable force, postured globally, ready to handle all types of crises, contingencies, conflicts and war, including threats from terrorists, the Commander, especially CCMDS, must have the best advice possible on WPS and this can only be done by having a gender advisor on staff. The resistance so far has been that a billet would have to be given up or a new one created which costs money. One billet in Gender is fiscally insignificant when it comes to the CCMDS’s overall budget. The work-around has been to assign someone with the additional duty as the gender advisor. If DoD is serious about changing the culture of the U.S. military to be inclusive and respectful of women then they need to be proactive and assign full-time gender advisors. The DoDI should mandate that there be gender advisors at the Military Service level, CCMDs and at all Major Commands. Southern Command is an example of best practices with a full-time gender advisor in attendance at all meetings with the Combatant Commander.

Outcome 2.1: Assist partner governments in improving and recruitment and retention of women..., into government ministries and the incorporation of women’s perspectives into peace and security policy.

A good example of a partner government would be Afghanistan, where U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has both military and civilians deployed. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military is providing advisors to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces - the military and police.¹⁴ There have been full-time gender advisors working at both the Ministries of Defense and Interior, since 2010. So far, there has been no guidance from CENTCOM on recruitment of women for the Afghan National Army and Police or other ministries. In addition, the

¹³ September 2013, Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.

¹⁴ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm

International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan (ISAF) has not emphasized recruitment of women. However, ISAF Gender Advisors do keep track of the numbers of women in both groups by ethnicity.

The argument for not paying attention to this task has been that it was more important to fight the war than worry about how many women have been recruited by the Afghan Army and Police, since women do not fight. What women in the Army and Police do, besides being role models, are searchers of other women and gatherers of intelligence. In this Muslim country, men cannot talk to or search women for weapons, explosives, or contraband. It is well known that insurgents have used burkas to hide behind. In addition, with only women culturally permitted to talk, army and police women provide human intelligence needed to help fight the insurgency.

“Evidence shows that security efforts are more successful and sustainable when women contribute to prevention and early warning, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict resolution and rebuilding.”¹⁵ This “Outcome” is a very important task not only to helping our partner-nation and supporting WPS issues in the country, but also to our national security and national interests. In addition, women are “significantly more likely to agree to talks and subsequently reach an agreement” when they are included in the peacekeeping processes.¹⁶

Outcome 2.1 (Continued): Leverage the participation of female U.S. military personnel to encourage and model gender integration and reach out to female and male populations in partner nations.

This objective is very challenging to accomplish because the Services requirements for deployment are based upon rank and military occupational specialty, not gender. The Joint Staff and CCMDS should specifically task Military Services and the CCMDS with the requirement to assign women as part of deployed forces or as Individual Augments to ensure the participation of female military personnel “to encourage and model gender integration”¹⁷.

A second way to accomplish this objective is to send more women to operations/missions to work with partner nations as members of Mixed (male, female) Engagement Teams (METs). This is a modification to the Female Engagement Teams (FETs). FETs are teams of women only used to interact with partner nation female populations in conservative societies where male service members cannot interact with them due to cultural norms. Cultural Support Teams, in Afghanistan, are a good example of integrated teams working together reaching out to both female and male populations.


A third way to accomplish this objective is to increase the number of women accessions in the military. Former Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated, women make up “50 percent of the American population. To succeed in our mission of national defense, we cannot afford to cut

¹⁵ How Women’s Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests by Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein Council on Foreign Relations, October 2016.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security June 2016.

ourselves off from half the country's talents and skills. We have to take full advantage of every individual who can meet our standards.”¹⁸



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Objective 2.1 (Continued): Mobilize men as allies in support of women's leadership and participation in security-related processes and decision-making.

When US Congresswomen visited the Afghanistan Ministries of Interior and Defense, and brought up the subject of women, the Afghans were expecting these issues to be discussed and took no action because they did not take the message delivered by women seriously. However, when a male leader brought up the subject, the Afghan males listened. This objective of mobilizing men as “allies” is not difficult to implement or accomplish if you have the support of men. For example, include women's issues as part of Talking Points when senior leaders visit their counterparts. When visiting partner countries insist that female leadership of the country be included in the discussions and have an active part in the visit. This is as simple as training our military and civilians on the importance of WPS.

In conclusion, the USMC nude-photo scandal brought out a glaring problem with the U.S. military today. It may very well be a cultural problem among male service members as noted by General Neller. One way to fix this “cultural” issue of military masculinity is by changing the way women are viewed through education and training. Education and training starts at recruit training and OCS by not only teaching respect for women but about WPS and how the inclusion

¹⁸ “Secretary of Defense Speech, Remarks on the Women-in Service Review” (Arlington, VA: DoD 2015) access at <http://www.defense.gov>

¹⁹ http://www.moaa.org/Content/Take-Action/Top-Issues/Currently-Serving/USMC-Update--Marines-United-Response.aspx?utm_source=legis&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MarinesUnited

of women in countries threatened by war is critical to our national and global security interests. Without a change in how male military members perceive women serving alongside them, the services will continue to struggle to include women in combat arms.

The DoD, leading from the top, needs to put their weight behind WPS and should start by issuing a DoDI on the implementation of the NAP-WPS rather than a Guide or Plan. The DoD and Joint Staff can ensure education and training does not end at basic training but continues through PME and mandatory classes, as part of pre-deployment training, and career level schools. As America's 911 force, our military stands for U.S. norms and values which demands inclusiveness. Those norms and values include understanding the importance of the NAP-WPS, respect for women, and empowering "half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened by war."²⁰ By not fully implementing the NAP-WPS, the DoD will likely continue to experience scandals such as Tailhook and the nude-photo scandal and denigration of women will continue.

²⁰ September 2013, Department of Defense Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security.

Appendix A: Measures of Effectiveness

Outcome	Implementing Office	Measures of Effectiveness
1.1. Incorporating NAP objectives into appropriate DoD strategic guidance and planning documents.	OSD, Joint Staff, Military Departments and CCMDs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OSD, Joint Staff - Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is included, in instructions, directives, plans, etc. - Military Departments and CCMDs have WPS included in directives, instructions, orders, operation orders or plans.
1.2. Ensure all relevant U.S. personnel receive appropriate training on Women, Peace, and Security issues, including instruction on the value of inclusive participation in conflict prevention, peace processes, and security initiative....	OSD, Joint Staff, Military Departments, CCMDs, Service School	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Courses or classes are taught on WPS. - Deployed civilian and military personnel receive pre-deployment and in-theater training on WPS.
1.3. Designate one or more officer, including senior-level officials as appropriate as responsible for coordination of implementation of the NAP, as well as other gender-related policies and strategies.	OSD, Joint Staff, Military Services, CCMDs, Service Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Designation has been made for coordination and implementation of WPS policies and strategies. - Designation has been made for a full-time or part-time gender advisor.
2.1. Assist partner governments in improving and recruitment and retention of women..., into government ministries and the incorporation of women's perspectives into peace and security policy.	CCMDs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Partner countries are recruiting women for their security ministries. - Financial support was given to the partner governments for recruitment of women in security ministries. - Women are being retained in the security ministries.
2.1. Leverage the participation of female U.S. military personnel to encourage and model gender integration and reach out to female and male populations in partner nations.	Joint Staff, Military Departments, CCMDs and Service Schools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Women are attending combat arms training. - Women are being deployed as part of a force or as Individual Augments. - Command has a strategy to deploy more women service members and civilians. - Women are being deployed as part of FETs, or METS.

<p>2.1. Mobilize men as allies in support of women's leadership and participation in security-related processes and decision-making.</p>	<p>OSD, Joint Staff, Military Services, CCMDS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formal and informal meeting held with dignitaries within the Ministries of Interior and Defense of partner countries include Talking Points on WPS. - Women leaders from partner countries are invited to attend US-partner security-related and decision-making meetings.
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UNSCR 1325 ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR PREVENTION OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE DURING CONFLICT

Carolyn J. Washington

INTRODUCTION

In April 2016, after a four-year struggle, U.S. Special Forces Sergeant First Class (SFC) Charles Martland would finally win his fight to remain in the Army following an incident in Afghanistan, in which he and Captain Dan Quinn, also U.S. Special Forces, assaulted an American-backed militia commander for chaining a boy to his bed as a sex slave. According to the New York Times “the Army contends that Martland and others should have looked the other way (a contention that I believe is nonsense),” stated Representative Duncan Hunter, California, Republican who worked to save SFC Martland’s career.¹

The New York Times further reported that the spokesman for the American command in Afghanistan, Colonel Brian Tribus, wrote in an email: “Generally, allegations of child sexual abuse by Afghan military or police personnel would be a matter of domestic Afghan criminal law.” He added that “there would be no express requirement that U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan report it.” “An exception,” he said, “is when rape is being used as a *weapon of war*.”² While the conduct of soldiers who engage in such behavior as Martland and Quinn should not be excused, soldiers should be provided with a coherent policy, a set of rules for rational decision making on the handling of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) as part of the military’s overall strategy for providing security.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) refers to “any act that is perpetrated against a person’s will and is based on gender norms and unequal power relationships.”³ SGBV can include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation and trafficking. While women and girls suffer disproportionately from SGBV, it can also be inflicted on men and boys. Although SGBV frequently occurs during conflict, it is not inevitable and can be prevented.

Since military personnel are charged with the responsibility to protect and may be the first to encounter victims, it is important to provide them with the tools to appropriately handle incidents

¹ Joseph Goldstein (September 20, 2015), U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies, *New York Times*.

² Ibid.

³ Sexual and gender based violence defined. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), accessed on June 1, 2017 at www.unhcr.org/en-us/sexual-and-gender-based-violence.html.

of SGBV. It is impossible to maintain a secure environment if SGBV is a widespread problem. In this paper, I focus on military strategies for the prevention of SGBV. I argue that the armed forces already have several mechanisms, that when coupled with a gender perspective can be effective in developing the appropriate strategies to prevent SGBV.

BACKGROUND

In October 2000, the landmark adoption of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security which marked the recognition of the roles that both men and women play in conflict and sustainable peace, identified as one of its four pillars, the *prevention* of sexual violence against women and girls during conflict.⁴ UNSCR 1325 calls for improving intervention strategies for the prevention of violence against women, which includes prosecuting perpetrators of violators of international law; enhancing women's rights under national law; and supporting local women's peace initiatives and conflict resolution processes.

Later, subsequent resolutions which comprise the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, would further emphasize the problem of sexual violence. UNSCR 1820 (2008), recognized sexual violence as a "weapon and tactic of war," advocating for the training of troops in the prevention of calling of sexual violence.⁵ And UNSCR 1888 (2009) acknowledges that "sexual violence exacerbates armed conflicts and impedes international peace and security" and calls for leadership to address sexual violence.⁶

NATO militaries play an important role in peace and security as they deploy to crisis situations around the world in the fulfillment of its three core tasks to safeguard its alliance members- collective defense, crisis-management and cooperative security.⁷ To this end, NATO has adopted a policy of the integration of a *gender perspective* as a tool to increase operational effectiveness through its Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1, "Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure."⁸

A GENDER PERSPECTIVE AND MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR THE PREVENTION OF SGBV

I argue that the key to implementing a viable strategy to prevent SGBV is the integration of a gender perspective, "a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources."⁹ A

⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) accessed on May 30, 2017 at www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps.

⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1820 on Women, Peace and Security (2008) accessed on May 30, 2017 at www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2008/6/un-security-council-resolution-1820.

⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1888 on Women, Peace and Security (2009) accessed on May 30, 2017 at www.unwomen.org/en/docs/2009/9/un-security-council-resolution-1888.

⁷ NATO Strategic Concept, (November 2010), 6, Core Tasks and Principles, accessed at http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf.

⁸ Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 REV 1 (2012) *Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure*, NATO, accessed on May 12, 2017 at www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2012/20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf.

⁹ Ibid, paragraph 1-4c, 5.

gender perspective can be a force enabler and inform SGBV planning on the ground by encouraging military forces to take into consideration the security needs of all members of a community in which it deploys to protect. The implementation of a gender perspective is accomplished through a *gender analysis*, “a systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand iniquities based on gender.”¹⁰

The appointment of the Gender Advisor within the military organization (GENAD) is key to the successful integration of a gender perspective. The GENAD is primary staff and required to provide constant guidance and oversight as well as provide feedback to the commander on gender issues. The role of the GENAD is to ensure a common understanding of UNSCR 1325 within the command and the integration of a gender perspective. The GENAD can also provide subject matter expertise on procedures to prevent SGBV.¹¹

In framing military prevention strategies, I examine three levels of sexual prevention efforts according to when they occur during the violence. These levels are primary prevention, secondary prevention, and tertiary prevention.¹²

PRIMARY PREVENTION

Primary prevention activities normally take place *before* sexual violence has occurred in order to prevent such acts. The best way for military forces to prepare to prevent SGBV at this level is through pre-deployment training and later SGBV targeted operations during deployment.

Pre-deployment

A good place for the commander to establish his or her priorities concerning a gender perspective in SGBV prevention is in the command’s Annual and Quarterly Training Guidance. Training Guidance allows the commander to determine his/her unit’s training requirements and priorities in the development of a training strategy which emphasize the importance of eliminating SGBV and its significance to the mission. Training should be tailored to local and cultural circumstances and address both the standards of conduct expected of soldiers and how to respond to SGBV incidents that occur, such as medical treatment for victims, and detention of perpetrators. Soldiers can benefit from *scenario training*.

Scenario-driven training exposes soldiers to situations they might encounter on the ground during deployments as well as possible solutions for handling them. It allows soldiers to think through problems and work out responses before challenges actually present themselves. A sample of scenario-driven training is as follows:

¹⁰ Ibid, paragraph 1-4d, 5.

¹¹ Ibid, paragraph 3-4a-c, 12.

¹² *Sexual violence prevention: Beginning the Dialogue* (2004) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, 3, accessed at <https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/svppresentation-a.pdf> on May 30, 2017.

SAMPLE SCENARIO

Your unit is operating in a country which has experienced numerous incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The area has been plagued by violence between rival armed factions jockeying for control. The situation is further complicated by a breakdown of government control, undisciplined security forces and criminal elements. The mission of your unit is to provide security through both mounted and dismounted patrols to maintain an effective presence and help improve security. The commander has directed the staff to prepare a SGBV checklist to help patrols identify and report on SGBV. In addition, the commander wants the staff to identify local actors, programs, and stakeholders that can help mitigate SGBV.¹³

During deployments

Military operations can be specifically tailored to prevent SGBV. Women and girls who are disproportionately targeted, are vulnerable as they perform domestic activities such as gathering firewood, drawing water, shopping at the market or taking children to and from school. They should be prepared to intervene and stop acts of SGBV when they encounter them and, depending upon policy, detain perpetrators.¹⁴ During routine patrols and checkpoints, units should be alert for indicators of SGBV such as the absence of women and children on the streets, evidence of sex in exchange for food and domestic violence.¹⁵ It is also important to pay attention to the activities of men. Are they still going to work or just hanging out? Men and boys may also be victims of SGBV.

An important aspect of prevention is the establishment of rapport with the local population, who may be valuable sources of information useful in identifying possible threats. Since women and children are the main victims of SGBV, it can prove difficult for male soldiers to cross cultural boundaries to engage with them. Female soldiers may be useful in fostering trust and gathering valuable information for prevention of SGBV. In Afghanistan, Female Engagement Teams (FET) consisting of female ISAF soldiers were assigned to patrols to engage with Afghan females.¹⁶ However, it should not be assumed that female soldiers possess innate characteristics to connect with populations. They too must be trained.

¹³ Modified from *Training Scenarios: Preparing to Prevent* (November 26, 2014) edited by Dwight Raymond, Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Army War College, accessed on June 1, 2017 at pksoi.armywarcollege.edu.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Megan Bastick, Karen Grimm, Rahel Kunz (2007) *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict-Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DECAF), Geneva, Switzerland, accessed on May 30, 2017 at https://www1.essex.ac.uk/armedcon/story_id/sexual_violence_conflict_fall%5B1%5D.pdf.

¹⁶ Zoe Bedell (May 2011) United States Marine Corps Female Engagement Team accessed on July 1, 2017 at www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/meeting-records/2011/pdf/BEDELL_FETPresentation.pdf.

Checklists provide the unit with another tool to systematically incorporate a gender perspective into operations focused on the prevention of SGBV. A sample checklist is shown below:

SAMPLE CHECKLIST

- How does the security situation affect women, men, girls and boys differently?
- How do the different movement patterns of men, women, boys and girls serve as indicators of the current security situation?
- What are the activities of women and girls? Are they conducting daily activities such as gathering firewood, drawing water, shopping at the market or taking children to school? Or are they staying at home or hiding?
- What are the activities of men and boys? Are they going to work? Congregating on street corners?
- What are indicators of SGBV for both males and females? Is there evidence of sex in exchange for food? Domestic violence?
- What critical elements of information should be gathered to identify high risk areas?
- What deterrent measures can be taken according to rules of engagement (ROE)?
- What actions should be taken in encountering victims of SGBV? Perpetrators?
- What NGOs and women's groups are operating in the area?

SECONDARY PREVENTION

Secondary prevention involves immediate responses after SGBV has occurred to deal with the *short term* consequences of violence in order to reduce the harm to the victims and detain perpetrators. In the aftermath of an SGBV incident, secondary prevention may require immediate action to include medical treatment for victims, investigation of the incident and the apprehension of perpetrators.

ISAF Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 362: *Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel* (2006), represents the type of action that could also be useful immediately following an SGBV incident.¹⁷ A NATO Holding Facility/NATO Detention Facility was used, designed or adapted for the detention of individuals. The period of detention was not to exceed 96 hours, beginning with the time of arrest up until the point a detainee was handed over to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)¹⁸ or government of Afghanistan (GOA) officials or released by ISAF.

¹⁷ISAF Afghanistan Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures, SOP 362: *Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel* (August 31, 2006) Headquarters International Security Kabul, Afghanistan (NATO/ISAF Unclassified REL GCTF, accessed on June 1, 2017 at <https://publicintelligence.net/ISAF-DetaineeSOP.pdf>.

¹⁸ The abbreviation ANSF stands for Afghan National Security Forces and includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police, Afghan Highway Police, Afghan Counter-Narcotics Police and any authorized Afghan national or regional government agency involved with security or detention facilities.

Detentions were both *planned*, during a specific operation and *unplanned*, during the course of normal duties, e.g. patrolling. Detainees faced questioning by specially trained individuals, with issues of admissibility and procedure for possible future prosecution raised with the Headquarters ISAF Legal Advisor (LEGAD). ISAF Rules of Engagement (ROE) allowed for the detention of an individual under the following circumstances: ISAF force protection; self-defense of ISAF or its personnel; and accomplishment of the ISAF mission. The ROE appears to be broad enough to extend to the detention of SGBV perpetrators.

Another initiative which can benefit victims of during secondary prevention is Afghanistan's Family Response Unit (FRU). Here mostly female police officers support victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse, child marriage and other issues. Resolute Support has constructed 41 FRUs and 93 Women's Participation Program facilities across Afghanistan. During incidents of SGBV, FRUs can provide essential services where victims can receive necessary treatment.¹⁹

TERTIARY PREVENTION

Tertiary prevention involves *long term* responses after SGBV has occurred to deal with the lasting consequences of violence such as prevention or treatment programs.²⁰ While it may seem that the military has no role in tertiary prevention because of the social nature of these programs, the U.S. Department of Defense does have several programs which can be supportive during this level of prevention. Two programs that I would like to highlight are the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) and the State Partnership Program (SPP).

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). The goal of DIILS as the lead defense security cooperation organization for "professional legal education and international engagement focused on human rights, international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict training" is to strengthen a nation's legal capacity.²¹ DIILS can offers training, often via mobile training teams (MTT) which travel directly to the country and provide important legal training which for the prevention of SGBV.

In December 2016, during a Military Justice Course, a three-week course which provides a "comprehensive overview of the U.S. military justice system and comparative analysis of other military justice systems,"²² an investigation specialist from the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service visited DIILS in Newport, Rhode Island, to lecture on how peacekeeping troop contributing countries can effectively gather evidence in cases of sexual misconduct during

¹⁹ E.L. Craig (June 24, 2017) *Afghan police provide shelter for domestic crime victims*, Resolute Support News Stories, accessed on June 30, 2017 at rs.nato.int.

²⁰ *Sexual violence prevention: Beginning the Dialogue* (2004) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, p.3, accessed at <https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/svpresentation-a.pdf> on May 30, 2017.

²¹ *Home*, U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) accessed on May 15, 2017 at globalnetplatform.org.

²² Nancy Parvin (December 9, 2016) *DIILS participants investigate and prosecute sexual misconduct in military justice course*, U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) accessed on May 15, 2017 at globalnetplatform.org.

remote missions. During a mock trial on the prosecution of sexual assault, the 24 course participants from 21 countries prepared charges, questioned witnesses and made arguments.²³

State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP is a joint U.S. Department of Defense program managed by the National Guard that links U.S. states with other countries to support the security cooperation objectives of geographic combatant commands. Through these partnerships, SPP can improve the capabilities of partner nations to prevent SGBV and also enhance the cultural awareness and skills of U.S. military personnel. The unique civil-military nature of the National Guard provides opportunities for a wide range of security cooperation activities which may support the prevention of SGBV such as: emergency management and disaster response; border and port security; leadership and NCO development; medical capabilities in responding to victims; economic security; peacekeeping operations; and counter trafficking. Since 1993, some 73 unique partnerships in 79 countries have been established such as the Indiana National Guard with Slovakia under European Command (EUCOM); South Africa with New York (Africa Command-AFRICOM); Thailand with Washington (Pacific Command-PACOM); Jordan with Colorado (Central Command-CENTCOM); Chile with Texas (Southern Command-SOUTHCOM) and the Bahamas with Rhode Island (Northern Command-NORTHCOM).²⁴

In spite of the best training and cooperation among security forces, there are still some major obstacles to the prevention of SGBV, both internal and external. These challenges include the problem of sexual exploitation (SEA) within the armed forces itself and host country cultural norms. SEA refers to “the abuse of service members by other service members as well as the abuse of sexual abuse of civilians.”²⁵ Training and education of military personnel can help to reduce SEA. Commanders must establish clear policies, reporting channels, swift and thorough investigations of reported allegations and strict punishment for offenders.

Host country cultural norms may discriminate against women resulting in the condoning of SGBV. As a result, victims may be discouraged from reporting SGBV. To mitigate the negative impact of these norms, military forces should actively engage with local security forces both in peacetime through security cooperation activities as previously mentioned and during deployments conflict situations in joint military operations.

In conclusion, the *prevention* of SGBV as outlined in UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda is an important aspect in conflict. Since military forces are often the first to encounter victims, especially in an environment where the host government’s security forces may be unavailable or incapable of providing protection, it is important that soldiers be equipped with the tools necessary to prevent and protect vulnerable populations from SGBV.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ U.S. Department of Defense State Partnership Program, accessed on June 1, 2017 at nationalguard.mil.

²⁵ Bi-Strategic Command Directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1 REV 1 (2012) *Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure*, NATO, paragraph 3-5, 12, accessed on May 12, 2017 at www.nato.int/issues/women_nato/2012/20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf.

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SO, YOU WANT TO FIGHT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST? FIRST, FIGHT GENDER INEQUALITY.

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U.S. Naval War College
July 30, 2017

INTRODUCTION

In the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, there has been a concerning rise of active violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and a marked increase in women's support and participation in these VEOs.¹ Consequently, the MENA region also boasts the widest collective gender gap in the world, at a distance of 39% from gender parity in the 2016 World Economic Forum's annual Global Gender Gap Report.² While the United Nations' Resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security strive to involve women in the MENA region in efforts to counter violent extremism, a direct attack on regional gender inequality issues must be made a priority. Gender inequality is inextricably linked to violent extremism in the MENA region, therefore, countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts must have a preceding or concurrent, comprehensive gender equality plan based on successful regional models and best practices to address this major cause of societal instability.

GENDER INEQUALITY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Numbers Don't Lie

Even the most cursory analysis of the Global Gender Gap Report and Global Terrorism Index shows the correlation between a nation's level of gender inequality and the occurrence of violent extremist activity. In fact, of the nations ranked as the 10 most affected by terrorism in the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI),³ all but one (India) were ranked in the bottom 20 for gender inequality, while three nations were unable to have data collected due to current conflict (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia).⁴ Unfortunately, current international programs aimed at eradicating violent extremism do not usually consider the elimination of gender inequality as a primary or interrelated step in reducing occurrences of violent extremism.

CAUSES OF DISCONNECT

According to *A Man's World*, jointly published in 2016 by the UAE's Hedayah Center and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, four main issues exist that create challenges in the

¹ USAID. 2015. People Not Pawns: Women's Participation in Violent Extremism Across MENA. USAID, 1.

² World Economic Forum. 2016. The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. World Economic Forum, 16.

³ Institute for Economics & Peace, 2016. Global Terrorism Index 2016. Institute for Economics & Peace, 10.

⁴ World Economic Forum, 11.

discussion surrounding countering violent extremism and gender. Not surprisingly, these issues are connected in one way or another to the challenge of gender equality. The main issues identified in the report are:

The debates about the roles of women and violent extremism are not connected to broader analyses about the relationship between gender and security.

Many policy discussions and programs on the role of women and their roles in countering violent extremism do not listen to the voices of women on the ground and are based on misguided notions of the power of women in many societies.

The larger Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda—that is the agenda of gender equality and women’s empowerment as embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and its follow-on resolutions—must not become subordinate to the counter-terrorism agenda. In other words, gender equality and women’s empowerment should not be reduced to a counter-terrorism policy, but should be pursued in its own right and according to national and international commitments.

International actors are not putting money where their mouth is. The amount of money spent on programming furthering the WPS agenda is very limited and is far outshined by the amount of money spent on counter terrorism efforts.⁵

Particularly significant is the implication that UNSCR 1325’s Women, Peace, and Security agenda is becoming subordinate to a counter-terrorism agenda. An understanding and assessment of the gender equality challenges of the broader MENA region and the drivers causing women to support and participate in VEOs are essential to both reducing gender inequality and violent extremism.

WHY WOMEN SUPPORT AND JOIN VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

To understand why a focus on increasing gender equality is essential to reducing and eradicating violent extremism, women’s roles and connections to VEOs must be explored and understood. According to the Global Gender Gap Index, gender subordination and exclusion have been cited as the main causes for women joining and supporting VEOs, while women who desire social and political agency are deemed vulnerable to recruitment.⁶ These vulnerabilities are directly tied to institutionalized gender inequality that is omnipresent in many MENA region nations. The MENA region family structures women are intrinsically tied to, can prove to be yet another vulnerability. Protecting family members from law enforcement, especially one’s children, spouse, father, and brother, keeps women silent regarding extremist activity. In some instances, women will even end up supporting a VEO that their family member has joined. Promises that participation in extremist activity will improve the financial situation of the family frequently

⁵ Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Sara Zeiger, Rafia Bhulai. 2016. *A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism*. Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security, 19-21.

⁶ USAID, 2.

play into women's decisions to support and eventually join VEOs, moving from a passive to active role.

The transition of women from passive to active roles in violent extremist organizations is influenced by several driving factors, the majority fueled by institutionalized gender inequality. USAID reports these driving factors are composed of, “push, pull, and context specific elements”,⁷ some of which are shared between the two genders, and some that are gender specific to women. *Push factors*, that are often situational and predispose individuals to support a VEO, often include gender subordination, exclusion from mainstream politics, dissatisfaction with regime or the political process, seeking security amidst instability, experiences of abuse or humiliation by state security forces, and death or abuse of family members.⁸ It is important to consider that lack of stability exacerbates these factors, and armed conflict often brings with it instances of gender based violence. *Pull factors*, that draw individuals to VEOs are frequently group-specific (identity-based) and include romanticism of ‘state-building’ projects (such as in the case of Daesh); selective incentives related to security; services or financial gain; group rejection of ‘Western’ political and economic experiments; and support of VEO ideology, such as nationalist goals or religious goals.⁹

While *push and pull factors* for VEO participation in the MENA region are more generalized, *context specific factors* change frequently according to the nation or area. These *context specific factors* may include: access to public space, freedom of movement, access to information, and previous political engagement and awareness. *Context specific factors*, along with gender specific factors (both *push* and *pull*), can be affected directly by a positive change in the gender equality of a nation. Conversely, they are also the most difficult factors for outside organizations, like the United Nations, to address. By increasing gender equality, factors such as gender subordination, exclusion from mainstream politics, restricted access to public space, limited freedom of movement, and lack of access to information disappear rapidly, removing drivers that encourage female (*and* male) participation in MENA VEOs.

MENA VEOs which recruit women consistently take advantage of *push, pull, and context specific factors*, as well as individual motivations. The reasons for female recruitment are often pragmatic on the part of VEOs. A lack of male recruits and the strategic advantages of using female recruits (they are less likely to be searched by authorities) are frequently cited as benefits of including women in VEO activity. Utilization of women's social networks, such as family or friends, in person recruiting, and targeted messaging are common methods used to recruit women. In many MENA nations, the VEOs' access to female recruits is their greatest challenge. Women lacking access to public space and freedom of movement, as well as limited access to technology (internet, mobile phones, and social media), while driving factors that may encourage women to join and support VEOs are also barriers to their recruitment.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid, 2.

⁸ USAID, 2.

⁹ Ibid, 2.

¹⁰ USAID, 3.

SUCCESS STORIES: BANGLADESH, MOROCCO, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Bangladesh

While not in the MENA region, as home to 9.2% of the world's Muslim population, Bangladesh is a majority Muslim state. After 1975 assassinations of political figures in disputes over a secular state, *madrassas* began to emerge that radicalized impoverished and unemployed students, resulting in widespread influence of militant Islamist organizations by the 1990s.¹¹ A 2005 terrorist attack that wounded the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, and killed 22 people was the tipping point for the nation to address the growing problem of violent extremism by developing a CVE strategy that worked within their societal context. Identifying the root causes allowing violent extremism to take root, the Bangladeshi Government focused on efforts to counter rampant poverty; specifically, through women's economic, educational, and social empowerment efforts. The determination that women's empowerment and gender equality in Bangladesh would have a positive long term impact did not miss the mark. The nation has not had a significant violent extremist attack since 2005.¹²

To empower women and close the reduce gender inequality in Bangladesh, required several initiatives; micro-lending programs were opened for women; women were employed in the ready-made garment (RMG) industry; education was increased for girls, particularly at the primary school level; and micro scholarships and free English classes were made accessible.¹³ These efforts dramatically reduced the level of poverty in Bangladesh, as they enabled women to participate in the economy. Education, specifically of women, is a cornerstone of CVE in Bangladesh, as the nation believes, "poverty is one of the root causes of terrorism because impoverished individuals lack safe and viable means to improve themselves...education... creates alternatives."¹⁴ In an effort to improve women's access to education in rural areas, Bangladesh used a quota system (much like the U.A.E. uses in regard to government positions) to ensure that 60% of primary school teachers would be women.¹⁵ First (Political) Secretary Shahanara captured this achievement, stating, "if you send your children to school, they will have distance from radical ideas and the allure will fade."¹⁶

Morocco

Over the past decade, Morocco has successfully combated violent extremism through modern means, with a 'political and social renewal' that allowed the nation to escape the chaos of the Arab Spring. Like Bangladesh, Morocco has integrated women into CVE efforts to ensure long-term stability, utilizing their critical role in family and community structures.¹⁷ Increasing gender equality through reforms of the *Moudawana* (family code), women were given access to similar

¹¹ Couture, Krista London. 2014. *A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent Extremism Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco*. Foreign Policy at Brookings, 20.

¹² Ibid, 22.

¹³ Couture, 25.

¹⁴ Ibid, 24.

¹⁵ Ibid, 25.

¹⁶ Ibid, 25.

¹⁷ Ibid, 28.

rights as those which women have under the U.A.E.'s personal status laws, women's economic agency was also increased. The passing of *Moudawana* reforms were inconsequential to some, however, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network lauded the effort as a, "landmark reform of the status of Moroccan women as it put them on equal footing with men regarding marriage and children."¹⁸ As seen previously, any efforts that reduce gender inequality are shown to *increase* the stability of nations and increase the likelihood of successful CVE initiatives.

Morocco took their integration of gender equality measures in CVE strategy further in 2005. The Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs began to certify *mourchidates*, female imams.¹⁹ Utilizing the role of women in the family and community structure, the *mourchidates* were assigned the duty of curbing radicalization, by encouraging religious moderation and tolerance.²⁰ This effort again increased the equality of women in Morocco and contributed to stability. In response to the reforms that appointed the *mourchidates* and reformed the *Moudawana*, American Foreign Policy Council Vice President Ilan Berman said:

*"In the Muslim world, few issues are as accurate a barometer of societal dynamism as the status of women. As recent scholarship convincingly shows, women have consistently been at the forefront of societal change in the region. Whatever their political orientation, countries that reward (or at least permit) this behavior, such as Tunisia and post-Saddam Iraq, tend to be vibrant and hopeful places. Those that do not, like Saudi Arabia, are stagnant and sclerotic...Morocco unequivocally falls into the former camp. Under the Moudawana...women have been endowed with rights not present—or even conceivable—in other parts of the Muslim world."*²¹

Eventually, the role of the *mourchidates* grew to encompass social issues, culture, and health. The *mourchidates* expanded role continued to increase gender equality in Morocco, resulting in rising women's political and religious empowerment.

The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) does not suffer domestically from rampant violent extremist activity, rather, the nation is frequently regarded as a bastion of stability and economic prosperity in the MENA region. Ranking 124th of 144 in the Global Gender Gap Report²², the U.A.E. is also ranked 103rd in the Global Terrorism Index, grouped with nations that experience the, "lowest impact of terrorism,"²³ While the nation doesn't have much first-hand experience conducting domestic CVE, they do have experience writing and implanting legislation meant to increase gender equality. In recent years, the U.A.E. has focused on increasing political participation, the number of women in the workforce (public and private sector), and passing laws to increase the rights of women both in the public sphere and the family. MENA nations

¹⁸ Couture, 28.

¹⁹ Ibid, 28.

²⁰ Ibid, 28.

²¹ Ibid, 30.

²² World Economic Forum, 11.

²³ Institute for Economics & Peace, 10

eager to adopt gender equality policies would greatly benefit from the model the U.A.E. has developed.

Sheikh Zayed once stated, “women have the right to work everywhere. Like men, women deserve the right to occupy high positions according to their capabilities and qualifications.”²⁴ The Constitution of the U.A.E. protects this right to work as does the UAE Federal Labor Law of 1980, while the U.A.E.’s Civil Service Law, Constitutional Article 35, outlines women’s right to political participation. These are just some examples of recent efforts to reduce gender inequality and increase women’s participation in the workforce and society. In recent years, minimum quotas for women’s participation have been instituted to develop further gender diversity. In the civil service sector, the quota is 30%, whereas, in the government sector, the minimum is 66%.²⁵ In 2008, Sheikha Lubna al-Qasimi, then the Minister of Foreign Trade and now the Minister of Tolerance, even launched a research project under her direction entitled, “The Emergence of UAE Women as an Economic Force.”²⁶ The research project focused on profiling leading women in a workforce that has grown over 59%. Support for working Emirati women comes in the form of organizations such as the Abu Dhabi Businesswomen Council (ADBWC) and the General Women’s Union (GWU). The U.A.E. is optimally positioned to provide mentoring to other MENA nations and has shown their capability to pass *context specific* legislation determined to increase gender equality that is sustainable in the long term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Middle East North Africa region is clearly in a dire situation regarding operating violent extremist organizations and seemingly insurmountable gender inequality challenges in many nations. Assistance is required in a timely manner to counter the already negative effects groups like Daesh, Al Qaeda, and their franchise organizations have had on the region. For regional reduction of violent extremism and gender inequality to become a realistic possibility, participation is required by both the international community and the most capable MENA region states. Nations such as the U.A.E. should take a mentoring role in passing new context specific legislation to increase gender equality, while nations like Morocco and Bangladesh should share their experience in the practical application of successful gender equality measures and CVE initiatives. Additionally, effectively leveraging the diversity of roles that women play in violent extremist activities is critical to success²⁷ and requires the input of nations that have experience in such practical application of strategies.

The Hedayah Center and the new UN Women Liaison office in Abu Dhabi are incredible assets for the MENA region, especially if used cooperatively, with the input of other nations and experienced practitioners (such as Morocco and Bangladesh). Increased research will be necessary to decipher exactly how and why gender inequality is inextricably linked to higher levels of violent extremist activity. Additionally, the international community must be willing to earmark funding for efforts that address gender inequality issues equally to and separately from

²⁴Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs. n.d. *Women in the United Arab Emirates: A Portrait of Progress*. Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs, 9.

²⁵ Ibid, 4.

²⁶ Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs, 10.

²⁷ USAID, 3.

the counter terrorism agenda. The increased research conducted on these connected issues will go a long way in leveraging the necessary funding to support widespread gender equality programs in the MENA region. Through cooperation of the international community and stable MENA region nations on gender equality and *context specific* planning, there is a greater likelihood of success in efforts to reduce the occurrence of violent extremism in the MENA region.

CONCLUSION

While the status quo response of the international community in response to the interconnectivity of gender inequality and violent extremism seems to still be missing the mark, there is a way forward. As the Hedayah Center identified in *A Man's World?*, the domination of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda by the counter terrorism agenda is not and will not be successful. Rather, the international community must change tact on their CVE efforts and include preceding or concurrent comprehensive gender equality plans and legislation to address each nation's *context specific* factors that contribute to gender inequality and ultimately, increased violent extremist activity. Fighting violent extremism is not impossible, as proven in the cases of Morocco and Bangladesh. However, we must first plan to fight gender inequality.

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NOT THE USUAL SUSPECTS: ENGAGING MALE CHAMPIONS OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY

Jolynn Shoemaker & Sahana Dharmapuri

This paper includes excerpted sections of a report that will be published by **Our Secure Future: Women Make the Difference**, a program of the One Earth Future Foundation in September 2017.

INTRODUCTION

In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously passed the landmark Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace, and Security. UNSCR 1325 is the first formal recognition of the critical role women play in effective conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It mandates attention to gender in all aspects of international peace and security decision-making. UNSCR 1325 and its subsequent related family of resolutions are now known as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

While men still dominate leadership roles within national and international security structures, they have remained on the sidelines of the Women, Peace, and Security movement. With the increasing awareness of the Women, Peace, and Security mandates in countries around the world, men who are personally moved by this agenda are stepping forward as supporters and contributors. However, there are obstructions (both institutional and perceptual) that have limited the engagement of men and the powerful impact they could have in vocally supporting this mandate. Recently, there has been more attention on engaging men, but the efforts have been ad hoc and lessons have not been documented sufficiently.

In 2017, Our Secure Future: Women Make the Difference, a program of the One Earth Future Foundation, launched a new project to begin to address this significant gap. Through interviews and surveys of leaders from across the US Government, US military, other governments and militaries, civil society, and international organization sectors, this project is collecting reflections of men who are promoting gender equality in peace and security policy and practice. Between December 2016 and July 2017, more than 50 semi-structured interviews were conducted by skype and phone for this project and more than 20 survey responses were collected and analyzed. This study is meant to provide important foundational knowledge that can inform policy, research and advocacy and support the next stage of growth for the Women, Peace, and Security movement.

DO MEN MATTER TO WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY?

Women, Peace, and Security presents an opportunity to make formal peacemaking and peacebuilding processes and structures more inclusive, effective, and sensitive to the needs and capacities of the entire population. Men are critical partners in this endeavor. Men have the power to move forward – or obstruct – this agenda because of their dominant roles in peace and security structures and decision-making. There are also deep interconnections between gendered norms – including concepts of masculinity and violence – and armed conflict. From the family unit to the highest levels of policy, men’s attitudes and behaviors directly affect women’s personal security and life opportunities with wider ramifications for stability and peace. Gender equality, and the transformative change that Women, Peace, and Security envisions, will only be achieved with men’s involvement.

Since the passage of UNSCR 1325, women have been visibly on the forefront of the Women, Peace, and Security movement. Women peacebuilders were the founders of this movement and they have persistently carried it forward. Men, who occupy positions of power within the peace and security institutions, are usually the advocacy targets for the agenda, but have rarely been the advocates themselves, with a few notable exceptions. However, as peace and security institutions begin to formally integrate Women, Peace, and Security, more men have started to participate directly. The National Action Plans (NAPs) and related policy mandates in many countries have also opened more space for men’s engagement. According to one interviewee who specifically works on developing NAPs, “We are seeing more men in the workshops. Men and women are working together.”

Men who were interviewed for this study point out that as men, they can convey a persuasive message about the relevance and importance of gender equality principles. When men deliver the message, it is given more weight precisely because Women, Peace, and Security is so often perceived as a “women’s issue.” Men with traditional national security backgrounds can also become credible bridge-builders between Women, Peace, and Security and other peace and security policy areas. They understand the perspectives, the language, and the prism of the security sector, as well as its biases, and can identify strategic opportunities for advocacy. Men also express the view that as men, they can open needed dialogue about prevalent gender norms and expectations for men, and their consequences. They can begin to shift perceptions on gender equality and security in positive ways.

A REDEFINITION OF SECURITY: WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY AS A TRANSFORMATIVE AGENDA

The bold idea behind Women, Peace, and Security was to change the way that security is conceptualized (the “what”) and pursued (the “how”) by national, regional, and international actors. Women, Peace, and Security recognizes that gender inequalities, power, social status, and violence are intimately linked together, and as a result, violent conflict can only be prevented, managed, or solved by fully including women and incorporating gender perspectives.

Male advocates and experts who participated in this study highlighted the transformational potential of Women, Peace, and Security to redefine security. They observed that recent experiences with terrorism, counterinsurgency and stability operations may have created much

more openness to change within security-focused institutions – out of necessity. Interviewees pointed out that no government or individual can address today's urgent peace and security issues without collaborative efforts that integrate equality and inclusiveness.

Interviewees, including those from the security sector, expressed the common view that military force cannot solve underlying issues that drive conflict and instability. They emphasized that the entire population needs to be engaged in finding solutions to these deeper challenges. One former military interviewee observed that the military is very good at “cutting the weeds” – i.e. fighting aggression with aggression – but this approach does not change the conditions that give rise movements such as Boko Haram. He observed that “Changing conditions starts with families, communities, and tribes” and that women play a central role in this process.

There was a common perspective that the current dominant approaches are failing to provide peace or security for much of the world's population, and that Women, Peace, and Security, and gender equality more broadly, offers a chance for deep structural and social change. One interviewee commented that “we need to change the parameters of the system.” He noted that gender equality needs to be considered in all aspects of foreign policy. “Women, Peace, and Security has tremendous strategic potential that is not being tapped,” according to another participant. For many male interviewees, this agenda goes far beyond institutional mandates: “We are not so much talking about policies as much as human values.... We do have the capability to change how we see the world.”

Interviewees pointed out that mandates are necessary but insufficient to bring needed change to peace and security institutions and processes. Much of the attention on Women, Peace and Security has remained symbolic, general, and high-level, but does not always filter down to changing practices in life and work. According to one former high-level official from a Western country: “The elements of government are based on standards and norms on one hand and laws and rules on the other. Much of the Women, Peace, and Security narrative has been focused on rules and laws, but what's really important is norms.”

Men who work in the Women, Peace, and Security arena made clear that this agenda should not be reduced to adding women to peace and security structures: “The point of 1325 is not to have more women doing what we were doing before. It's about including women to transform security. Parity is important but it is not 1325...It is very valid but does not supplant the need for gendered institutions.” As one senior-level military interviewee noted: “Parity is not irrelevant but it doesn't achieve the goals. To provide comprehensive security solutions you must have representatives from all of society. A diverse security sector means that all of society is invested in the solutions.”

Men highlighted the need to move from general sensitization about gender to the transformation of institutions and people as the next stage for the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Interviewees said this is a juncture to reflect on the body of research and experiences that have been collected on Women, Peace, and Security and gender equality and learn from best practices. They spoke about expanding beyond micro-interventions to focus on larger social and structural issues that are prerequisites for peaceful societies.

OVERCOMING GENDER BLINDNESS AND BIAS

Men indicated that changing organizational cultures and leaders are the greatest impediment to implementation of Women, Peace, and Security and related gender equality goals in peace and security. They point to pervasive gender blindness and gender bias in the peace and security field that must be overcome to achieve the vision of Women, Peace, and Security. Among those surveyed for this study, half report that they have experienced or observed instances of gender bias against the agenda.

Male advocates described personal and professional experiences, including family dynamics, academic studies, and early experiences in conflict settings, that were influential in their understanding of gender. Some men who had served in the military were deeply affected by the realities of war and its disproportionate effects on women. Others saw the negative consequences when security forces excluded or exploited women. Those who served in recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan observed the ability of female colleagues in the military to build relationships with women and increase awareness of what was happening in the communities. It was sometimes eye-opening to realize that they had not been hearing from half of the population.

Exposure to gender equality and the Women, Peace, and Security agenda altered their perspectives on security significantly. One interviewee who was in the military said he dismissed “women’s issues” for a long time because he considered them “something extra.” But he began to see the critical role of gender, and has been actively trying to learn since. “The challenge is waking men up to the issue,” he said. One interviewee with a traditional military background described his own learning process about Women, Peace, and Security: “It had a profound impact on me...How could I not be an activist? I began promoting it quite fiercely.” A former senior-level diplomat said that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda shaped his current outlook and his priorities in foreign policy. With a gender perspective, “once you put on the lens you can’t take it off. The world never looks the same.”

Case Study: US NAP—An Insider View

In December 2011, the U.S. Government released its first National Action Plan (US NAP). The US NAP was the culmination of more than 12 months of work inside the sprawling US foreign policy and national security apparatus. Individuals who were closely involved in the process were interviewed for this study.

The US NAP process demonstrated the vital importance of senior-level champions. The unique constellation of leadership across government agencies who were personally committed to Women, Peace, and Security was unprecedented. In many ways, the US NAP

process was more important than the product, according to interviewees. It brought representatives from across the US Government together, including diplomatic, military, development, health, and other officials. The process of formulating a US NAP was strongly supported and prioritized by the President and those in senior leadership positions. Various components of the US Government needed to come up with a credible plan.

The process introduced many government policymakers to Women, Peace, and Security for the first time. Advocates within the government found that different arguments resonated with different people as they were trying to build support. Many policymakers were influenced by the concept of improving effectiveness, others were moved by a belief in equality, human rights and women's rights, and some were interested in unpacking issues around masculinities and security. It necessitated a factual and nuanced approach. Those who were leading the process framed it as a mission-driven strategy. Women, Peace, and Security was presented as a new lens on complex peace and security issues.

One interviewee observed that those who responded to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda positively often tapped into a personal experience (e.g. had a daughter; worked with very competent women, etc.) to recognize the importance of gender equality. The process was female-dominated (women made up the majority of government staff involved), which complicated efforts to clarify gender equality concepts or to overcome the perception that Women, Peace, and Security is a women's issue. According to one interviewee, there were 11 senior staff from various agencies who participated in the working meetings, and only two of them were men (he was one of them). In comparison, the MAPRO (Mass Atrocity Prevention) teams were almost entirely comprised of male staffers.

There was more support from Department of Defense (DoD) than anticipated. Some former officials attribute that to larger shifts within DoD that created openness to this agenda. There was a significant increase in the number of senior-level women in DoD and clear support from the Secretary of Defense. There was a recognition from recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that a failure to engage with women in the communities was a strategic disadvantage for the military. Counterinsurgency strategies emphasized engagement of local populations, so the

Women, Peace, and Security agenda was understood as legitimate. Some of the men from the military were unenthusiastic, although not outright resistant, in the beginning. After some involvement in the working group discussions, many became very supportive and began to see that this wasn't "just a women's issue."

Some participants reported that the momentum during the process of drafting the NAP has faded with implementation. According to those who were involved in the US NAP process, the biggest challenge is that policies cannot be prioritized without adequate resources. It is very difficult to add more to portfolios to over-extended government staff. Senior-level officials, even if they are personally supportive, are time-pressed. The responsibilities are given to the most junior staff who lack influence or authority, often also young women. Interviewees were uncertain about the fate of the US NAP under the new Administration. Many pointed out that the implementation was moving forward. However, they emphasized that the attitudes of senior-level leaders send a very clear message about priorities that reverberates throughout the ranks of government.

1. THE "HOW" OF WOMEN, PEACE, AND SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION

The participants in this study, reflecting on their experiences and lessons learned, offered recommended approaches to move Women, Peace, and Security forward in practice.

1. *Cultivate Champions – Women and Men -- on the Inside*

- Consider Women, Peace, and Security and gender equality both an internal and external policy issue. Peace and security institutions need to improve gender equality internally to make a case for gender equality externally in bilateral and international relations.
- Cultivate support from senior-level men to overcome skepticism, resistance, and inertia in peace and security bureaucracies. Support gender equality champions among the mid-level ranks in these institutions who will move into senior ranks.
- Increase opportunities for men and women in peace and security institutions to build competencies on gender equality and Women, Peace, and Security. Facilitate more opportunities for learning from gender experts on best practices.

- Bridge civil society and security sector communities working on Women, Peace, and Security.
- Integrate gender advisors and focal points –both male and female – in peace and security bureaucracies to ensure policy documents or programs do not move forward without adequate consideration of gender implications.

2. Address Gender Norms as a Foundation for Peace

- Focus on listening and open dialogue as first steps to starting conversations about gender norms and equality principles in local contexts.
- Conduct participatory research to examine gender relations and behaviors, and how these relate to peace and security in specific contexts.
- Address the role of masculinities in peace and security – including the connections between masculine norms and violence, and the development of healthy masculinities and caregiving/fatherhood attitudes. Focusing on people as fathers, brothers, sons, helps them to think differently about themselves and how violence affects others.
- Utilize mixed gender teams on the ground to facilitate contact with both women and men on peace and security issues, and to send a visible message that gender equality is relevant to everyone. When designing research and programming, communicate with women’s civil society groups to determine if women-only or mixed workshops are most appropriate for context.
- Partner with civil society and women’s organizations on the ground to identify genuine champions, and to formulate approaches to Women, Peace, and Security and gender equality that will resonate with the population.

3. Tailor the Women, Peace, and Security Message

- Tailor the gender equality message very carefully for specific audiences, based on an understanding of the institution and individual. Engage people from “where they are.” Consider strategic opportunities to draw attention to the gendered aspects of high-profile peace and security issues to gain the attention of policymakers and build increased support.
- Emphasize that gender equality is smart policy because it makes communities and countries safer. Offer country-specific examples to illustrate the importance of gender in a direct and powerful way. Counter the perception that this is a zero-sum game – women’s gains are men’s losses – to mitigate overt and subtle pushback.
- Push peace and security institutions to utilize data about local needs and solutions to inform policy and programs in specific, gender-sensitive ways.

- Broaden the framing for discussions to include different audiences and encourage new approaches. Develop coalitions and alliances among advocates on gender equality who approach the issue from different fields and/or disciplines to influence specific policies and programs.
- Find ways to engage young people, and other sectors, including business and media, to help formulate innovative approaches to gender equality goals in countries and communities.

INTERNATIONAL

A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION, NEPALI WOMEN AS A RESOURCE FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

CDR Suzanna Brugler, USN



Photo provided by Aarti Chataut



Photo provided by Aarti Chataut



Reuters photo

A former kingdom that is now a federal democratic republic, post-civil war Nepal has seemingly limitless potential to elevate over half its population¹ – its women and girls – from centuries of severe historical and cultural oppression. But like the great Mount Everest that resides within its borders, are Nepal's deep-rooted patriarchal values insurmountable for even the newly elected woman president to influence change? And as the U.S. continues to foster its “rebalance to the Pacific” global strategy, should the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) have any interest in helping Nepal gain ground toward gender equality and empowerment in an effort to increase regional stability?

Strategically, Nepal may have greater value to the U.S. than what previously has been realized, providing more than just regional stabilization. As a nation, Nepal has close, separate ties to both its bordering neighbors – India and China. With an eye toward avoiding the current India-Nepal unrest over Nepal's new constitution,² a strengthened U.S.-Nepal partnership could make for greater U.S. influence within the region. And with the recent election of Communist leader Bidya Devi Bhandari as Nepal's first woman head of state, promoting women's rights fits neatly into her long-supported political agenda.³

Women, as a gender that comprises 52 per cent of the national populace, are by-and-large an untapped human resource with great stabilizing potential in Nepal, making them a specific target audience in which USPACOM can and should invest. And by utilizing the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) as a vehicle for building partnerships and collaborations that work to promote and protect women, the U.S. can emerge as a champion of international women's rights while reinforcing the international rules-based order as a counter-balance to rising China.

GLOBAL GENDER INEQUALITY AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY GUIDANCE

Gender inequality is rampant worldwide, whether examining traditional women's roles in Nepali society, or the gender wage gap in the most advanced Western cultures, to include the United States. Drawing on societal effects, the United Nations Development Program states that gender inequality remains a major barrier to human development. According to the UN, girls and women have made major strides since 1990, but they have not yet gained gender equity. This has hampered the development of societies as a whole, which in turn has had an adverse effect on global security.

The World Economic Forum's 2015 *Global Gender Gap Report* revealed that, after a decade of data collection, the gap in health, education, economic opportunity and politics around the world has closed by only 4 per cent, while the economic gap has narrowed by just 3 per cent,

¹ Population 52.2% female nation-wide, according to Nepal's National Population and Housing Census 2011. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_phc/Nepal/Nepal-Census-2011-Vol1.pdf

² Foreign Policy, *India Pushes Nepal into China's Arms*, October 23, 2015. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/23/india-pushes-nepal-into-chinas-arms/>

³ Reuters, *In patriarchal Nepal, first female president works for equality*, November 10, 2015. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/11/10/nepal-woman-president-idINKCN0SZ1IR20151110>

suggesting it will take another 118 years to achieve equality.⁴ Furthermore, current gender inequalities risk being exacerbated by the coming Fourth Industrial Revolution, as industries are undergoing profound shifts in their business models while technology is disrupting methods of production, distribution and consumption. Tragically, gender gaps are set to increase in some industries where jobs traditionally held by women will become obsolete.

According to the report, the magnitude of national gender gaps is the combined result of various socioeconomic, policy and cultural variables. Governments have a leading role to play as the closure or continuation of these gaps is intrinsically connected to the framework of national policies in place.⁵

Even the United States, which fell eight places compared to last year, ranking 28th out of 145 countries in the study, recognizes the issue of gender inequality as a matter of global security. In December 2011, the Obama Administration released the first-ever *U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*. The plan's goal is to empower half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace in countries threatened and affected by war, violence and insecurity. Deadly conflicts can be more effectively avoided, and peace can be best forged and sustained, when women become equal partners in all aspects of peace-building and conflict prevention, according to the plan.⁶

This notion is reinforced in the February 2015 *National Security Strategy* (NSS), which states that the focus of U.S. efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such as inclusive politics, reforming security and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting economic opportunity, particularly among youth and women. "We will press for transformative investments in areas like women's equality and empowerment, education, sustainable energy, and governance," says the strategy.⁷

From a security perspective, countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity as men. This concept is reinforced in the NSS, which says, "Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and girls – who are too often denied their inalienable rights and face substantial barriers to opportunity in too many places."

⁴ Financial Times, *Gender gap progress stalling, warns World Economic Forum*, November 18, 2015. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b4adbfa-8de7-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b.html#axzz41EPZpmay>

⁵ World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2015*, November 12, 2015. <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2015>

⁶ *United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*, December 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/email-files/US_National_Action_Plan_on_Women_Peace_and_Security.pdf

⁷ The White House, *National Security Strategy 2015*, February 1, 2015. www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf

GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN NEPAL

Founded as a Hindu caste-based society, Nepal has developed over centuries as a nation of social hierarchies and divisions of deep-rooted and systemic discrimination and exclusion. After the abolition of caste-based discrimination in 1963, social hierarchies remained with the patriarchal system assigning women a subordinate role in society, which was reflected in state-based discrimination. In a series of five-year national plans, 2002-2006 focused on Nepal's Poverty Reduction Strategy. As part of the plan, the government identified social exclusion as a fundamental development challenge and acknowledged that exclusion and the lack of political representation were major reasons for women's deprivation.⁸

A result of deep-rooted social exclusion, Nepali women suffer on various societal levels. Relegated to second-class citizenry, they face gender specific challenges due to having subordinate status in a male dominated society which sees them as home makers and child bearers. Says President Bhandari, "People still think women should only do household work. They are still mistreated, discriminated against and insulted."⁹

Even worse, crimes such as human trafficking, domestic violence and rape are common but rarely reported because victims are afraid of being blamed and ostracized by their family or community. Women also face discrimination in accessing healthcare, education and employment and in establishing their rights to property and land. All of these issues contribute to instability in Nepal and across the greater South Central Asia region.

WHERE USPACOM STRATEGY AND NEPALI WOMEN'S ISSUES INTERSECT

On January 22, 2013, former USPACOM Commander Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III outlined three major components to the *USPACOM Strategy*: strengthening alliances and partnerships, maintaining an assured presence in the region, and effectively communicating our intent and resolve to safeguard U.S. national interests.¹⁰ Of these three components, partnerships have proven critical to establishing regional security, especially in keeping rising China in check, over recent years.

In his February 23, 2016 statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Locklear's relief and the current USPACOM Commander, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr. told committee members, "USPACOM's forward presence, posture, and readiness reassure allies and partners of U.S. commitment to security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Strengthening these relationships is critical to meeting the challenges and seizing opportunities." Harris explained that through bi-lateral and multi-lateral relationships and activities, USPACOM is building a community of like-minded nations that are committed to maintaining the international rules-based order, as opposed

⁸ Asian Development Bank, *Overview of Gender Equality and Social Inclusion in Nepal*, 2010.
<http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32237/cga-nep-2010.pdf>

⁹ Reuters, *In patriarchal Nepal, first female president works for equality*, November 10, 2015.
<http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/11/10/nepal-woman-president-idINKCN0SZ1IR20151110>

¹⁰ U.S. Defense Department, *USPACOM Strategy*, January 22, 2013.
<http://www.pacom.mil/AboutUSPACOM/USPACOMStrategy.aspx>

to China's non-conformity. "Strengthening and modernizing alliances and partnerships is a top USPACOM priority," said Harris.¹¹

With the recent development of internationally renowned criminal and terrorist organizations, most notably the Islamic State, transnational crime is becoming more of a regional concern throughout the world. In his statement before the SASC Harris specifically addressed transnational crime as a USPACOM security challenge, with nearly 36 million victims of human trafficking estimated worldwide, nearly two-thirds come from Asia. Furthermore, he singled-out human trafficking as a women and children's issue, as they – especially those from the lowest socioeconomic sectors – comprise the most vulnerable demographic.

Nepal, unfortunately, is especially vulnerable to the exploits of human trafficking due to its poverty rate, dominant patriarchal cultural heritage, and proximity to human trafficking destination countries. The U.S. State Department's July 2015 *Trafficking In Persons Report* categorizes Nepal as a Tier 2 country according to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. Tier 2 countries are those whose governments do not fully comply with TVPA's minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. According to the report, Nepal is a source, transit and destination country for men, women and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking.¹²

A recent opinion piece that ran in *The Kathmandu Post* reports, every year it is estimated that between 5,000 to 10,000 Nepali women and girls are trafficked to India for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.¹³ Additionally, UNICEF reports as many as 7,000 women and girls are trafficked out of Nepal to India every year, and around 200,000 are now working in Indian brothels.¹⁴ The *Post* attributes that most girls trafficked are from very poor families and villages where they or their families are lured by false marriages or promises of employment or education. Yet, the U.S. State Department says that although the government of Nepal does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, it is making significant efforts to do so. This quality makes Nepal an especially attractive partner for championing women's issues because it demonstrates great potential for improvement plus the willingness to improve.

In his statement to the SASC Harris recognized that, of human trafficking victims worldwide, roughly half of the 36 million are women and children who end up in the commercial sex trade. The rest end up as laborers in factories and farms or as domestic servants, or as child soldiers. Tying back to the overall USPACOM strategy, Harris said, "While much remains to be done,

11 U.S. Defense Department, *Statement: Commander U.S. Pacific Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture*, February 23, 2016. http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_02-23-16.pdf

12 U.S. State Department, *Trafficking In Persons Report*, July 2015. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf>

13 The Kathmandu Post, *Taken from Nepal*, January 31, 2016. <http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-01-31/taken-from-nepal.html>

14 UN.GIFT.HUB, *Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking* website, April 9, 2014. <http://www.ungift.org/knowledgehub/en/stories/September2014/unicef-reports-7-000-nepali-women-and-girls-trafficked-to-india-every-year.html>

USPACOM forces ... are building partner capacity and sharing intelligence in order to combat these transnational threats.”

A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE FACE OF OPPRESSION, A TV STAR BRINGS GENDER TRAINING TO NEPAL

One partner program that is already making headway toward addressing gender issues in the USPACOM AOR is the DKI APCSS Fellows Project. In his statement to the SASC, Harris declared the center serves as a truly unique venue to empower regional security practitioners to more effectively and collaboratively contribute to regional security and stability. He also affirmed that the DKI APCSS provides added support to the USPACOM mission in several uniquely focused areas, to include as USPACOM’s lead in implementing the U.S. National Action Plan mandate to increase inclusion of women in the security sector under the Women, Peace, and Security program. “This center is one of our asymmetric capabilities. No other country has anything quite like it,” said Harris.

Established in 1995 and based out of Honolulu, the DKI APCSS’s mission is, “Building capacities and communities of interest by educating, connecting and empowering security practitioners to advance Asia-Pacific security.” All students, known as Fellows, who attend a course that lasts four to five weeks also work on a Fellow’s Project during their studies. The greater aim of the Fellow’s Project is to improve security sector governance, cooperation and the capacity of countries in dealing with security matters. At the same time, the overarching theme of the Fellow’s Project is Comprehensive Engagement, a concept that focuses on creating linkages between American security practitioners and their counterparts in the region while providing a basis for mutual understanding.

This past spring, Nepali television journalist Aarti Chataut graduated from the Fellow’s Project program after developing her Project entitled, *Breaking the Silence: Bringing Real Peace to Nepal Through Reconciling the Issues of Wartime Violence Against Women*. Upon graduation, Chataut returned to her native country to advance women’s issues, for which she has received national recognition and an award from former president Ram Baran Yadav.

Through her work as a television journalist, Chataut has produced news programs in cooperation with her employer news agency, National Television of Nepal (NTV), to highlight sexual and gender-based violence as it relates to Nepali Truth and Reconciliation Law. In addition, she has accomplished work as a gender analyst and advisor, working for women’s rights by giving UN lectures to Nepali government and state officials on behalf of the Nepal Department of Home Ministry. Specifically, she provided three program lectures on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security in the cities of Kathmandu, Chitwan and Dhulikhel, to chief district officers, police chiefs and other security agencies from 25 out of 75 total districts. As recently as December of last year, she worked with former Communication Minister and Nepali Congress leader Minendra Rijal at a workshop and training program on increasing gender sensitivity. Within Nepal’s patriarchal society, this body of work is no small feat for a woman.

In her role as a woman journalist Chataut embodies the message that she delivers to her audiences, that empowering women by involving them in the peace-making process is the only way to ensure real and lasting peace. In her Fellow's Project, *Breaking the Silence*, Chataut asserts that the absence of clear statistical data on sex and gender -based violence during the Maoist insurgency (of the Nepali Civil War), and failure to address it as a problem in the subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement, has left Nepal in a state of social conflict. Not only were female victims left physically harmed, but debilitated as a result. Worse still, she suggests that if the issue of sexual and gender-based violence continues to be unaddressed, it could lead to the resurgence of yet another violent conflict.

Chataut lobbied hard to deliver on the promise she made upon graduating the DKI APCSS Fellow's Project, which was to develop television programming hi-lighting women's struggle in post-civil war Nepal. After much convincing and demonstration of resourcefulness, she managed to develop a recurring television program focusing on women's issues, a program she directs, produces and presents. The first episode, airing April 14, 2015, was a 25-minute show that featured the Nepali Honorable Minister of Women, Children and Welfare Ministry. On that show, the minister publicly accepted the problem of the blight of Nepali women and expressed her commitment to create an enabling environment for them in the future. The second episode aired the following week, where Chataut expanded on ideas presented in the previous episode and related them to government authority. Although the signal for Chataut's station, NTV, blankets 50 percent of Nepal's total land mass, it reaches up to 72 per cent of the country's population: she has quite an impressive megaphone from which to deliver her gender-promoting message throughout Nepal's mountainous terrain.

BRINGING REAL SECURITY TO THE ASIA-PACIFIC

When considering the value of spending time and energy toward promoting and championing women as a gender rather than addressing broader women's issues such as poverty and human trafficking, some may argue that the resulting impact is so minimal that it is not worth the resource investment. One could say that it is more prudent to invest time and energy toward addressing the issues themselves. To these objectors, I say we should embrace a holistic approach to building relationships, an approach that aims to lift-up targeted interest groups – especially women – to ensure that we are reaching and influencing all layers of the larger global society. The DKI APCSS is already an established vehicle recognized by the USPACOM commander. We should work to develop courses that specifically address women's issues in the region to influence security cooperation at the highest levels and, ultimately, promote a more secure regional environment.

On the surface, breaking down Nepal's ingrained patriarchal society and culture to promote gender equality in the post-civil war era can appear as treacherous and daunting as the towering topography upon which the country resides. However, with the assistance of USPACOM partnership capacity building initiatives, such as the NKI APCSS, we have seen how the empowerment of just one woman is reaching up to 72 per cent of the entire Nepali population. That kind of return on investment is staggering on the macro level, but the same principles can and do apply on the micro level, too.

Women are by-and-large an untapped human resource with great stabilizing potential in Nepal, making them a specific target audience in which USPACOM can and should invest. By focusing on regional partner education and training at the DKI APCSS, and specifically developing collaborations that work to promote and protect women, not only can the U.S. emerge as a champion of international women's rights, but it can also shape and influence the region at a higher level, reinforcing a rules-based order for regional security cooperation.

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY EXPERIENCE IN RUSSIA: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT TRENDS

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It goes without saying that men and women are absolutely equal before the law. A sincere desire to give effect to this equality is evident in all spheres. We are enlisting women to work in the economy, the administration, legislation, and government. All courses and education institutions are open to them so they can improve their professional and social training.

V.I. Lenin, 1920¹

Similar to women in many other nations, Russian women participate in decision-making for regional, national, and international institutions, engage in the labor force, education, healthcare, and social services. However, women in Russia are grossly underrepresented in traditional positions of power and face many challenges and discrimination. Understanding the ‘women question’ – ‘zhenskiy vopros,’ the Russian term for a broad range of issues and policies concerning women, would benefit Russian women as well as improve cooperation between the nations, ensuring national and world peace, security, and stability. In order to explain the complexity of the ‘women question,’ it is necessary to begin with a historical reference.

The first part of the paper is a historical background of women’s role in the society and established trends in Russia’s experience with Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Secondly, I provide analysis of the women’s status and participation in “Putin’s Russia” and their engagement with the international community since 2000.² Lastly, I discuss the possibilities and opportunities for cooperation between the international community and Russian women in the government, military, and non-governmental organizations focused on peace, security, and humanitarian relief. The framework for this paper analyzes the ‘women question’ through the DIME (Diplomacy /Intelligence/ Military/Economy) elements of the governmental spectrum of influence and the Four Pillars that support UN Resolution 1325

¹ V.I. Lenin in the interview on the Woman Question with Clara Zetkin in the Fall 1920.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *The Emancipation of Women. From the Writings of V.I. Lenin*, 4th ed. (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc, 1966), 115

² In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325, and President Vladimir Putin began his rule of Russia. The first President of Russia Boris Yeltsyn chose then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as his successor in 1999. During the traditional televised address to the nation on 31 December 1999, President Yeltsyn officially transferred his authority to Prime Minister Putin. Vladimir Putin became the acting President of Russia until he won Presidential elections in March 2000 to govern Russia for the next seventeen years.

(Participation, Protection, Prevention, Relief and Recovery).³ The DIME and Four Pillars define the spheres where women are active and describe women's initiatives and decisions that bring changes into the Russian politics, education, healthcare, economy, military, and society as a whole.

The history of Russia is rich with life stories of women who ruled over the land, expanded territories, built alliances, secured borders, advanced education, and cared for the less fortunate. Throughout history, Russian women demanded equal rights, opportunities, respect, and dignity; women fought for ideas and the nation, and defied traditions and the cultural norms of a patriarchal society. As a result, many women became leaders and brought changes in Russian society and the world, opening more opportunities for women's participation in the decision-making, conflict resolution, and peace negotiations. When leaders recognized national peace and security were closely connected to the empowerment of women to seek education and their voice in the society, stability and prosperity of the state and its allies followed.

While Russia remained a serfdom until 1861, peasant women in the villages and servants in the palaces and noble household did not have many opportunities to advance in the society and suffered even more from The Domostroi rules, which described the ideal family and its management where everyone knew his or her place. A wife had to be obedient to her husband at all times, follow his instructions, and could be disciplined if not compliant. Thus, women obediently endured domestic violence and abuse, while the Russian Orthodox Church, the authority for many, preached about the suffering that Christ endured and commanded His people to do the same.⁴ When there was no support or protection from the leaders, women found support from each other: neighbors helped each other, and networks of women built stronger communities, creating a foundation for the society. During the industrialization and urbanization of Russia, many emancipated peasant women moved from villages to cities. Women's labor contributed to manufacturing, expanding commerce, and social services. A greater number of women became professionals, such as doctors, teachers, and factory workers; many were dedicated to helping poor, widows, and orphans. Women became active participants in protests, political meetings, igniting and supporting the revolution that changed the world.⁵ The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 empowered women to push for legal and political equality; women were able to vote and had greater access to education and employment. The Soviet government prided itself in the liberation and empowerment of women. Nevertheless, the Communist Party's policies addressing women issues throughout the Soviet Union lacked consistency, which became the trend in Russia for the next century. The policies reflected the needs of the Party rather than 'women question' issues. Currently, women are involved in all spheres of the society, but remain underrepresented in the decision-making process at the executive levels of the government, businesses, and education institutions.⁶

Although women have a better representation in the Russian society, the numbers are still low. The Eurasian Women's Forum indicates that as of 1 January 2017, the Federation Council of the Federal

³ United States Institute of Peace. *What is U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 and Why is it so Critical Today?* http://www.usip.org/gender_peacebuilding/about_UNSCR_1325 (accessed May 20, 2017)

⁴ Barbara Alpern Engel, *Women in Russia, 1700-2000. Advance Praise for Women in Russia (1700-2000)* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

⁵ Elizabeth A. Wood, *The Baba and the Comrade: Gender and Politics in Revolutionary Russia* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997)

⁶ *Federal State Statistics Service* (Moscow: 2017), including population of Crimea and Sevastopl', since 2015. http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/population/demography/#

Assembly of the Russian Federation consists of 170 members, of which 30 are women (17.6 percent). There are 450 representatives in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly, of which 72 are women (16 percent).⁷ According to the World Economic Forum 2016 report, Russia ranked 129 out of 145 countries in political empowerment of women, even as it scored fairly well on economic participation, education and health (ranks 41, 45 and 40 respectively – See Table 1).⁸ This gap is an indicator of the challenges faced by Russian women while establishing their presence in the political life of the country.

Country	GLOBAL INDEX		ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION AND OPPORTUNITY		EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT		HEALTH AND SURVIVAL		POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Russian Federation	75/75	0.694/ 0.691	42/41	0.731/ 0.722	27/45	1.000/ 0.997	42/40	0.979/ 0.979	128/129	0.066/ 0.066
United States	28/45	0.740/ 0.722	6/26	0.826/ 0.752	40/1	0.999 1.000	64/62	0.975/ 0.975	72/73	0.162/ 0.162
Japan	101/111	0.670/ 0.660	106/ 118	0.611/ 0.569	84/76	0.988/ 0.990	42/40	0.979/ 0.979	104/103	0.103/ 0.103

Table 1. The Global Gender Gap Report, World Economic Forum, 2015/2016

PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT

Female members of the government strive to be “ultimate loyalist” - once elected they fully support the government’s agenda, not their constituents needs, simply to maintain their position.⁹ While the Russian government attempts to empower women, promote dignity and respect for women, it also adopts laws decriminalizing domestic violence, which diminishes women dignity and violates women rights. Instead of concrete steps promoting grassroots mobilization of women into politics, the regime nominates

⁷ Eurasian Women’s Forum, <http://eawf.ru/en/> (accessed: 20 June 2017)

⁸ The Global Gender Gap Report 2015 / World Economic Forum, 2015. <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR2015/cover.pdf> (accessed 25 May 2017)

⁹ Janet Elise Johnson, “Putin’s Russia Promotes Both Women and Misogyny in Politics. Wait, What?: Using Women as “Showgirls” or “Political Cleaners” to attract Voters Doesn’t Exactly Promote Gender Equality,” *The Washington Post*, November 6, 2016

Russian elite, such as celebrities, singers, and athletes to attract voters and promote the government's agenda and policies. In February 2017, President Putin signed the law reducing punishment for the domestic violence with more than 85 percent of legislators in Russia's Duma approving the bill.¹⁰ To voice opposition to such abuse and discrimination, women in Russia start grassroots movements to spread awareness, prevent the abuse, and educate the population about domestic violence. Women establish relief and recovery shelters and centers for the victims of domestic violence abuse.¹¹ If there is no support from the government, women make it their own business, providing peace, security, safety, and support to every girl and woman in need.

DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE

The common perception in Russia is that “diplomacy is no women's business.” The numbers in the latest report from the Russian government to the UN on the implementation of the UN convention

focused on the elimination of all forms of women discrimination confirm the situation. Women represent approximately 13 percent of all diplomatic service officers in the upper ranks within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Throughout the history of Russia, only 5 women served as Ambassadors leading diplomatic missions. While male diplomats acknowledge the benefit of having women in the diplomatic corps because women often think “outside the box and deliver wise and creative solutions” in a different situation, women are underrepresented in the field of foreign affairs, except in a strictly administrative support roles or as good-will ambassadors.¹²

A similar situation exists in Russia's intelligence community, although it is difficult to locate the statistics about the numbers and role of women in this sphere. The general public usually learns about women working for the intelligence community, when the information is revealed after the fact.¹³ In Russia, similar to many other countries, women contribute to peace and security serving in the law enforcement agencies, and, recently, in the military as the contractors in the Russia's Army, Special Forces, Marines, Navy, and Air-Space Defense. The conscript military service in Russia is still mandatory only for men of age 18 – 28.

MILITARY

With the President of the Russian Federation's approval of order №1237 on 16 September 1999, women became eligible to serve in the military as contractors. After this ruling, the number of women entering military service increases every year. Women are admitted to every branch of service, if there are

¹⁰ Janet Elise Johnson, “Putin's Russia”, *The Washington Post*.

See also: State-run news agency RIA Novosti has reported that 40% of serious crimes in Russia are committed in the family, 36,000 women are beaten by their husbands daily, and 12,000 women die yearly as a result of domestic violence, one woman dies every 44 minutes. <http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/13/europe/russia-domestic-violence/index.html> (accessed: July 1, 2017)

¹¹ Change.org. <https://www.change.org/p/state-duma-adopt-the-domestic-violence-law-in-russia> (accessed: July 1, 2017)

¹² “Many Think that Diplomacy is No Women's Business.” How Women-Diplomats Fight for the Place under the Sun.” *Gazeta.ru*, 7 March 2016, trans. A. Davis. http://m.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/03/07_a_8112761.shtml (accessed: March 25, 2017)

¹³ “Spies Swapped by US and Russia at Vienna Airport,” *BBC News*, 9 July 2010, <http://www.bbc.com/news/10564994> (accessed: June 10, 2017). The recent example, is the story of Anna Chaplan, at that time 28 years old cosmopolitan woman, who pleaded guilty in New York court for the act of espionage on the territory of the United State with ten other Russian spies in the summer of 2010. It was the public revelation of a spy ring, their trial, and the first high-profile spies exchange since the Cold War.

vacancies, and at the discretion and needs of the Ministry of Defense (MoD).¹⁴ Preparation of women for military service in Russia starts at a young age and is becoming an increasing trend in Russia's experience with WPS. The MoD and Russian government make a priority to invest in patriotic education and military training of the Russian youth, including girls. In April 2008, President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, signed an executive order permitting young girls to study at the historically boys' military boarding schools, such as Nakhimov's Navy Boarding School, Suvorov's Military school, military band schools, as well as the cadets' academies.¹⁵ In July 2008, the MoD and Ministry of Education established the first and only military boarding school for girls – Moscow Cadet's School "Boarding School of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (MCS)."¹⁶ MCS is an elite school that provides the best education available and is devoted to raising women who will become leaders and decision-makers in the government, military, foreign affairs, and economics.¹⁷

In addition to new policies enabling girls to receive the best education and increased opportunities, the Russian government resurrected the idea of youth upbringing and education through indoctrination – the youth patriotic movement *Yunarmia* (Young Army), which is similar to the Soviet Union period Young Pioneers and Komsomol members (Young Communist). Currently, more than 100 thousand Russian teenagers, 11 - 18 years old, are part of *Yunarmia*, learning about national interests, security, and the military.¹⁸ The main goal of this movement is to inspire the young generation to become devoted, patriotic, physically fit citizens of Russia who are ready and willing to defend their nation.¹⁹ Similar enthusiasm is present among young women who pursue their careers in the different branches of the Russia's military.

According to Russia's MoD, there are 45 thousand women contractors, equaling approximately 10 percent of 425 thousand military contract personnel. The majority of women, in all branches of the military, traditionally serve in support roles such as nurses and doctors, logistics, communication, and Information Technology.²⁰ Similar to other nations' militaries, Russia, does not permit women to serve on submarines. However, the reasons for the absence of the female submariners in the Russian Navy is

¹⁴ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation order №30, 16 January 2001., trans. Anna Davis, <http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/conditions/women.htm> (accessed: June 18, 2017)

¹⁵ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation order №30, 16 January 2001., trans. Anna Davis, <http://recrut.mil.ru/career/soldiering/conditions/women.htm> (accessed: June 18, 2017).

¹⁶ Moscow Cadet's School "Boarding School of Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation," trans. A. Davis (accessed June 19, 2017) <http://pansion-mil.ru/>

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, (Red Star), May 29, 2017, N56, trans. A. Davis. On 29 October 2015, the Ministry of Defense, DOSAAF (*Dobrovolnoye Obschestvo Sodeystvia Armii, Aviatsii i Flotu*/Volunteer Society to Support Army, Airforce, Navy), and the Central Army Athletic Club established youth patriotic movement *Yunarmia* (Young Army).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation News, 8 March 2016, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12080101@egNews (accessed: June 1, 2017) See also: Ministry of Defense News, 14 June 2015 http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12041310@egNews (accessed: June 1, 2017) According to Commanding Officer of the VDV (Airborne), Colonel-General Andrey Serdyukov, reported that currently there are more than 1,500 women serve in Russia's Airborne command as contractors, of which 60 women are officers, more than 1,300 in the ranks of lieutenants, sergeants, private soldiers. In Russia's Special Forces (*Spetsnaz* – Special Designation Force) women serve in mixed units, many in support positions.

different: Russia does not need women serving on subs because “there are enough highly educated and trained men who are capable of serving and performing their duties.”²¹ This comment reflects a common perspective about women’s participation and service in the military: women can assist when there are not enough men to do the job instead of extending equal opportunities to serve and contribute. Many male leaders do not understand nor see the benefits of having women serving in their units. Although the ‘women question’ has reemerged on the government agenda, and some new policies have a “woman’s face,” the process of empowering women and fully engaging them in every aspect of life in the society is a very slow process. Women generated their own trend in the military: the incentives to join the military, moreover to engage in combat are often attributed to private reason. It could be economic considerations, desire to continue the legacy of their family members in defending the Motherland, defiance of a traditional view and role of women in society, personal aspirations, or taking revenge for their loved ones.²² If a war has a woman’s face, women are engaged in combat and insurgency; then they absolutely can participate in peacekeeping missions, a peace negotiation process, or reconstruction of a post-war zone in different parts of the world.

The UN reports there are approximately 14 thousand policemen, 10 percent of them are women, from 90 countries participating in UN peacekeeping and other special missions throughout the world. In Russia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) employs approximately 180 thousand women in the police force, equaling one-fourth of the total number of employees. Many women are in leadership positions in the law enforcement agencies and actively participate in the decision-making regarding law and order, protection of women and children against any form of violence, drug abuse, crime, peace, and security.²³ According to the MoIA, Russia is planning to increase training of women for participation in UN peacekeeping operations.²⁴ In March 2016, three women of the Russian police force joined the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus. It was the first deployment of the female police officers on the peacekeeping mission in a foreign country.²⁵ Although the level of participation of women in the Russia’s military and the police force is slowly increasing, the reasons for the change is mainly out of necessity to fill the vacancies due to the lack of manpower.

ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT

A January 2016 statistics services of Russia indicate there are approximately 35.2 million women contributing to the Russian economy; that is 48.7 percent of the 72.3 million people employed in Russia. More than half of the educators in schools, colleges, universities, are women, and the medical field consists of more than 80 percent women.²⁶ Women in Russia are breaking many stereotypes regarding the role of women in society by choosing the trades and industries that have been traditionally male-dominated career fields. There are female astronauts, women who serve as first responders and deep-water divers for search and rescue teams, many work as firefighters, cab-drivers, and some as

²¹ Rear Admiral Viktor Kochemazov, Director of the Military Training of Russia’s Navy. Interview . *Gazeta.ru*. 18 March 2017, trans. A.Davis. <https://m.gazeta.ru/army/news/9812987.shtml>; (accessed: March 18, 2017)

²² Amandine Regamey and Brandon M. Schechter, “Women in Arms: From the Russian Empire to Post-Soviet State”, *The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies*, Issue 17, 2016. www.pipss.revues.org (accessed: June 20, 2017)

²³ TASS. <http://tass.ru/info/4076669> (accessed: June 1, 2017)

²⁴ <https://russian.rt.com/article/306054-glava-mvd-rf-rossiiskie-zhenschiny-gotovy-sluzhit>

²⁵ “Three Female Police Officers Help UN to Maintain Peace in Cyprus,” *Russia Today*, 12 March 2016, trans. A. Davis. <https://russian.rt.com/article/153192> (accessed: June 1, 2017)

²⁶ “Women Employment Situation,” *Tass*, 8 March 2017, trans. A.Davis. <http://tass.ru/info/4076669> (accessed: June 1, 2017)

blacksmiths.²⁷ These women become heroes and role models in Russian society. Overall, women in Russia are more educated than men: 37 percent of women have a university education, which is 8 percent higher than among men. However, women still face discrimination in the workforce: women's salary is typically 73 percent of the men's earnings, depending on the career field.²⁸ Staying true to the historical trend, when facing challenges and injustice, Russian women mobilize the masses to form national movements and forums that bring changes in the society, draw the attention of the international community, opening venues for cooperation.

There are 2000 women's organizations in Russia.²⁹ Until recently, they operated in an "informational vacuum," according to the Eurasian Women's Forum, which became a platform and mechanism for network support of the women organizations. The Forum discusses issues of sustainable development of women initiatives, humanitarian relief, "empowerment of women in evolving economic context, politics, and social integration."³⁰ The Eurasian Women's Forum works in cooperation with the ASIAN, Eurasian Economic Forum, The Commonwealth of Independent States and Shanghai Cooperation Organization to address "both domestic and global challenges within the Eurasian space."³¹ The Forum and its working groups became the driving force in articulating policies of the National Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Women, 2017-2022, signed by the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitriy Medvedev, on 8 March 2017.³² The adoption of the strategy will give a new impulse for the further participation of women in all areas of public life and increase women engagement in national and world peace and security processes. Russia has yet to join 63 nation-states, which have already adopted and successfully implement the National Action Plan to fulfill the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 WPS.³³ The delay creates a perfect opportunity for nations leaders in WPS to assist Russia in the process, ensuring a successful integration of women in the decision-making and policy implementation process.

Lastly, it is necessary to discuss a few venues and opportunities for cooperation with Russia through engaging women and entities where women are in leadership. Such collaboration is in our national interest and can contribute to the world peace and security. Education, science, arts, and technology do not have borders, and women have a presence and voice in all these spheres. Education in the spirit of patriotism, such as national youth movements, *Yunarmia*, founding military boarding schools for girls, and admitting girls and young women to military academies, cultivates pride in the national identity of a

²⁷ "Free from Stereotypes. Women are Choosing Men's Trades," TASS, Special Project. trans. A.Davis. <http://tass.ru/spec/woman-job> (accessed: June 1, 2017)

²⁸ "Golodets: Women in Russia Are More Educated but Face Salary Discrimination," TASS, 27 February 2017. trans. A.Davis. <http://tass.ru/ekonomika/4053831> (accessed: June 15, 2017); Olga Golodets is the Deputy Speaker of the Federal Council of the Russian Federation.

²⁹ Eurasian Women's Forum, <http://eawf.ru/en/> (accessed: June 20, 2017)

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Eurasian Women's Forum, <http://eawf.ru/en/> (accessed: June 20, 2017)

³² The National Strategy of Actions in the Interests of Women 2017-2022 initiated by the Chair and a Spokesperson of the Federal Council of the Russian Federation Lyudmila Matvienko. She oversees the work of the Forum and its working group. trans. A. Davis. <http://eawfpress.ru/en/new-strategy-as-a-present-for-russian-women/> (accessed: June 20, 2017)

³³ InclusiveSecurity. *Inclusive Security National Action Plan Resource Center*. n.d. <https://actionplans.inclusivesecurity.org/> (accessed: May 15, 2017).

country: its history, values, achievements, and traditions. Raising responsible and respectful citizens is beneficial to children and the society. However, when education is administered by propaganda, indoctrination on the borderline with nationalism, there is a direct threat to national and international peace and security. Professional exchanges of educators and students, international forums, such as the Eurasian Women's Forum, and the sharing of innovative methodologies in education and leadership reflecting ideas regarding gender theories and their implementation in various spheres of influence are proven to promote good will and cooperation between nations.³⁴

Many UN agencies have representatives in the Russian Federation, who participate in the work of Theme Groups. There are seven working Theme Groups in Russia, which are established within the framework that supports the UN Resolution 1325. One of the groups is a Special North Caucasus Theme Group covering the full spectrum of humanitarian needs, recovery, and justice for victims of recent armed conflicts. The group is also focused on providing protection, relief, and recovery from traditional customs and practices (such as female genital mutilation practices in remote rural areas of Dagestan) that violate the dignity and endanger the lives of girls and women.³⁵ Therefore, joint multinational efforts, certainly, are more effective in the implementation of WPS through DIME and the Four Pillars that support Resolution 1325.

In conclusion, women's leadership and influence in Russia affects both national and international peace and security. Although the role and participation of girls and women in all spheres of the society have evolved, empowerment of the female population and gender equality leaves much to be desired. The reasons for such a slow process of women integration and participation are societal genders bias, inconsistency in government's policies, the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church, advocating strict preservation of cultural traditions and norms, and economic challenges. When there is a lack of support from the government, historically, Russian women initiate the changes in the workforce and society, drawing attention to the needs and capabilities of women. Facing challenges, women remain resourceful, creative, resilient, and rely on the power of various women's networks and organizations. Russian women assume leadership of many entities, in government and non-government sectors, opening a variety of venues for cooperation with the international community, which in turn contributes to national and international peace, stability, and security.

³⁴ Eurasian Women's Forum, 2015, <http://eawf.ru/en/press/1849/>

³⁵ UN Russia, Theme Groups, <http://www.unrussia.ru/en/groups>; (accessed: 20 June 2017).

Aso see *Eto Kavkaz* (This is Caucasus), 18 August 2016 <https://etokavkaz.ru/news/13435> (accessed: 20 June 2017).

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A LEGACY OF PARTICIPATION: HOW SERBIAN WOMEN CONTINUE TO ADVANCE THEIR INCLUSION AND CREATE LASTING PEACE AND SECURITY

Nikoleta Sremac

I. INTRODUCTION

In December of 1990, Yugoslavia was on the brink of a decade-long civil war that would tear the country apart, leaving thousands dead and millions displaced. Unnoticed by most, this was also the month that the country's rate of female political participation dropped dramatically to only 1.6%, one of the lowest in the world. For scholars and practitioners of "women, peace, and security," however, Serbia is a remarkable case study through which to examine the relationships between gender inclusion, political ideology, government structure and cultural change. Rooted in a history of female participation and an emphasis on equality and inclusion during the communist era, the collapse of the dictatorship of Josip Broz Tito and his socialist ideology left a political vacuum that was filled by nationalist propaganda and aggression. The rise of macho political mentality also meant a reappearance of hegemonic masculinity in Serbian society and culture, coinciding with the low rate of female political participation during the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

Following his ouster in 2000, Serbia has opened itself to the West, established democracy and a free market, and sought to reconnect to other European states. Rebuilding from a strong historical legacy of female participation in the Communist era, Serbian women have established themselves again as a cornerstone of the country's new democracy, with rates of participation climbing to 34% in 2017. Thanks also in part to external actors like the UN, EU, and international NGOs, additional structural changes have been achieved, including increased female participation in security forces, gender quotas for parliamentary parties, and two National Action Plans for implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

However, structural reform must also be supported by cultural beliefs, and in Serbia's case, culture has been slow to change. "Macho" values persist throughout society and manifest themselves in conditions such as a persistent pay gap, traditional gender roles at home, and the "tokenization" of female politicians. These attitudes can be challenged through education, national dialogue about these issues, and changed media portrayals. In Serbia, a combination of cultural and structural reforms is needed to promote a robust democracy, an inclusive environment for all and bolstered prospects for peace and stability throughout the region.

This working paper presents the findings of a series of personal interviews with Serbs both in- and out-of-country from various relevant sectors who shared their unique perspectives on the role of women in Serbia's peace and security processes moving forward. Their views are a mix of optimism and pessimism, and shed light on both the successes of structural change and the

challenges of cultural shifts. The case of Serbia's combined efforts in this field deserves close attention because it has broad implications for the region, for women in post-conflict societies, and because it can define how others tackle these challenges in the 21st century.

II. A HISTORY OF FEMALE PARTICIPATION: SERBIAN WOMEN IN COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM

While it is true that Serbia has always had a “traditional” culture in terms of gender roles and “macho” values that persists today, it has also had a strong history of women's participation in politics and society that should not be discounted. Every single respondent, at the beginnings of our interviews, framed Serbia's current situation of gender inclusion as being firmly rooted in the post-World War II, communist era lasting until the late 1980s. They pointed out that after World War II, women were actually “rewarded” for their participation in the fight against fascism and the rebuilding of the country with equal rights.¹ One of the “missions on paper” during the communist times was equality for everyone, and especially to include women equally in society and in education.² In such senses as voting rights, inheritance laws, and pay, women were equal during the Tito regime. They were roughly equally represented within the work force and “women comrades were equal to male comrades.”³ Even in the Communist government, women were prominently ranked within the party and occupied important positions. Respondents pointed out that this “legacy of communism” with its emphasis on equality and participation is often not recognized in external narratives about Serbian history.⁴

This legacy of equality and participation has paved the way for women's inclusion today, even though it took a sharp dive during the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s—at least on paper. When asked about Milosevic's rise to power, interviewees recall that his aggressively nationalist and violent policies also coincided with their memories of male-dominated suppression overtaking political and cultural life. It was in the elections of 1990 under that regime that female parliamentary participation fell to the lowest rate in Europe at 1.6%.⁵

However, as former Member of Parliament Milica Delevic pointed out, there is a difference between a “formal way of wielding power and informal way of wielding power.”⁶ She describes how the wife of Slobodan Milosevic, Mirjana Marković, was a prominent political figure in her own right and was even the leader of Milosevic's rival party, the “Yugoslav Left.” Delevic herself, the former wife of Belgrade mayor and opposition leader Dragan Đilas, was a leader of the protest movements against the Milosevic regime together with her former husband. Vice Chair of Inclusive Security Miroslav “Miki” Jacevic, told a similar story about a high degree of women's participation during the 1990s, and explained how this represented a direct and paradoxical contrast to the “macho” nationalism of Milosevic, which emphasized women's

¹ Dragana Milojevic, email interview with author, May 3, 2017.

² Gabor Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA, April 25, 2017.

³ Dragana Milojevic.

⁴ Milica Delevic, phone interview with author, May 18, 2017.

⁵ National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, “Women's Parliamentary Network of Serbia,” October 10, 2014, <http://www.womeninparliaments.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Serbia-WPN-Washington.pdf>.

⁶ Milica Delevic.

passive roles as “carriers of the nation.”⁷ He spoke about organizations like Women in Black and others that led women in resistance to not only Milosevic’s regime, including its suppression of women’s rights, but also to the nationalism and militarism overtaking the country.⁸ This legacy of female participation is therefore key to understanding the current situation and how representation has “risen” so high—it has actually historically been quite high, though in different ways.

III. SERBIAN POLITICS TODAY: EUROPEAN UNION ACCESSION, EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND GENDER REFORM

In 2000, major democratic changes in Serbia are also the starting point for security sector reforms (SSR), including gender integration of police, security and military forces.⁹ After the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was signed in 2006, the process began to create Serbia’s first National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.¹⁰ Throughout the process of National Action Plan adoption and implementation, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were crucial in pushing for reform and publicizing their efforts, along with a government working group comprised of representatives from various ministries. The first Serbian National Action Plan 1325 was adopted in December of 2010 for the period of 2010-2015, and is unique among NAPs in that it is sponsored by the Ministry of Defense rather than other ministries that commonly administer National Action Plans such as gender ministries or ministries of the interior.¹¹

Other major “gender and security” laws were adopted in 2009 during the first generation of gender reforms, including the Law on Gender Equality and the Anti-Discrimination Law, which contain broad-based and urgent reforms prohibiting gender-based discrimination and mandating equal access to opportunities across all sectors.¹² It also requires all public and official statistics to be gender-disaggregated and calls on mass media to actively work to change gendered cultural norms and stereotypes.¹³ In May of 2017, Serbia’s second National Action Plan 1325 was approved by the Cabinet to build upon the work already being accomplished.

Another political process occurring in Serbia today that overlaps in many ways with gender integration is its goal of joining the European Union. The EU has bolstered progress by including related provisions in its accession criteria, encouraging Serbia to take on more inclusive policies in order to meet them. It has also contributed funding, investing €3 billion in Serbia since 2001—

⁷ Mirsad “Miki” Jacevic, phone interview with author, May 4, 2017.

⁸ Žene u Crnom Beograd, http://zeneucrnom.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=2&Itemid=4.

⁹ Maja Bjeloš, “Monitoring and Measuring Progress in Implementation UNSCR 1325 in Serbia,” Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/110559?download=true>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Alexandra Amling and Marie O’Reilly, *From Global Promise to National Action: Advancing Women, Peace, and Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Philippines, Serbia, and Sierra Leone* (Washington, D.C.: One Earth Future Foundation and Inclusive Security, 2016), https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/GlobalPromise_NationalAction_Digital_rev.pdf.

¹² Bjeloš, “Monitoring and Measuring Progress.”

¹³ Ibid.

the equivalent of €400/citizen.¹⁴ Serbia was the first country outside of the EU to adopt the “EU Index for Gender Equality,” which assigned it a rating of 40.6% (the EU-28 Member States rating is 52.9%). Serbia’s highest ratings were in the domain of power at the national level, while its lowest were in the domains of work and money. Former Director of the EU Integration Office Milica Delevic agrees that EU accession contributed to greater gender inclusion, but also points out that gender inclusion “has never been a serious impediment for European Integration because it was not at a very low level where the Commission would have reprimanded us. When it comes to inclusion, it was mostly about sexual minorities, Roma, national minorities, disabled... those are the conditions I was worried about.”

Other respondents, however, had a more negative perception on the relationship between these two goals—that gender inclusion is a priority pushed on to the country by external actors, and not because citizens and internal actors truly “buy in” to its importance. They claim that these goals are not true priorities but are merely tools used by the government to gain funding or favor in EU accession talks¹⁵ Gabor Sines, former student protest organizer during the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, cautions even more strongly that “the biggest danger... is trying to institutionalize equality.” External parties may not see the potential for entrenched cultural backlash towards inclusion to threaten their visions of change.¹⁶

They also point out that external researchers and policymakers often ask Serbians to help others without acknowledging their own continuing struggles as a nation. Being asked to consider issues of inclusion and equality may feel like a luxury when faced with rising unemployment, economic disparity, ethnic tension, and political turmoil. Serbians also often feel that they were villainized by the rest of the world, which results in a distrust of foreign intervention. Natasa Kis-Sines, former student protest organizer and current social worker, says:

The suffering and what these people are going through... it hasn't been acknowledged. There is so much blame and shame put on these people. So unless you acknowledge that suffering and pain, you cannot start having those conversations with people about helping others... People have to say “this is what happened to us, and this is what we need to do for others.”¹⁷

V. IMPACTS SO FAR AND CURRENT STATUS OF GENDERED POLICY AND POLITICS

Though Serbia still has milestones to reach in terms of structural progress for women, the country has made tremendous strides politically by many measures, and these gains have influenced the culture and mindset of the people as well—therefore ensuring the country’s lasting democratization. During the parliamentary elections held on May 6th, 2012, a gender quota system was introduced that required one third of all candidates to be women, and they

¹⁴ “Serbia: On the Path Towards the EU,” European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, June 12, 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/serbia-factograph.pdf>.

¹⁵ Dragana Milojevic, email interview with author, May 3, 2017.

¹⁶ Gabor Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA, April 25, 2017.

¹⁷ Natasa Kis-Sines, in-person interview with author, Arlington, MA April 25, 2017.

were elected to 84 out of 250 seats, therefore dramatically increasing their political representation.¹⁸ An informal “Women’s Parliamentary Network” was also formed at that time to promote women in politics and occasionally to “propose joint amendments specifically addressing women’s issues.”¹⁹

The parliamentary quotas were extremely important for female MPs, even though there was resistance to them. Milica Delevic reflected that “once these quotas were introduced for MPs I actually benefited from that, because I can imagine that I never would have been ranked so high on the parliamentary list.”²⁰ However, Sofija Mandic, legal researcher at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy (BCSP), points out that there has also been resistance and that norms and biases are slow to change, where “MPs have accepted the quota amendment as the necessary evil and they voted under their parties’ directions, not out of a true understanding of the need to make sure that the underrepresented gender should increase their presence minimally in the Parliament... The women MPs are often times forced to vote following the party command, and not according to their opinions and consciences.”²¹

Nonetheless, respondents agree that as their numbers have increased, and as now a third session of parliament contains a higher percentage of women, female politicians have become more comfortable and active, and cultural norms have also begun to change.²² Women are increasingly represented in departments that were previously considered “male domains” such as defense, police, border security, and infrastructure committees.²³ As gendered policies and women’s political positions have begun to change, public perceptions of their roles in the Serbian culture and mentality will also be impacted. However, lasting cultural norms remain that are oppressive to women and which can be seen in the workplace, in the home and in the tabloid-ridden media.

VI. Serbian Culture Today: Traditional Gender Roles in Work, Home and in the Media

Although a great deal of structural change has been achieved in Serbian policy and legislature, true progress will not be achieved until there are parallel cultural shifts as well—and Serbian culture has always been “traditional” and patriarchal in terms of gender roles, even during the communist era with its emphasis on equality. Many respondents identified a “macho” value system in Serbian culture, which manifests itself in the workplace, in home and family life, and in media portrayals. These elements impede on progress either by preventing structural or legislative changes to be passed in the first place, or even when structural change is achieved, longstanding cultural beliefs and values prevent them from being truly enforced.²⁴

¹⁸ “WPN Serbia – Four Years of Activity and Results,” National Assembly of the Republic of Serbian Women Parliamentary Network, February 2, 2017, <https://wpnserbia.wordpress.com/2017/02/14/wpn-serbia-four-years-of-activity-and-results/>.

¹⁹ Sofija Mandic, email interview with author, May 30, 2017 [trans. from Serbian].

²⁰ Milica Delevic.

²¹ Sofija Mandic.

²² Ibid; Milica Delevic; Miki Jacevic.

²³ Miki Jacevic.

²⁴ Sofija Mandic.

For example, according to Dragana Milojevic, a social services employee in Belgrade, “in general, men take the better paid positions and women take the less paid ones. Women take lots of jobs in government, organizations as well in social services. So, even though there is a Gender Equality Law that was enacted, the implementation of it runs into obstacles at every step.”²⁵ Another example of failure to implement policies was raised in regard to the country’s generous parental leave policies, a legacy of socialism which many respondents mentioned as evidence towards a high degree of gender equality.²⁶ However, one respondent told a story about her right to this policy being completely disrespected by her male boss, who threatened her into continuing to work for his privately-owned company even while on maternity leave.²⁷ At home, women still face disproportionate expectations in terms of childcare and housework, especially in rural areas, where “the expectation is that even though a women graduates from University, she is going to take on the full house work; there is no sharing of household chores with men.”²⁸

Another contributing factor raised in almost every interview are the extremely popular and largely government-controlled tabloids of Serbian media, which promote a solely sexual and objectified view of women including “sensationalist reporting of domestic violence cases.” True inclusion and peace in Serbia will not be achieved until media and education emphasizes these values—resulting in cultural shifts along with structural reforms.

VII. CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD

Many surprising facts have become clear in the course of discussions with the wide variety of remarkable actors that make up the story of gender, peace and security in Serbia. One is the collective pride that female and male activists, practitioners and experts feel about the progress that has been made in achieving true inclusion of women in Serbian society. When asked about remaining impediments or statistics about women’s status, most interviewees redirected conversations to focus on the progress that has been made. When asked about recent history and the political suppression of women during the Milosevic era, respondents overwhelmingly made the immediate correction that the story of women’s participation in Serbia starts long before then—with a history of strong Yugoslav women exercising their power, whether informally or formally, throughout the communist times of the 20th century and even before that.

It must also be acknowledged that there are lasting improvements yet to be made in the Serbian way of thinking which is still so dominated by “traditional values” and patriarchy. This is evidenced by pay gaps in work, discrimination in workplaces and in formal culture and economy, media portrayals of women as sex objects, gender-based and domestic violence, and

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Serbia has one of the top five most generous parental leave policies in the world, with 52 weeks of leave and 100% of wages paid during that time. By comparison, the U.S. is in the bottom five with no guaranteed paid maternity leave. See Taline McPhedran, “Best and Worst Maternity Leave Policies Around the World,” *CTV News*, April 11, 2016, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/best-and-worst-maternity-leave-policies-around-the-world-1.2854349>; Chris Weller, “These 10 Countries Have the Best Parental Leave Policies in the World,” *Business Insider*, August 22, 2016, <http://www.businessinsider.com/countries-with-best-parental-leave-2016-8/#finland-1>; Dunja Milosevic, email interview with author, May 10, 2017; Izabela Sremac, email interview with author, April 4, 2017.

²⁷ Izabela Sremac.

²⁸ Ibid.

by persistent gender roles that dictate women's places and spaces within home and family life. However, the country also endured a catastrophic, tragic civil war and a little over a decade later, boasted one of the highest rates of female political participation in the world. As Miki Jacevic says, "as somebody who has lived through that war, I just don't buy that narrative that nothing's working in Serbia, or even in Bosnia. I lived through 'nothing is working'... But, at the same time, what I do see, is when I do go to Leskovac, and 100 men and women show up to talk about security through a gender lens. That came out of something... I always say I'm more curious about why these things *work*."²⁹

Clearly, in Serbia, there is a great deal that is working. As gender advocates and scholars all over the world, we must pay attention to the remarkable progress achieved by this small country against all odds, and in the face of violent division and aggressive nationalism. Change takes time, but it is happening in Serbia—both through sometimes small, but significant structural and political achievements as well as through cultural shifts occurring through a vibrant engagement with civil society and education that is also slowly changing the mindsets of the people. As Gabor Sines aptly concluded, "Equality, it's not about percentage. It's about some kind of inner change. It's going to take generations. One man at a time. Or woman, it doesn't matter."³⁰

²⁹ Miki Jacevic.

³⁰ Gabor Sines.

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UNWILLING BRIDES, AN ANALYSIS ON SEXUAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA

Winona Hudak

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

George Kimble, an early twentieth century geographer, once said that “the darkest thing about Africa has always been our ignorance of it.”¹ That statement is as true today as it was when Mr. Kimble said it over a hundred years ago; the world continues to bask in its blissful ignorance of the problems rampant throughout Africa while the continent suffers alone in darkness.

Africa is the second largest continent and hosts 16% of the world’s population²; yet, it hosts the sickest and poorest people, the most corrupt governments, and the deadliest conflicts. Although all of Africa’s problems need to be addressed, the most prevalent and, arguably, the most dangerous problem is the growing rise of terrorist groups throughout the continent. These groups arise “whenever and wherever there are serious discontents which complainants consider unaddressed or ignored.”³ Usually, but not always, these groups exploit religion “to attract attention even when the main complaint is not religious;” however, these groups take advantage of that chaos and then religion is blamed for the disturbance⁴.

Boko Haram, for example, is an African militant Islamic group, that claimed over 11,000 lives in 2015, and has been labeled the deadliest terrorist organization currently in operation⁵; yet, the world’s headlines are littered with the exploits of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Although ISIL is dangerous and a threat to international security, the death toll from their exploits primarily stems from combat. On the other hand, Boko Haram and the other African terrorist groups target civilians. In fact, many of the victims of these African terrorist groups are women and children, who face a constant threat of death. However, death is no longer the only threat.

In recent years, African terrorist groups have added another tactic of terror into their arsenals – sexual terrorism. Sexual terrorism, also known as a Rape Jihad, is a “practice executed in the

¹ "George Kimble Quotes." ThinkExist.com. ThinkExist, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

² Boyes, Steve. "Getting to Know Africa: 50 Interesting Facts...." National Geographic Society. National Geographic Society, 25 Aug. 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

³ Nzwili, Fredrick. "Africa's Islamic Extremist Groups Are on the Rise." The Washington Post. WP Company, 29 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Smith, Alex. "ISIS Owns Headlines, but Nigeria's Boko Haram Kills More Than Ever." NBCNews.com. NBCUniversal News Group, 01 Jan. 2016. Web. 08 May 2017.

name of a state, an oppositional entity, or their surrogates as part of a political, racial, religious, or ethnic armed conflict.⁶ It involves a wide range of practices including forced marriage, rape, gang rape, forced impregnation, and sexual mutilation⁷. A component of a total war campaign, African terrorist groups use sexual terrorism for five main reasons: ideology, propaganda, indiscriminate amoral violence, voluntary compliance, and societal perceptions of terrorists and the terrorized⁸.

Unfortunately, much like Africa's other problems, the international community has sparsely addressed the increasing use of sexual terrorism by African terrorist groups and has been slow to react despite overwhelming evidence regarding the severity of the issue. The United Nations (UN) has passed six resolutions in the last twenty years on the subject, and even those only include international outrage and allocation for medical assistance⁹. The United Nations Office for Sexual Violence in Conflict has issued no reports, resolutions, or communiques regarding sexual terrorism in Africa since 2014¹⁰. If the international community remains ignorant of Africa's growing problem of sexual terrorism, women and children, especially, will continue to suffer in darkness facing the bleak future as unwilling brides.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF SEXUAL TERRORISM

Although sexual terrorism is a major problem on the African continent, Africa's terrorist groups were not the first to utilize it. In fact, sexual terrorism is a "worldwide phenomenon with historic roots" reaching back to the Bible and Greek and Roman history¹¹. Throughout the Bible, there are many instances of sexual terrorism including the rape of women in conquered villages, 'marriage' to female captives, and the gang rape of those captives¹². Similarly, the Greeks and Romans "wholly accepted rape as a common practice in warfare and captive women came to expect this a consequence of defeat."¹³

Sexual terrorism has been used for centuries but, it finds its most barbaric expression during war, especially under conditions of modern 'total war'¹⁴. The term total war was coined during the Second Seminole War of 1840-1842 where William Tecumseh Sherman told his troops that they not only fought hostile armies, but also hostile people¹⁵. Mr. Sherman further stated that the

⁶ Rosen, David. "Sexual Terrorism." *The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and Sexuality Studies* (2016): 1-2. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Stock, W. E. "PUBLICATIONS." NCJRS Abstract - National Criminal Justice Reference Service. National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 1991. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁹ "Resolutions Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict." *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

¹⁰ "Home Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict." *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

¹¹ Rosen, David.

¹² Gafney, Ph.D. Rev. Wil. "God, the Bible, and Rape." *The Huffington Post*. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 15 Jan. 2013. Web. 08 May 2017.

¹³ Attah, Christiana E. "Boko Haram and Sexual Terrorism: The Conspiracy of Silence of the Nigerian Anti-terrorism Laws." *African Human Rights Law Journal*. University of Pretoria, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

¹⁴ Rosen, David.

¹⁵ Ibid.

soldiers must make the “young, rich and poor, feel the hard hands of war”¹⁶ by rendering war unappealing through whatever means necessary. Mr. Sherman’s concept of total war provided the basis for the modern-day definition of sexual terrorism. Today, terrorist groups believe that sexual terrorism serves the dual purpose of spoils and as a means of making the populace feel the hard hands of war.

Sexual terrorism hit its peak following the end of World War II in 1945. Peace was expected to emerge and, yet, modern terrorism found its foothold on the fragile cliff of global peace. Although terrorism can be traced back just as far as war, modern terrorism is different “due to its global visibility, aided by the availability of sophisticated weapons, money, and the revolution in the information communication technology.”¹⁷ As such, terrorist groups have been able to adapt and utilize different techniques that incite terror among their enemies. One such adaptation is the inclusion of sexual terrorism in their campaigns of total war.¹⁸ The upsurge in global terrorism is a direct link to the increasing use of sexual terrorism, evidenced by the atrocities of the of Bosnian War in the early 1990’s and those of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994¹⁹. While by no means exhaustive, those two incidents demonstrate how terrorists have branched from traditional terrorism techniques to include sexual terrorism as a means of total war.

III. MOTIVATIONS OF SEXUAL TERRORISM

African terrorist groups, like Boko Haram and the FDLR, use sexual terrorism as a tool in their total war campaign for many reason: ideology, propaganda, indiscriminate amoral violence, voluntary compliance, and societal perceptions of terrorists and the terrorized²⁰.

These terrorist groups justify the use of sexual terrorism based on their ideological preferences. For example, members of these terrorist groups have the: incorrectly-held general belief that rape committed during wars and conflicts are pardonable and natural as ‘a byproduct of wartime activity, as ‘collateral damage’ and ‘spoils of war’, not as a violation of humanitarian law’. Terrorists have also realized that rape can be used effectively as a weapon of terror, without attracting any legal penalty, even in the midst of existing laws which criminalize and prescribe penalties for rape²¹.

Sadly, this mindset is prevalent among the African terrorist groups that utilize sexual terrorism. Women are no longer people but, rather, “mere toys in the hands of soldier boys” who can use their toys as part a badge of their victory²². Although these groups know that sexual terrorism is outlawed, they continue to perpetuate the terror. These groups know that there are almost no repercussions for their actions and, even if there were repercussions, these soldiers see sexual terrorism as a right bestowed upon them by their religious affiliations or mystic leanings. Boko Haram, for example, subscribes to the radical Islamic followings of ISIL who twists the Qur’ans

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Attah.

¹⁸ Rosen, David.

¹⁹ Attah.

²⁰ Stock.

²¹ Attah.

²² Ibid.

teachings to sanction the rape of Kafirs, or infidels, and non-practicing or lax-practicing Muslims. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), on the other hand, believe that raping women will allow their magic potions to work against their enemies. As such, the FDLR believe that they must rape as many women as possible or their enemies will not be vanquished. Regardless of the ideological justifications, religion, magic, or otherwise, sexual terrorism is “one of the most horrific weapons of war” and the “most intimate of violations” against women²³.

Sexual terrorism is also used as a propaganda tool to entice new recruits into these organizations. It is the belief in these terrorist groups that “sexual violence is necessary to serve as a morale booster for the troops and to keep soldiers happy.”²⁴ Of the 1.1 billion people in Africa, 52% of the population is under the age of twenty-five, making it the world’s youngest region²⁵. Despite the young population, most the region is either unemployed or working at poverty rates; in fact, 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s working youth lives in extreme or moderate poverty or at less than \$3.10 a day²⁶. The region continues to report the highest youth working poverty rates globally²⁷. As a result, many men are enticed into terrorist groups with the promise of escaping the poverty that runs rampant amongst the young people.

In addition to poverty, religion plays a determinative role in whether young men join terrorist groups. Islam and Christianity are prevalent among Africans; the two faiths have approximately 900 million followers throughout the continent²⁸. As such, many followers subscribe to each religion’s abstinence doctrine which requires the follower to refrain from sexual activity until the bounds of matrimony. Knowing this doctrine, terrorist groups exploit the sexual frustration of the youth by offering young women as ‘brides’ to slack their unspent lust. Therefore, terrorist groups use sexual terrorism to entice new recruits with the promise of better lives – ones without abject poverty and sexual frustration.

Indiscriminate amoral violence is another motivating factor for the use of sexual terrorism by terrorist groups. These groups have discovered that rape as a tactic of terrorism is a “relatively cheaper means of achieving their aims and it does not require the purchase or use of guns and bullets on enemy targets, yet its effects on the victims are no less devastating.”²⁹ In fact, terrorist use of sexual terrorism is:

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Boyes.

²⁶ "Youth Unemployment Challenge Worsening in Africa." World Employment and Social Outlook 2016: Trends for Youth: Youth Unemployment Challenge Worsening in Africa. International Labor Organization, 24 Aug. 2016. Web. 08 May 2017.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Liu, Joseph. "Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project. Pew Research Center, 14 Apr. 2010. Web. 08 May 2017.

²⁹ Attah.

an effort to dehumanize and defeat the enemy, leaving an entire society with long-term suffering as victims cascade across generational divides. The scourge of rape as a weapon, affects not only the individual lives of the victims, but the entire family and community in which they live. Leaving their lasting marks on the entire country's civil society, this in turn affects our globalized world³⁰.

These groups' aim is to incite as much fear as possible and the most effective means to do so is with the "one weapon all men carry and more often use" – their manhood³¹.

Sexual terrorism uses indiscriminate, amoral violence to garner voluntary compliance from the terrorized. The FDLR, for example, have no qualms about the age of their victims – they have raped babies as young as two and grandmothers as old as eighty³². The FDLR will gang rapes its victims, force family members to watch, and, continually, mutilate their bodies³³. The public display of sexual terrorism and subsequent mutilations are messages to fall in line or face the same fate – a fate, to some, worse than death.

Lastly, sexual terrorism manipulates African perceptions of terrorists and the terrorized. Sexual terrorism reduces women to mere pawns in the hands of the perpetrators who are then used to send powerful messages to the opposing political leaders to accede to the demands of the group.³⁴ This tactic becomes most effective because of: the high premium placed on the chastity of women by most societies. The act of rape, therefore, humiliates not only the women but also the male members of society who are portrayed as incapable of protecting their women.³⁵

An accurate numerical representation of the sexual terrorism throughout Africa is unknown. Many attacks go unreported because the victims are threatened by their attackers, deterring victims reporting³⁶. Additionally, victims are often held in shame and are frequently ostracized by their families and communities³⁷. Another problem is the lack of medical care in the region; many victims develop serious medical complications and frequently die from their wounds due to the lack of accessible medical care³⁸. If the victims do not die from their wounds, they are ostracized due to their lack of chastity, STIs or HIV/AIDS infections, and bearing enemy offspring³⁹.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nanivazo, Malokele. "Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." United Nations University. United Nations University, 24 May 2012. Web. 10 May 2017.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence." Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, 02 July 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Holmes, John. "Congo's Rape War." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 11 Oct. 2007. Web. 10 May 2017.

IV. BOKO HARAM

On April 14, 2014, members of the extremist Islamic group, Boko Haram, stormed the Chibok secondary school in Borno, the Northern portion of Nigeria, and forced 276 students onto a convoy of trucks; 113 of those students have never been seen again⁴⁰. While heavily publicized, the Chibok kidnapping is not the first of Boko Haram's sexual terrorism campaign; in fact, according to an Amnesty International report, an estimated 2,000 women and girls have been abducted since 2014⁴¹. What happens to these women once abducted is not entirely clear; however, Boko Haram's leader, Abubaker Shekau, has stated that God has instructed him to sell these girls⁴².

Ryan Cummings, a member of the Nigerian Security Network, believes the Chibok girls, like the other abducted women, "were probably divided up and sent to various areas"⁴³. Mr. Cummings continues to say that: a large number of them have perhaps been married off to Boko Haram combatants [and, there is] a possibility that some of them may have been subject to human trafficking. [Additionally], some of them may have been deployed as potential suicide bombers or made to assume other logistical, operational roles in the Boko Haram war machine⁴⁴.

Regardless of which path these girls were forced, it is evident that Boko Haram is using sexual terrorism to fulfill their primary motivations – generating revenue, enticing recruits, and decimating communities.

Boko Haram is primarily funded as a direct result of crime: bank robberies and drugs⁴⁵. However, abductions have become a major source of funding in terms of monetary means, governmental concessions, and fear⁴⁶. The abductions of the Chibok girls are no different. Boko Haram first tried to broker a deal for the return of the girls with the Red Cross, on behalf of the Nigerian government, in September of 2014⁴⁷. Yet, the deal fell through when Boko Haram demanded the release of prisoners the Nigerian government did not have⁴⁸. On April 9, 2016, Boko Haram released a 'proof of life' video, shot on December 25, 2015, that features what appears to be fifteen of the Chibok girls⁴⁹. This is the first time in almost two years that any

⁴⁰ Heaton, Laura. "Nigeria: Kidnapped Schoolgirls 'sold as Wives to Islamist Fighters'" *The Telegraph*. Telegraph Media Group, 30 Apr. 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴¹ Amnesty International. "Nigeria: Abducted Women and Girls Forced to Join Boko Haram Attacks." *Amnesty International*. Amnesty International, 14 Apr. 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴² BBC News. "Boko Haram 'to Sell' Nigeria Girls Abducted from Chibok - BBC News." *BBC News*. BBC News, 5 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴³ Rosen, Armin. "Boko Haram Is Weaker than It Was a Year Ago - but the Fate of the Girls It Kidnapped May Never Be Known." *Business Insider*. Business Insider, Inc, 14 Apr. 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Chiamonte, Perry. "Bank Robbery, Kidnapping, Drugs and Guns Fund Boko Haram's Bloody Ventures." *Fox News*. Fox News, 16 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴⁶ McCoy, Terrence. "Paying for Terrorism: Where Does Boko Haram Gets Its Money From?" *The Independent*. Independent Digital News and Media, 6 June 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴⁷ Freeman, Colin. "Red Cross Involved in Secret Boko Haram Prisoner Swap to Bring Back Kidnapped Girls." *The Telegraph*. Telegraph Media Group, 18 Sept. 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Freeman.

evidence of their well-being has been recovered⁵⁰. On May 6, 2017, eighty-two of the missing girls were released in exchange for captured members of Boko Haram; however, the fate of 113 girls remains a mystery⁵¹

It is believed that some of the girls have been given to existing militants as 'brides'. These brides are repeatedly gang raped for months, and beaten if they become pregnant⁵². The girls who have lost their value are then sold to other militants as sexual slaves in order to fund the Boko Haram terror machine and are rarely seen again⁵³. These girls and women are sold for a nominal bride price of \$12 USD⁵⁴, suggesting that Boko Haram's main objective is to demoralize the conquered⁵⁵ rather than increase their coffers. In fact, Boko Haram often uses their captives as suicide bombers; women who gladly volunteer to die in order to be free from their sexual prisons.

It is also hypothesized that these girls are being used to lure new recruits. In their recruitment materials, Boko Haram promises sexual access to women and children which, unfortunately, has been a relatively successful inducement⁵⁶. Nigeria is an oil-rich country that is one of the richest in sub-Saharan Africa; however, 70% of the population lives off less than \$1/day⁵⁷. Boko Haram, like other terrorist groups, promises a way out of the abject poverty and the additional enticement of sex from the girls proves too strong for many young, religious men to resist.

While some consider the actions of Boko Haram to be human trafficking, Boko Haram's sexual terrorism aims to decimate the community so they may rule the area themselves; as such, Boko Haram's actions are much more terrifying. Since the start of its campaign, Boko Haram has displaced 2.6 million people who fear rape, sexual violence, slavery, and death⁵⁸. Those who remain, withdraw their daughters from school, and encourage them to marry and leave the area⁵⁹. Additionally, those who stay, are forcibly converted and recruited, or killed for their defiance⁶⁰. As of 2017, approximately 20,000 civilians have been killed in Boko Haram controlled areas⁶¹. However, due to their nomadic nature and the lack of reliable information on their travels, the death count attributed to Boko Haram could be much higher than reported. Regardless of the

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Umar, Haruna, and Krista Larson. "Dozens of Nigerian Girls Are Freed 3 Years after Boko Haram Kidnapping - The Boston Globe." *BostonGlobe.com*. Boston Globe, 06 May 2017. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵² Rosen, Armin.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ BBC News. "Boko Haram 'to Sell' Nigeria Girls Abducted from Chibok - BBC News." *BBC News*. BBC News, 5 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵⁵ Shelley, Louise I. "ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Growing Role of Human Trafficking in 21st Century Terrorism." *The Daily Beast*. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 26 Dec. 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵⁶ UN Security Council. "United Nations Official Document." *UN News Center*. UN, 23 Mar. 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵⁷ Patel, Keshar. "The ENACTS Approach ." *Boko Haram: Spotlight on Human Trafficking*. World Policy, 22 May 2014. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵⁸ United Nations Security Council. "United Nations Official Document." *UN News Center*. UN, 15 Apr. 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Umar.

actual death count, Boko Haram has left a path of destruction, and darkness, in its wake that cannot be tamed without the assistance of the international community.

V. DEMOCRATIC FORCES FOR LIBERATION OF RWANDA (FDLR)

Every hour, forty-eight women are raped in the Democratic Republic of Congo making it the rape capital of the world⁶². In the last two decades, horrific levels of sexual terrorism have plagued the country. Tens of thousands of people have suffered sexual violence at the hands of terrorist groups like the FDLR; however, the exact number of victims remains unknown⁶³. Although sexual terrorism is rampant in the Congo by several groups, the FDLR are the most prolific in the region.

The FDLR first began in the early 1990's as a Rwandan Hutu extremist faction. They are the group directly responsible for the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and continue to fight against the Congolese government in one the bloodiest civil wars in history⁶⁴. Today the FDLR is an exiled terrorist group comprised of key members from the Rwandan genocide, Hutu members from the Rwandan army, and some displaced Rwandan Hutus. In their fight against the Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda and the transitional Congolese government, the FDLR has "used rape as a weapon of war to 'punish' civilians belonging to a particular ethnic group, or those accused of supporting the enemy."⁶⁵

Although both groups employ sexual terrorism, the FDLR differs from Boko Haram due to the sheer magnitude of the incidents and the brutality of the violence⁶⁶. It is estimated that "13% of [FDLR] victims are under the age of fourteen, 3% die as a result of the rape, 10-12% contract HIV/AIDS" and countless others are impregnated⁶⁷.

Similar to Boko Haram, the FDLR has many motivations for the use of sexual terrorism in their campaigns of total war. However, their main motivation is to use sexual terrorism as a tool "to win and maintain authority over civilians in territories occupied by rebel groups."⁶⁸ In 2010, it is reported that the FDLR committed 15,000 rapes during a brutal civil war in the Kivus region⁶⁹. As such, these women were no longer human but, rather, "legitimate military targets" that need to be vanquished in the FDLR's fight to garner power over a weak state's abundance of mineral wealth⁷⁰. Additionally, the rapes were committed to "humiliate the community for their 'support' of the Congolese government."⁷¹

⁶² "Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence." Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, 02 July 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Nanivazo.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Stearns, Jason. "Congo's Shocking Sexual Violence." The Daily Beast. The Daily Beast Company, 17 Oct. 2010. Web. 10 May 2017.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

Not only have the FDLR surpassed Boko Haram in terms of volume of sexual terrorist attacks, they also are far more brutal than their counterparts. While Boko Haram employs most of the same techniques in their campaign of sexual terrorism, the FDLR's techniques are more violent. While Boko Haram's use of sexual terrorism against the Chibok girls is terrible, their cruelty dims when compared to the atrocities of the FDLR. One woman reported that she was tied to a tree and raped by five men while her husband and children were forced to watch⁷². She says that she got one hand free and, while a soldier was on top of her, he cut it off with his machete⁷³. Another woman recounts her story where she was gang raped by eleven men in front of her husband and, once they were done, she was forced to watch while the soldiers cut him into pieces⁷⁴. She goes on to explain that the soldiers also forced her to eat some of her husband's body parts before they raped her again⁷⁵. These two instances are just a fraction of the FDLR's brutality which will continue as long as the FDLR wishes to exert its control over the people and without viable actions to stop them.

Even though sexual terrorism through Africa is an epidemic, the violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo is cancerous. The FDLR is more voluminous and violent in its attacks of sexual terrorism and the number of affected women continues to rise. Until the international community offers more than legal or medical aid, the problem of sexual terrorism in the Congo will remain unhindered and continue to grow.

VI. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Overall, the international response to the epidemic of sexual terrorism in Africa has been slow and minimal. From 2000-2017, the United Nations (UN) has passed six resolutions condemning sexual terrorism in the African region. The last resolution on the subject was passed in 2015.

These resolutions offer, primarily, legal and medical solutions to a rapidly growing problem. The first of these resolutions S/RES/1325, the premier resolution, was passed in 2000 and called for increased HIV awareness among survivors of sexual terrorism⁷⁶. The following four resolutions (S/RES/1820, S/RES/1888, S/RES/1960, and S/RES/2106) all call for the countries to strengthen their rule of law, provide more police vigilance, and establish medical assistance for survivors⁷⁷. The resolution with the most clout is the 2015 Security Council Resolution, S/RES/2242. S/RES/2242 tries to address the main cause of sexual terrorism – terrorism – by offering vague solutions. S/RES/2242 is the most popular Security Council Resolution ever drafted and was unanimously approved by the Security Council and all other members of the UN⁷⁸. Despite its overwhelming support, S/RES/2242, offers little to African governments who require viable and

⁷² Democratic Republic of Congo: Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence." Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch, 02 July 2015. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ "Resolutions Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict." *United Nations*. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

concrete solutions to the problem of sexual terrorism. Furthermore, S/RES/2242 is too little too late, especially in terms of the Congo, whose problem with sexual terrorism is terminal without the right treatment. Unfortunately, the international response, thus far, is not the right treatment for Africa.

In addition to the lack of response by the UN, the United Nations Office for Sexual Violence in Conflict has been relatively silent despite the alarming rate of sexual terrorism purported in Africa. Their last communique or report about sexual terrorism in Africa was released in 2014⁷⁹. Furthermore, the General Assembly and other organs of the UN have very few acting documents to guide countries facing sexual terrorism and have also been silent on Africa's growing problem of sexual terrorism.

While the international community recognizes the problem of sexual terrorism in Africa, it is not wholly to blame for the overall lack of response. Nigeria and the Congo, like other governments plagued with sexual terrorism, have been reticent to ask the international community to address the issue. These countries, like the other African nations, are in the midst of internal and external conflicts between terrorist groups, small civil factions, the central governments themselves, and outside militants. Additionally, these groups have caused hysteria and mass migrations for which the governments are ill-prepared to handle. The governments lack resources and, with rampant corruption and weakened states, sexual terrorism has taken a back seat to other more 'pressing' issues. As such, these countries have involved the international community with what they deem to be more 'pressing' issues while the growing problem of sexual terrorism festers.

Although the international community is not wholly to blame for the current growth of sexual terrorism in Africa, their lack of response is worrisome. Despite the evidence of sexual terrorism, particularly the Chibok kidnappings and the brutality of the FDLR, the international community's blissful ignorance of the continuing problem has established vague solutions, little action, and a continent shrouded in darkness.

VII. CONCLUSION

The international community has sat idle for far too long and allowed Africa to muddle through the darkness. The darkness is not receding but, rather, increasing due to the indiscriminate use of sexual terrorism by terrorist groups in the region. Although sexual terrorism is not a new phenomenon, Boko Haram and the FDLR's attacks have bred a new era of sexual terrorism due to the magnitude and sheer violence of the attacks.

These groups' motives for the use of sexual terrorism have evolved to include: ideological leanings (whether religious or mystic); propaganda (sex as an enticement for impoverished and sexually frustrated men); indiscriminate, amoral violence (brutal attacks to demoralize the terrorized); voluntary compliance (attacks that prevent other rebellions that fear the same treatment); and, Africa's views of terrorists and terrorized (capitalizing on the stigma used women and the men who could not protect them).

⁷⁹ "Home Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict." United Nations. United Nations, n.d. Web. 08 May 2017.

The motivations behind sexual terrorism are not important when the international community has done nothing to combat this epidemic. The number of attacks is not stopping; in fact, the number of victims rises every single year. This problem will not be solved by publishing six resolutions in two decades that dedicate legal and medical aid, but little else. This problem will not be solved by issuing press releases that spark outrage at the attacks on women in Africa. Outrage is no substitute for action. The international community, having recognized the horror of this issue, “has a responsibility to design an equally systemic, and global, response” to sexual terrorism in Africa⁸⁰. The international community “cannot hope to put a dent in this phenomenon merely by condemning it” or by calling for the perpetrators to be brought to justice⁸¹. The states in Africa are too corrupt, too poor, and too fragile to combat this issue alone, and in the darkness, any longer. If the international community does not cease its ignorance of Africa and its many problems, particularly the rampant sexual terrorism, Africa’s people will remain in the darkness and face the bleak future as unwilling brides to war machine spinning out of control.

⁸⁰ Tramontano, Marisa, and Michael Soussan. "Beyond Outrage -- Bringing Sexual Terrorists to Justice." The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 26 Aug. 2010. Web. 08 May 2017.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

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INFORMATION, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

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A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY

Neyla Arnis

UNSCR 1325: Women, Peace, and Security



References:

http://ndu.libguides.com/MERLN_WPS
&
www.womanstats.org

For Further Reading:

UN Security Council Resolution 1325
<http://www.peacewomen.org/resolutions-texts-and-translations>

The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security
<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/National%20Action%20Plan%20on%20Women%2C%20Peace%2C%20and%20Security.pdf>

DOD Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security
http://ndu.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=33796434

How Women's Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution Advances U.S. Interests
<http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/womens-participation-conflict-prevention-resolution-advances-us-interests/p38416>

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UNSCR 1325: Women, Peace, and Security



What is Women, Peace, and Security?

Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) aims to *empower half the world's population as equal partners in preventing conflict and building peace, while recognizing the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and children*. Its principles are outlined in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, issued in 2000.

UNSCR 1325 calls on UN member states to take action through their national security planning to advocate for women internationally, protect human rights, uphold international law as it concerns women, and seek greater inclusion of women in both domestic and international processes, such as peace building, policy and decision-making.



What is the U.S. Policy on Women, Peace, and Security?

E.O. 13595 and the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, adopted WPS as U.S. government policy and recognizes that *advancing U.S. security interests requires a gender-sensitive approach to defense, diplomatic, and development activities*.

Why does WPS matter for national security?

Women's participation in conflict prevention and resolution as well as in security sector institutions advances U.S. security interests. As a crosscutting issue, the successful involvement of women contributes to:

- **Greater security.** Decades of data suggest that a nation's economic prosperity, political stability, and inclination to engage in violence with its neighbors is related to the size of the gender gap in that country.
- **Conflict prevention and early warning.** Women are uniquely positioned within their communities to identify social behaviors and patterns that may lead to conflict. The status of women's rights and their physical protection within a country may serve as an early warning indicator for future violence.
- **More sustainable peace agreements.** Inclusion of women in peace negotiations is correlated with a longer duration of the resulting accords: an agreement is 35% more likely to last at least 15 years if women are meaningful participants at their creation. Women bring a different perspective to peace processes and tend to work across cultural and sectarian divides.
- **Reduction in violent extremism.** Societies with significant gender inequality are more likely to experience violence by extremist groups. Restrictions on women's rights are often accompanied by the rise of extremist groups. Incorporating women in strategies to counteract violent extremism can help to decrease radicalization, as women are able to challenge extremist narratives in their homes and communities.
- **Reduction in gender-based sexual violence.** Violence against women can be a primary indicator of a nation's stability. When women are more equal within their societies, they are less likely to experience gender-based violence. Research shows that women are more likely to report crimes and violations of their security to female security officials, which leads to more effective governance and equitable application of the rule of law.



Why is this important to the Department of Defense?

Studies show incorporating WPS initiative delivers results we cannot afford to ignore. Inclusiveness *increases mission effectiveness* and integrating gender perspective is a *force multiplier*. Integrating gender consideration requires **routinely assessing** gender-based differences of women and men as reflected in their social roles, the distribution of power, and access to resources throughout **all mission activities**, including policies, training, doctrine, and personnel practices. Ignoring the talent, resources, and potential (for good and evil) of half the population is a **strategic blind spot**. Failure to apply a gender lens can introduce vulnerabilities as well.

Applying a gender perspective yields information that will increase situational awareness, strengthen force protection, and improve operational effectiveness—ultimately saving time, money, and lives.

How is DOD implementing WPS?

Through the U.S. National Action Plan, the President directs the DOD (within a whole of government approach) to take action and DOD has responded with a comprehensive implementation plan directing specific actions on the part of all organizational entities within the DOD. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy provides annual implementation progress reports to the National Security Council and has ensured that WPS principles and objectives have informed the strategic planning process. This includes incorporating specific WPS language in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Campaign Plan, multiple Joint Publications, and the Geographic Combatant Commands' Theater Campaign Plans indicating how women's involvement contributes to specific security-related priorities.

Guided by the U.S. National Action Plan on WPS, DOD works with the interagency, partner governments and multilateral and international institutions to support recruitment, retention, and integration of women in the security sector; to encourage participation of women in peace processes and decision-making; to develop mechanisms to protect women and children from violence; to promote women's role in conflict prevention; to promote equal access to relief and recovery; and to train and educate WPS principles.

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NEW HORIZONS IN THE TRAINING OF SPANISH OFFICERS ACCORDING TO GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Beatriz Berne Macipe

1.- INTRODUCTION: GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN SPAIN

The Spanish Constitution of 1978, the basis and pillar on which the principles and values of our Nation are based, proclaims, in its Article 14, the right to equality and non-discrimination on grounds of sex. Moreover, Article 9.2 mandates public authorities to promote conditions so that the equality of the individual and of the groups in which it is integrated is real and effective.

The right to equality, therefore, is not a mere proclamation of intentions but an obligation and a priority for our Nation ; as indeed it is reflected in the legislative development with laws such as the effective equality between men and women of 2007 in which “ *it is intended to combat all forms of discrimination, which still continue to exist, whether directly or indirectly on sex-based, and to promote real equality between men and women, with the removal of obstacles and social stereotypes that prevent them from achieving it* ”ⁱ. Also, it is necessary to highlight the law on comprehensive protection measures against gender-based violence in 2004, which following the recommendations of international organisations, aims to provide a global response to the serious problem of the violence against women, The law goes beyond mere punitive actions against the aggressor by dealing with preventive, educational, social, victim care aspects.

Moreover, Spain, as a member of supranational organisms (UN, NATO or EU, among others), assumes the commitments concluded in this field, by incorporating international texts into the internal regulations and by internalizing the values and principles therein. One example is the Plan of Action of the Government of Spain for the implementation of *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of 2000 on Women, Peace and Security*, which constitutes the decisive political framework to incorporate gender perspective in the prevention, management and solution of military conflicts.

Our Armed Forces (FAS)ⁱⁱ, fully integrated in the society they serve, are equally sensitive to this issue incorporating to its structure and organization all those measures which allow them to evolve from a gender perspective. In this way, we can highlight the creation of the *Military observatory for the equality of men and women* in 2005 or the *Protocol of action against sexual harassment and by reason of sex* in 2015.

The Academia General Military (AGM), popularly known as *la General*, responsible for the formation of all the Officers of the Army has set itself the main task of providing Spain with the best Officers, being fully aware of the importance of the formation from a gender perspective. This paper aims to describe what is currently being done in this field, to later on show the horizons towards which to look at in the future.

2.- THE ACADEMIA GENERAL MILITAR

2.1.- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The AGMⁱⁱⁱ has a long and glorious tradition in the formation of Spanish Army Officers. Although there are research projects which place its historical precedent in 1340 with the creation of the “Company of the One Hundred Young Noblemen, it is necessary to wait until 1674 with the foundation of the Military Academy of the Army in the Netherlands, where it is possible to find the first attempt of progressive teaching of the general common ground of all the Branches together with the specific scope of each one of them.

Several projects, such as the General Schools of Leon Island, Segovia or Toledo, were needed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, until, definitely, the AGM was created in 1882^{iv} located in its first Epoch in the town of Toledo; during the eleven-year activity, a career profile was developed and which consisted of two stages where the common part would be carried out at *la General* and the specific part at their respective Academies for each branch. Brief journey but transcendental legacy: The Colours of *la General* were handed in to the center in 1886, being since then a privileged witness of the Oath of Allegiance that all cadets pledge. Moreover, during this period the so-called “Esprit of *la General*” was born, which implies the cohesive feeling of comradeship and unity of origin, forged through the close coexistence of all students subjected to a harsh daily routine and a diligent moral formation; sentiment which is still present nowadays.

It was necessary to wait until 1927^v so that, once again, the Academy opened its doors, although just for a short period of time of only three years, and in this case in Zaragoza, a city located half way between Madrid and Barcelona. The Second Epoch was a continuation in all aspects, including the teaching and pedagogical fields of its predecessor, the Academy in Toledo. The regime of strict military boarding system, the rehabilitation of the status of “cadet” and “gentleman” with the cultivation of courtesy and good manners, “the Cadet Decalogue”, set of values and fundamental virtues that cadets have to seek and that are still recited nowadays in different events and parades, represent a brilliant example of educative coherence, which has made *la General* be one of the most modern teaching centers of its time.

In 1940^{vi} the AGM was reestablished again in Zaragoza, maintaining its activity uninterrupted until now. Throughout these years, *la General* has consolidated itself as a reference center of the Military Education in Spain. The curricular evolution has adapted the scientific and technological studies to the factors that have emerged from the conflicts, completing them with a necessary preparation in humanities and values, trying to find a balance in the integral formation that shapes the would-be officer’s profile. In this extended period, outstanding students such as HM the King of Spain in 1985 and formerly his father 30 years before have attended classes there. It was in 1988 when the first woman entered *la General* with the Royal Decree 1/1988, which regulated the incorporation of the women in the Spanish Armed Forces.

2.2.- OUR CADETS

Currently Officer Cadets of the Army are trained at the AGM. They are integrated into different fundamental branches: Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signals,

Quartermaster Corps and Polytechnic Engineer Corps. Also the Defense Common Corps^{vii}, as well as the Civil Guard Officers, Police Military Corps who shares their two first years of formation integrated with their Army comrades.

Of these, the present document will deal with the students of the Officer Cadets of the Army, who remain four of the five-year formation at the AGM and represent the highest percentage of the student body.

Generally, our cadets enter the AGM at the age of 18-20, being the access mode similar to any university studies, where, for those who meet the general requirements demanded, the decisive factor is the grade achieved in high school together with the mark got in the public entrance exam to get to University. The mark required for the AGM is one of the highest of the Spanish University system. Moreover, the candidates have to pass different exams: a second language test, a physical^{viii} test and a medical check-up so as to achieve their goal of entering the AGM. Lately, the percentage of women in 2016 was 10.4%

The syllabus, set up since 2010, includes in its formation: *“on the one hand, the military general training and the specific one, and, on the other hand, the corresponding university degree from the general education system, as well as the formation for the acquisition of the fundamental requirements needed to develop the different tasks of each corps”*^{ix}. On the whole, the syllabus consists of 333 ECTS^x and 52 military training weeks, which are given during the five academic years, the first four ones at *la General* and the last one is the specific training provided in each of the Academies for each branch.

After accomplishing the syllabus, cadets are both commissioned as First Lieutenants and graduated in the university degree of Management Engineering^{xi}. Therefore this is an all-round university multidisciplinary education (scientific, technological, humanistic, job training and, essentially, a formation on values).

Professors from the *Centro Universitario de la Defensa* (organization under the Ministry of Defense, currently attached to the University of Zaragoza, and located inside the AGM), together with the teachers and instructors from the *Academia General Militar* take part enthusiastically, in the success of such important task. The former are specifically in charge of the subjects necessary for the university degree and the latter are responsible for the military training and education. All of them work in a devoted and committed way so as to embed the corresponding values needed for the young *soldiers* called to lead units and, therefore, people, wherever Spain needs them.

3.- GENDER PERSPECTIVE FORMATION AT THE ACADEMIA GENERAL MILITAR

3.1.- SYLLABUS

Our cadets attend different subjects in which they study gender perspective in a specific or cross-curricular way.

Throughout discussion and analysis of the international, national and specific regulations of the Armed Forces, teachers pursue further study in aspects of vital importance in this field with the aim of not only allowing students to get the necessary knowledge but also interiorizing what gender perspective entails.

It begins in such a way with the analysis of the universal right of equality of all people before the Law^{xii} and it goes on with the study of the Armed Forces Royal Regulations^{xiii}, a compendium of values and virtues that all soldiers need to have and in which Commanders are ordered to ensure the implementation of the criteria and norms related to the effective equality of men and women, and the prevention of gender violence.

Cadets also learn that there is no discrimination on the basis of gender or sex^{xiv} in the Armed Forces and that the expressions of contempt for gender are not only disapproved in their disciplinary system^{xv} but they are also prevented and avoided by the commanders.

From an administrative point of view, all regulations related to equality, the prevention of gender violence, reconciliation of the professional, personal and family life and the one helping to facilitate the access and professional promotion of women, i.e. the leave for being a gender violence victim, other specific leaves on this matter or the facilities and protection for childbirth, pregnancy, adoption or foster care.

The Armed Forces, reference in the fight against sex-based or sexual harassment have a wide range of regulations which emanated from the Agreement of the Ministers' Council of November 20, 2015. Students discuss and analyze this subject while being aware of its importance in their near future in their posts as Commanders who will have to face situations related to harassment.

When addressing the quality review of the organizations, students are told about the essential parameters to take into account in determining the academic excellence, especially the ones related to the systems of ethics management, in which the organizations deal with the problem of sexual harassment, workplace harassment, equality and gender violence.

In a cross-curricular way, the gender perspective is present in all subjects, such as Constitutional Law, International Law of the Armed Conflicts, where in a repetitive way there is a reference to the principle of equality, non-discrimination due to sex or the treatment of women in armed conflicts; in other cases, teachers use the topic of "gender roles" to set some examples and activities related to their subject.

3.2.- ADDITIONAL MEASURES

In addition to everything outlined in the syllabus, the AGM makes an additional effort to promote training in the field of women, peace and security, due to the importance it has for the immediate future of its students. In order to do so, a series of measures, which will be explained below, are being carried out.

New students are given lectures on *Gender Violence Sheets* and *Information Security* talks where they are specifically talked about sexting and other problems that may arise

from the misuse of social networks. Moreover, female Second Lieutenants give informative talks to the Cadet Ladies and advise them in a practical way over their new way of life.

With respect to the *Sexual Harassment Protocol in the Armed Forces and the Prevention of Gender Violence*, all students and teachers attend different informative lectures in which the different ways of behaving are outlined in detail, whether victims or witnesses. Commanders are in charge of carrying out relevant proceedings to solve or punish what happened.

Once the present academic year is over, a *Conference about Gender Perspective* aimed at all the teachers of the Academy and fifth-year students will be held in order to correctly conclude the process of interiorizing the gender perspective. This is a key aspect to carry out the command action in the present society. The lectures will be given by highly qualified personnel, both from the Army and the Civil Guard, and they will deal with the protocol of sexual harassment, gender violence and the figures of Authority Agent and Gender Advisor in International Missions.

4.- FUTURE VISION

The great concern that the leading staff of the AGM presents before gender perspective allows to augur a promising future in this field. This is why, during the current course, a new Working Group, called Gender Perspective, has been created. The members of such a group are working precisely on the analysis of the present situation and in the search of formative improvements in this area.

In the short term, some initiatives have already been developed, such as the inclusion in the Cervantes Chair^{xvi} of a conference related to this topic, or the proposal of doing some of the end-of-degree projects based on the topic of women, peace and security in the following academic years.

In the medium term, it is hoped that the formation of the cadet encompasses all those aspects which cover such a wide field as the one dealt with in the current essay. The formative process should be progressive and continuous throughout the different courses and it will accomplish the following aims:

- Structure the teaching imparted, fundamentally, at the beginning and at the end of their studies. Upon their incorporation into the AGM, students will receive basic training, becoming aware of the importance of this subject. During the following years, the focus will be on the learning and internalization. To finish, students will be given a series of lectures on the aspects of greatest impact and importance that, from the commanders' point of view, must be known and taken into account to reach the optimal professional capacity.
- Study, analyze and synthesize the advantages and disadvantages of the presence of women in the front line or their presence in the operations theatre so that our would-be officers have the tools to take full advantage of the human resources.

- Train teachers with specific courses, such as the Gender Advisor Course in order to transfer this knowledge to the students.
- Make an international or European comparison with other armies and police military corps to learn new ways of integrating gender perspective in our teaching and share experiences in this field.

In the long term, it is essential to lead, through the working group or other teachers from the Center, research projects which analyze and think over gender perspective so as to contribute to make an even better Army.

5.- CONCLUSIONS

- There is a great concern in the field of women, peace and security nationally and internationally speaking, also among the Spanish Armed Forces and at the AGM.
- Due to its importance, this subject should be present throughout the whole cadet's formative process with periods of special intensity, such as the first steps in the military life when they enter the AGM and the previous moments when a First Lieutenant begins to command.
- The curriculum gathers different aspects of gender perspective specifically in certain subjects of the different courses and it also deals with them in a cross-curricular way in many other subjects and activities throughout all the academic courses.
- The interest of the AGM in this subject has led to the need to improve the cadets' formation with complementary actions (conferences, lectures, formative talks, etc), as well as those ones which may also be approved for being considered of interest.
- As a result of the need of continuous improvement, there is the creation of the working group of gender perspective, whose fundamental purpose is to detect the deficiencies or formative needs so as to propose the lines of action which allow to improve the educative process in the difficult task of pursuing excellence.
- The educational integral system, which fundamental pillar is the instruction in values should have gender perspective in a prominent place; as the Article 5 from the Teachers Decalogue of the Academia General Military claims: *"Thechers will devote all their effort to the integral formation of the cadet, conscious that ethical principles such as maturity and professional capacity constitute a whole in their development as a person"*.

ⁱ Memorandum of Organic Law 3/2007, of 22 March, for the effective equality of women and men.

ⁱⁱ Article 8.1 of the Spanish Constitution. The Armed Forces, constituted by the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, have as their mission to guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Spain, to defend its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.

ⁱⁱⁱ <http://www.ejercito.mde.es/unidades/Zaragoza/agm/>

^{iv} By Royal Decree of February 20, 1882, the General Military Academy was created in the Alcázar of Toledo

^v By Royal Decree of 20 of February of 1927, the General Military Academy was created in Saragossa.

^{vi} By Law of September 27, 1940, by which the General Military Academy is reestablished in Zaragoza.

^{vii} Constituted by Judicial Corps, Comptrollers, Medics and the unit of music.

^{viii} In 2007, the requirements for the evaluation of physical tests were modified to incorporate gender differentiation.

^{ix} Article 44 of Law 39/2007 of the Military Career

^x European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System

^{xi} The university degree of Management Engineering consists of 240 ECTS

^{xii} Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution

^{xiii} R.D. 96/2009 that regulates the Royal Orders of the Spanish Armed Forces

^{xiv} Organic Law 9/2011 on Rights and Duties of the Spanish Armed Forces

^{xv} Organic Law 8/2014 of the Spanish Armed Forces Disciplinary Regime

^{xvi} Cycle of Conferences (www.ejercito.mde.es/unidades/Zaragoza/agm/Catedra/index.html) that is carried out at the Academia General Military as a complement to the training of the cadets and in which there are lecturers of very high level, both civilian and military.

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GENDER AWARENESS TRAINING: A COMPARISON OF U.S. MILITARY UNITS TO NATO/PFP MILITARY UNITS

By Elizabeth Owens Lape

INTRODUCTION

"The empowerment of woman in unstable countries benefits not only them, but all of us. It is a crucial component of a comprehensive approach to the security challenges of the 21st century."

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (UN, 2000), initially adopted on 31 October 2000 and updated with a resolution in 2009 (UN, 2009), proclaimed that all peacekeeping personnel – military, police and civilian, receive training on the protection, rights and the needs of the women, as well as on the importance of women in all peacekeeping and peace building measures (Lyytikäinen, 2007). Enforcing such a resolution can be difficult as there are often barriers to leaders accepting the issue as one that needs to be changed. These barriers can be time, resources, community values, policies and lack of a desire (Cameron-McCabe, 2008). Even though the resolution has been in place since 2000, countries have been slow to adopt their implementation plans (Tirman, 2011). There are currently 64 countries that have passed National Action plans with the first being the Danish plan in June 2005 followed by the Norwegian plan in March 2006 (PeaceWoman, 2013). The first U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security was not passed until December 2011 (The White House, 2011), and then updated in June 2016 (The White House, 2016).

Within the U.S. National Action Plan, DOD has "actions" (or tasks) identified that require attention by the office of primary responsibility for implementation of that area (DOD, 2012). It also emphasized the requirement for all DOD components to monitor the outcomes and actions listed in the plan so that everyone can have a better understanding of the requirements. An understanding is important to know how they may have an effect when planning for operations, whether they are security operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, stabilization programming and/or engaging with the civilian population. Three of these actions assist in institutionalizing a gender-sensitive approach by conducting training and education on the subject.

Training and educating all personnel on the dynamics of gender integration will become even more critical with the complete integration of women into areas within the services that previously were only open to men. On January 24, 2013, the 1994 rule excluding women from

combat was lifted. This change allows women to be assigned to units and positions where the primary mission is to engage in ground combat (DOD, 2013). The different services are now required to develop gender-neutral occupational standards. The implementation of these new positions is to begin immediately and to be finished by January 1, 2016. Currently, 15% of the U.S. military is comprised of women. This new ruling will allow more new recruits to request/apply for positions that were previously off-limits and will insert women into positions where previously there were only men. With the workplace dynamic changing, there needs to be a concern for the treatment and security of women in areas where women previously did not work. Additionally, there will now be more women as a part of a unit available to interact with the local population in countries that culturally prohibits the local women from talking to male soldiers. All the above are reasons that the current and future forces need to be aware of including a gender perspective when planning operations. One way to increase awareness is through training and education.

Research was conducted in order to provide a means of determining if U.S. military units are behind or ahead of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in regard to gender awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325. It provided a cross-country examination of how militaries in specific countries are institutionalizing gender as a planning factor that will assist in operational effectiveness and any cultural considerations. The resulting information assisted in determining if there are areas in the U.S. implementation of the National Action Plan that could be improved upon based upon the work conducted by other countries.

Research Questions

1. Are U.S. military units behind or ahead of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in regards to implementation of gender awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325?
 - a. What has the U.S. military done with regards to Gender Awareness training
 - b. What have other NATO and PfP countries militaries done with regards to Gender Awareness training?
 - c. What are the factors that affect the outcome of these questions
 - i. What are the gender/sexual harassment/sexual violence issues within the respective countries?
 - ii. Are there culture barriers or other factors that might affect the support of the training?
 - iii. Have the countries developed a particular position on their staffs that is specifically in place to advise on gender issues?
 - iv. Have professional military education institutions of the respective countries inculcated gender awareness training as a standard in the curriculum?

METHODOLOGY

To answer the proposed research questions, the qualitative design best suited to study this theme is “phenomenology.” Per Hayes & Singh (2012), phenomenology tries to discover how people experience a phenomenon, and how they think about that experience. It also values the

perspectives that the person being researched has about the experience. By using a phenomenological approach, I was able to collect data on the various training programs within the NATO/PfP countries, along with information discovered regarding what training the U.S. is conducting on gender awareness. This involved studying the details about the programs, categorizing the data, interpretation of the information, identification of any patterns, and synthesis and generalizations regarding the findings (Leedy & Ormrod, 2013).

PARTICIPANTS

The population size of the U.S. military, along with members of other country militaries, is impossible to consider as a group to study. Polkinghorne (1989) recommends that in phenomenological study, the sample should be 5-25. A representative sample of 12 individuals was selected and interviewed twice which adequately provided information in response to the research questions. The purposeful sampling strategy used to select the participants of this study was criterion sampling. Criterion sampling is defined as “purposefully picking all cases that meet some criterion” (Patton, 2002, p. 243). This kind of sampling was used since there are several military members of the U.S., European countries and PfP countries at my current employment, and the NATO command “Allied Command Transformation” is in Norfolk close to Old Dominion’s campus. This allowed for the different variations in the approach to the training and education of gender awareness. Since all the people being interviewed are military members, or those who work with the military, the variation was narrower which enabled the common patterns to be more easily analyzed. The relatively small number of personnel of the same type being interviewed was a limitation in this design strategy as I was only able to depend upon the opinions of a small part of the population.

Of the thirteen people who were interviewed, I included a cross-section of the different categories of personnel. From the U.S., I interviewed members of the military and civilians who have been involved with the training programs of military members. These personnel were either interviewed in person or by Skype if they are in a different location. Additionally, there were interviewees selected from civilians who work at Allied Command Transformation and other local offices who have been involved with training of their NATO forces and military members from either NATO or PfP countries. Some of the latter were members who work in the Hampton Roads area or Washing, DC, or were contacts I have made from past working groups. Those who meet the criteria noted above were contacted either in person, by telephone, or by email if overseas to ask for participation. I used the snowball method (Patton, 2002) to “sample people who know people who know people” (p. 243) to find other knowledgeable participants. Thus, I could obtain diversity between men and women and between those from the U.S. and those from other countries. The demographic factors of male or female, and country of residence are known, but specific names are kept confidential. The participant’s names were extracted from the transcription and replaced with a representative code.

These interviews were conducted face to face in the participant’s offices within the Joint Staff building in Suffolk, or in their respective offices. For those being interviewed by Skype or telephone, I conducted the interviews from a confidential area of my home or office. All the interviews were scheduled at a time convenient for the interviewees. I requested permission from the interviewees to be recorded. Upon granting permission, the interviews were recorded using a

small recorder that was used to assist with transcription. After all the interviews have been transcribed, the recordings will be destroyed.

DATA COLLECTION

Two strategies for data collection were used for this study, the analysis of archival organizational documents that assisted in explaining the organizational environment and the semi-structured interviews.

The initial step of this analysis was to conduct a document analysis of all the National Action Plans of NATO and PfP countries. These plans were reviewed for specific data on their application to their defense departments and any documentation of training and/or education required to be implemented. These documents collected will be the background information regarding the various programs within the different countries and provided a rich source of information regarding the implementation of a gender awareness training and education program within the different organizations. A matrix was developed to aid in the accumulation of the data and to visually look for trends. These documents helped provide information on the processes and decisions relevant to that organization, and helped stimulate further areas for review during the interviews (Patton, 2002).

The other phase of the data collection were semi-structured interviews. Interviews are used in qualitative research as “we interview people to find out from them those things we cannot directly observe” (Patton, 2012, p. 340). Data was collected through two sets of 13 face to face interviews where the participants will be asked to respond to a semi-structured interview (Hayes & Singh, 2012). The interviewees were told that they will be recorded, and agreed to participate in the study. The semi-structured interviews took about 45 minutes each and included approximately 20 open ended questions each using probes as required. The interviews were recorded using technology available and will be transcribed from the audio recording into a document that will be coded to protect participant’s confidentiality. Any identification of the interviewees was deleted from the final research report to ensure anonymity. The participants were given a copy of their transcript as a method of member checking (Hayes & Singh, 2012) to ensure their views were properly recorded. After a cursory review of the responses from all the participants, a second round of interviews was conducted to cover any additional questions that might have been raised in the first round of questions or to follow-up on information presented in the first round.

ANALYSIS STRATEGY

A simple, iterative framework was used to help with the analysis of the data collected. Per Srivastava & Hopwood (2009), the continual review of patterns within a loop for the process of continuous meaning-making of the material which will result in a progressive understanding through the analysis process.

The first step of the analysis was to review the matrix developed through the document analysis. This review looked for application of the National Action Plan within the defense departments, and showed if there is any emphasis in training and education. From this review, the draft interview questions were finalized inserting appropriate information as required.

Figure 2. Iterative framework for the qualitative analysis of UNSCR 1325 implementation with a view towards training and education programs.




Figure 2. A sequential review of the data obtained from the NATO/PfP countries National Action Plans as a feedback loop refining the interview questions. Adapted from “A Practical Iterative Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis,” by P. Srivastava and N. Hopwood, 2009, *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 8(1), 76-84.

Significance of the Study

Through the interviews I explored how the United States and other countries' military organizations have instituted programs to educate and train their military to be able to have a gender perspective during military operations and what these forces have done to further the overall use of gender as a planning factor in a military organization. Through the questioning I looked for any barriers the individuals may have had to incorporating a gender perspective into their operations, and any security issues the individuals may perceive within their organizations regarding gender. The results should be useful in improving upon a country's plan by highlighting successful gender awareness implementation and if any available training increased the county's successful implementation. This increased awareness should assist in improving actions taken by the NATO/PfP countries by giving areas to incorporate in the military planning process to meet the objectives of their respective National Action Plans. Meeting the goals of the UNSCR 1325 will ultimately benefit peace and security of women. My research agenda was designed to explore a comparison of U.S. and NATO/PfP countries when integrating gender awareness as a planning factor for operational effectiveness. A rationale for using a phenomenological approach was offered, and methods of data collection and analysis were given. Individual interviews revealed elements on the various training programs and descriptive

pictures of how the individual interviewees perceive their programs within their respective countries. Finally, I discussed with the interviewees measures that were taken to ensure objectivity and trustworthiness of the findings.

Document Review Findings

Based upon the requirements of UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2000), the President of the UN Security Council signed a statement that “welcomes the efforts of Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level.” Through several reports of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security in S/PRST/2001/31, 2002/32 and 2004/40 (UN, 2001, 2002, and 2004) there was increasing concern that not enough action was being taken to implement the requirements. Based upon the report submitted in 2004, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General submit an action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (UN, 2000) on women and peace and security across the United Nations system to strengthen commitment and accountability at all levels (UN, 2005). The Task Force organized to develop the plan that consisted of 22 United Nations member entities with representatives from intergovernmental organizations and civil society. The initial step of the task force was to develop an accountability matrix based on mandates stated in UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2005). This framework was briefed by the UN Special Advisor on Gender Issues Advancement of Women to the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. The Committee endorsed the plan and stated the framework proposed was a way member states could implement UNSCR 1325. The structure of the system-wide plan, signed on 10 October 2005, was based upon the following 12 areas of action (UN, 2005):

- A. Conflict prevention and early warning
- B. Peacemaking and peacebuilding
- C. Peacekeeping Operations
- D. Humanitarian Response
- E. Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation
- F. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
- G. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence in armed conflict
- H. Preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations staff, related personnel and United Nations partners
- I. Gender Balance
- J. Coordination and partnership
- K. Monitoring and reporting
- L. Financial Resources

Earlier submitted annual reports were not clear and consistent on what was being reported in regard to implementation (UN, 2005). As the member states are accountable to provide their own

report on how they are doing in the mainstreaming of gender, the system wide plan would provide a resource in assisting in presenting their submissions.

OVERALL

UNSCR 1325 was a call to all the countries within the United Nations to implement a plan to address the concerns listed. Within NATO, the NATO EAPC (NATO, 2014) and the Bi SC Directive 40-1 (rev 1) (NATO, 2009) directed the NATO member countries to integrate UNSCR 1325 into their national defense and security policies and activities, the national level implementation as well as that of military forces. By 2016, 17 out of 28 NATO member states and 9 out of 41 NATO partner countries had developed NAPs implementing UNSCR 1325 (peacewomen.org). Upon review of the nine NAPs, it was apparent they vary greatly in terms of structure, objectives, focus, and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The Department of Defense/Ministries of Defense have important implementation responsibilities for the WPS requirements, but these requirements also vary greatly. These disparities make it difficult to directly line by line evaluate how NATO and partner countries are doing to compare efforts among these nations. The scoring matrix reviewed and discussed above lends a more qualitative method to consider the different themes. Upon tallying of the 10 themes across the nine countries, the scores individually discussed above were tallied and an average of these scores was taken. With the overall average being 17.33, there were four countries that scored above the average with The Netherlands having the highest score of 22. The countries with the next highest scores were the USA and Germany and with 19, and then Bosnia-Herzegovina with 18. At the bottom was Bulgaria with the lowest score of 13, and then next were Sweden and France with 14.

INTERVIEWS

The next step of this analysis was to conduct a series of interviews with various members of NATO and Partnership for Peace countries, as well as the United States. These respondents were selected to be interviewed based upon at least a basic understanding of the topic. The interviews were conducted in a variety of methods as indicated in the individual profiles.

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA AND CONCLUSION

In this study, participants described various aspects of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and how a training and education program can influence the implementation. The findings supported the purpose of this research which was to determine if U.S. military units are behind or ahead of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/ Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries in regards to the implementation of gender awareness training in support of UNSCR resolution 1325. It provided a cross-country examination of how militaries in specific countries are institutionalizing gender as a planning factor that will assist in operational effectiveness, and should eventually result in a decrease in sexual gender based violence. The results will be analyzed and discussed based upon each of the pillars of the UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2000) of participation of women within peace processes, prevention of harm, and protection of women and their rights as objectives of the original UNSCR 1325 and emphasized in the system-wide plan (UN, 2005a) have been reviewed for inclusion in the NAPs, along with additional objectives that the various National Action Plans have delineated.

PARTICIPATION

It is clear the United States military is leading the way in providing a gender balance in the forces which will ultimately affect the participation of women in leadership positions, one of the pillars of the National Action Plan. The U.S National Plan not only discusses a gender balance within the U.S. Forces, but specifically discusses assisting other nations in the recruitment of women into their own force, or the inclusion of women then are sent over the U.S. for training purposes. The number of women currently in the force listed in Figure 3 shows that the U.S. is leading the way in inclusion of women into the military over the other countries that were a part of this research. This number was confirmed by all the interviewees during the second round of the interviews. During the interviews, all the members from the U.S. stated that the increase in the participation of women within the U.S. forces was positive and seemed to be supported by all. These respondents also commented that the inclusion of women was a positive aspect and should be a benefit to operations as more women are included and the pillar of participation is supported. As more women enter the force, there will eventually be more women in leadership positions to continue to affect the support and perspective from a different point of view, which should assist in peace processes. This objective appears to be met by the U.S. and those countries researched.

PREVENTION

This pillar from the UNSCR 1325 was an objective to ensure women and children were prevented from being harmed. This study confirmed that all the country NAPs reviewed for this research indicated internal sexual harassment training was a requirement. The members interviewed from the respective countries indicated that this training was being emphasized and was being conducted. With the continued emphasis on this training, and the additional women to the force, the number of sexual harassment complaints should be reduced.

This pillar is also supported by the training conducted to ensure the women externally within the countries where forces are being deployed are being protected from sexual exploitation and abuse from the individual sent to protect them. This type of training is also mentioned as a requirement in most of the NAPs reviewed, to include the U.S National Action Plan. The subjects interviewed from the U.S. positively agreed that this was also occurring, and most of the NATO and partner countries commented positively in this requirement being met. Therefore, this objective seems to be met by the U.S. and most of the countries who had members interviewed, though continued training and support is necessary to ensure women and children are prevented from harm.

PROTECTION

This objective of UNSCR 1325 is to ensure the protection of women and their rights. A critical element to ensure this objective is being met includes a training and education program that discusses what those rights are, and how including a gender perspective in the conduct of operations will lead to operational effectiveness by not only protecting the women, but by considering their rights as it affects the stability of the area.

The presence of a training and education program assisted in the awareness of what having a gender perspective is and indicated an understanding of the framework documents. Though all the National Action Plans require a training program, it was clear by the interviews of the U.S. members that training in this area was lacking behind that conducted within the NATO and partner countries. The presence of at least a training program is related to the countries attitudes and perceptions of how having a gender perspective can have a positive influence on operational effectiveness. This was made apparent from some of the responses from the NATO members interviewed. It appears through this research that there is still some work that needs to be done in meeting this objective. Including more leadership in Key Leader seminars so they understand the topic will begin the support from the top of the chain of command that will permeate throughout the staff. The inclusion of protection of women and children into exercises will be a way to train many people who will “train as they fight” through meeting the exercise objectives.

There were obstacles identified that may be contributors to this objective not being reached. The leadership involvement, resources, and culture (within the nation or between men and women) are factors of concern globally to all the countries interviewed.

Participants discussed how having the support of leadership is crucial to having a strong training and education program that will eventually have an impact on the protection of women in the community, and the overall ability to mainstream gender through all military operations. The leadership theme was developed when the interviews revealed that even in the countries that had a training program established, it was sometimes not supported. It was evident that countries that have leadership who actively promote elements of UNSCR 1325, such as Sweden and Bosnia Herzegovina, are much more likely to have members who are informed of and engaged in initiatives that support a gender perspective.

Resources to implement an effective program were mentioned by members from the U.S. and most of the NATO countries. The only countries who had subject members who did not specifically note this as an issue was Sweden, Germany and Canada. Resources provided to support a trained network of gender advisors is the ultimate outcome desired for future operations. Countries need to invest the resources for an effective program and view it as valuable and perceive it is the right thing to do for the country. Financial resources may be more difficult to provide during cutbacks in funding. But the assignment of a Gender Advisor position at least part-time if not full-time will assist in including this perspective when planning for operations.

There did not appear to be a correlation in comparing the NAPs, the requirements from the NATO Action Plan, the number of women in the force and the interview responses. Culture among some of the male leadership did seem to affect the full acceptance of a gender perspective more in the NATO countries than in the U.S. The interviews of the member from Sweden stated they had an excellent training program with more gender advisors resulting in the more acceptance of women as equal. But a review of the National Action Plans in Appendix 3 resulted in Sweden having one of the lowest scores, and they also have one of the lower percentages of women in the force noted in Figure 3. This same member commented that the warfighting culture for predominantly older men seems to influence their understanding and awareness of

what exactly is being discussed regarding implementing a gender perspective, and therefore still was not completely accepted by all. The member interviewed from France stated their training program seems to be well established, and they do have one of the higher numbers of women in the force, but the NAP from France also resulted in one of the lowest scores, and the interviewee commented that “moreover for some of them there is also a lot of misunderstanding with the word gender they think it is all about women and they categorically refuse to be train on this subject.” The training program described by the member from Bosnia Herzegovina seems to be one of the most extensive, and their NAP resulted in one of the higher scores, yet the number of women in the service is the lowest of the countries reviewed. This is also true of The Netherlands with a comment made “There is limited general knowledge about the topic and the gender expert capacity is limited to develop good scenarios, injects or provide training” and that “For more traditional warfare operations, it is seen as not relevant.” The number of women in the service from Norway is right in the middle, as was their NAP score, and their training program appears stagnant per comments made by the member from Norway. She stated that there is resistance to this topic “due to organizational culture (gender issues have low status, immaturity towards gender issues, suboptimizing, fight for funds etc), lack of knowledge, organizational structures and functions that give too much power to individual staff workers) and lack of leadership commitment.” The U.S. NAP scored near the top based upon the rubric used, and has the highest number of women in the military forces. Yet the training and education program seems to be lacking based upon the interviews, along with the resources and support from leadership. One member commented in the interview

In my opinion, the US Department of Defense does not yet believe that women play a role in conflict stability and military operations. They still see the enemy as being male in gender. They do not see the bigger picture that, in this day and age, war cannot be won by battle alone.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were a different way of fighting a conflict than had been in the past as the area was more urban, and there was more of a desire for nation building. This nation building concept seems to be prevailing within the military and most likely will continue with the goal of stability operations. In such an environment, the human contact will be unavoidable. The military needs to consider how to protect the civilians, and how to use all the resources they have for operational effectiveness. Therefore, based upon the findings in this research, the following recommendations are provided to enable the U.S. and NATO to meet the needs of the changing environment.

RECOMMENDATION 1 – KEY LEADER TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Because most the nations reviewed for this study commented upon leadership as a factor affecting implementation, any direction regarding this phenomenon could be applied across the countries. The Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations conducts a Key Leader Seminar periodically. Per their website (NCGM, 2016), the seminar aim is to “increase key leader’s knowledge on how to integrate gender perspectives into operations planning, execution and evaluation at strategic and operational level and how to argue in favour of integrating gender perspectives at political- and military strategic level.” The recommendation would be to conduct one of these seminars in the Washington, D.C. area held at the National Defense University.

Having it conducted in that area would allow for more of the senior level leaders at the political/strategic level to attend. It would be important that the attendees not only be U.S. members, but to include Foreign Liaison Officers from other NATO countries who are in the same geographic area to get the cross exchange of ideas and best practices. This seminar would enable leaders in top positions to have a better understanding of what is being discussed in regard to including a gender perspective, and then the knowledge could trickle down within the services and other military organizations. These leaders must then be held accountable for the requirements in the National Action Plans.

RECOMMENDATION 2 – CHANGE THE OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY

The current policy document governing U.S. Joint Professional Military Education (DOD, 2015) lists the following as one of the required learning areas: “Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, culture, region, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations.” The inclusion of the word “gender” in this sentence as one of the factors would necessitate the education institutions to teach this topic within the colleges as this would be part of their accreditation requirements viewed by the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education. The “how” to teach this topic could be discussed during the annual Joint Faculty Education Conference. Any best practices in this area could be discussed with the other NATO nations during the Annual NATO Education and Training Discipline Conference. As this policy addresses senior level education all the way down the military academies, changing this policy would be one step in addressing the structural change of including the gender perspective right from the start of a member’s career where eventually the discussion of gender mainstreaming will be common to all.

RECOMMENDATION 3 – SUPPORT THE POSITION OF A GENDER ADVISOR

Discuss with the Combatant Commands and the services about including a Gender Advisor as either a full time or part time position. This position has been recently established at three of the six geographic combatant commands and one of the services. This person would be the advisor to the Commander in regards how to implement a gender perspective within operations. The training for this position could be conducted at the Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations in the Gender Advisor course. Some of the interviewees from the NATO countries indicated they already had people acting in this position, and others mentioned that it had been tried but not supported. Seeing this position of gender advisor supported in operations, and the potential for an increase in operational effectiveness, should assist in generalizing this phenomenon across the other NATO nations.

RECOMMENDATION 4 – INCREASE INCLUSION OF GENDER IN EXERCISES

The quickest way to get to a large group of people is through exercises. Including gender perspectives as an objective within exercises, whether they are conducted jointly or single service, will reach a large training audience ensuring more are aware of the topic and the potential benefits. Many of these exercises are conducted in partnership with NATO and other countries, so the training would reach more than just a U.S. audience, therefore assisting the other countries in implementing their programs. The inclusion of exercise injects that focus on

sexual exploitation and abuse would have the additional benefit of how to react and report on issues of concern regarding this topic.

RECOMMENDATION 5 – RECRUITMENT OF WOMEN

The U.S. is leading the other nations in the recruitment of women into the military force. The increase in the number of women will eventually lead to more women in leadership positions. The participation of women in the leadership ranks will visually show other countries that the U.S. supports women's participation. In addition, any positive effects that occurred in operations should assist in the change of the affective domain regarding the acceptance into these positions. The U.S. modeling this support to women in key positions will be noted by other countries, particularly when conducting joint operations. They would then have more proof to leaders within their countries that the inclusion of women can cause positive change.

RECOMMENDATION 6 – DRAFT AN “INSIGHTS AND BEST PRACTICES” PAPER OR HANDBOOK

These papers are written by members of the Joint Staff through lessons observed during exercises. The lessons are collected and compared between other organizations drawing out the lessons learned. Recommendations are given that are best practices, but not necessarily doctrine. The information provided could lead to a doctrinal change, but also provide others with education on the topic. These papers are published and sent out around the world as best practices on the topic. Including gender perspectives in operations has been written by other organizations at the tactical level, but there has not been anything published on how to include gender at the operational or strategic levels. A handbook would not only give best practices, but would also address “how” a gender perspective would be implemented.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As mentioned in one of the recommendations, including the gender perspective into more exercises should be able to reach and train more people, which would result in a broader number of personnel understanding and being able to apply the subject. It would not only be beneficial to prove to leadership that this transfer of knowledge is occurring, but that a change in the affective domain regarding the subject matter has also occurred.

One way to accomplish this would be to take a blended approach to evaluate a phenomenological change in behavior. The U.S. Pacific Command Talisman Sabre series of exercises would be a good example of an exercise sequence of events where this type of research could be applied. This exercise is a bi-lateral exercise conducted biennially with the U.S. and Australia supporting the established Joint Task Force Headquarters with some assistance from New Zealand. It is a large-scale exercise that has many story lines within the exercise, to include several involving aspects of a human dimension. There are several hundred people that usually participate in this exercise. As soon as the members receive notification that they will be supporting the exercise, they would be assigned the NATO course on Gender Awareness to take online. The next step would be the participation of the staff in the two-week Staff exercise where the staff will conduct planning for the scenario. A gender perspective would need to be included within all the stages

of the planning process. The final step would be the three-week execution where the plan would be executed in the exercise.

The knowledge transfer within the cognitive domain could be monitored throughout the process by viewing the products that were produced. The change in the affective domain would be determined by interviewing the participants after the Staff exercise, and then upon completion of the entire exercise.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The U.S. is behind NATO in developing a training program and in all the training requirements mandated by UNSCR 1325 when compared to many NATO countries. A training and education program must be implemented immediately that starts with the commanders at the top, the leaders in the field. This is a country with many opportunities available to enhance the education and training process, though it is also a country that will be difficult to provide robust support behind raising the awareness of gender security as a concern. The U.S. will most likely never again conduct an operation on its own, and therefore will be conducting operations next to countries that may have already instituted education and training programs regarding UNSCR 1325, and would expect similar support and understanding from contributing nations. As this is being written, there is a Women, Peace and Security Act that was passed through the House. If this Act were to be signed by the Senate, then the legislation would require DOD to train deploying personnel involved in the following areas: conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution, protecting civilians from violence, and combating human trafficking. This Act, presented by a non-governmental organization, shows the importance of this topic to all, and passage would be an endorsement of the critical requirement to fill a needed gap.

There must be tangible steps identified to further streamline current training and education within NATO organizations and by individual members in partner countries. An assessment must be taken of available courses to determine the knowledge base, and to discover if there are is a shortfall in any area. Only through training and education can these gaps be filled for the awareness level of gender security concerns can be raised among military and civilians so they can contribute to the effectiveness of military operations. Continued education by the member NATO nations and PfP partners regarding UNSCR 1325 will assist in changing the mindsets of personnel who may not realize the full impact of supporting this resolution.

The last 15 years of war have demonstrated many differences in the approaches to conflict and peacekeeping operations globally. Particularly in Afghanistan, and in some of the operations in Africa, the scope of peacekeeping operations has widened considerably beyond only military tasks. Through this period there were eight other UNSCR resolutions that have been passed with each one being consistently stronger in language in regards to what the member nations should do to support the efforts of women, peace and security. The last one published (UN, 2015) was strong in the message that violent extremism is also an increasing concern when it comes to protecting women and children, but it also brought up the fact that women must be considered as actors also.

For units to properly accomplish their mission, consideration must be given for protection and security of all their members, as well as innocent civilians. Overall understanding violence and security should not only single out women as victims: women as both men and women are victims of gender-based violence. An important planning factor when dealing with this concept as a planning factor is what training must be provided to the troops to help them gain an understanding of the issues.

The issue of gender inequality is one the military has acknowledged is still an issue. Acknowledgement of a social injustice issue by the leadership is a critical first step in the ability to get any changes made. But also important is the requirement to hold these leaders accountable for their actions in the carrying out of the requirements to change the injustice. Sometimes these requirements are only implied, but the UN Security Council Resolutions have mandated these changes to gender security and awareness occur for the safety of all.

With the appearance of growing support for UNSCR 1325 among many of the NATO organizations, the institutionalization of this concept among the defense organizations would be the easiest approach since they usually work together for the benefit of a coalition operation. Raising the number of women in these organizations is certainly important to provide a gender balance, but it is also important to raise the awareness of gender mainstreaming among the personnel because only when a country has both, can gender equality even be considered.

Also important is to include gender advisors in each of the operational units as the concern for security can be applied to both genders. Future conflicts are only going to become more complex and must face difficult human challenges within the security environment.

With this research shortly following the 15-year anniversary of the original passage of the resolution, it is evident that high level commitment of support is present, and that additional guidance now needs to be provided and implemented throughout the U.S., NATO and supporting PfP countries. While NATO has begun the slow process of changing tough mindsets and behaviors by introducing gender perspective throughout its operations, they now need to include more women in key positions within key countries to help protect those on the ground.

Today's conflicts not only call for military responses should include all necessary resources when working in crisis situations. NATO's operational effectiveness includes making contributions sustainable and lasting peace, within which gender equality is a key factor. Future operations will be alongside these coalition partners.

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GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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WOMEN MINISTERS OF DEFENSE IN SPAIN

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WHAT IS THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN SPAIN?

Spain is a democracy since 1977, after the dictatorship of General Franco. From this moment a democratic model is established in which the sovereignty resides in the town. Like any other democracy, from its beginnings, this one has been evolving, adapting to the new times. With the passage of time, the woman has been having more presence and its presence is more relevant.

In Spain, by means of the vote the Congress of the Deputies is configured. The deputies who form it elect by vote to which will be the President of the Government, and this in turn chooses the equipment of Ministers with which it goes to work. In this team is where you choose who will be the Minister of Defense.

The Ministry of Defense was created with the first democratic government of Adolfo Suárez in July 1977, and merged the former ministries of the Army, Navy and Air. It is the only ministry of the democratic period that has kept its original name in all ministerial restructurings carried out to date.

Start	Ending	Name	Party
July 4, 1977	April 6, 1979	Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado	Military
July 5, 1977	February 26, 1981	Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún	UCD
February 26, 1981	December 3, 1982	Alberto Oliart Saussol	UCD
December 3, 1982	March 12, 1991	Narcís Serra Serra	PSOE
March 12, 1991	July 3, 1995	Julián García Vargas	PSOE
July 3, 1995	May 5, 1996	Gustavo Suárez Pertierra	PSOE
May 5, 1996	April 27, 2000	Eduardo Serra Rexach	Independent (Government of PP)

April 27, 2000	April 18, 2004	Federico Trillo-Figueroa y Martínez-Conde	PP
April 18, 2004	April 7, 2006	José Bono Martínez	PSOE
April 7, 2006	April 14, 2008	José Antonio Alonso Suárez	PSOE
April 14, 2008	December 22, 2011	Carme Chacón Piqueras	PSOE
December 22, 2011	November 2, 2016	Pedro Morenés y Álvarez de Eulate	Independent (Government of PP)
November 2, 2016	Today	Maria Dolores de Cospedal García	PP

HOW DOES THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE WORK?

The Ministry of Defense in Spain, according to different surveys, is the most valued of all Ministries. In Spain the work carried out by the Armed Forces is one of the most valued by all the work of the Public Administration. This work in defense usually carries much recognition by the citizens.

The Minister of Defense is not usually a military man, he was only the first in the democracy, when he was still in a period of transition. Usually the Ministry of Defense is a civilian, a politician. Since 1977 we have had thirteen ministers, of whom only two have been women, and have been in recent times.

The Ministry of Defense in the political arena is one of the most desired ministries. This is because the Minister in charge is usually not a Minister who goes awry. This Minister is usually well regarded with regard to citizenship. In addition, to add that his work does not depend much of political decisions that he takes the same, but that depends more on the membership to International Organizations and of decisions that already have taken with respect to the security and defense.

In general, whenever ministers are appointed, intrigues are often inflicted by those who occupy each ministry, and when they are revealed by the media, there is always some guess as to the reasons why that candidate has been chosen.

In the case of the Minister Chacón, by the media, the coverage and the amount of information was very great. The mere presence of the Minister in acts of the Ministry, was news. It was the first time this happened, and also in conditions that made it even more striking. She was pregnant.

In the second case with the Minister Cospedal, the stir was not so great. The important thing in the second case, it was no longer a woman, that was a question surpassed.

CARME CHACON

Carme Maria Chacón Piqueras (Barcelona, March 13, 1971-Madrid, April 9, 2017), was a lawyer and university professor rather than political.

It always had a close connection with the PSOE. She was vice-president of the Congress of Deputies during more than half of the eighth legislature, assuming in 2007 the portfolio of Housing of the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero and in 2008, the one of Defense, being the first woman to hold such position in Spain. In the 38 congress of the PSOE, celebrated 4 of February of 2012, presented like candidate to general secretary of the PSOE; His rival was Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, before which he lost by 22 votes. In the extraordinary congress of the PSOE celebrated 26 and 27 of July of 2014 was chosen secretary of International Relations of the PSOE until 2016, when it presented its resignation.

On April 14, 2008, seven months pregnant, she became the first Minister of Defense of Spain and the Spanish Prime Minister who agreed to a pregnant ministry, which was widely spread in the rest of Europe due to its exceptionality. Among his first decisions was his visit to the Spanish troops of the Spanish detachment in Herat (Afghanistan).

During his term of office, the Minister of the Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, replaced the minister and was in charge of the dispatch of ordinary affairs of the Ministry of Defense until his reinstatement

The image reviewing the troops in Afghanistan seven months pregnant became one of the icons of the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Zapatero had put a woman more traditionally masculine at the head of the ministry and had done it knowing that he was in the final stretch of his pregnancy.

She was 37 years old, when she was admitted to the position she declared "Pregnant or not, I was clear that my first obligation was to visit those who are capable of putting their lives at risk for higher values: the freedom of others. That it is harder to be a cashier and to stand all day. I wanted to express the gratitude of society to those who take risks for there to be peace in regions of conflict".

MARÍA DOLORES DE COSPEDAL

María Dolores de Cospedal García (Madrid, December 13, 1965) is a lawyer (state lawyer) and Spanish policy, current Minister of Defense of Spain. She is the secretary general of the Popular Party and the president of the PP of Castilla-La Mancha. From 2011 to 2015 she was president of the Board of Communities of Castilla-La Mancha.

In July of 2015 lost the regional government in spite of to have won the autonomic elections celebrated in May of that same year. Dismissed from power, in November of 2015 it was announced that Maria Dolores de Cospedal would be the head of list of Popular Party to the Congress of the Deputies in the general elections of 20 of December of 2015 by the circumscription of Toledo, being chosen. After the repetition of the elections the 26 of June, it returned to be re-elected deputy. On October 29, Mariano Rajoy was inaugurated as President of the Government of Spain and on

November 3 announced the composition of his second executive, with María Dolores de Cospedal being appointed Minister of Defense. On November 4 he vowed his position before King Philip VI and took office as minister receiving the Defense Portfolio from the hand of his predecessor, Pedro Morenés. She is the second woman in charge after Carme Chacón.

WHAT IS THE "GLASS CEILING"?

It is called a glass ceiling to the veiled limitation of the labor increase of the women inside the organizations. This is a ceiling that limits their professional careers, difficult to overcome and that prevents them from further progress. It is invisible because there are no established or official social laws or devices that impose an explicit limitation on the labor career of women.

The term "glass ceiling barriers" first appeared in a 1986 Wall Street Journal article in the United States. The article described the invisible barriers faced by highly skilled women workers who were unable to reach the highest hierarchical levels in the business world, regardless of their achievements and merits.

Since then, several scholars in sociology have described this concept as referring to women's work since women make up half of the world's population but occupy a disproportionately low percentage of management positions. Authors like Carr-Ruffino (1991), Lynn Martin (1991), Davidson and Cooper (1992), Morrison (1992), Holloway (2002) among others.

The glass ceiling is built on the basis of features that are difficult to detect, so it is not seen and is called glass. This invisible barrier appears when women approach the top of the corporate hierarchy and block the possibility of advancing in their professional career towards managerial and executive positions.

Although the concept was originally used to analyze the careers of women who had had high qualifications in their jobs thanks to their superior educational background and could not ascend because they encountered that invisible top surface or glass ceiling, the metaphor quickly spread To refer to the obstacles that impede the progress of minorities in general: racial minorities, religious minorities, sexual orientation, nationality, etc.

Throughout the 13 years of her work in the forefront of Spanish politics, Carmen Chacón wanted to break the glass ceiling that prevents women from rising to first place in their careers. Chacón got it in several areas. In addition to being the first woman named Defense Minister, she was also the first to arrive at a ministry while pregnant.

SIMILARITIES OR DIFFERENCES?

Between the two women as defense portfolio holders, they can differentiate between two completely different styles. In the analysis of the press material made, from the main Spanish newspapers, the results are very interesting.

The newspapers analyzed have been El País, El Mundo, ABC and the Vanguard, of such newspapers, has analyzed the photograph that has accompanied in the news written, in all those news that had the name of one of the two ministers.

The photographs of most cases were provided by the Ministry of Defense itself, or in one way or another they were managed by the Ministry.

We find the images referring to Minister Chacón, where the vast majority refers to images that seek to make strong their position as a woman in the Ministry, when on the side of the Minister Cospedal, what we find is to generate a masculine image, aseptic .

Both ministers reflect very different images, although both, being of different political parties, have defended the position of women with respect to having responsibility in security and defense areas.

Of note is the image of the Minister Chacón reviewing the Spanish troops in Afghanistan pregnant seven months. That image is iconic of what is the step of the Minister by the ministry. It is the most reproduced and recognized image of the minister. The other most notable image is the style he wore in a tuxedo at the Military Easter, where usually this dress is reserved for men and women wear a long dress. Both images are transgressors to the institutionalized system.

On the death of Carma Chacón the head of Defense Cospedal said that he showed "his respects" to Chacón, "as a Spanish woman" and also as a minister.

It is through the Minister Chacón, for whom the glass ceiling is broken, and the contribution of women is established as the space of peace and international security from the Spanish state itself.

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GENDER IN INSECURITY: WOMEN LEGISLATORS AND MILITARY BUDGETS

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Paper prepared for the Women, Peace, and Security Conference 2017, U.S. Naval War College.

Abstract: Previous research has found that when a higher percentage of women hold legislative office, defense spending is lower in established democracies (Koch and Fulton 2011). However, since this relationship has been studied only in established democracies, existing studies have overlooked an important determinant of military spending that interacts with gender: the domestic security environment. The security environment interacts with gender to affect legislative preferences through both substantive representation and electoral incentives. As has been argued elsewhere (Shea and Christian 2016), women legislators may be particularly sensitive to the gendered costs of war (i.e., dislocation, sexual violence, etc.) and so favor more military action (and, thus, spending) to provide substantive representation for their countrywomen who are threatened by conflict. We present evidence from a cross-national time series panel. The interaction of conflict and women's representation increases military spending. Refinements show that this is driven primarily by the effects of civil conflicts.

Most studies on gender gaps in conflict-related policy preferences occur in North American and European states. American women, for example, were less supportive than men of World War II and the Korean and Vietnamese conflicts (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986), the Gulf War (Bendyna et al. 1996), and U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan and the Iraq War (Huddy et al. 2005). In North America and Europe, security threats revolve around economic or strategic interests, rather than direct military threats within or near their borders. Military policy also frequently concerns overseas interventions and direct and extended deterrence. However, most studies on gender gaps in conflict-related policy preferences do not allow us to consider whether women view the use of force *for self-defense* differently than do men.

In the few studies that examine public opinion in countries with higher levels of security threat, no evidence of a gender gap in preferences over military action and spending exists. Morgan (1996) finds similar conflict attitudes between men and women in Northern Ireland. Inglehart and Norris (2000) report no difference between men and women in political ideology in individual post-communist countries. Tessler and Warriner (1997) and Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant (1999) find no significant gender gap in attitudes toward international conflict in Middle Eastern countries. However, these studies do not capture the full range of security environments as survey data from populations experiencing current conflict is rarely collected.

Thus, current research leaves unanswered whether gender gaps exist among elites or the public in less secure environments. As such, we explore the relationship between women legislators and military spending, mediated by the domestic security environment, in a broad cross-national panel of democracies.

THEORY

If physical and economic vulnerability (Tickner 1992, Sylvester 1994, Confortini 2012) (or motherhood (Conover and Sapiro 1993, Ruddick 1989)) make women more likely than men to want to avoid involvement in war, because they (or their children) are likely to be harmed, how does that desire and self-interest extend to situations where national involvement in war is not avoidable? Preferences over military spending increase more sharply for women than men as the likelihood or the costs of potential conflict increase. Escalating threat of attack by state or non-state actors may prompt women to prefer that the state strengthen its deterrent capability, still to avoid war and some of its costs. Where conflict has begun, similar concerns about war costs should prompt women to make sacrifices to bolster military spending if it increases the probability of quick, decisive victory. Concerns about the death of husbands and sons will shift women from preferring non-involvement to strong preferences for an adequately provisioned army (and the spending required for the purchase of weapons, body armor, etc.), once conflict has started.

Figure 1 graphically represents the posited interaction of gender and the domestic security environment and its effects on women's spending preferences.




Figure 1: Likelihood of Conflict and Increasing Military Priorities of Women

We argue that women legislators and their military preferences are influenced by concerns about both representation and re-election. In terms of representation, women legislators' views are more influenced than men's by the gendered costs of conflict. During and following conflict, sexual violence and impunity are widespread (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Targeted and accidental attacks maim women in fields, preventing their food production and resulting in husbands abandoning wives (Mann et al. 1994). Women and children in refugee camps starve at higher rates than men (Ashford & Huet-Vaughn, 1997). Civil war devastates educational expenditures and enrollment by hurting infrastructure and personnel (Lai and Thyne 2007) and hospitals (Ghobarah et al. 2004).

These concerns are likely to only indirectly impact elite women, those elected to the legislature. Nonetheless, women legislators are more sensitive to the suffering and fears of general populations. Shea and Christian (2016) argue that, even in countries considering foreign interventions, women legislators support military involvement when concerned for the plight of women and children. This effect on women legislators' military preferences should be even stronger regarding their own populations.

Additionally, insensitivity to these costs has potential consequences for women retaining office. Obviously, a conflict of sufficient severity risks a turnover in government due to overthrow or domestic revolt sparked by war-imposed difficulties. In democracies, legislators' constituencies affected by the conflict, or the risk of it spreading, will punish legislators if they perceive an insufficient dedication to resources. In less democratic regimes, failure to respond to these issues threaten entire governments and elite classes. These office-preserving mechanisms interact with women's enhanced sensitivity to the problems producing greater impact on legislative outcomes. Both male and female incumbents face the possibility of loss of office. If women are present in higher numbers in the legislature and are particularly sensitive to conflict's impact, they can discuss these impacts in committee, deliberation, or intra-party discussions to heighten men's awareness, both to the problem and to their self-interest in acting.

OUR HYPOTHESES ARE THEN AS FOLLOWS:

H1: Military expenditures will increase as the percentage of women in the legislature increases in countries experiencing conflict.

H2: The effect of women legislators on military spending will occur in interaction with militarized violence, but not with non-militarized political violence.

H3: The magnitude of the effect of women legislators on military spending will increase as the effect of the conflict on the domestic population increases.

DATA

To test these hypotheses, we use 1988-2009 country-year data on major political violence, women in legislatures, and military spending as a percent of GDP.

Our dependent variable is military expenditure as a percent of GDP, a World Bank World Development Indicator, available for a broad sample of countries, ranging from 0 to 9.2% of

GDP in our sample of democratic countries. The median value is 1.62% of GDP; the mean is 1.8%. This measure allows for straightforward comparisons internationally and across time.¹

Our primary independent variable is the interaction of two measures described below. First is the percentage of women in the lower (or single) house of parliament in a country each year (V-Dem 2016). For the time-period that overlaps with the availability of our dependent variable, this measure ranges from 0% to 47.3%, with a median of just over 12%.

The Center for Systemic Peace's Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset provides measures for domestic security environments, coding episodes of political violence resulting in at least 500 deaths. Each magnitude is assigned a number on an 11-point scale from 0 (no episodes of political violence) to 10 (Extermination and Annihilation). Magnitude scores reflect women's particular sense of vulnerability in insecure environments: effect of violence on human resources; population dislocation; costs to societal networks; damage to environment; damage to infrastructure and resources; and diminished quality of life.

Measures are disaggregated as civil war, civil violence, ethnic war, ethnic violence, international war, and international violence.² The distinction between war and violence is made using "information regarding the degree of militant organization, tactical and strategic characteristics, and expressed level of commitment to the use of violence ... the designation of "war" carries with it a stronger institutional, or institutionalized, component and more definite objectives." This distinction approximates our theoretical distinction between militarized and non-militarized violence. International war and international violence are only coded as non-zero values for a country if the country and its society are directly affected by the violence. According to the codebook, "Countries that engage in military intervention in an episode taking place solely in another country are generally not considered to be directly affected by the violence" (Marshall 2015, 2). Table 1 displays the mean scores, ranges, and percent of countries involved in each type of political violence.

¹ Our analysis excludes Israel for statistical and theoretical reasons. First, it is a clear outlier in terms of military spending. Over this time-period, Israel's mean military spending is 9.8%, which is higher than the upper end of the range for all other countries. Theoretically, Israel's military spending is disproportionately influenced by military aid from the United States, and thus is determined outside the normal legislative budgeting considerations. While other countries also receive military aid from various sources, the data transparency of military assistance from non-U.S. sources is low. We use data on U.S. security aid programs from the organization Security Assistance Monitor (<http://www.securityassistance.org>). It is available beginning for the year 2000. Over this time-period, the democracies receiving the next highest amounts of aid from the United States are Colombia and Mexico. On average between 2000 and 2009, Colombia received less than 30% of the military aid that Israel received and Mexico less than 5% of the military aid received by Israel.

² They also identify wars of independence. Given the period over which the dependent variable is available and exclusion of non-democracies (since it is unclear why or how legislature exert influence over budgets in these environments), this variable drops out of the analysis.

Table 1: Incidence of Major Episodes of Political Violence

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	% of country-years >0*
Civil War	0.048	0	6	1.4%
Ethnic War	0.187	0	8	4.7%
International War	0.016	0	3	<1%
Civil Violence	0.082	0	4	2.5%
Ethnic Violence	0.063	0	4	4.0%
International Violence	0.008	0	2	<1%

As robustness checks, we also use alternate measures of conflict. We employ dichotomous measures of participation in inter- (1.7% of country-years) and intra-state (4.8% of country-years) conflict from Clio Infra (drawing on Brecke (2001)). These measures include all violent conflicts that meet a criterion of 32 or more deaths, representing a much lower level of violence than MEPV's 500-death threshold. The data further differ from MEPV data in that they include minimal involvement in international wars. For example, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are listed as having been involved in international conflict in 1990 and 1991 in the Clio Infra data, but not according to MEPV data. It also does not code any involvement in conflict after 2000. Given the differences in the measures, if both provide evidence in favor of an effect of women in the legislature on military spending during conflict, it aids our hypotheses.

We measure democracy using combined Polity V scores, ranging from 10 (most democratic) to -10 (most autocratic). Conventionally, countries with scores above +6 are considered to have some meaningfully democratic features and those below considered either anocracies or autocracies. Thus, we restrict our primary analyses to country-years where the country received a score of at least 6 on the Polity scale. To test hypothesis 1a, we run identical analyses on the sample of countries with scores below 6, since the link we specify between women, security environment, and military spending to exist, the legislature must be both meaningfully powerful in policy-making and have electoral incentives to respond to their constituencies.

All analyses control for GDP per capita, life expectancy at birth, democratic durability, election years and combined polity scores (V-Dem 2016). We also control for the number of international borders the country has, as it may affect the countries' security environment (MEPV dataset).³ In

³ If all countries had no change in the number of international borders over the time-period examined, this variable would drop out in a fixed effects model. However, because our time-period covers some important changes

robustness checks, we also include additional controls to account for other possible explanations of the relationship we observe.

ESTIMATION STRATEGY

Both the percent of women in the legislature and the types of domestic security challenges correlate with a number of other characteristics of society. This correlation makes it difficult to determine if these variables (or other underlying historical or cultural factors) are driving the observed correlation with military spending. These unobserved unit-specific factors must be modelled to avoid omitted variable bias. A Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978) provides evidence coefficients would be inconsistent unless we account for these unit-specific factors. We, therefore, present the results for an OLS multilevel model with country fixed effects. This model controls for time-invariant factors of a country (over the time period 1988 to 2009), accounting for the higher level of correlation between error terms for the multiple years of observation for the same country.

We write the fixed effect model as

$$\text{Military expenditure (\% GDP)}_{ij} = \beta_1 \text{Female Legislators}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{Female Legislator } ij * \text{Conflict Variables } ij + \beta_8 X_{ij} + \alpha_j + \zeta_i + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

In this analysis, all time invariant country-specific effects are subsumed into α_j (a dummy variable for each country), such that the beta coefficients explain the within-country changes due to changes in levels of conflict and levels of female representation. Year fixed effects are included and denoted by the ζ_i variables. The year controls are important because over time the percentage of women in legislatures has increased while military spending has decreased. Without time-controls, the level of female legislators appears to be significantly and negatively correlated with military expenditure. The interaction terms between female legislators and different types of conflict are equal to 0 if no conflict is present or if the lower house of the legislature lacks females. They take their highest values where there is both intense conflict and a relatively high percent of female legislators. X is a matrix of controls.

RESULTS

Model 1 in Table 2 shows the results of panel OLS fixed effects analysis on the full sample of democracies (as determined by a combined Polity score of 6 or higher) using the combined measures for any type of war (civil, ethnic or international) and any type of violence. Model 2 presents the results for democracies using the dichotomous war variable. Our primary interest in the coefficient on the interaction term Women LegislatorsXWar. Our argument is that the coefficient should be positive and significant, or that, in the presence of conflict, a higher percentage of women legislators should lead to higher levels of military spending. The results for the interaction term do show that military spending increases when there are more women *and* conflict. This is true whether the conflict measure is dichotomous or increasing as the magnitude

in the international system, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the state of Yugoslavia (and these changes are correlated with conflict in several cases), the variable does not drop out of a fixed effect model and we deem it important to include as a control.

of the conflict increases (as measured by the MEPV data), confirming hypotheses 1 and 3. In this broader sample of countries over this shorter time-period, the data do not replicate Koch and Fulton's (2011) result, but, in the absence of conflict, more women in the legislature produce lower levels of spending. The sign is in the correct direction, but the result is not significant.

Substantively, as presented in the table the coefficient may seem small. However, the dependent variable is a percentage of GDP; even fractions of a percent amount to changes in millions or billions of dollars. Furthermore, it is a coefficient on an interaction term of two variables, ranging from 0 to over 30, so the impact on military spending as a percent of GDP can be substantively significant.

For example, if two countries move from no conflict to serious, but low-level warfare (a move from 0 to 4 on the 11-point magnitude scale employed by MEPV coders) and one has no women and the other has the median percentage of women in the country-years included in this sample (about 12%), the country with women will increase military spending by 0.29% of GDP (where the median military expenditure is only 1.62% of GDP) more than the country without.

To better understand the meaning of an interaction between two continuous variables, Figure 2 shows the effects on military spending of four different levels of female legislative representation. There, we choose to represent the quartiles of women's representation in the country-years included in our panel analysis. Thus, we show the effect when there are no women in the legislature and when the legislature is 7.6% female (the 25th percentile of the measure in our sample), 12% female (the median percentage of women in our sample), and 20% female. The four dashed lines show the marginal effects (and the shaded areas the accompanying confidence intervals) of women in the legislature as the magnitude of conflict increases. The graph demonstrates that the greater the representation of women, the more that increasing the level of conflict in the country increases military expenditure.

These analyses, however, do not support Hypothesis 2, as the violence measures indicate that political violence, even if not militarized, also interacts with the percentage of women in the legislature to increase military spending.

Models 3 and 4 replicate models 1 and 2 on the sample of non-democracies and show that the relationship between women in the legislature and conflict does not exist in these cases. This lends credibility to the argument that the results stem from changes in the internal processes of a meaningfully powerful legislature with a meaningful electoral connection to the public.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

As robustness checks, we control for the effects of the chief executive on military spending. Obviously, the executive also has influence over policy (both directly and in his or her role as a party leader with influence over co-partisans in the legislature) and faces electoral incentives to deal with any security threats facing the country. We, thus, control for the executive's party orientation and also whether the executive is female, as previous research has shown that these factors affect military spending. Executive party orientation is coded as 1 for right orientation, 2 for centrist party positions; and 3 for left party orientation. It is expected that increasing values of

this measure will be associated with lower levels of military spending. Data on the presence of female executives are taken from the Worldwide Guide to Women in Leadership (www.guide2womenleaders.com) and includes women heads of state and women heads of government. Democracies have female executives in 11.7% of the country years included in these analyses. We expect that female executives will increase military spending, due to the pressure they face to be “hawkish” (Koch and Fulton 2011). We repeat the analysis in models 1 and 2 from Table 1 with these controls. We repeat the analyses on the sample of non-democracies using the control for female executives, but not partisanship of the executive, because partisanship of the executive is missing for 64% of the non-democratic country-years in our sample and *missingness* is significantly correlated with the country’s level of autocracy, which would significantly bias the results of this analysis. The results are shown in Table 2. These analyses support the findings from the previous section, except that the coefficient on the violence variables are not robust to inclusion of controls for the executive’s characteristics, as predicted in Hypothesis 2.

CONCLUSION

This paper analyzes the effect of women legislators on military spending where military spending is not dedicated to international interventions or extended deterrence, but to close security threats. The analyses demonstrate that, over a broad class of democratic countries, where women hold political power in societies experiencing militarized conflict within or close to their borders, governments dedicate more to military spending than in countries with similar levels of conflict and fewer women policy-makers. We believe that the explanation for this pattern in military spending is that gender gap in preferences for military spending is a function of the domestic security environment. Where risks to the domestic public and infrastructure are remote or non-military in nature, women prefer to buy butter rather than invest in guns. However, given the high gendered costs of militarized threats to domestic society, in women’s presence the tradeoff between the two types of spending becomes much less steep.

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Military expenditure % GDP	Democracy 6-9
% Women in Legislature	0.004 (0.007)
% Women*Intrastate war	0.008 (0.005)*
% Women*Interstate war	0.120 (0.015)***
% Women*Violence	0.047 (0.023)**
Quota for Women (Leg)	0.217 (0.101)**
Election Year	-0.028 (0.048)
durable	0.001 (0.001)
Democracy (Polity)	-0.124 (0.036)***
Autocracy (Polity)	0.132 (0.039)***
GDP per capita	-0.000 (0.000)
Life expectancy at birth	0.007 (0.012)
# of Border	0.263 (0.088)***
Intrastate war	0.074 (0.059)
Interstate war	0.000 (0.000)
Violence	-0.323 (0.207)
_cons	2.158 (0.900)**
R^2	0.33
N	745

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ Multi-level fixed effects model, includes controls for years

OPENING THE DOOR: THE ROLE OF CONFLICT IN SECURITY SECTOR GENDER REFORM¹

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ABSTRACT

Since the passing of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, gender mainstreaming policies - or those that assess the gendered implications of any planned state action with the hope of promoting gender equality - have become increasingly popular in security sector reform (SSR). However, little is understood regarding the systematic patterns of adoption of these reforms. This paper examines the influence of conflict on the adoption of national gender balancing and gender mainstreaming policies in the security sector. Specifically, this study analyzes how the experience of intrastate conflict increases the domestic political will, need, and resources available for security sector gender reforms. Using logistic regression and a unique dataset on security sector gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms between 1988 and 2012, this study strongly demonstrates that conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector compared to non-conflict states. As the first cross-national quantitative examination of the role of conflict in gender security policy adoption, this study advances our understanding of the dynamic processes that influence security sector reform.

Key Words: Security Sector Reform, Gender, Conflict, Post-Conflict
Word Count: 2,992³

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³ Excludes footnotes, tables, and bibliography

In October 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), which promoted women's right to participate in security and peace processes. Governments sought to comply by increasing women's participation in their security forces, establishing specialized gender units, and adopting other security sector gender reforms. However, a great degree of variation exists among countries in the number and character of their security sector gender reforms.⁴ While the progress of individual states has been increasingly documented, little is understood about gendered security sector reform (SSR) cross-nationally.

This paper examines how conflict alters a state's willingness and ability to adopt security sector gender reforms by challenging traditional gender roles, increasing mobilization needs, delegitimizing the security sector, highlighting women's insecurity, and increasing international influence. Using a unique dataset on security sector gender reform, this paper demonstrates that conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict states. Further, it illustrates that the character of security sector gender reform differs slightly in conflict and post-conflict states. Additionally, post-conflict states only became more likely to adopt these policies after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.⁵

GENDERED SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Although women have long participated in security, security sectors remain highly masculinized, both in composition and values (Sjoberg 2007).⁶ However, highly masculinized security sectors are increasingly criticized as less effective, less comprehensive, and more abusive.⁷ As a result, international commitments calling for security sector gender reform have been adopted and governments have committed to integrate more women and women's perspectives into security.⁸

There are many types of gender reforms undertaken by security sectors under the banner of gender mainstreaming.⁹ Gender mainstreaming seeks to break down the masculinized values, hierarchies, and composition of security sectors to create a new institutional culture which values male and female characteristics, perspectives, bodies, and voices equally. Examples of gender mainstreaming in SSR include the recruitment of women, appointment of women into decision-making, establishment of sexual harassment policies, creation of gender equality offices or units,

⁴ The terms "countries" and "states" are used interchangeably in this study.

⁵ In this study, the terms "policies" and "reforms" are used interchangeably since in general, gender mainstreaming policies are reform policies since they challenge existing, primarily male-dominated, norms of the security sector.

⁶ Security sector institutions consist of organizations that have the authority to use force to protect individuals and the state, including the armed forces, police forces, federal agents, border and immigration agents, and intelligence services. The 'security sector' refers to the state's security apparatus, including all the civil and military personnel (Meharg 2010; Jacob 2009).

⁷ See Cohen and Nordas (2013), Nordas and Rustad (2014), Enloe (1989, 2000), Goldstein (2003), Sjoberg and Via (2010), Higate (2004, 2009), Karim and Beardsely (2013, 2017), Karim (2016), and Tickner (1992, 1998, 2005).

⁸ See the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), UNSCR 1325 (2000), UNSCR 1820 (2008), UNSCR 1888 (2009), UNSCR 1889 (2009), UNSCR 1960 (2010), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013), UNSCR 2242 (2015).

⁹ As defined by the UN, gender mainstreaming is "The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels (ECOSOC).

building of female facilities and equipment, gender sensitization training, and creation of National Action Plans (NAP) for UNSCR 1325. One type of gender mainstreaming reform is gender balancing, which specifically seeks to increase women's physical representation relative to men's representation.¹⁰ Gender balancing is one component of gender mainstreaming, but is not sufficient because women's presence alone does not guarantee gender equality (Karim and Beardsley 2017). Therefore, gender balancing must take place with other reforms to change the institutional culture in addition to the physical composition of security personnel.

Despite increased interest in gendered SSR, relatively little is understood about why states adopt gender mainstreaming policies as there is no cross-national, systematic comparison of the adoption of security sector gender reforms.¹¹ A wide range of compliance exists with gendered SSR. For example, women's representation in police and military forces range from 1% to 56% and 0.5% to 26%.¹² Further, only 66 states have adopted NAPs for UNSCR 1325. Finally, a sample of 150 states in 2016 shows that only 54 states had official gender recruitment targets or quotas. This variation highlights a puzzle: why do states adopt security sector gender reforms and why are some states more likely to adopt these reforms than others?

CONFLICT: OPENING DOORS FOR SECURITY SECTOR GENDER REFORM

The conflict and post-conflict environment shifts political will to favor gender mainstreaming in SSR by altering the needs and will of the government, the security sector, and the population. First, conflict leads to increased mobilization into the security sector and its related institutions. As mobilization demand begins to outstrip the availability of men, the government may turn to women to bolster security personnel (Goldstein 2003). For example, Thomas and Bond (2015) examine how insurgent competition led to the recruitment of women despite ideological reluctance. Additionally, there may be greater female mobilization into war-related activities, such as weapons-making and medical care, as seen during World War II (Goldstein 2003). Therefore, as mobilization needs increase, the security sector is more likely to engage in gender reform.

Second, conflict may also challenge traditional gender roles that bar or dissuade women from joining the security sector. Gender roles are most directly challenged by women's participating as combatants, which shatters ideals of feminine innocence, weakness, and nonviolence and demonstrates that women are capable of excelling in security roles (Sjoberg Forthcoming). Therefore, female combatants' experience may degrade gender norms that women are not suitable for the security sector.¹³ Short of direct participation in combat, women's experiences in

¹⁰ Gender balancing includes actions such as recruitment drives that specifically target women, gender quotas, the creation of gendered units or offices, the removal of bans of women from certain positions, the promotion of women to high-ranking offices, and the creation of a NAP for UNSCR 1325.

¹¹ See Huber and Karim (Forthcoming) for a cross-national analysis of gender *balancing* policies in *post-conflict* states. This study moves beyond that original examination by investigating the role of conflict in the process of gendered security sector reform, developing a theory which applies to both conflict-affected and non-conflict affected states, and incorporating a broader range of reforms.

¹² Data based on 2012 figures from the author's random sample of 88 states.

¹³ For example, Karim (2016) found that after the Liberian civil war, Liberians evaluated the competency of Liberian female police officers higher than foreign female peacekeepers potentially because they had directly witnessed Liberian women's strength and abilities as security agents during the conflict.

conflict may challenge traditional gender roles in other ways. For example, during conflict, women often fill male roles, such as economic laborers, family and community leaders, and politicians (Carpenter 2005; Tripp 2015). Further, women may mobilize as part of a peace movement.¹⁴ After conflicts, women may use this experience to gain political representation, such as women's unmatched representation in the Rwandan legislature or the election of the first African female president in Liberia (Thomas and Adams 2010; Berry 2015). Therefore, during and after conflict, women gain influence over their homes, communities, and country, challenging traditional gender roles and demonstrating their agency, increasing the likelihood that women will be deemed capable for security roles.

Third, conflict also contributes to women's insecurity as they are displaced, disconnected from their communities, and economically and physically vulnerable (Bennoune 2007). This insecurity is predominantly expressed through increased threat of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) (Cohen and Nordas 2014; Nordas and Rustad 2013; Manjoo and McRaith 2011; Karim and Beardsley 2016; Karim and Beardsley 2017). Therefore, the security sector may feel obligated to address women's insecurity by undertaking gender mainstreaming.¹⁵ Similarly, the population may distrust the security sector for its participation in destructive conflict. Therefore, the security sector may undertake gender reforms in the hope of leveraging stereotypes that women are less corrupt, less violent, and more concerned about vulnerable populations to distance itself from its conflict behavior (Karim 2016).

Finally, during and after conflict, new actors may gain influence over policymaking. Conflict may weaken policymaking abilities by damaging infrastructure, limiting resources, and increasing political dysfunction, leading states to rely upon foreign donors. Therefore, states, IGOs, and NGOs intervening to end the conflict, prevent conflict resurgence, and assist in reconstruction gain influence over the reforms adopted. International actors may specifically promote security gender mainstreaming due to the norm's growing popularity since UNSCR 1325. For example, Huber and Karim (Forthcoming) and Bush (2011) find that peacekeeping missions increase the likelihood that post-conflict states will adopt security sector gender balancing reforms and legislative gender quotas.

While conflict may provide an opportunity for gender mainstreaming in security, it is not sufficient to ensure gender equality. In many ways, conflict is directly damaging to gender equality.¹⁶ However, this theory examines how normative changes regarding gender mainstreaming in the past twenty years may challenge traditional ideas regarding conflict and gender. Specifically, while previously the WPS norm was underdeveloped and had little support, it is now increasingly important, which may alter state behavior. While the concern that SSR

¹⁴ For example, in Liberia, women famously launched a nonviolent peace campaign, which demanded an end to the civil war and called for more women's participation in peacemaking efforts. Similar women's movements for peace include the Woman's Peace Party in the USA during World War I, Mothers Against Silence in Israel during Israel's war with Lebanon, Women in Black in Israel starting during the Intifada, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina after the Dirty War.

¹⁵ Women's heightened security needs alone may not be sufficient to cause gender reform, but may act as a rallying point around which gender reform advocates organize to pressure the security sector for gendered SSR.

¹⁶ See Goldstein (2003), Enloe (1989, 2000), and Hudson et al. (2013) for arguments that conflict, militarization, and patriarchy are mutually reinforcing.

gender mainstreaming does not actually promote gender equality is valid, this study focuses primarily on adoption. While the larger outcome of these policies is important, this theory is limited to examining which states adopt these policies regardless of effect.¹⁷

Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms than their non-conflict affected counterparts.¹⁸

Hypothesis 1: Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms than non-conflict affected states.

Hypothesis 2: Conflict affected states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict affected states.

However, while both active conflict and post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming and balancing reforms, the expression of these reforms may differ. This is most strongly observed in the increased need for mobilization in conflict states. During conflict, the security sector expands, causing the government to turn to women. In contrast, after conflict, the government may decrease the size of the military, decreasing the need for women.¹⁹

Hypothesis 3: Active conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms compared to post-conflict states.

Similarly, although the need for SSR gender mainstreaming may be great in both conflict and post-conflict states, there may be more awareness, political will, and resources in post-conflict states. After conflict, states may be able to focus more on the equality of the security sector since militarization demands have decreased. Further, after conflict, awareness of SGBV, concerns for legitimacy, and international pressure may increase greatly. Therefore, SSR gender mainstreaming should be especially likely after conflict.

Hypothesis 4: Post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms compared to conflict states.

Finally, while gendered SSR has occurred for decades, UNSCR 1325 represented the first time that gendered SSR was declared to be an international and national obligation.

Hypothesis 5: Active conflict states should be especially likely to adopt SSR gender balancing reforms after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.

Hypothesis 6: Post-conflict states should be especially likely to adopt SSR gender mainstreaming reforms after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.

¹⁷ This may include states which adopt these policies in hopes of improving gender relations and those states that adopt them simply to appease demand. Future research planned by the author will examine how conflict affects the implementation and outcome of these policies.

¹⁸ “Conflict affected” refers to active conflict and post-conflict states.

¹⁹ This may only occur if the government is willing to retain the same troops it used during conflict.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test these hypotheses, this analysis uses a unique cross-national dataset on gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms in 150 states between 1988 and 2016.²⁰ Logistic regression models with state-clustered standard errors are used to account for autocorrelation.²¹

The main dependent variables are *SSR Gender Balance* and *SSR Gender Mainstream*. *SSR Gender Balance* is a dichotomous indicator of whether a gender balancing reform was adopted by the security sector in the state-year. Gender balancing reforms were defined as the adoption or creation of a female recruitment target or quota, female-focused recruitment campaign, gendered office or unit, associations for female security personnel, a NAP for UNSCR 1325, the removal of barriers to women's participation, and the first promotion of women to high-ranking positions.²² This indicator varies from year to year, recording gender balancing only if a reform was adopted *in that year*.²³ This examines whether conflict has any effect on gender reform, rather than the effect's magnitude.²⁴ Gender balancing reforms occur in 15.1% of state-years and in the majority of the states.

SSR Gender Mainstream is a dichotomous variable indicating adoption of a security gender mainstreaming policy in the state-year, defined as any government led or approved reform to increase security sector gender equality or sensitivity to gendered issues.²⁵ All reforms included within *SSR Gender Balance* are included in addition to other reforms, such as gender sensitization trainings, SGBV training, sexual harassment or gender equality policies, the building of female facilities or equipment, and policies for gendered crimes. *SSR Gender Mainstream* also varies from state-year and is coded as 1 in the state-year when a policy is first adopted. 19.6% of state-years across 141 states observed the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms.²⁶ The most reforms adopted by one state is 13.²⁷

²⁰ Countries included in the dataset were chosen randomly. A list of the countries can be found in the appendix. The state-year dataset contains 4,227 observations.

²¹ Alternative model specifications, including Generalized Estimating Equations and Negative Binomial Regressions, can be found in the appendix.

²² Reforms were largely recorded based on newspaper articles or country SSR gender mainstreaming reviews, such as country reports published by the UN or NGOs. This variable expands on the same variable in the Karim, Wagstaff, and Huber (n.d.) dataset, extending it to non-conflict countries, standardizing the yearly range, and altering some coding rules.

²³ This coding not only allows for an examination specifically of adoption patterns, but also is more reliable since it is difficult to determine how long most gender policies are in place.

²⁴ However, an alternative measure of the dependent variable as a count of the number of reforms adopted is used with a negative binomial regression in the appendix to analyze the magnitude of the effect. Further, pending the collection of further data, future studies should examine the gender reformed status of the security sector.

²⁵ This coding excludes programs supported NGOs without the government's direct support and collaboration. This was done to ensure that the variable only recorded programs that were directly supported by the government, rather than programs that are done independently from or without the involvement of the government.

²⁶ It should be noted that instances of gender mainstreaming are likely to be underreported compared to gender balancing. However, there does not appear to be any systematic country differences in the degree of underreporting.

²⁷ The correlation between *SSR Gender Balance* and *SSR Gender Mainstream* is 0.85. The high correlation is expected given that gender balancing reforms are part of gender mainstreaming reforms and because it is likely that states that adopt gender balancing reforms are also more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms.

Two sets of independent variables are used. The first is a dichotomous indicator of whether the state-year is “conflict affected.” *Conflict Affected* indicates the state-year was either experiencing civil conflict with 25 battle deaths or had experienced conflict within ten years (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This variable is lagged by one year. About 39% of state-years are conflict-affected. The second set of independent variables, *Active Conflict* and *Post-Conflict*, indicate whether the state is experiencing an active conflict with more than 25 battle deaths or not and whether the state has experienced a conflict within 10 years but is not currently experiencing conflict.²⁸ These variables are lagged by one year. Around 19.2% of observations are active conflict and 19.6% are post-conflict. Further, *UNSCR 1325* indicates whether the state-year is after the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000.²⁹

Control variables include the number of years since Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) ratification, the fertility rate,³⁰ regime type,³¹ state-year transition to democracy, the percentage GDP per capita growth, and whether the state was majority Muslim.³² All controls are lagged by one year. To account for autocorrelation, cubic polynomials of the number of the years since the previous gender balancing or mainstreaming reform was adopted are included (Carter and Signorino 2010).³³ Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether large-scale, non-gendered SSR was adopted in the state-year is included for a sub-set of states to account for the possibility that conflict-affected states are simply more open to SSR.³⁴ This variable is only available for a random sample of 2,473 state-years.³⁵ Results are presented with and without this variable.

²⁸ Alternative measures of post-conflict, namely post-conflict as ending five years after a conflict ends or as a permanent state, are included in the robustness checks.

²⁹ 2000 is not included in the dummy variable because UNSCR 1325 was adopted in October, meaning that most states would not have had time to incorporate gender mainstreaming policies by the end of the year.

³⁰ As a robustness check, several alternative measures for gender equality are used, including female-to-male secondary school ratios, female legislative representation, and labor force ratios.

³¹ Polity II score (Marshall, Gur, and Jagers 2015)

³² The World Religion's Dataset only includes data on the percentage of Muslims within a country in five year intervals. The coding recorded at each interval was continued for the next four years until the next interval. Since this is a dichotomous interval and the percent of the population which practices Islam is unlikely to change rapidly within a four-year period, this coding is likely to be accurate.

³³ Additional robustness checks include the use of these variables as time variable dummies and the use of a generalized estimation equation (GEE) without time variables. The results remain consistent.

³⁴ Non-gendered SSR was defined as the establishment of a national or institutional plan to reform an institution of the security sector, the creation or dissolution of a security institution or office, the establishment of a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program, the institution of an oversight committee, or the creation of funding programs to improve the security sector.

³⁵ A list of countries from which some state-years are included is in the appendix.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender Balance	4,225	0.151	0.358	0	1
Gender Mainstream	4,224	0.196	0.397	0	1
Conflict Affected	4,227	0.388	0.487	0	1
Active Conflict	4,227	0.192	0.394	0	1
Post Conflict	4,227	0.196	0.397	0	1
CEDAW Years	4,198	13.689	9.832	0	37
Fertility	4,020	3.572	1.801	1.085	8.789
UNSCR 1325	4,227	0.561	0.496	0	1
Democracy	3,847	2.185	6.729	-10	10
Democratic Transition	3,831	0.014	0.117	0	1
GDPPC Growth	3,980	2.020	6.744	-64.996	140.501
Muslim Majority	4,227	0.283	0.451	0	1
Non-Gender SSR	2,473	0.414	0.493	0	1
Time Gender Balance	4,227	5.896	6.247	0	28
Time Gender Balance ²	4,227	73.787	134.175	0	784
Time Gender Balance ³	4,227	1,221.360	3,071.580	0	21,952
Time Gender Mainstream	4,224	5.202	5.943	0	28
Time Gender Mainstream ²	4,224	62.368	122.428	0	784
Time Gender Mainstream ³	4,224	1,004.171	2,744.232	0	21,952

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results strongly demonstrate that intrastate conflict increases the probability that a state adopts security sector gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms. Table 2 shows the results of logistic regression models 1 through 4.³⁶

Models 1 and 2 strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2. *Conflict Affected* is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating active and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender balancing or gender mainstreaming reforms. Substantively, a conflict-affected state is 8% more likely to adopt a gender balancing reform, increasing the probability of gender mainstreaming policy adoption from 37% to 45%. Model 3 similarly supports Hypothesis 3. Active conflict states are statistically more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms than non-conflict states, increasing the likelihood of adoption from 39% to 50%, while post-conflict states do not have a statistically significant relationship with gender balancing reforms. Model 4 demonstrates that both conflict and post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms than non-conflict states.

³⁶ Models 1 and 2 examine whether conflict affected states are more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector. Model 3 tests whether conflict states are especially likely to adopt gender balancing reforms compared to post-conflict states. Finally, Model 4 tests whether post-conflict states are especially more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming policies. A table of the marginal effects can be found in the Appendix.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results: Conflict and Gender Security Sector Reform

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Gender Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)	Gender Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
Conflict Affected	0.32*** (0.12)	0.35*** (0.10)	0.46*** (0.15)	0.41*** (0.13)
Active Conflict			0.20 (0.15)	0.31** (0.12)
Post Conflict			0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
CEDAW Years	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)
Fertilitylag1	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)	0.53*** (0.16)	0.72*** (0.14)
UNSCR 1325	0.52*** (0.17)	0.72*** (0.14)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Democracylag	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.41)	-0.02 (0.37)
Democratic Transition	0.003 (0.41)	-0.01 (0.36)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.0002 (0.01)
GDPPC Growthlag1	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.09 (0.16)	0.07 (0.15)
Muslim Majority	0.08 (0.16)	0.06 (0.14)	-0.19*** (0.06)	
Time Gender Balance	-0.19*** (0.06)		0.01* (0.01)	
Time Gender Balance ²	0.01* (0.01)		-0.0002 (0.0002)	
Time Gender Balance ³	-0.0002 (0.0002)			
Time Gender Mainstream		-0.24*** (0.05)		-0.24*** (0.05)
Time Gender Mainstream ²		0.01** (0.01)		0.01** (0.01)
Time Gender Mainstream ³		-0.0003 (0.0002)		-0.0003 (0.0002)
Constant	-1.91*** (0.25)	-1.61*** (0.20)	-1.93*** (0.24)	-1.62*** (0.20)
Observations	3,490	3,488	3,490	3,488
R ²	0.09	0.15	0.09	0.15
χ ²	175.50*** (df = 11)	344.04*** (df = 11)	178.53*** (df = 12)	344.58*** (df = 12)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

However, in contrast to expectations, the size of this effect is larger in active conflict states than post-conflict states. While non-conflict states have about a 33% probability of gender mainstreaming reform, conflict and post-conflict states have a 43% and 40% likelihood (this is not a statistically significant difference between active conflict and post-conflict states).

Models 5 and 6 demonstrate interesting results. First, Model 5 examines whether SSR gender balancing and mainstreaming become more likely after the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Surprisingly neither conflict nor post-conflict states are more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms before or after UNSCR 1325 than non-conflict states. This may indicate that gender balancing reforms are driven primarily by need in conflict-affected states and therefore, are unaffected by the adoption of UNSCR 1325. Interestingly, after the adoption of UNSCR 1325, non-conflict states do become statistically more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms, which may imply that UNSCR 1325 was successful in changing the behavior of non-conflict states. Model 6 demonstrates that while neither conflict nor post-conflict states were more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms before the adoption of UNSCR 1325, post-conflict states are significantly more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms after 2000. It appears that UNSCR 1325 may have had success in increasing the adoption of these policies in post-conflict states. As seen in Figure 1, before UNSCR 1325, post-conflict states and non-conflict states had a 37% probability of adopting gender mainstreaming reforms. After UNSCR 1325, post-conflict

Table 3: Logistic Regression Results: Conflict and UNSCR 1325 Interaction Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Gender Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(5)	(6)
Active Conflict	0.27 (0.26)	0.18 (0.24)
Post Conflict	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.04 (0.22)
UNSCR 1325	0.37** (0.19)	0.54*** (0.17)
CEDAW Years	0.01* (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)
Fertilitylag1	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.07*** (0.03)
Democracylag	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
Democratic Transition	-0.03 (0.41)	-0.04 (0.37)
GDPPC Growthlag1	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Muslim Majority	0.08 (0.16)	0.06 (0.15)
Time Gender Balance	-0.18*** (0.06)	
Time Gender Balance ²	0.01* (0.01)	
Time Gender Balance ³	-0.0002 (0.0002)	
Time Gender Mainstream		-0.23*** (0.05)
Time Gender Mainstream ²		0.01** (0.01)
Time Gender Mainstream ³		-0.0003 (0.0002)
Active Conflict *UNSCR 1325	0.29 (0.31)	0.34 (0.28)
Post Conflict *UNSCR 1325	0.41 (0.26)	0.48** (0.24)
Constant	-1.83*** (0.25)	-1.49*** (0.21)
Observations	3,490	3,488
R ²	0.09	0.15
χ^2 (df = 14)	181.14***	348.82***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

states have a 62% probability of adoption. Further, conflict states are not more likely to adopt either gender mainstreaming or gender balancing reforms after UNSCR 1325, indicating that conflict states may continue prioritize traditional security concerns.

Finally, Models 7 through 11 demonstrate that gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms appear to be adopted independently from non-gender SSR programs. The results remain consistent with those in Table 2 with *Conflict Affected*, *Active Conflict*, and *Post-Conflict* increasing the probability of gender mainstreaming and gender balancing reforms.




Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities Plot: Post-Conflict, UNSCR 1325, and SSR Gender Mainstreaming

Table 4: Logistic Regression Results: Non-gender SSR Sub-Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Gender Balance (7)	Gender Mainstream (8)	Gender Balance (9)	Gender Mainstream (10)
Conflict Affected	0.41*** (0.15)	0.53*** (0.14)	0.55*** (0.17)	0.58*** (0.16)
Active Conflict			0.31 (0.20)	0.50*** (0.17)
Post Conflict			0.12 (0.14)	0.01 (0.13)
Non-Gender SSR	0.17 (0.13)	0.03 (0.12)		0.01 (0.01)
CEDAW Years	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Fertilitylag1	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
UNSCR 1325	0.62*** (0.22)	0.91*** (0.18)	0.63*** (0.21)	0.92*** (0.18)
Democracylag	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Democratic Transition	0.10 (0.45)	0.18 (0.40)	0.08 (0.45)	0.17 (0.40)
GDPPC Growthlag1	-0.001 (0.01)	0.0003 (0.01)	0.0001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
Muslim Majority	0.05 (0.19)	-0.005 (0.17)	0.06 (0.19)	-0.002 (0.17)
Time Gender Balance	-0.18** (0.08)		-0.18** (0.08)	
Time Gender Balance ²	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	
Time Gender Balance ³	-0.0001 (0.0003)		-0.0001 (0.0003)	
Time Gender Mainstream		-0.21*** (0.08)		-0.21*** (0.08)
Time Gender Mainstream ²		0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
Time Gender Mainstream ³		-0.0001 (0.0002)		-0.0001 (0.0002)
Constant	-2.24*** (0.40)	-2.01*** (0.37)	-2.26*** (0.39)	-2.01*** (0.37)
Observations	2,086	2,086	2,086	2,086
R ²	0.11	0.17	0.12	0.17
χ ²	139.47*** (df = 12)	230.57*** (df = 12)	141.41*** (df = 13)	230.82*** (df = 13)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

The results generally remain robust to the operationalization of post-conflict as a permanent state and as lasting five years. However, when post-conflict is operationalized as 5 years, in Model 5 neither conflict nor post-conflict states have significant interactions with UNSCR 1325 and in Model 6, both have a significant interaction. Finally, when operationalized as a permanent state, active conflict states have a significant interaction in both Models 5 and 6, whereas post-conflict states do not. Additionally, an alternative measure of gender mainstreaming which excludes reforms that primarily recruit more women produced consistent results except in Model 4 as *Conflict* loses its significance and *Post-Conflict* increases in magnitude, which supports Hypothesis 4.³⁷ Further the models are robust to GDP instead of GDPPC Growth, alternative measures for gender equality,³⁸ majority Catholic or Christian controls, communist controls, regional controls, an individual empowerment index (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014), and conflict controls, such as conflict intensity,³⁹ termination, and previous conflict history (Kreutz 2010). Additionally, the results remain robust without state clustered standard errors, the use of a Generalized Estimating Equation, and when a Negative Binomial Model is used to examine the effect of conflict on the number of reforms adopted.⁴⁰

The results do appear sensitive to the operationalization of conflict. With a threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in intrastate conflicts (Sarkees and Wayman 2010), active conflict states lost significance in Models 3 and 4. However, when both interstate and intrastate conflicts with 1,000 battle deaths (Reiter, Stam and Horowitz Forthcoming) are included, the results are consistent, except active conflict states lose their significance in Model 4. These results underscore that even low intensity conflicts prompt gender reforms.

CONCLUSION

This study is the first cross-national, quantitative analysis of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming policies in the security sector. In the past fifteen years, gender equality has been increasingly recognized as vital to international and national security. These findings demonstrate that conflict-affected states are more likely to adopt gender reforms in SSR.

These findings hold important theoretical and policy implications. First, they demonstrate that conflict can sometimes act as a powerful agent of social change. Second, the results underscore that security gender reform may have great implications for civilians, the state, and the international community as adoption may improve responses to SGBV, improve relations with civilians, increase gender equality, and decrease state violence. Finally, the findings indicate the rise of a new international norm and some success of UNSCR 1325 by highlighting that states are attempting to incorporate more women into security and become more responsive to women's differing security needs, wants, and challenges.

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³⁷ This meant that recruitment campaigns, female promotion, and recruitment gender quotas or targets were excluded

³⁸ Such as women's legislative representation, female-to-male secondary school and labor force ratios, and an index of women's rights from the CIRI human rights dataset

³⁹ Active conflict states lose significance.

⁴⁰ The GEE model was fit with an AR-1 correlation structure.

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