




U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

College of Distance Education

## Fleet Seminar Program

# Strategy and War

Academic Year 2025 - 2026 Syllabus



**CDE**

College of Distance Education  
Strategy and Policy Department





**COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION  
FLEET SEMINAR PROGRAM  
STRATEGY AND WAR COURSE  
AY 2025-26 SYLLABUS  
FOREWORD**

This syllabus contains both an overview and a detailed description of the Strategy and War Course. Adapted from the College of Naval Command and Staff curriculum for use in the nonresident Fleet Seminar Program of the Naval War College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments, reading, and study guide material for class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	2
SECTION I: COURSE DESCRIPTION .....	4
1. INTRODUCTION .....	4
2. COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT .....	4
3. STUDENT OUTCOMES .....	6
4. COURSE THEMES.....	7
5. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS FOR STRATEGY AND WAR.....	12
6. COURSE METHODOLOGY.....	15
7. COURSE FORMAT .....	16
8. COURSE ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING .....	18
9. ACADEMIC HONOR CODE .....	26
10. ATTENDANCE.....	28
11. TEXTBOOKS.....	28
12. NWC LIBRARY SERVICES.....	29
13. COURSE CATALOG.....	29
SECTION II: SEMINAR MEETING SCHEDULE .....	30
SM 1 – Introduction (1 – 4 September) .....	30
I. MASTERS OF WAR.....	32
SM 2 – Lecture (9 – 11 September).....	40
SM 3 – Discussion (15 – 18 September) .....	41
SM 4 – Discussion (22 – 25 September) .....	43
SM 5 – Discussion (29 September – 2 October).....	45
II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.....	47
SM 6 – Lecture (7 – 9 October).....	54
SM 7 – Discussion (13 – 16 October).....	55
SM 8 – Discussion (20 – 23 October).....	57
III. THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE .....	59
SM 9 – Lecture (28 – 30 October).....	66
SM 10 – Discussion (3 – 6 November).....	67
SM 11 – Discussion (10 – 13 November).....	69
IV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.....	71
SM 12 – Lecture (18 – 20 November).....	78
SM 13 – Discussion (1 – 4 December) .....	79
V. THE FIRST WORLD WAR.....	81
SM 14 – Lecture (9 – 11 December) .....	90
SM 15 – Discussion (15 – 18 December).....	91
SM 16 – Discussion (5 – 8 January).....	93
VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE .....	95
SM 17 – Lecture (13 – 15 January) .....	102
SM 18 – Discussion (19 – 22 January).....	103

	SM 19 – Discussion (26 – 29 January) .....	105
VII.	THE PACIFIC WAR .....	107
	SM 20 – Lecture (3 – 5 February) .....	115
	SM 21 – Discussion (9 – 12 February) .....	116
	SM 22 – Discussion (16 – 19 February) .....	118
VIII.	THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953 .....	120
	SM 23 – Lecture (24 – 26 February) .....	128
	SM 24 – Discussion (2 – 5 March) .....	129
IX.	THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975 .....	131
	SM 25 – Lecture (10 – 12 March) .....	139
	SM 26 – Discussion (16 – 19 March) .....	140
	SM 27 – Discussion (23 – 26 March) .....	142
X.	THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN’S IRAQ, 1990-1998 .....	144
	SM 28 – Lecture (31 March – 2 April) .....	150
	SM 29 – Discussion (6 – 9 April) .....	151
XI.	THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR .....	153
	SM 30 – Lecture (14 – 16 April) .....	161
	SM 31 – Discussion (20 – 23 April) .....	162
XII.	THE CHINA CHALLENGE .....	164
	SM 32 – Lecture (28 – 30 April) .....	172
	SM 33 – Discussion (4 – 7 May)   Distribute Final Exam .....	173
XIII.	RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT .....	174
	SM 34 – Discussion (11 – 14 May)   Submit Final Exam .....	178
 <b>SECTION III: ANNEXES</b> .....		179
	ANNEX A: COURSE CALENDAR .....	179
	ANNEX B: ACTIVE LEARNING EXERCISES .....	182
	ANNEX C: GUIDE TO ESSAY PREPARATION .....	199
	ANNEX D: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY GUIDANCE .....	204
	ANNEX E: STUDENT END-OF-COURSE SAMPLE CRITIQUE .....	205
	ANNEX F: CJCS MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY .....	210

## ***SECTION I: COURSE DESCRIPTION***

### ***1. INTRODUCTION***

Education at the Naval War College (NWC) is in keeping not only with the College's mission and objectives, but also with the program for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). The resident intermediate-level curriculum centers around three trimester courses: (1) Strategy and War (S&W), (2) Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM), and (3) Joint Maritime Operations (JMO). Each course is designed to increase students' capacity to think critically, and to analyze the elements of decisions.

This syllabus is provided for students in the S&W FSP course. In both purpose and scope, this course is an adaptation of the S&W course offered by the College of Naval Command and Staff at Newport. Classes are conducted on a level equivalent to a university graduate school, and the course meets the high academic standards demanded by the NWC, as well as those required for accreditation by the New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE).

The course is one academic year (34 sessions) in length. Participants are exposed to a Service College educational experience similar to that of resident students in Newport, including lectures and peer-group interaction in a seminar environment. Like its resident counterpart, the FSP is certified for JPME Phase I credit and for an M.A. degree.

### ***2. COURSE OBJECTIVES AND CONTENT***

The S&W course teaches students to think strategically. Strategy is the relationship between war's purpose, objective, ways, and means. The aim of the course is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best serve to achieve overall strategic and national objectives. Students will be asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, a range of potential strategies, and the strategic effects of joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

The task for strategists and planners in translating operational outcomes into enduring strategic results is never easy or straightforward. The S&W course examines how the overall strategic environment shapes operational choices and outcomes. In turn, the course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. Operational success in war, for example, might open up new strategic opportunities. Operational failures might close off promising strategic courses of action.

This interaction between the operational use of military force and strategic outcomes can lead to unanticipated results. The history of warfare provides many examples of lopsided military victories that were largely unforeseen by planners. The commitment of large numbers of forces and huge resources, however, cannot ensure strategic success. Unanticipated second- and third-order effects time and again frustrate planners, who seek to dominate the battlefield and the course of operations.

Of course, in war, the enemy always seeks to frustrate the best-laid plans and impose high risks and costs on operations. The S&W course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by those engaged in the fighting. A skillful adversary seeks to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Further, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that frustrates decisive outcomes. Skilled strategists and war planners understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome. The S&W course gives critical attention to how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is the test of war. Critical strategic thinking serves as the hallmark of the S&W course. Admiral James Stavridis, a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, notes:

The armed forces have always needed independent-minded officers who dare to read, think, write, and publish the innovative ideas that can change the course of history. Now, as America enters an era of international flux and budgetary stress reminiscent of the interwar years, the services need skilled, outspoken strategic thinkers more than ever.<sup>1</sup>

The S&W course uses a unique interdisciplinary approach to strategy. The course integrates the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, along with military factors from the profession of arms – such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics – into a coherent approach that provides students with a conceptual frame of reference to analyze in a systematic way complex strategic problems and formulate military strategies to address them.

The curriculum consists of two core components: a study of foundational theories of war and analysis of key case studies. The works of prominent strategic thinkers – Carl von Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Julian Corbett, Mao Tse-Tung, and David Galula – provide a sound foundation on which the course builds an analytical framework that students can use to understand the interrelationship between the realms of strategy and operations. The influence of these classic works on strategy cannot be denied. General Colin Powell, reflecting on his education, wrote: “That wise Prussian Karl [sic] von Clausewitz was an awakening for me. His *On War*, written 106 years before I was born, was like a beam of light from the past, still illuminating present-day military quandaries.”<sup>2</sup> The case studies provide a means to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic planners and military leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) addressed the problems associated with the use of force to attain national objectives. The case studies highlight many different types of war and cover a wide range of strategies and operations. This in-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also about those that might emerge in the future.

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<sup>1</sup> Correspondence between Admiral Stavridis and Professor James Holmes, October 10, 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 207.

Strategic leadership and operational command in wartime figure prominently in the S&W course. This course examines the leadership and actions of some of history's most famous military leaders. Studying these major historic figures provides insight into the recurrent problems that confront senior military leaders and planners in crafting strategies and carrying out operations in wartime. The effects of enemy operations, in particular, shape the range of strategic and operational courses of action open to those holding command in wartime. Success in wartime requires, too, that leaders and planners overcome the problems of uncertainty and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction of politics and strategy with operational realities.

The S&W course addresses: Intermediate-level Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) for JPME established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see [Annex E](#)); additional areas of emphasis put forward in the United States Navy's guidance on professional military education; the intent articulated by the President of the Naval War College; and strategic challenges highlighted by the Department of Defense. The S&W course also reflects the experience and judgment of the Naval War College faculty and assessments offered by the students.

At a time when the country and global community face daunting security challenges, the need for levelheaded strategic analysis and clear guidance is of the utmost importance. The late Congressman Ike Skelton maintained: "*This Nation does not have enough strategists.*"<sup>3</sup> The goal of the S&W course is to educate joint warfighters, who are strategically minded and skilled at critical analysis.

### ***3. STUDENT OUTCOMES***

The Naval War College's goal is to educate tomorrow's leaders and produce graduates who are proficient in outcomes that will make them more effective participants in the decision-making process at a major national security organization such as a Combatant Command, Service Staff, Joint Staff, or equivalent within the interagency arena. The course utilizes an outcomes-based learning methodology to produce graduates capable of applying select outcomes when conducting analysis of complex real-world security and strategic issues.

The outcomes are listed in [Annex F](#) of this syllabus (Joint Learning Areas (JLAs), Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs), and Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)). The CLOs are shown third in [Annex F](#) because they flow from the PLOs, which, in turn, flow from the JLAs. But the CLOs are really the focus of the course: They represent the Naval War College's expectations for those who successfully complete the S&W course.

In paragraph D of each case study overview, we list the specific CLOs, PLOs and JLAs that are supported by the case study.

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<sup>3</sup> The Honorable Ike Skelton, U.S. House of Representatives, "Family and Future: Five Assignments for Future Leaders," *Military Review* (July-August 2006): 3.

#### **4. COURSE THEMES**

The Strategy and Policy Department has developed nine related themes for use in the Strategy and War Course. These themes represent neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of “school solutions,” or conventional wisdom. War is much too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to such simple things as formulas or algorithms. Rather, the course themes supply sets of questions to provoke thought and discussion. They will be used throughout the course because they illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes are not designed to provide answers. Rather, they furnish overarching context for analysis and decision making. These themes constitute a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with *the process* of matching strategy and operations and those concerning *the environment* in which that process takes place.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>S&amp;W COURSE THEMES</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE PROCESS:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS</li><li>2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS</li><li>3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR</li><li>4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS</li><li>5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION</li><li>6. WAR TERMINATION</li></ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS THE ENVIRONMENT:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>7. MULTINATIONAL ARENA</li><li>8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT</li><li>9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES</li></ol>
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#### **MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE PROCESS**

##### **1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS**

Did the belligerents understand and spell out political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to reconsider the effort if it became too costly? Did leaders anticipate and manage costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth its likely costs and risks? How well did the belligerents build support for their aims and strategy at home and abroad?

Did the political leadership provide the military with strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict the use of force, and, if so, with what impact on chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent's political and military objectives? What assumptions did political and military leaders make about how attaining military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent believe its operations would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and operations support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

## **2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS**

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? How available was intelligence to leaders who needed it? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions? Was intelligence collection and assessment shaped by social, ideological, or racial biases?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the character of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic and operational plans informed by the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did plans rely upon intelligence, deception, surprise, psychological operations, and strategic communication? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? To what degree did preconceived ideas about the adversary distort intelligence and planning? Did the initial plans consider problems of war termination?

## **3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR**

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders consider operational, logistical, or other constraints on the deployment and employment of instruments of war?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common

assumptions about how force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations hindered integration of different forms of military power?

How did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation or changes in information technology? What role did influence operations and strategic communications play?

#### **4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS**

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a vision of the desired end-state, an accurate assessment, and understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander's intent? Were operations joint and combined? Did operational leaders exploit opportunities, parry or counter enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations maximize the campaign's strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force? To what degree did information operations and strategic communications affect the outcome of the campaigns?

#### **5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION**

How well did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the character of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its enemies fight on its own terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents react to enemy operations and adjust to fog and friction? How did information operations affect the process of reassessment and adaptation?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater, did its decision signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate

in the original theater, or an effort to seize a new opportunity created during the war? Did it make sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

How did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational reassessment of political objectives and the military means available?

## **6. WAR TERMINATION**

Did either belligerent squander opportunities to bring an end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side's operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did any antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory or attack to maintain pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor's political objectives? Did the closing operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? To what degree was the defeated state reincorporated into the international system?

To what extent did the relationship among the political and military leaders contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the character of the war affect the durability of the settlement? How did the populations of the victor and the defeated affect the peace settlement? Did the victor maintain sufficient strength and resolve to enforce the peace?

## **MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS: THE ENVIRONMENT**

## **7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA**

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from allies? How successful were these efforts, and why? Did belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations while sharing burdens, and what were the consequences if not? How did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify or degrade the coalition? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the actions of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

## **8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT**

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? Did their organizations facilitate planning, training for, and executing joint and combined operations? Did a process exist to coordinate military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities? If there was rivalry among military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy?

How did civil-military relations contribute to strategic success or failure? Were relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and with what consequences? Did a lack of clarity or consistency in political aims affect the civil-military relationship? How did political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk? Did the actions of civil and military leaders result in the erosion of the institutions that underpinned their political system?

## **9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES**

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence strategy, operations, and military organization? Did a contender display a "strategic culture," or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? How did ideology affect the war's course and outcome? If the war involved competition for political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage? How did social divisions affect force structure and military operations?

Was the relationship among a belligerent's government, people, and military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations? If so, were they designed with consideration of the culture of the target audiences? Did each belligerent's military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends—periodic successes—to maintain support among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war? Was either side able to exploit social divisions in the opposing population?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership's effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?

## 5. KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS FOR STRATEGY AND WAR

In this course, precise definitions are important. Several are provided below:

**Doctrine** - Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive. Though neither policy nor strategy, doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.

**Fabian Strategy** - A strategy of wearing down the enemy by limiting combat to harassing attacks while simultaneously avoiding any decisive engagement.

The term derives from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verruscosus (agnomen, Cunctator, which means "the delayer"), a Roman military leader who employed this strategy against Hannibal and the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War. Many Romans, desirous of a full-scale battle, opposed Fabius' strategy. When he stepped down as dictator in 216 B.C., the policy was discarded, resulting in the Romans' disastrous defeat at Cannae. The Romans then returned to Fabius' strategy, which laid the foundation for Rome's eventual victory.

Clausewitz discusses Fabian strategy: "All campaigns that are known for their so-called temporizing, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, were calculated primarily to destroy the enemy by making him exhaust himself."<sup>4</sup>

Alexander Hamilton also discusses the Americans' use of a Fabian strategy during the War for American Independence: "I know the comments that some people will make on our Fabian conduct. It will be imputed either to cowardice or weakness: But the more discerning, I trust, will not find it difficult to conceive that ... we should not play a desperate game ... of a single cast of the die. The loss of one general engagement may effectually ruin us, and it would certainly be folly to hazard it...."<sup>5</sup>

**Information Operations** - The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting

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<sup>4</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, **On War**, ed. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1989), 385.

<sup>5</sup> Harold G. Syrett ed., **The Papers of Alexander Hamilton** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 14-15.

our own. This includes electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, and military information support operations.

***National Goals, Objectives, and Interests*** - The combination of resources, conditions, and elements of national power and prestige that determine the viability of a nation and its relative status among nations. Please note that goals and objectives can be very distinct from interests, as aims can be much broader than interests; interests should relate directly to the viability of a nation.

***Net Assessment*** - A structured analysis of the elements and resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national goals, objectives, and interests. The interactive comparison of belligerents' goals; degree of commitment of personnel, material and temporal resources; military capability; public support for the conflict; and the identification of one's own and opponent's center(s) of gravity. The purpose of a net assessment is to gain knowledge of one's own side, as well as that of all other belligerents in a war (Sun Tzu's famous dictum, "know the enemy, know yourself") with the intent of protecting one's own side and increasing the vulnerability of the enemy side.

***Operational Art*** - The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the Joint Force Commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war.

***Policy*** - The articulation of national goals, objectives, and interests as related to the international environment and the manner to be pursued. In the S&W course, the terms unlimited objective and limited objective (or aim/goal) will be used in a specific manner; this usage will be discussed in a subsequent section entitled "Political Objectives and Military Means."

***Political Objectives and Military Means*** - In this course, the terms "policy" and "political objective/goal/aim" refer only to the political aim that a belligerent wants to achieve by military force. There are two types of aims: unlimited and limited. An unlimited objective is one in which a belligerent seeks to overthrow an opponent's political authority/government and replace it with an alternate form of government (i.e., "regime change"). A limited objective (goal/aim) is anything less than that, such as trading rights, taking control of a certain piece of territory, or gaining access to water.

In this course, the terms "means" or "level of effort (LOE)" will be used to refer to the amount of effort that a belligerent exerts to achieve a political goal. When describing "means" or LOE, students should use the terms "partial" or "minimal" to express the lower end of the "means" scale, and the term "maximal" to describe the upper end of the scale. Accordingly, students should avoid using the term "total" or "total war" to describe effort, because that term is used frequently to include assumptions about both the political goal and the means exerted to achieve a political goal. Thus, using this specific terminology will help ensure clarity of meaning with regard to political goals and the level of effort to achieve them.

It is helpful to place the relative importance that nations attach to political objectives in war on a continuum as well as the likely level of national commitment or means to achievement of those objectives. One should place both one's own and enemy objectives and means on a continuum to evaluate the relative importance of a military objective and the portion of a nation's resources and time that it is likely to expend to get it. Always remember that warfare is an interactive process and the level of commitment that each side in a conflict is willing to expend is as much a matter of perception as of reality. Some unlimited objectives can be won quickly and with little expenditure of national means while some limited objectives are almost unobtainable against a foe that is willing to expend maximal national resources for as long as it takes to reach its objectives.

**OBJECTIVES**




**MEANS**




The below graphics demonstrate the "Problem of Perspective" in the Vietnam conflict, and as such, may prove helpful in visualizing the evaluation of contending states' commitment to the war effort. Developing such evaluations for each of the case studies highlights implications for strategy.

**By Means or Effort:**



## By Political Objective:



**Strategy** - Unless otherwise noted, the term “strategy” in S&W means the military component of strategy. Implicit in strategy is a desired end state that will result in achievement of the political objective(s) for which military force has been employed.

**Tactics** - The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use the full potentialities.

**War Termination** - The application of strategic leverage to induce an adversary to accept one’s political objectives, either by application of decisive force, or negotiation directed at concluding hostilities on mutually acceptable terms, at minimum time and cost, both to be followed by a settlement seeking enduring peace on favorable terms.

## 6. COURSE METHODOLOGY

This course of study uses a series of historical case studies to demonstrate aspects of strategic-political and strategic-operational interaction. The course is not intended, therefore, to be a study of history for its own sake. The case study topics, reading assignments, and essay questions are chosen instead to focus on historical and current situations that illustrate the enduring and recurring concerns of the strategist. Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, former President of the Naval War College, explained this approach to education in his convocation address to the newly reported resident class on 24 August 1972:

Our courses of instruction have hitherto concentrated too exclusively on the brief period of military strategy since the close of World War II. The domination of this period by only two world powers will likely prove to have been a temporary aberration. The current trend toward a multipolar world would seem to confirm this. Studying historical examples should enable us to view current issues and trends through the broader perspective of the basic elements of strategy. . . . We will not be

concerned with history as chronology, but with its relevance and application to today and tomorrow.

## **7. COURSE FORMAT**

The S&W course is designed as a graduate-level, directed seminar. The course combines lectures, seminars, readings, seminar essays, and a final exam.

### Lectures

Each case study begins with a lecture presented in the first seminar of that case study. Lectures are delivered by the seminar professor, a faculty member of the Naval War College, or a member of some other institution. Lectures impart knowledge about the case studies, provide content to inform student essays, offer insights into strategic problems, and stimulate learning and discussion in seminar. Lectures also provide an opportunity for interaction between students and faculty. There will be an opportunity for the students to address questions to each lecturer and students are highly encouraged to use this opportunity. The arguments expressed in Strategy and War lectures reflect the lecturer's expertise and do not necessarily represent the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. Government.

### Seminars

Seminar meetings center on analysis and critical discussion. Seminar discussion is crucial to understanding the issues of the individual case studies. It is thus essential that students prepare for seminar. Each member of the seminar is expected to contribute to the discussion and to help the group as a whole understand the issues examined by the case study as well as course themes and objectives. After a short administrative period at the outset, seminars will be conducted in a Socratic manner (the predominant use of questions to evoke discussions), which highlights the political, strategic, and operational considerations of the case being studied. A high degree of student interaction is expected to explore and reinforce the themes and goals of the course. By the end of the session, the professor will summarize and reinforce critical points, and relate the material to the course themes and other framework of the course.

### Readings

The case study readings have been arranged in descending order beginning with those that provide the overall context of the case. Ideally, students should read all of the required texts before the lecture for each case study. When that is not possible, students should follow the specific seminar session reading assignment guidance. Professors may also direct students to read specific selections before a seminar meeting. In weeks in which assigned essays are due, students are also expected to read the essays prepared for that week. *These readings are the only assigned texts for the course and are all the readings required for seminar preparation, essays, and the final examination.* Since S&W is not a research course, students should **not** use references or sources other than those supplied in constructing the writing assignments. Additional readings are provided for a number of case studies that are either (1) previously

assigned and provide insight on a particular essay question, or (2) supplemental readings that may provide additional material for a particular essay question. Essay writers can look at the reading description (in paragraph C of the case study write-up) or check with their professor for the applicability to their assigned essay question.

“Points for Consideration” are included in each case study prior to the assigned readings to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while completing reading assignments as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.

### Seminar Essays

Each student will be assigned three essays from the syllabus by their professor. The three essays will be relatively evenly spaced throughout the course of the academic year and will be assigned near the beginning of the year.

Tutorials for Essays: Prior to writing each essay, but after reading at least a substantial portion of the assigned reading, students are *required* to arrange for a tutorial session (either in person or via phone/e-mail/virtual means, at the instructor’s discretion) to discuss the student’s approach to the assigned essay topic. The purpose of the tutorial is for the student to outline their approach to the essay and for the professor to evaluate the student’s approach, provide guidance to ensure proper focus and organization, and offer suggestions to improve the quality of the student’s essay.

Submission of Essays: Students will submit a copy of the completed essay via the Submission Portal in Blackboard *two days prior to the relevant seminar*. In addition, the student will use the Discussions Board in Blackboard to provide a copy to each fellow student. All students must read the essays prepared by seminar colleagues before the seminar meets.

For specific essay requirements, including the cornerstones of a superior essay, formatting, and citations, see Section III: [Annex C](#), Guide to Essay Preparation.

### Final Examination

During the week of Seminar Meeting 33 (SM-33), students will be given a take-home (open-book) essay examination. The exam will be due one week later, during the week of Seminar Meeting 34 (SM-34). The final exam is to conform to the format for the regular essays found in [Annex C](#). Since the final examination covers the entire course, answers should bridge across case studies. The final exam also requires students to demonstrate their ability to apply history and theory through critical thought in professional communication (Program Learning Outcome 4).

## 8. COURSE ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING

There are two types of assessments: **Formative and Summative**. Formative Assessments are not assigned a grade *per se* but serve as a check of the student's comprehension of the material and ability to think critically, analytically, and strategically. *Formative Assessments must be assessed as satisfactory before a student progresses in the course.* If unsatisfactory, the student will be provided guidance, and perhaps assigned further study followed by a remedial Formative Assessment. Summative Assessments are written analytic essays that are assigned a grade that is a percentage of the student's final grade. They validate the student's comprehension and mastery of the course outcomes through evaluation of the course themes, theories, and concepts. Students must successfully meet the standards for each Formative and Summative Assessment before proceeding to the next case study. The minimum standard is a B- (80) for all Summative Assessments.

**The assessments will be evaluated to determine if the student demonstrates an understanding of the basic concepts the course is designed to convey, particularly the nature of the enduring strategy themes, the essential thematic and theoretical constructs of the course, and the most significant theories of warfare as advocated by the selected theorists.**

### *Formative and Summative Assessments*

**Formative Assessments (Tutorials).** Prior to each assigned Summative Assessment (Essay), students are *required* to engage in a tutorial with their professor. These conferences will primarily be used to ensure that the student understands the essay question, relevant course themes, and S&W course standards for a successful essay. Tutorials serve as formative assessments and will be assessed as either "Meets Expectations" or "Not Yet." Elements of a successful tutorial include providing an outline not in excess of one page in advance of the tutorial, and actively participating in a live conference with the professor (either virtual or in-person). Faculty will offer advice and insight during the tutorial, which students can then incorporate into their Summative Assessment (Essay). If the outline or conference demonstrate a lack of preparedness for the Summative Assessment (Essay), students will be assessed as "Not Yet" and will be given clear expectations for remediation and a timeline for a follow-up Formative Assessment (Tutorial). This follow-up Formative Assessment (Tutorial) must be assigned a grade of "Meets Expectations" to continue to the Summative Assessment (Essay).

**Formative Assessment (Active Learning Exercise).** In a seminar meeting of their choosing, professors will assign an Active Learning Exercise as a formative assessment. This exercise will be crafted at the discretion of the professor, but can include exercises such as reading analysis, role play assignments, net assessments, peer critique, etc. For a suggested list of Active Learning Exercises, see [Annex B](#). The purpose of these exercises is to assess students' ability to contribute to seminars in an engaged and thoughtful manner. These will be assessed as "Meets Expectations" or "Not Yet." In the event a student is assessed as "Not Yet," they will be given clear expectations for remediation and an opportunity to complete another Active Learning Formative Assessment. This is a required element of the course. Failure to complete this

element will result in an inability to receive a Seminar Contribution grade and in inability to complete the course.

**Summative Assessments (Seminar Contribution).** Student contribution to seminar discussion is an important part of this course. Seminar moderators evaluate the overall contribution made by each student, assessing the quality of the student's input. The goal in assigning a seminar contribution grade is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have demonstrated an understanding of the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to their seminar colleagues' learning. This caliber of commitment entails that each student come prepared to take part in discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively to presentations, and thinking critically about both. Students are expected to prepare for, and be thoughtfully engaged in, each seminar. The seminar is a team effort. Not contributing in seminar undercuts the learning experience for everyone in the seminar. At the end of the course, the professor will assign a seminar contribution grade as a Summative Assessment that counts for 25% of the student's final course grade. The final participation/contribution grade must be at least a B- (80 and above) to receive course credit.

**Summative Assessments (Essays).** Each student will submit three essays on questions assigned from the syllabus and an essay-format final examination. The seminar professor will assign students their essay questions near the beginning of the term. The final exam will be assigned during the penultimate seminar meeting.

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis. A good essay is an analytical "think piece" in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned readings and lectures. Essays must also include a counter-argument and rebuttal. Because these essays are analytical thought pieces and not research papers, the essays should not contain historical narrative for narrative sake. The recitation of factual data should be minimized; students should present only that historical narrative necessary to support the thesis and analysis in response to the question. Moreover, the arguments should concern the strategic and operational levels of war according to the S&W course themes, and evaluate alternative strategies. If the paper or essay discusses tactical-level considerations, it is a clear indication that the question is not being properly answered.

A successful essay will have five "cornerstones:"

- 1) It answers the question assigned;
- 2) It has a thesis which supports that answer;
- 3) It marshals evidence to support that thesis. It provides analysis of the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and makes a clear, unambiguous, substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis as well as addressing all parts of the posed question;
- 4) It considers, explicitly or implicitly, opposing arguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence. This is the counter-argument. The essay should also

refute the counter-argument. The refutation or rebuttal is equally important, because it ultimately demonstrates why the argument is better than any potential weaknesses posed by the counter-argument;

5) It does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

Additionally, the essay must address the S&W Learning Outcomes established in Paragraph D of the overview for each particular case study. For more information on essay writing, see [Annex C](#).

**Each essay must achieve a minimum grade of a B- (80).** Until the essay has achieved a B- (80), the student will not be allowed to proceed to the following case study. **If the essay fails to achieve a B- (80), the student will re-write the essay incorporating the professor's recommendations for improvement to increase the assigned grade to at least a B- (80) standard.** The re-written essay is due to the professor not later than one week after the first essay was returned. If, after the re-write, the essay exceeds the B- (80) standard, the assigned grade will be a B- (80) and the student will proceed in the program. If, after the re-write, the essay does not exceed the B- (80) standard, the professor shall report the grade to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport with disenrollment the likely outcome.

In computing the final grade, the following percentages will be used:

**Essays—20% for each essay (60% total)**

**Final Examination—15%**

**Seminar Contribution—25%**

All written essays and seminar contribution will be graded in accordance with the following Naval War College standard grading scale and are assigned a numeric grade and its corresponding letter grade equivalent. Final grades will be calculated based on the weighted scale above using the assigned numeric equivalent to determine a final numerical average within the below Numeric Range. That numerical average will be translated to a final letter grade for the course.

***FSP students must complete, with a B- or better grade, all three NWC core courses to remain eligible for the Graduate Degree Program.***

<u>Letter Grade</u>	<u>Numeric Range</u>	<u>Numerical Equivalent</u>	<u>Description</u>
A+	97<100	98	Work of very high quality; clearly above the average graduate level.
A	94-<97	95	
A-	90-<94	92	
B+	87-<90	88	Expected performance of the average graduate student.
B	84-<87	85	
B-	80-<84	82	

C+	77-<80	78	Below the average performance expected for graduate work.
C	74-<77	75	
C-	70-<74	72	
D+	67-<70	68	Well below the average performance expected for graduate work.
D	64-<67	65	
D-	60-<64	62	
F	0-<60	As Assigned	Unsatisfactory work.

Final course grades are expressed as the unrounded numerical average to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grade. Historical evidence indicates that a final grade distribution of 35 - 45 percent A's and 55 – 65 percent B's and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty split.

Two sets of general grading criteria determine the final letter grade. The grading criteria offer the student a suggestion of the standards and requirements expected. The first set covers the case study essays and final examination essay while the second covers the individual seminar contribution grades.

### Grading Criteria for Essays

Essays will be graded in accordance with the specific requirements found in Section III: [Annex C](#), Guide to Essay Preparation.

In all essays, grading emphasis will be placed on the student's ability to answer the assigned question using the appropriate course themes and concepts and the **five “cornerstones”** mentioned above and found in [Annex C](#). The essays cannot simply be a narrative of historic events, rather, they must analyze the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts and make a clear, unambiguous, and substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis, as well as addressing all parts of the posed question. Failure to include *all* of these elements may result in a grade deduction.

### Essays and Final Exam Grades

Written assignments (all essays and the final exam) will be graded first on the quality of their content in accordance with the below stated standards or rubrics as applied to the five “cornerstones” and guidance provided in [Annex C](#). Papers will rarely fit perfectly into one standard. The final grade will be a holistic assessment of the quality of the work. Additionally, **all written assignments are subject to administrative requirements that may result in a grade degradation or possible disenrollment. Timely submission, essay length/format, and plagiarism are the primary administrative considerations that may impact the grading of written assignments.**

**Timely Submission:** Since student essays provide a starting point for seminar discussion, it is critical that students submit their essays by the deadline. All summative assessments (all essays and the final exam) have a specific due date for submission. Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous approval by the professor—will receive a grade not greater than a B- (80). Work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior approval of the professor may result in the student’s removal from the course. Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student’s progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so that professors can render assistance in a timely manner. In any case, when written work is submitted more than 30 days late, the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport shall be notified, with dis-enrollment the likely outcome.

**Essay Length/Format:** Written assignments (all essays and final exam) have specific length and formatting requirements identified in [Annex C](#). Failure to meet format or length requirements may, at the discretion of the individual Professor, and on a case basis, also reflect a degradation.

**Plagiarism:** Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation violate the Academic Honor Code and may result in disenrollment. These are discussed in depth in Section 9.

### *Grading Criteria for Essays and Final Exam*

All written work in the S&W course will be graded according to the following standards:

**A+ (97-100):** The essay indicates brilliance and is ready for publication. The essay answers the question in a way that offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. The thesis is definitive and exceptionally well-supported. The counterargument and rebuttal are addressed completely. The writing is clear throughout and exceptionally well-organized.

**A (94-96):** Work of superior quality that demonstrates a high degree of original, critical thought. The essay intelligently answers the question. The thesis is clearly articulated and focused. Evidence is relevant and purposeful. Consideration of arguments, counterargument, and rebuttal is comprehensive. The organization is especially clear throughout the essay.

**A- (90-93):** A well-written, insightful essay that is above the average expected of graduate work and does not have major flaws. The essay skillfully answers the question. The thesis is articulated. Evidence is significant throughout. Arguments, counterargument, and rebuttal are presented effectively. The essay is coherently organized and very clearly written.

**B+ (87-89):** A graduate-level essay that meets all five elements of a seminar essay, though with varying degrees of success. The essay answers the question. A thesis is clearly stated. The supporting evidence advances the thesis. A viable counterargument and rebuttal are present. The organization has strong points, and the essay is clearly written.

**B (84-86):** An essay that is a satisfactory consideration of the topic and demonstrates acceptable graduate performance. The essay generally answers the question. A thesis is stated. The thesis is generally supported with relevant evidence. A counterargument and rebuttal are presented but likely not fully developed. Problems with organization and clarity may exist.

**B- (80-83):** The essay is slightly below the expected graduate-level performance. The essay may only partially answer the question. A thesis is presented, but the evidence and analysis does not fully support it. The counterargument and rebuttal are not fully developed. The essay may have distracting organizational flaws or significant problems with clarity. **Essay below this grade must be remediated.**

**C+ (77-79):** The essay is below acceptable graduate-level performance. The essay fails to address one or more of the five elements described above. The essay may not effectively answer the question. The thesis may be vague or unclear. Evidence may be inadequate, and analysis may be incomplete. The treatment of the counterargument and rebuttal may be deficient. The organization may be poor, making the other four elements of an effective essay difficult to identify.

**C (74-76):** The essay generally fails to meet the standards of graduate work. While it might express an opinion, it fails to adequately answer the question, develop a thesis appropriate to the question, make adequate use of evidence, include a counterargument and rebuttal purposeful to the overall argument. The essay does not have a coherent structure or demonstrate the quality of insight deemed sufficient to explore the assigned question adequately.

**C- (70-73):** The essay conspicuously fails to meet the standards of graduate-level work. The essay reflects a failure to understand or answer the question. The thesis may be poorly stated, with minimal evidence or support, or the essay may lack a counterargument and/or a rebuttal. The essay may express an opinion more than it provides a critically argued response to the question. Construction and development flaws further detract from the readability of the essay.

**D (56-69):** Essay lacks evidence of graduate-level understanding and critical thinking. The essay fails to address the assigned question or present a coherent thesis. It lacks effort expected or understanding of the subject matter. It may not consider a counterargument or rebuttal. The organization is critically unclear.

**F (0-55):** Conspicuously fails to meet graduate-level standards in every area. The essay does not address the question. The essay has no thesis and suffers from significant flaws in respect to structure, grammar, and logic. The essay lacks a counterargument and rebuttal. The essay displays an apparent lack of effort to achieve the course requirements. Gross errors in construction and development detract from the readability of the essay, or it may display evidence of plagiarism or misrepresentation.

### Grading Criteria for Seminar Contribution

Seminar contribution grades are determined by moderator evaluation of the quality of a

student's contributions to seminar discussions and exercises.

All students are expected to contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or moderators offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

**A+ (97-100):** Contributions indicate brilliance through a wholly new understanding of material throughout the course. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance between “listening” and “contributing.”

**A (94-96):** Contribution is always of superior quality. Arrives prepared for every seminar. Contributions are highlighted by insightful thought and understanding and contain some original interpretations of complex concepts. Displays attentive listening skills. Thinks through the issues at hand before commenting.

**A- (90-93):** Above the average expected of a graduate student. Prepared for and fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of colleagues. Exceptional ability to listen and analyze the comments of others as evident through insightful quality of contribution.

**B+ (87-89):** Graduate-level contribution. Preparation and contribution reflect an understanding of the material. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. A positive contributor to seminar who thoughtfully joins in most discussions as an active listener and engaged speaker.

**B (84-86):** Satisfactory contribution. Involvement in seminar reflects adequate preparation with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought. May not always consider others’ contributions when speaking or may not always demonstrate active listening.

**B- (80-83):** Only demonstrates minimally acceptable graduate-level contribution. Contributes, but sometimes speaks or responds without having thought through the issue well enough to present a structurally sound position. Minimally acceptable consideration of others’ contributions when speaking and minimally acceptable active listening.

**C+ (77-79):** Below acceptable level of contribution. Does not demonstrate preparation for seminar. Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions.

**C (74-76):** Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent logic structure, and critically unclear quality of insight demonstrate a lack of preparation. Frequently seems disconnected or disengaged from the conversation.

**C- (70-73):** Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects clear substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Sometimes displays a negative attitude.

**D (56-69):** Is not prepared or engaged. Contributions are infrequent and reflect below minimum acceptable understanding of course material. Engages in frequent fact-free conversation.

**F (0-55):** Completely unprepared for seminar. Fails to demonstrate acceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative.

### Grade Appeals

1. Formative Assessments: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of course competencies. They are not graded events *per se* and, as such, are not subject to appeal.
2. Summative Assessments: Summative Assessments that receive an initial grade below B- (80) are not eligible for appeal. The student must first go through the remediation process described above (page 20). Following remediation, students receiving a grade of less than 80 (B-) on their second attempt to complete a Summative Assessment may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Strategy and Policy Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will then grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of 80 (B-) or above, the student will receive a grade of 80 (B-) for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the review results in a grade which is still below an 80 (B-), the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of their appeal.
3. Any Assigned Grade (except for a final grade): Students must meet submission deadlines for appeals of unsatisfactory Summative Assessments discussed above, but may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of 80 (B-) or above within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the Strategy and Policy Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event that this grade is subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.
4. Contribution Grades: Students may only appeal contribution grades to the faculty member who assigned the grade. That faculty member will consider the student's

feedback, make a final determination, and present the situation and the final determination to the Department Chair.

5. Final Course Grades: A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

## **9. *ACADEMIC HONOR CODE*** (excerpt from the NWC Faculty Handbook)

The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

(1) **Plagiarism**: Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command.

(a) Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

1. The verbatim use of others' words without citation;
2. The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;
3. Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, generative artificial intelligence (AI), etc., without giving credit.

(b) Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

(2) **Cheating**: Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

- (a) Gaining unauthorized access to exams;
- (b) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests, unless specifically

permitted; the use of artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs to compose, or aid in the composition of, formative assessments, or summative assessments.

(3) **Misrepresentation:** Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. Misrepresentation includes the following:

- (a) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission of the instructors;
- (b) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

(4) **Action in the case of suspected violation:** If a student's submitted written work appears to violate the code of conduct specified in the Faculty Handbook, the following procedures shall be followed:

- (a) The Deputy Dean, CDE, will be notified and an informal investigation will be initiated. The Department Chair will provide all supporting documentation. In the event that the Deputy Dean determines that a formal investigation is warranted, the student will be informed of the nature of the case and be allowed to submit information to the Deputy Dean on his/her behalf. The results of the investigation will be submitted to the Dean, CDE.
- (b) The Dean, CDE, will then forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost, who will determine whether the case should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).
- (c) The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE or refer it to the AIRC; in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.
- (d) If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will thoroughly review the case, interview the student if feasible, make findings of fact, and recommend appropriate action to the President via the Provost. This action may include any or all of the following:
  - 1. Lowering of the grades on affected work (this will be a letter grade of F and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59) or on the entire course of instruction.
  - 2. Inclusion of remarks in fitness reports.
  - 3. Letter to appropriate branches of service, agencies, offices, or governments.
  - 4. Dismissal from NWC.
  - 5. Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or for appropriate action under the rules governing civilian personnel.

- (e) Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of NWC diploma, master's degree, and JPME credit.

## ***10. ATTENDANCE***

Attendance is defined as a student's physical (or virtual) presence in any Fleet Seminar Program event (meeting, lecture or discussion, whether it is the home seminar or at another FSP location) for the course. Any student who does not attend a seminar in any location for a given week or session shall be considered as absent. There is no distinction between "excused" and "unexcused" absences. A student who is absent from four or more seminar meetings (whether lecture or discussion seminar) in any single course may not be eligible, by accreditation standards, for the M.A. degree. Upon the fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is anticipated, the specifics of the situation shall be reported by the seminar Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. degree will be made by the Dean, CDE. Students who are subsequently absent from five or more events in any single course shall be reported by the Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for an NWC Diploma and JPME Phase I certification will be made by the Dean, CDE.

The FSP is structured such that any student who cannot be physically present in the normally assigned seminar on any given week or weeks, but who is able to attend a seminar at another location for that week or those weeks, is given full credit for attendance. Students are responsible for advising their professor in advance of an anticipated absence, as well as for coordinating participation with another seminar, if possible. Such coordination will include email advisories to all professors. After the student has attended a seminar at another location, the professor of the visited seminar will advise the professor of the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of participation. If a student is unable to attend any seminar at any location for a given week or weeks, he or she must submit an Executive Summary of that week's topic that satisfies the professor's expectations that the student has mastered the material and course concepts. This written work shall be submitted by the beginning of the next seminar attended in the student's normally assigned seminar. The quality of this written submission will be considered in the overall participation grade. Note that the submission will not erase the recorded absence from seminar. Guidance for an Executive Summary is provided in [Annex D](#).

## ***11. TEXTBOOKS***

CDE provides, on a loan basis, all textbooks and selected readings required for the course. All textbooks must be returned upon completion of or withdrawal from the course. Please *DO NOT MARK IN OR UNDERLINE IN BOOKS THAT MUST BE RETURNED*. Books are reissued to other students in subsequent years. Students will be expected to provide a replacement for any books that are lost, damaged, marked up, etc. or they will be billed accordingly. No student will

receive credit for a course until all materials have been returned. Many students wish to purchase their course materials, however, regulations preclude direct purchase of this government property. Most books are available online or at bookstores.

## ***12. NWC LIBRARY SERVICES***

CDE students and faculty have access to various NWC library databases through the Blackboard Learning Management System. These databases are for the exclusive use of NWC faculty, staff, and students; therefore, please do not allow unauthorized usage. For Strategy and War students, some of the more useful ones include Lexis-Nexis Academic, EBSCO, ProQuest, and STRATFOR.

Here are the steps to access the various databases:

- 1) Go to the Blackboard (Bb) site (<https://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/>)
- 2) On the “Institution Page”, find the section for the Henry E. Eccles Library
- 3) Click on the “NWC Library via Blackboard”
- 4) Find the desired resource

## ***13. COURSE CATALOG***

The Naval War College *Course Catalog*, which contains policy guidance on aspects of all NWC programs, is accessible online from the College site at <http://www.usnwc.edu>. Under Academics and Programs select Academic Resources, scroll down to Academic Information and Contacts and select Academic Catalog. From this page you can access the current course catalog and academic calendars detailing the ways in which nonresident students may participate in the academic life of the College at Newport, including war-gaming, prize essay competitions, and graduation ceremonies.

## ***SECTION II: SEMINAR MEETING SCHEDULE***

### **SM 1 – Introduction (1 – 4 September)**

#### **Title: Strategy and War: An Overview/Theoretical Underpinnings**

**A. Objectives:** The objectives of this seminar meeting are to:

1. Introduce seminar members.
2. Provide information on the administrative procedures and academic requirements.
3. Outline the course philosophy, purpose, and objectives; define key terms.
4. Provide information on the use/potential use of virtual platforms (i.e., BlackBoard Collaborate or Zoom). Develop a timeline for testing the seminar's ability to use a virtual platform by Seminar Meeting 9.
5. Introduce students to two core theorists and conduct an initial discussion of the theories of war that serve as a basis for developing the analytical thought processes.

Note: Students are advised to start the readings for this session and the initial case study (*Masters of War*) immediately after receiving the materials. This will give a head start in optimizing the intellectual experience that the course offers, given that the theorists presented in these sessions permeate the course. Getting started early will preclude falling behind and maximize the ability to contribute in seminar.

**B. Essays:** None.

**C. Assigned Readings:**

1. View Welcome to Strategy and War (Link available in Blackboard) [1 hour and 28 minutes]
2. Syllabus, Section I. [29 pages]
3. Syllabus for Seminar Meeting 1 and Case Study I (Masters of War). [17 pages]
4. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Book 1, Chap. 1; Book 2, Chaps. 2-3, 5-6; Pages 61-63, 69-71. (Physical or E-Reserve) [58 pages]

[In these sections of *On War*, Clausewitz emphasizes the importance of critical analysis and the nature of war itself, both of which are foundations of the S&W course.]

5. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 1-44, 63-76. (Physical) [58 pages]

[Griffith's translation of this text on war is both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

6. Van Riper, Paul K. "The Relevance of History to the Military Profession: An American Marine's View," in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pages 34-54. (E-Reserve) [19 pages]

[Van Riper provides an assessment of the value of history for the study of strategy and reflects on the value of his education at the Naval War College for his professional development.]

Total Reading: 181 pages

#### **D. Topics for Discussion:**

1. How do Clausewitz and Sun Tzu define war? How do the definitions differ and how do those definitions shape concepts about war and strategies for winning wars?

2. What are the distinctions between the various levels of war – policy, grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics.

3. What does Clausewitz mean by the "Paradoxical Trinity?" How does he relate the dynamics of the "Trinity" to the various elements of any society? What is meant by the "Clausewitzian Triangle?"

4. What are the distinctions between limited war, unlimited war, and total war?

5. What is critical analysis? Why is the use of history so important to this concept? How is it used in the S&W course

## I. **MASTERS OF WAR**

*Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, Corbett, Mao and Galula*

### A. **Description:**

One of the desired outcomes of Professional Military Education is to “demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills, ... to support the development and implementation of strategies and complex operations.”<sup>6</sup> Those seeking to hone their critical thinking skills can do so either through first-hand experience or study. For the military professional, first-hand experience tends to entail real-world trial and error during combat operations. The Strategy and War Course uses case studies to impart critical habits of thought in the classroom, where learning does not have the possibility for such catastrophic results. Though each case is unique, the sequence of cases is designed toward a cumulative outcome through the integration of theorists, course themes, and historical examples. As such, the first case study promotes strategic literacy through several key strategic theorists, establishes a common vocabulary for effective communication, and provides foundational course concepts. This case study emphasizes the application of theory as outlined in Program Learning Outcome 4 ([Annex F](#)).

This case study is unlike any of the others in the Strategy and War Course. While subsequent cases provide opportunities to apply history, this case presents many of the course’s theoretical foundations. This will be accomplished through a three seminar-week structure. Following the lecture week, seminar-week one presents Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu as foundational theorists. Seminar week two expands our theoretical studies to present more focused advice on naval strategy through the writings of Alfred T. Mahan and Julian S. Corbett. Finally, seminar-week three introduces revolutionary, protracted, irregular warfare through the writings of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and David Galula. Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of war, the basic principles discussed by these theorists remain unchanged.

This is why Carl von Clausewitz’s *On War*, Sun Tzu’s *The Art of War*, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, Sir Julian Corbett’s *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, and the writings of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-Tung) and David Galula remain relevant as conceptual frameworks for the study of strategy and war.

*On War* and *The Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes among the different kinds of wars we will examine and elucidates the

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<sup>6</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Officer Professional Military Education Policy,” CJCSI 1800.01G, April 15, 2024, p. A-3

relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. *The Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations-other-than-war at one end to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships between national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of a war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment in which the conflict takes place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception are of central importance to Sun Tzu at all levels of war. Clausewitz is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance on information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Strategy and War course includes many examples of the successful application of both of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance, probability, and irrationality on warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz, in particular, wants leaders to see war as a rational act. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent's objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu's work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure, and ultimately enhance, the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners or allies.

U.S. joint and service doctrines derive from concepts and definitions in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Official documents such as the *National Security Strategy of the United States* and the *National Military Strategy of the United States* restate Clausewitz's concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance are consistent with Sun Tzu, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation. And while both theorists' masterworks give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

Both texts explore the value of education in the art of war. Both authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they

identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that help prepare today's leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action to achieve strategic success in the future. The masters' expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. *On War* and *The Art of War*, therefore, constitute natural points of departure to think critically about strategy and war.

This case study also introduces naval theory and sea power conceptualizations through the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Mahan wrote his famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, as a member of the faculty and president of the Naval War College. Mahan's writings confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness, the limits of sea power; naval concentration; calculations of when to risk the fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; and the uses and limits of blockades.

British born Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was an historian whose theories on sea power and naval strategy stemmed from his work on British naval history. His pivotal *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* seeks to understand the role of the navy within the larger military apparatus of the State. Consequently, Corbett was not interested in sea control for its own sake but for how it could further the larger goals of the war. His writings focus on the importance of joint-operations, sea lines of communication, and the concept of limited war.

Born only fourteen years apart, both Mahan and Corbett had the opportunity to witness and write about contemporary conflicts, in addition to historical events. While similarities exist in their writings, they offer different perspectives on the role of the navy and implementation of naval power.

Mao is the fifth major strategic theorist examined at the beginning of the Strategy and War course. He is the premier strategist for weaker states and non-state actors. His writings drew on other great works on strategy and politics, including those of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Indeed, Mao's work represents an important synthesis between *On War* and *The Art of War*. In his writings, Mao develops a strategy for how a non-state actor can gradually build organizational strength to mobilize armed strength and defeat more powerful state adversaries. Asymmetric strategies employing irregular warfare—such as terrorism, insurgency, and information operations—loom large in Mao's work.

Mao blended theory with his experience as a strategic practitioner. He led the communists to victory in the Chinese Civil War, demonstrating how an initially weak political organization pursuing extremist objectives can overthrow an existing regime and subsequently wage a global ideological struggle. Mao's success has inspired leaders of other extremist movements to look for guidance in his writings and life. Mao's writings raise important ethical questions relating to war and statecraft and have great relevance for understanding contemporary long wars involving extremist groups that employ subversion, propaganda, political agitation, popular mobilization, terrorism, and insurgency to defeat their enemies.

The final theorist of this case study is French military officer and scholar David Galula. A keen student of Mao who was twice detained by the Chinese Communists in 1948, counter-insurgency (COIN) theorist Galula observed revolutions in China and Greece, and spent two years in combat during the French-Algerian War in the mid-1950s. These experiences formed the basis of two seminal works on counter-insurgency theory: “Pacification in Algeria” and “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Galula’s theory also influenced FM 3-24, “Insurgency and Countering Insurgencies,” and therefore, is highly relevant for modern U.S. military forces.

### **B. Points for Consideration:**

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *Topics for Discussion* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationships between war and politics and between military and political leaders differ from that of Sun Tzu? (See in particular Book 1, Chapter 1 and Book 8, Chapters 6A-6B of *On War* along with Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*.)
2. Clausewitz emphasizes the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance, creativity, and uncertainty. What role does each play in war?
3. Sun Tzu argues: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” (Chapter 3 of *The Art of War*). Meanwhile, Clausewitz states, “Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction” (Book 8, Chapter 3B of *On War*). Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?
4. Designed to provide guidance for strategists and policy makers, the Weinberger Doctrine is based directly or indirectly on Clausewitz’s *On War*. In what way does it reflect Clausewitz’s ideas on the primacy of politics, his “Trinitarian Analysis,” and the “rational calculus of war?”
5. What are the most important centers of gravity in war according to Sun Tzu and Clausewitz? How do the theorists differ from each other in the choice of centers of gravity? What explains the different choices?
6. Clausewitz argues: “in war the result is never final.” Is he right? What important conclusions can be drawn from this statement?
7. Clausewitz has argued: “war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in

magnitude and duration. Once the expenditure of efforts exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.” Why do nations find it so difficult at times to bring a war to an end? Why is this advice sound in theory but difficult to follow in practice? Would Sun Tzu agree with Clausewitz on this comment?

8. Clausewitz states: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” What are the strategic implications of this statement?

9. Some contemporary observers have argued that technological innovation might soon lift the fog of war completely, thus invalidating some of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

10. Sun Tzu argued that the best wars are short wars: “When the army engages in protracted campaigns the resources of the state will not suffice.” Would Clausewitz agree with this statement? Are there circumstances in which a prolonged war can be more effective than a short war in search of a quick decision?

11. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it more closely resembles an art than a science. What are the implications of this for the critical analysis of strategy and war?

12. Why does Clausewitz believe that maintaining the guiding role of political purpose in wartime is both vital and difficult?

13. Discuss the differences between limited and unlimited war according to Clausewitz. How does the concept of absolute war differ from unlimited war? Why are these distinctions important?

14. How does the “Trinitarian Analysis” relate to Clausewitz’s emphasis on the need to understand the nature of the war?

15. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are the culminating point of victory, the center of gravity, and the need to be strong at the decisive point. How useful are such concepts for political and military leaders? Are these as valuable at the strategic level of war as they are at the operational level?

16. What roles and responsibilities do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Mao assign to military leaders in political and strategic decision-making?

17. Is the Clausewitzian principle mandating the subordination of strategy to policy applicable to wars fought between coalitions? What special difficulties may coalition partners encounter while striving to devise common war aims and strategy?

18. In Book 1 of *On War*, Clausewitz explains the challenges presented by friction and the fog of war. How can a strategic planner mitigate these challenges for their own side, and amplify them for the enemy?

19. The phrase “the enemy gets a vote” is commonly used in today’s discourse. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao, and Galula address the role of the enemy in war?

20. How do Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao and Galula address the role of ethical considerations in decision-making on politics, strategy, and warfare?

21. What is the significance of a “disposal force” in Corbett’s writings?

22. To what extent is Mahan discussing national Grand Strategy versus purely naval strategy?

23. Which of the six theorists in this case study offer the most relevant concepts to a modern strategist?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pages 61-63, 69-71; Book 1; Book 2, Chaps. 1-3, 5-6; Book 3; Book 4, Chap. 11; Book 5, Chap. 3; Book 6, Chaps. 1, 5, 6, 26, 27; Book 7, Chaps. 2-5, 22; Book 8. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[This translation of *On War* was much heralded when it appeared in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s famous work.]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 63-149. (Physical)

[Griffith’s translation of this text on war is both scholarly and approachable for the professional military officer.]

3. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-63, 81-117, 135-276, 307-326, 353-360. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Handel argues that, despite some important differences in emphasis and substance, there is a universal or unified strategic logic, which transcends the wide gaps in time, culture, and historical experience of various nations. He also introduces the post-Vietnam incorporation of the Weinberger Doctrine into American military theory.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Preface, Introductory, Chapters 1. (Physical or Selected Readings)

[Mahan examines the critical elements of sea power in Chapter 1.]

5. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Pages 3-106. (Physical or Selected Reading)

[Corbett shows how a sea power can deploy its navy to achieve strategic objectives against a land power. He emphasizes the utility of joint and peripheral operations.]

6. McCranie, Kevin. *Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021. Chapters 12, 13. (E-Reserve)

[McCranie provides in-depth analysis on both Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. This book does for naval theorists what Handel's work does for Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.]

7. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (E-Reserve)

[These extracts from Mao's writings on insurgency, including his famous *On Protracted War*, examine the dynamics of how a sub-state entity confronts the stronger state using irregular warfare.]

8. Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006. Introduction, Chapters 1-5, 7. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Galula looks at insurgency from the counterinsurgent's perspective, and offers a step-by-step COIN operational plan.]

9. *The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age*. Edited by Hal Brands. New edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023. Chapters 3,5,7. (E-Reserve)

[Former Naval War College professor Toshi Yoshihara provides an in-depth overview of Sun Tzu's universal application, influence on Chinese strategic thought, and the role of his theories for modern strategists. Historian Hew Strachan, in his chapter on Clausewitz, accomplishes something similar, engaging with the Prussian's importance, development of theory, and role in modern strategic thought. Finally, Naval War college professor John Maurer surveys Mahan, Mahan's critics, and how modern nation states like China incorporate the naval theorists' teachings.]

10. Lee, Bradford A. “Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners” in *Competitive Strategies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Theory, History, and Practice*. Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2012. Pages 28-46. **(E-Reserve)**

[Former Naval War College professor Bradford Lee utilizes both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to address interaction on the strategic level, offering four concepts that he argues every strategist should be aware of as we enter into a new age of great power competition.]

11. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages xii – xxii; 176 – 196. (E-Reserve)

[Michael Walzer’s seminal text on morality and ethics in war provides a good starting point for thinking about ethics and war. The two sections discuss the strategic impact of ethical decisions in insurgencies and provide some background to Mao’s thinking.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

This case study, the first in the Strategy and War course, introduces students to some of the greatest writers on strategy and operations. Their theories have significant overlap with the learning outcomes this course is designed to convey.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for the students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4

#### **E. Deliverables**

At the professor’s discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative Assessments and/or [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 2 – Lecture (9 – 11 September)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pages 61-63, 69-71; Book 1, Chaps. 2-8; Book 3; Book 4, Chap. 11; Book 6, Chaps. 1, 5, 27; Book 7, Chaps. 2-5, 22. (Physical or E-Reserve) [113 pages]

2. Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Pages 77-149. (Physical) [73 pages]

3. Lee, Bradford A. “Strategic Interaction: Theory and History for Practitioners” in *Competitive Strategies for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Theory, History, and Practice*. Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken. Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies, 2012. Pages 28-46. (E-Reserve) [19 pages]

4. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 81-117. (Physical or E-Reserve) [37 pages]

Total Reading: 242 pages

### SM 3 – Discussion (15 – 18 September)

#### Title: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu

A. *Essays*: None.

#### B. *Topics for Discussion*:

1. Clausewitz emphasizes the primacy of politics in waging war. “Policy,” he states, “will permeate all military operations.” At the same time, he notes “the political aim is not a tyrant,” that political considerations do not determine “the posting of guards,” and that “policy will not extend its influence to operational details.” How can one reconcile the first statement with the others? Does Clausewitz’s view of the proper relationship between war and politics differ from that of Sun Tzu?

2. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that although war can be studied systematically, it is an art, not a science. What are the implications of this for the study of strategy and war?

3. Among Clausewitz’s most important concepts are “the culminating point of victory,” “the center of gravity,” and “the need to be strong at the decisive point.” How useful are such concepts for strategic and operational leaders?

4. Sun Tzu places great emphasis on the role of intelligence in warfare. Clausewitz states: “The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponents he can only know from unreliable intelligence.” He contends that this “can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him.” Considering these two views, what is the proper role of intelligence in determining a course of action?

5. Clausewitz emphasized the need to understand the importance of three interrelated aspects of war: reason, passion, and the play of chance and creativity. What is the role of each in war, and do these dynamics interact differently at the operational level of war as opposed to the strategic or tactical?

6. Sun Tzu argues: “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Clausewitz stated that “since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction.” Are these two statements contradictory or complementary? What are the dangers of adhering to only one of these statements?

7. Clausewitz refers to “operations that have direct political repercussions that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance, or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc.” At the operational level, does this contradict his guidance in the chapter’s introduction that “the fighting forces must be destroyed?”

8. Some proponents of transformation and network-centric warfare have suggested that technological innovation might soon lift the “fog of war” completely, thus invalidating certain of Clausewitz’s most important insights. Do you agree?

9. Clausewitz recognized two kinds of war involving a limited or unlimited objective. How do these dynamics differ from each other? Is one type of war more political than the other?

**C. Assigned Readings:**

1. Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Book 5, Chap. 3; Book 6, Chaps. 6, 26; Book 8. (Physical or E-Reserve) [74 pages]

2. *The New Makers of Modern Strategy : From the Ancient World to the Digital Age*. Edited by Hal Brands. New edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023. Chapters 3, 5 (E-Reserve) [53 pages]

3. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 1-52, 155-276. (Physical or E-Reserve) [174 pages]

Total Reading: 272 pages

## SM 4 – Discussion (22 – 25 September)

### Title: Mahan and Corbett

A. *Essays.* None

### B. *Topics for Discussion:*

1. Do Mahan's theories fit more with Clausewitz or Sun Tzu's definition of war?
2. Do Corbett's theories fit more with Clausewitz or Sun Tzu's definition of war?
3. What are Mahan's fundamental elements of sea power, and do they remain relevant in the modern security environment?
4. What is a "limited war" and how do Corbett's thoughts refine, alter, or build upon Clausewitz's incomplete conceptualization?
5. Explain the concept of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and how it relates to both Mahan and Corbett's theories on sea power.
6. How do Mahan and Corbett's thoughts on sea control differ?
7. Which of the two naval theorists' writings, in your opinion, is more relevant the modern security environment?

### C. *Assigned Readings:*

1. McCranie, Kevin. *Comparing Mahan and Corbett*. Recorded lecture. [62 minutes]
2. McCranie, Kevin. *Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought*. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2021. Chapters 12, 13. (E-Reserve) [38 pages]
3. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Preface, Introductory, Chapter 1. (Physical or Selected Reading) [93 pages]
4. Corbett, Julian S. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. London: Longman, Green, 1911. Pages 3-106. (Physical or Selected Reading) [104 pages]
5. *The New Makers of Modern Strategy : From the Ancient World to the Digital Age*. Edited by Hal Brands. New edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2023. Chapter 7 (E-

Reserve) [24 Pages]

Total Reading: 259 pages

## SM 5 – Discussion (29 September – 2 October)

### Title: Mao and Galula

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Topics for Discussion*:

1. Did Mao radically modify Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, or is he merely adapting them?
2. Sun Tzu puts a premium on acquiring a decisive superiority in the information domain for obtaining victory in war. How realistic is it to expect that one side can gain such a decisive edge against a competent adversary?
3. What are the principal strategic and operational tenets of Mao's writings on how a non-state actor can defeat more powerful adversaries?
4. What role did Mao assign to intelligence, military deception, psychological operations, and information security in his writings on strategy and war?
5. Does Mao perceive or address the elements of the Trinity? If so, what does he have to say about them?
6. What are the key aspects of Galula's counter-insurgency strategy?
7. Are Mao and Galula two sides of the same COIN? Where does Galula diverge from Mao's arguments?
8. Is Mao or Galula more helpful to a modern strategist planning against an insurgency?

### C. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Lynch, Daniel. *Mao and Galula*. Recorded lecture. [90 minutes]
2. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-63, 135-154, 307-326, 353-360. (Physical or E-Reserve) [59 pages]
3. *Seeing Red: The Development of Maoist Thought on Insurgency*. (E-Reserve) [103 pages]
4. Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006. Intro, Chapters 1-5, 7. (E-Reserve) [80 pages]

5. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages xii-xxii; 176-196. (E-Reserve) [29 pages]

Total Reading: 271 pages

## **II. THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR**

### *Democracy, Leadership, and Strategy in a Protracted War*

#### **A. Description:**

Although this conflict occurred 2400 years ago in ancient Greece, it yields timely insights into the enduring problems of strategy and war, the employment of all instruments of national power, and the interrelationship among the political, strategic, and operational levels of war. In this conflict, the Delian League, controlled by a sea power, democratic Athens, fought the Peloponnesian League, led by the militaristic land power, Sparta. The Athenian general Thucydides meant for his history of this twenty-seven-year struggle to be “a possession for all time,” and that has indeed turned out to be the case. In Congressional testimony on Iranian strategic motives, General Martin Dempsey, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: “Thucydides ... said that all strategy is some combination of reaction to fear, honor and interests; and I think all nations act in response to one of those three things.”<sup>7</sup> All wars, Thucydides wrote, will resemble the conflict between Athens and Sparta, as long as human nature remains the same.

Thucydides supplies archetypes for strategic leadership, the challenges of homeland security, the exercise of sea control, the disruptive effects of biological catastrophe, and the ethical conundrums inherent in the use of violence to achieve political ends, to name just a few. Whereas Clausewitz and Sun Tzu emphasize rationality, Thucydides reveals the extent to which passion can overpower rational calculations. He recounts the moral depths to which people can fall. Not merely political institutions but civilization itself can breakdown in the face of passions fired by war. The mass murder of men, women, and children, and the torture and killing of prisoners, raise the question of whether war can ever be a rational tool of statecraft.

Thucydides also charts the influence of politics on the making of strategy and policy. He takes pains to describe battles yet also presents speeches and debates in which different leaders compete to set policy, frame strategy, and execute operations as theater commanders. Strategy is a continuation of politics in this war, with military commands often divided to reflect the balance of political power at home. As a result, relations between political and military authorities frequently prove decisive in the success or failure of campaigns. But the policy goals of belligerents and the strategies they choose are not always self-evident. The leaders of different cities often lie or reveal only part of what they have in mind. Not only do chance, friction, and uncertainty make every strategic decision a gamble, but the private interests and ambitions of different political and military leaders sometimes triumph over the interests of the state.

The origins of this war appear to lie in something trivial: a dispute between two Greek cities, Corcyra and Corinth, about influence over Corcyra’s colony, Epidamnus. The dispute

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<sup>7</sup> General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Response to Representative Tom Price of Georgia during a House Committee Hearing”, 29 February 2012.

eventually drew Athens, Sparta, and their allies into what for the ancient Greeks might have been considered a world war. Yet as Thucydides' account unfolds, he makes a case that the truest cause of the war lay in something deeper: Sparta's fear of the growing power of Athens. The efforts of Sparta's allies (Corinth especially) to persuade Sparta to overthrow the Athenian empire before it dominated the rest of Greece, and the refusal of the Athenian political and military leader, Pericles, to yield to demands from Sparta and its allies force one to think carefully about what each side meant to achieve (policy) and how it meant to succeed (strategy). These are the underlying and proximate causes of this conflict. Even after the decision for war was made, however, difficulties impeded deliberations about what policies and strategies to pursue. These difficulties were compounded by the fundamentally asymmetric contest between a land power and a sea power, and by the clash of two coalitions with different strengths and weaknesses.

The coalitions were led by two radically different polities. Sparta was a militarized regime in which a warrior elite dominated an enslaved majority, the Helots. Yet Sparta also had a complex system of government with multiple checks and balances, making it admired across Greece for its political stability and seeming moderation. Strategically conservative and wary of helot revolts, Spartans rarely ventured far from home or stayed away too long. If Sparta was too cautious, Athens was perhaps too bold. The Athenians were energetic, innovative, and adventurous. At home, Athenian democracy meant that her citizens were perhaps the freest people in Greece, but even Pericles admitted that Athens ruled its alliance like a tyrant – demanding tribute at the point of a spear. Trade and tribute made Athens extraordinarily wealthy, while Sparta lived off the labor of the helots. Thucydides contrasts not just the combatants' military capabilities, plans, and objectives, but also the economic, diplomatic, cultural, geopolitical, institutional, and social dimensions of strategy.

Traditionally, Greek warfare featured heavy infantry, or hoplites, from rival cities massing against each other to fight for some contested piece of ground. Wars might be won on a single day because the combatants were prepared to accept the battlefield result. Sparta excelled at hoplite warfare, but was unprepared materially and intellectually to take on a sea power like Athens. Athens found it equally difficult to bring its military strengths to bear against Sparta. A protracted stalemate ensued. Frustration with the stalemate fueled the vengeful passions that drove the war to escalate and pushed each side to violate traditional ethical standards of ancient Greece, even when doing so was not strategically productive. Yet success for both sides depended on finding ways to rationally match strategy to political ends, and on devising comprehensive approaches that compensated for strategic weaknesses through other means of national power than traditional strengths on land or sea.

Athenian and Spartan leaders strove to match their policy aims with the capabilities at their disposal. The strengths and weaknesses of Pericles' initial strategy, including his remarkable ability to communicate with the Athenian people, deserve close scrutiny, as do the leadership qualities of the Spartan king, Archidamus. Their successors' triumphs and failures provide an opportunity to assess strategic adaptation in wartime. In particular, the skill of the Spartan commander, Brasidas in combined operations and the ingenuity of the Athenian

commander, Demosthenes, in joint and unconventional operations, supply models for thinking about how theater commanders can use such operations for strategic effect. Then there is the contrast between the pious and conservative Athenian commander, Nicias, and his innovative and daring rival, the Athenian commander, Alcibiades. The Athenian expedition to Sicily was the brainchild of Alcibiades, but it was Nicias' caution as commander at Syracuse that led to catastrophic delay and overextension – a blunder exploited by the Spartan general Gylippus. Perhaps the ultimate model of strategic adaptation is Lysander, the Spartan admiral who found a way to decisively defeat the Athenian Navy at Aegospotami in 405 B.C.

Given the length and costs of this war, it is reasonable to ask whether each side should have reassessed its political goals and sought peace. Thucydides shows Athens and Sparta offering terms but never quite managing to terminate the war - Athens during the plague that claimed perhaps a third of its people, Sparta after its defeats at Pylos, and both Athens and Sparta after Sparta's victory at Amphipolis. Whether these efforts failed because one side or the other demanded too much politically or did not go far enough militarily remains a matter of dispute. So too is whether the Peace of Nicias, which Thucydides considered nothing more than an unstable truce, could have produced a lasting peace in Greece or was doomed to failure. Since the largest land battle of the war, at Mantinea, occurred during the Peace of Nicias, we might ask whether the Athenians should have committed more forces to help Argos defeat the Spartan army at Mantinea, or should have tried to fix the peace before it broke down completely. In addition, Athens launched the Sicilian expedition while it was still technically at peace with Sparta. What looked like a way for Athens to avoid a two-front war supplied an opportunity for Sparta to reenter the fray.

Thucydides' account of the Athenian expedition to Sicily reads like a Greek tragedy. It shifts back and forth between the home front in Athens and the field in Sicily, illuminating how events inside Athens shaped the planning and execution of the campaign, and vice versa. Sicily was a complex operating environment, and Syracuse, a city-state almost as populous as Athens, was a formidable adversary fighting on home ground. Despite its overwhelming material advantages, Athens found itself bogged down in a protracted siege of a walled city. Whether the resulting quagmire and military debacle stemmed from unclear political goals, inadequate strategy, poor assessment, or poor execution of an otherwise sound strategy remains a matter for vigorous debate. With defeat in Sicily, Athens faced a coup at home, revolt among its allies, and intervention by Persia on the side of Sparta. If Athens had not overextended itself, it might have won the war or at least avoided catastrophic defeat. Nonetheless, the Athenians proved remarkably resilient. They recovered from Sicily to continue the war for almost another decade. It was not until Lysander's victory at Aegospotami, enabled by significant Persian support, that Athens was forced to surrender in 404 B.C.

Finally, Thucydides' account of the political and strategic failures of this great democracy supplies an opportunity to look in the mirror. To what extent do modern democracies embody the characteristics of ancient Athens, and how much can we learn from the Athenian experience? If Sun Tzu was right to suggest that self-knowledge is the foundation of any effective policy and strategy, then is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens an

essential beginning for understanding the problems modern democracies are likely to experience in war?

**B. *Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Which power, Athens or Sparta, was the status quo power? Which was the revisionist power? Why? Why is this distinction important?
2. What were the proximate and underlying causes of the war?
3. What was the nature of the rival Spartan and Athenian alliance systems?
4. What were Sparta's conditions for going to war? What were Sparta's conditions for ending the war? Which power, Athens or Sparta, was hegemonic in intent? What was the policy intent of the other power?
5. Of Pericles and Archidamus, whose proposed strategy (keeping in mind Clausewitz's argument on the relationship of strategy to policy) held the elements of success? In what areas did the other strategist come up short?
6. The Peloponnesian War reveals the strategic problems encountered by a maritime power at war with a land power. Identify these problems and consider how well Athens handled them by evaluating the strategies it employed against Sparta.
7. The Peloponnesian War reveals the strategic problems encountered by a land power at war with a maritime power. Identify these problems and discuss how well Sparta handled them by evaluating the strategies it employed to defeat Athens.
8. What was the importance of Pylos? Why was Athens unwilling to conclude a permanent peace as a result of the peace terms offered by Sparta after her defeat at Pylos? Are there any lessons about war termination to be gained here?
9. Was the Sicilian Campaign a good idea badly executed, or a bad idea? Consider the ramifications of using the contributions of allies to pursue war for political objectives of little concern to them while left essentially unprotected during a tenuous peace that represents little more than an armistice. In what areas was the Athenian policy or strategy flawed? Why did the Athenian debacle in Sicily not result in a peace settlement?

10. Evaluate Athenian strategy after the Sicilian Campaign; evaluate Spartan strategy after the Sicilian Campaign.

11. What was the impact of Alcibiades on the war? Was he a product of the degeneration of democracy in Athens during the war?

12. Why, after the Sicilian Campaign, was Athens able to place herself in a position to end the war on favorable terms after Cyzicus and Arginusae? Why was peace not concluded at these opportune times?

13. What does the experience of Athens reveal about the sorts of problems democracies are likely to face in fighting a long war against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

14. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Athenian “realist” approach to strategy, as seen in the Mytilenian Debate and Melian Dialogue?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 3-483, 549-554. (Physical)

[Thucydides covers all nine course themes in his account of this war and compels his readers to think through the problems of strategy and policy.]

2. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74. (Physical)

[Kagan provides a helpful account for understanding the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.]

3. Hanson, Victor David. *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans fought the First Peloponnesian War*. New York: Random House, 2005. Pages 274 – 287. (E-Reserve)

[Hanson gives a good overview of the Ionian War and the defeat of Athens.]

4. Kagan, Donald. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Viking, 2003. Pages 437 – 490. (E-Reserve)

[Kagan covers the final years (408-404) of the war in these chapters, particularly the events surrounding the Spartan alliance with Persia, the battles of Arginusae and Aegospotami, and provides concluding thoughts regarding the war.]

5. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318. (Physical)

[Plutarch’s biographies of Alcibiades and Lysander highlight the nature of strategic leadership; the impact of democratic politics on strategy, policy, and civil-military relations; and debates within Sparta over how to terminate the war with Athens effectively. (Note, some students may be issued a different edition than indicated above and the pages for the chapters will not necessarily match. The entire chapters on Alcibiades and Lysander are assigned.)]

6. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230. (Selected Readings)

[Mahan evaluates the Athenian plans for a campaign against Sicily and provides insightful analysis on how the campaign might have been better executed.]

7. Nash, John. “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War.” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 71, no.1(Winter 2018). Pages 119-139. (E-Reserve)

[Nash describes how both Athens and Sparta used sea power during the Peloponnesian War, from diplomatic initiatives to trade interdiction and sea control. He focuses on the second half of the war from 413-404 B.C., commonly called the Ionian War. Students should pay special attention to his characterization of Athenian maritime strategy under Pericles as compared to under his successors.]

8. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages 3-13 (E-Reserve)

[This section of Walzer’s text applies directly to this case study in its treatment of the Melian Dialogue.]

**NOTE:** The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation

1. Walling, K. F. “Reader’s Guide to Key Leaders, Battles, Cities, and Concepts of the Peloponnesian War.” Naval War College, 2002. (E-Reserve)

[Use this reference, as needed, to look up unfamiliar names, battles, cites, and concepts.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

Thucydides argues that human nature does not change. Enduring questions arising from the conflict between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League thus remain with us today.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 3, 4

### ***E. Deliverables***

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 6 – Lecture (7 – 9 October)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays:* None.

### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 3-219. (Physical) [216 pages]

#### *Key Passages:*

Book I – pages 3-85. (Especially the speeches).

Book II – Outbreak of the War, pages 89-107.  
– Pericles' Funeral Oration, the plague, and the policy of Pericles, pages 110-128.

Book III – Revolt of Mytilene, pages 159-167.  
– The Mytilenian Debate, pages 175-184.  
– Civil War in Corcyra, pages 194-201.

2. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 15-74. (Physical) [60 pages]

Total Reading: 266 pages

## SM 7 – Discussion (13 – 16 October)

### Title: The Peloponnesian War: Its Beginning and Development

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Which leader did a better job of net assessment prior to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles or Archidamus?
2. "Sparta and Athens were dragged into a war neither wanted because of alliances which caused both powers to act against their interests and inclinations." Agree or disagree?
3. Evaluate Athenian strategy during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.).
4. Evaluate Spartan strategy during the Archidamian War (431-421 B.C.).
5. How well did the land power, Sparta, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the maritime power, Athens, up to the Peace of Nicias?
6. How well did the sea power, Athens, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in fighting against the land power, Sparta, up to the Peace of Nicias?
7. What was Pericles' strategy for winning, or at least not losing, the Peloponnesian War? In what ways did Cleon's strategy differ from Pericles' strategy? Which was superior?
8. Clausewitz stresses the importance of identifying the "center of gravity" in formulating a strategy to defeat one's enemy. Which power, Athens or Sparta, best identified and articulated its opponent's center of gravity in formulating a war-winning strategy?
9. What were Athens and Sparta's political objectives at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War? To what extent did Athens and Sparta pursue strategies compatible with the political objectives as these objectives changed during the war?
10. Athens sued for peace unsuccessfully in 430 B.C., as did Sparta in 425 B.C., and even the Peace of Nicias broke down almost immediately. Explain the reasons for these failures and the problems revealed about war termination.

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 223-483. (Physical) [261 pages]

*Key Passages:*

- Book IV – Athens' success at Pylos, pages 223-246.  
– Brasidas in Thrace, pages 263-272.  
– Brasidas captures Amphipolis, pages 279-285.
- Book V – Peace of Nicias, pages 309-316.  
– The Athens / Argos Alliance, and the Battle of Mantinea, pages 327-350.  
– The Melian Dialogue, pages 350-357.
- Book VI – Launching of the Sicilian Expedition, pages 361-379.
- Book VII – Athenian disaster, pages 427-478.
- Book VIII – Reaction to Athenian defeat in Sicily, pages 481-483.

2. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915. Pages 222-230. (Selected Readings) [9 pages]

Total Reading: 270 pages

## SM 8 – Discussion (20 – 23 October)

### Title: The Peloponnesian War: The Defeat of Athens

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Did either Athens or Sparta have an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow during the war, and if so why did either fail to do so?
2. Was the Sicilian Campaign a good idea badly executed or a bad idea?
3. Which theater commander was most skilled at using joint and combined operations to produce significant strategic effects, Demosthenes, Brasidas, or Lysander?
4. How significant was sea power as a factor in determining the outcome of the Peloponnesian War? What lessons can be derived from this conflict concerning the relationship between sea power and land power?
5. After the Peace of Nicias, who did a better job of compensating for its weaknesses and exploiting its strengths: Athens or Sparta?
6. The great strategic dilemma for both Athens and Sparta was how to bring strengths to bear against each other. Explain how each accomplished (or failed to accomplish) this throughout the course of the Peloponnesian War, and with what strategic consequence.
7. Thucydides implies that democracy complicated the Athenian conduct of war. Do you agree that this is a legitimate assessment of Athenian politics and civil-military relations?
8. In light of the Athenian joint campaign at Pylos, the Spartan combined campaign in Thrace, and the campaigns of both Sparta and Athens in Sicily, explain the risks and rewards of opening a new theater in an on-going conflict.
9. How did ethical considerations impact the course of the Peloponnesian War, particularly in the cases of the Mytilenian Debate and Melian Dialogue?
10. Sparta's withdrawal from the anti-Persian coalition created an opportunity that Athens exploited to expand her empire. Do hegemonic powers such as Sparta have a responsibility to remain engaged in political and military affairs beyond their borders?

#### B. *Required Readings:*

1. Thucydides. *The Landmark Thucydides*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: The Free Press, 1996. Pages 549-554. (Physical) [6 pages]

2. Hanson, Victor David. *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans fought the First Peloponnesian War*. New York: Random House, 2005. Pages 274-287. (E-Reserve) [14 pages]

3. Kagan, Donald. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Viking, 2003. Pages 437-490. (E-Reserve) [54 pages]

4. Plutarch. *The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives*. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. New York and London: Penguin, 1960. Pages 252-318. (Physical) [67 pages]

5. Nash, John. "Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 71, no.1(Winter 2018). Pages 119-139. (E-Reserve)

6. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages 3-13 (E-Reserve) [10 pages]

Total Reading: 176 pages

### **III. THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE**

#### *Sea Power, Joint and Combined Operations, and Irregular Warfare*

##### **A. Description:**

In June 1776, five days before the Continental Congress signed the Declaration of Independence, the British Empire launched the largest European maritime expedition in history to enable the British Empire to regain control of its rebellious North American colonies. The British campaign achieved spectacular operational success yet fell short of the political objective of pacifying the colonies. This case explores why the British military failed and the colonists, the weaker contender by any conventional standard, achieved their independence in a revolutionary war. The War for American Independence is of strategic interest because it provides an opportunity to study three different types of war at once. It was a war within a war within a war: an irregular or partisan war for the allegiance of the colonists; a conventional war between the Continental Army under George Washington and the British Army supported by the Royal Navy; and, after the British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, a global conflict among the great European maritime powers. Fighting stretched far beyond North America, with engagements occurring in the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, the West Indies, the South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the War for American Independence is of operational interest because its decisive battle, the joint and combined operation conducted by French and American forces at Yorktown, compels us to investigate the circumstances and conditions under which such campaigns are most likely to yield their desired strategic results.

A revolutionary war hinges on the struggle for the political allegiance of a group of people. That defining characteristic links the War for American Independence to more recent insurgencies, some of which we shall study later in this course. Nonetheless, the political ideology of the Patriots fighting for independence was quite different from that of more recent revolutionaries. The British leaders found it difficult to understand the motives impelling their enemy, even with the advantage of similarities in language and culture. This proved to be a liability for Britain and a significant asset for revolutionary leaders seeking to sustain and expand their base of political support.

The Patriots relied on all of the elements of national power and a mix of conventional and unconventional military operations. Patriot leaders employed these efforts differently, however. Washington preferred a strategy of decisive battle, while General Nathanael Greene preferred exhausting the enemy. Greene led a strategically effective operation coordinating regular and irregular forces during the Southern Campaign. Colonial support for the revolution was not unanimous, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Insurgents had to earn support and deny it to the enemy, who sought to do the same. Hence, this conflict requires us to examine how insurgents and counterinsurgents fight to sustain the loyalty of their followers, win support of neutrals and the undecided, and marginalize the influence of their adversaries. The War for American Independence also affords us a chance to evaluate how well both sides understood the security environment and the potential contributions of all instruments of national power.

This case also invites us to appraise the impact of foreign intervention in an ongoing war, along with the challenges of multinational cooperation. France intervened in 1778, followed the next year by Spain and the Dutch Republic in 1780. This made the war in the colonies a war within a larger global struggle against Britain and its empire. As the war expanded, British statesmen had to reassess their strategic priorities as their colonies in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and India became vulnerable. Meanwhile, France faced the challenge of how to develop the capabilities of American land and sea forces.

The global war was principally maritime in nature, fought for the control of the sea lines of communication between Europe and various colonies and outposts. This global naval conflict provides us with the opportunity to consider the strategic uses of sea power in light of the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan wrote his famous book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* as a member of the faculty and president of the Naval War College. By examining Mahan's critique of British naval strategy during the war, we confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce, and the material foundations of strategy; naval preparedness, land versus sea power; joint operations; naval concentration; calculations of when to risk the fleet; the decisiveness of naval battle; and the uses and limits of blockades.

This case also explores the strategic effects of joint and combined operations. Successful British joint operations in New York in 1776 and at Charleston in 1780 failed to yield the desired strategic results. Yet the only significant French and American joint and combined operation of the war, the siege of Yorktown by both land and sea, broke the will of the British government to continue the war. *Jointness* is not an end in itself, but a means among many to strategic success. Understanding why Britain failed to obtain her desired strategic results while the French and Americans succeeded may enable us to discriminate between the kinds of joint operations that win wars and those that do not. Discerning when to open a theater in an ongoing war, and how to use naval forces to support it, is surely part of the strategic problem. Many other factors also deserve attention, such as: the nature of the war; the availability of local support and intelligence; control of sea lines of communications; the willingness of allies to cooperate; civil-military and intra-military relations; coherent command structures; coalition leadership; and, keeping pressure on the enemy without passing the culminating point of victory.

This case explores the evolution of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army from the darkest days of the War for Independence, when defeat seemed all but inevitable for the Patriots, to his triumph at Yorktown. Washington's partisans ascribe much of the credit for colonial victory to his strategic and operational leadership, his understanding of the profession of arms, and his capacity for making decisions. After numerous mistakes, he adapted enough to deny Britain an early victory and sought decisive battles when the opportunity allowed. As much by necessity as by choice, he employed a Fabian strategy, or one that avoided large high-stakes battles in favor of wearing out the British Army. Although this approach required staying on the strategic defensive for most of the war, it enabled the Continental Army to survive. Tactical offensives supplied "incremental dividends" until Washington could seize the initiative and transition to the strategic offensive. However, even during the war, some

questioned Washington's skill as a strategist. In fact, many thought that the outcome of the revolution owed more to British blunders than Patriot generalship. A critical analysis of Washington's leadership and the failures of his British counterparts may thus aid in understanding the nature of strategic and operational leadership itself.

Washington did not bear the responsibility of leadership alone. Having served in the Second Continental Congress himself, he knew most of the political leaders of the revolution, many of whom were well-versed in the uses of information, diplomacy, intelligence, and foreign aid. The committee that drafted the Declaration of Independence employed it as a means of strategic communication and an information operation as well as a statement of principle. Nonetheless, the political organization of the Americans complicated winning the war. Congress was a coalition of independent states wary of any central authority that might become dangerous to liberty. Without the authority to raise troops and revenue on its own, Congress often found it difficult to support Washington's rag-tag army in the field with many wondering whether inflation, bankruptcy, desertion, and even mutinies in the army were a greater danger to American independence than the British themselves.

The War for American Independence case study includes readings from multiple perspectives, including Patriots, Loyalists, British, and French. This variety of viewpoints allows us to better grasp multiple sides of a strategic problem and particularly highlights the concept of interaction. For example, a stronger appreciation of British decision-making offers a window into the British war effort while helping explain why an American victory was anything but a foregone conclusion.

**B. Points for Consideration:**

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Assuming that the American War for Independence was a struggle for the allegiance of the American people, compare how well the strategies of American commanders and British commanders were suited to the nature of the war.

2. How "revolutionary" were the American colonial rebel forces in terms of strategy against regular British forces? Was there a different strategy for defeating the Loyalist provincial or militia forces?

3. How would Alcibiades and Lysander evaluate the conduct and outcome of the War for American Independence?

4. What was the nature of civil-military affairs between the Continental Congress (civilian authority) and the principal Continental Army officers (Washington and his major subordinate commanders such as Gates and Greene)?

5. What was the level of strategic and operational independence granted by the Crown to the field commanders? Did the civil authority attempt to influence strategy at the theater level?

6. What was the impact of American commerce raiding and privateering against British merchant interests? Did this aspect of the war have any bearing on military strategy, political decisions or public support for efforts to suppress the rebellion?

7. How should one assess the British “divide and conquer” strategy of 1777 that ultimately resulted in the American victory at Saratoga? Was it founded in sound strategic thinking and, if so, why did it fail?

8. What best explains the failure of the British Southern Strategy and Campaign of 1778-1781?

9. What were the “centers of gravity” of each side in the conflict and did these centers shift during the evolution of the struggle?

10. Could the British have formulated a strategy that would have been successful in achieving her policy objective of continued control of the thirteen North American colonies?

11. George Washington is a classic example of a general who lost almost every battle but still won the war – or more importantly, the political objective for which he was fighting. Could Washington have followed a strategy that would have achieved his political objective more quickly?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Ferling, John. *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015. Pages 4-318. (Physical)

[Ferling traces the events that led to civil conflict and a transformation of politics and society in America. The result was the War of American Independence, the outcome of which, Ferling argues, was contingent on leadership and strategy and remained in doubt until the very last year of the conflict. Even during the peace talks, the United States might have emerged from the war far weaker and more vulnerable than it did were it not for adept American diplomatic efforts at war termination.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39. (E-Reserve)

[Weigley considers American strategy from both conventional and partisan warfare perspectives, suggesting a symbiotic relationship between the two.]

3. Fischer, David Hackett. *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-181 (Physical)

[Fischer examines the strategic and operational planning and campaigns in 1776. He highlights the initial success of British joint operations in New York and George Washington's ability to learn from his mistakes in order to deny the British an early and decisive victory.]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987 Chapters 10 – 11, 14. (Physical or Selected Readings)

[Mahan analyzes British Naval Strategy while advancing a "blue water" theory of war at sea.]

5. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence," in *Revolutions in the Western World 1775-1825*, edited by Jeremy Black. London: Routledge, 2006. pp. 87-105. (E-Reserve)

[Mackesy explains the rationality of British governmental strategy, including the decisions by George III and Lord Germain. Mackesy analyzes British advantages during the war that made the ultimate American victory far from inevitable.]

6. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (E-Reserve)

[Pritchard examines the French decision for war, the French alliance with both the Americans and the Spanish, and the global naval war.]

7. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 165-203, 207-285, 320-361. (E-Reserve)

[O'Shaughnessy offers a red team analysis of the strategic environment built around the perspectives of key British personalities and decision-makers including Germain, Clinton, Cornwallis, and Sandwich.]

8. Taylor, Alan. *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. Pp. 281-311. (E-Reserve)

[Taylor addresses the post-1778 global war, showing how it threatened Great Britain's entire empire, not just the North American colonies.]

**NOTE:** The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. Third, Revised and Expanded Edition. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 255-276. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[These two chapters compare and contrast the ideas of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini on military leadership and risk taking and are very useful for analyzing the indispensability of Washington's generalship.]

2. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. "British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778 – 1781." Naval War College Paper, 2008. (Selected Readings)

[Carpenter examines the strategic and operational decision-making process of the Southern Campaign, and traces the failures and successes of joint-operations through the Franco-American victory at Yorktown, Virginia.]

3. Kurland, Philip B. and Ralph Lerner, editors. "Fundamental Documents of the American Revolution," from *The Founders' Constitution*. Vol. I. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, and University of Chicago, 1987; and Syrett, Harold G., editor. *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. (Selected Readings) [18 pages]

[These primary source documents aid in an understanding of Washington's Fabian strategy against Britain and the cultural, social, material, institutional, and international dimensions of strategy during this war.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

The American Revolution case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine the concepts of sea power, traditional and irregular warfare, and joint and coalition operations.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 3, 4

#### **E. Deliverables**

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In

addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

**SM 9 – Lecture (28 – 30 October)**

**Title: Lecture**

**A. *Essays:*** None.

**B. *Assigned Readings:***

1. Ferling, John. *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It*. New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2015. Pages 4-318. (Physical) [315 pages]

Total Reading: 315 pages

## SM 10 – Discussion (3 – 6 November)

### Title: Sea Power, Joint, and Combined Operations

#### A. *Essays:*

1. When the United States declared its independence in July 1776, what was the likelihood that the Americans could win the struggle with Great Britain?
2. Why did British military successes in North America during 1776 fail to produce a quick victory over the Americans?
3. Before July 1776, what was Great Britain's best course of action to achieve its objectives?
4. How well were the strategies and operations of Patriot and British commanders suited to the nature of the war pre-1778.
5. Was Patriot success in achieving independence due more to the strategic skill of George Washington or to the operational and strategic mistakes of the British?
6. Who would rate Washington better as a general, Clausewitz or Sun Tzu?
7. Was George Washington's decision to engage the British in the New York and New Jersey campaign of 1776 counterproductive to overall American strategic interests?
8. Was the use of information operations, deception, and intelligence during the American War for Independence decisive?
9. How did geography and loyalty influence each side's strategy? For example, did concentrations of Loyalists in New York, North Carolina, and Georgia have any bearing in determining British strategy?

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 4-14, 165-203. (E-Reserve) [50 pages]
2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 3-39. (E-Reserve) [37 pages]

3. Fischer, David Hackett. *Washington's Crossing*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pages 7-181 (Physical) [175 pages]

Total Reading: 262 pages

## SM 11 – Discussion (10 – 13 November)

### Title: The Globalization of Strategy and Irregular Warfare

#### A. Essays:

1. In *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, Mahan was harshly critical of British naval strategy during the War of American Independence. Do you agree with his critique? Explain why or why not?

2. The United States fought the War of American Independence as a coalition of thirteen separate states in alliance with France. How well did Washington and the Congress manage these different coalitions?

3. In 1778, after France entered the war, what strategic course of action should the British have followed?

4. Given the instruments of national power available to the Patriots, could the Patriots have won their independence without the assistance of France?

5. Why did British leaders find it so difficult to reassess and to adapt strategy during this conflict?

6. What was more important in accounting for Great Britain's defeat in the War of American Independence, failures in intelligence or inadequate concentration?

7. Why was Great Britain not able to translate its naval strength into decisive strategic effects during the War for American Independence?

8. How could the British have conducted joint operations in the South from 1778-81 to have won the war?

9. Why did Britain maintain most of its empire at the conclusion of the War of American Independence, while the end of the Peloponnesian War resulted in the destruction of the Athenian Empire?

10. How well did the belligerents in this conflict anticipate and respond to the surprise and uncertainty created by the fog and friction of the war?

#### B. Assigned Readings:

1. Mackesy, Piers. "British Strategy in the War of American Independence," in *Revolutions in the Western World 1775-1825*, edited by Jeremy Black. London: Routledge, 2006. pp. 87-105. (E-Reserve) [19 pages]

2. Pritchard, James. "French Strategy in the American Revolution: A Reappraisal," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1994). Pages 83-108. (E-Reserve) [26 pages]

3. O'Shaughnessy, Andrew Jackson. *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. Pages 207-285, 320-361. (E-Reserve) [121 pages]

4. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1957 or New York: Dover, 1987. Chapters 10-11, 14. (Physical or Selected Readings) [97 pages]

5. Taylor, Alan. *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016. Pp. 281-311. (E-Reserve) [31 pages]

Total Reading: 294 pages

#### **IV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR**

##### *Maritime Strategy, Joint Operations, and War Termination in a Limited Regional Conflict*

###### **A. Description:**

This case study examines the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), a conflict between an established great power and a rising challenger that sought to overturn the existing regional balance of power. Whereas Russia had been the dominant Eurasian land power throughout the nineteenth century, Japan started modernizing only in 1868. It defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and then fought Russia in 1904-1905. Japan's remarkably successful strategy reveals many of the key elements necessary to prosecute a limited regional war, notably well-thought-out coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national power, equally well coordinated land and sea operations, and foresight with regard to war termination. In contrast, Russian strategy illustrates the dangers of failing to understand the culture and military potential of the adversary. Despite Japan's success, however, this limited war did not resolve the underlying problem of regional instability caused by failing regimes in Korea and China where the fighting on the ground took place. Indeed, instability in Northeast Asia remains a dangerous international problem to this day.

The conflict examines fundamental geostrategic problems such as the relationship between land and sea operations. Despite major advantages in resources, men under arms, naval vessels, interior lines, and strategic depth, Russia lost the war to a rising power whose military transformation Russian policy makers had grossly underestimated. The limited carrying capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian link to Vladivostok and Port Arthur) precluded a rapid Russian troop buildup. This deficit in land transportation allowed Japan to achieve numerical superiority in the first half of the war. Japanese forces seized the strategic initiative before the Russian Far Eastern railway network could be completed, launching a surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur in Manchuria and landing armies on the Asian mainland in both Korea and China. The Russo-Japanese War demonstrates how the weaker side can win a limited regional war. It also highlights the consequences for a stronger belligerent should its leadership fail to anticipate, innovate, or exercise sound judgment in a complex and uncertain environment.

Yet, Japan's initial gains did not produce a rapid end to the conflict, which lasted for almost nineteen months. The fighting on land revolved around the desperate siege of Port Arthur (May 1904-January 1905) and huge battles fought in Manchuria – Liaoyang (August-September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and Mukden (February-March 1905). Neither side proved able to deliver a knockout blow. Rather, Russian forces retreated into the interior of Manchuria, stretching Japan's supply lines. This war thus illustrates the relationship between operations and war termination. By the spring of 1905, Japan was physically exhausted and Russia was politically unstable. Japan had also used up its financial and manpower reserves. Moreover, although Russia had overcome transportation bottlenecks to reverse Japan's numerical superiority in theater, the defeats suffered by the Russian armed forces provoked outbreaks of

revolutionary violence throughout the empire, with the result that Russia's will to fight began to evaporate even as it marshaled its logistical capacity to defeat Japan. War weariness led both sides to accept President Theodore Roosevelt's offer to mediate an end to the war.

Naval operations loomed large in determining the outcome of this conflict. Russian naval forces neither coordinated with each other nor with Russian land forces. The Vladivostok cruiser squadron caused consternation among the Japanese public when it disrupted commercial traffic, but only for a short time. Japan kept the Port Arthur squadron bottled up in port except for a brief period when Admiral Makarov was in command. During that time, Russian mines sank two of Japan's six battleships. After Makarov went down with the Russian flagship *Petropavlovsk* in April 1904, the Port Arthur Squadron reverted to inactivity. The Imperial Japanese Army ultimately destroyed the squadron at anchor while reducing Port Arthur.

In contrast to Russian paralysis at sea, Japanese naval forces commanded by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō focused on neutralizing Russian naval forces so that the Imperial Japanese Army could land men and supplies on the Asian mainland unimpeded. Indeed, the Japanese navy achieved a series of notable successes at sea. The Battle of Tsushima – at which the Russian Baltic Fleet was annihilated after steaming 18,000 miles from the Baltic Sea to Northeast Asia – is often considered a classic example of a decisive fleet engagement. The Imperial Japanese Army, on the other hand, jeopardized its primary mission of annihilating the Russian Army in Manchuria in order to prosecute a joint operation with the navy against Port Arthur. This division of forces deprived the army of the numerical superiority necessary to envelop Russian land forces.

An in-depth examination of the Russo-Japanese War highlights several enduring problems in strategy and war. First, the conflict was fought in Northeast Asia, then as now an arena for regional instability and conflict. The Russo-Japanese contest for primacy on the Korean Peninsula precipitated the Russo-Japanese War, while rivalry between the Soviet Union and Japan would be central to the conduct of much of the Chinese Civil War (1927-1949) and U.S.-Soviet rivalry lay at the heart of the Korean War (1950-1953). Examining the Russo-Japanese War thus provides a useful starting point for understanding the geopolitics, geo-strategy, societies and cultures of Northeast Asia.

Second, the Russo-Japanese War was Japan's second successful limited war fought both to promote its own regional influence and to contain Russian expansion in East Asia. Japan waged the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to expel China from the Korean Peninsula and to forestall the eastward Russian advance Japanese leaders believed would come once the Trans-Siberian Railway was complete. These two successive wars illustrate an effective strategy of using limited regional wars to achieve national objectives.

Third, the case shows how difficult it can be to develop doctrine to guide operations effectively amid rapid technological change. Before the war, many naval experts maintained that modern torpedoes would revolutionize the nature of war at sea. The erratic performance of these weapons during the war punctured such expectations. Conversely, naval mines, quick-firing

artillery, and machine guns yielded surprisingly important operational results. At the same time, the scale of the Manchurian conflict, and in particular the carnage on display at Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden, foreshadowed the horrors of trench warfare a decade later in World War I. This conflict was at the time, perhaps, the most observed war in history with military officers from many foreign powers accompanying the engaged forces, including a young Douglas MacArthur, yet neither the belligerents nor the majority of foreign observers completely understood these phenomena or the implications.

Fourth, the engagements on land and sea raise important questions about the interactions between land and sea power and the possibilities for combining different kinds of military power to produce desired strategic outcomes. Before Port Arthur fell, for example, the Japanese Army was compelled to face hostile forces on two fronts, both on the Liaotung Peninsula and in Manchuria. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Japanese Navy could not leave Port Arthur to refit and prepare for the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, lest the Russian squadron escape to disrupt vital sea communication between Japanese expeditionary forces and the sources of supply in the Japanese home islands. Joint operations allowed the Japanese to capture Port Arthur, easing these dilemmas. For its part, Russia suffered endemic problems with coordination. Indeed, the war demonstrates the consequences of Russia's lack of jointness and the corresponding benefits for Japan.

Fifth, the war affords an opportunity to examine the influential sea power theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both men studied the conflict, drawing lessons that molded thinking about the theory and principles of maritime war and analyzed the strategic effects of Japan's use of sea power and joint operations. The Russo-Japanese War can be used to compare and test ideas about sea power, naval strategy, and the proper relationship between armies and fleets. While Russia could reach the front both by land and sea, its sea lines of communication and lines of communication were long. Japan enjoyed much shorter lines of communication, but it depended on its navy to deploy troops on the Asian mainland. While Russia could have prosecuted the war without a navy, the Japanese could not, and Japanese shipyards could not construct state-of-the-art battleships. These differences raise interesting strategic questions: When should the belligerents have risked its fleet? Should Russia or Japan have focused on prosecuting the war at sea or on land? If on land, how far inland?

Finally, the termination of the war sheds light on how to translate military achievements into political results. Japan went to war only after using diplomacy to shape the international arena to its advantage. Having done so, Tokyo managed to end the conflict on desirable terms. Japan set the stage for strategic success by isolating Russia through its 1902 alliance with Great Britain and by planning ahead to seek U.S. mediation. The Japanese carefully integrated all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) into the planning, prosecution, and termination of the war. During the hostilities, Japanese military leaders determined the culminating point of victory, took Sakhalin Island at the very end to use as a bargaining chip at the peace negotiations, and coordinated with the civil counterparts to end the conflict before the balance of power on the battlefield shifted to Russian advantage. Russia provides a negative case in many respects. St. Petersburg's handling of the conflict was beset by

dysfunctional civil-military relations, the leadership's inability to integrate the elements of national power, and a lackluster approach to war termination.

### **B. Points for Consideration:**

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. In what ways did Japan strive to keep the war limited? Were the political goals realistic and achievable given the limitations on resources, manpower, and the spatial aspect of the conflict?
2. After the successful Port Arthur raid, did the Russians do a strategic reassessment, and if so, what conclusions were drawn regarding the nature of the conflict? Did the dispatch of the Baltic Fleet to the theater represent an escalation on the Russian's part or was it simply an operational reaction to events?
3. How accurate was the initial net assessment of each of the belligerents? Who did the better job in terms of defining a policy and formulating a strategy that would establish the conditions to achieve the policy objectives?
4. How did Imperial Japanese Navy operations contribute to the war's outcome?
5. George Washington successfully executed a Fabian strategy of avoiding major battles, protracting the war, and raising the adversary's costs during the War of American Independence. Why did a Fabian strategy work for Washington but not for the Russians?
6. Could an alternative Russian strategy have overcome Japan's geographical advantages?
7. How are the theories of both Mahan and Corbett reflected in the events of the war? What "lessons learned" appear to have been drawn from the war by each of the theorists?
8. Were the rewards Japan hoped to gain worth the risks it took by fighting a Russian adversary with much greater economic and military resources?
9. How well did Japanese and Russian military leaders understand the lethality of modern weaponry and exploit the transformation taking place in warfare on land and sea?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Paine, S.C.M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pages 15-75. (E-Reserve)

[Paine gives an overview of both the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and tempers the narrative of Japan's success with critical analysis of their failings.]

2. Connaughton, Richard. *Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan*. Third edition. London: Cassell, 2003. Pages 155-290. (Physical)

[Connaughton, a long-serving officer in the British Army, provides a detailed operational overview of the ground campaign from Liaoyang to the end of Mukden.]

3. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective : World War Zero*. Edited by John W. Steinberg. 1st ed. Leiden ; Brill, 2005. Chapters 6, 7, 9, 11, 23. (E-Reserve)

[*World War Zero* offers a wide and varied array of topics on the Russo-Japanese War. John Steinberg gives a clear, succinct operational overview of the entirety of the conflict. Bruce Menning delves deeper into the Russian strategy pre-war and in-theater, using Moltke and Mahan as a foil to analyze the Russian decision-making process. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka's chapter centers on the Siege of Port Arthur, and the realities and myths surrounding General Nogi's operational choices. Pertti Luntinen and Bruce W. Menning look at the Russian naval perspective, providing a companion piece to *Kaigun's* Japanese focus. Finally, Edward Miller addresses the fiscal aspect of the war, looking at Japanese debt as a necessary tool to prosecute the conflict *and* how it was used to help force an agreement during war termination.]

4. Koda, Yoji. "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 11-44. (E-Reserve)

[Koda, a retired Japanese Vice-Admiral, summarizes Japan's pre-war strategic situation, its wartime policy and strategy, and the lessons the Japanese drew from the war.]

5. Andidora, Ronald. "Admiral Togo: An Adaptable Strategist." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991): Pages 52-62. (E-Reserve)

[Andidora focuses on the Japanese strategic dilemmas concerning when to risk the fleet.]

6. Nish, Ian. *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*. Oxon, England; Routledge, 2014. Pages 238-257. (E-Reserve)

[The conclusion of Ian Nish's book on the origins of the Russo-Japanese War sets the stage for the war, explaining the motivations and objectives for both belligerents.]

7. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 94 -132. (E-Reserve)

[Peattie and Evans look at naval operations during the war from the Japanese perspective.]

8. Warner, Denis and Peggy. *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 521 – 538. (E-Reserve)

[Warner and Warner provide a detailed account of the discussions surrounding war termination at Portsmouth.]

9. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia,” in *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings or E-Reserve)

[Mahan presents his assessment of the naval strategies of Russia and Japan.]

10. Corbett, Julian S. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (Selected Readings or E-Reserve)

[Corbett outlines Japanese strategy and sketches a Russian alternative strategy, while the Appendix discusses the strategy that the Russians employed.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-193 (including the map), 215-253. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Chapter 13 highlights how skillful Japanese statesmen and commanders determined exactly how far to go militarily and what precisely to demand politically of the defeated, but still powerful, foe. Chapter 15 enables students to reflect on how well Japanese statesmen and commanders used deception, surprise, and intelligence in the planning and execution of their strategy and operations against a more powerful foe.]

2. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 52-93. (E-Reserve)

[Evans and Peattie address the Imperial Japanese Navy and examine Japan’s prewar preparation for a conflict with Russia.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

The Russo-Japanese War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine a regional, limited war and the importance of joint maritime strategy.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 3, 4

### ***E. Deliverables***

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 12 – Lecture (18 – 20 November)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective : World War Zero*. Edited by John W. Steinberg. 1st ed. Leiden ; Brill, 2005. Pages 105-128. Chapters 6 and 7 (E-Reserve) [52 pages]

2. Paine, S.C.M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pages 15-75. (E-Reserve) [61 pages]

3. Nish, Ian. *The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War*. Oxon, England; Routledge, 2014. Pages 238-257. (E-Reserve) [20 Pages]

4. Connaughton, Richard. *Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan*. Third edition. London: Cassell, 2003. Pages 155-290. (Physical) [136 pages]

Total Reading: 269 pages

## SM 13 – Discussion (1 – 4 December)

### Title: Great Power Warfare for Limited Regional Objectives

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Was Japan's success due more to the strategic and operational skills of Japanese military leaders or to a cooperative Russian adversary?
2. How well did Japanese operations cope with Russian strengths and exploit Russian weaknesses?
3. Could Russia have defeated Japan in this war? If not, why not? If so, why and how?
4. What were the most important Japanese operational mistakes, and how might the Russians have exploited them?
5. How successfully did Russia and Japan integrate the international dimension of strategy in their prosecution of the war?
6. Both Mahan and Corbett found evidence in the Russo-Japanese War to support their strategic theories. Whose analysis of the conflict is more persuasive, and why?
7. Should the Japanese have made the transition to defense earlier rather than staying on the offensive at Mukden?
8. Was Tsushima a decisive victory?
9. When and under what strategic circumstances should Russian and Japanese commanders have accepted greater risk in fleet operations?
10. What enduring lessons about war termination in a conflict fought for limited aims can be learned from studying the Russo-Japanese War?
11. Many contemporaries were struck by leniency of the Peace of Portsmouth to Russia given its poor military performance. Could Japan have secured a more advantageous peace?

#### B. *Readings:*

1. Corbett, Julian. *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. Vol. 2. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Pages 382-411. (E-Reserve) [30 Pages]

2. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little Brown, 1918. Pages 133-173. (Selected Readings/E-Reserve) [41 pages]
3. *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective : World War Zero*. Edited by John W. Steinberg. 1st ed. Leiden ; Brill, 2005. Chapters 9, 11, 23. (E-Reserve) [73 Pages]
4. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 94-132. (E-Reserve) [39 Pages]
5. Andidora, Ronald. "Admiral Togo: An Adaptable Strategist." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 44, no. 2 (Spring 1991): Pages 52-62. (E-Reserve) [11 Pages]
6. Koda, Yoji. "The Russo-Japanese War: Primary Causes of Japanese Success." *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring 2005): 11-44. (E-Reserve) [34 Pages]
7. Warner, Denis and Peggy. *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*. New York: Charterhouse, 1974. Pages 521 – 538. (E-Reserve) [18 pages]

Total Reading: 216 pages

## V. **THE FIRST WORLD WAR**

### *Prewar Planning, Wartime Realities, Reassessment, and Adaptation*

#### **A. Description:**

The First World War – originally known as “The Great War” – has been described as “*the great seminal catastrophe*” of the twentieth century.<sup>8</sup> By war’s end, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires had collapsed. Sixteen million Europeans had died, while many tens of millions more were scarred physically and emotionally. The war precipitated Europe’s geopolitical decline, facilitated the rise of the United States as a global power, and helped bring about the creation of the Soviet Union. Disgust with the war’s outcome provided fertile soil for extreme political views, including fascism in Italy and Germany. At the same time, the war left people in Britain and France so averse to another war that they found it difficult to counter the rising fascist threat of the 1930s.

Few in 1914 could have predicted that war would prove so catastrophic or entail such long-term repercussions. Before the war, Europe stood at the height of its influence and prosperity. Technological innovation, industrialization, and globalization – particularly in international trade, finance, and information – had brought higher standards of living to much of Europe. Even so, there were troubling signs. Each of the European great powers worried that the strains of globalization and industrialization would cause it to fall behind its rivals.

Furthermore, security concerns led to alliances and arms races, both on land and at sea. By 1914, the great powers stood in armed camps ready to use force to maintain or advance their positions. Ever-larger militaries sustained by nationalism, industry, commerce, and rising living standards, created the conditions for war on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, military officers were increasingly dedicated members of a profession of arms who focused on how to mobilize armies rapidly and employ them effectively. Many military planners believed in 1914 that a quick, decisive victory was possible through high levels of planning, preparation, training, and morale.

Few military or civilian leaders gave consideration to the consequences if the war became prolonged. Alliances caused the war to expand, preventing any one power from obtaining decisive superiority over its opponents. The firepower of the industrial age created battlefields of unprecedented lethality. The prewar strategic plans of both the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) and the Entente (Britain, France, and Russia) failed in great part because they failed to understand and adapt to the evolving interrelationship among strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. As the war became protracted, leaders tried to adapt. They turned to novel instruments of warfare such as submarines, poison gas, and airplanes, challenging existing

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<sup>8</sup> George F. Kennan, *The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

ethical norms of warfare and gradually erasing the distinction between combatants and noncombatants.

The war began in August 1914 with Germany launching the Schlieffen Plan, a daring western offensive designed to knock France out of the war before its Russian ally could fully mobilize against Germany's eastern flank. The German plan sought to avoid the numerical military disadvantage created by the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1893-94. The Germans realized that they needed to end any conflict quickly since Germany lacked the economic resources to wage a long war. The German war plan remains the object of considerable controversy since its failure set the stage for the grinding three-year slaughter of trench warfare. Studying the war plans allows students to conduct critical analysis considering tactical, operational, and strategic constraints as well as alliance considerations. Certainly, no belligerent completely anticipated or recognized the uncertain and complex nature of this war. These circumstances invite students to analyze whether more effective military options were available.

Like the ground war, the war at sea took diverse forms that highlighted competing strategies against a backdrop of new technological innovations and operational concepts. Prewar naval leaders became increasingly interested in the newest technologies and strategic planning. Navies went through nothing short of a technological revolution. The transition from wooden to steel hulls and from wind to coal, and later oil, for propulsion, coupled with new communications and weapons technologies, brought unprecedented reach, speed, and lethality to naval warfare.

Concurrently, theoretical writings about naval warfare proliferated. Previous case studies have introduced students to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both wrote in the pivotal years before the First World War, and their writings influenced debates about sea power, maritime strategy, and naval operations. Mahan's theories gained wide currency among naval and policy leaders of almost every great power and his writings arguably contributed to prewar naval arms races. Corbett's writings, focused on British strategic and operational problems, emphasized the importance of joint operations.

Many expected a decisive battle between British and German fleets to occur in the North Sea during the first months of the war, but leaders on both sides avoided risking their expensive fleets in hopes that events ashore would yield a decision. As the war on land deadlocked, the enduring strategic question about the proper use of navies in war reasserted itself. Were fleets too costly to risk? Alternatively, could one side gain command of the sea through battle, and for what purpose? Within the North Sea, the two sides faced a highly lethal environment populated by mines, submarines, torpedo-armed flotilla craft, coastal artillery, and capital ships. Although British and German ships did fight a sea battle at Jutland in 1916, questions remain about missed opportunities for the Royal Navy given its numerical superiority and the battle's ambiguous strategic effect.

Meanwhile, the struggle to control the sea lines of communication played out in two attritional struggles. Britain, with its dominant navy, could physically control the sea lines of

communication by conducting a distant blockade of Germany. Each year the war continued, the results became more devastating for Germany's economy as well as the morale and health of its people. In response, the German navy conducted a *guerre de course* or commerce-raiding campaign, a traditional strategy of weaker naval powers. By using new submarine and torpedo technologies to sink merchant shipping, Germany's commerce-raiding strategy broke with international norms. In the first days of 1917, the Germans made the critical decision to institute unrestricted submarine warfare allowing submarine commanders to sink any ship on sight. Their objective was to take advantage of Britain's dependence on imported resources and thus starve Great Britain into submission. German leaders had to balance the potential strategic rewards against the risks of provoking a hostile response from the United States. Ultimately, neither the German nor the British blockade proved effective in isolation.

As Great Britain committed to fighting alongside France on the Western Front, British leaders also sought to develop joint solutions to the deadlock on the Western Front. These solutions entailed strategies that utilized naval power to project ground forces into peripheral theaters in hopes of obtaining disproportionate strategic effects on the war's outcome. In 1915, the British spearheaded the Dardanelles campaign against one of Germany's allies – the Ottoman Empire. British commanders aimed at taking the Ottoman Empire out of the war while opening a line of communication with Russia through the straits between the Mediterranean and Black Sea. Attempting to break through this contested zone proved more costly than envisioned and showcased the complexity of planning and executing a joint operation as well as the difficulty of extracting decisive results from peripheral strategies. Although the Allies did manage to wage more successful peripheral campaigns in the Middle East and Balkans, one should question whether potential strategic rewards of these campaigns and the diversion of forces from the principal theater in France were worth the cost.

Contrary to popular opinion, the German, French, and British militaries never ceased in their efforts to break the deadlock on the Western Front. These efforts involved constant adaptation in the midst of an uncertain and costly evolving environment. Both sides developed infiltration tactics, aircraft, tanks, and rudiments of what eventually became known as combined arms operations. Such endeavors furnish a case study for understanding the difficulties of reassessment and adaptation in war.

By the spring of 1918, both sides were preparing offensives to end the war. The Germans struck first, taking advantage of resources freed up by their victory over Russia in hopes of winning on the Western Front before significant U.S. land forces reached France. German armies drove a wedge between the British and French armies, temporarily breaking the trench deadlock before grinding to a halt. Students should assess the reasons for the failure of the German offensive as well as the role of the United States in the German decision to ask for an armistice in late 1918.

Understanding the relationship among national security objectives, military objectives, and war termination from 1917 to 1919 remains a valuable strategic challenge. In hindsight, the treaties ending the war - particularly the Treaty of Versailles with Germany - contributed to post-

war instability. The European victors were exhausted and poorly positioned to enforce the peace. Yet the unprecedented costs of the war forced the victors to seek aims commensurate with the price they had paid. To complicate the postwar settlement, the United States, the only power not exhausted by the war, decided to disengage politically and militarily from the international system.

Were these the conditions of a doomed peace? As Clausewitz highlighted, the end of one conflict can plant the seeds for future wars. Students should assess whether a better means of war termination existed – one that might have prevented an even greater tragedy a generation later.

**B. Points for Consideration:**

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Contrary to the expectations of many European statesmen and soldiers, the First World War became a protracted war of attrition. Why did the quick decisive victories anticipated in 1914 not materialize?
2. To what extent and with what result did Britain and Germany follow Mahan's principles of sea power and naval warfare during the First World War?
3. To what extent and with what result did Britain follow Corbett's principles of maritime strategy during the First World War?
4. Were British and German leaders too risk-averse in the use of their main battle fleets?
5. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, rational strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers find this guidance so difficult to follow in practice during the First World War?
6. Which strategic theorist examined so far in the course provides the best insight into German defeat and Allied victory in the First World War?
7. What impediments hindered the Allied Powers in achieving unity of effort while executing a strategy to defeat Germany? To what extent did they overcome these impediments?
8. Were the German offensives of 1918 on the Western Front likely to result in a positive war termination for Germany?
9. What key questions did Allied and Associated Powers need to address in the war termination phase of this conflict? How well did the leaders address these questions?

10. After the First World War, the British naval leadership made the following critique: “some of the principles advocated [by Corbett]..., especially the tendency to minimize the importance of seeking battle and of forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with their [the leadership’s] views.” Is this a fair critique of Corbett’s theories?

11. What were the moral and ethical implications of using new weapons such as poison gas on the Western Front and unrestricted submarine warfare at sea?

12. What lessons, if any, should be drawn from the origins of the First World War when considering the current peer vs peer conflict scenario between the United States and China?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99, 281-307. (Physical)

[Kagan provides an overview of the causes of the war as well as showing that negotiation between great powers was possible, despite conflicts of interest. He also describes the end of the war and the problems of establishing a stable peace after the conflict.]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 3-31, 35-64, 99-340. (Physical)

[Sir Hew Strachan provides essential background information for evaluating the policies and strategies adopted by Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He counters traditional perceptions of the strategic deadlock on the Western Front by stressing the novelty of the war’s technology and the operational and strategic challenges faced by leaders on both sides.]

3. Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-554. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[The assigned chapters provide a valuable introduction to Germany’s operational doctrine, the evolution of its general staff system, and an analysis of the issues created by prewar technological advances.]

4. Doughty, Robert A. “France.” In *War Planning 1914*, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (E-Reserve)

[Doughty assesses prewar French war planning, command structures, and instruments of war. He analyzes their effectiveness given French performance in the war’s opening campaign.]

5. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 239-265. (E-Reserve)

[Kennedy examines Britain's response to growing threats from a rapidly changing technological environment in the maritime domain at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this section, he provides an assessment of British naval operations during the war.]

6. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82. (E-Reserve)

[Baer provides an overview of the United States Navy's role in the First World War, including the anti-submarine campaign against Germany.]

7. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163. (Physical)

[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure in war by exploring the Dardanelles Campaign and landings at Gallipoli.]

8. "In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)

[This compendium of primary source documents addresses pivotal points in the war when leaders reassessed and adapted. The first of these points involves the reassessment following the initial failure of the war movement in the fall and winter of 1914. The second point involves German decision-making culminating with the decision to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare in the spring of 1917. The final point of reassessment highlights war termination planning by Allied powers in 1918.]

9. Stevenson, David. "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation 1917." *The Historical Journal* 34, no.1 (1991). Pages 65-86. (E-Reserve)

[Stevenson analyzes the attempts to end the war in 1917 and why they resulted in failure.]

10. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (E-Reserve)

[Offer provides an account of the flawed assessments and planning assumptions behind Germany's decision to embark on a disruptive, asymmetric strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare.]

11. Stevenson, David. "1918 Revisited." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-139. (E-Reserve)

[Stevenson analyzes the war's ending, examining the failure of the German spring offensives and the different policy goals of the Allied leadership. Stevenson helps us not only understand how the First World War ended, but also grasp enduring problems with war termination.]

12. Halpern, Paul G. *A Naval History of World War I*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Pages 287-343. (E-Reserve)

[Halpern offers insight into the German naval strategy, the restricted (later unrestricted) submarine campaign, and the Battle of Jutland.]

13. Lambert, Nicholas. “The Strategy of Economic Warfare: A Historical Case Study and Possible Analogy to Contemporary Cyber Warfare.” In *Cyber Analogies*, edited by Emily O. Goldman and John Arquilla. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. Pages 76-89. (PURL or E-Reserve)

[Lambert offers a provocative reinterpretation of British prewar planning for economic warfare against Germany. The tradeoff he identifies between a blockade’s economic effectiveness and its political utility has immense contemporary significance for the United States due to its reliance on sanctions as a nonviolent tool of coercion and to the growing role of cyberwarfare.]

14. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 2015. Pages 172-175. (E-Reserve)

[This short section in Walzer’s book examines the ethical ramifications of the British blockade of Germany during the war]

15. Mayer, Robert. “Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade”. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 18, 1: 2-19, 2019. (E-Reserve)

[Mayer’s article directly and purposefully contrasts Walzer’s thoughts on the British blockade. More emphasis is placed on the Germany’s self-sufficiency and the German leadership’s agency in the face of the blockade.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 189-192, 416-418. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[In these sections, Handel provides insight into the transition from defense to offense and the dangers of continuing war past ones culminating point.]

2. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 270-317. (E-Reserve)

[Offer discusses in-depth the lead-up to World War I. Of particular note is Chapter 19 which discusses the legal and moral implications of a strategy of blockade.]

3. Rosencrance, Richard N. and Steven E. Miller edited. *The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of U.S.-China Conflict*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2015. Pages 71-99. (E-Reserve)

[Three scholars offer different perspectives on the Thucydides Trap, the origins of WWI, and the current U.S – China tension. Graham Allison argues for the applicability of the Thucydides Trap for both WWI and current U.S. – China relations. David K. Richards offers a counter-argument, arguing errors of governance was both the root cause of WWI and is the primary danger for future international relations. Finally, Charles S. Maier addresses how alliance politics and entanglements interact with all three topics.]

4. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 205-237 (E-Reserve)

[This section of Kennedy focuses on the lead-up to World War I and the challenges, both internal and external, to British naval dominance.]

5. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 145-214. (Physical)

[This section from Kagan provides a detailed account of the origins and outbreak of World War I. The concluding portion (205-214) features particularly insightful analysis that can guide students in the kinds of questions strategists should ask about war origination]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

The World War I case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine prewar planning, adaptation, and innovation as well as naval and joint military strategies.

This case study supports and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in the following CLOS, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4

#### **E. Deliverables**

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative

Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 14 – Lecture (9 – 11 December)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 81-99. (Physical) [19 pages]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 3-31. (Physical) [29 pages]

3. Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 281-325, 510-554. (Physical or E-Reserve) [90 pages]

4. Doughty, Robert A. "France." In *War Planning 1914*, edited by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pages 143-174. (E-Reserve) [32 pages]

5. Offer, Avner. *The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pages 354-367. (E-Reserve) [14 pages]

6. Lambert, Nicholas. "The Strategy of Economic Warfare: A Historical Case Study and Possible Analogy to Contemporary Cyber Warfare." In *Cyber Analogies*, edited by Emily O. Goldman and John Arquilla. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014. Pages 76-89. (PURL or E-Reserve) [14 pages]

7. Stevenson, David. "1918 Revisited." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (2005). Pages 107-139. (E-Reserve) [33 pages]

Total Reading: 231 pages

## SM 15 – Discussion (15 – 18 December)

### Title: Strategic Options and a Stalemated Struggle

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?
2. Did Britain commit a strategic error in carrying out major ground offensives on the Western Front in France and Belgium?
3. Was the Dardanelles Campaign a good strategy badly executed, or a bad strategy?
4. Once the fighting deadlocked on the Western Front by the end of 1914, what strategic courses of action should the countries of the Entente and Germany have adopted?
5. Were military leaders too slow to learn lessons from combat experience and adapt to changes in warfare brought about by new technologies?
6. Clausewitz argued that when the cost of fighting exceeds the value of the object, strategic leaders should seek a way to end the war. Why did the leaders of the great powers during the First World War find this guidance difficult to follow?
7. In what ways did pre-war alliance relations lead to the outbreak of war and what does that dynamic tell us about the nature of coalitions and alliances?
8. The Dardanelles Campaign is an example of opening a second front. What dynamics must be considered when opening a second front? Is it a good idea or a bad idea to do so and under what conditions?
9. What moral or ethical questions did new instruments and tactics of war (poison gas, flamethrowers, early strategic bombing that included civilian population centers, unrestricted submarine warfare) present?

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 35-64, 99-197, 233-265. (Physical) [162 Pages]
2. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. Paperback edition. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 133-163. (Physical) [31 pages]

3. "In Search of Victory: First World War Primary Source Documents." (Selected Readings)  
[46 pages]

4. Stevenson, David. "The Failure of Peace by Negotiation 1917." *The Historical Journal*  
34, no.1 (1991). Pages 65-86. (E-Reserve) [22 pages]

Total Reading: 261 pages

## SM 16 – Discussion (5 – 8 January)

### Title: Struggle at Sea and Establishing the Peace

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Did the First World War's conduct and outcome lend more support to Corbett's views on naval strategy or Mahan's?

2. Did Britain commit a strategic miscalculation when it became involved in major land operations on the European continent, forsaking Corbett's strategic advice that Britain's comparative advantage rested in its ability to conduct limited maritime war?

3. Did leadership at the operational and strategic levels of war adequately account for the ethical dilemmas posed by the use of blockades and submarines in commerce warfare?

4. Was the German decision to implement unrestricted submarine warfare in January 1917 a good strategic course of action? If not, what better courses of action were available to German leadership?

5. How and why was British seapower used and might there have been a better operational employment or overall strategy for the war at sea?

6. How and why was German seapower used and might there have been a better operational employment or overall strategy for the war at sea?

7. Clausewitz advocates that in war the result is never final. Was it possible to conclude the war in a way that resulted in a more lasting peace? If so, how? If not, why not?

8. Were the German offensives on the Western Front in the spring of 1918 a strategic mistake?

9. Could the Allies have defeated Germany without the economic and military contributions of the United States?

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. Pages 281-307. (Physical) [27 pages]

2. Strachan, Hew. *The First World War*. New York: Viking, 2004. Pages 201-230, 269-340. (Physical) [102 Pages]

3. Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Atlantic Heights: Ashfield Press, 1987. Pages 239-265. (E-Reserve) [26 pages]

4. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 64-82. (Physical) [19 pages]

5. Halpern, Paul G. *A Naval History of World War I*. Annapolis, ND: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Pages 287-343 (E-Reserve) [57 pages]

6. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. New York: Basic Books, 2015. Pages 172-175. (E-Reserve) [4 pages]

7. Mayer, Robert. "Noncombatant Immunity and the Ethics of Blockade." *Journal of Military Ethics*, 18, 1: 2-19, 2019. (E-Reserve) [28 pages]

Total Reading: 263 pages

## **VI. THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN EUROPE**

### *Waging Total War: Interdependence of Sea, Air, and Ground Operations*

#### **A. Description:**

The Second World War was truly a global struggle. Germany sought to conquer a continent and impose upon it a program of genocide and slavery. The Nazi regime overran continental Europe in the war's opening stages and appeared poised to achieve its political objectives. Germany's adversaries, however, mobilized their economies for war, deployed huge armies, navies, and air forces, and convinced their populations to endure immense sacrifices to roll back German conquests and destroy Hitler's tyranny. It was a fight to the death between irreconcilable worldviews.

Between 1939 and 1941, German military forces occupied Europe from Norway to Greece and from Poland to France, and into North Africa. Germany's only serious setback was its defeat in the Battle of Britain. Unable to force Great Britain to make peace, Hitler faced stark strategic choices. One option entailed continuing operations against Britain, including a submarine campaign targeting merchant shipping to starve the United Kingdom. Or Germany could undermine the British Empire by supporting its coalition partner, Italy, in carrying out a peripheral strategy in the Mediterranean and Middle East. A third option involved attacking the Soviet Union. This option meant violating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which had enabled Hitler to throw the main weight of German forces against Poland, France, and Britain. Hitler decided to do all three. As a result, Germany mired itself in a protracted struggle of attrition, fighting in the West, the Mediterranean, and the East.

Hitler's aim in the East called for the destruction of the Soviet state. He considered the vast natural resources in Soviet territory essential for a resource-poor Germany to carry out his quest for global hegemony. Moreover, Hitler hoped that the defeat of the Soviet Union would convince Britain's leaders to make peace and accept German hegemony in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of the survival of the British Empire. The German campaign in the Soviet Union eventually became the largest theater of land operations in world history.

Operation BARBAROSSA, the German attack on the Soviet Union, made stunning initial gains. Follow-on operations in late 1941 pushed German forces to the outskirts of Moscow, laid siege to Leningrad, and overran the Ukraine. Germany stood ready to invade the oil rich Caucasus region. These gains, however, did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet state. When the Germans advanced again the following year, they were checked and then defeated at Stalingrad. From 1943 onward, the Soviets pushed the Germans back. In the process, the Soviet Union bore the bulk of Allied casualties in the war against Germany (between 20,000,000 and 30,000,000 soldiers and civilians killed) and inflicted the majority of the casualties suffered by the German military.

The mortal threat posed by Nazi Germany forged an unlikely coalition between the Western democracies and the totalitarian Soviet regime. Defeating Nazi Germany required both

hard fighting and strategic cooperation. Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin worked to build and maintain the Grand Alliance that held together long enough to achieve victory over Germany and the other Axis powers. While the Grand Alliance subscribed to a common strategic vision for defeating “Germany First,” they argued over the proper timing of the Second Front (a large-scale invasion of German occupied France) and the exact role that it would play in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The controversy was not resolved until the first summit meeting involving the 'Big Three,' Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, the leaders reached a final agreement to conduct Operation OVERLORD in mid-1944.

American and British leaders faced difficult strategic choices in reconciling disputes over resource allocation, the timing and location of future operations, and competing political objectives. One should consider whether they made the best strategic choices among the viable operational alternatives given available resources. Courses of action including the Battle of the Atlantic, the air war in the skies over Europe, and operations in the Mediterranean should be evaluated, especially as they influenced strategic decision-making by Grand Alliance leaders on opening the second front in France.

In the Atlantic, the Allied navies fought to secure the sea lines of communication linking Great Britain with the world. The cumulative loss of merchant shipping in the Atlantic imposed a severe constraint on the strategic options open to the Grand Alliance. Britain’s dependence on imports made defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic tantamount to defeat in the Second World War. The Allies, accordingly, used naval, air, scientific, and intelligence assets to protect merchant ships from the German submarine fleet. The relative importance of each of these instruments to Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic, however, remains open to dispute.

Aerial bombardment was a new form of warfare, and this case study allows us to explore both the expectations of Allied leaders and the bomber offensive’s actual results. To provide a frame of reference, the readings for this case study include a piece on Giulio Douhet, an influential theorist of air warfare who wrote between the two world wars. Critics of Douhet maintain that his theories encouraged unjustifiable optimism about bombing’s efficacy that wasted scarce resources while magnifying the barbarity of war. Even so, his writings have proven influential in the development of air power strategy.

Allied leaders used intelligence and deception efforts as force multipliers. Although these efforts could be compromised and required skillful implementation, they did on occasion yield significant advantages for the Allies. Some historians have even argued that the success of Polish, British, and American cryptologists in breaking Axis codes dramatically shortened the Second World War in Europe. An examination of World War II in Europe thus provides a valuable opportunity to assess the role of intelligence and deception in warfare.

Anglo-American air power, intelligence operations, efforts in the Atlantic, and endeavors in the Mediterranean theater paved the way for Operation OVERLORD in June 1944, in coordination with Soviet action in the East. But how should students of strategy critique the relative importance of Anglo-American and Soviet operations to the defeat Nazi

Germany? Moreover, a political agreement at the highest levels on the scope and timing of the invasion had to occur. How did Allied leaders come to such an agreement despite very different American, British, and Soviet conceptions of how the war should be won?

OVERLORD was the most complex and intricate amphibious operation in the history of warfare, but it hardly assured victory against Nazi Germany. First, the invaders had to secure, protect, and expand their lodgment in France through weeks of hard-fought actions in Normandy. The Soviets contributed on the Eastern Front by launching Operation BAGRATION, an offensive that destroyed German Army Group Center and drove the Germans back to Warsaw. A combination of factors, including Germany's lack of air power, overextension on multiple fronts, dwindling fuel stocks, and material and numerical inferiority, ultimately allowed the Allies to break out from Normandy in August 1944 and liberate most of France by year's end.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, commanded the Normandy landings and executed follow-on operations while presiding over a joint and combined environment full of uncertainty. He held together a multinational coalition that included generals - and politicians - with clashing opinions and personalities. Eisenhower has been both widely praised for his diplomatic skill and criticized for some of his operational decisions. His leadership is perhaps the single most instructive example in this course of the problems inherent in leading the armed forces of an international coalition. The readings give us our own opportunity to assess his performance.

Although facing imminent defeat, Germany continued to offer stiff resistance: American combat deaths in April 1945 were as high as any other month of the war in Europe, while Soviet casualties during the Battle of Berlin alone numbered more than 300,000. Did less costly options exist, and what do these heavy losses indicate about the cost of defeating a resolute, ideological opponent facing what seemed to be hopeless circumstances?

### ***B. Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. What were the national policy objectives of Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and the United States in the decade leading up to the Second World War?
2. What were the implications of the United States choosing a "Europe First" strategy for both the European theater and the broader global context of the Second World War?
3. What alternative strategies could the Axis powers have developed to produce a more favorable outcome for them?

4. Why did the Grand Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States display greater strategic effectiveness than the Axis coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan?

5. The United States entered the Second World War with a “Germany First” strategy. By 1943, however, American forces were on the offensive against both Germany and Japan. Did the United States adhere sufficiently to the Germany First principle? Should a greater proportion of the available resources have been dedicated to the campaigns in Europe?

6. Was Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic a precondition for the defeat of Germany? What impact did the Battle of the Atlantic have on Allied strategy?

7. What were the effects of strategic bombing against Germany? Compare and contrast the actual effects with their intended effects and Douhet’s theory of airpower.

8. What were the potential risks and rewards of a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 as compared with 1944?

9. Could a better agreement have been reached at Yalta which might have prevented the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union? What lessons should have been learned with respect to war termination and structuring the post-war peace settlement from the First World War, and to what extent were these lessons incorporated into the settlement for Europe after the Second World War?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millet. *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 234-335, 374-483. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Murray and Millet’s narrative history of World War II focuses on the operational level of war. The selections cover the entire war in Europe from its inception in September 1939 until the surrender of Germany in May 1945.]

2. Matloff, Maurice. “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Matloff provides a policy and strategy overview of the Grand Alliance in the European Theater of the Second World War]

3. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 412-508. (E-Reserve)

[Larrabee provides an appreciation of Eisenhower's leadership during the Second World War. He also deals with the major operational controversies of the Normandy campaign, many centering on the relationship between Eisenhower and Montgomery.]

4. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231. (E-Reserve)

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the Battle of the Atlantic and in supporting the Allied landings in the Mediterranean and at Normandy.]

5. Wilson, Evan, and Ruth Schapiro. "German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941." *Journal of Military History*. Vol. 85, no. 2 (2021). Pages 369-398. (E-Reserve)

[Wilson and Schapiro examine the German strategic dilemma of the submarine campaign and demonstrate the German Naval War Staff's awareness of it.]

6. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 59-94. (Physical)

[Cohen and Gooch examine operational failure by exploring American antisubmarine warfare during the initial stages of U.S. involvement.]

7. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings)

[These five primary documents – a proposed strategy by the British Chiefs of Staff in December 1941, a counter-argument, in effect, written by General Marshall around March 1942, a September 1943 discussion of American and British military leaders, and an account of the first meeting between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Tehran in November 1943 – illustrate the critically different strategic concepts of the British and Americans and show how the dispute was finally resolved.]

8. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds. *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (E-Reserve)

[Hinsley addresses the potential decisiveness of intelligence obtained through Anglo-American codebreaking, analyzing how effectively the allies exploited their ability to read German coded signals traffic and how they used this information to influence various naval and land operations.]

9. Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age: The Heritage of Douhet*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1959. Pages 71-106. (PURL or E-Reserve)

[Brodie provides an assessment of the thinker he deems the most original air-power mind, Brigadier General Giulio Douhet. Brodie analyzes Douhet's strengths and weaknesses while assessing why his writings have been so influential among air-power strategists.]

10. Biddle, Tami Davis. *Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History*. US Army War College Press, 2019. Pages 1-33. (E-Reserve)

[Biddle examines the development and application of air power as an instrument of warfare from the interwar era to the present, introducing key air power theorists such as Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell. The text examines the theoretical and conceptual foundations of air power's use in warfare and whether those expectations were achieved during World War II.]

11. Doughty, Robert. "Myth of the Blitzkrieg." In *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically*. Lloyd Matthews, ed. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998. Pages 57-79. (E-Reserve)

[Doughty addresses the mythology surrounding the German campaign against France and the Low Countries in May-June 1940. He also explains why Germany was unable to replicate its success the following year when it attacked the Soviet Union.]

12. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-111. (E-Reserve)

[O'Brien reconsiders the traditional view that Soviet ground forces were largely responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany. He plays up the importance of American Lend-Lease aid to the Red Army and, even more, the powerful effects of the Anglo-American strategic bombing of the German homeland.]

13. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-42," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (E-Reserve)

[Wegner addresses the first two years of the war on the Eastern Front from the German perspective to showcase how German strategic choices relating to the war against the Soviet Union contributed to Germany's eventual wartime defeat. He also provides details on the role of Nazi ideology and decision-making by Hitler and his generals.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 215-253. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Handel mines Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao and other theorists to explore the role of deception in warfare.]

2. Douhet, Giulio. *Command of the Air*. Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998. Pages 3-10, 15-19, 31-35, 49-61, 125-129. (Selected Readings)

[Douhet, an early advocate of strategic bombing, sought to show that offensives by fleets of bombers would prove the decisive instrument in future wars.]

3. O’Neill, William. *A Democracy at War*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1998. Pages 301-319. (E-Reserve)

[O’Neill makes a fascinating argument concerning the limitations of a democracy in a protracted war, specifically as it relates to the temptation of airpower.]

4. Biddle, Tami Davis. “Democratic Leaders and Strategies of Coalition Warfare: Churchill and Roosevelt in World War II,” in Hal Brands, ed., *The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023), pp. 569-592. (E-Reserve)

[Biddle explores key differences between totalitarian and democratic states and examines Anglo-American strategic debates as well as disagreements over war termination and the desired political end-state of the war in Europe.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

This case study on the Second World War in Europe supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they can be applied to a large, unlimited war, fought as part of a coalition.

This case study supports and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in the following CLOS, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6

#### **E. Deliverables**

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor’s discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

**SM 17 – Lecture (13 – 15 January)**

**Title: Lecture**

**A. *Essays:*** None.

**B. *Assigned Readings:***

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 1-142, 234-335, 374-445. (Physical or E-Reserve) [316 pages]

Total Reading: 316 pages

## SM 18 – Discussion (19 – 22 January)

### Title: Toward A Second Front: Planning, Deception, and Joint Enablers

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Germany won a quick victory over France in the spring of 1940. Why could it not duplicate that success against other adversaries?
2. Assess the strategic thinking behind Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union in June 1941.
3. An analyst of the role played by intelligence in the Second World War writes: "If the Axis had possessed the best intelligence and the Allies the worst, the Allies still would have won." Do you agree with this assessment?
4. Did Germany have viable strategic options after Operation BARBAROSSA failed and the United States entered the war?
5. What were the most important strategic and operational factors behind the eventual Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic?
6. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, there were many who predicted that air power would play a decisive part in the next general European war. To what extent did the performance of Allied air forces in the European Theater of Operations from 1943 to 1945 confirm these predictions?
7. "Mahan's strategic theories are largely irrelevant for explaining the course, conduct, and outcome of the war at sea fought by the Western allies against Nazi Germany." Do you agree?
8. Without Allied success in the Battle of the Atlantic and the Combined Bomber Offensive, was a cross-Channel invasion of France possible?
9. Given the chief differences of opinion between Washington and London concerning strategy, how effective were US and British leaders in developing new ways of working in a combined environment?
10. Clausewitz advises belligerents to understand the nature of the war on which they are embarking. To what extent did Germany, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States understand the nature of the war when they began fighting?

## **B. Assigned Readings:**

1. Biddle, Tami Davis. *Air Power and Warfare: A Century of Theory and History*. US Army War College Press, 2019. Pages 1-33. (E-Reserve) [34 pages]
2. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 189-205, 222-231. (E-Reserve) [27 pages]
3. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: Free Press, 2006. Pages 59-94. (Physical) [36 pages]
4. Brodie, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age: The Heritage of Douhet*. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1959. Pages 71-106. (PURL or E-Reserve) [36 pages]
5. Hinsley, F. H. "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds. *Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Pages 1-13. (E-Reserve) [13 pages]
6. Doughty, Robert. "Myth of the Blitzkrieg." In *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically*. Lloyd Matthews, ed. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998. Pages 57-79. (E-Reserve) [23 pages]
7. Wegner, Bernd. "The Road to Defeat: The German Campaigns in Russia, 1941-42," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 13, no. 1 (1990). Pages 105-127. (E-Reserve) [23 pages]
8. Wilson, Evan, and Ruth Schapiro. "German Perspectives on the U-Boat War, 1939-1941." *Journal of Military History*. Vol. 85, no. 2 (2021). Pages 369-398. (E-Reserve) [31 pages]

Total Reading: 215 pages

## SM 19 – Discussion (26 – 29 January)

### Title: The Design, Execution, and Effects of Coalition Warfare

#### A. *Essays:*

1. How effectively did Eisenhower balance the achievement of strategic objectives against the interests of various coalition partners while accounting for the uncertainty of war?
2. Which proved more decisive in the European theater, Allied bombing or Allied sealift?
3. “Germany’s defeat in both world wars would not have come about without the arrival of a powerful United States Army in France.” Do you agree?
4. How did ideology affect strategy and operations in the European Theater of the Second World War?
5. “The Second World War was decided on the Eastern Front. All the other fighting fronts were of secondary importance.” Do you agree?
6. How would Sun Tzu have evaluated the exploitation of intelligence by the Allied leaders?
7. Judging from this case, the First World War, and the War for American Independence, what elements make for a strategically effective multinational coalition?
8. Which contributed most to the Anglo-American victory over the German armed forces between 1942 and 1945: the Allies’ superior application of force or the errors of German leaders?
9. Which theorist provides the best insight into Allied victory and German defeat in the Second World War?
10. Was the victory of the Allies practically inevitable in view of their economic and manpower superiority?

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. Murray, Williamson and Alan R. Millett. *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pages 446-483. (Physical or E-Reserve) [38 pages]
2. Matloff, Maurice. “Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945,” in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 677-702. (Physical or E-Reserve) [26 pages]

3. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Pages 412-508. (E-Reserve) [97 pages]

4. O'Brien, Phillips. "East versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 23, no. 2 (June 2000). Pages 89-113. (E-Reserve) [25 pages]

5. "The Anglo-American Strategic Controversy, 1941-43." (Selected Readings) [25 pages]

Total Readings: 211 pages

## **VII. THE PACIFIC WAR**

### *Victory at Sea: Prewar Planning, Military Transformation, Theater Command, and Joint Operations in a Major Maritime War*

#### **A. Description:**

The Second World War in the Pacific was the most intense and most lethal maritime conflict ever fought. It featured the main types of naval platforms that the United States Navy still relies on in our own era: surface combatants; aircraft carriers; and submarines. Aviation emerged as an integral instrument of war in the maritime domain. Near the end of the war, Japanese leaders resorted to *kamikaze* tactics, in effect human cruise missiles that foreshadowed naval warfare in the age of precision strikes. The Pacific War also illuminated the importance of information superiority and the electromagnetic spectrum in warfare. Above all, it provided a lesson of enduring relevance as to the importance of mastering skills necessary for joint warfighting.

The Pacific War presents an extraordinarily rich menu for exploiting a central theme of the Strategy and War Course, namely the strategic effects of operations. Initial surprise attacks occurred in December 1941. Japan seized the initiative, but to what end? Then, pivotal campaigns occurred at Midway and in the Solomon Islands in 1942. Success in these endeavors enabled the United States to seize the initiative in the Pacific while simultaneously pursuing victory in Europe. The global character of the war required U.S. strategic leaders to set priorities between theaters, allocating resources and capabilities to achieve U.S. national interests in both Asia and Europe while keeping the risk of defeat in either theater to a minimum. For America, a combination of what Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie terms “sequential” and “cumulative” strategies loomed even larger. Finally, in the war termination phase during the summer of 1945, U.S. leaders debated which courses of action would lead directly to a Japanese decision to accept unconditional surrender. That debate ended with the first and – to date - only uses of atomic weapons in the history of warfare.

Initial surprise attacks are a prominent feature of many Strategy and War Course case studies. In 1941, the transformational possibilities of carrier aviation prompted Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, to alter the traditional thrust of Japanese naval planning against the United States. Rather than waiting to engage the U.S. Pacific Fleet as it advanced across the Pacific, Yamamoto advocated a preemptive attack on the fleet using carrier aviation. American political and military leaders failed to anticipate a carrier aviation strike on Pearl Harbor. Moreover, U.S. Navy and Army commanders on Oahu failed to prepare an adequate joint defense of their bases.

That the United States was caught by surprise reflected the difficulties of assessing an adversary from a very different culture. Americans have experienced such difficulties repeatedly since 1941. That surprise proved strategically counterproductive for Japan demonstrates that it too found it hard to understand its adversary. A good exercise in critical analysis is to evaluate

the alternative courses of action open to Japan in 1941, in terms of both likely operational results and potential strategic effects.

Japan achieved extraordinary operational successes from December 1941 into the spring of 1942. In a noteworthy aberration in the normal pattern of bitter inter-service rivalry between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, Japan's military executed an exemplary series of joint operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Through these operations, Japan seized territory rich in valuable strategic resources, including oil. Never had a country gained control over such a broad area of the world in such a short time.

The first stage of the Pacific War drew to a close during the spring of 1942. Though Japan's conquests were immense, its leaders were no closer to terminating hostilities against the United States. Midway became Japan's next objective. As the Midway operation unfolded, both Nimitz and Yamamoto confronted one of the most important strategic decisions a naval commander may face: when to risk the fleet. Mahan's writings, which inspired Japanese naval leaders at least as much as their American counterparts, highlighted the strategic importance of risking the fleet but never fully addressed the operational concept of risk management. Students should seek to understand why Yamamoto and Nimitz were willing to risk their fleets at Midway, and also how the two commanders managed that risk. The way Nimitz put his trust in both his intelligence officers and his subordinate commanders is especially worth pondering.

As President Roosevelt had anticipated, the attrition suffered by the Japanese at Midway and in the Solomon Islands put them at an ever greater material disadvantage as American war production began making its full weight felt in late 1943. As a result, the U.S. was able to execute an increasingly effective combination of sequential and cumulative strategies. Cumulative strategies sought to degrade Japan's war making potential by targeting industry and critical sea lines of communication. The latter became the target of American submarine operations, while the U.S. Army Air Force based bombers in China to destroy Japanese industrial production. Sequential strategies focused on a two-pronged American offensive across the Pacific. One prong island hopped through the Southwest Pacific under the operational leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. The other prong drove across the Central Pacific under the operational leadership of Admiral Nimitz, employing new fast carrier task forces, underway replenishment, forward logistical bases, and amphibious force. Nimitz and MacArthur provide two examples of leaders attempting to manage risk while seeking strategic effects in an uncertain operational environment. All this helps us understand the need to reflect on the cultural dimension of war, be adaptive, and honestly reassess operations and strategy.

The Pacific War provides the most controversial case study for the analysis of war termination. As American forces developed bases in the Marianas in order to bomb the Japanese home islands, some Japanese leaders began to realize the scale of the strategic defeat that awaited Japan. Before the atomic bombings in August 1945, the emperor refused to confront the military leadership on the issue of peace. In traditional practice, the emperor reigned but did not rule. This allowed Japanese military leaders to circumvent civil authority, and they remained determined to fight to the bitter end. They anticipated that by inflicting heavy casualties on U.S.

forces invading Kyushu, they could compel the U.S. to back down from its policy of unconditional surrender. When U.S. forces took Okinawa in June 1945, however, the emperor began to exert influence behind the scenes in favor of a negotiated settlement to end the war. Students should consider the impact of divisions within the Japanese political and military leadership as they evaluate American options for war termination in 1945.

Within the U.S. government, there was considerable debate about two competing war termination strategies: invasion and atomic bombings. Strategists had to answer two questions. First, what operations would most expeditiously elicit Japan's surrender? And second, how could U.S. forces obtain Japan's surrender with a minimum of American casualties? Given ethical issues raised by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians and others have argued ever since over whether it was necessary for the U.S. to use atomic weapons. Their use underscores the difficulty of understanding new technologies, their ethical implications, and their strategic effects. It is worth noting, however, that no American political or military leaders expressed strong moral misgivings during the summer of 1945.

From the perspective of military success during the war and the enduring alliance with Japan afterward, the Pacific War could well represent the greatest American strategic success ever. But some might argue that the outcome of the Pacific War spelled future trouble for the U.S. American war termination strategy and policy, focused as they were on Japan itself, made virtually no provision for shaping the postwar fate of the broader Japanese Empire. In Asia, as in Europe, the United States thought too little, too late, about the regional balance of power that would emerge from the war. East Asia emerged as the most violent region in the world for more than thirty years with a civil war in China, major conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, and political violence and insurgencies. The Pacific War's ending, then, did not bring peace to the region, but created a new set of geopolitical conditions and ideological antagonisms that will claim our attention as we move forward in the course.

### ***B. Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Should the policy of the United States in 1939-1941 have been Europe First, Pacific First, or hemispheric defense?
2. Japan's attack in December 1941 against the British Empire and the United States is considered a classic case of deterrence failure. Why did the foreign policy and strategic steps taken by Britain and the United States fail to deter Japan?
3. Were the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War?

4. What alternative strategies could the Axis powers have developed to produce a more favorable outcome?
5. Why did the Grand Alliance of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States display greater strategic effectiveness than did the coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan?
6. The United States entered the Second World War with a Germany First strategy. By 1943, however, American forces were on the offensive against both Germany and Japan. Why did the United States begin offensives in both the European and Pacific theaters? Did the United States make a strategic mistake in carrying out these simultaneous offensives?
7. What role did strategic bombing play in defeating Japan?
8. How did Japanese strategic culture influence the decision to launch a surprise attack against the United States in 1941? To what extent did Japanese strategic planning reflect the realities of her military and geo-strategic position from 1931 through 1941, and, during the first year of the war with the United States?
9. Was the Guadalcanal Campaign decisive with respect to the outcome of the Pacific War? Evaluate the joint cooperation and contributions of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps to “turning the tide” against Japan in the Pacific.
10. Why did the United States adopt a multi-pronged strategy for its advance across the Pacific? Was it the most effective strategy available? To what extent did it give the Japanese military exploitable strategic opportunities?
11. Before the war, American and Japanese naval planners expected that the outcome of a war between the two countries would be decided by major battles fought by surface ships. To what extent were these prewar expectations borne out by the experience of the Pacific War?
12. Identify and evaluate the war termination strategies developed by the United States during the closing phases of the war against Japan. How did the precipitousness of victory against Japan limit the options available to the United States strategically for the post-war period along the Pacific Rim and set the stage for the Cold War?

**C. Readings:**

1. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[James provides a policy and strategy overview of the Pacific War.]

2. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189, 206-272. (E-Reserve)

[Baer provides an overview of the U.S. Navy's role in the development of American policy, strategy, and operations against Japan from 1940 to 1945.]

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517. (E-Reserve)

[Evans and Peattie address the IJN's doctrinal and institutional deficiencies as revealed in the Pacific War.]

4. Marston, Daniel, ed. *The Pacific War Companion*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-5, 7, 9, 11, and 13. (Physical)

[Chapters 2-5 cover the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 through their defeat at Midway in the first six months of the war; they focus on the key operations and operational leaders on both sides of the Pacific War. Chapters 9, 11, and 13 cover the Central Pacific Campaign, amphibious operations, and the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.]

5. Paine, S.C.M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Chapter 6. (E-Reserve)

[Paine addresses both the proximate and underlying causes of the conflict, explains the importance of peripheral operations, and engages with the complexities of war termination.]

6. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59. (E-Reserve)

[Parshall and Tully provide the Japanese side of the pivotal naval engagement at Midway in June 1942, including a close analysis of Admiral Yamamoto's operational plan.]

7. Prados, John. *Combined Fleet Decoded*. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (E-Reserve)

[Prados analyzes the role of American codebreakers deciphering Japanese operational messages and how this helped Admiral Nimitz to formulate his plan for Midway.]

8. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Pages 316-411. (E-Reserve)

[Larrabee gives students a good look at the leadership of the two American theater commanders in the Pacific War—General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz.]

9. Lee, Bradford A. “A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific,” in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (E-Reserve)

[Lee illuminates why the operations in and around Guadalcanal deserve to be highlighted in this case study. Note in particular the concept of a “pivotal campaign” and the relevance of Corbettian theory for a peripheral theater.]

10. Mahnken, Thomas. “Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943.” *Naval War College Review*, vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121. (E-Reserve)

[Mahnken offers insight into the naval battles off Guadalcanal.]

11. “The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War.” (Selected Readings)

[This compendium includes an important speech by President Roosevelt in February 1942, Admiral Nimitz’s operational plan and “Letter of Instruction” to his subordinate commanders for Midway, minutes of a crucial June 1945 meeting at the White House that considered war-termination options, and other primary source documents that shed light on American policy, strategy, and operations vis-à-vis Japan.]

12. Rosen, Stephen Peter. “New Blood for the Submarine Force,” in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (E-Reserve)

[Rosen emphasizes the major adaptations that the U.S. submarine force made in order to be operationally effective in the Pacific War, and the strategic effects of submarine operations against Japanese shipping and war economy.]

13. Wylie, J.C. “Excerpt from ‘Reflections on the War in the Pacific,’” Appendix A in *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (E-Reserve)

[Wylie distinguishes between “sequential” and “cumulative” operations and shows how both were important to the outcome of the Pacific War.]

14. Bernstein, Barton. “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu

Have Occurred?” *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609. (E-Reserve)

[Bernstein assesses the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States during the summer of 1945; he underscores the casualty aversion of American political and military leaders in bringing about the final defeat of Japan. It provides important context for assessing the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.]

15. Kort, Michael. *The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (E-Reserve)

[Kort addresses the United States’ decision to use atomic bombs in 1945. The author charts a variety of opinions put forth by scholars about key questions including alternatives to using the atomic bombs, the relationship between the atomic bombs and war termination, Japanese intentions to continue the war if the atomic bombs were not dropped, and ethical issues about using the atomic bombs.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as additional resources for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 53-65, 135-154, 215-254. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Handel discusses three key strategic issues that were significant factors in the Pacific Theater - attacking the enemy’s strategy, decisive victory, and intelligence.]

2. Millett, Alan R. “Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare between the Wars: The American, British, and Japanese Experiences,” in Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pages 50-59, 64-95. (E-Reserve)

[Millett highlights the conceptual and technical advances made in the 1920s and 1930s by the U.S. Marines in preparing to conduct amphibious operations against the Japanese.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

This case study on the Second World War in the Pacific supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to examine how they were applied in a period of rapid technological innovation by theater commanders using joint forces in the largest of all maritime wars.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4

### ***E. Deliverables***

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 20 – Lecture (3 – 5 February)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. James, D. Clayton. “American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War,” in Peter Paret, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pages 703-732. (Physical or E-Reserve) [30 pages]

2. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 119-189. (E-Reserve) [71 pages]

3. Evans, David C. and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Pages 447-517. (E-Reserve) [71 pages]

4. Marston, Daniel, ed. *The Pacific War Companion*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 2-5. (Physical) [68 pages]

5. Paine, S.C.M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pages 143-161. (E-Reserve) [19 pages]

Total Reading: 259 pages

## SM 21 – Discussion (9 – 12 February)

### Title: War in the Pacific: Adapting Strategy to Rapidly Changing Circumstances

#### A. Essays:

1. According to Clausewitz, “The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound anticipation of the likely nature of the war?

2. Arguably, in December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the world’s best in important respects. Why did that superiority not lead to victory in the Pacific War?

3. After successfully executing operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific by the spring of 1942, what should Japan have done next?

4. In the three years after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, did the United States adhere closely enough to the “Germany First” priority proposed by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in November 1940 and adopted in Anglo-American war planning in 1941?

5. Germany’s *Blitzkrieg* and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor both leveraged surprise. In comparing the operational and strategic advantages and disadvantages of surprise, did operational or strategic surprise turn out to be more important in these two examples?

6. Which had the greater impact on the outcome at Midway in June 1942—how Admiral Yamamoto designed his operational plan or how Admiral Nimitz interacted with his subordinate commanders and intelligence officers?

7. Compare how well Admirals Nimitz and Yamamoto managed the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chaos of war.

8. Given that the Pacific War was part of a larger global war, did it make operational and strategic sense for Japan to open, and for the United States to contest, a new theater in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1942?

9. Who had done the better job of prewar preparation for the Pacific War – the United States or Japan?

#### B. Assigned Readings:

1. Parshall, Jonathan B. and Anthony B. Tully. *Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of Midway*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005. Pages 19-59. (E-Reserve) [41 pages]

2. Prados, John. *Combined Fleet Decoded*. New York: Random House, 1995. Pages 312-335. (E-Reserve) [24 pages]

3. Larrabee, Eric. *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988. Pages 316-411. (E-Reserve) [96 pages]

4. Lee, Bradford A. "A Pivotal Campaign in a Peripheral Theatre: Guadalcanal and World War II in the Pacific," in Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, eds. *Naval Power and Expeditionary Warfare: Peripheral Campaigns and New Theatres of Naval Warfare*. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. Pages 84-98. (E-Reserve) [15 pages]

5. Mahnken, Thomas. "Asymmetric Warfare at Sea: The Naval Battles off Guadalcanal, 1942-1943." *Naval War College Review*, vol. 64, no. 12 (Winter 2011): 95-121. (E-Reserve) [27 pages]

6. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." Documents 1-5. (Selected Readings) [35 pages]

7. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 206-221 (E-Reserve) [16 Pages]

Total Reading: 254 pages

## SM 22 – Discussion (16 – 19 February)

### Title: Industrial Mobilization, Force Integration, and Regaining the Strategic Initiative

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Many prominent military analysts agree that concentration (or mass) is the most important principle of war. By disregarding this principle, did the United States commit a strategic error by dividing its forces between the Southwest Pacific and Central Pacific offensives from late 1943 to late 1944?

2. The official British historian of intelligence in the Second World War has concluded that Allied information superiority, achieved largely through codebreaking, hastened the end of the war in Europe by a number of years. Would a similar conclusion be warranted for the war in the Pacific?

3. Evaluate the alternative strategic courses of action open to the United States for terminating the Pacific War. Was there any better course of action to follow other than the one actually executed?

4. Did Japan lose the Pacific War because it was excessively preoccupied with winning decisive naval battles?

5. Did the United States win the Pacific War because it was excessively preoccupied with winning decisive naval battles?

6. Thucydides highlighted the erosion of both ethical standards and strategic rationality in a democratic political system engaged in a protracted war against a hated adversary. Does that classical insight apply to the United States as the war against Japan unfolded from 1941 to 1945?

7. Which peripheral operation offered more potential, the Athenian Sicilian Expedition or the United States decision to fight on Guadalcanal?

8. What does the Pacific War suggest about the risks posed by inter-service rivalries to effective jointness in the operational domain of war?

9. “Coalition partners were of limited importance to American strategic success against Japan in the Pacific War.” Do you agree?

10. Mahan did not foresee the role that aviation and submarines would come to play in naval warfare. Did these changes make irrelevant his strategic theories?

**B. Assigned Readings:**

1. Marston, Daniel, ed. *The Pacific War Companion*. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Chapters 7, 9, 11, and 13. (Physical) [73 pages]

2. Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Blood for the Submarine Force," in *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pages 130-147. (E-Reserve) [18 pages]

3. Wylie, J.C. "Excerpt from 'Reflections on the War in the Pacific,'" Appendix A in *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989. Pages 117-121. (E-Reserve) [5 pages]

4. Bernstein, Barton. "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?" *The Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1999). Pages 561-609. (E-Reserve) [49 pages]

5. Kort, Michael. *The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. Pages 81-116. (E-Reserve) [36 pages]

6. "The Blue Team: Documents on U.S. Policy, Strategy, and Operations in the Pacific War." Documents 6-7. (Selected Readings) [13 pages]

7. Paine, S.C.M. *The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pages 161-177. (E-Reserve) [17 pages]

8. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 222-272 (E-Reserve) [51 pages]

Total Reading: 262 pages

## **VIII. THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953**

### *Clash of Ideologies: Fighting and Terminating a Major Regional War*

#### **A. Description:**

This case study examines the strategic and operational challenges that the United States faced fighting a major regional war as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary. The time, place, and type of war that erupted on the Korean peninsula in 1950 caught the United States materially, strategically, and intellectually unprepared. Nonetheless, in response to North Korea's aggression, the United States decided almost immediately to intervene in the fighting under the auspices of the United Nations (U.N.). The Korean War helps us understand the capability of U.S. military forces to conduct a full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests, as well as the limits of that capability.

The U.N. suffered initial military setbacks before counterattacking. Its breakout from the Pusan perimeter and the landings at Inchon (Operation CHROMITE) were masterpieces of surprise, deception, and joint warfighting. Operation CHROMITE also highlights the fundamentals of joint operational planning. These remarkable operational successes, however, did not bring about a rapid end to the conflict. Instead, the war became even more difficult to end. U.N. forces sought to exploit victories and keep the pressure on the enemy by advancing into North Korea. Their advance prompted China to intervene in the fighting; the United States found itself embroiled in a major regional war. The failure to estimate China's strategic intentions and operational capabilities contributed to one of the worst battlefield reverses ever suffered by American arms. While U.N. forces eventually halted and pushed back the Chinese offensive, the fighting did not end. Instead, a costly, two-year stalemate took hold on the battlefield. The stalemate proved immensely frustrating to Americans, who had come to expect that wars would have decisive and unambiguous results.

Profound differences in ideology and strategic culture between the belligerents further complicated net assessment, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, operational planning, strategic choice, and negotiation tactics. The erratic course of the American intervention in Korea reflected the complexities of the first war fought for limited aims in the nuclear age. This case study showcases the difficulties faced by political leaders in developing clear strategic intent while empowering and trusting military commanders in the theater of operations. They failed to calibrate political objectives, keep strategy in line with policy, and isolate adversaries. In particular, Washington failed to reach agreement on key strategic issues with the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur. This case study highlights the contrast between the so-called American way of war and the strategic preferences, operational art, and negotiating styles of hardened ideological enemies, who sought to break the will of the United States' people, government, and armed forces and disrupt the U.N. coalition.

The origins of the Korean War can be found in the profound changes that occurred in the international strategic environment immediately after the Second World War. Vast areas of the globe were thrown into political, social, and economic chaos. In Asia, post-conflict stability

operations were further complicated by the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War in August, 1945, the actions of indigenous communist movements and the return of colonial powers in places like Vietnam and Malaya. Because peace arrived somewhat unexpectedly – at least a year before many had anticipated – war termination in Asia tended to be more *ad hoc* than in Europe. The former Japanese colony of Korea was partitioned between U.S. and Soviet forces at the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel, based on negotiations that took less than a week. Attempts to form a single government that would unite a divided people broke down, and a short-term demarcation of zones of occupation became a defining line between Stalin’s proxy, Kim Il-Sung, and the American-supported government of Syngman Rhee, each of whom wanted to unite Korea under his rule.

This case examines how the broad strategic guidance set forth by George F. Kennan in his long telegram, later published as the influential “X” article, and later by Paul Nitze in NSC-68, helped shape American strategy during the early years of the Cold War. The broader international environment played a key role in shaping the strategic and operational courses of action available to those fighting in Korea. While the Korean War remained confined in geographic scope, it was fought between two global coalitions. This competition between two ideological blocs both complicated the matching of policy and strategy and raised the specter that the fighting in Korea might expand into a larger regional or even global conflagration involving the use of nuclear weapons. The leaders in both coalitions made decisions at the operational and even tactical levels of war with an eye toward controlling escalation. Hence, our study of the Korean War allows us to better comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

An in-depth examination of the Korean War also highlights how the United States struggled to master the complexities required to think critically and strategically in applying joint warfighting principles and concepts to complex multinational operations. The geography of the Korean Theater played to U.S. strengths as a naval and air power. At the same time, the terrain of the peninsula negated many of these advantages, especially against the lighter and less road-bound Chinese forces. This case study thus permits us to assess the strengths and limitations of specific instruments of war – sea, air, land, and nuclear – for achieving strategic objectives. The bounded nature of this conflict further provides an opportunity to analyze the importance of interaction, adaptation, and reassessment in wartime. In particular, this case shows how difficult it can be to accurately determine both the culminating point of attack and the culminating point of victory.

This case study is valuable for understanding the importance of intelligence, deception, surprise, and assessment in strategy and war. Failing to foresee China’s intervention in the Korean War provides one of the most dramatic episodes in American history, along with Pearl Harbor and September 11<sup>th</sup>, of a major intelligence failure. Whether the failure to understand China’s intentions and actions stemmed more from simple ignorance, the difficulties of assessing adversaries from different cultures, willful disregard of clear warnings, or a triumph of operational secrecy on the part of the enemy remains a hotly debated issue among historians.

In addition, the Korean War highlights the special problems encountered in terminating a conflict fought for limited aims. The process of war termination in Korea was obviously frustrating to American statesmen and commanders alike and left a legacy that directly affected U.S. conduct of the Vietnam War and the Gulf War of 1990-1. While the U.S. ultimately realized its aim of preserving an independent South Korea, China's intervention and the protracted negotiations with the Communists greatly increased the costs of the war. American leaders also found that, in trying to reach a settlement with adversaries, it faced vexing problems in managing coalition partners.

Negotiating and fighting with the enemy formed but a part of the complex strategic problem in war termination that confronted American decision-makers and military commanders. The challenges associated with the values of the profession of arms were on display in tense civil-military relations during the Korean War. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense and the joint military establishment that endures to this day. The Korean War was the first conflict fought by the United States with this organizational framework. General MacArthur acted both as a multi-national (Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command) and a joint (Commander-in-Chief, Far East) commander. MacArthur's dual role gave rise to tense coalition dynamics, including Great Britain's concerns about the possible use of atomic weapons.

General Matthew Ridgway took command of U.N. forces following MacArthur's dismissal from command. The contrast between Ridgway and MacArthur as theater commanders is telling: Ridgway concentrated on the operational problem of evicting Chinese forces from South Korea. Coming from the Pentagon, Ridgway understood the administration's goals and undertook operations to achieve them. Although he stabilized the conflict, he failed to achieve decisive effects due to the massive Chinese military presence and significant Soviet materiel aid. The result was a stalemate from mid-1951 until the armistice in 1953. Fear of escalation—specifically, fear that the Soviet Union would launch operations in Europe while U.S. forces were occupied in East Asia—reinforced the stalemate, calling into question the utility of nuclear weapons at the operational level of war.

Having forced the enemy back across the 38th parallel in mid-1951, Ridgway opened truce talks but could not secure a quick peace. Negotiations yielded results only after the death of Stalin in 1953. U.S. troops remain in South Korea more than seventy years after the armistice to help defend against a potential renewed communist onslaught. A limited intervention to repel communist aggression and restore order thus turned into more than a half-century of enmity. This case illustrates the unintended long-term consequences of intervention in regional conflicts, showing that guaranteeing peace might demand a considerable and lengthy commitment of military power.

#### **B. *Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay*

*questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. What prompted Kim Il Sung to launch his aggression against South Korea? Were U.S. leaders consistent in employing the strategy of containment of unlimited geographic scope articulated by President Truman in his Truman Doctrine in the period leading up to the North Korean onslaught?

2. In what ways did U.S. strategic culture inhibit or enable a military response to North Korean aggression?

3. How did NSC-68 fundamentally alter the nature of the U.S. response to communist challenges around the world?

4. How important was the linkage between U.S. interests in NATO and Europe and the response to communist aggression in Korea?

5. What circumstance enabled the United Nations to respond militarily to the North Korean aggression against the South? Was UN condemnation of North Korean aggression a necessary or useful circumstance for U.S. conduct of military action?

6. Was General MacArthur's landing at Inchon a bad idea magnificently executed or a good idea?

7. Was the strategic reappraisal conducted after the success at Inchon correct in calling for a modification in political objective to re-unite Korea under democratic rule? Under what circumstances should a major shift in policy and strategic intent such as this be favorably endorsed? How should the United States have considered China and the Soviet Union in the net assessment which should have been part of that strategic reappraisal?

8. Evaluate General MacArthur's strategic reasoning regarding actions he advocated against China once that nation entered the war. Did President Truman have any other choice but to recall General MacArthur and replace him with General Matthew Ridgway? What effect, if any, did General MacArthur's relief for cause have in inhibiting General Ridgway's flexibility in conducting the war effort?

9. Was the second strategic reappraisal once China entered the war necessary? Aside from Chinese intervention, was the strategy of rollback viable given geostrategic concerns at the time?

10. What role did nuclear weapons play in the strategic equation? Did availability of the nuclear option provide any real leverage for the U.S. with respect to Soviet conduct, or was Stalin's knowledge of U.S. nuclear stockpiles extensive enough to negate potential fears of a nuclear attack?

11. Evaluate the war termination strategy of the United States and its United Nations allies. What lessons are to be learned regarding fighting while negotiating? Was President Eisenhower's threat to use nuclear weapons the deciding factor in precipitating an agreement with North Korea/China? What impact did Josef Stalin's death have on the conclusion of peace?

12. Why did negotiations with the Communists stagnate? Were repatriation issues the major stumbling block, or were there other dominant concerns? Given the strengthened relationship with Japan as a result of involvement in Korea, which player in the conflict benefitted the most from the Korean experience? How did Korea influence the relationship between the Soviet Union and China, and did this provide policy and strategy opportunities for the United States? If so, did the U.S. exploit them?

### C. *Readings:*

1. Millett, Allan R. *The Korean War*. "The Essential Bibliography Series." Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. Pages 5-95. (Physical)

[Millett provides an overview of the Korean War at the operational and strategic levels with good consideration of both coalitions and issues specific to the Korean domestic context.]

2. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 87-181, 213-239. (E-Reserve)

[Stueck provides an overview of the foreign intervention, war termination, the effect of the Korean War on the Cold War alliances, and its enduring impact on U.S.-Korean relations.]

3. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (E-Reserve)

[Osgood analyzes the Truman administration's rationale for intervening in the conflict and addresses problems that waging a limited war posed for the U.S. and its "Clausewitzian triangle."]

4. "X" [George Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 566-582. (Selected Readings)

[Kennan argued that the U.S. needed a strategy to contain Soviet expansion. This article played a critical role in shaping the strategic views of American decision-makers during the Cold War.]

5. "The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947." Pages 434-437. (Selected Readings)

[Truman's speech was a landmark in the articulation of American Cold War policy goals.]

6. “Summary of NSC-68, A Reexamination of United States Objectives and Strategic Plans,” April 7, 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library. Pages 1-6. (Selected Readings)

[The Summary outlines the key points of NSC-68, which guided U.S. security policy post-1950.]

7. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Pages 165-195. (Physical)

[Cohen and Gooch provide a detailed post-mortem of the intelligence and operational failures.]

8. “North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, Volume VII: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (E-Reserve)

[These documents illuminate the nature and resolution of the debate within the American government before the successful amphibious operation at Inchon, over whether the political objective of the U.S. in the Korean War should be limited or unlimited.]

9. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (E-Reserve)

[Schnabel details the planning and execution of Operation CHROMITE in the first section. The later excerpt reproduces instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur for his advance into North Korea in the fall of 1950.]

10. Hunt, Michael H. “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 453-478. (E-Reserve)

[Hunt provides perspective on Chinese Communist policy and strategy, including a contrast of how Mao and Truman handled the respective military commanders.]

11. Zhang, Shuguang, “Command, Control, and the PLA’s Offensive Campaigns in Korea,” in Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt (eds.), *Chinese Warfighting-The PLA Experience Since 1949*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (E-Reserve)

[Drawing on Chinese primary sources, including telegrams exchanged between Mao Zedong and Chinese People’s Volunteer (CPV) Army Commander Peng Dehuai, Zhang examines the Chinese military’s offensive campaigns during the Korean War, devoting particular attention to command and control issues.]

12. “Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall,” in Allen Guttman, ed., *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (E-Reserve)

[General MacArthur defended his actions in the civil-military relations conflict with Truman and his administration.]

13. Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Origins of Self-Deterrence” in *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (E-Reserve)

[Gaddis explores the development of American nuclear strategy and the deliberate non-use of these weapons from the end of World War II to the end of the Korean War.]

14. Crane, Conrad C., “To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2000): 72–88. (E-Reserve)

[Crane examines the views of senior American leaders about the operational utility of nuclear weapons during the Korean War.]

15. “Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. XV, part 1: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (E-Reserve)

[This brief summary of an interagency meeting called during the war discusses operational and strategic courses of action involving the use of nuclear weapons.]

**NOTE:** The following work is provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 165-213. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[In these chapters, Handel explores the tension between the principle of continuity and Clausewitz’s idea about the culminating point of victory. Handel also explores war termination and how belligerents convert military success into peace settlements. Specific issues that dominate this process include the questions of what to ask for at the bargaining table and how to maintain the peace after the fighting stops.]

2. Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. Pages 381-98. (E-Reserve)

[Weigley discusses the difficulty the U.S. had in transitioning from a World War II approach to war to a Cold War approach.]

3. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 12-26. (Physical)

[Clodfelter highlights the challenges that UN commanders faced in using air strikes to inflict sufficient operational and strategic costs on the Chinese to force them to accept peace terms.]

4. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 314-331. (E-Reserve)

[Baer examines the role of the United States Navy in the Korean War, as well as the overall maritime strategic environment in which the conflict occurred.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

The Korean War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to a major regional war in which the United States served as a leader of a coalition against a determined ideological adversary.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for the students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

#### **E. Deliverables**

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 23 – Lecture (24 – 26 February)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Millett, Allan R. *The Korean War*. “The Essential Bibliography Series.” Washington: Potomac Books, 2007. Pages 5-95. (Physical) [91 pages]

2. Stueck, William. *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pages 87-181, 213-239. (E-Reserve) [122 pages]

3. Osgood, Robert. *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pages 163-193. (E-Reserve) [31 pages]

4. “X” [George Kennan]. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 65, no. 4 (Spring 1987): 566-582. (Selected Readings) [17 pages]

5. “The Truman Doctrine, 12 March 1947.” Pages 434-437. (Selected Readings) [4 pages]

6. “Summary of NSC-68, A Reexamination of United States Objectives and Strategic Plans,” April 7, 1950. Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library. Pages 1-6. (Selected Readings) [6 pages]

Total Reading: 271 pages

## SM 24 – Discussion (2 – 5 March)

### Title: Containment and Korea

#### A. Essays:

1. Like Athens and Sparta, were the United States and China drawn into a war neither power wanted because of their alliances?
2. Did the United States make a strategic mistake in going to war in Korea, a region of minor importance in the larger Cold War?
3. Evaluate the operational risks and rewards of Operation CHROMITE.
4. Which theorist - Sun Tzu or Clausewitz - best explains the outcome of the Korean War?
5. Which belligerent suffered the most from exceeding their culminating point of attack and/or culminating point of victory? (*On War*, Book 7, Chapters 5 and 22)
6. Could U.N. forces have achieved more strategic advantage out of the sea and air power superiority? If so, how? If not, why not?
7. In examining the relationships between civilian and military decision-makers, which was more harmful to the American conduct of the war in Korea—the failure of the military to comprehend the political objective or the failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by force?
8. During the 1951-1953 war termination phase of the Korean Conflict, three strategic challenges needed to be addressed by both belligerents: how far to go militarily before making peace; what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and how to convince or compel the enemy to accept as many of your terms as possible. Which side—the Americans or the Chinese—did a better job overcoming these three challenges?
9. Was the decision for UNC forces to press north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel a strategic mistake?
10. Why did the United States have to accept a stalemate in Korea whereas it achieved its basic political objectives in World War II when operating on a much larger scale?
11. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians argue that “the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must” in international relations. Were they right, judging from the Korean War and the world wars?

## **B. Assigned Readings:**

1. Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Pages 165-195. (Physical) [31 pages]
2. “North Korean Offensive, July 1-September 15,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, Volume VII: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976. Pages 393-395, 449-461, 502-510, 600-603, 712-721, 781-782. (E-Reserve) [41 pages]
3. Schnabel, James F. *Policy and Direction: The First Year*. Washington: Center of Military History, 1992. Pages 139-172, 182-183. (E-Reserve) [36 pages]
4. Hunt, Michael H. “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 - June 1951,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 453-478. (E-Reserve) [26 pages]
5. Zhang, Shuguang, “Command, Control, and the PLA’s Offensive Campaigns in Korea,” in Mark Ryan, D. Finkelstein, and M. McDevitt (eds.), *Chinese Warfighting-The PLA Experience Since 1949*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003. Pages 91-122. (E-Reserve) [32 pages]
6. “Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George Marshall,” in Allen Guttman, ed., *Korea: Cold War and Limited War*. Lexington: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pages 26-52. (E-Reserve) [27 pages]
7. Gaddis, John Lewis. “The Origins of Self-Deterrence” in *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pages 104-129. (E-Reserve) [26 pages]
8. Crane, Conrad C., “To Avert Impending Disaster: American Plans to Use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2000): 72–88. (E-Reserve) [17 pages]
9. “Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, March 27, 1953,” in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Vol. XV, part 1: *Korea*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984. Pages 817-818. (E-Reserve) [1 page]

Total Reading: 237 pages

## **IX. THE VIETNAM WAR, 1965-1975**

### *Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Joint Operations*

#### **A. Description:**

This case examines the Vietnam War, from its origins as a colonial war through its transformation into a conflict that drew in great powers engaged in a global, ideological Cold War. From 1945 to 1954, the United States supported France with money and munitions in French efforts to restore control over the former colony of French Indochina. When the insurgent Viet Minh defeated France in 1954, the French government conceded full independence to North Vietnam, or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), where Ho Chi Minh's Communists solidified their rule. South Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), remained non-communist. The United States replaced France as South Vietnam's key patron. From 1954 to 1975, the United States sought to maintain an independent, non-communist South Vietnam against internal and external aggression. South Vietnam faced a hybrid threat: internal Viet Cong insurgents backed by the North, as well as North Vietnam's conventional forces, both enjoying the backing of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

After the French withdrawal, the United States expanded its advisory role to develop South Vietnam's capabilities and its armed forces. In 1965, the United States launched ROLLING THUNDER, a large-scale air offensive against North Vietnam to convince the North to end its campaign against the South. In the same year, the United States introduced large numbers of combat troops for the first time into the South. By 1968, the United States had some 550,000 troops in South Vietnam aimed at reducing enemy capacity and providing internal security. Air operations attempted to slow the infiltration of soldiers and supplies from the North while also convincing Hanoi to abandon its goal of reunification. In the wake of the February 1968 Tet Offensive, the United States accelerated its pacification efforts to quell the Viet Cong insurgency and gain more support from the population of South Vietnam for the government in Saigon. The Nixon Administration, in office from January 1969, increased the intensity of the air war and expanded the war to include ground operations in Laos and Cambodia. Even while expanding the war geographically, Nixon began "Vietnamization": withdrawing U.S. troops and transferring responsibility for the ground war to RVN military forces.

The Easter Offensive of 1972 was a major test of Vietnamization. A massive conventional North Vietnamese invasion was halted by the RVN military, supported by American air power. The defeat of the Easter Offensive, more aggressive bombing of North Vietnam in Operation LINEBACKER II, and concessions by the United States at the bargaining table persuaded the North to agree to a negotiated settlement. At the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the North capitalized on the perceived weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and the waning commitment of the United States. Even with these advantages, the North Vietnamese needed to agree to major concessions in return for a temporary peace. After the American troop withdrawal, a second, massive conventional attack by the North in 1975 was successful. The South's army collapsed rapidly, and the United States chose not to provide further political or military support to the South. The Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist.

This case highlights several enduring dilemmas inherent in nested wars: an internal conflict in South Vietnam, a regional war in Indochina, and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all the course themes apply in this case study, the case specifically highlights the following: Intelligence, Assessment, and Plans; the Design, Execution, and Effects of Operations; the Multinational Arena; and Cultures and Societies. In the realm of assessment, the readings underscore the difficulty and the degree of effort required to understand the character of the war and the major players involved—their enemies, their allies, and themselves. At various critical junctures after 1965, U.S. leaders also had opportunities to reassess the problem and their strategic options. Strategists continue to debate whether a more accurate assessment or reassessment would have produced a better outcome.

The United States confronted major problems when designing and executing operations to obtain the desired effects on the ground and in the air. The Krepinevich reading highlights the tension between the attrition strategy of 1965-1968 and rival ideas about counterinsurgency. Beginning in the early 1960s, the CIA worked in conjunction with Army Special Forces and the RVN military to launch a series of pacification and unconventional-warfare programs. U.S. military advisors also pressed South Vietnamese civilian and military officials to serve popular interests in the countryside, as analyzed in the Hazelton reading. Before 1965 and after 1969, the United States focused primarily on training, advising, and assisting the South Vietnamese armed forces in their efforts to gain the support of the southern population and resist insurgent and Northern conventional forces. In many of these operations, the United States often achieved tactical and operational success, yet the United States was unable to translate those successes into strategic results.

The air campaign represented another failure to turn operational success into desired strategic results due to challenges arising at all levels of U.S. political and military leadership. While President Lyndon Johnson and his senior advisers wanted to ensure that the air campaign did not completely alienate domestic opinion or lead to unwanted expansion of the war, the military saw the operation from a different perspective. The resulting Operation ROLLING THUNDER highlights challenging command relationships in the theater, the effectiveness of joint and service doctrine in an unfamiliar environment, and the role of political guidance. Meanwhile, the lack of clear lines of authority made the campaign difficult to coordinate. The case addresses how air operations translated (or failed to translate) into battlefield and strategic effects against a mostly pre-industrial nation.

Subsequent air campaigns including Operations LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II during 1972 present different obstacles. The first aimed at interdicting the supply lines supporting the Easter Offensive and then continued to attrite conventional enemy forces through the summer and fall. LINEBACKER II, an all-out air operation in December 1972 featuring hundreds of B-52 sorties over Hanoi and Haiphong, was intended to compel the North to sign the agreement it had accepted in October of that year. While the communists did sign the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, the impact of LINEBACKER II on their acquiescence remains controversial.

As with later wars, this case raises questions about achieving a productive and ethical relationship among allies, and between patrons and clients, during wartime. The readings demonstrate that the relationship between the United States and its South Vietnamese allies was far from ideal. The United States was consistently frustrated by what it saw as Vietnamese corruption, tepid commitment, political machinations, and dependence. At the same time, U.S. forces demonstrated serious failures to understand Vietnamese culture and society. The Vietnamese government and military resented the American tendency to dominate and dictate the direction of the war during peak U.S. involvement, only to unload all responsibilities in the name of Vietnamization. Experts continue to disagree about the relative success or failure of Vietnamization, resting their arguments on interpretations of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign, the Easter Offensive of 1972, Congressional behavior, or the collapse of the RVN in 1975.

This case also considers the broader consequences of withdrawal from protracted conflicts. The U.S. decisions to persevere and escalate in Vietnam often stemmed from concerns about the consequences of withdrawal. In the minds of many hawks, withdrawal from Vietnam would lead to the collapse of neighboring regimes (under the “domino theory”) and damage the credibility of American commitments worldwide, including the main Cold War theater in Europe. Opponents of the war argued that withdrawal was unlikely to damage U.S. credibility or precipitate a regional collapse. The subsequent course of events in Indochina supports elements of both arguments. The fall of Laos in 1975 and the nightmarish civil wars in Cambodia might appear to support the hawks’ fears of regional collapse. By contrast, Thailand’s successful resistance and the emergence of a regional rivalry between China and Vietnam appear to support more dovish arguments. This debate, in turn, forces one to consider the second- and third-order effects of opening a new theater. Students should consider the parallels between the dilemmas the United States faced in Vietnam and more recent challenges.

### ***B. Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Why didn’t the United States adhere to the 1954 Geneva accords calling for elections in Vietnam to unite that country? Given the United States’ position on those accords, were there any options short of military involvement open to the U.S.?

2. What, if any, were the U.S. interests in Vietnam? The stated interest was to create a “free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam.” Was that objective consistent with the U.S. policy of containment? If so, what strategies of containment supporting that policy were being applied (limited geographic scope, unlimited geographic scope, rollback)? What was the U.S. trying to contain: monolithic (Moscow-led) Communism; Chinese-style Communism; or a particularly nationalistic form of North Vietnamese-style Communism? Does the answer to that question

have any implications for the nature of American involvement in Vietnam or the policy and strategy options?

3. What, if any, were the inhibitors to achieving a “free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam?” What are the implications of these inhibitors for the formulation of policy, strategy, and operations?

4. How stable was the government of South Vietnam? Was South Vietnam a suitable alliance partner? How well, in fact, did the United States know its friend - let alone its enemy - in the period leading up to significant military involvement in Vietnam? What conditions would the U.S. have had to create to achieve its policy objective of a “free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam?” What are the implications for strategy and operations of achieving this condition?

5. Characterize the three phases of the war - 1954-1964, 1965-1968, and 1969-1975. What were the strategies actually employed by the U.S. during each of those periods? Were these strategies consistent with U.S. policy objectives? If not, why not? Given the nature of the conflict – against North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, an urban insurgency, and guerrilla warfare being conducted from sanctuaries simultaneously – were there viable alternatives to the strategies actually employed in Vietnam?

6. What were the strong points and drawbacks of the pacification operations employed in Vietnam? At what point(s) in the conflict was/were strategic reassessment(s) required? What operations were actually conducted and with what significance?

7. Evaluate North Vietnamese policy, strategy, and operations. What condition did the North Vietnamese have to create to achieve the political objective and how? Were the North Vietnamese more astute than the U.S. in areas of policy and strategy? Sun Tzu said as his first axiom “attack your enemy’s strategy.” How well did the North Vietnamese do that during the conflict? Were there options for the U.S. and the South Vietnamese to attack North Vietnamese strategy?

8. What was the Vietnamese conflict all about? Was there ever any real prospect for the South Vietnamese leadership to “win the hearts and minds” of the people in this civil war? Considering the French imperialist involvement in Vietnam, were there any inherent inhibitors to effective U.S. action on behalf of the South Vietnamese? To what extent did U.S. racial biases and the “go it alone” attitude inhibit effective U.S. strategy? How important was the role of public opinion in framing U.S. options during the war? How well did the “Clausewitzian Trinity” hold up and with what consequences?

9. One theme that should be considered during this course is the responsibility of commanders to the troops. At some point in the conflict, many U.S. commanders came to the realization that the courses of action were not working. Did U.S. commanders abrogate responsibilities to the forces? If so, what options were open and why were these options not

taken? Overall, how did the civil-military relationship hold up during the involvement in Vietnam?

10. Remembering Korea, how well did the United States leadership learn from that conflict concerning war termination and negotiation? What lessons are to be learned here? Evaluate the U.S. dual-track negotiating strategy for the Vietnam conflict. Was turning the war effort over to the South Vietnamese a viable option? Had President Nixon not resigned in 1974, could the threat of resumption of U.S. bombing alone have sufficiently modified North Vietnamese behavior? All things considered, was there any strategy that could enable the United States to achieve its policy of either a “free, independent, and non-communist Vietnam” or containment of some form of Communism? What moral implications are there regarding U.S. military conduct and the way the war ended?

11. Some would contend that nations learn more for future conflicts when a war is lost rather than won. What lessons should have been learned from the war in Vietnam, and how well has the U.S. actually made use of such lessons? What lessons from previous wars of U.S. involvement could have been profitably incorporated in Vietnam?

12. Stansfield Turner saw the Peloponnesian War, and specifically the Sicilian Expedition, as crucial to making sense of America’s experience in Vietnam. To what degree does Thucydides help us understand the strategic challenges the U.S. faced in Vietnam?

13. During the war, General William Westmoreland was reading and re-reading Mao and Sun Tzu, and he also had his staff and subordinates read these books. Was this a waste of their time?

### **C. Readings:**

1. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275. (Physical)

[Krepinevich shows how the Army attempted to apply conventional doctrine in Vietnam.]

2. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210. (Physical)

[Clodfelter discusses air power doctrine, broader civilian concerns, operational problems, and strategic effects of ROLLING THUNDER, LINEBACKER I, and LINEBACKER II.]

3. Hazelton, Jacqueline L. “The client gets a vote: counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2020. 43:1, 126-153. (E-Reserve)

[Hazelton, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department, argues that U.S. military officers in the advisory period believed in the need for reforms and pressed their South Vietnamese counterparts to implement them. This article identifies the client state's ability and will to resist reforms as an important, overlooked element of counterinsurgency campaigns. Further, it challenges Krepinevich's argument that U.S. advisors did not understand what successful counterinsurgency required.]

4. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 212-252. (Selected Reading)

[Pike focuses on *dau tranh*, or "struggle,"— the essence of Viet Cong political and military strategy and argues that no effective counterstrategy to it was yet known to exist.]

5. Willbanks, James. *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (E-Reserve)

[Willbanks examines the Easter Offensive of 1972, providing important insights on South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese strategies, the role of United States air power, and the mixed results of Vietnamization.]

6. Andrade, Dale. "Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War", *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 2008. 19:2, 145-181. (E-Reserve)

[Andrade provides another potential counterpoint to Krepinevich, arguing that there was very little choice available for Westmoreland in Vietnam, given the constraints of the theater. He also makes a larger point about how to learn lessons from war, and the dangers of flawed retrospective analysis.]

7. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: The Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308. (E-Reserve)

[Bergerud discusses U.S. and Communist strategies during the period of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign and the overall effects by focusing on one key province.]

8. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393. (E-Reserve)

[Baer discusses the Navy's role during the war, including its riverine campaign.]

9. Haun, Phil and Jackson, Colin. "Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II." *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/16). Pages 139-178. [E-Reserve/PURL]

[Two former professors in the Strategy and Policy Department offer a rejoinder to Clodfelter. They argue that air power was quite effective in direct attacks on the North Vietnamese Army.]

10. Final Paris Peace Accord, 1973. (Selected Readings)

[This is the text of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973. This reading offers an opportunity to ask to what extent the terms of the peace contributed to its fragility.]

11. Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. *Hanoi's War : an International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. Pages 231-304. (E-Reserve)

[In the final chapters of her book covering the multinational dimensions of the Vietnam War, Nguyen provides a broader Cold War context for the peace negotiations and eventual evacuation of Vietnam.]

12. United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, XII. in "Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 – December 7." (Selected Readings)

[A summary of the issues facing the working group formed in the fall of 1964 as they debated the merits of escalation in Vietnam]

13. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages 95-100. (E-Reserve)

[In these sections, Walzer examines the ethics and justification of intervention.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation and for the role-play exercise listed in Annex B:

1. Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 91-117. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Handel provides a framework for discussing the most perplexing aspect of the Vietnam War, the nature of the conflict as defined by the various theorists.]

2. Komer, Robert. *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972. Pages 1-10, 37-45, 64-68, 106-118, 151-161. (Selected Readings)

[Komer, who headed the CORDS program in Vietnam, examines the bureaucratic obstacles that inhibited effective interagency participation.]

3. Vietnam Contingency Planning, October 1969, National Security Council Files, Box 89, Folder 2, and Box 122, Folder 6, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Archives. (Selected Readings)

[Declassified documents reveal that the United States developed plans in 1969 to attack critical infrastructure, logistical networks, and air defense capabilities in North Vietnam, as well as to mine North Vietnamese waters to reduce the flow of supplies.]

#### **D. *Learning Outcomes:***

The Vietnam War case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its allies should cope with a regional, limited war across the spectrum of politico-military operations ranging from counterinsurgency to conventional military engagements.

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for the students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4

#### **E. *Deliverables***

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

**SM 25 – Lecture (10 – 12 March)**

**Title: Lecture**

**A. *Essays:*** None.

**B. *Assigned Readings:***

1. Krepinevich, Andrew F. *The Army and Vietnam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. Pages 131-275. (Physical) [145 pages]

2. Clodfelter, Mark. *The Limits of Air Power*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006. Pages 73-210. (Physical) [138 pages]

Total Readings: 283 pages

## SM 26 – Discussion (16 – 19 March)

### Title: Engagement and Escalation

#### A. Essays:

1. How might existing Army doctrine have been modified in an attempt to improve pacification efforts in South Vietnam?

2. Walzer notes that “the goal of counter-intervention is not to win the war,” (100) echoing President Kennedy’s assertion about South Vietnam that “...it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it.” Based on the American experience in Vietnam, how can military leaders best craft a strategy in situations without a clear theory of victory?

3. How and why did the U.S. senior civilian leadership attempt to control Operation ROLLING THUNDER, and did they contribute to the realization of their political objectives? How did that dynamic affect Civil-Military Relations?

4. How did joint planning, command relationships, and overlapping command authority affect the use of air power during the Vietnam War?

5. What best explains the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to have a decisive effect in the Vietnam War?

6. Were the most important security problems within South Vietnam susceptible to the application of U.S. military power?

7. What is an appropriate division of labor between external sponsors and client states in the prosecution of counterinsurgency?

8. What would an effective counter to the *dau tranh* mode of warfare have required?

9. How well did American leaders assess the effectiveness of the military strategy and adapt it to interaction with the enemy?

10. To what extent did the doctrinal outlook of the American armed forces about how to fight wars inhibit the strategic effectiveness of the United States during the Vietnam War?

#### B. Assigned Readings:

1. Baer, George W. *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Pages 384-393. (E-Reserve) [10 pages]

2. Hazelton, Jacqueline L. “The client gets a vote: counterinsurgency warfare and the U.S. military advisory mission in South Vietnam, 1954-1965”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2020. 43:1, 126-153. (E-Reserve) [28 pages]

3. Andrade, Dale. “Westmoreland was right: learning the wrong lessons from the Vietnam War”, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 2008. 19:2, 145-181. (E-Reserve) [37 pages]

4. Pike, Douglas. *PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam*. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986. Pages 212-252. (Selected Readings) [41 pages]

5. United States Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, Vol. I, Vietnam, 1964, XII. in “Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 – December 7.” (Selected Readings) [97 pages]

6. Walzer, Michael. *Just and Unjust Wars*. Fifth Edition, Basic Books, 2015. Pages 95 – 100 (E-Reserve) [6 pages]

Total Reading: 259 pages

## **SM 27 – Discussion (23 – 26 March)**

### **Title: Vietnamization and Legacy**

#### **A. Essays:**

1. Was the communist victory in Vietnam due more to the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon regime, strategic mistakes made by the United States, or the brilliance of North Vietnamese strategy?

2. Did the United States armed forces discover elements of a strategy that, if combined, might have secured American objectives at an acceptable cost?

3. The United States fought a successful limited regional war in Korea. Why, when faced with an ostensibly similar strategic situation, did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, despite a greater effort in both magnitude and duration?

4. In what ways did the multinational arena impact the development of strategy and the process of war termination in the Vietnam War?

5. Was Vietnamization a success? What does this case tell us about problems of withdrawal and the challenges of shifting the burden to client states?

6. What were the most important barriers to the United States accurately reassessing their strategy in Vietnam between 1968 and 1973?

7. What effect did LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II have on the signing of the Paris Peace Accords and on the outcome of the war?

8. Assess the likely strategic effects of the operational plans developed by the United States during 1969 to carry out an intense air and naval offensive against North Vietnam.

9. Why did the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 fail to cement the United States' gains in Vietnam?

10. Krepinevich argues that the U.S. lost in Vietnam because it applied the "Army concept" of conventional operations to an insurgency. The fact remains that the RVN fell to conventional invasion in 1975 and not to a popular uprising or insurgency. Does the nature of the endgame invalidate Krepinevich's argument? If so why; if not, why not?

11. How significant was operational surprise (e.g., the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, the 1975 Offensive) to the outcome of the Vietnam War?

**B. Assigned Readings:**

1. Bergerud, Eric. *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. Boulder: The Westview Press, 1991. Pages 223-308. (E-Reserve) [86 pages]

2. Nguyen, Lien-Hang T. *Hanoi's War : an International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012. Pages 231–304. (E-Reserve) [74 pages]

3. Final Paris Peace Accord, 1973. (Selected Readings) [8 pages]

4. Haun, Phil and Jackson, Colin. “Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II.” *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/16). Pages 139-178. (E-Reserve) [40 pages]

5. Willbanks, James. *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2004. Pages 122-162. (E-Reserve) [41 pages]

Total Reading: 249 pages

## **X. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM HUSSEIN'S IRAQ, 1990-1998**

### *Joint and Coalition Operations in a Major Regional War and Post War Containment*

#### **A. Description:**

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered a major regional war that involved a huge commitment of American and coalition forces to roll back Saddam Hussein's aggression. Though the coalition attained overwhelming military victory in Operation DESERT STORM, successful war termination proved elusive. Examining the 1990-1998 period of interaction affords students an opportunity to engage in critical comparative study with past case studies as the Strategy and War Course becomes more cumulative. As in the Russo-Japanese War, the victors in this limited war confronted the challenging task of deciding how to translate military success into political outcomes. Unlike the isolated settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, which proved highly unpopular with the Japanese public but tolerable to the Russians, the multinational settlement to the 1991 Gulf War revealed how global dynamics and opposing interests can complicate war termination and inhibit enduring peace.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 came at an unusually advantageous time for the United States. Iraq was still recovering from an eight-year war with its neighbor, Iran. The recent – somewhat surprising – end of the Cold War meant that abundant forces were available for regional operations. Intense competition with Moscow during the Cold War had prompted technological adaptation and innovations that some analysts dubbed a revolution in military affairs. Most importantly, the dissolving Soviet Union was unlikely to intervene militarily on behalf of its former Iraqi ally due to economic dependency on Western aid and the collapse of its empire.

Despite these advantages, joint, interagency, and combined issues complicated United States operations. First, the Bush administration feared that domestic opposition would undermine its strategy if the war went badly and coalition forces suffered heavy casualties. Iraq's large stockpile of chemical and biological weapons contributed to these fears, creating new requirements for force protection. Second, despite the fact that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act emphasized the importance of joint planning and operations, inter-service rivalries remained an obstacle to a truly unified effort. Old rivalries were exacerbated by suggestions that advances in precision technology could allow air power alone to win the war. Third, the coalition against Iraq was a disparate group of states with varying capabilities and interests. Not all members were equally enthusiastic about the mission or about the prospect of fighting under foreign command. Coalition efforts required some way of assuaging the political concerns of key regional partners, which threatened to inhibit the efficiency of operations. Coalition concerns contributed to constraining the United States from expanding its objectives at the end of the war. Finally, the war was a test of civil-military relations, which had been badly damaged in the Vietnam era. While the Bush administration promised to avoid micro-managing the military campaign, it frequently intervened to reinforce the primacy of policy.

Critical decisions about war termination reflected military judgments, coalition concerns, and domestic politics, illustrating the complex interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. President Bush's decision to halt the ground offensive after 100 hours, possibly prompted by concerns about media coverage of Iraqi forces retreating under heavy air attack, was also influenced by miscommunication regarding the actual military situation on the ground and the remaining strength of Iraq's Republican Guard forces. General Norman Schwarzkopf's emphasis on a quick coalition withdrawal from Iraqi territory made it difficult to ensure Iraqi compliance with the cease-fire terms. Surviving Iraqi forces crushed major uprisings against Saddam Hussein with the assistance of helicopter flights that were permitted under the cease-fire agreement. Despite the fact that Iraq came under international sanctions and an intrusive U.N. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspection regime, United States leaders feared that Saddam remained intractable and ruthless.

The Bush administration worked hard to assemble the coalition that fought in DESERT STORM, but international solidarity was difficult to sustain in the post-war years. In this period, inspectors sought to destroy Iraq's remaining unconventional weapons programs, and economic sanctions prevented any effort to rebuild Iraq's conventional military. As the decade wore on and the cost of containment rose, some coalition members argued that Iraq no longer presented a serious regional or international threat, and they began debating ways to relax sanctions. Yet at the same time, Saddam Hussein managed to consolidate power while intimidating and obstructing U.N. inspectors.

Because Saddam Hussein never eliminated the doubts about his WMD programs or aspirations, balked inspectors, and kept his bellicose rhetoric, many officials in the United States concluded that lasting stability was impossible as long as the Baathist regime remained in power in Iraq. By December 1998, the U.N. Security Council concluded that the inspections regime had reached an impasse. Inspectors were withdrawn, paving the way for Operation DESERT FOX. Assessing the period as a whole, some argue that DESERT FOX marked the effective end of the post-Gulf War period. No fly zones remained in place while Security Council members debated between escalating the use of force or abandoning their policy goals. Others argued that containment remained viable, or that the United States had already succeeded but did not realize it. Students will have the opportunity to revisit these questions and conclusions while extracting insights relevant to today's equally complex, dynamic international environment.

### ***B. Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

NOTE: "Jointness" in military operations has become the normal operational mode in the modern era, thus exerting a tremendous influence on the formulation of national policy and the subsequent formulation of military strategy. Since the Gulf War represents the first large-scale

conflict in the post-Goldwater-Nichols period, this case study is ideally suited for the examination of strategy and policy issues within the framework of joint operations. Thus, the below Points for Consideration are more inclusive of operational and service doctrinal considerations than any previous case study.

1. Considering the “Clausewitzian Trinity,” how important was the interplay between the governments and people of the coalition states in formulating and sustaining the military effort against Iraq during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and the post-war period?

2. Was Saddam Hussein a cooperative adversary? How did his concepts of the strategic situation result in the deployment of Iraqi forces? How did the process of coalition strategy decision-making account for Iraqi strategic decisions?

3. Does the Gulf War reflect more of a Corbettian or Mahanian concept of the employment of naval forces? How does each theoretical framework fit into the modern context of joint operations?

4. How did civil-military relations influence the derivation of a military strategy for the Gulf War. Did the previous Vietnam experience – as well as the Weinberger Doctrine – influence the political decision-making as well as major military commanders’ concepts of appropriate war-winning strategy?

5. Did the coalition’s technological advantage, particularly the ability to strike targets with great accuracy and little risk to coalition forces, influence the derivation of the military strategy?

6. There are vast differences between the air doctrine of U.S. naval, land, and air forces that have significant implications for joint operations and the derivation of strategy. How did doctrinal differences affect the conduct of the Gulf War? Were there strategic decisions, either good or bad, made solely on the basis of differing air power concepts between the services or even between coalition partners? What are the implications for future joint or combined operations?

7. Given the weight of world opinion against Saddam and the potential for Islamic solidarity as either a hindrance to the coalition or as providing support for Iraq, what were his strategic options? How might the coalition have formulated strategy in reaction to different Iraqi actions?

8. Which theorist or practitioner of war would have given the U.S.-led coalition higher marks for the conduct of the Gulf War -- Sun Tzu or Clausewitz? Were there elements of the theoretical frameworks of each?

9. What problems were encountered in the creation and sustainment of the coalition against Iraq? Did the dynamics of the Gulf War coalition mirror those encountered in previous case studies? Did technology/ideology/religion create unique problems for coalition leaders?

10. Did the 100-Hour War achieve a lasting political settlement? If not, why not? Could a different military strategy have achieved more tangible policy objective results? How might the coalition governments have employed a different war termination strategy?

### C. Readings:

1. Baram, Amatzia. "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad," in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. *Iraq's Road to War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-28. (E-Reserve)

[Baram explores Saddam Hussein's rationale for attacking Kuwait, and the Iraqi perspective on events leading up to Operation DESERT STORM.]

2. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 31-53, 75-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461, 476-477. (Physical)

[Gordon and Trainor explore civil-military relations and the national command structure, inter-service cooperation and rivalry in war planning and execution, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of technology, the limits of intelligence, the formation of joint doctrine and planning after the Goldwater Nichols Act, and issues related to war termination.]

3. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492. (Physical)

[President George Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime illustrating American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, the crafting of a coordinated information campaign, the president's role as Commander-in-Chief, and war termination dynamics.]

4. *National Security Directive (NSD) 54*, January 15, 1991. (Selected Readings)

[Declassified version of U.S. war aims in January 1991.]

5. Pollack, Kenneth M. "The United States and Iraq: The Crisis, the Strategy, and the Prospects after Saddam" in *The Threatening Storm*. New York: Random House, 2002. Pages 46-94. (E-Reserve)

[Pollack provides a Washington-oriented perspective of the war's immediate aftermath, its potential "lost opportunities," and the difficulty of realizing the full span of U.S. policy objectives up through Operation DESERT FOX in 1998 and the end of UNSCOM weapons

inspections.]

6. O'Brien, William V. "Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis." *St. John's Law Review* : Volume 66, Fall 1992, Number 3, Article 12. (E-Reserve)

[O'Brien argues that Desert Storm was a just war.]

7. Helfont, Sam. "The Gulf War's Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone." *Texas National Security Review*: Volume 4, Issue 2 (Spring 2021). (E-Reserve)

[Helfont, an S&W professor at Naval Postgraduate School, discusses the long aftermath of the Gulf War. He argues that the war was not as clean as it is sometimes portrayed and discusses missed opportunities to establish a stable post-Cold War order.]

8. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects," *Air & Space Power Journal*, July 13, 2005. (E-Reserve)

[Conversino undertakes a campaign analysis of Operation DESERT FOX. He examines the campaign in light of the potential promises and limitations of air power writ large, as well as in terms of a policy-strategy match for the specific campaign. In addition, it provides a net assessment of the viability of continued containment and the strength of the coalition towards the end of the case period, providing a foundation for debate with the Lopez and Cortright selection.]

9. Clinton, President William Jefferson, "Address to the Nation," 16 December 1998. (Selected Readings)

[This speech was delivered by President Clinton on the opening night of the DESERT FOX bombing campaign to articulate a policy-strategy match to the American public.]

10. Interview with Margaret Thatcher. *Frontline: The Gulf War – Oral Histories*. First published 9 January 1996. (PURL)  
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/thatcher/1.html>

[In an interview with Frontline, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, shares her views in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion and on some elements of war termination.]

11. Lopez, George A., and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004): 90-103. (Selected Readings)

[Lopez and Cortright note that despite much criticism, the international sanctions put in place after Operation DESERT STORM successfully eroded Iraq's conventional military power and unconventional arsenal.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Handel, Michael, I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Cass, 2001. Pages 81-89, 307-326. (Physical or E-Reserve)

[Handel discusses Clausewitz' "moral forces of war" and applies it to the Gulf War. Appendix B is the Weinberger Doctrine.]

2. Woods, Kevin M. "Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II: Um Al-Ma'arik (The Mother of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective," Vol. 1. **Institute for Defense Analyses**, May 2008. Pages 167-225, 280-337, 385-391. (Selected Readings)

[Woods examines the Department of Defense sponsored effort to enhance critical strategic analysis by considering the adversary's point of view made possible by primary source material captured from Iraqi government archives after 2003. The first selection explores Iraqi strategies for defending Kuwait, the second selection covers the last phase of DESERT STORM from the cease-fire talks at Safwan through the uprisings, and the third selection sets the stage for 1991 and later.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

The Iraq case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners coped with the planning, execution, and termination, of a limited regional war and how it coped with the post-war containment period, all in a near-contemporary setting.

This case study supports and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in the following CLOS, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4.

PLOs: 1, 3, 4.

JLAs: 1, 2, 3, 4.

#### **E. Deliverables**

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 28 – Lecture (31 March – 2 April)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Baram, Amatzia. “The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad,” in Amatzia Baram and Barry Rubin, eds. *Iraq’s Road to War*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993. Pages 5-10, 15-28. (E-Reserve) [20 pages]

2. Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). *The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. Pages 31-53, 75-202, 227-248, 267-288, 309-331, 400-461, 476-477. (Physical) [282 pages]

Total Reading: 302 pages

## SM 29 – Discussion (6 – 9 April)

### Title: The Gulf War: Desert Storm

#### A. *Essays:*

1. How effectively did Saddam Hussein frustrate his enemy's strategy from 1990-1998?
2. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives, but was also sensitive to other political considerations that weighed on the minds of policymakers?
3. How well did senior leaders manage the fog, friction, and uncertainty of war?
4. How well did the U.S. military and political leadership manage the problems of coordinating inter-service, interagency, and coalition concerns in the planning and execution of DESERT SHIELD, DESERT STORM, and DESERT FOX?
5. What effect did the Weinberger Doctrine have on US policy during DESERT SHEILD and STORM?
6. Between 1990 and 1998, which state was more strategically effective in its use of intelligence, surprise, and deception, the United States or Iraq? Why?
7. Drawing upon the experiences of United States operations in Iraq from 1990-1998 along with the American War for Independence and World War II in Europe, what are the strengths and limitations of multinational coalitions?
8. Gordon and Trainor maintain that “the air campaign had all but won the war” by the time the ground invasion began (p .331). Do you agree?
9. Clausewitz forces strategists to grapple with two competing ideas: the principle of continuity and the culminating point of victory. How well did United States leaders deal with this contradiction?
10. In the war-termination phase of a conflict, three key strategic problems need to be addressed: a) how far to go militarily before making peace; b) what to demand in the armistice or peace talks; and c) who will enforce the peace and how. How well did the United States handle these questions at the end of DESERT STORM?
11. During the 1990-91 conflict with Iraq, U.S. military and political leaders made banishing the ghosts of Vietnam a high priority. Did they succeed?

12. Judging from the 1990-91 conflict with Iraq, the Korean War, and the Russo-Japanese War, what are the determinants of success in limited regional wars?

13. What lessons can be learned from the League of Nation's response to German aggression on the eve of WWII, the UN's response to North Korean aggression in 1950, and the UN's response to Iraqi aggression in 1990-91?

14. O'Brien argues that Desert Storm was a just war. Do you agree? Either way, what are the implications of adhering to or not adhering to just war principles in making strategy and prosecuting war?

### **B. Assigned Readings:**

1. Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998. Pages 380-415, 424-492. (Physical) [105 pages]

2. *National Security Directive (NSD) 54*, January 15, 1991. (Selected Readings) [3 pages]

3. Pollack, Kenneth M. "The United States and Iraq: The Crisis, the Strategy, and the Prospects after Saddam" in *The Threatening Storm*. New York: Random House, 2002. Pages 46-94. (E-Reserve) [48 pages]

4. Conversino, Mark. "Operation DESERT FOX: Effectiveness with Unintended Effects," *Air & Space Power Journal*, July 13, 2005. (E-Reserve) [11 pages]

5. Clinton, President William Jefferson, "Address to the Nation," 16 December 1998. (Selected Readings) [5 pages]

6. Lopez, George A., and David Cortright. "Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July/August 2004): 90-103. (Selected Readings) [14 pages]

7. O'Brien, William V. "Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis." *St. John's Law Review* : Volume 66, Fall 1992, Number 3, Article 12. (E-Reserve) [27 pages]

8. Helfont, Sam. "The Gulf War's Afterlife: Dilemmas, Missed Opportunities, and the Post-Cold War Order Undone." *Texas National Security Review*: Volume 4, Issue 2 (Spring 2021). (E-Reserve) [21 pages]

9. Interview with Margaret Thatcher. *Frontline: The Gulf War – Oral Histories*. First published 9 January 1996. (PURL) [10 pages]  
<https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/thatcher/1.html>

Total Reading: 244 pages

## **XI. THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

### *Insurgency, Blending Conventional and Irregular Warfare, and Searching for an “Imperfect” Peace*

#### **A. Description:**

The United States has spent more than two decades fighting terrorist organizations and insurgencies on a global scale. The story of how the conflict began and how it has evolved is full of numerous twists and turns that defy a linear narrative. In many ways, two decades of the United States and its allies fighting violent extremist organizations and employing irregular warfare laid the foundation for today’s security environment. The conflicts against Al Qaeda (AQ) and associated movements (AQAM), the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have presented deep and complex challenges for both the United States and its allies. This case study also marks the transition from studying completed historical cases to studying contemporary cases. It highlights four main course themes: The Interrelationship of Policy, Strategy, and Operations; Interaction, Reassessment, and Adaptation; War Termination; and Cultures and Societies.

The events of September 11, 2001, paved the way for the period commonly identified as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). At this critical juncture, the U.S. leadership had two options: either fight a campaign of limited aims, that is, disrupt AQ networks across the globe and punish the Taliban, or to launch a more ambitious war of unlimited aims with the intention of defeating global terrorism. The latter prevailed. As a first step, the United States invaded Afghanistan in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and his transnational terror organization, AQ. The interrelationship of policy, strategy, and operations played a significant role in the U.S. response. The initial U.S. strategy in Afghanistan refrained from committing a substantial number of ground troops, and instead focused on employing air power, special operations forces, and partnering with local actors against the Taliban. While the United States and its partners failed to capture bin Laden, the United States decided to pursue more unlimited objectives including the overthrow of the Taliban. The U.S. attention in Afghanistan then turned to stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

In 2003, imbued by the success of swiftly overthrowing the Taliban, the United States pivoted away from “hunting” bin Laden and turned to Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein’s regime over fears that it possessed weapons of mass destruction. The United States pursued the unlimited objective of regime change. While the United States swiftly overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein, war termination proved far more challenging. U.S. operations, some of which were based on faulty assessments of the nature of local cultures and societies in Iraq, created a power vacuum that violent extremist organizations rushed to fill. As the invasion became an occupation, Iraq slid into a state of exceptional volatility, marked by insurgency, sectarian tensions between the Sunnis and Shiites, terrorism, and chaos writ large. By late 2004, a destabilized Iraq also attracted countless jihadists, and AQ formally emerged in Iraq. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), in turn, played a crucial role in fueling the sectarian divide. At the dawn of 2006, Iraq seemed to be heading for a full-scale sectarian civil war.

Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, both the United States and a resurgent Taliban adapted and reassessed with varying degrees of success. The remnants of the Taliban adapted and regrouped to launch a persistent insurgency. The United States reassessed the situation and determined that military operations could only achieve limited success to stabilize and secure the country unless the United States and its partners addressed failures in governance. The U.S.-led coalition poured significant resources into the region without fully addressing the rampant corruption among Afghan officials. As a result, the United States found rebuilding Afghan governance while fighting an insurgency to be especially challenging. The United States and its coalition partners struggled in an entirely foreign cultural terrain, and the Taliban fought on its own home turf, with most of its networks still intact. Moreover, the United States faced difficulties in managing forces between Afghanistan and Iraq.

At nearly the same time in Iraq, the United States sought to prevent a full-scale civil war while undermining AQI. Similar to Afghanistan, interaction, reassessment, and adaptation emerged as the key dynamic that shaped the course of the conflict. The new U.S. strategy was in line with Sun Tzu's teachings: first, attack the enemy's strategy; second, attack the enemy's alliances. Recognizing that AQI benefited greatly from having access to safe havens in Sunni-majority provinces, the United States adopted two complementary measures to attack the enemy's strategy, namely the Surge (2007), and increased emphasis on counterinsurgency operations. In terms of attacking the adversary's alliances, the United States brokered a deal between the central Iraqi government and the Sunni tribes, an initiative commonly referred to as the Anbar Awakening. When combined, the Surge and the Anbar Awakening effectively undermined AQI. As of 2008-2009, AQI was heavily degraded. As a result, Iraq seemed to have reached a degree of security and normalcy that would enable more effective governance. The U.S. military presence in Iraq eventually came to an end by the late-2011 except for a small number of advisors.

The conflict in Afghanistan, in the meantime, evolved into a war of attrition. The Taliban demonstrated resilience while adapting strategically over the course of this protracted conflict. In 2009, the United States decided to initiate a troop surge, modeled after the successes in Iraq. The surge sought to deny AQ networks safe haven in Afghanistan, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the Afghan government and its security forces. Between 2009 and 2012, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations helped stabilize the most important cities and districts. Through numerous reconstruction projects, the United States and its partners sought to strengthen the Afghan army and police, while also rallying support for the government. Despite all of this effort, the association between interaction, reassessment, and adaptation and cultures and societies still favored the Taliban, and, consequently, the resources poured into Afghanistan failed to create an economically self-sustaining, politically stable environment.

With Afghanistan devolving into an "endless war," what Clausewitz referred to as the "value of the object" took precedence for both the Taliban and the United States. For the members of the Taliban, the conflict was not only over what they considered to be their ancestral homeland, it was also a matter of organizational life and death. For the United States, almost two decades of fighting with no end in sight, when combined with the return of great power competition, raised questions about the strategic logic of staying in Afghanistan. When the

United States announced its impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, the balance of resolve between the Taliban and the Afghan government decisively shifted in favor of the former. As the United States withdrew, the Afghan government and security forces rapidly collapsed. The Taliban swept into power, marking the end of two decades of U.S. involvement in the country. This also raised questions about whether the United States could have approached war termination differently allowing the outcome to be more beneficial and less disruptive from the U.S. point of view.

While the U.S. political and military leaders were struggling to find a way to conclude the conflict in Afghanistan, operations in Iraq (and eventually Syria) took a different turn. The remnants of AQI first went into hiding, and then, through dedicated attention to interaction, reassessment, and adaptation, devised and executed a series of operations that took advantage of the existing divisions and tensions among different cultures and societies in the broader region. Most notably, when the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, remnants of AQI branched into Syria, once again exploiting existing political instability and sectarian tensions. By mid-2014, the group captured Iraq's second biggest city, Mosul, and rebranded itself as ISIS. ISIS also declared itself a "caliphate," in reference to the Islamic empires of the past. Simultaneously, ISIS consolidated its gains in both Iraq and Syria. At its peak, the organization controlled a collection of territories that rivaled the size of Britain. The fact that the group controlled large swaths of territory, in turn, served as an unprecedented recruitment tool, attracting countless foreign fighters.

The United States responded by launching OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE while also forming a multinational coalition against ISIS. However, defeating ISIS required liberating the territories that the group had captured and committing combat troops in both Iraq and Syria. This dynamic challenged the United States in two ways. First, public opinion in the United States did not favor yet another large-scale military intervention in the Middle East. Second, the dwindling U.S. military presence in the region and the outbreak of the Arab Spring had both allowed and incentivized regional actors such as Iran, Turkey, and (eventually) Russia to amplify their influence as well as presence in Iraq and Syria. Under the circumstances, the United States turned to local partners to do most of the fighting against ISIS.

In Iraq, the United States worked with both the central government and the Kurdish Peshmerga forces to undermine ISIS. The Shiite militia groups, some of which were backed and trained by Iran, also played an important role in the defeat of ISIS in Iraq. In Syria, where regional actors like Turkey or the Syrian regime were unwilling to directly engage ISIS, the United States, partnering with local actors, especially the Kurdish-dominated militia known as the Syrian Democratic Forces, took the lead. Drawing from the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States combined numerous elements of conventional and irregular warfare, and, as of 2019, defeated ISIS in both Iraq and Syria.

In sum, this case study offers a detailed analysis of the United States most recent and longest war, with an emphasis on not only the ways in which violent extremist groups can threaten regional and global security, but also how to fight and degrade such organizations. More than two decades of continuous conventional and irregular warfare against violent extremist organizations around the globe, not to mention the qualified successes of the United States and

its allies in their efforts, have slightly eased but in no way divested the necessity of paying very close attention to the enduring nature of terrorism and insurgencies. As the United States shifts its attention to great power competition, civilian and military leaders should carefully analyze the lessons of the past two decades, with an eye on both the risk of yet another threat from violent extremist groups and the unconventional challenges that its peer competitors can pose in the near future.

**B. Points for Consideration:**

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the *essay questions* and the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted (or, in the case of essay questions, assigned) by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. How does AQAM differ from other armed groups engaged in irregular warfare that you have studied in this course, and do those differences suggest successful strategies for the United States and its allies to win the war against AQAM?
2. How coherent and effective were the strategies and conduct of operations by al Qaeda and its allies in its war on the United States? What about the United States and allies?
3. How well did American policy-makers and military planners respond to the surprise attacks of 9/11, and how well did they adapt policy and strategy to the changing nature of the war against AQAM?
4. Henry Crumpton, who led the CIA effort in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from September 2001 until June 2002, stresses the importance of understanding the “cultural terrain” in Afghanistan for American-led strategy and operations. How coherently and effectively did the effort in Afghanistan and Iraq utilize and shape this terrain between 2001 and 2018?
5. Which was more important in the fight against AQAM at both the strategic and operational levels: counterinsurgency or counterterrorism efforts?
6. In the period 2006-2011, were the gains made in Iraq by U.S. and Iraqi forces due more to the surge or to AQAM’s self-defeating behavior?
7. Based on examples from this case and previous counterinsurgency cases in this course, are there key strategic and operational principles that produce success in counterinsurgency operations? If so, which principles are most important and why? If not, why not?
8. In the Peloponnesian War case study, we considered the strategic wisdom of the Sicilian Expedition for the Athenians. To what extent was opening and contesting the Iraq theater strategically and operationally similar to that ancient expedition?

9. Why did the United States have difficulty terminating the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a way that contributes to overall political goals in the larger war against AQAM?

10. What does the American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest about the importance and the difficulty of interagency operations for achieving the strategic goals of the United States in the war against AQAM?

11. Looking at this case and the others covered in the course, are information operations and strategic communication more important in wars against insurgents and non-state actors than in the other kinds of wars?

12. What strategic lessons from the course apply to war termination in the Afghan theater?

13. How would Clausewitz evaluate American strategy and execution of operations in Afghanistan?

### C. *Readings:*

1. Brian Glyn Williams, *Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. Pages 1-320. (E-Reserve)

[While some parts of his work are controversial, Williams offers an overarching and forthright narrative of the War on Terror, providing a comprehensive baseline for the more focused readings in the case.]

2. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*. Newport, RI: Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Osama Bin Laden "Strategy of Attrition," and Ayman Zawahiri, "Realities of the Conflict," and Two Letters: "Zarqawi to al-Qaeda," and "Zawahiri to Zarqawi." (Selected Readings)

[These key speeches represent some of the most important I/O efforts by Al-Qaeda's senior leadership and reflect AQAM's ideological view of the world, peculiar version of history, and image of the United States. It also details various political objectives, strategies, information operations, and internal divisions and debates.]

3. Harmony Project, "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa'ida 1989-2006." West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-24. (E-Reserve)

[This analysis uses primary sources and captured documents to provide insight into al Qaeda's senior leadership and its strategic decision-making.]

4. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). *What We Need Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction*, August 2021, Interactive Summary. Pages 1-42; 71 – 80, 95-97. (PURL or E-Reserve)

[This reflection on twenty years of American efforts in Afghanistan is highly critical of the strategy behind American involvement and the execution of American military and nation-building efforts. It identifies a number of strategic and conceptual errors that had pernicious effects throughout coalition operations.]

5. Whiteside, Craig, Hyink, Jeff, & Schramm, Harrison. (2024). “Non-state campaigning: Islamic State’s Guerrilla Warfare Doctrine.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Pages 1–33. (E-Reserve) [34 pages]

[This recent article traces the influences and evolution of Islamic State’s guerrilla warfare doctrine, how it fits into a larger insurgency strategy, and how its military leaders sequenced the employment of military forces in time and space to achieve operational and strategic effects in its patient and successful campaign to establish its so-called caliphate in 2014. Applying Mao’s three phases of guerrilla warfare, the authors argue that the group maintained a disciplined and patient approach to achieving political consolidation, eschewing any reliance on popular uprising, or conducting large-scale military operations.]

6. *The US Army in the Iraq War Vol. 2: Surge and Withdrawal 2007-11*. U.S. Army War College Press, 2019. Chapter 17, “Conclusion: Lessons of the Iraq War”. Pages 615-642. (E-Reserve)

[Part of a massive two-volume history of the war in Iraq, this concluding chapter attempts to draw broader lessons from the American experience: strategic, operational, and tactical.]

7. Malkasian, Carter. “How the Good War Went Bad: America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 99, no. 2 (2020). Pages 77-91. (E-Reserve)  
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26892666?sid=primo>

[Malkasian spent years in Afghanistan as an adviser to the U.S. military and a State Department representative. This excerpt from Malkasian's comprehensive analysis of the war in Afghanistan provides the context for the United States' longest war. According to Malkasian, Americans can best learn its lessons by studying the missed opportunities that kept the United States from making progress. Ultimately, the war should be understood neither as an avoidable folly nor as an inevitable tragedy but rather as an unresolved dilemma.]

8. Arnold, Bo, and John Nagl. “A Light Footprint in Syria: Operational Art in Operation Inherent Resolve.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 34, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1032. (E-Reserve)  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09592318.2023.2197671>

[Written by two Army War College professors, this article provides a case study on the conflict with ISIS in Syria, examining the elements of what they refer to as “operational art,” which, according to the authors, had the most significant impact on the outcome of the conflict. The article highlights the role that Special Operations Forces played in Syria, while also arguing that the application of operational art throughout the campaign sought to preserve and strengthen the

friendly center of gravity—the Syrian Defense Forces—by improving access to critical capabilities, controlling tempo, recognizing culmination criteria, and properly phasing operations and resources.]

9. Stein, Aaron. *The US War against ISIS*. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. Pages 211-219. (E-Reserve)

[Stein provides a conclusion to the story of the American side of the war against ISIS. In this brief chapter, Stein offers a number of insights about the extremely complex geopolitical environment affected by the American war efforts, highlighting the roles that numerous actors (ranging from Russia to Turkey) played in the outcome. The chapter concludes with Stein’s analyses on the relationship among the ways in which the United States (as well as its allies) chose to fight the group, war termination, the consequences of the war efforts for transatlantic relations, and how the U.S. experience in Iraq and Syria may shape future wars.]

10. Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 25-April 2018”, Validated 30-April 2021, Chapter III-1 – III-21. (E-Reserve)

[https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_24.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf)

[This U.S. Joint doctrine publication explains counterinsurgency—fundamentally an armed political competition between a government and its partners and insurgents and their supporters—as a blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.]

**NOTE:** The following works are provided as an additional resource for Essay Preparation:

1. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “The War on Terrorism’: What Does It Mean to Win?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 2 (2014). Pages 174-197. (E-Reserve)

[Cronin uses many of the frameworks from the S&W course to discuss how to define victory in the “War on Terrorism.” This article raises a number of different scenarios for ending the war and discusses the challenges of war termination.]

#### **D. Learning Outcomes:**

This case study supports the OPMEP by applying the theories, themes, and frameworks developed throughout the course to assess how the United States and its coalition partners have planned, executed, and sought to terminate regional wars, counterinsurgent wars, and a global counterterrorist war in the twenty-first century. It considers how best to knit outcomes in different theaters into the larger global struggle against AQAM. As the second post-Goldwater-Nichols case, it provides an excellent platform for an analysis of institutional and operational change as well as material for a critique of remaining areas of deficiency.

This case study supports and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in the following CLOS, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4.

PLOs: 3, 4.

JLAs: 1, 3, 4.

### ***E. Deliverables***

Essays submitted in this case study will serve as a Summative Assessment. Students are expected to have completed a Tutorial as a Formative Assessment in advance of submitting their essay. In addition, at the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative and Summative Assessments, as well as [Annex C](#) for more information on Essays, and [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

**SM 30 – Lecture (14 – 16 April)**

**Title: Lecture**

**A. *Essays:*** None.

**B. *Assigned Readings:***

1. Brian Glyn Williams, *Counter Jihad: America's Military Experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. Pages 1-320. (E-Reserve)  
[320 pages]

Total Reading: 320 pages

## SM 31 – Discussion (20 – 23 April)

### Title: The War on Terror

#### A. *Essays:*

1. Sun Tzu advised that the best way to win is to attack the enemy's strategy. To what extent does that insight apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

2. To what extent did irregular warfare operations support the United States and its allies' strategy and ultimately their policy?

3. What, if any, opportunities existed for the United States to pursue successful war termination in Afghanistan prior to its final exit?

4. In which theater, Iraq or Syria, did the United States fare better in terms of understanding the cultural and societal dynamics and turning the cultural-societal terrain to its advantage?

5. How would Clausewitz evaluate American strategy and execution of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

6. As far as war termination is concerned, what are the most important lessons to draw from the United States experiences in this case?

7. How well did the US handle the challenge of balancing its resources among multiple theaters in the War on Terror?

8. How well did al Qaeda, as a non-state organization, compensate for its weaknesses and exploit its strengths in its war with the United States?

9. To what degree do Mao's theories of revolutionary warfare explain the actions of ISIS in Iraq and Syria?

10. To what extent is it appropriate to conceive of the Iraqi theater as the GWOT's "Sicilian Expedition" in its strategic effects?

11. How does irregular warfare in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters compare to other examples of irregular warfare that you have studied in this course?

#### B. *Assigned Readings:*

1. *In the Eyes of Your Enemy: An Al-Qaeda Compendium*. Newport, RI: Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, September 2009. Two Speeches: Osama Bin Laden "Strategy of Attrition," and Ayman Zawahiri, "Realities of the Conflict," and Two Letters: "Zarqawi to al-Qaeda," and "Zawahiri to Zarqawi." (Selected Readings) [47 pages]

2. Harmony Project, “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida 1989-2006.” West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, September 2007. Pages 1-24. (E-Reserve) [24 pages]

3. Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). *What We Need Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction*, August 2021, Interactive Summary. Pages 1-42; 71 – 80, 95-97. (PURL or E-Reserve) [56 pages]

4. Whiteside, Craig, Hyink, Jeff, & Schramm, Harrison. (2024). “Non-state campaigning: Islamic State’s Guerrilla Warfare Doctrine.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Pages 1–33. (E-Reserve) [34 pages]

5. *The US Army in the Iraq War Vol. 2: Surge and Withdrawal 2007-11*. U.S. Army War College Press, 2019. Chapter 17, “Conclusion: Lessons of the Iraq War”. Pages 615-642. (E-Reserve) [28 pages]

6. Arnold, Bo, and John Nagl. “A Light Footprint in Syria: Operational Art in Operation Inherent Resolve.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 34, no. 5 (2023): 1007-1032. (E-Reserve) [26 pages]

7. Stein, Aaron. *The US War against ISIS*. London: Bloomsbury, 2022. Pages 211-219. (E-Reserve) [9 pages]

8. Malkasian, Carter. “How the Good War Went Bad: America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 99, no. 2 (2020). Pages 77-91. (E-Reserve) [15 pages]

9. Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 25-April 2018”, Validated 30-April 2021, Chapter III-1 – III-21. (E-Reserve) [21 pages]  
[https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3\\_24.pdf](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf)

Total Reading: 260 pages

## ***XII. THE CHINA CHALLENGE***

### *A Return to Great Power Competition*

#### **A. Description:**

This concluding case study of the Strategy and War Course is ripped from the headlines. The case challenges students to consider why China aspires to be a great sea power, how its ambitions might lead to conflict with the United States, and how conflict might be averted. A useful point of departure is to recall Thucydides' emphasis on honor, fear, and self-interest as motives for waging war. How might these three motives shape China's quest for capabilities to fight in the maritime domain? And will its quest succeed? Aspiration is one thing, fulfilling aspirations quite another.

The October 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy pronounces the People's Republic of China "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the world's leading power. It is using its technological capacity and increasing influence over international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values." The strategy vows that the United States will "outcompete" China while "constraining" Russia and managing other challenges.<sup>9</sup>

As if to highlight the challenge posed by a return to great-power competition, China's President Xi Jinping has repeatedly called on his country to build itself into a maritime power. In April 2018, most strikingly, Xi praised China's navy for making a "great leap in development" while exhorting officers and crewmen to "keep working hard and dedicate ourselves to building a first-class navy." He made these remarks at a naval parade in the South China Sea. Some 48 surface warships and submarines passed in review before the president, including the aircraft carrier *Liaoning*, while 76 fighter aircraft streaked overhead. China's communist rulers see this display of naval power—the largest in China's modern history—as boosting the party's influence, power, and prestige.

President Xi's words echo calls to national greatness from past naval powers. At the turn of the twentieth century, Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaimed that his country must construct a large navy to challenge Great Britain. The Kaiser saw the imperial navy as a symbol of Germany's standing in the world and a tool to fire the passions of the German people for national endeavors. The German naval buildup, however, challenged Britain's position as the world's leading sea power. The antagonism stemming from that rivalry set loose a strong undercurrent propelling Germany and Britain toward war. The rise of Japan as a major naval power affords another

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<sup>9</sup> White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, October 2022), 23, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf>.

example of a challenger whose actions precipitated war. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the Pacific War of 1941-1945, Japan attacked stronger great powers in an effort to achieve regional hegemony. These past conflicts should give us pause as we contemplate the emerging dangers highlighted by recent editions of the National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy.

Mahan's six elements of sea power remain useful measures for determining whether a country has the prerequisites to make itself a great seafaring state. To these Mahanian elements, we might add such factors as economic growth, fiscal capacity, technological sophistication, multinational partnerships, and strategic leadership. These are basic conditions for success in the maritime domain. Our historical case studies amply illustrate the difficulties that traditional landward-oriented countries confront when they turn seaward. Mahan helps us fathom whether China can overcome these difficulties. We should also ponder whether new technologies and ways of fighting have transformed geopolitical and strategic axioms that have long governed contests between land powers and sea powers in the maritime domain. It may be that technological advances and novel warmaking methods have muted the disadvantages continental powers encounter when they venture out to sea—or canceled them out altogether.

This case study requires us to gauge the likelihood of armed conflict with China. Will geography, nuclear deterrence, and economic interdependence reduce the pressures that push great powers into rivalry and conflict? Or will the past repeat itself in the twenty-first century, with rising great powers posing challenges to the international order that result in war? Does China's rise as a sea power make the outbreak of war more likely? Assuming China seeks to win without fighting, in the tradition of Sun Tzu, how will it go about it? Might China miscalculate American responses to aggressive actions on its part, as other adversaries of the United States have done? Could coalition partners embroil the United States and China in war—much as the fighting between Corinth and Corcyra spiraled into system-shattering war between Athens and Sparta? What actions might the United States take to dissuade or deter other countries from resorting to war?

These troubling questions bring to the fore the prospect of war with China. In thinking about how the United States might wage a future war, students can look back to the course's strategic theories, to the course themes found at the beginning of this syllabus, and to case studies in which maritime power loomed large. Along with Mahan's teachings, this case study offers an opportunity to revisit Corbett's principles of maritime strategy, Mao's concept of active defense, the prewar assessments by Athens and Sparta, the Anglo-German rivalry preceding World War I, and Imperial Japan's adventurism. Students should reconsider navies' warfighting missions through the lens of the past. Now, as ever, these missions include winning command of the sea or local sea control through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea or maritime bases onto land using ground or air forces; and waging economic warfare by preventing enemy shipping from using the sea while assuring friendly use of nautical thoroughfares.

Although traditional missions endure, the character of future warfare will be shaped by uncrewed vehicles, artificial intelligence, and actions in outer space and the cyber domain. The readings encourage students of strategy to think about how the development and diffusion of new technologies like networks and cyber weapons may transform the execution of naval missions in twenty-first-century warfare, make them prohibitively expensive, or even supersede them altogether. Students should look beyond current doctrine to consider whether cyber is an instrument of national power, a platform, a tactic, a domain, or a type of war. And they should mull the strategic implications of assigning it a category. One certainty is that China and other potential adversaries will harness new warmaking technologies in their search for strategic advantage.

Of course, it is vital that decision-makers and strategic planners examine not only how a war might start but also how it might end. War termination forms an essential part of this case study's readings. In exploring the contours of a contest with China, from its origins to its end, political and military leaders must keep in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action developed by strategic planners deliver the political goals desired at a cost and risk commensurate with the value policy-makers and society place on those goals? The answers to questions about rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. To understand interaction in wartime, we must obey Sun Tzu's injunction to know the enemy and know ourselves. We must try to anticipate the strategic concepts that opponents may harness to fulfill their policy goals, assess their operational capabilities in relation to our own, and think ahead to how they might work around our future moves. We cannot predict the future, but we must prepare for it.

Finally, of special importance is the role that nuclear weapons might play in a conflict between China and the United States. The readings challenge us to consider the paths whereby a conventional conflict might escalate to involve nuclear attacks on the combatants' homelands. Decisions to escalate will demand searching moral and ethical questioning as part of strategic deliberations. How does the ultimate weapon fit into the rational strategic calculations that Clausewitz demands we undertake? As we grapple with such questions, Sun Tzu admonishes us across the centuries: "War is a matter of vital importance to the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied."

### ***B. Points for Consideration:***

As students prepare for seminar, they are advised to consider possible answers to the below *points for consideration*. This is in addition to considering possible answers to the questions listed in the *course themes*. Some of these may be highlighted by the professor for greater focus/discussion in seminar.

1. Thucydides chronicled a conflict pitting a democratic sea power against an authoritarian land power. What strategic guidance should U.S. leaders draw from Thucydides as they confront the China challenge today?

2. What policy and strategy guidance might China's political and military decision-makers draw from Thucydides as they manage their country's rise?

3. Looking back to Pericles' and Archidamus' assessments on the eve of war, what should be the main elements of a U.S. assessment for a contest against China? What kind of assessment might Chinese strategic analysts present to China's rulers?

4. It is often said that coalition partners "dragged" Athens and Sparta into war against each other. Might coalition partners entrap China and the United States into war, and if so, how?

5. Henry Kissinger calls on U.S. and Chinese leaders to avoid conflict by practicing prudent diplomacy and showing mutual respect. Are these recommendations realistic considering the sources of friction in U.S.-China relations?

6. Alfred Thayer Mahan examined long-term strategic competitions among great powers in his books exploring *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*. What strategic guidance should American leaders derive from Mahan for great-power competitions?

7. Margaret Sprout maintains that "no other single person has so directly and profoundly influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy as Alfred Thayer Mahan," and that "his writings affected the character of naval thought" in major seafaring states across the globe. Mahan is now an object of study in China. What lessons should, and will, China's political and military decision-makers derive from studying his works?

8. Sun Tzu asserts that to win without fighting constitutes the summit of strategic skill. How can China win without fighting in a contest with the United States? How might the United States win without fighting?

9. Can the United States retain command of the maritime common as China's strength grows?

10. What strategic guidance would Julian Corbett offer to U.S. and Chinese naval leaders?

11. In what ways are Mao's strategic theories relevant for understanding a contest between China and the United States?

12. Which case studies in the Strategy and War Course are most relevant for understanding a future conflict with China?

13. What strategic role could ground, air, and space forces play in a conflict with China?

14. What strategic role could nuclear weapons play in a conflict with China? What factors would discourage decision-makers from ordering nuclear escalation, and which factors would provoke them to escalate? What would be the most likely outcome?

15. What guidance do the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War Course offer for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain?

16. How would a protracted conventional conflict between China and the United States be fought? Is such a conflict likely, or would the fighting soon escalate to include major attacks on the combatants' homelands employing nuclear or cyber weapons?

17. What role might America's major allies or coalition partners play in a hegemonic war against China?

18. What role might Russia play in a conflict involving China, the United States, and American allies or coalition partners?

19. In one of the readings for this case study, Oriana Skylar Mastro concludes: "China has demonstrated a preference only to talk to weaker states, to rapidly escalate any conflict to quickly impose peace, and to use third parties not as genuine mediators but to pressure its adversaries to concede—all of which work against war termination." What are the strategic implications of her findings for a war fought by China against the United States and its allies?

20. Clausewitz advises rational leaders to seek ways to end the fighting when the cost of waging war comes to exceed the value of the object. How does this insight apply for understanding war termination in a conflict between China and the United States?

### C. Readings:

1. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. *Red Star Over the Pacific*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Second Edition, 2018. Chapters 1, 4, 6-8. (E-Reserve)

[Professor Holmes of the Strategy and Policy Department and Toshi Yoshihara, a former Naval War College professor now at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, provide a comprehensive analysis of the competition between China and the United States. This reading plays a central role in examining the strategic contours and capabilities of the American and Chinese armed forces.]

2. U.S. State Department, Policy Planning Staff. *The Elements of the China Challenge* (2020). Pages 8–27, 40–50. (E-Reserve)

[In this document, the U.S. State Department lays out the contours of the "China Challenge" complete with an analysis of China's internal and external dynamics. The conclusion that China seeks a fundamental transformation of the international order is a good starting point for this case study, with the caveat that this was published under the previous Presidential administration.]

3. U.S. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2023. Pages 1-116. (E-Reserve or PURL:

<https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>)

[This annual report out of the Pentagon provides a rich net assessment of China’s goals, strategies, and capabilities across its various tools of national power. If knowing potential opponents is crucial to operational and strategic success, this document is essential reading for anyone in the U.S. fighting forces and the national security apparatus at large.]

4. China Aerospace Studies Institute. *In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 2020*. Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 2022. Pages 26-52, 132-155. (E-Reserve/PURL: <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf>)

[This is a translation of an authoritative work compiled periodically by a team of coauthors from China’s National Defense University. It complements the previous reading in particular. The selections here review the Chinese armed forces’ general approach to active defense for deterrence and conventional warfare while explaining how party officials and military commanders apply this Maoist strategic concept to such emerging warfare domains as outer space and cyberspace.]

5. Mitter, Rana and Elsbeth Johnson. “What the West Gets Wrong About China: Three fundamental misconceptions,” *Harvard Business Review* (May–June 2021). Pages 42–48 (E-Reserve)

[This article tackles some of the potential misconceptions that emerge when Western thinkers approach China. This is helpful in the context of “Cultures and Society” and serves as a reminder against mirror-imaging our own values and principles onto our adversaries.]

6. Rovner, Joshua. “A Long War in the East: Doctrine, Diplomacy, and the Prospects for a Protracted Sino-American Conflict.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 29, no. 1 (March 2018). Pages 129-142. (E-Reserve)

[Rovner, a former professor in the Strategy and Policy Department who is now at American University, examines how a conflict between China and the United States might be fought. He draws on Thucydides to analyze a conventional conflict between great powers.]

7. Dutton, Peter. "Conceptualizing China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations" in Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan D. Martinson. *China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations*. Studies in Chinese Maritime Development. 2019. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. (E-Reserve)

[This chapter provides a conceptual overview of China's use of nonmilitarized coercion to achieve its maritime aims in the East Asian sea space.]

8. Rielage, Dale C. and Austin M. Strange, "Is the Maritime Militia Prosecuting a People’s War at Sea?" in Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan D. Martinson. *China’s Maritime Gray Zone*

**Operations.** Studies in Chinese Maritime Development. 2019. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. (E-Reserve)

[This chapter looks at the historical roots of the term "peoples war at sea" and its contemporary place in Chinese strategy.]

9. Doshi, Rush. ***The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*** (Oxford University Press, 2021). Chapters 8, 11-13. (E-Reserve)

[Doshi traces the development of Chinese military strategies of "sea denial" and "sea control" in response to American capabilities and in order to establish regional order.]

10. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. ***Archipelagic Defense 2.0***. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, September 2023. Pages 91-158. (E-Reserve/PURL)

<https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Archipelagic+Defense+2.0+-+Andrew+F.+Krepinevich+Jr+-+September+2023.pdf>

[This recent work from Krepinevich, the author of *The Army and Vietnam*, probes the advantages, disadvantages, costs, and dangers of operating along Asia's first island chain. *Archipelagic Defense 2.0* sets forth a course of action worth critiquing in the same way we have evaluated courses of action throughout the course.]

11. Mastro, Oriana Skylar. "How China Ends Wars: Implications for East Asian and U.S. Security." ***Washington Quarterly***, vol. 41, no. 1 (spring 2018). Pages 45-60. (E-Reserve)

[How would a war between China and the United States end? Mastro explores this provocative question. Her article's conclusions regarding war termination in the Western Pacific make for troubling reading.]

12. O'Rourke, Ronald. ***Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress***. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2024. Pages 1-36. (E-Reserve/PURL) <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838>

[This regularly updated report from the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service explores the nature and dynamics of great-power competition, highlighting issues relevant for congressional deliberations. O'Rourke takes account of the China challenge while also widening the aperture to encompass related challenges from Russia, a "no-limits" partner of China, as well as other competitors such as Iran and North Korea.]

**NOTE:** The readings for this case study may shift in response to current events. Any adjustments or updates will be made via the Blackboard site.

**D. Learning Outcomes:**

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 2, 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 3, 4

**E. Deliverables**

At the professor's discretion, this case study may contain an Active Learning Exercise as a Formative Assessment. See page 18 for more information on Formative Assessments and/or [Annex B](#) for potential Active Learning Exercises.

## SM 32 – Lecture (28 – 30 April)

### Title: Lecture

A. *Essays*: None.

### B. *Assigned Readings*:

1. U.S. State Department, Policy Planning Staff. *The Elements of the China Challenge* (2020). Pages 8–27, 40–50. (E-Reserve) [29 pages]

2. Yoshihara, Toshi and James R. Holmes. *Red Star Over the Pacific*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, second edition, 2018. Chapters 1, 4, 6-8 (E-Reserve) [71 pages]

3. U.S. Department of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2023. Pages 1-116. (E-Reserve/PURL) [117 pages]  
<https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>

4. China Aerospace Studies Institute. *In Their Own Words: Science of Military Strategy, 2020*. Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, 2022. Pages 26-52, 132-155. (E-Reserve/PURL) [27 pages]  
<https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2022-01-26%202020%20Science%20of%20Military%20Strategy.pdf>

Total Reading: 244 pages

## SM 33 – Discussion (4 – 7 May) | Distribute Final Exam

### Title: Deterrence and Defense: Crafting a Strategy for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

A. *Essays*: None. See “Points for Consideration” for discussion topics.

### B. *Final Examination: 5 - 8 May: Distribute Final Examination*

#### C. *Assigned Readings*:

1. Doshi, Rush. *The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order* (Oxford University Press, 2021). Chapters 8, 11-13 (E-Reserve) [98 pages]

2. Rovner, Joshua. “A Long War in the East: Doctrine, Diplomacy, and the Prospects for a Protracted Sino-American Conflict.” *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 29, no. 1 (March 2018). Pages 129-142. (E-Reserve) [13 pages]

3. Mitter, Rana and Elsbeth Johnson. “What the West Gets Wrong About China: Three fundamental misconceptions,” *Harvard Business Review* (May–June 2021). Pages 42–48. (E-Reserve) [6 pages]

4. Dutton, Peter. "Conceptualizing China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations" in Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan D. Martinson. *China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations*. Studies in Chinese Maritime Development. 2019. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. (E-Reserve) [5 pages]

5. Rielage, Dale C. and Austin M. Strange, "Is the Maritime Militia Prosecuting a People’s War at Sea?" in Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan D. Martinson. *China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations*. Studies in Chinese Maritime Development. 2019. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. (E-Reserve) [9 pages]

6. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. *Archipelagic Defense 2.0*. Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, September 2023. Pages 91-158. (E-Reserve/PURL) [68 pages]

7. Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “How China Ends Wars: Implications for East Asian and U.S. Security.” *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 1 (spring 2018). Pages 45-60. (E-Reserve) [16 pages]

8. O’Rourke, Ronald. *Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2024. Pages 1-36. (E-Reserve/PURL) [37 pages]

Total Reading: 252 pages

### ***XIII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT***

#### *Sea Power and Maritime Strategy – War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*

##### **A. Description**

Alfred Thayer Mahan published an article entitled “Retrospect and Prospect” in 1902. As the title of his article suggests, Mahan gazed back across the nineteenth century to identify trends he could project forward into the twentieth century—gleaning insights into then-present contingencies such as the Philippine War of 1898 while catching sight of the future. By connecting past, present, and future, he foreshadowed the forward-looking nature of the Strategy and War Course in general and of this final case study in particular.

Much has changed since Mahan wrote “Retrospect and Prospect.” Yet Mahan, despite his keen awareness of the technological transformation in naval platforms that occurred during his lifetime, did not foresee some of the major innovations about to change the future of naval warfare. In fact, Lieutenant Commander William S. Sims, a future President of the Naval War College and Chief of Naval Operations, bested him—by Mahan’s own admission—in a public debate over battleship armament, design, and tactics. Mahan also had little inkling of how submarines and aircraft, not to mention drones and AI, would transform war at sea in the decades to come.

Even as Mahan’s effort to draw upon the experience of the past should inspire us as we peer ahead into the future, the limits of his foresight remind us of the limits of our own. Like Mahan, we cannot predict the future with certainty. Indeed, the future is not foreordained. It depends on the strategic choices that we and others make, on the interaction between clashing wills, and on the play of chance and contingency that Clausewitz and Thucydides emphasize in their classic works on war. It will also depend on how human wills interact in new parts of the commons, notably cyberspace. The best we can do is to become as nimble as possible, preparing our intellects for different alternative futures and anticipating the impact of complex, dynamic, ambiguous, and dangerous environments when planning and understanding operations.

What might the future global security environment look like? A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower foresees turbulence in the coming years. This Maritime Strategy anticipates a major shift in the global balance of power toward the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, an area of growing geostrategic importance to the United States. Framers of the strategy acknowledge that Chinese naval presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans will likely be a permanent feature of Asian politics. At the same time, other traditional and irregular threats, ranging from Russian aggression to terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, continue to demand policy attention. The proliferation of weaponry that could impede access to U.S. maritime forces in the global commons is another worrying trend.

An uncongenial strategic environment awaits the seagoing services. The maritime future could resemble the period between 1890 and 1945, when multiple naval powers, motivated by major conflicts of interest, grappled with one another for strategic advantage. China, like Japan in the last century, boasts the potential to mature into a great naval rival of the United States in the Pacific. But unlike the Imperial Japanese Navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy has

demonstrated a penchant for radically asymmetric operations and tactics to defeat the United States.

A country need not be a great naval power to turn technological change to its own maritime advantage in ways that might challenge the United States and disrupt the international economy. Consider Iran and Ukraine. Uncertainties surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions continue to complicate the geometry of deterrence in the region. Bordering on a chokepoint of globalization—the Strait of Hormuz—and combining missiles and mines with fast boats and irregular forces under a radically asymmetric operational concept, Iran may be able to cause major strategic problems for the United States and its allies in the Arabian Gulf. Likewise, Ukraine, with no conventional maritime forces, has so far successfully thwarted Russian naval ambitions in the Black Sea through the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. What would Mahan and Corbett have to say about either the Iranian or the Ukrainian model?

The armed forces of the United States must have leaders with sufficient critical skills to lead Joint and Combined forces in this environment, as well as to execute national strategies and policies. In preparing for seminar in this final case study, students should consider the various ways in which United States and partner maritime forces can help prevent war along the rimlands of Eurasia in the twenty-first century. They should also consider the ways American and allied maritime forces can help win a war. There are many potential maritime theaters of conflict in the twenty-first century, including the Arctic Ocean, Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific

In thinking about how the United States might wage war in the maritime domain in the twenty-first century, students should bridge back to the basic naval warfighting missions identified in the theories of Mahan and Corbett and analyzed in past cases where sea power loomed large: securing command of the sea (or at least local sea control) through naval engagements; denying a superior opponent command of the sea to frustrate its operational aims or gain time; projecting power from the sea (or maritime bases) onto land using ground and air forces; and waging economic and logistics warfare by interdicting enemy sea lines of communication. Going forward, we need to consider how developing and harnessing new technologies may affect these missions and their prospects for success. Gaming out scenarios involving potential adversaries must take account of operational interactions across multiple domains, including space and cyberspace, helping us forecast how a conflict might unfold through different phases and how the United States and its allies might terminate the fighting on favorable political terms.

From the beginning of a conflict to its end, wise political and military leaders will need to keep firmly in mind the two overarching concepts of strategy that stand out in Clausewitz's work from two centuries ago, namely rationality and interaction. Can the courses of action that they develop and then execute deliver the desired political objectives at a cost and risk commensurate with the value of the object? The answers to questions of rationality rest on how adversaries and other audiences react militarily and politically to one's own courses of action. In dealing with China, Iran, and other potential adversaries that cannot match the full array of American military capabilities, American strategic and operational leaders must be prepared for radically asymmetric forms of interaction—some of which may be inspired by concepts broached by Sun

Tzu more than two millennia ago. Applying strategic theory to operational practice is never easy, as Clausewitz warned. Nonetheless, sound theory and past experience provide the starting point for leaders in their search for a secure future.

### ***B. Points for Consideration***

“Points for Consideration” are included to help structure study. An attempt to come to grips with these questions should be made while preparing for the final exam and seminar as such questions form the basis of understanding of Strategy and War concepts.

1. To what extent, and under what conditions, do the strategic concepts of Mahan and Corbett remain relevant?
2. Should the United States worry more about irregular threats, either from non-state actors or from states supporting them, or about conventional challenges from peer or near-peer competitors? How can the United States balance the risk between these two fundamental strategic challenges?
3. How would Sun Tzu advise prospective adversaries to defeat the United States without fighting? What counterstrategies are available to the United States?
4. Coalitions are a key element to strategic success. How might an adversary attempt to disrupt the relationships of the United States with coalition partners? How can the United States best preserve those partnerships in peace and war?
5. Will technological change alter the strategic logic or operational grammar of war in the coming decades?
6. What Strategy and War case studies are most relevant for understanding a possible future conflict between China and the United States? What scenarios can you envision for the course and outcome of a conflict involving China?
7. “Sea powers find it difficult to fight for unlimited aims because that objective typically requires operations on the ground of the adversary’s homeland.” How is this insight into the relationship between aims and strategy relevant for American decision-makers when designing strategies and anticipating strategic outcomes in a possible conflict with China?
8. What strategic guidance would Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, and Corbett offer about the prospect of success in armed conflict against irregular groups at sea, such as the Houthis?
9. How likely is major warfare at sea between nuclear-armed powers to deliver strategic rewards that justify the risk of escalation?

10. What are Iran's prospects of success in any future attempt to cut access to sources of energy in the Arabian Gulf region?

11. What can the strategic theorists examined in the Strategy and War course offer as guidance for understanding conflict in the cyber domain? For example, what do offense and defense mean in the cyber domain? Is one dominant over the other?

12. How might operations in the cyber domain be combined with actions in other domains to achieve decisive strategic effects?

***C. Readings:***

Any readings for this session will be provided by the professor in the preceding two or three weeks. The intent is for this session to be tailored not just to the current moment but also to this specific iteration of the Strategy and War Fleet Seminar Program. Readings here can be used to supplement students' efforts in the Final Exam.

***D. Learning Outcomes:***

This case study supports, and provides opportunity for students to demonstrate proficiency in, the following CLOs, PLOs, and JLAs (listed in [Annex F](#)):

CLOs: 1, 2, 3, 4

PLOs: 2, 3, 4

JLAs: 1, 3, 4

***E. Deliverables***

Students will write and submit the Final Exam during this one-week case study.

## SM 34 – Discussion (11 – 14 May) | Submit Final Exam

### **Title: Retrospect and Prospect**

**A. Essays:** None

Given that the Final Exam will be submitted prior to this session, students should come prepared to incorporate insights from their final exam into the discussion.

### **B. Readings:**

Any readings for this session will be provided by the professor in the preceding two or three weeks. The intent is for this session to be tailored not just to the current moment but also to this specific iteration of the Strategy and War Fleet Seminar Program. Readings here can be used to supplement students' efforts in the Final Exam.

1. Recorded Lecture (TBD)

Total Readings: Not to exceed 50 pages

**SECTION III: ANNEXES**

**ANNEX A: COURSE CALENDAR**

Date	Class	Topic	Notes
9/1 - 9/4	SM - 1	S&W Overview	9/1: Labor Day; Recorded lecture
9/9 - 9/11	SM - 2	<b>Lecture</b> - Masters of War	
9/15 - 9/18	SM - 3	Clausewitz and Sun Tzu	
9/22 - 9/25	SM - 4	Mahan and Corbett	Recorded lecture
9/29 - 10/2	SM - 5	Mao and Galula	Recorded lecture
10/7 - 10/9	SM - 6	<b>Lecture</b> - Peloponnesian War	
10/13 - 10/16	SM - 7	Beginning and Development	10/13: Columbus Day
10/20 - 10/23	SM - 8	The Defeat of Athens	
10/28 - 10/30	SM - 9	<b>Lecture</b> - American War for Independence	
11/3 - 11/6	SM - 10	Sea Power, Joint and Combined Operations	
11/10 - 11/13	SM - 11	The Globalization of Strategy and Irregular Warfare	11/11: Veterans' Day
11/18 - 11/20	SM - 12	<b>Lecture</b> - The Russo Japanese War	
11/24 - 11/28	No Class Meeting	Thanksgiving (11/27)	
12/1 - 12/4	SM - 13	Land vs Naval Power in Theory and Practice	
12/9 - 12/11	SM - 14	<b>Lecture</b> - The First World War	

12/15 - 12/18	SM – 15	Strategic Options and a Stalemated Struggle	
12/22 - 12/26	No Class Meeting	<b>Christmas</b>	
12/29 - 1/2	No Class Meeting	<b>New Year's</b>	
1/5 - 1/8	SM - 16	Struggle at Sea and Establishing the Peace	
1/13 - 1/15	SM - 17	<b>Lecture</b> - The Second World War in Europe	
1/19 - 1/22	SM - 18	Toward a Second Front	1/19: MLK Day
1/26 – 1/29	SM - 19	The Design, Execution, and Effects of Coalition Warfare	
2/3 - 2/5	SM - 20	<b>Lecture</b> - The Pacific War	
2/9 - 2/12	SM - 21	War in the Pacific: Adapting Strategy to Rapidly Changing Circumstances	
2/16 - 2/19	SM - 22	Industrial Mobilization, Force Integration, and Regaining the Strategic Initiative	2/16: Presidents' Day
2/24 - 2/26	SM - 23	<b>Lecture</b> - The Korean War	
3/2 - 3/5	SM - 24	Containment and Korea	
3/10 - 3/12	SM - 25	<b>Lecture</b> - The Vietnam War	
3/16- 3/19	SM - 26	Engagement and Escalation	
3/23 - 3/26	SM - 27	Vietnamization and Legacy	
3/31 - 4/2	SM - 28	<b>Lecture</b> - Iraq, 1990 - 1998	
4/6 - 4/19	SM - 29	Iraq: Desert Shield to Desert Fox	

4/14 - 4/16	SM - 30	<b>Lecture</b> – The Global War on Terror	
4/20 - 4/23	SM - 31	The War on Terror	
4/28 - 4/30	SM - 32	<b>Lecture</b> - The China Challenge	
5/4 - 5/7	SM - 33	Deterrence and Defense	Distribute Final Exam
5/11 - 5/14	SM - 34	Retrospect and Prospect	Recorded lecture; Submit Final Exam
5/29		Course Grades Due	
		Graduation Dinner (Newport)	
		Graduation	
		Faculty Workshop	

## ***ANNEX B: ACTIVE LEARNING EXERCISES***

The purpose of this annex is to provide some *suggestions* for Active Learning exercises for use in the Strategy and War Fleet Seminar Program. While these are complete activities, professors should feel free to adapt and adjust freely. Any of these assignments can be used as Formative Assessments. The purpose of a Formative Assessment is to give professors an opportunity to identify students' strengths and weaknesses and identify areas for improvement as necessary. Specifically, these exercises give the professor insight into how students are performing in terms of seminar contribution and their ability to incorporate course themes and strategic insights into discussions. While these are "assessments" in the sense that students are being asked to demonstrate competency, the word "formative" is critical. They are graded simply as "Meets Expectations" or "Not Yet" and should be constructive and integrated into the relevant course material.

There are two sections in this annex. The first is for general exercises that can be used in any seminar. Some of these may include a small amount of work pre-class. These exercises can be used at any point during a seminar. Though they can almost all be completed without the use of paper and pencil (or a virtual equivalent), it is usually recommended that students write down their responses. This serves both to eliminate any fog, friction or forgetfulness, and also serves to provide something concrete for the professor to assess in the case of the activity is being used as a formative assessment. The second section is for case-study specific role-play exercises. Currently, there is at least one role-play for each two-seminar case study. While it is possible to do a role-play for a one-seminar case study, be aware that even a "short" exercise can balloon to take up quite a bit of time. The estimated time for the activities is a very rough guess and can vary wildly depending on the nature of the class.

*Section I: General Exercises*

**Exercise 1: Net Assessment**

At the beginning of the session, students are divided into two groups (Red and Blue) corresponding to the two main belligerents in a conflict.

Students have thirty minutes to fill out the following chart. Depending on the conflict/directions, students can also assess allies and potential allies. The purpose of this assessment can be to assess either one's adversary or oneself.

Each group should choose a spokesperson to brief the group's discussion to the entire seminar at the conclusion of the exercise. Briefs should be no longer than 15 minutes each, resulting in an activity length of ~1 hour.

The chart is on the next page. These are brief descriptors of what each box means:

**Motivations:** What was behind your sides' political objectives? Feel free to use Thucydides' triangle (fear, honor, interest) or anything else that seem appropriate to them (i.e., religion, nationalism, ideology (democracy, oligarchy, communism), etc.).

**Policy objective(s):** Describe the policy objective(s) of your given side, either stated or unstated. Note that these can be vague or even contradictory, depending on the conflict.

**Value of the Object:** What is the relative value of the political objectives listed above?

**Strengths and Weaknesses:** Consider all relevant strengths and weaknesses (tactical, operational, strategic, political, alliance, etc.) of your given side.

**Centers of Gravity:** Consider all centers of gravity (operational, strategic, political, etc.). Note that there can be a considerable difference between what we, with more complete knowledge, might assess as a CoG, and what would or could be assessed at the time.

**Military Objective(s):** Determine what military objectives your side sought at the beginning of the war.

**Theory of Victory:** Explain the relationship between the achievement of the military objective(s) and the achievement of the policy objective(s), and how the first leads to the second.

If, on any of the above, any of the allies' or potential allies had different views from those of the main antagonist, point this out in your brief. (These differences may be useful in understanding alliance dynamics.)

<i>Understanding The Nature of the War</i>	<i>Red/Blue</i>	<i>Red/Blue Allies</i>	<i>Red/Blue Potential Allies</i>
<b>Motivations</b>			
<b>Policy Objective(s)</b>			
<b>Value of Object(s)</b>			
<b>Strengths</b>			
<b>Weaknesses</b>			
<b>Centers of Gravity</b>			
<b>Military Objectives</b>			
<b>Theory of Victory</b>			

### **Exercise 2: BYOO (Bring Your Own Quote)**

Students will each bring in one quote from the readings. This quote can be from any portion of the assigned readings. Students should choose a quote that they see as particularly interesting and relevant. In class, students will be expected to share their quote along with their reasoning for choosing it. Professors may require students to email their quotes prior to class to allow time for the professor to incorporate common trends into the seminar.

### **Exercise 3: Around the Horn**

The premise of this exercise is simple: The professor will ask a question and each student will answer it. There may be duplicated answers, but students are expected to go beyond “What they said” and give their own insights and contribution. One way to avoid copying or leaving the last people in class without much to say is to have each student write down their answer before everyone goes around.

The question provided by the professor can vary, but some suggestions are:

- What course theme is most relevant when looking at this case study?
- What is one new thing you learned from this case study?
- What is one way this case study can be applied to the modern world?
- What is your one-sentence “lesson learned” from this case study?
- What is one question you have going in to this case study?
- What is the “muddiest point” for you in this case study? (In other words, what is something that is confusing, or a sticking point that you can’t quite get through cleanly)

### **Exercise 4: Reading Precis**

Assign a reading to each student (or let students choose). Duplicates are fine. They must bring in to seminar answers to the following questions:

1. What is the argument/thesis statement?
2. What course themes are present?
3. What is one potential counterargument?

### **Exercise 5: Peer Review**

All students are required to read the essays submitted in any given seminar meeting. For this exercise, students will go further and have an essay assigned for Peer Review. The “Reviewer” will read and comment on their classmates’ paper in advance of class. The intention here is not for the Reviewer to grade the paper, but rather to critically engage with their classmate’s

argument and content, highlighting areas that worked particularly well and areas that could have been developed further.

### **Exercise 6: Theorists Twitter**

At any given strategic junction (ie, Sicilian Campaign, Mukden, Gallipoli, Pearl Harbor, Tet, etc), ask students to provide a tweet-length response from a theorist (professors can assign theorists or have students choose).

Example of Sun Tzu on successful strategic bombing: “Winning without fighting may be the acme of skill, but fighting without dying is probably a close second!”

### **Exercise 7: Argue and Counter**

Choose an essay prompt that was not assigned. Pair students up and give them 5 minutes to come up with a thesis statement. After 5 minutes they share with their partner. Students then have five minutes to come up with a counterargument to the argument of their partner. Both the thesis statement and counter-argument should be 1 – 2 sentences. At the end of the exercise, everyone will share the thesis statement of their partner and their corresponding counterargument.

### **Exercise 8: 3, 2, 1**

Give students five minutes at the end of a seminar to write down an answer to this question: What are three things you learned, two things you’re still curious about, and one thing you don’t understand?

### **Exercise 9: Charting the Conflict**

Using the chart on page 14 (copied below), have each student identify roughly the objectives and means of belligerents. Students should share their answers and identify any significant differences in their answers.

#### **OBJECTIVES**



#### **MEANS**



### **Exercise 10: DIY Syllabus**

At the end of a case study, ask students to come up with a new essay question or Point for Consideration that could be used in the syllabus to better address the some aspect of the case study.

#### *Section II: Role Play Exercises*

Depending on the activity, it is highly advised for professors to suggest specific readings that will help students prepare specifically for the activity. It is up to the professor whether to give students advance warning of these exercises, and whether/how to divide into groups (if applicable). Keep in mind that both explaining the activity/dividing students into groups and concluding the activity/debrief will take time, so be sure to plan accordingly.

You will note that many of these activities involve counterfactual or “what might have been” scenarios. In active learning, this is common due to the emphasis on “active.” For students to be active and engaged in an earnest manner, they must have some degree of agency. Rehashing the readings or events as they happened is proof that students understand the material, but these activities provide students space for using what they have learned to apply, reframe, modify, and create. The results of this creativity may diverge from historical fact. This is always acceptable in these exercises, but part of the debrief/discussion should include an analysis of why students chose different courses of action and what the implications of those choices might be. Did the students adequately account for fog and friction? Were the students operating from a valid set of objectives (or were they superimposing the end result of a conflict on the middle)? Are the choices consistent with the ideological, political, and technological limitations at place in any given historical (or contemporary) moment? Not all of these questions need to be raised, but keep in mind that giving students agency in an educational setting means letting go of the reins, and it’s important to know when to collect them again.

### **Exercise 11: The Melian Dialogue**

Time: ~30 minutes.

Activity: The year is 416 BCE. The Peace of Nicias provides a veneer of peace, but less than two years have passed since the Battle of Mantinea, where the Athenians suffered an embarrassing defeat at the hands of the Spartans. They are now looking to score a victory and consolidate their position at sea. To that end, they turn to the neutral island of Melos, demanding that the much smaller (though still prosperous) island accept the “protection” of Athens and the Delian League. The Melians desire to remain neutral.

Split the class into slightly unequal groups in order to simulate an inequality of power. Note that this inequality will by no means be similar to the imbalance between Athens and Melos, but can slightly simulate the superiority/inferiority dynamic at play.

The larger group is Athens. The Athenian group is guided by the following principles:

- Melos must not ally against Athens
- Melos can not realistically stand against the naval power of Athens. In other words, should a battle occur, there is virtually no risk of defeat, though protraction is a risk
- Athens can manufacture claims to legitimate conquest or control of Melos
- Athens must act in a way consistent with its objectives:
  - Maintain hegemony over the sea
  - Maintain a compliant system of allies
  - Prevent Sparta from growing stronger
- Melos is the only significant island in the Aegean who is not under the hegemony of Athens
- If Melos remains neutral, it is a strategic threat to Athens
- If Athens attacks Melos without provocation, it may restart the war with Sparta
- Athens can offer Melos security, but not freedom
- Athens therefore strongly desires that Melos reject neutrality and submit to their rule

The smaller group is Melos. The Melians group is guided by the following principles:

- Melos has an association with an enemy of Athens, but has remained truly neutral
- Melos is confident they have done nothing to actively antagonize Athens
- Melos strongly desires to maintain neutrality in order to maintain their ancestral connections to the Dorians (Spartans), though they will maintain neutrality in the current conflict (note that in 416 BC, Athens and Sparta were nominally operating under the Peace of Nicias)
- Melos values freedom and self-determination over security and subordination
- Melos is unsure whether anyone will come to their aid if Athens attacks them
- Melos is an island and Athens has relatively unquestioned control over the sea

Each group should take five minutes to review their relative positions and establish priorities and negotiating points. After five minutes, the two sides will meet to negotiate the fate of Melos. This debate will take no longer than 20 minutes. At the 20 minute mark, if both sides are not in agreement, the Athenian side must decide to either attack or leave. **Note that neither side is bound to the historical events as they occurred.** In other words, the activity here is not to recreate the Melian Dialogue word for word. Rather, the activity is to *dialogue* and explore the dynamics of power politics and neutrality, and the tension between security, ideology, and strategy.

At the end of the dialogue, discuss the ramifications of the result, e.e., if Melos remains neutral, what is the impact on the Peloponnesian War? If Athens opts to place Melos under siege, what are the possible results? Discuss the potential ethical or moral dimensions of the situation as well (Seminar Meeting 8, Essay Question 9).

### **Exercise 12: Fogless and Frictionless American Revolution**

Time: 30 – 45 minutes

Preparation: Completed course readings. This can either be a full-class activity or the class can be divided to develop independent strategies, though they are operating from the same knowledge and same perspective.

Activity: Due to a mix-up at the NWC warehouse, a box containing the readings for this case study was accidentally sent to the British leadership in America during the War of American Independence. Following the Battle of Bunker Hill\*, your taskforce has been given these resources and charged with developing a winning strategy for the war. You have two primary objectives:

1. Retain British control of the North American colonies
2. Do not weaken British interests in any meaningful way on a global scale

Keep in mind that the conflict has already broken out. You cannot roll the clock back on the policies that resulted in the insurrection in the first place. Your task is to develop a strategy, with near-perfect knowledge, that achieves victory in North America while not losing elsewhere. Whether your superiors will listen to this strategy remains to be seen, and whether this strategy changes the course of history is above your pay grade. But know that the King will not accept “We are going to lose so let’s get out now” as a strategy.

(Students, do not be overly concerned with anachronisms or the framing of this as a “time travel” story. The point is for you to develop a strategy with near-perfect knowledge, but without the ability to significantly control or alter policy. In other words, if you eliminate as much fog and friction as possible, can you achieve victory? How can you operationally implement this ideal strategy? And what obstacles might still emerge to prevent you from achieving your policy objectives?)

\*Bunker Hill can also be replaced with Saratoga or Yorktown to diversify responses

### **Exercise 13: Gallipoli or what?**

Time: ~ 45 minutes

Preparation: Read Strachan; Cohen and Gooch.

At the beginning of 1915, the Great War in Europe had begun to stall. The Western Front was not quite the quagmire it would become in the next three years, but the British in particular were looking for alternative operations that would enable them to achieve their strategic objectives. On a grand scale, the primary objective was to defeat Germany, but supporting their allies of France and Russia, attacking the alliance system of the Central Powers, and protecting the interests of Britain globally, were key dimensions of that grand strategy.

The task at hand is to decide on the operation that will best achieve those strategic objectives. Winston Churchill proposes an attack on the Dardanelles. This would serve to relieve pressure on Russia, secure a valuable SLOC, and potentially devastate the German alliance system. John French, on the other hand, urges every available resource to be spent on the Western Front. While this obviously would not affect the naval dimensions of a potential Dardanelles campaign, any risk of a diversion from the main front would be disastrous in his view. A spring offensive was imminent, and French had promised British troops to aid in the Battle of Neuve-Chappelle. Beyond these two primary alternatives, other options existed, such as an attack on Schleswig-Holstein by sea or an amphibious landing into Syria. Simply reinforcing the British coast to prevent an invasion was also an option.

Activity: Divide the class into three groups, each with a spokesman. The first group will have Winston Churchill as a spokesman and should develop an argument for the Dardanelles operation. The second group will be headed by John French and should argue for increased effort to be put into breaking the impending stalemate on the Western Front. The third will be represented by Herbert Kitchener, and while Kitchener himself does not represent one coherent alternative strategy, the task of this group will be to decide on a third option. This group is free to propose any operation, but if there is not a clear choice between the Dardanelles or the Western Front groups, the third group will cast the deciding vote.

Groups will have 20 – 25 minutes to develop an argument for their proposed operation. This argument should include a risk assessment, a general understanding of costs and benefits, and a counter-argument/rebuttal. Groups will then spend 5 minutes proposing their operation to the class, with a clear articulation of how it achieves strategic objectives better than the alternatives. The remaining five minutes will be an open discussion/Q&A with the War Council (ie, the Professor) to establish the best course of action in the Spring of 1915.

Keep in mind that while you now know that both the Battle of Neuve-Chappelle (or the overall Spring Offensive) and the Dardanelles Campaign were failures, approach this activity with the intent to succeed where the actual operations failed.

### **Exercise 14: Kaiserliche Marine**

Time: 15 – 20 minutes

Activity: The Imperial German Navy stands out as one of the most curious “What If?” scenarios of World War I. Most anticipated that a conflict between Germany and Britain for hegemony in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century would have a heavy, if not determinative, naval dimension, but in actuality, World War I is more remarkable for its lack of naval activity. The Royal Navy surprised the Imperial German Navy by employing a distant, extended blockade of the North Sea rather than a close blockade of Kiel, resulting in uncertainty regarding the best way to employ the German fleet. This uncertainty was also born from competing, even paradoxical objectives.

Your task in this activity is to “weigh” three different objectives. While, in actual practice, strategic objectives are malleable and change continually based on circumstance, for the purpose of this exercise, consider these frozen in time for the period immediately following the Battle of

Jutland (alternative moments would be at the outbreak of war, immediately prior to Jutland, or at the end of war prior to the Kiel Mutiny).

The objectives are as follows:

1. Utilize the fleet to achieve a decisive victory, contributing to an overall victory in the war, particularly against Britain. This also includes breaking the British blockade and allowing resupply to Germany.
2. Maintain a “fleet in being” in order to keep the British committed to their blockade, and to prevent a devastating loss, given the numerical superiority of the British navy.
3. Utilize the fleet in war termination negotiations. This means potentially avoiding even advantageous engagements in order to maintain as strong of a position post-war as possible.

Divide into three or four groups. As a group, assign a relative weight to each of these three objectives (Decisive Victory, Fleet in Being, Bargaining Chip). You have 15 “points” to assign. An example would be giving 10 points to the “fleet in being” objective, 4 points to the “decisive victory” objective, and 1 point to the “diplomatic weight” objective. This would mean you see having a “fleet in being” as 2.5x as important as a potential decisive victory and 10x more important than maintaining the fleet as a bargaining chip.

You can distribute the points however you would like, but should be able to explain why you assigned the weights that you did. This should take no more than 10 minutes.

At the end of 10 minutes, each group will briefly share their point distribution and the points will be tallied together for the whole class. Conclude with a discussion both about the overall weight of these particular objectives in the context of World War I, and also about the process for evaluating competing or contradictory objectives.

### **Exercise 15: Theorists and Nazis**

Time: ~30 minutes

Preparation: *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 677 – 702

Activity: Following their success in 1940 in the Battle of France, Germany seemed poised to achieve victory. As we know, they were subsequently stymied in the Battle of Britain and the Atlantic, and blundered in Operation Barbarossa. Returning to 1940, let us ask the question of what Germany should have done differently. Rather than proposing specific alternative operations, instead imagine that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were evaluating German strategy in 1940. What suggestions might they have, and what advice might they give to the German high command?

Divide into two groups, one for Clausewitz and one for Sun Tzu. Imagine that in 1940, German high command has solicited esteemed strategists for advice on next steps. What advice would the theorists give? Keep in mind that this is not an exercise in perfect knowledge (i.e., the theorists do not know that an invasion of the Soviet Union will happen or will fail, though they might be

able to guess that). This is an exercise in incorporating the theorists into an active conflict, applying their insights not simply retrospectively but also in the moment.

### **Exercise 16: Tehran Talks**

Time: 30 – 45 minutes

Preparation: “Anglo-American Strategy Controversy.” Additional perspective can be found in the unassigned chapter 23 in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, particularly pages 683 – 692.

Activity: In late 1943, Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt met in Tehran to decide on the next phases of the Second World War. In this activity, designate a Churchill, a Stalin, and a Roosevelt. Then divide the rest of the class under these leaders (either randomly or via another method).

Groups should spend 10 - 15 minutes establishing a list of strategic priorities and objectives. If time permits, suggested supporting operations can also be included. Once this time is finished, the groups will meet together in a mock Tehran conference to coordinate and definitively craft a winning strategy.

Note that you are under no compunction to decide on the exact same strategy as the Allies decided at Tehran, though you certainly may do so. The end result is less important than the process in this case. How do three roughly equal partners with different strengths and different objectives coordinate their efforts? And perhaps most importantly, what do negotiations and coordination look like when “victory” looks different for each, particularly in terms of the desired post-war order?

### **Exercise 17: Counterfactual Pearl Harbor**

Time: ~30 minutes

Activity: Divide into two groups. Group One will theorize what the war in the Pacific might have looked like **if Pearl Harbor had never happened**. This does not mean that it failed, but that the Japanese had not pre-emptively attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor (professors can decide whether they still attack the Philippines).

Group Two will theorize what the war in the Pacific might have looked like **if Pearl Harbor had been more successful**. This can be adapted, but at a minimum consider if the Japanese had destroyed the oil storage tanks and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor. Further extension could include if the Japanese had also managed to significantly weaken the carrier force.

Both groups should consider in particular the implications for A2/AD in the Pacific, the relationship between Japanese objectives (a “Great East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere”) and strategies, the impact of Pearl Harbor on the “people” side of the American triangle, and the broader impact for American strategy in World War II.

Groups should take 20 minutes to play out the implications of the different scenarios. Each group will then have 5 minutes to brief their conclusions.

### **Exercise 18: Atomic Questions**

Time: 30 – 60 minutes

Preparation: Read Kort, *The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb*; Bernstein, “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Kyushu Have Occurred?”

Activity: The setting is mid-July, 1945. Truman is aware of the successful test detonation of atomic weapons. His advisors indicate that while Japan has little hope of victory, they are uncertain when Japan will surrender. Further, the domestic situation is not yet tense, but signs of war weariness are beginning to show. He calls together his most trusted advisors and poses the question: **Do we use the atomic bomb on Japan?**

There are numerous sub-considerations of this question. Should the bomb be dropped on a populated area or an unpopulated area? Will it have the desired strategic effect? What will the international response be? What will the domestic response be? What other options are available? Conventional strategic bombing? Ground invasion? Blockade? However, at the end of the day, the primary question is a simple yes or no.

Divide the class into four groups, each with their own agenda. These groups can be of equal or unequal sides.

#### Group 1: Scientists

Scientists are **opposed** to the use of nuclear weapons, particularly on a populated area. They are opposed primarily on moral grounds, as well as intellectual grounds. They have the best understanding of the capabilities of nuclear weapons but the least understanding of the strategic concerns of the Pacific Theater. They are concerned and aware of the possibility of proliferation, though still uncertain about the long-term ramifications of nuclear weapons on the broader world order. This is a strong position but not universal or unable to change.

#### Group 2: Diplomats

Diplomats are **split** on the use of nuclear weapons, primarily due to the uncertain international ramifications. This is both in terms of international prestige (ie, will this harm or benefit the US on a global level), and in terms of proliferation (ie, if we have it and use it, what will happen when others have it?). Diplomats have a decent appreciation for the capabilities of nuclear weapons and of the strategic arena, but are primarily concerned with the post-war order. They can either support or reject the use of nuclear weapons.

#### Group 3: Politicians

Politicians are **split** on the use of nuclear weapons. The primary concerns of the politicians are ending the war in a way that is consistent with the ideological and political pressures on the

United States. Politicians are vaguely aware of the capabilities of atomic weapons, but are more aware of the domestic situation (war weariness/resolve) and the broader geostrategic place of the United States. They can either support or reject the use of nuclear weapons.

#### Group 4: Military

The Military **supports** the use of nuclear weapons. They primarily support this based on a desire to end the war quickly and decisively with minimal US casualties. They are somewhat aware of the capabilities of nuclear weapons, and highly aware of the strategic position of the United States in the Pacific theater. This includes the US position relative to both Japan and the USSR. They are slightly aware of domestic politics and the post-war settlement, but are primarily focused on ending the war. This is a strong position but not universal or unable to change.

Each group will have 5 – 10 minutes to work together to develop positions, marshal arguments and potential rebuttals, and decide on a strategy to convince the President and other advisors of their positions.

Once brought back together, each group will then have a short 2-minute window to share their initial position with others. Discussion and debate will then commence. Members of particular groups are free to be convinced by other arguments and change their individual positions, as long as they remain consistent with their role. For example, a scientist can be convinced to support dropping the bomb under certain conditions.

At the end of the discussion period, the President (Professor or designated student) will have to decide on a course of action.

A few notes:

- These roles are roughly historically accurate. Not all scientists opposed dropping the bomb in 1945, though most did. Not all military leaders supported dropping the bomb, though most did. Not all diplomats worried about the creation of atomic diplomacy and brinkmanship, and politicians are not necessarily exclusively or primarily concerned with domestic issues. These are amalgamated roles, and students should feel free to individualize. That being said...
- This is a role-play exercise and works best if students embrace their roles. However, **the roles assigned should not be conflated to reflect the personal opinions or views of students.**
- At its heart, this is a discussion concerning restrictions on strategic thinking. At what point does the unthinkable (dropping nuclear weapons on a populated area) become thinkable, and how does that strategic discussion play out? How do moral, political, and strategic factors interact with each other in these scenarios? To be blunt, you can argue that it is/was morally wrong to drop the atomic bombs, but for the purposes of this exercise and this course, this must be paired with an argument of why this would be a strategic mistake as well.

### **Exercise 19: Atomic Counterfactual**

Time: ~30 minutes

Activity: The Manhattan Project was delayed for two years. Now, in 1945 you are tasked with deciding the best way to end the war with Japan. Atomic weapons are still a feasible option, but will take two years to be employed. All other considerations remain the same (policy of unconditional surrender, intelligence concerning Japanese capabilities and dispositions, relationship with the Soviet Union, etc).

There are two elements to this activity. The first is how you decide to approach the discussion. Students should propose and decide upon the best way to develop a strategy (smaller working groups or subcommittees? One roundtable discussion?). How do you best ensure that all interested parties have a voice in the discussion? What structural weaknesses and strengths exist in any given strategic planning arrangement?

The second element is actually deciding upon a strategy. The form of this will depend on the outcome of the first element. By the end of the activity, you should have a realistic plan that utilizes means to achieve the end. Any questions concerning means or ends can be directed to the President (Professor). The President will decide at the end of the activity whether your strategy is viable.

Professors Note: If there are questions beyond the scope of your knowledge, feel free to either provide a “best guess” or give students an uncertain answer based on “fog of war.” Depending on the direction of arguments, professors can also adjust the means and ends appropriately (such as backing down on the unconditional surrender policy).

### **Exercise 20: Vietnam Decision Room**

Time: 90+ minutes

Activity: The seminar will be placed in late December of 1964 after the Gulf of Tonkin (Southeast Asia) Resolution of 7 August 1964 but before the large-scale troop introductions of 1965. One member of the seminar will play the President and others will fill select roles of key national security and military advisors. These advisors will be constrained only by the position within the administration, but not by what the incumbents in these positions actually thought and did at the time (e.g., Secretary of State will adhere strictly to the role of Secretary of State, taking positions appropriate to that office but not constrained by Secretary Dean Rusk’s positions). The seminar will then formulate a course(s) of action it deems appropriate to secure U.S. the policy objective(s) in Vietnam. The entire seminar session will be used for the role play with time left at the end of the session for the President to brief the seminar moderator on the policy adopted and the strategy(ies) selected to create the situation that will achieve that policy objective or objectives.

The role play may require any number of elements, including, but not limited to: Talking Papers written prior to the exercise, short situational briefings to the President by major political and

military advisers; various sub-groups to formulate either policy or strategy recommendations to the President and, open forum discussion as in a Cabinet or working group meeting. The precise format and rules of the role play will be discussed in preceding seminar sessions. To assist each role player in comprehending the political and strategic situation in Vietnam by December 1964, students are provided the "**Proceedings of the NSC Working Group on Vietnam, November 1 - December 7,**" which are primary source documents relating to the Vietnam situation in late 1964.

The role play is intended to help students make the leap from critiquing strategy to formulating strategy. The latter, after all, is the purpose of the course with respect to future assignments in command or on senior staffs. The list below designates the basic exercise roles depending on the seminar size; the professor may create, assign, and/or modify these, as appropriate.

**President of the United States:** Opening remarks and specific guidance for the conduct of the National Security Team meeting (as previously published).

**National Security Advisor:** Overall United States security policy towards communist expansion.

**Secretary of State:** International diplomatic view of the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), the administration's policy relative to RVN, relationships with Allies, and potential problems with unfriendly nations, specifically the USSR and the PRC.

**Secretary of Defense:** United States capabilities for prosecuting military actions in RVN.

**White House Chief of Staff/Domestic Policy Advisor:** Overall assessment of domestic situation, particularly relating to fears of Communism, willingness to become involved in Southeast Asia, and potential for domestic disruption.

**Ambassador to Vietnam:** Political situation in RVN.

**Director of the CIA:** Status of intelligence gathering and assets in Southeast Asia.

**Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:** Military strategy relative to the United States' worldwide commitment of military forces, and specifically Southeast Asia.

**Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam:** Military situation in the RVN and status of Army forces assigned to prosecute and support Southeast Asia operations.

**Chief of Staff of the Army:** Army's status relative to involvement in RVN.

**Chief of Naval Operations:** Navy's status relatively to involvement in RVN.

**Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific (Hawaii):** Be prepared to brief on the status of forces Pacific and Southeast Asia theater of operations.

**Commander, U.S. Air Force, Pacific (Hawaii)/Commander, Seventh Air Force (Osan Air Base, South Korea):** Status of air forces assigned to the Pacific Area of operations and to prosecute and support Southeast Asia theater operations.

Other role options:

**Attorney General:** Legal considerations of intervention in Southeast Asia (position was vacant in 1964).

**Director of USAID:** Status of pacification and humanitarian assistance efforts, particularly relating to supporting the government of RVN.

**SEATO Secretary-General:** Provide perspective on the willingness of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization to support military involvement in Southeast Asia

**Ambassador to the United Nations:** Provide perspective on the general mood and opinion in the United Nations relative to Russia, China, and the situation in Vietnam

**Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:** Provide context for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and perspective on Congressional opinion relative to American involvement in Southeast Asia.

### **Exercise 21: Controlling the Narrative**

Time: 45 - 60 minutes

Activity: While controlling the narrative concerning the goals and status of a conflict has always been a key component of strategy, with the Vietnam War and the advent of televisions, this imperative took on new life. While typically we confine our considerations in this course to developing strategies and operations against belligerents, in this activity you will be tasked with developing an information operation that serves the strategy of bolstering domestic American support for the Vietnam War. An ancillary goal would be to also increase the South Vietnamese rural receptivity to the US, though this is beyond the specific bounds of your tasker.

Your taskforce has been positioned as a liaison between Westmoreland, the JCS, and the President. You can position yourself either in the United States or in South Vietnam. Your task is simple: Craft an information strategy that bolsters support in the United States for the Vietnam War.

For the activity, divide the class however will best serve the mission of the taskforce. Students can work all together or they can form sub-groups of their choosing.

There are two parts to this activity. For the first part, you should come up with an information strategy that supports the build-up of US troops between 1965 - 1968. You do not have any say in the actual operations, except to offer proposals for operations that would support the information strategy. These may or may not be executed (Professor's discretion). You have ~20 minutes to develop a strategy, and five minutes to brief the Professor.

In the second part of the assignment, your task remains the same but you are now dealing with the fallout from the Tet Offensive. This is a difficult, if not impossible, task, but it must be done. How do you adapt your strategy to this setback? How do you maintain or even increase American domestic support for both the high-level strategy of the military and the specific

operations? If you want a further challenge, also consider the implications of the relative failure of Rolling Thunder, the My Lai Massacre, and/or the leak of the Pentagon Papers. You have 20 minutes to develop a strategy, and five minutes to brief the professor.

At the end of the brief, discuss the anticipated effectiveness of the information strategies proposed. What difficulties emerge in crafting a message concerning military strategy to a civilian audience? Would a more effective information strategy have meaningfully affected the results of the Vietnam War? How much “managing” should the military do of its own narrative?

### **Exercise 22: The Nixon Administration and Vietnam: A Case Study in Negotiation and War Termination**

Time: 90+ minutes

This exercise is drawn from the Georgetown University School of Policy’s extensive case study library. It focuses on the final phase of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, beginning in 1969, as President Richard Nixon sought to disengage the United States from the conflict. This was a wrenching and pivotal experience, affecting America’s willingness to commit itself abroad and its perception of its actual political leverage in international bargaining. The study asks students to consider why—since the peace accord reached in early 1973 did not differ markedly from the terms of a 1969 peace plan—it took the two sides four years to reach a settlement.

To gain free access for classroom use, faculty will need to register with Georgetown University here: <https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/pages/faculty-registration> . Once set-up, you can log in and find the case study by number (130) or by name.

### **Exercise 23: The Hundred Hour War**

Time: 90+ minutes

This exercise is drawn from the Georgetown University School of Policy’s extensive case study library. It describes the struggle by key national security officials in the administration of President George H.W. Bush to respond to Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Of particular interest are the effects of the “Vietnam syndrome” on civil-military relations during the crisis, and the ensuing decline in popular support for the intervention.

To gain free access for classroom use, faculty will need to register with Georgetown University here: <https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/pages/faculty-registration> . Once set-up, you can log in and find the case study by number (234) or by name.

## ***ANNEX C: GUIDE TO ESSAY PREPARATION***

### 1. *Academic Philosophy*

a. Graduate-level work is required in this course. Students are expected to write thorough, comprehensive papers in an academically acceptable style.

b. Students are encouraged to consult with others who may be enrolled in CDE courses or with persons knowledgeable in the subject matter. In this way, there can be an exchange of views and an increase in understanding. *The essay submitted to the College, however, must represent the individual's own work.*

c. Textbook material provided with each topic is sufficient to enable students to do "A" quality work. These materials have been selected on the basis of content, availability, and cost. **Only the texts and Selected Readings provided by the NWC are to be used as sources for the essays. Remember – these are analytical “thought pieces,” not historical research papers.**

d. While there are no school solutions, the responses to the topic question should be supported by the text material, lecture presentations, and sound logic. In grading the students' work, professors will, when appropriate, comment upon other options or alternative approaches.

### 2. *Purpose, Goal, and Key Elements of an S&W Essay.*

The essay offers an opportunity to undertake a strategic analysis. A good essay is an analytical “think piece” in which the author presents a thesis supported by arguments based on the information available in the assigned readings and lectures. Essays must also include a counter-argument and rebuttal. Because these essays are analytical think pieces and not research papers, the essays should not contain historical narrative for narrative sake. The recitation of factual data should be minimized; students should present only that historical narrative necessary to support the thesis and analysis in response to the question. Moreover, the arguments should concern the strategic and operational levels of war according to the S&W course themes, and evaluate alternative strategies. If the paper or essay discusses tactical-level considerations, it is a clear indication that the question is not being properly answered.

A successful essay will have five “cornerstones:”

- 1) It answers the question assigned;
- 2) It has a thesis which supports that answer;
- 3) It marshals evidence to support that thesis. It provides analysis of the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and makes a clear, unambiguous, substantial argument in support of the essay's thesis as well as addressing

all parts of the posed question;

4) It considers, explicitly or implicitly, opposing arguments to or weaknesses in the thesis and supporting evidence. This is the counter-argument. The essay should also refute the counter-argument. The refutation or rebuttal is equally important, because it ultimately demonstrates why the argument is better than any potential weaknesses posed by the counter-argument;

5) It does the above in a clear and well-organized fashion.

### 3. *Guidelines for Preparation of Essays -*

The Naval War College recognizes that learning is more meaningful if students consult scholarly sources that provide specialized treatment of the subject under consideration. In writing essays, however, students are expected to produce works that are original. The following steps are recommended in producing original essays of graduate-level quality:

- a. Analyze the question. Many essay questions are composed of several parts, so list the elements to ensure that the essay deals precisely with the question, and decide on the most salient aspects of the case study for concentration - then stick to the methodology in presenting an analysis. Good analysis is the cornerstone of essay preparation.
- b. Read all assigned materials to gain a broad picture of the major concepts covered in the case study. Take notes and record each source of information by title, author, and page number(s) to incorporate the citations into the text (as required by the individual seminar professor). Use of removable note tabs to indicate particularly useful passages may prove helpful. If the lecture session associated with the seminar topic has already taken place, read carefully any sections highlighted by the lecturer.
- c. Organize the response to include a thesis, body, and conclusion. Develop thoughts logically and write clearly, simply, and concisely. *Do not stray into historical narration; use historical facts sparingly, only as needed to defend the positions!*
- d. Prepare a rough draft or an outline of the essay using the detailed notes and citations. Review the draft or outline to ensure that it addresses all aspects of the question. Eliminate superfluous material.
- e. Follow the seminar professor's guidance on how to include citations (he/she will select a method from the choices shown in Section 6, "Footnotes, Endnotes, or Parenthetical References").

**CRITICAL NOTE: In all essays, using the aforementioned five “cornerstones,” the student must address the appropriate course themes and concepts. The essays cannot simply be a narrative of the events, rather, they must analyze the issues in relationship to the appropriate course themes and concepts, and, make a clear, unambiguous, and substantial argument in support of the essay’s thesis as well as addressing all parts of the posed question. Failure to include all of these elements will result in a grade deduction.**

4. *Style / Format*

a. Considerable latitude is granted in the area of style as long as the one used facilitates clear and accurate presentation of the material and is consistent.

b. The preferred style for these essays lies somewhere between that of a research paper and a classical essay. This allows for a somewhat less structured style than for a true research paper, but the essay should conform to the following requirements at a minimum:

- (1) Eight (8) full pages (approximately 2400 words)
- (2) Typed double space
- (3) Times New Roman 12-pitch font
- (4) One (1) inch margins top, bottom, both sides
- (5) Number all pages consecutively throughout the essay
- (6) Bind or staple at the upper left corner (if hard copy submitted)
- (7) Use direct quotations sparingly
- (8) Document reference material as directed by the seminar professor, using some recognized form for footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical citations.
- (9) Divide the essay into component parts, labeling the thesis, conclusion, and the main areas of discussion in the body of the paper, if necessary to organize your thoughts and produce a well-organized essay.
- (10) Reproduce the essay question as it appears in the syllabus on the cover page.
- (11) Notes or title page will not be counted toward the page requirements (i.e., only pages with the actual essay will be included).

c. Students should refer to some recognized style manual or writing guide for guidance on correct usage and acceptable convention. Manuals for this purpose include, but are not limited to:

- (1) *The Chicago Manual of Style*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1906-2017 (Seventeenth Edition).
- (2) Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. Any edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (3) John C. Hodges and Mary E. Whitter, *Harbrace College Handbook*. Any edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
- (4) Walter S. Achtert and Joseph Gibaldi, *MLA Style Manual*, 1986.

## 5. *Clarity*

a. After reading the materials, analyzing them in terms of the topic, and outlining the structure of the paper, the final step is to communicate specific ideas to the reader in a clear, concise, and professional manner. Pay particular attention to sentence and paragraph structure and avoid unnecessarily long or complex sentence structure. Choose words carefully and avoid jargon, obscure acronyms, and slang. Spell out any acronyms upon first usage. Define any words or phrases that have ambiguous or obscure meanings.

b. There are a number of excellent guides to clear and effective writing. This list includes, but is not limited to:

(1) William Strunk, Jr. and E. B. White, *The Elements of Style*, Any edition. New York: Macmillan or Longman.

(2) Porter G. Perrin, *Writer's Guide and Index to English*. Any edition. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman & Co.

## 6. *Footnotes, Endnotes, or Parenthetical References*

Since the course requires a formal scholarly writing approach, use some form of recognized citation (footnotes, endnotes, or parenthetical references) to document all external sources of information. The seminar professor will advise students as to the accepted form for that seminar. By using proper citations, students avoid either deliberate or accidental plagiarism. Citations shall be used when there is:

a. *Direct quotations*. Direct quotations should be used sparingly. To avoid misrepresenting the author, a quotation must be copied exactly as it appears in the original, including complete punctuation and any errors in the original printing. Extended block quotations (those that run four lines or more) should be indented five spaces and single-spaced. Quotation marks are not used for indented block quotations.

b. *Paraphrasing*. Paraphrasing is a rewording of an author's ideas. Paraphrasing is helpful when the original text is unclear or not oriented to the issue at hand.

c. *Summarizing*. Summarizing also involves rewording an author's ideas. In addition, the author's thoughts are usually condensed for space considerations. Summarizing is useful when the source deals with the subject at a greater length than desired.

d. *Recording Factual Information*. The decision to acknowledge the source of supposed factual information depends largely on the extent to which the data has been accepted as accurate. The year and manner of the death of Thucydides, for example, are not definitely known. Some sources claim he was lost at sea during a storm, while others disagree. If this statement were to be included in an essay, therefore, a citation would be appropriate because

there is still some doubt of its validity. The guiding principle for determining what to cite is simple: when in doubt, cite.

e. *Citation Format*. While the College of Distance Education does not prescribe a specific form for citations for papers written in this course, consistent usage is required. Your seminar professor may provide specific guidance on citations. Examples of specific citation styles may be found in **The Chicago Manual of Style** and Kate Turabian's **A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations**. In the absence of more specific guidance from your professor, for Strategy and War essays, the parenthetical citation form on pages 111-119 of Turabian is convenient.

### ***ANNEX D: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY GUIDANCE***

Per paragraph 10 of the syllabus, when students are absent from a seminar, they are required to submit an Executive Summary by the beginning of the next seminar meeting after the absence. The following general guidance for an Executive Summary is provided:

- The Executive Summary should be no longer than one page, back and front.
- The purpose of the Executive Summary is for the student to provide the professor with evidence that he or she has reviewed the material for the seminar from which they were absent. That evidence should always include some reference to the readings for that seminar session (i.e., to provide evidence that the student has read the assigned readings for that session and has reflected on the salient points discussed in those readings). In some cases, evidence may include reference to other sources, as well (i.e., lecture slides, handouts, agendas, essays submitted by fellow students, etc.).
- Because of this limited space available in the Executive Summary (one page, back and front) and the multiple readings assigned, the evidence the student provides should be broadly presented, and not presented in a very detailed fashion.

If students need more guidance on this requirement, they should contact their professor.

## ***ANNEX E: STUDENT END-OF-COURSE SAMPLE CRITIQUE***

### **STRATEGY AND WAR, AY 2025-26**

At the end of the S&W course, each student will be asked to submit an online critique. Student critiques are carefully reviewed by the faculty. Since constructive and thoughtful student criticism is an invaluable tool to improving the content/delivery of the course, the faculty appreciates students' constructive, thoughtful inputs and recommendations.

Students can provide lecture feedback immediately after each lecture, using the "S&W Lecture Survey" tab in BlackBoard. That tab is available throughout the year.

Because the end-of-course critique will not be available until the end of the course, the faculty has provided a sample critique on the following pages for students to capture their thoughts while they are still fresh in the mind.

For both lecture surveys (collected throughout the year) and the end-of-course critique (collected at the end of the year), student inputs will be anonymous. Additionally, regardless of when the inputs are collected electronically, professors will not see them until after all grades have been submitted at the end of the year. So, students should feel free to be as open and honest as they can be.

Please use the below sample critique to evaluate each case study while impressions are still fresh in the mind. Please note specific books or readings that are particularly useful or not helpful. If you have a book or reading that you think is better, please include that recommendation. Using the sample provided will make it easier for students to complete the end-of-course critique at the end of the year. It will also increase the quality of student inputs.

Again, the end-of-course critique will be available near the end of the course. When it is available, an announcement will be made. Students should use the sample critique *throughout the year* to capture thoughts when they are fresh in the mind. They can transfer them to the end-of-course critique later, when it becomes available.

Thank you, in advance, for your thoughtful, constructive inputs in both the lecture surveys (throughout the year) and the end-of-course critique (at the end of the year).

**Case Study:**

**Date:**

Masters of War  
Peloponnesian War  
American Revolution  
Russo-Japanese War  
World War I  
World War II – Europe  
World War II – Pacific  
The Korean War  
Vietnam War  
Iraq, 1990 - 98  
AQAM  
China Challenge  
Retrospect and Prospect

**1. What was the overall satisfaction with the case study?**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

**2. How appropriate were the stated course objectives?**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

**3. To what degree did the case study meet its stated objectives?**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

**4. Estimate the case study's future value.**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

**Overall Impression of the Course.** Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” Please also provide feedback as appropriate in the spaces for narrative comments. Please explain any low ratings (below 4) in the area provided at the end of the critique form.

- 1. This course enabled me to evaluate strategic arguments and alternative courses of action within wars (Course Outcome #1).**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 2. This course enabled me to creatively apply strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war (Course Outcome #2).**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 3. This course enabled me to evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains (Course Outcome #3).**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 4. This course enabled me to evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims (Course Outcome #4).**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 5. This course was well-planned and organized.**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 1. The workload for this course was appropriately challenging.**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

- 2. I was a diligent student in this course.**

(very low)      1   2   3   4   5   6   7      (very high)

**3. Please assess the individual Case Studies in terms of their contribution to the value of the S&W course.**

(very low)            1   2   3   4   5   6   7            (very high)

**4. Which Case Study did you find MOST interesting and helpful? Why?**

**5. Which Case Study did you find LEAST interesting and helpful? Why?**

**6. Using a scale where 7 indicates a “high value” and 1 indicates a “low value” please assess how the following learning techniques contributed to achieving the stated objectives of this course.**

- a. Seminar Discussion \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Lectures \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Student Essays \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Required Readings \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Professor(s) \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Final Exam \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Blackboard Course Site \_\_\_\_\_

**7. Please indicate whether you agree with the following statements using a scale where 7 indicates that you “strongly agree” and 1 indicates that you “strongly disagree.” If you had more than one professor in your seminar, please use the comments section if you would like to provide individual feedback.**

- a. This professor was effective overall. \_\_\_\_\_
- b. This professor was effective at presenting course material. \_\_\_\_\_
- c. This professor was effective at guiding seminar discussion. \_\_\_\_\_
- d. This professor encouraged questions and participation in discussions. \_\_\_\_\_
- e. This professor respected my opinion. \_\_\_\_\_
- f. This professor was effective at providing feedback. \_\_\_\_\_

**8. On average, how much time did you spend in weekly preparation for class (excluding written requirements)?**

- 9. How many hours did you spend preparing and writing each assigned essay?**
  
- 10. On average, how much time did you spend commuting to class each week (one way)?**
  
- 11. Rate the quality of the classroom facilities and environment (physical and/or virtual).**
  
- 12. What two things did you like most about the S&W course?**
  
- 13. What two things did you like least about the S&W course?**
  
- 14. Please provide any other specific suggestions or recommendations concerning the S&W course.**

## ***ANNEX F: CJCS MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY***

### **JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME) PHASE I (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL) PROGRAM GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

Excerpts from: CJCSI 1800.01G dtd 15 APRIL 2024 – OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY (OPMEP)

On 15 April 2024, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff published a policy document that governs the joint aspects of Service College education. This Annex provides the six Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) for the JPME program. These Joint Learning Areas guide the S&W course curriculum and content.

JLA 1 - Strategic Thinking and Communication. Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

JLA 2 -The Profession of Arms. Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

JLA 3 -The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War. Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument to achieve national security objectives.

JLA 4 -The Security Environment. Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate interdisciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

JLA 5 - Strategy and Joint Planning. Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-

informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives.

JLA 6 - Globally Integrated Operations. Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.

### **PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)**

To meet the JLAs published in the OPMEP, the Naval War College has developed, and the Fleet Seminar Program has adopted, the following College of Naval Command and Staff/Naval Staff College (JPME I) Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs):

1. Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition.
2. Create theater and national military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments.
3. Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to decision-making in theater-level, joint, and multinational operations.
4. Apply theory, history, doctrine, and seapower through critical, strategic thought in professional, written communication.

### **COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (CLOs)**

To meet the PLOs developed by the Naval War College, the Strategy and Policy Department has developed, and the S&W course has adopted, the following Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs). We expect that students who successfully complete the Strategy and War Course will be able to:

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of action within wars.
2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.



