



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

Fleet Seminar Program

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

Academic Year 2024-2025 Syllabus



CDE

**COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT**

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE
SYLLABUS

Foreword

This syllabus contains both an overview and detailed description of the Theater Security Decision Making course of study. Prepared for the College of Naval Command and Staff for use in the Fleet Seminar Program of the College of Distance Education, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for weekly class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

Prepared by:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Michael W. Pratt".

Prof. MICHAEL W. PRATT
Chair, National Security Affairs Department
College of Distance Education

Approved by:

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Steven L. Pierce".

Dr. STEVEN L. PIERCE
Interim Dean
College of Distance Education

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THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) STUDY GUIDE

1. Course Overview. The National Security Affairs (NSA) Department's course in Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) is designed to engage intermediate-rank students in the complexities of today's national and international security environment with a strong emphasis on regional security issues. The course offers a broad interdisciplinary curriculum in contemporary security studies that encompasses a diverse spectrum of regional and global issues and perspectives, but with particular emphasis on U.S. decision making challenges and processes at the theater-strategic level through the various combatant commands. Because of the theater-strategic focus of the course, TSDM will concentrate on three specific geographic regions—the Pacific Ocean region, the Indian Ocean region, and the Atlantic Ocean region. Based on the fact that this is JPME at the “Naval” War College, much of the course, particularly the Capstone Exercise (CX), will focus on the INDOPACOM area of responsibility as it is the largest area for U.S. Naval activity.

2. Course Intent. The goal of the TSDM course is to provide an educational experience that combines conceptual rigor and professional relevance in order to prepare students to be more effective participants in the decision making environment. This may be as part of a major national security organization such as a combatant command or Service staff or when in command. The intended outcome of this graduate-level course is to foster joint warfighting skills, regional awareness, strategic perspectives, critical thinking, and analytic rigor. These skills are needed by national security professionals who will be working in a complex staff environment or when in command. The goal is to help develop skilled Joint warfighters who can develop and execute national- and theater-level military strategies that effectively employ the Armed Forces in concert with other instruments of national power to achieve the goals of national security strategy and policy in the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace).

3. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Officer Professional Military Education Policy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 1800.01G (dated 15 April 2024), sets the policies, procedures, outcomes, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and JPME. The instruction directs the Services and Service schools to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting the Joint Learning Areas (JLAs) which are broad categories of Joint knowledge to inform the JPME curricula and meet the requirements for Joint officer education. The education continuum for JPME-1 outlined in the OPMEP is intended to prepare mid-career officers to conduct operations and campaigns in Service-specific and Joint constructs and to be fully capable of serving as leaders and staff officers at the operational level of war. This syllabus will list the TSDM Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) for each individual session. In addition, the syllabus will also list the Naval War College's Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) that are supported by that session. A full listing of the OPMEP JLAs for JPME-I can be found in Annex I.

4. Learning Outcomes. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has directed that JPME maintain a current and relevant curriculum that provides graduates with the knowledge, skills, and attributes necessary to perform successfully across a competition continuum comprising armed conflict, competition below armed conflict, and cooperation in both traditional and irregular warfare contexts. The CJCS further directed that this be adopted through an outcomes-based military education (OBME) approach in its development, delivery, and assessment. Given this,

“outcomes” will be an integral part of JPME and the TSDM curriculum. The desired outcomes for the TSDM course are referred to as Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) and can be found in Annex G of this syllabus as well as below. The TSDM CLOs directly complement and support the Naval War College’s Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) for JPME-I. The Naval War College’s PLOs are the same for all modalities of JPME-I, resident, the Fleet Seminar Program, the Naval Command and Staff (NC&S) Online Program, and NWC-at-NPS. The Naval War College JPME-I PLOs can be found in Annex H of this syllabus as well as below.

a. TSDM Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs). The CLOs for TSDM are the key concepts, skills, or competencies that a student should be able to articulate, demonstrate, or utilize—theoretically or pragmatically—after completion of the session(s) relevant to a particular CLO. Each CLO will be assessed for student mastery at various stages of the curriculum. Student mastery of each CLOs must be achieved in order to successfully complete TSDM. The syllabus page for each of the TSDM sessions will identify the relevant CLO(s) covered by that session as well as when and how the CLO(s) will be assessed. The CLOs for TSDM are as follows:

- CLO-1** Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
- CLO-2** Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3** Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4** Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.

b. NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs). The Naval War College’s PLOs were approved by the President, Naval War College and the Joint Staff J-7 for all NWC JPME-I modalities, resident, Fleet Seminar Program, NC&S Online Program, and NWC-at-NPS. The Naval War College JPME-I PLOs are achieved only after a student has successfully completed all assessments in TSDM, JMO, and S&W. The PLOs most relevant to TSDM will be PLO-2 and PLO-3. The NWC’s JPME-I PLOs are as follows:

- PLO-1** Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition.
- PLO-2** Create theater and national military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments.
- PLO-3** Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to decision-making in theater-level, joint and multinational operations.
- PLO-4** Apply theory, doctrine, and seapower through critical, structured thought in professional, written communication.

5. Course Approach. TSDM is focused at the theater-strategic level where students intensively study various regions of the world and analyze how U.S. government foreign policy decisions impact theater security. The course follows the logic of analyzing national security through two

distinct lenses: *International Security*, providing the international strategic context with a strong regional focus on INDOPACOM, and *Foreign Policy Analysis* focusing on U.S. national and organizational decision making environments. At the end of the course, each seminar acts as a combatant command-level working group during the capstone event known as the Capstone Exercise (CX). Each seminar will develop an executive-level strategic estimate of the USINDOPACOM region over the next eight years, an outline of a regional strategy, and identify five capabilities required to advance the strategy.

6. Course Organization. The TSDM course in Fleet Seminar is 34 weeks long with 68 individual sessions. Each week will consist of two individual sessions which include the following major elements:

1) TSDM Foundations (seminars)	6 Sessions
2) International Security (IS) (seminars)	22 Sessions
3) Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) (seminars)	22 Sessions
4) Assess – Decide – Implement – Assure (ADIA) (seminars)	7 Sessions
5) Capstone Exercise (CX) (course-wide capstone)	10 Sessions
6) TSDM Course Synthesis (seminar)	1 Session

7. Course Requirements

a. Individual Student Responsibilities. Students are expected to be fully prepared for each seminar session and to actively contribute positively in classroom discussions. An inquisitive attitude and the willingness by all students to engage constructively with peers and faculty are essential prerequisites for a successful graduate-level seminar experience. The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a highly-qualified faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the final and most important third is the thorough preparation and active participation and contribution of individual students.

b. Workload. Every effort has been made to provide for a consistent reading and preparation workload from week-to-week throughout the course. TSDM is a graduate-level course that as a general rule requires approximately two hours of student preparation for every hour of class time. Accordingly, on balance over the course of each week, students should anticipate approximately six hours of preparation time each week. However, note that other student deliverables such as formative assessments (FAs) and Summative Assessments (SAs) in the form of written essays, exercises, and group presentations will be due throughout the course as well. Students should take careful note of the due dates for assignments as indicated below in order to plan far in advance for effective time and workload management.

c. Student Preparation. All student preparation materials (readings, videos, podcasts, etc.) must be completed prior to class since they serve as the basis for informed and lively seminar discussion. The goal of the seminar is to discuss national security issues informed by the preparation materials, not necessarily a review of each. From time to time, Professors may also

identify (optional) recommended readings to provide additional background knowledge directly relevant to course concepts or to provide current insights into a seminar discussion.

d. Study Guidance. For each session, the syllabus page identifies five distinct areas. Each week's preparation should begin with a thorough review of the respective syllabus pages paying particular attention to the Guidance Questions listed in Section C. The five areas of each syllabus page include:

- 1) Section A (Session Overview) offers a brief overview of that session and where it fits within the overall TSDM course.
- 2) Section B (Objectives) identifies the session objectives for that specific session, the relevant TSDM Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) for that session, and the relevant Naval War College Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) for that session.
- 3) Section C (Guidance Questions) outlines specific questions for that session which should be used to thoroughly prepare for seminar discussion.
- 4) Section D (Student Preparation) materials, as mentioned above, are the required readings, videos, podcasts, etc., for that session.
- 5) Section E (Student Deliverables) identifies any student deliverables required by that session and the associated suspense date.

e. Case Preparation. Case studies are frequently used in TSDM to provide intellectual stimulation, demonstrate application of course concepts, and to develop student abilities to analyze, synthesize, and solve complex problems using the knowledge and skills honed throughout the academic year. Students will be tasked with analyzing, synthesizing, and evaluating the case study material. Those efforts must be completed prior to seminar sessions so that discussion can focus on more deeply exploring concepts involved and analysis of the issues contained in the case. In some cases, the case preparation will include an interactive exercise during seminar where the student's full preparation and participation in seminar will be essential.

f. End of Course Survey. An invaluable part of any learning experience is substantive feedback. In an effort to improve the learning experience, students will be required to complete a student survey on their experience in TSDM—the curriculum, assessments, and their Professor. Students must submit this on-line end of course survey to the College of Distance Education in order to receive a final grade and course credit. All survey submissions are anonymous and the anonymous data shared with Professors only after all grades have been finalized.

8. Attendance. Students are expected to attend every seminar meeting during the 34 weeks of TSDM. Attendance is defined as a student's physical presence in any Fleet Seminar Program meeting (exercise or discussion), whether it is in the home seminar or at another Fleet Seminar Program location. Any student who does not attend a seminar meeting at a Fleet Seminar location for that week shall be considered absent. There is no distinction between "excused" and "unexcused" absences; a student is either physically present for a seminar meeting or not. A student who is absent from four (4) or more seminar meetings in TSDM, is, by accreditation standards, not eligible for the NWC M.A. degree. Upon the fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is

anticipated, the specifics of the situation will be reported by the seminar Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. Degree will be made by the Dean, CDE. Students who are subsequently absent from five (5) or more seminar meetings in TSDM will be reported to the Department Chair and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for a Naval War College Diploma and JPME I certification made.

a. Attendance at an Alternate in-person Seminar. The Fleet Seminar Program is structured so that any student who cannot be physically present in their normally assigned seminar on any given week may attend another physical location and earn credit for their attendance. Students are responsible for advising their Professor in advance of any anticipated absence, as well as assisting their Professor in the coordination for participation with another seminar. For example, a student assigned to the Washington Navy Yard is going TDY to San Diego, the student will need to let their Navy Yard Professor know that they will be absent from seminar due to a TDY and of their desire to attend the San Diego seminar rather than incur an absence. The student's Professor would coordinate via email with the gaining Professor in San Diego to facilitate the student's attendance, provided there is space available. Once coordinated, the student's Professor will put the student in touch with the gaining Professor via email so that the student can coordinate any requirements from the gaining Professor. After the student has attended a seminar at the alternate location, the Professor of the visited seminar will advise the Professor of the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of preparation and contribution.

b. Request for Attendance in an Alternate Virtual Seminar. If an in-person seminar at another location is not available a student may request to be included in one of the two TSDM virtual seminars, if space is available. The student must make this request in writing through their home Professor who will then forward a written request to the TSDM Fleet Seminar Program Director for approval. All requests for attendance in a virtual seminar *must be for operational reasons only where an in-person seminar option is not available or the student is SIQ (sick in quarters)*. A student seeking approval of attendance in a virtual TSDM seminar must provide the information identified below in an email to their Professor in order to be considered for approval. The Professor will ensure the validity of the student's request and forward the student's email along with a recommendation for approval to the TSDM Program Director. The information required for approval must include the following:

- 1) Student's name, home seminar location, and home seminar Professor's name.
- 2) Confirmation that the student is on operational TDY/TAD orders or SIQ.
- 3) The start and end dates of the operational TDY/TAD and the location or SIQ.
- 4) Date(s) and virtual location student is requesting to attend (East Coast Virtual meets on Tuesdays at 1730 ET; West Coast Virtual meets on Thursdays at 1730 PT).

c. Approval of Attendance in an Alternate Virtual Seminar. If approved, the TSDM Program Director will email the student, the home Professor, and the gaining virtual Professor to confirm approval for attendance and the corresponding dates. Following the written approval, the student will coordinate with the gaining virtual Professor for any specific requirements for

their pending attendance. Following the student's attendance in the virtual seminar, the Professor of the virtual seminar will advise the Professor at the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of preparation and contribution.

d. Requirements for Attendance in Virtual Seminar. In order to earn credit for attendance in a virtual seminar—whether permanently assigned or visiting—students *must have full access to Blackboard via the internet and have and maintain the ability to project and receive both audio and video so that they may be full participants in the seminar experience.* Students must also be in a quiet and private location where their full participation can be expected without any distractions for themselves or classmates. If full audio and video capabilities are not available or the student is not in an appropriate private location, they will be asked to leave the virtual seminar and will not earn attendance credit for the session(s) missed. Examples of locations that are *not* appropriate for virtual seminar attendance include but are not limited to airports, moving vehicles, commercial eating/drinking/shopping establishments, or any area open to the public that could be distracting to other members of the seminar or where others might overhear student discussions meant to be for non-attribution.

e. Requirements for Seminar Absence. If a student is unable to attend seminar at a physical location or virtually for any given week or weeks, he or she must submit a written essay for each of the sessions missed. The Professor will assign a minimum of two Guidance Questions from the respective syllabus pages for the student to thoroughly answer. The essays must be of a high enough quality to satisfy the Professor that the student has mastered the CLO(s) and course concepts for the session(s) missed. The submission will not erase the recorded absence for the seminar(s) missed but will ensure a student's thorough understanding of the session(s) missed. The quality of the written submission will be considered in the student's overall preparation and contribution grade.

9. Assessments. The Professor will assess student progress throughout TSDM using three means of assessment: formative assessments (FA), summative assessments (SA), and student preparation and contribution.

a. Formative Assessments. Formative assessments (FAs) are ungraded assessments which offer students and Professors an opportunity to assess student progress and comprehension of course material prior to completing a graded assignment. Each FA is assessed by the Professor as either “meets standards” or “not yet.” Although FAs are not graded, in order to meet standards, the student's work must be assessed at the equivalent of an 80/B- or better. All FAs must meet standards in order for a student to continue in the course. Any FA assessed by the Professor as “not yet” will need to be re-accomplished following thorough feedback and a remediation plan given by the Professor to the student. Remediation and successful completion of the FA must be completed within 48-hours of being assigned. Any student who receives a second “not yet” on the same FA will be referred to the NSA Department Chair and considered for involuntary disenrollment for failure to progress in the course. TSDM will have 10 FAs spread evenly throughout the course. The following is a list of the TSDM FAs and their corresponding suspense date.

FA #	Type of FA	Effort	Due
FA-1	Short Essay	Individual/Group	Week of 16 Sep

FA-2	Short Essay	Individual	Week of 21 Oct
FA-3	Group Presentations	Individual/Group	During IS 14-18
FA-4	Short Essay/in-class Exercise	Individual	Week of 20 Jan
FA-5	Group Presentation/Exercise	Individual/Group	Week of 10 Mar
FA-6	Short Essay/in-class Exercise	Individual	Week of 21 Apr
FA-7	Group CX Deliverable 1	Group	During CX-3
FA-8	Group CX Deliverable 2	Group	During CX-4
FA-9	Group CX Deliverable 3	Group	During CX-6
FA-10	Group CX Deliverables 4/5	Group	During CX-8

b. Summative Assessments. Summative Assessments (SAs) are graded assessments that validate a student's mastery of the CLO(s) being covered by that assessment. SAs will be graded with a number and letter grade (e.g., 87/B+). In order to be considered passing, an SA must earn a grade of 80/B- or higher. Each of the SAs in TSDM must earn a grade of 80/B- or higher in order for a student to continue in the course. Any SA assessed by the Professor as being below a grade of 80 will need to be re-accomplished following thorough feedback and a remediation plan given by the Professor to the student. Remediation and successful completion of the SA must be completed within 7 days of being assigned. If the second attempt on the SA earns a passing grade, the student will earn a final grade on that SA no higher than 80/B-. Any student who receives a second failure on the same SA will be referred to the NSA Department Chair and be considered for involuntary disenrollment for failure to progress in the course. SAs have a firm due date as outlined below. *Any late submission received after the due date without a written request from the student and written approval from the Professor will earn a grade no higher than an 80/B-.*

c. Student Seminar Preparation and Contribution. The final means of graded assessment is student seminar preparation and contribution. This assessment will be evaluated (with a numeric and corresponding letter grade) throughout the course based on how well a student prepared for each seminar and their effectiveness at applying applicable course concepts, demonstrating critical and creative thinking, and communicating these skills in seminar discussions, in-class exercises, and other course activities.

***An important note regarding seminar preparation and contribution grade.** Thorough preparation for each seminar, meticulously absorbing student preparation materials, and substantive contributions during seminar discussions are key aspects of the learning construct. Students will therefore be assessed on the cumulative quality of their individual seminar preparation and contributions. Student contribution is assessed by its quality. The goal is not to measure the number of times students have spoken, but how well they have demonstrated that they have prepared and understood the subject matter, enriched discussion, and contributed to a positive and active learning dynamic. This caliber of commitment requires students to come prepared to take part in every seminar discussion by absorbing the readings, listening attentively, thinking critically, and offering informed comments on session topics. Students are expected to prepare for and be thoughtfully engaged in each seminar session.

10. TSDM Graded Assessments. The following is a composite listing of TS8 course requirements, type of effort, basis of evaluation, time due, and their relative weight:

ASSESSMENT	TYPE OF EFFORT	BASIS OF EVALUATION	DUE DATE	WEIGHT
SA-1	Individual	Ability to analyze a case study and apply course concepts in a logical & concise way. (CLO-1)	48-hours after completion of TSDM-6 in Week 3	10%
SA-2	Individual	Ability to conduct research and explore in-depth a dimension of security (CLOs 1 & 2)	Prior to IS-21 in Week 14	25%
SA-3	Individual	Ability to analyze a case study and apply course concepts in a logical & concise way. (CLOs 1 & 3)	48-hours after completion of FPA-22 in Week 25	25%
SA-4	Group Briefing	Quality of product development, presentation, and Q&A responses. (CLOs 1-4)	During CX-10 in Week 34	20%
Student Seminar Preparation and Contribution	Individual	Quality of student seminar preparation and contribution in seminar discussions. (CLOs 1-4)	Weekly Weeks 1-26 and Weeks 28-30	15%
Student CX Preparation and Contribution	Individual	Quality of student preparation and contribution to CX product development. (CLOs 1-4)	Weekly Week 27 and Weeks 30-34	5%

a. *Grading Criteria.* A course grade will be assigned based on grades earned for summative assessments and preparation/contribution. Students must complete, with a 80/B- or better grade, each of the three NWC core courses for the master's degree program and receipt of JPME Phase I certification. All work in the prescribed curricula for the intermediate program will be graded using the standards below.

1) Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average of the weighted course assessments in the table above, to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grades with pluses or minuses.

2) General rubrics (in paragraph b. below) are provided so students will know the general performance criteria for summative assessments and student preparation and contribution.

3) Grades for all TSDM assignments are based on the standards set forth in the 2019 U.S. Naval War College Faculty Handbook (chapter 3, section7), which states in part:

“Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35% - 45% ‘As’ and 55% - 65% Bs and ‘Cs’ can be expected from the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely if ever reach an overall ‘A’ to ‘B/C’ ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50/50 distribution.”

4) Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous *written notification* from the student to the Professor and *written approval* from the Professor—will receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). Work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior *written approval* of the Professor will be referred to the NSA Department Chair and may result in the student's removal from the course. Professors are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so the Professor can render assistance in a timely manner. In any case, work submitted more than 30 days past the due date will be referred by the Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, with disenrollment the likely outcome.

5) All TSDM Course assessments are open-book and open-notes. Students may consult any of the student preparation materials or course resources while completing the assessments. Collaboration between students on assessments is NOT permitted unless specifically authorized or required by the Professor. The use of commercially available computer software for proofreading a student's work (e.g., Grammarly) prior to submission is not only authorized, it's highly encouraged.

b. *Grading Standards.* All graded activities in TSDM will be evaluated using the following rubrics:

1) *Summative Assessments.* In addition to the substantive criteria specified below, the written response must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, etc.).

A+	(97-100)	Organized, coherent, and extremely well-written response that offers a genuinely new understanding of the subject. Completely addresses the question(s). Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic. Ready to be published “as is” in a peer-reviewed journal. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
A	(94-96)	Demonstrates an outstanding grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent and very well-written. Ready for publication in a peer-reviewed journal with minor edits. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
A-	(90-93)	Well above average graduate level. Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and most of the minor points in a clear and coherent manner. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B+	(87-89)	Slightly above average graduate level work. Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis. Demonstrates mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B	(84-86)	Expected graduate level performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
B-	(80-83)	Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts or is weak in rationale and clarity. However, demonstrates acceptable mastery of all Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C+	(77-79)	Demonstrates some grasp of the topic, but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
C	(74-76)	Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Missing major elements or concepts. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.

C-	(70-73)	Addresses the question, but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the Course Learning Outcomes evaluated.
D+	(67-69)	Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking
D	(64-66)	any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter.
D-	(60-63)	In some measure, fails to address the entire question.
F	(0-59)	Failure to meet assignment or course requirements.

2) *Student Seminar Preparation and Contribution.* Seminar preparation and contribution will be graded at the end of TSDM as a whole number on a 100-point scale. Preparation and contribution grades are determined by Professor evaluation of the quality of a student's preparedness and contributions to seminar discussions, projects, exercises and other course activities. The evaluation will consider a student's critical and creative thinking as demonstrated in oral or written communication when contributing to seminar activities. All students are expected to have completed all student preparation materials, substantively contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar mates or Professors offer ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade. When a student's contribution grade falls below a B- (or is in danger of it) the Professor will intervene and ensure that the student understands that a contribution grade of B- or better is required for successful completion of each part of the TSDM course. The student will be provided the opportunity to increase the contribution grade through remediation provided by the Professor. Remediation must be determined by the Professor to be of high quality to warrant an increase in the student's contribution grade. A final contribution grade below a B- will result in the student not successfully completing course requirements. The key criteria used to evaluate seminar contribution are:



A+	(97-100):	Contributions provide a wholly new understanding of the topic, expressed in a clear and concise manner. Demonstrates exceptional preparation for each session as reflected in the quality of contributions to discussions. Strikes an outstanding balance of “listening” and “contributing,” engaging with classmates in a way that elevates the overall level of seminar discourse.
A	(94-96):	Contribution is always of superior quality. Unfailingly thinks through the issue at hand before comment. Can be relied upon to be fully prepared for every seminar, and contributions are highlighted by insightful thought, understanding, and in part original interpretation of complex concepts. Thoughts are expressed clearly and concisely, and engage with contributions of others.
A-	(90-93):	Fully engaged in seminar discussions and commands the respect of Colleagues through the insightful quality of their contribution and ability to listen to, analyze, and build upon the comments of others. Ideas are generally expressed clearly. Well above the average expected of a graduate student.
B+	(87-89):	A positive contributor to seminar meetings who joins in most discussions and whose contributions reflect understanding of the material. Contributes original and well-developed insights. Above the average expected of a graduate student.
B	(84-86):	Average graduate level contribution. Involvement in discussions reflects adequate preparation for seminar with the occasional contribution of original and insightful thought, with some consideration of others’ contributions. Ideas may sometimes be difficult to follow.
B-	(80-83):	Contributes, but sometimes speaks out without having thought through the Issue well enough to marshal logical supporting evidence, address counterarguments, or present a structurally sound position. Sometimes expresses thoughts that are off-track, not in keeping with the direction of the discussion. Minimally acceptable graduate-level preparation and participation for individual lessons.
C+	(77-79):	Sometimes contributes voluntarily, though more frequently needs to be encouraged to participate in discussions. Satisfied to allow others to take the lead while showing minimal interest in course content and the views of others. Minimal preparation for seminar reflected in arguments lacking the support, structure or clarity to merit graduate credit.
C	(74-76):	Contribution is marginal. Occasionally attempts to put forward a plausible opinion, but the inadequate use of evidence, incoherent

logical structure, and a critically unclear quality of insight is insufficient to adequately examine the issue at hand. Usually, content to let others form the seminar discussions and demonstrates little preparation of the session's materials. Alternately, the student contributes but in a manner that is dismissive of others and detracts from the overall seminar discussion.

C-	(70-73)	Lack of contribution to seminar discussions reflects substandard preparation for sessions. Unable to articulate a responsible opinion. Comments reduce rather than promote constructive dialogue.
D+	(67-69)	Rarely prepared or engaged. Contributions are seldom and reflect
D	(64-66)	below minimum acceptable understanding of course material.
D-	(60-63)	Engages in frequent fact-free conversation and adds little value to seminar deliberations.
F	(0-59)	Student demonstrates unacceptable preparation and fails to contribute in any substantive manner. May be extremely disruptive or uncooperative and completely unprepared for seminar.

c. Grade Appeals

1) *Formative Assessments*: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the Professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of Course Learning Outcomes. They are not graded events per se and, as such, are not subject to appeal.

2) *Failing Summative Assessments*: Following remediation, students receiving a grade of less than 80 (B-) on their second attempt to complete a Summative Assessment may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the Professor who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the National Security Affairs Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of 80 (B-) or above, the student will receive a grade of 80/B- for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the initially assigned grade is sustained or lowered, the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of the appeal.

3) *Passing Grade on Summative Assessments*: Students must meet submission deadlines for appeals of unsatisfactory Summative Assessments as discussed above, but may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of 80 (B-) or above within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the Professor who

assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the NSA Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event this grade is also subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of that grade, a request that the appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.

4) *Preparation and Contribution Grades:* Students may only appeal preparation and contribution grades to the Professor who assigned the grade. That Professor will consider the student's feedback, make a final determination, and present the situation and the final determination to the National Security Affairs Department Chair.

6) *Final Course Grades:* A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

11. Academic Integrity

a. *Honor Code.* (Excerpted from the NWC 2019 Faculty Handbook) The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma/degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

b. *Plagiarism.* Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- 1) The verbatim use of others' words without citation;
- 2) The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;
- 3) Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving credit.
 - (a) Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade but is not plagiarism.

(b) Professors are expected to give full credit in written work that supports the academic courses. Readings and summary documents published through the academic departments or through the Naval War College Press shall be treated as scholarly papers, fully crediting sources used, and ideas borrowed. The level of originality of faculty-written readings may differ significantly from that expected of student-written papers, however, as the intent of faculty work is often to summarize or compare and contrast various published works on the same subject. Professors shall always remember that their work serves as an example to the students for style, format, and integrity.

c. *Cheating*. Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

- 1) Gaining unauthorized access to exams;
- 2) Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or during tests, unless specifically permitted;
- 3) Utilizing unauthorized materials during assessments.
- 4) The use of artificial intelligence (AI) software platforms to compose, or aid in the composition of, formative or summative assessments.
- 5) Misrepresentation: Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgment. Misrepresentation includes the following:
 - (a) Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at NWC without permission of the instructors;
 - (b) Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

d. *Actions in Case of Suspected Violations*

- 1) If a student's submitted written work appears to violate this code of conduct, the following procedures shall be followed:
 - (a) The Deputy Dean, CDE, will be notified and will initiate an investigation. The Department Chair will provide all supporting documentation. In the event that a formal investigation is warranted, the student will be informed of the nature of the case and be allowed to submit information on his/her behalf. The results of the investigation will be delivered to the Dean, CDE.
 - (b) The Dean, CDE, will forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost who will determine whether the case should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).

(c) The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.

(d) If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will thoroughly review the case, interview the student if feasible, make findings of fact, and recommend appropriate action to the President via the Provost. This action may include any or all of the following:

i. Lowering of grades on the affected work or on the entire course of instruction (this will be a letter grade of F and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59).

ii. Inclusion of remarks in fitness reports.

iii. Letters to appropriate branches of the Service, agencies, offices, or governments.

iv. Dismissal from NWC.

v. Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or for appropriate action under rules governing civilian personnel.

2) Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of the NWC diploma, master's degree and JPME credit.

12. Diploma Offered. A Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff diploma may be earned through successful completion of all three core courses (TSDM, S&W, & JMO) through the Fleet Seminar Program. A diploma is awarded for satisfactory completion (overall grade of "B-" or higher) of the three core courses.

13. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings. Seminars meet one evening per week, for 180 minutes of class time. The schedule showing meeting dates for the year is contained in Annex A.

14. Key Personnel Contacts. If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your professor, please contact the following Professor:

CDE National Security Affairs
Department Chair

Prof Michael W. Pratt
Tel: 401-856-5545
michael.pratt@usnwc.edu

CDE National Security Affairs
Fleet Seminar Program Director

Prof Michael J. Mooney
401-856-5538
michael.mooney@usnwc.edu

ANNEX A

TSDM MASTER COURSE SCHEDULE ACADEMIC YEAR 2024-2025 (Each meeting will be 3.0 hours of class time)

Meeting Number	Week of	Session Number	Session Title
1	2 Sep	TSDM-1 TSDM-2	Introduction to Theater Security Decision Making Thinking Critically and Writing Effectively
2	9 Sep	TSDM-3 TSDM-4	Essence of Decision Making Heuristics and Pitfalls of Decision Making
3	16 Sep	TSDM-5 TSDM-6	Professionalism and Decision Making Ethics and Decision Making

Summative Assessment 1 Due 48-hours *after* TSDM-6

International Security (IS)

4	23 Sep	IS-1 IS-2	The International Security Environment America's Place in the International System
5	30 Sep	IS-3 IS-4	International Relations: Theory and Grand Strategies National Interests and Instruments of Power
6	7 Oct	IS-5 IS-6	Economic Fundamentals and the Political Economy Deterrence: Concepts and Theory (STRATCOM)

Summative Assessment 2 Proposal Due *prior* to IS-7

7	14 Oct	IS-7 IS-8	U.S. National Security Strategy U.S. Defense Strategies: NDS and NMS
8	21 Oct	IS-9 IS-10	U.S. Maritime Strategy The Combatant Commands and Global Integration
9	28 Oct	IS-11 IS-12	The Pacific Ocean Region: Foundations and Security Challenges (INDOPACOM) The Indian Ocean Region: Foundations and Security Challenges (INDOPACOM)
10	4 Nov	IS-13 IS-14	China in the 21st Century The Atlantic Ocean Region: Foundations and Security Challenges (EUCOM)

11	11 Nov	IS-15 IS-16	Russia in the 21st Century The Middle East and International Security (CENTCOM)
12	18 Nov	IS-17 IS-18	Africa and International Security (AFRICOM) Latin America and International Security (SOUTHCOM)

25 – 29 Nov Thanksgiving Break

13	2 Dec	IS-19 IS-20	Emerging Domains: Cyber and Space (CYBERCOM / SPACECOM) Emerging Domains: The Impact of Technology
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Summative Assessment 2 Due *prior* to IS-21

14	9 Dec	IS-21 IS-22	The Logic of Force Planning The Future Security Environment: Challenges and Opportunities
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Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

15	16 Dec	FPA-1 FPA-2	Foreign Policy Analysis for Practitioners Case Study: The Cuban Missile Crisis
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23 Dec – 3 Jan Holiday Break

16	6 Jan	FPA-3 FPA-4	Two-Level Games: Sources of Influence in Policy Making Understanding Organizational Process
17	13 Jan	FPA-5 FPA-6	The Presidency and National Security The Interagency Process, NSC, and Palace Politics
18	20 Jan	FPA-7 FPA-8	Congress' Role in National Security Case Study: Intervention in Beirut (1982-1983)
19	27 Jan	FPA-9 FPA-10	Funding Foreign Policy: Authorizing, Appropriating, and DoD Relations The Realities of Force Planning: The Pentagon, JCS, and the Combatant Commands
20	3 Feb	FPA-11 FPA-12	Civil-Military Relations Case Study: Deciding the Iraq War (2003)
21	10 Feb	FPA-13 FPA-14	Diplomacy: The Role of the State Department Economics: Instrument of National Power and Warfare

22	17 Feb	FPA-15 FPA-16	Information: Strategic Communication and Intelligence Lobbyists, Interest Groups, and Think Tanks
Summative Assessment 3 Released <i>after</i> FPA-16			
23	24 Feb	FPA-17 FPA-18	The Media and Public Opinion States and Non-State Actors
24	3 Mar	FPA-19 FPA-20	Intergovernmental Organizations: Institutions and Alliances Sources of Influence: Culture, Religion, and Ideology
25	10 Mar	FPA-21 FPA-22	Synthesis Case Study Future Foreign Policy Challenges

Summative Assessment 3 Due 48-hours *after* FPA-22

Assess – Decide Implement – Assure (ADIA) Foundations for CX

26	17 Mar	ADIA-1 ADIA-2	Assessing the Strategic Landscape (A: Assess) Application of Strategic Assessment (A: Assess)
27	24 Mar	CX-1 CX-2	Introduction to Capstone Exercise Assessment Methods and Strategic Estimate
28	31 Mar	ADIA-3 ADIA-4	Deciding Strategy (D: Decide) Case Study: Strategic Assessment and Deciding Strategy
29	7 Apr	ADIA-5 ADIA-6	Implementing Strategy (I: Implement) Assuring Strategic Goals (A: Assure)

Capstone Exercise (CX)

30	14 Apr	ADIA-7 CX-3	Case Study: ADIA and Strategy Synthesis Theater Strategic Assessment
31	21 Apr	CX-4 CX-5	Theater Vision and Strategy Seminar Product Development
32	28 Apr	CX-6 CX-7	IPL: Capabilities to Achieve Theater Strategy Seminar Product Development
33	5 May	CX-8 CX-9	IPL Caselet Implementation and Performance Measures Seminar Product Development
34	12 May	CX-10 TSDM-7	Summative Assessment 4 – CX Group Presentations TSDM Course Synthesis

ANNEX B
THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING
STUDY GUIDE

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ANNEX B

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY GUIDE

TSDM-1: INTRODUCTION TO THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING

A. Session Overview

The College of Distance Education's (CDE's) National Security Affairs (NSA) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in contemporary national and international security studies as one key element of a wider educational continuum. The Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) course focuses on the theater-strategic processes and challenges of the combatant commands. This introductory session will address how the course is organized to achieve its professional educational objectives.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the TSDM course structure, assignments, and expectations.
 - Identify the backgrounds, expertise, and experiences of the students in seminar.
 - Define national security and the influences that lead to foreign policy decisions.
 - Identify how strategic competition manifests at a regional level.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Do you completely understand the introduction pages (pp 1-16) to the TSDM syllabus which identify the course structure, expectations, assignments, due dates, attendance, and CDE and NWC policies?
2. What is the most pressing national security issue for the United States today in each of the three oceanic regions covered in TSDM—the Atlantic Ocean region, the Indian Ocean region, and the Pacific Ocean region? What are the roles and limits of national power to address these issues?
3. What does strategic competition look like through a regional lens?
4. What are some of the legacies of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods? Are these legacies pertinent to today's security environment, why or why not?

CI. Student Preparation (26 pp; ~59 min of video)

1. Theater Security Decision Making Course (TSDM) Syllabus, Academic Year 2024-2025, read pp. 1-16 and scan the introductory pages for each annex. (16 pp)
2. Video: Gates, Robert M. "Exercise of Power: American Failures, Successes, and a New Path Forward in the Post-Cold War World." *The Aspen Institute*, YouTube video, July 2, 2020,(00:00-58:40). (~59 min)
3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Derek S. Reveron. "Legacies of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Periods," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, June 29, 2023. (7 pp)
4. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. and Derek S. Reveron. Geography, "Bureaucracy, and National Security: The New Map," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, July 20, 2023. (8 pp)

CII. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM's CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-2: THINKING CRITICALLY AND WRITING EFFECTIVELY

A. Session Overview

This session focuses on two areas that are essential to being an effective national security professional—the ability to think critically and the ability to write effectively. Many national security professionals (even at the highest levels) believe they are effective critical thinkers. For example, would most Americans agree that effective critical thinking was utilized during the prosecution of the Vietnam War? What about the 20 plus years of the Global War on Terrorism? In reality, many people are unable to articulate exactly what constitutes critical thinking. Simply put, critical thinking is the ability to think clearly and rationally. It includes the ability to engage in reflective and independent thinking. Someone with critical thinking skills can: (1) understand the logical connections between ideas (2) identify, construct, and evaluate arguments (3) detect inconsistencies and common mistakes in reasoning (4) solve problems systematically (5) identify the relevance and importance of ideas and (6) reflect on the justification of one's own beliefs and values.

Critical thinking is not a matter of accumulating information, it is a specific skill acquired over time based on practice and reflection. A person with a good memory and who knows a lot of facts is not necessarily a good critical thinker. Critical thinkers seek relevant sources of information, deduce likely consequences from what they find, and know how to make use of that information in solving problems.

Critical thinking should not be confused with being argumentative or being critical of other people. Although critical thinking skills can be used in exposing fallacies and bad reasoning, it can also play an important role in cooperative reasoning and constructive tasks. Used effectively, this form of thinking helps one acquire knowledge, improve one's theories, and strengthen arguments. Critical thinking can be used to enhance work processes and improve social institutions. It is also an essential prerequisite for being an effective participant in TSDM.

The second part of this session will focus on applying critical thinking to gather one's thoughts and effectively put them in the written word. The success of today's military greatly depends on its ability to rapidly and accurately transmit information from those possessing it to those requiring it. At the tactical level, most of this communication is conducted verbally. As one transitions from the tactical level to the operational and higher levels of command, they will find a much heavier reliance on written communication. Although all forms of communication are essential to being successful, it is the written form of communication that is the focus of this session. This is because a significant portion of the communication for mid- and senior-level leaders in the national security enterprise is achieved through writing. For example, a letter outlining commander's intent, operational orders (OPORDS), deployment orders (DEPOORDS), concept of operations (CONOPS), requests for information (RFI), Joint and Service doctrine, and even the fitness reports that gets one promoted. Such written communication must be clear, concise, and specific in order for all personnel involved to understand their role and explicit responsibilities.

Unfortunately, "senior officers and senior civilian officials have observed that many recent graduates of JPME programs lack the ability to write clear and concise military advice

recommendations” (CJCS Memorandum dated 6 May 2019). This problem was deemed so significant by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he made it one of his “Special Areas of Emphasis” for all JPME institutions.

While military writing shares many characteristics with academic writing, there are significant differences. Both styles stress the importance of using proper grammar and spelling, but in order to support rapid decision making and mass dissemination, military writing is more direct in nature with an emphasis placed on clarity and brevity. Military writing also relies heavily on the use of common formats to assist the reader in rapidly locating the specific information needed. These formats vary based on the intended purpose of the document. For example, if the intent is to merely inform the reader, a simple “E-mail” or an “Information Paper” may be requested. However, if a decision is required, a “Position Paper” may be required. Long detailed reports are often summarized for key decision makers through an “Executive Summary.”

Regardless of format, any written product—whether for military or academic purposes—reflects directly on its author. All national security professionals must constantly develop their written and verbal communication skills to ensure they don’t find themselves being the “weak link” in this mission essential chain of information sharing.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the history and philosophy of critical thinking.
 - Examine how critical thinking is tied to national security professions.
 - Understand and implement the elements of critical thinking.
 - Understand why improving the quality of one’s thinking leads to greater awareness of situations and self.
 - Examine the differences between academic and military writing styles.
 - Comprehend the need for brevity and accuracy in military correspondence.
 - Understand the various forms of military correspondence and the roles they play in informing and aiding decision making.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.

- CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is critical thinking?
2. Why is critical thinking a vital skill for national security professionals to possess?
3. What results will a well-cultivated critical thinker achieve?
4. What are *the elements of thought* and why are they essential to effective critical thinking?
5. What are *universal intellectual standards* and how are they used in critical thinking?
6. What are *intellectual traits and virtues*?
7. What is the relationship between the elements of thought, universal intellectual standards, and intellectual traits and virtues?
8. Why does former Secretary of Defense Mattis believe that critical thinking was so important for himself as a battlefield commander and for the next generation of national security professionals?
9. What are three key steps one can take to ensure they meet the requirements of written assignments?
10. Why is drafting an outline an effective way to organize one's thoughts prior to writing?
11. What does the acronym BLUF stand for and why is it so important in military communication?

D. Student Preparation (59 pp; ~49 min of video)

1. Paul, Richard and Linda Elder. "The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking Concepts and Tools, Seventh Edition." The Foundation Thinker's Guide Library, *Foundation for Critical Thinking*, 2014. (5pp)
2. Paul, Richard and Linda Elder. "Critical Thinking in Everyday Life: 9 Strategies." Modified from the book *Critical Thinking: Tools for Taking Charge of Your Learning and Your Life*, (2001). The Foundation Thinker's Guide Library, Foundation for Critical Thinking. (6 pp)

3. Video: Mattis, General James, USMC (ret). Secretary of Defense, 2017-2019. “Critical Thinking: Our Greatest Weapon to Winning Tomorrow’s War?” A speech given to *The U.S. Naval Institute*, October 25, 2023, (2:00 – 49:33). (~47 min)
4. Joint Staff, J-7. “*Joint Officer Handbook, Staffing and Action Guide, 4th Edition*,” 21 September 2018, pp. 139 – 149. (11 pp)
5. U.S. Naval War College. “*Pocket Writing and Style Guide*”, Newport, RI, 2018. Read pp. 29-39, Scan pp. 1-38 and pp. 39-84. (11 pp)
6. Air Force Handbook 33-337. “*The Tongue and Quill*,” 27 May 2015 with Change 1, dated 19 November 2015. 1 – 22 and 41 – 46. (28 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM’s CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-3: ESSENCE OF DECISION MAKING

A. Session Overview

This session is the first of four sessions dedicated to decision making, and it introduces some fundamental concepts of decision science. Everyone makes decisions. Decision science shows us that when we make decisions, we use a combination of feeling, knowledge, and intuition. Too often we end up oversimplifying these decisions, ignoring facts that do not conform to our perception of reality and ultimately making a poor decision. This is not about hindsight – this is about opening our minds to seeing what is really around us, not just what we want to see. Leveraging work by Paul J.H. Schoemaker, J. Edward Russo, Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky, we now understand far more about how we make decisions than ever before.

In addition to introducing models for decision making, the session will examine how trust, humility, and vulnerability influence the process of making decisions. The session will also explore the concepts of cognitive diversity, complexity, and a growth mindset and their impacts to the decision making process. In International Security (IS) students will begin to recognize the volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous (VUCA) nature of the international security environment in which national security professionals make decisions. Later in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) students will learn to understand and apply the fundamental concepts of decision making, introduced in this series of four sessions, within the U.S. national security enterprise.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify the various factors and contexts that are critical to decision making.
 - Understand the importance of trust, humility, and vulnerability in decision making.
 - Understand the rational actor model, together with the advantages and disadvantages associated with this approach to decision making.
 - Understand the ‘alternative’ models to the rational actor model and the advantages and disadvantages associated with each.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the factors critical to decision making, and how do differing contexts affect consideration of those factors?

2. How do humility and vulnerability help to build trust in relationships? How does this promote or hinder decision making?
3. What is the rational actor model of decision making, why is it important, and what are its underlying assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses?
4. For each “alternative” to the rational actor model, describe the model, its underlying assumptions, strengths and weaknesses.
5. How does Daniel Kahneman's cognitive model relate to the rational actor model?

D. Student Preparation (26 pp; ~44 min video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Decision Making Theories: A Primer.” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, June 2020. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, July 2024. (26 pp).
2. Video: Hogan, Robert. “Robert Hogan on the Importance of Humility in Leaders,” *Hogan Assessments*, YouTube video, March 29, 2020, (00:00-04:52). (~5 min)
3. Video: Brown, Brené. “Embracing Vulnerability,” *Sounds True*. Jan 7, 2013, (00:00-05:55). (~6 min)
4. Video: Syed, Matthew. (2019). "Pursuing Cognitive Diversity," YouTube video, Sep 20, 2019, (00:00-06:56). (~7 min)
5. Video: Kahneman, Daniel. “10 Questions for Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman,” *Time*, November 26, 2011, (00:00-06:06). (~6 min)
6. Video: Berger, Jennifer. “Making Sense of Complexity,” YouTube video, July 24, 2017, (00:00-04:07). (~4 min)
7. Video: Syed, Matthew. "Why You Should Have Your Own Black Box," YouTube video, May 31, 2016, (00:00-15:33). (~16 min)

E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM’s CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-4: HEURISTICS AND PITFALLS OF DECISION MAKING

A. Session Overview

This session builds on the theories presented in TSDM-3 and focuses on the process of decision making, specifically the part played by heuristics, rules of thumb, intuition, rationality, and dual-process thought. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that help to speed up the process of decision making, but they come with inherent risk. Some examples of heuristics which will be introduced are recency bias, confirmation bias, and primacy. These concepts are used in order to better understand the specific ways in which individual decision makers are influenced by a range of different factors. Students will also consider the concepts of perspective taking and the subject-object shift and how these tools can help to enhance the decision making process.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend how heuristics and biases affect decision making.
 - Apply information to discover different patterns and connections between ideas.
 - Examine complex problems to discover competing interpretations.
 - Comprehend how subject-object relationships and mental complexity can shape a leader's ability to frame problems effectively.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How do personal heuristics and biases affect one's decision making?
2. What are common decision traps, and how do they impact decision making?
3. How can one use knowledge of common decision traps to improve their personal decision making, and the decision making of the organization?
4. How do the factors and contexts of decision making, the environment, and organizational culture and climate create complex patterns and connections between ideas?
5. How do the complex patterns and connections between ideas create competing interpretations of the problem?

6. How can considering subject-object relationships and competing interpretations of the problem help a leader frame a problem effectively?

D. Student Preparation (72 pp; ~8 min video)

1. Williams, B. S. "Heuristics and Biases in Military Decision Making," *Military Review*, 90(5), 40-52, 2010. (26 pp)
2. Bazerman, Max H. and Dolly Chugh, "Decisions Without Blinders," *Harvard Business Review*, January 2006. (9 pp)
3. Russo, J. E., & P. J. H. Schoemaker. "Decision Traps and How To Avoid Them." *Chemical Engineering*, 98(5), 181, 1991. (4 pp)
4. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September-October 1998. (22 pp)
5. Soll, Jack B., Katherine L. Milkman, and John W. Payne. "Outsmart Your Own Biases." *Harvard Business Review*, January 2006. (7 pp)
6. Video: Facts Verse. "Photos That Will Make You Appreciate Life from Others Perspectives" YouTube video, February 22, 2018, (00:00-06:00). (~6 min)
7. Video: SBJLive. "Understanding Perspectives Critical to Decision Process" YouTube video. April 23, 2019, (00:00-01:56). (~2 min)
8. Platt, Michael, Vera Ludwig, Elizabeth Johnson, and Per Hugander. "Perspective Taking - A Brain Hack That Can Help You Make Better Decisions," *Innovation, Knowledge@Wharton*, March 2021. (4 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM's CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-5: PROFESSIONALISM AND DECISION MAKING

A. Session Overview

While in the past there has been little serious debate about whether the “profession of arms” is indeed a profession, the claim is now being reexamined in various circles. This examination has included a harder look at who exactly is considered a true “professional” within the military. Most would agree that the act of merely joining the military “profession” does not, ipso facto, make one a professional. But there is little consensus as to when exactly a member of the profession of arms becomes a military professional. In recent history, most discussions that attend to military professionalism have focused on various dimensions of military ethics, which will be discussed in TSDM-6, or civil-military relations, which will be considered in FPA-11. This session will look more deeply at the notion of military professionalism and the questions that should arise when students consider individually what exactly makes them a professional in the truest sense of the word. Placing these discussions into a decision making context students will consider how the decisions of leaders and organizations at every level impact and are impacted by the way that the leader and organization understand military professionalism.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze views of military professionalism and how they may affect decision making.
 - Discuss briefly the issues and challenges faced by commanders and staff officers that complicate professional decision making.
- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How do differing views of military professionalism affect decision making?
2. What factors might complicate the decisions of commanders and staff officers to enhance military professionalism?

D. Student Preparation (36 pp; ~12 min video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Thinking Critically about the Military Profession.” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 2013. Revised by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, July 2024. (22 pp)

2. DiBella, Anthony J. "Military Leaders and Global Leaders: Contrasts, Contradictions, and Opportunities," *Prism*, 2013. (8 pp)
3. Howe, P. Gardner, RADM, USN. "Professionalism, Leader Development Key to Future." Naval War College, Newport, R.I., May 19, 2015. (6 pp)
4. Video: Hill, Donn H., BGen, USA. "Educating the Force on the Profession" Army University Press, March 1, 2021, (00:00-11:57). (~12 min)

E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM's CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-6: ETHICS AND DECISION MAKING

A. Session Overview

This is the last of four introductory sessions on decision making, which exposes students to several philosophical perspectives on ethics and demonstrates their applicability to the military profession by using them in analysis and discussion. Philosophy can be extremely challenging and there is insufficient time in this course to delve deeply into any one school of thought, much less several. As a result, this session focuses on practical aspects of the major philosophical schools: virtue ethics, duty ethics, consequentialist ethics, and care ethics.

The session then builds on the premise that an individual formulates a moral world view based on various influences such as family, culture, religion, and a host of other factors. This view, along with the process preference for making moral judgments, can result in conclusions that vary significantly from person to person. In the case of professionals, that view must also be reconciled with the common demands and standards of the profession. Ethics are important to consider as one engages in the continual study necessary to take on greater professional responsibilities. At senior leadership levels, one's actions communicate deeper professional and ethical messages to subordinates and to the organization. Accompanying these ethical messages are also important implications concerning organizational values, trust, loyalty, standards of integrity, and stewardship. To that end students will be introduced to and practice applying an ethical decision framework for the military profession.

This session will also connect with earlier sessions on decision making and specifically military professionalism, by examining the contention that Navy ethos may have evolved too heavily towards one of compliance and boundary constraints and away from one based predominately on belief systems that focus on doing what is "right." Finally, students will consider some of the factors which may lead to ethical failures, especially in high performing organizations.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Develop a basic understanding of the four major moral perspectives.
 - Apply the four major moral perspectives to challenges within the profession of arms.
 - Relate one's own personal morals with his/her obligations within the profession of arms.
 - Understand one's own moral paradigm and how it affects decision making.
 - Comprehend the differences between moral failures and moral dilemmas.
 - Recognize the ethical slippery slope that can often occur, especially among high-performance people in high-performance organizations.

- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the basic premises, strengths and weaknesses of each of the four major moral perspectives? Which do you tend to follow? When might you deviate from this perspective?
2. How do the four major moral perspectives relate to the application of military force, and the profession of arms?
3. How does your personal moral decision making compare to your obligations?
4. What moral paradigm do you favor? Are you able to recognize the limits of this paradigm and expand your thinking when making decisions?
5. When have you faced a moral dilemma, either personally or professionally? How could it have become a moral failure?
6. Have you allowed prior successes to influence your decision making? How has/could this lead to incrementally more questionable decisions?

D. Student Preparation (38 pp; ~76 min video)

Note: Entries 1-4 below consist of a webpage with an imbedded video. Students are expected to both read the page and watch the video.

1. Video: "Ethics Explainer: Virtue Ethics," *The Ethics Centre*, 2016. (2 pp; 00:00-03:19). (~3 min)
2. Video: "Ethics Explainer: Deontology," *The Ethics Centre*, 2016. (2 pp; 00:00-03:10). (~3 min)
3. Video: "Ethics Explainer: Consequentialism," *The Ethics Centre*, 2016. (1p; 00:00-04:03) (~4 min)
4. Video: D'Olimpio, Laura. "Ethics Explainer: Ethics of Care," *The Ethics Centre*, 2019. (2 pp; 00:00-05:26) (~5 min)
5. Video: Shanks Kaurin, Pauline. "The Four Major Moral Perspectives," Naval War College Lecture. Blackboard, (00:00-1:00:38). (~61 min)

6. National Security Affairs Faculty. "A Tool for Thinking About Ethical Challenges." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, April 2016. Revised by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, July 2024. (2 pp).
7. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Ethics Vignettes for Military Officers." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, April 2016. Revised by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, July 2024. (6-10 pages as assigned by faculty)
8. McPherson, Scott J. PhD. "Personal Ethics and Moral Decision Making." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, May 2015. Revised by Professor Bradley Hawksworth, July 2024. (11 pp)
9. Ludwig, Dean C. and Clinton O. Longenecker. "The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders," *Journal of Business Ethics*, April 1993. (8 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

48 hours prior to TSDM-5 in Week 3, students are required to successfully complete FA-1 addressing TSDM's CLO-1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after TSDM-6 in Week 3, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-1—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLO 1. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

TSDM-7: TSDM COURSE SYNTHESIS

A. Session Overview

This session provides dedicated time to review broad TSDM concepts and address any end-of-course questions. Program administrative or curriculum-based questions/issues will also be addressed.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Review major course themes and their value to the practicing security professional.
 - Address end-of-course administrative issues as required.
- Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What TSDM course themes and concepts were most valuable to you professionally?
2. Did TSDM provide professional relevance to your future professional success?
3. What were the most valuable takeaways you have gained from completing TSDM?
4. What areas of the TSDM course would you improve upon?

D. Student Preparation

None

E. Student Deliverables

None

ANNEX C
TSDM – INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (IS)
STUDY GUIDE

1. Overview

The International Security (IS) sessions in the TSDM course focuses on the myriad elements of the ever-changing and dynamic international security environment. It draws its theoretical basis from international relations theory and comparative politics to analyze the complex challenges and opportunities posed by these elements, and how they affect the formulation of coherent national and theater strategies. Students are challenged to comprehend U.S. national and theater strategies in the context of fundamental elements of strategy, and how best to employ the national instruments of power, and particularly the military instrument, to advance and defend U.S. national interests.

2. Focus

The 22 IS sessions concentrate on five main themes:

- International Security Environment

The first theme is an overview of current global security challenges from both state and non-state actors, transnational challenges such as terrorism, pandemics, transnational criminal organizations, and climate change, and introduces the idea of strategic competition.

- National Strategies

This theme considers the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), the National Military Strategy (NMS), and Maritime Strategy. Throughout, we concentrate on thinking about how the national tools of power contribute to strengthening national security during peace rather than war, as the latter is the focus of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

- Oceanic Regions

The third theme shifts focus to a closer examination of security dynamics within the ocean regions of the world, which present both challenges and opportunities for U.S. national security. As a framework to this study, the sessions will explore the three major global oceanic regions that figure most prominently in the achievement of U.S. national security objectives: the Pacific Ocean Region, the Indian Ocean Region, and the Atlantic Ocean Region. Students will assess each region's deeper political, geographic, socio-economic, security, and diplomatic dynamics. Throughout this study the sessions will focus on the most pressing strategic opportunities and challenges to the U.S. vision of a "free, open, prosperous, and secure world" – chief among them the rise of China (or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC); both names will be used interchangeably in TSDM) and the return to the world stage of an aggressive Russia.

- **Combatant Commands**

What impact do the combatant commands (CCMDs) within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) have in the international security environment? This next theme examines the CCMDs, the regional challenges they face, how they coordinate and execute operations within the previously discussed ocean regions, and the role they play in advancing and defending U.S. national interests.

- **Force Planning and Future Security Challenges**

The IS sessions conclude with a brief overview of the logic of force planning given all the demands, challenges, and nuances of the international security environment covered in the previous sessions. Three sessions are dedicated to examining emerging domains of warfare and the impact of technology, as well as a look forward to the future challenges and opportunities in the international security environment that could shape the strategic decision making calculus of the United States in the 21st century.

3. Guidance

This Annex (ANNEX C of this study guide) is the primary planning document for the International Security sessions. For each session it will provide a session overview, the objectives and learning outcomes covered in that session, general guidance for seminar preparation, the required student preparation (readings and videos), and outline any student deliverables and their associated suspense. Student preparation materials should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid. The diversity of the IS readings provides not only an opportunity to examine course concepts, but also an overview of international security dynamics and alternative perspectives.

4. Student Deliverables

The primary student deliverable for the IS sessions is a publication-quality analytic research paper (Summative Assessment 2, or “SA”) that applies appropriate course concepts. Details of this SA are provided within the Blackboard site of each seminar.

ANNEX C

TSDM – INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (IS)

STUDY GUIDE

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-1: THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. Session Overview

This introductory session provides a foundational understanding of the international security environment, including the complexity of transnational threats and strategic competition, and how these intersecting challenges effect U.S. national security interests. The spectrum of global security challenges is never static and is increasingly diffuse. As stated by the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, “During the next year, the United States faces an increasingly fragile global order strained by accelerating strategic competition among major powers, more intense and unpredictable transnational challenges, and multiple regional conflicts with far-reaching implications.” Some have opined that the contemporary international security environment is similar to that which occurred following the break-up of the Soviet Union and can be summed up in the acronym “VUCA”: volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous.

It is also important to understand that competition remains a fundamental aspect of international relations, as actors in the international community (both state and non-state) seek to advance and protect their national interests. As such we will also look at the concept of the “competition continuum”, as introduced in Joint Doctrinal Note 1-19, which “describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict.”

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify and assess security challenges to the United States in the current international environment.
 - Examine and evaluate the differences in scope and impact between threats emanating from state actors versus non-state actors.
 - Comprehend the elements of the competition continuum model and how nations compete in the 21st century security environment.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the key international security environment concerns of the U.S. intelligence community?

2. Of the international security threats articulated by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines, which is the most serious, and which is the most manageable?
3. What role do non-state actors play in the international security environment?
4. On what part of the competition continuum model should the U.S. focus? Does it vary by country, region, or domain? Why?
5. How are transnational challenges likely to shape the future security environment? Which transnational challenges are most important? How do they interact with state dynamics?
6. What are the direct and indirect security ramifications from climate change? How do they impact U.S. national security? What responses are possible?
7. How can the lessons observed from COVID-19 be applied to other transnational and non-traditional security issues? How can they be misapplied?

D. Student Preparation (55 pp; ~40 min of video)

1. *Joint Chiefs of Staff*. Joint Doctrinal Note 1-19, 03 June 2019, 1-11. (11 pp)
2. Video: “Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, CSPAN video, 12 March 2024, (02:46-34:44). (~32 min)
3. McQuaid, Julia, Pamela G. Faber, and Zack Gold. “Transnational Challenges and U.S. National Security: Defining and Prioritizing Borderless Threats,” *Center for Naval Analyses*, November 2017, 3-19. (16 pp)
4. Foulis, Patrick. “Multipolar Disorder,” *The Economist: The World Ahead 2024*, 11 November 2023. (1 pp)
5. Jones, Seth. “The Future of Competition: U.S. Adversaries and the Growth of Irregular Warfare,” Washington: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 2021. (9 pp)
6. Clarke, Colin. “Trends in Terrorism: What’s on the Horizon in 2024?” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 19 December 2023. (4 pp)
7. Video: “UN Chief on Transnational Organized Crime, Growing Challenges & New Threats,” *United Nations*, YouTube video, 07 Dec 2023, (00:48-09:13). (~8 min)
8. O’Rourke, Ronald. “COVID-19: Potential Implications for International Security Environment— Overview of Issues and Further Reading for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, 10 January 2024, pp 9-13. (4 pp)
9. Cho, Renee. “Why Climate Change Is a National Security Risk,” *Columbia Climate School*, 11 October 2023. (5 pp)
10. Appling, Scott, A., et al. “Pivoting the Joint Force: National Security Implications of Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th Quarter 2022. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM's CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-2: AMERICA’S PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A. Session Overview

With an understanding of the international security environment in hand, this session will now introduce the fundamental questions that must be answered to think critically about the future of U.S. national security and foreign policy decisions. The session will start by briefly reviewing the historical evolution of America’s role in the world. Despite general impressions among many, the U.S. has been significantly engaged globally since its founding, with policies evolving based on its relative strengths, the global environment, and security requirements. During World War II, the U.S. was the “arsenal of democracy”. Phrases like “Speak softly but carry a big stick,” “trust but verify,” the “indispensable nation,” are just some from this past century alone.

The role of the United States in the 21st century is a complicated one, marked by the return of “strategic competition” as introduced in IS-1. In 2019, William J. Burns, (the Director of Central Intelligence) stated, “Today’s world is more crowded, complicated, and competitive than at any point in my three and half decade diplomatic career. The global order that emerged after the end of the Cold War has shifted dramatically, creating unprecedented challenges for American statecraft.”

The United States, like all sovereign states, operates within the international system, defined as the network of states, organizations, and individuals that interact on a global scale. The international system forms the framework for international relations, outlining who interacts with whom, how they interact, and the rules of engagement. Countries set their foreign policy and develop diplomatic relations within this system. And like the security environment, the international system is constantly evolving as states work together and establish international agreements.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the historical evolution of U.S. national interests, foreign policy, and its place in the international system.
 - Comprehend the fundamental questions that an informed observer must know when analyzing U.S. foreign policy and national security.
 - Comprehend the multiple and varying interests with which U.S. foreign policy must contend and manage.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.

- Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How has America's role in the international system changed across its history? What explains these changes? To what extent are the changes due to domestic factors and to what extent are they due to the international environment?
2. What are the five traditions of American statecraft Zoellick outlines?
3. What are the national interests of the United States? Who decides what they are? How are they prioritized? What justifies a particular interest's relative priority, addition, or elimination?
4. What is the relationship between U.S. national interests (the ends), the policies it pursues to achieve those interests (the ways), and the tools that it uses to execute those policies (the means)?
5. How does the U.S. national security establishment define regional foreign policy priorities? Has geopolitics driven U.S. priorities? How do concepts like Anne-Marie Slaughter's "chessboard" or the "web" help in this process?

D. Student Preparation (56 pp; ~41 min of video)

1. Video: Zoellick, Robert B. "America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy," *Hoover Institution*, YouTube video, 01 April 2021, (00:00-15:42). (~16 min)
2. Zakaria, Fareed. "The Self-Doubting Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2024. (10 pp)
3. Gates, Robert. "The Dysfunctional Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, 29 September 2023. (8 pp)
4. Brands, Hal. "The Overstretched Superpower," *Foreign Affairs*, 18 January 2022. (8 pp)
5. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "The Regional Dimension of U.S. Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 2022. (9 pp)
6. Stolberg, Alan, B. "The International System in the 21st Century," The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Studies, *Strategic Studies Institute*, U.S. Army War College, 2012, 137-145. (9 pp)
7. Kundnani, Hans. "What is the Liberal International Order?" *German Marshall Fund*, 2017. (12 pp)
8. Video: Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "The Chessboard and the Web," *The MacMillan Report*, Yale University, YouTube video, 08 December 2015, (00:00-15:43). (~16 min)

9. Video: “Competing visions? American, Chinese, and European Perspectives on the Future of the International System”. *Brookings Institution*, YouTube video, 13 October 2023, (05:15-14:00). (~9 min)
10. Optional Video: “The International System,” *UK Defense Studies Education and Training*, YouTube video, 26 May 2020, (00:00-14:51). (~15 min)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM’s CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-3: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY AND GRAND STRATEGIES

A. Session Overview

As observed in the cumulative session readings and videos to this point, the world is constantly changing; it is no surprise that the relationships between states are also dynamic. In a world that is increasingly interconnected, it is more important than ever to understand how states interact with each other and the impact of those interactions on each other and their citizens.

Having considered the complexity of the international security environment system in IS-1 and the evolution of America's place in the world in IS-2, this session considers some major international relations (IR) theories that seek to explain why and how states behave the way they do in the international system. Particular emphasis will be given to the three prominent schools in American IR: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Each theory has its own strengths and weaknesses, and no single theory can fully explain the complex world of international relations. However, by understanding the different theories, one can better understand the world and make more informed decisions about how to interact with other states in achieving and protecting U.S. national interests.

This session then builds upon the previous lessons on the global security environment by examining what has been termed "grand strategy", which Dr. Hal Brands at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies states is, "...[the] purposeful and coherent set of ideas about what a nation seeks to accomplish in the world and how it should go about doing so." It is a long-term plan that integrates all aspects of a state's instruments of national power (which are addressed in greater detail in IS-4). Grand strategy is not just about winning wars; it is about promoting and defending national interests in a variety of ways, including preventing wars, and maintaining peace while meeting those interests, then winning any war that 'lesser' attempts have failed to resolve.

It can be difficult to develop and sustainably implement a successful grand strategy in a dynamic security environment, while maintaining public support that often requires sacrifice and strategic patience. For the military, the nation's strategic choices have implications for force posture, design, and level of defense spending. Despite the challenges, grand strategy is an important tool for achieving national interests. This session defines and explores five competing grand strategies that range from the most activist in nature (primacy, liberal internationalism, selective engagement) to least activist (offshore balancing and strategic restraint).

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Achieve a basic understanding of IR theories, how they differ in explaining international relations, and the implications of those differences for the conduct of foreign policy.

- Apply IR theories to real-world events, analyzing them and drawing out the different conclusions and implications for U.S. behavior.
- Understand the different variations of grand strategies and how they shape and inform the pursuit of national interests.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How helpful are IR theories for understanding and explaining international relations? Are any more convincing than the others?
2. What would the various theories have to say about China's rise, or Russia's invasion of Ukraine, or U.S. foreign policy?
3. In IS-2, you were introduced to Anne-Marie Slaughter's concepts of "web and chessboard." If the chessboard is a synonym for geopolitics, does a chessboard approach tend to align with realism?
4. Does Slaughter's "web" focus on institutions and connectivity lend itself to liberal or constructivist approaches?
5. What would you consider to be the most effective grand strategy for the U.S. to pursue today?

D. Student Preparation (57 pp; ~24 min of video)

1. Synder, Jack. "One World, Rival Theories," *Foreign Policy*, 26 October 2009. (9 pp)
2. Video: "Steve Smith on Bringing International Relations Theory to Life," *Oxford Academic*, YouTube video, 03 January 2014, (00:00-05:56). (~6 min)
3. Brands, Hal. "The Meaning and Challenge of Grand Strategy," in *What Good Is Grand Strategy? Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014, 1-16. (16 pp)

4. Posen, Barry, and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* 21, no. 3, 1996, 5–43. (29 pp)
5. Video: Walt, Steven. "What Grand Strategy for America? Why Offshore Balancing is Best," *Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs*, Brown University, YouTube video, 07 November 2016, (04:30-17:14). (~13 min)
6. Layton, Peter. "Rethinking Grand Strategy," *Small Wars Journal*. 06 June 2018. (3 pp)
7. Video: Mearsheimer, John. "The U.S. Grand Strategy Since Independence," *International Relations and Politics*, YouTube video, 14 April 2022, (00:00-05:18). (~5 min)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM's CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-4: NATIONAL INTERESTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER

A. Session Overview

Having looked at the concept of grand strategy in IS-3, this session focuses attention to examining national interests and instruments of national power. National interests are essentially a country's priorities in the international arena. These priorities, like security or economic well-being, are what a country wants to achieve or protect. National power, on the other hand, is a country's ability to achieve those goals. There are different dimensions of power that contribute to a country's overall strength; strategists often talk about “hard power” or “soft power.” In today's world, national power is increasingly measured by a combination of hard and soft power elements. A state that can effectively wield both types of power is more likely to achieve its goals on the international stage. A common framework used in international relations for understanding the different instruments of national power available to a state is by the acronym D-I-M-E: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power. Scholars and strategists often expand the definition of the instruments of national power by including other distinct sub categories of the instruments of national power in addition to the standard D-I-M-E framework such as financial, intelligence, development and law enforcement (i.e., D-I-M-E-F-I-L).

In short, understanding national interests helps us know what objectives states are trying to achieve, and national power shows the potential means they can use to achieve those objectives. There can be debate about what exactly constitutes a national interest, with some arguing for a narrow focus on security and economics, while others believe it should encompass broader values like human rights. Regardless of the definition, national interests play a vital role in shaping a state's course on the world stage. The strategist must understand the types of power (and their limitations) and appreciate that national interests can be difficult to define or agree upon, and their endurance is questionable depending on the political leadership of the state.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Examine the dimensions of national power and their role in shaping strategy.
 - Analyze the role national interests play in strategic thinking and the formation of strategy.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are national interests and why are they important? How do vital, important, and peripheral national interests affect a state's strategic calculus?
2. Why is there so much difficulty determining and prioritizing national interests?
3. When designing strategy, how can a state achieve balance with the various tools of national power?
4. Does overemphasizing one instrument of national power place strain on the other instruments?

CI. Student Preparation (51 pp; ~7 min video)

1. Reveron, Derek S. and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "National Interests and Grand Strategy," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. (12 pp)
2. Sullivan, Jake. "The Sources of American Power: A Foreign Policy for a Changed World." *Foreign Affairs*, 24 October 2023. (17 pp)
3. Kagan, Robert. "A Free World If You Can Keep It: Ukraine and American Interests." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2023. (7 pp)
4. Nation, R. Craig. "National Power," in *The U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Studies, Volume I: Theory of War and Strategy*, Edited by J. Boone Bartholomees, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012. (8 pp)
5. Mead, Walter Russell. "America's Sticky Power." *Foreign Policy*, 2004. (7 pp)
6. Video: "Defined: Instruments of National Power," YouTube video, 13 March 2021, (00:00-07:03). (~7 min)

CII. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM's CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-5: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

A. Session Overview

While the TSDM course is obviously focused on security issues and decision making, it is important to remember that most states usually do not face existential threats and are equally or more concerned with their economic health. Moreover, economic activity can constitute a basis for either conflict or conflict resolution, and a state's economy is the primary factor in its ability to use either coercive force or significant incentives in international bargaining. Thus, it is critical for a security professional to understand the basics of how economic systems work, interact, and how certain economic systems provide a sovereign state various and unique degrees of leverage.

Political economy is a field that studies the interwoven relationship between political and economic systems. In other words, it examines how governments and their policies influence economies, and how economic conditions affect politics. Political economists use tools from economics, political science, and sometimes even sociology to understand these complex interactions.

This session will also look at more complex questions of how economic power works, how states act to counter or avoid the exercise of economic power, and the relationships between economics (both domestic and international) and politics (both domestic and international).

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the basic structure and institutions of the international economic system, including processes of globalization and de-globalization.
 - Understand how economic power is formed and used and learn to analyze its likely effects.
 - Comprehend the relationships between political and economic systems and learn to incorporate them into strategic thinking.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. States choose whether their economy will serve the state's interests or whether state security serves economic interests. What are the pluses and minuses of each approach?

2. How do states pursue economic power? What are the respective roles of cooperation and competition in the international system? Why isn't it purely competitive?
3. Discuss specific sources of state economic power, and potential tensions between economic and security considerations, as well as what happens when a state miscalculates its use of economic power.
4. Discuss how domestic political and economic organizations enable or constrain states in their foreign policy.
5. Most observers see the world as becoming more multipolar, especially in economic terms. What do you think this means, and what can/should the U.S. strategy be going forward?

D. Student Preparation (57 pp; ~23 min of video)

1. Cohn, Lindsay P. "Introduction to Political Economy, Part I Comparative and Part II International." *Naval War College*, National Security Affairs Department, 2022 (revised). (29 pp)
2. Schilde, Kaija E, Norrin M Ripsman, and Rosella Cappella Zielinski. "The Political Economy of Security." in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud. Oxford University Press, 2018. (9 pp)
3. Video: Petrova, Magdalena. "We traced what it takes to make an iPhone, from its initial design to the components and Raw Materials Needed to Make it a Reality," *Inside an Apple iPhone: Where Parts and Materials Come From*, CNBC video, 14 December 2018, (00:00-06:51). (~7 min)
4. Freiden, Jeffry. "The Political Economy of Economic Policy." *International Monetary Fund*, June 2020. (5 pp)
5. Video: "Harvard Professor Jeffry Frieden on Political Economy," *International Monetary Fund*, YouTube video, 15 June 2020, (00:00-16:14). (~16 min)
6. Pitron, Guillaume. "The Geopolitics of the Rare-Metals Race," *Washington Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (2022), pp. 135-150. (12 pp)
7. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Downs. "Development and Democracy." *Foreign Affairs* 84, no. 5, 2005. (5 pp)
8. Cimino-Isaacs, Cathleen D. "World Trade Organization," *Congressional Research Service*, 16 February 2024. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM's CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-6: DETERRENCE: CONCEPTS AND THEORY (STRATCOM)

A. Session Overview

Deterrence is the art of convincing an adversary that the costs of taking an unwanted action are greater than the possible benefits. Part of the larger concept of coercive diplomacy, deterrence has a long history as a strategy used by leaders and governments to manage and prevent conflict. Though the use of deterrence has been around for millennia, deterrence as a formal theory was developed largely in the post-World War II nuclear environment as an effort to better understand these new weapons and their effects. However, deterrence theory also has important implications for strategy in the conventional domain. Deterrence is now complicated by an environment that has a more complex array of threats, new domains such as cyber and space, and a broader range of actors. This session will examine the fundamental concepts of deterrence theory, the challenges with implementing a successful deterrent strategy, and how the theory is applied in practice.

Throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons and theories of nuclear deterrence were central to U.S. strategy and defense planning. This was a paradox: nuclear weapons were unlikely to be used, but their destructive power demanded continual thinking and planning about their role in protecting U.S. national security. In the years following the Cold War, as the threat of an existential nuclear conflict appeared to recede, analysts gave far less thought to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. Over the past decade, however, the nuclear question has resurfaced, not only because of increased competition with China and Russia, but also because of North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities and ongoing concern over a potential nefarious Iranian nuclear program.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Examine the basic concepts of deterrence and assess their utility in the current and future security environment.
 - Apply deterrence theory to current security challenges.
 - Examine and assess the structure of the U.S. nuclear force, the plans for modernization, and the U.S. strategy in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.
 - Analyze the impact of Russian nuclear threats and Chinese nuclear modernization on deterrence theory.
 - Understand and evaluate the concept of integrated deterrence.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.

- Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the basic concepts of deterrence? How does a state construct a credible deterrence commitment? What role does rationality play in deterrence calculations? What are the important distinctions in the different types of deterrence?
2. What are the challenges for states to "extend" deterrence to protect allies?
3. How well do deterrence concepts hold up in today's evolving international security environment? Do traditional concepts of deterrence apply to the domains of space and cyberspace? If not, why not, and how does deterrence theory need to adjust to account for these two domains?
4. What is the meaning of "integrated deterrence"? How is it different from earlier conceptions of deterrence and is it useful?
5. What is the best approach to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan? Is deterrence the correct strategy to address this security challenge?
6. How large do you think the U.S. strategic nuclear force should be? Should the size, composition, and capability of certain parts of the force be adjusted?
7. What is your assessment of the arguments for and against U.S. nuclear modernization? Can the United States afford the current modernization plan for its strategic nuclear forces? If not, what should the priorities be?

D. Student Preparation (59 pp; ~30 min of video)

1. Mazzar, Michael, J. "Understanding Deterrence," *RAND*, 19 April 2018. (11 pp)
2. Biddle, Tami Davis. "Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners," *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020), 94-109. (10 pp)
3. Video: Deterrence 101 – Foundations of Deterrence, *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, CSIS video, 08 December 2021, (00:00-17:39). (~18 min)
4. U.S. Department of Defense. "2022 Nuclear Posture Review" in the *2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, October 2022. (23 pp)
5. Kerr, Paul K. "Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces." Congressional Research Service, 19 May 2023. (2 pp)
6. Weaver, Greg, and Amy Woolf. "Requirements for Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control in a Two-Nuclear-Peer Environment," *Atlantic Council*, 02 February 2024. (9 pp)

7. Video: The Debrief: “Contemplating the Unthinkable: Making Nuclear Deterrence Credible.” *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 09 November 2023, (01:29-07:52). (~8 min)
8. Video: “U.S. Strategic Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 07 March 2024, (24:43-28:37). (~4 min)
9. Fink, Anya, F. “Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture,” *Congressional Research Service*, 01 April 2024. (2 pp)
10. Raine, John. “The Erratic Results of Deterrence Against Non-State Armed Groups,” *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 02 April 2024. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM’s CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-7: U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

A. Session Overview

The U.S. Congress mandates that the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government (USG) submit a wide range of strategy documents, which are designed to create internal coherence on foreign and defense policy within the Executive Branch itself, across the USG and provide a basis for Congress to fund security priorities to achieve national interests.

The primary document that defines the United States' national security interests, objectives, and goals - in effect the U.S. "grand strategy" - is the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS is the President's vision for achieving national security objectives and safeguarding the United States' well-being in a dangerous world. It is a road map that outlines the most pressing security threats, both domestic and international, and lays out a course of action for addressing them. As mentioned above, the NSS ensures a coordinated effort across various USG agencies, and addresses proposed uses of all instruments of national power to achieve the nation's security goals, thereby fostering a unified response to challenges. By identifying potential threats and crafting proactive solutions, the NSS strengthens the United States' ability to defend itself and achieve its interests.

Sent by the President to Congress to communicate the Executive Branch's national security vision, the NSS is required to include a discussion of the United States' national interests, commitments, objectives, and policies, along with defense capabilities necessary to implement U.S. security plans and deter threats. As such it provides a foundation for subsequent national security policies and strategies, which we will examine in IS-8.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the purpose of NSS and how it defines U.S. national security concerns and efforts to address them.
 - Examine the coordination between the ends, ways, and means in formulating strategy.
 - Analyze how well the NSS lays out key U.S. national interests and priorities.
 - Evaluate how well the NSS provides guidance for U.S. military and national security planners in formulating strategy.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What purposes do national strategy documents serve? How well do they function as strategic communications tools? How well does the Executive Branch follow its announced strategies? What utility do they provide to Congress?
2. How does the current NSS define national interests and how does it propose addressing them? How well does the current NSS capture what we know of this administration's strategic vision?
3. Has the NSS become no more than a rhetorical exercise? Does it serve a useful purpose? Does the unclassified nature of the NSS impact its effectiveness? Should the NSS be abolished? Why or why not?
4. How evident is a grand strategy in the current NSS? Are the guiding strategic documents effective in spelling out the long-term competition challenges facing the United States? How effective are the U.S. ends, ways, and means as expressed?

D. Student Preparation (55 pp; ~25 min video)

1. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: *White House*, October 2022, pp. 6-48. (42 pp)
2. Chin, John J., Kiron Skinner, and Clay Yoo. "Understanding National Security Strategies Through Time." *Texas National Security Review* 6, no. 4 (2023). (11 pp)
3. Slaughter, Anne-Marie. "It's Time to Get Honest About the Biden Doctrine," *New York Times*, 12 November 2021. (2 pp)
4. Video: "A Conversation with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan," *Center for a New American Security*, YouTube video, 12 October 2022, (34:00-59:45). (~16 min)

E. Student Deliverables

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No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-8: U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGIES: NDS AND NMS

A. Session Overview

IS-7 explored how the NSS provides a foundation for subsequent U.S. national security policies and strategies. With the NSS providing a holistic view of the objectives and goals of the United States are, and how all elements of national power are generally going to be combined to achieve them, the next “tier” of U.S. strategic guidance to examine is the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

The NDS is a critical element for ensuring U.S. national security and is signed by the Secretary of Defense. It outlines how the DoD will address potential threats, defend national interests, and achieve the goals set forth in the NSS. By clearly defining priorities and allocating resources accordingly, the NDS helps maintain a strong military force capable of deterrence and conflict resolution across the competition continuum. It also fosters collaboration with allies and partners, promoting international stability. Regularly updated to reflect the evolving global landscape, the NDS is a blueprint for safeguarding a nation's peace and prosperity.

Taking it a step further, the NMS is one of the core documents that provides the common thread to integrate and synchronize the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commanders (CCDRs), Services, and combat support agencies. It translates the broad security goals of the NSS and NDS into concrete military objectives. By outlining these objectives and preferred military actions, the NMS helps focus military activities and resource allocation. This ensures the U.S. Joint Force is prepared to address the most pressing threats, deter adversaries, and achieve U.S. national security goals. In essence, the NMS acts as a guide, ensuring the military is manned, trained, equipped, and strategically positioned to safeguard the nation's interests as outlined in the NDS and NSS.

All of these strategic documents inform and provide overarching guidance for how the U.S. Armed Services man, equip, and train their forces, and how CCDRs formulate their individual theater strategies to achieve U.S. national interests as directed by Title 10 USC. IS-9 will provide more information on how the maritime services have incorporated this guidance, while IS-10 will discuss the role of CCDR. To illustrate the influences and linkages to the NSS, NDS, and NMS, a CCDR's theater strategy is provided for students to review and discuss in seminar.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify and analyze major themes of current U.S. military strategic guidance.
 - Understand the nested and aligned nature of U.S. national security documents.
 - Understand the core components of the NDS.
 - Understand how the NMS provides detailed planning guidance to the Joint Force.
- Learning Outcomes

- CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does strategic competition impact defense strategy?
2. What are the areas of alignment and agreement between the NDS and NMS? Are there any areas that are not?
3. What are the major current and future challenges to the U.S. Joint Force? What important conversations are not happening?
4. Do you agree with the current NDS vision? Does the current NDS establish clear priorities for DoD?
5. How should the U.S. and allies adapt forces, operational concepts, and posture to respond to new challenges?
6. Do you agree with the current NMS vision? Does the current NMS establish clear priorities for the Joint Force?

D. Student Preparation (48 pp; ~27 min video)

1. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: *Department of Defense*, 27 October 2022, pp. iii-23. (16 pp)
2. Department of Defense. National Defense Strategy Strategic Ways Compilation Factsheets, Washington, DC: *Department of Defense*, 27 October 2022. (3 pp)
3. *Atlantic Council*. "Eight Things You Need to Know About the New US National Defense Strategy," 20 April 2022. (6 pp)
4. Video: "The 2022 National Defense Strategy: A Conversation with Colin Kahl." *Brookings Institute* video, 04 November 2022, (8:35-35:50). (~27 min)
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: *Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 08 May 2023. (6 pp)
6. Groves, Bryan. "Strategic Discipline and Developing the 2022 National Military Strategy." *The National Interest*, 10 March 2023. (6 pp)
7. Milley, Mark A. "Strategic Inflection Point: The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War is Happening Now – While the Future is

Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 110 (3rd Quarter 2023): 6-15. (6 pp)

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Message to the Joint Force,” Washington, DC: *Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 02 October 2023. (1 pp)
9. U.S. Central Command. Theater Strategy: People, Partners, and Innovation. *Headquarters, U.S. Central Command*, 08 June 2023. (4 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

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No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-9: U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY

A. Session Overview

Having examined the guidance provided by the NSS, NDS, NMS, as well as an example of a theater commander's strategy, this session looks at the current maritime strategy endorsed by the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard: "Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power", also known as the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy (TSMS). The TSMS provides the conceptual foundation for how the maritime services will work to achieve the national security objectives set forth in the NSS, NDS, and NMS.

With over 95,000 miles of shoreline, the United States has always been a maritime nation. From its colonial founding, the country's economic and political ascendancy has been facilitated and underpinned by its mastery of the maritime domain, the realm of 90% of global trade. As outlined in the TSMS, America's maritime services—the Navy, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard—provide the tools of such mastery, ranging from diplomacy, force projection, maneuver warfare within littoral spaces, coastal defense, defense of the global commons, law enforcement and environmental protection, among other activities.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand key security challenges and opportunities facing the U.S. maritime services.
 - Examine current debates within the maritime services regarding future force structures and concepts.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the key concepts in each maritime service and what are some potential synergies related to these concepts, that could link the different maritime services with each other and partner navies?
2. What are some urgent and long-term challenges facing the maritime services? Does the TSMS provide an effect path forward to address these challenges?
3. What does the rise of Chinese naval power mean for U.S. maritime strategy and how should the United States respond?

4. What is the risk involved with making significant changes to force structure as outlined in Force Design 2030?

D. Student Preparation (53 pp; ~27 min video)

1. Berger, David H., Michael M. Gilday, and Karl L. Schultz. "Advantage at Sea, Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power," *Department of the Navy*, December 2020. (20 pp)
2. Franchetti, Lisa M. "America's Warfighting Navy," *Department of the Navy*, 09 January 2024. (1 pp)
3. Grady, John. "Assisting Pacific Island Nations is 'Sweet Spot' for Coast Guard, Says USCG Commandant," U.S. Naval Institute, 29 April 2024. (2 pp)
4. Video: Chief of Naval Operations. "State of the Navy Leadership Keynote," *Defense One*, 27 March 2024, (04:45-15:39, 23:46-26:25). (~13 min)
5. Rubel, Robert C. "Command of the Sea: Why It Is Essential to U.S. Maritime Strategy." *Proceedings* Vol. 150/1/1,451, January 2024. (4 pp)
6. Mahnken, Thomas G. "A Maritime Strategy to Deal with China." *Proceedings* Vol. 148/2/1,428, February 2022. (7 pp)
7. O'Brien, Robert C. "U.S. Maritime Priorities for a New Era of Competition." *Center for Maritime Strategy*, 21 December 2023. (2 pp)
8. Video: "Implementing a New Maritime Strategy." *Hudson Institute*, YouTube video, 02 August 2021, (09:54-24:19). (~14 min)
9. Kennedy, Mark and Jeffrey Kucik. "It's Time for a Comprehensive Maritime Strategy." *War on the Rocks*, 28 March 2024. (4 pp)
10. Kline, Jeffrey, E. "Revamping Fleet Design and Maritime Strategy: An Integrated Naval Campaign for Advantage," *Center for Maritime Security*, 18 September 2023. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the conclusion of IS-9 in Week 8, students are required to successfully complete FA-2 addressing TSDM's CLO-2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-10: THE COMBATANT COMMANDS AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION

A. Session Overview

This session provides an overview of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the CCMDs, and their role in developing theater strategy. There are currently 11 CCMDs – four with transregional responsibilities and seven with assigned physical areas of responsibility (AORs). CCMDs with transnational responsibilities operate world-wide across geographic boundaries and provide unique capabilities to other regionally oriented CCMDs and the Services, while CCMDs with an assigned AOR operate in clearly delineated areas of responsibility and have a regional military focus.

As Joint Publication (JP) 1-0 makes clear, “Joint force decision making with a transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional context may require the integration of joint forces with a global perspective.” The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) plays a critical role in the global integration of U.S. military forces. This concept emphasizes a more unified approach across all branches of the armed forces, ensuring a strategic perspective that considers threats and resources on a global scale. The CJCS advises the President and Secretary of Defense on how to best allocate forces and develop joint capabilities. This includes planning, decision making, and force management, all aimed at giving the U.S. military a competitive advantage in a complex and interconnected world. The concept of global integration allows students to consider the DoD’s approach to address transregional challenges in multiple domains within the contemporary international security environment.

B. Objectives

- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.
- Session Objectives
 - Understand the purpose of the UCP.
 - Understand the origins, roles, and responsibilities of CCMDs.
 - Examine how CCMDs develop theater strategy, how they contribute to concept development and identify required capabilities for the Joint Force.
 - Analyze the importance of global integration and its impact on the CCMDs and oceanic regions.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Why did the United States feel it needed regional combatant commands? Is the current structure still effective? What changes would you suggest?
2. What are the most effective ways for CCDRs to work together? What is the most effective role for the Joint Staff?
3. Do CCDRs have 'too much' power relative to the Services or the Joint Staff? Do they have too much sway in the execution of U.S. foreign policy?
4. How important is theater strategy? How do the CCMDs affect DoD capability requirements and force planning?
5. How should the U.S. military best prioritize global and regional threats? Is DoD adequately structured to meet this challenge?

D. Student Preparation (47 pp; ~26 min of video)

1. Lucas, Nathan, J. "Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations (Version 12)," *Congressional Research Service*, 06 December 2022. (2 pp)
2. Video: Coffey, Ross, "NWC Talks: Combatant Command 101" *U.S. Naval War College video*, 10 August 2021, (00:00-14:39). (~14 min)
3. Reveron, Derek S., James L. Cook., and Ross M. Coffey. "Competing Regionally: Developing Theater Strategy". *Joint Force Quarterly* 104, 1st quarter 2022, 48- 61. (8 pp)
4. Video: "The Debrief Episode 5: Global Integration for an Interconnected Security Environment," *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 09 November 2023, (01:09-12:53). (~12 min)
5. Freedberg, Jr., Sydney, J. "Joint Staff Must Boost Global Coordination; No New Powers Needed: J5," *Breaking Defense*, 27 April 2017. (3 pp)
6. Dunford, Joseph F. "The Character of War and Strategic Landscape Have Changed." *Joint Force Quarterly* 89, 2018. (3 pp)
7. Garamone, Jim, "Global Integration Seeks to Buy Leaders Decision Time, Increase 'Speed of Relevance'," *DoD News*, 02 July 2018. (5 pp)
8. Eaglen, Mackenzie, "Putting Combatant Commands on a Demand Signal Diet," *War on the Rocks*, Texas National Security Review, 09 November 2020. (6 pp)
9. Lee, Caitlin. "The U.S. Military's Force-Management Tug-of-War," *War on the Rocks*, 23 March 2022. (6 pp)

10. Conway, Tim. Information Paper, Subject: Global Force Management. Suffolk, VA: *Office of the J-35*, 2023. (4 pp)
11. Sukman, Dan. "Global Contingency Plans: A New Look at War Planning," *Military Review*, November-December 2019. (5 pp)
12. Berkowitz, Marc. "Organizing to Deter or Prevail in Space Warfare." *War on the Rocks*, 26 March 2024. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

No later than the conclusion of IS-10 in Week 8, the Professor will have assigned students to one of four regionally-focused groups - the Atlantic Ocean region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America – for FA 3. Each regionally-focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-11: THE PACIFIC OCEAN REGION: FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES (INDOPACOM)

A. Session Overview

This is the first of three sessions that will explore the three oceanic regions most significant to U.S. security considerations: the Pacific Ocean Region, the Indian Ocean Region, and the Atlantic Ocean Region.

Per the CIA World Factbook, “the Pacific Ocean is the largest of the world’s five ocean basins (followed by the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Southern Ocean, and Arctic Ocean). It is about 15 times the size of the United States and covers about 28% of the global surface (almost equal to the total land area of the world). Strategically important access waterways include the La Perouse, Tsugaru, Tsushima, Taiwan, Singapore, and Torres Straits. The decision by the International Hydrographic Organization in the spring of 2000 to delimit a fifth world ocean basin, the Southern Ocean, removed the portion of the Pacific Ocean south of 60 degrees south. For convenience and because of its immense size, the Pacific Ocean is often divided at the Equator and designated as the North Pacific Ocean and the South Pacific Ocean.” The U.S. combatant command responsible for this region is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).

It is a center for global commerce, and a conduit for global trade and investment. It is also a region fraught with military tensions, including rising nuclear weapons capabilities, and persistent antagonism over various territorial and sovereignty claims. These threats are complex and interconnected, and they pose a significant challenge to the security of the region.

This session explores U.S. allies, its relations, and their actions and interactions, including specific regional dynamics that play a major role in U.S. policy considerations. The region is the home of many of America’s key alliances, including Japan, Australia, Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. It also features several intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that play an increasing role in security matters. Understanding the national interests, ambitions, and vision of the region’s international actors, and how to work in concert with like-minded partners in the Pacific is essential to the United States’ long-term objective of achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the importance of the Pacific Ocean Region to U.S. national security.
 - Understand the importance and origins of the U.S. treaty system within the Pacific Ocean Region.
 - Understand the vulnerabilities of the Pacific Ocean Region, including rising great power competition, and the role the wider Pacific community may play in addressing them.

- Understand the role of institutions and IGOs, and how they can influence regional security.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the key alliances in the Pacific Ocean Region and how did they form?
2. Is the U.S.-PRC rivalry all-encompassing? Are there areas for cooperation and, if so, what are they? Is the U.S.-PRC rivalry a zero-sum game?
3. Should the U.S. seek to “win” great-power competition against China, or should it seek to “manage” great-power competition with China?
4. Is there a role for regional security organizations in the Pacific Ocean Region? Or should the United States stay focused on its hub-and-spokes alliance model?
5. What are the key interdependencies linking the various states within the Pacific Ocean Region?
6. What is the interplay of the various national interests, ambitions, and visions of regional states and how will they evolve their relations among each other, as well as with the U.S., in coming years?
7. What challenges does Oceania face in sustaining its fisheries which are central to the region's survival? What are possible solutions to these challenges?

D. Student Preparation (44 pp; ~47 min of video)

1. Video: “The Debrief Episode 2: Understanding Regions through Oceans,” *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 26 September 2023, (00:00-11:46). (~12 min)
2. The White House. Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, Washington, DC: *White House*, 11 February 2022. (14 pp)
3. Video: “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command / U.S. Forces-Korea posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 20 March 2024, (15:50-34:50). (~20 min)
4. Nicastro, Luke, A. “U.S. Defense Infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific: Background and Issues for Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, 06 June 2023, 1-10, SCAN remainder. (5 pp)

5. Video: “The Future of the Indo-Pacific with the Coast Guard Commandant,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, YouTube video, 29 April 2024, (04:12-14:35). (~10 min)
6. Schake, Kori. “Realistic Ambitions for the US Alliance System in Asia.” *East Asia Forum*, 07 April 2021. (2 pp)
7. Manyin, Mark, E, and Liana Wong “South Korea: Background and U.S. Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 21 December 2023. (2 pp)
8. Chanlett-Avery, Emma, Kronstadt, K, Alan and Bruce Vaughn. “The “Quad”: Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia,” *Congressional Research Service*, 30 January 2023. (2 pp)
9. Manyin, Mark, E, Cimino-Issacs, Cathleen, D., Kitamura, Kyla, A., and Caitlin Campbell. “U.S.-Japan Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 21 December 2023. (2 pp)
10. Orchard, Philip. “Japan’s Indispensable Role in Southeast Asia,” *Geopolitical Futures*, 21 November 2021. (4 pp)
11. Mandhana, Niharika. “The Dark Horse Alliance Racing Forward to Take on China,” *Wall Street Journal*, 29 April 2024. (3 pp)
12. Campbell, Caitlin, Thomas Lum, and Ben Dolven. “China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea,” *Congressional Research Service*, 23 January 2024. (2 pp)
13. Lum, Thomas and Bruce Vaughn. “The Pacific Islands,” *Congressional Research Service*, 25 January 2024. (2 pp)
14. Video: “Indo-Pacific Islands: Caught in Between U.S.-China Competition,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, YouTube video, 10 August 2022, (00:00-03:28). (~3 min)
15. Video: “Pacific Islands Summit: Can Island Nations Count on the United States?” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, YouTube video, 30 September 2022, (00:00-02:05). (~2 min)
16. Cimino-Issacs, Cathleen, D., Kitamura, Kyla, H., and Mark E. Manyins. “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF),” *Congressional Research Service*, 14 December 2023. (2 pp)
17. Lee, Rachel, M., “The North Korea Conundrum: Pyongyang’s Strategic Calculus and Future Trajectory,” *Georgetown Journal of International Studies*, 31 May 2023. (3 pp)
18. Lawrence, Susan, V, and Caitlin Campbell. “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues,” *Congressional Research Service*, 13 June 2023. (2 pp)

19. U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on Partners in the Blue Pacific Foreign Ministers Meeting,” Washington DC: *U.S. Department of State*, 22 September 2022. (1 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-12: THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION: FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES (INDOPACOM)

A. Session Overview

As mentioned in the IS 11 session overview, the Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world's five ocean basins (after the Pacific Ocean and Atlantic Ocean, but larger than the Southern Ocean and Arctic Ocean). In regard to total area, it is almost seven times the size of the United States. Four critically important access waterways that impact the Indian Ocean Region are the Suez Canal (Egypt), Bab el Mandeb (Djibouti-Yemen), Strait of Hormuz (Iran-Oman), and Strait of Malacca (Indonesia-Malaysia). Similar to the Pacific Ocean, the decision by the International Hydrographic Organization to delimit a fifth world ocean basin, the Southern Ocean, removed the portion of the Indian Ocean south of 60 degrees south latitude.

Economically, the Indian Ocean Region connects the resource-rich eastern coast of Africa and the Middle East to Asia's labor markets and manufacturing industries. It is home to some of the world's busiest shipping lanes and major energy resources. As a result, it is a focus of competition and cooperation among major powers as well as a target for transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and illegal trafficking. In addition to these challenges, the Indian Ocean Region is also facing the effects of climate change, which is exacerbating existing problems such as sea level rise, drought, and flooding. These effects are likely to have a significant impact on the region's security concerns in the years to come.

Within the Indian Ocean Region, not only is one emerging great power, India, present, but also a number of key middle powers (Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran and South Africa) are located in the region, even as U.S., Chinese, European and Russian interest has increased in the 21st century. As such, the region is defined not only by the global competition among the great powers but also by a series of regionally based rivalries in the Middle East and in South Asia. The two main rivals in the Indian Ocean Region are China and India. China has been expanding its military presence in the region, building ports and other facilities in states such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. India is also expanding its military presence in the region, and it has been working to strengthen its ties with states such as the United States, Japan, and Australia.

The U.S. combatant command responsible for this region is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The United States has been the dominant power in the Indian Ocean Region for decades, but its relative influence is waning. China is now the world's second-largest economy, and it is investing heavily in the region. The United States is concerned with China's growing military presence in the Indian Ocean Region, and it is working to counter China's influence. These interconnected security challenges make this oceanic region perhaps the most dynamic in terms of future challenges, especially given the importance of this region to the global economy and security balance.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the importance of the Indian Ocean Region to U.S. national security.

- Understand the challenges of great power competition in the Indian Ocean Region.
- Understand the importance of the Indian Ocean Region to the global economy.
- Understand the dynamics of the India-China rivalry and how it manifests itself in regional affairs.
- Assess the coalition-building efforts of initiatives like BRICS and the Quad.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does the Indian Ocean region factor into great power competition with Russia and China?
2. Is the Indian Ocean region merely a keystone connecting the Pacific and Atlantic regions? Conversely, are there risks of thinking of the Indian Ocean as a subunit of the larger Pacific Ocean region?
3. Why has the United States traditionally viewed this area primarily through the lens of its subregions? Why are states like India attempting to conceptualize a regional view of security and partnership?
4. How does India view its role in and the role of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue? How does the United States view India's role?
5. How does India hedge between Russia and China, on one hand, and its U.S., European and Asian partners on the other? How does hedging impact regional competition?
6. How does China attempt to compete with India and the West in the region? How does China push for both maritime and land routes through the trans-Indian region?
7. How do regional rivalries impact great power competition? Does great power competition exacerbate regional tensions and divisions?
8. Why does China seek to play a greater role in this region? How do key regional powers assess the Chinese role? How does this create opportunities for the United States?
9. How does the expanding Chinese role in the greater Middle East and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan impact the regional security balance?
10. What are China's goals in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Is it a serious challenge to U.S. and global interests? Why or why not? What is the likely future of the BRI?

D. Student Preparation (55 pp; ~4 min of video)

1. Baruah, Darshana M., Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely. "Mapping the Indian Ocean Region." *Carnegie Endowment for Peace*, 15 June 2023. (21 pp)
2. Graham, Jeffrey D. "Building an Enduring U.S.-India Partnership to Secure a Free, Open, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 4th Quarter (October 2022): 23-38. (8 pp)
3. Video: "Indian Ocean Politics: Why Is It So Strategically Important?" *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, YouTube video, 03 March 2021, (00:00-02:13). (~2 min)
4. Baruah, Darshana and Caroline Duckworth. "We're Thinking About the Indian Ocean All Wrong," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 2022. (2pp)
5. Baruah, Darshana M. "Surrounding the Indian Ocean: PRC Influence in the Indian Ocean." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Congressional Testimony. 18 April 2023. (7 pp)
6. "Challenges and Solutions for Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean." *Stable Seas Report*, 05 May 2021, 1-20. (10 pp)
7. "India's Growing Influence," *The Economist: The World Ahead 2024*, 11 November 2023. (1 pp)
8. Liechtenstein, Michael. "The Changing Balance in the Indian Ocean," *Geopolitical Intelligence Services*, 15 March 2023. (2 pp)
9. Bhatt, Pooja. "The Indian Ocean is Witnessing a Surge in Russian Military Exercises," *The Diplomat*, 13 December 2023. (2 pp)
10. Grossman, Derek. "Why Most of the Indo-Pacific Tiptoes Around Russia," *RAND Corporation*, 07 April 2022. (2 pp)
11. Video: "What is BRICS, and Which Countries Want to Join, and Why?" *Reuters*, 21 August 2023, (00:00-02:22). (~2 min)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2.

Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-13: CHINA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A. Session Overview

China's ascendancy on the world stage is the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. By area it is the world's largest, and most powerful non-democratic state in the international community. China possesses the world's second largest population, second largest economy, and significant global social and political influence. It is also a state confronting significant challenges, including demographic decline, economic slowdown, and regional instability. The state of the U.S.- China relationship has important implications for everything from global health and nuclear proliferation to economic growth and the threat of major war.

The strategic competition between the U.S. and China is the defining challenge of our time, as its outcome will have a significant impact on the world order. Both the NSS and NDS emphasize the challenge that China poses to U.S. national security interests; the NDS specifically states that China is the "pacing" threat for the U.S. military. As such, the United States must be prepared to compete effectively with China across the competition continuum to protect its interests and values. The U.S. combatant command primarily engaging in this strategic competition with China is INDOPACOM, but each CCMD has a significant supporting role considering the global reach and ambitions of China.

As is well known, the United States and China have very different interests and values, and forming agreements on many substantive issues will be challenging. While this competition could lead to conflict, it could also lead to cooperation. This session introduces key elements of China's domestic politics, China's rise and future trajectory, the U.S.- China relationship, and U.S. strategy.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify and analyze key areas of potential cooperation, competition, and conflict between China and the United States.
 - Evaluate competing U.S. strategies toward China and produce recommendations for U.S. strategy.
 - Describe and evaluate key dimensions of national power and compare China and the United States along those dimensions.
 - Analyze shifts in both the balance of power and in Chinese domestic politics and assess their implications for the U.S.- China relationship.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.

- Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does Xi Jinping differ from previous Chinese leaders and how has PRC governance changed during his tenure? What are the potential implications of these changes for PRC domestic politics, foreign policy, and U.S.-PRC relations?
2. Is the PRC a rising or declining power? How does China and the United States compare when looking at each through the lens of the instruments of national power? What are the major risks, opportunities, and threats that stem from the rise of the PRC, both for the PRC, the United States, and the region?
3. What have been the main features of U.S. strategy toward the PRC? Has that strategy been successful? What should the U.S. strategy be going forward?
4. How might different IR theories imply different U.S. policy options in regard to the PRC? How likely is conflict between the U.S.-PRC, and how can it be avoided?
5. Why does China want to control the East and South China Seas' land formations, surrounding waters, and potentially all water within the nine-dashed line? What are the implications for the United States and for regional states?

D. Student Preparation (59 pp; ~36 min of video)

1. Doshi, Rush. *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*. London: Oxford University Press, 2022, 1-14. (13 pp)
2. Westad, Odd Arne. "What Does the West Really Know About Xi's China?" *Foreign Affairs*, 13 June 2023. (5 pp)
3. Economy, Elizabeth. "China's Alternative Order," *Foreign Affairs*, 23 April 2024. (9 pp)
4. Brands, Hal and Michael Beckley. "China Is a Declining Power—and That's the Problem." *Foreign Policy*, 24 September 2021. (13 pp)
5. Video: "Has China's Belt and Road Initiative been a success?" *Financial Times*, YouTube video, 30 October 2023, (00:00-10:51). (~11 min)
6. Lawrence, Susan, V. "China Primer: China's Political System," *Congressional Research Service*, 29 January 2024. (2 pp)
7. Video: "China's National People's Congress Begins: What's on the Agenda?" *DW News*, YouTube video, 05 March 2023, (00:00-05:41). (~6 min)
8. Jones, Seth, G, et al. "Competing Without Fighting: China's Strategy of Political Warfare," *Center for International and Strategic Studies*, 02 August 2023, 8-15. (6 pp)

9. Video: Confronting Beijing's Weaponized Economy, *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, YouTube video, 08 September 2023, (17:52-28:52). (~11 min)
10. Video: "A Secretive Chinese Force Is Becoming the U.S. Military's Biggest Challenge," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 January 2024, (00:00-07:23) (~8 min)
11. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2023," Washington DC: *Department of Defense*, 19 October 2023, ii-xii. (11 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally-focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-14: THE ATLANTIC OCEAN REGION: FOUNDATIONS AND SECURITY CHALLENGES (EUCOM)

A. Session Overview.

The trans-Atlantic relationship between the United States and Europe is long enduring and extremely important for U.S. security as it encompasses most of America's treaty allies, and due to the dense web of economic, political, and informational ties that stretch across the Atlantic. As the former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, R. Nicholas Burns noted, "Europe is our largest trade partner. Europe is the largest investor in the American economy. Europe contains the greatest number of American allies in the world - treaty allies through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - so Europe is of vital importance to the United States."

As such, it is obvious that the Atlantic Ocean is a vital region for the United States. When Latin America and West Africa are added, the Atlantic Ocean Region becomes both the critical nexus for securing U.S. geopolitical and geo-economic interests as well as facilitating the projection of U.S. power around the world. Four U.S. combatant commands share responsibility for the Atlantic Ocean (U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Southern Command, and U.S. Northern Command), making it a very dynamic and complex region regarding the coordination and synchronization of the use of the military instrument of national power.

The United States has long been the dominant regional power, but its traditional dominance is increasingly being challenged. Trans-Atlantic security encompasses more than the relationship with Europe. It is also a major strategic region for China and Russia, which are increasingly competing with the United States for regional influence. China has been building its navy and air force, has been conducting more regional military exercises, and is building military and intelligence facilities in Cuba. With major investments in the region, China has been increasingly using its economic power to gain political influence. Russia has been expanding its military presence in the Arctic, and it has also been conducting more military exercises in the Atlantic. This session will explore the security dynamics that impact this important region.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the importance of the Atlantic Ocean Region to U.S. security.
 - Understand how the trans-Atlantic relationship, especially NATO, bolsters U.S. security and its position in the world.
 - Understand the north-south linkages in trans-Atlantic security and the role of the Western Hemisphere and Africa in securing the Atlantic basin.
 - Understand the dynamics of trans-Atlantic relations and the challenges of enlarging the Atlantic community.

- Understand the competing global strategic tensions in addressing Chinese challenges to U.S. national security.
- Assess the difficulties in forging an overarching “Atlantic” strategy from the Arctic to the South Atlantic.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does the partnership between Europe and the United States enable the West to “write the rules” of the international order? How does this enhance U.S. leadership within the international community?
2. The “trans-Atlantic” community initially started as a formulation to describe relations between Europe and North America. Should the concept be widened to encompass West Africa and Latin America? How does this overlap with a geopolitical or geo-economic conception of “the West”?
3. How does NATO sustain a security community between North America and Europe? How does it prioritize challenges from Russia, China, the Middle East and Africa?
4. The COVID pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have demonstrated critical commodity supply vulnerabilities, including energy, of the Euro-American economic space. Would reorienting towards Latin American and West African supply sources make strategic sense?
5. Does an expanded Atlantic neighborhood policy that integrates Africa into the overall Atlantic framework alleviate those concerns?
6. How do NATO and the EU cooperate to improve security in the Atlantic Ocean Region?
7. How does the development and expansion of economic and technological ties across the Atlantic community benefit U.S. national security? Does the U.S. benefit from the EU?
8. What are principal U.S. security considerations in the Western Hemisphere? To what extent does the trans-Atlantic relationship help address those concerns? Could Europe play a greater role in the region, and how would the U.S. view such engagement?
9. How do Russian and Chinese security challenges manifest in the Atlantic Ocean Region? What are the Russian and Chinese strategic objectives?

D. Student Preparation (51 pp; ~4 min of video)

1. Video: “U.S. European Command posture statement,” Senate Armed Services Committee, 11 April 2024, (14:43-19:05). (~4 min)
2. McInnis, Kathleen, J., Brendan W. McGarry, and Paul Belkin “United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues.” Congressional Research Service, 30 March 2022. (2 pp)
3. Jones, Bruce, and Daniel S. Hamilton. “The promise of a free and open Atlantic,” Brookings Institution, 20 September 2023. (2 pp)
4. Brizzi, Matteo. “Shaping a Pan-Atlantic Community: An Opportunity for the European Union,” CeSPI, 14 March 2022. (3 pp)
5. Mattox, Gale A. “The Transatlantic Security Landscape in Europe,” in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security, 05 February 2018. (12 pp)
6. NATO 2022 Strategic Concept. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 29 June 2022. (10 pp)
7. The White House. “Fact Sheet: 32 Countries Launch the Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation,” 18 September 2023. (2 pp)
8. Wall, Colin, and Pierre Morcos. “Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 June 2021. (4 pp)
9. Borck, Tobias and Jack Senogles, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: Implications for the Middle East and North Africa,” Royal United Service Institute, 10 March 2022. (3 pp)
10. Sany, Joseph. “To Counter Russia’s Aggression, Invest in Africa,” USIP, 06 July 2022. (3 pp)
11. Archick, Kristin. “Russia’s War Against Ukraine: European Union Responses and U.S.-EU Relations,” Congressional Research Service, 05 February 2024. (3 pp)
12. Simon, Luis. “NATO’s China and Indo-Pacific Conundrum,” NATO Review, 22 November 2023. (4 pp)
13. Vohra, Anchal. “The ‘Military Schengen’ Era is Here,” Foreign Policy, 04 March 2024. (3 pp)
14. Optional Video: “What is the NATO Strategic Concept?” NATO, YouTube video, 14 June 2022, (00:00-02:15). (~2 min)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally-focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security

interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-15: RUSSIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY

A. Session Overview

Russia's 21st century has been a period of both challenge and opportunity. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia grappled with economic instability and a new political landscape. Under Vladimir Putin's leadership and influence, Russia has sought to reassert itself as a major power on the world stage, leveraging its vast natural resources and military strength. However, democratic backsliding and heightened tensions with the West over the unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine have complicated these efforts.

Consequently, the 2022 NDS labels Russia as an "acute" threat, while the combatant commander of U.S. European Command, Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, characterized Russia as a "chronic threat" during his April 2024 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee. Similar to INDOPACOM being the CCMD primarily engaging across the competition continuum with China, EUCOM is the CCMD primarily engaging across the competition continuum with Russia. And similarly, all the CCMDs play a key role in confronting Russia due to the scale of its global reach and ambitions.

Since the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, U.S. led economic sanctions have sought to punish the Russian state and restrict funds for its war effort. The growth of NATO, to now include Finland and Sweden, and Russia's turn toward other like-minded authoritarian regimes (i.e., China, Iran, North Korea) have further isolated the country. Russia's future will likely depend on its ability to navigate these challenges and develop its economy while still maintaining its global influence.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the Russian national security objectives in the 21st century.
 - Assess the impact of the Russian maritime strategy on U.S. national security interests.
 - Evaluate competing U.S. strategies toward Russia and produce recommendations for U.S. strategy.
 - Describe and evaluate key dimensions of national power and compare Russia and the United States along those dimensions.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the basic elements of Russian national security strategy?
2. How does the growing cooperation and engagement between Russia and other authoritarian powers threaten the international rules-based order? Is it something for the U.S. leadership to take seriously?
3. How does the Russian maritime strategy intersect with the Western view of the trans-Atlantic community? How does this correlate with EU and NATO understandings of security?
4. How do Russian actions in Ukraine and the Middle East create security issues for Europe and North Africa?
5. What are Russian “active measures”, and the threat posed by economic coercion in the form of “state capture”?
6. How does the fracturing of the Collective Security Treaty Organization impact Russian security decision making?

D. Student Preparation (61 pp; ~11 min of video)

1. Herd, Graeme. “Russia’s 21st Century Imperialism,” *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies*, 08 December 2021. (3 pp)
2. Duclos, Michel. “Russia’s National Security Strategy 2021: the Era of “Information Confrontation,” *Institut Montaigne*, 08 February 2021. (3 pp)
3. Chiriac, Olga, R. “The 2022 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Mobilization, Maritime Law, and Socio-Economic Warfare,” *Center for International Maritime Security*, 28 November 2022. (5 pp)
4. Clark, Colin. “Russia-North Korea ‘partnership’ could have long-lasting repercussions, NSC official warns,” *Breaking Defense*, 05 March 2024. (2 pp)
5. Schwarzenberg, Andres B. “Russia’s Trade and Investment Role in the Global Economy,” *Congressional Research Service*, 17 January 2023. (2 pp)
6. Video: “How Russia is Taking Control of the Arctic.” *The Guardian - It's Complicated*, YouTube video, 25 January 2024, (00:00-05:53). (~6 min)
7. Alberque, William, and Paul Fraioli. “Russia’s New Foreign-Policy Concept: The Airing of Grievances and a New Vision of World Order,” *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 13 April 2023. (3 pp)
8. Lloyd, Gabriel. “Hybrid Warfare and Active Measures.” *Small Wars Journal*, 10 October 2021. (7 pp)

9. Stefanov, R. et al., “The Kremlin Playbook in Europe.” *Center for the Study of Democracy*, Sofia: Bulgaria, October 15, 2020, pp. 9-16. (10 pp)
10. Video: “The Kremlin Playbook in Europe – State Capture of Cyprus.” *Center for the Study of Democracy*, YouTube video, 15 December 2020, (00:00-4:51). (~5 min)
11. Welt, Cory, Paul Belkin, Rebecca Nelson, and Andrew S. Bowen, “Russia’s War on Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Role of Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, 15 February 2024. (2 pp)
12. Dibb, Paul. “How Will Russia’s War on Ukraine End?” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 01 March 2024. (3 pp)
13. Rumer, Eugene, and Richard Sokolsky. “Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 23 May 2022. (14 pp)
14. *Norwegian Intelligence Service*. Focus 24: The Norwegian Intelligence Service’s Assessment of Current Security Challenges, (Russia’s Permanent Break with the West). 26 January 2024, pp. 28-41. (5 pp)
15. Temnycky, Mark. “The Demise of Putin’s Little Non-NATO,” *Center for European Policy Analysis*, 06 September 2023. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-16: THE MIDDLE EAST AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (CENTCOM)

A. Session Overview

The Middle East occupies a significant position within the global security landscape, and is a region marked by complex and enduring geopolitical tensions. There are competing definitions of what states exactly comprise the “Middle East” (a Eurocentric term coined in the 19th century). Generally, it can be defined as, “...the lands around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, encompassing at least the Arabian Peninsula and, by some definitions, Iran, North Africa, and sometimes beyond... In addition, geographic factors often require statesmen and others to take account of Afghanistan and Pakistan in connection with the affairs of the Middle East.”¹ The U.S. combatant command mostly responsible for this region is U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); the regional area of responsibility for CENTCOM in fact does include Pakistan and Afghanistan due to the geographic linkages referenced above.

The first two decades of the 21st century witnessed significant U.S. presence and influence in the region, with the U.S. being engaged in multiple military operations in the region (e.g., Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Odyssey Dawn) following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland. Recent years have seen a shift as the United States focuses more on the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region. This has created a vacuum filled by regional powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, each vying for influence. Further complicating the situation are ongoing conflicts, fragile states, and competition for resources like oil.

Political instability and conflict within the Middle East can disrupt these resources, impacting economies worldwide. Additionally, the region is a breeding ground for extremism and terrorism, posing a direct threat to international security. Unresolved conflicts and the presence of nuclear weapons further heighten tensions, potentially escalating into wider wars. The recent war between Israel and Hamas has once again plunged the region into uncertainty, as have the Iranian-backed Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. Ensuring stability in the Middle East is a complex challenge, and one that has a ripple effect on international security.

B. Objectives

- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.
- Session Objectives

¹ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East>

- Understand the major 21st century security challenges facing the states in the Middle East.
- Identify emerging trends and potential future challenges to security in the Middle East (e.g., climate change, water scarcity, demographic shifts).
- Evaluate the role of international cooperation in addressing U.S. regional security challenges in the Middle East.
- Understand the influence of non-state actors (e.g., terrorist organizations, militias) on regional security.
- Understand the impact of the Middle East on global energy security and economic stability.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How do ongoing regional conflicts in the Middle East, like the Israeli-Palestinian dispute or the Syrian Civil War, impact international security and U.S. national security objectives within the region?
2. To what extent do sectarian tensions within the Middle East contribute to broader regional instability? Does this dynamic have an impact beyond the immediate region?
3. How is the competition for resources, like water and oil, affecting security dynamics in the region?
4. What role do external powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, play in shaping security issues in the Middle East? How do the interests of these external actors sometimes clash and contribute to regional tensions?
5. What are the security implications of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons technologies in the region?

D. Student Preparation (51 pp; ~27 min of video)

1. Video: “U.S. Central Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 07 March 2024, (25:30-31:08, 34:16-36:44). (~8 min)
2. Lucas, Nathan, J. and Brendan W. McGarry. “United States Central Command.” *Congressional Research Service*, 16 December 2022. (2 pp)
3. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The United States Strengthens Cooperation with Middle East Partners to Address 21st Century Challenges,” Washington DC: *The White House*, 16 July 2022. (3 pp)
4. Clayton, Thomas. “Iran: Background and U.S. Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, 26 January 2024. (14 pp)

5. Pollack, Kenneth, M. "Iran's Grand Strategy Has Fundamentally Shifted," *Foreign Policy*, 15 August 2023. (3 pp)
6. Robinson, Kali, and Will Merrow. "Iran's Regional Armed Network," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 31 January 2024. (1 pp)
7. Robinson, Kali. "Iran's Support of the Houthis: What to Know," *Council on Foreign Relations*, 01 March 2024. (3 pp)
8. Schenker, David. "Leaving Iraq May Be Washington's Wisest Choice," *Foreign Policy*, 26 February 2024. (3 pp)
9. Brown, Phillip. "Middle East Oil," *Congressional Research Service*, 05 January 2024. (1 pp)
10. Gering, Tuvia. "Full Throttle in Neutral: China's New Security Architecture for the Middle East," *Atlantic Council*, 15 February 2023. (14 pp)
11. Blanchard, Christopher, M. "Syria and U.S. Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, 08 January 2024. (2 pp)
12. Zannotti, Jim. "The Palestinians: Overview, Aid, and U.S. Policy Issues," *Congressional Research Service*, 24 January 2024. (2 pp)
13. U.S. Department of State, "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel," Washington DC: *U.S. Department of State*, 19 October 2023. (1 pp)
14. Blanchard, Christopher, M. "Saudi Arabia," *Congressional Research Service*, 22 November 2023. (2 pp)
15. Video: "Middle East Security Declining Amid Strikes," *CBC News*, YouTube video, 17 January 2024, (00:00-12:54). (~13 min)
16. Video: "India & UAE Ink Pact for Mega Trade Corridor," *WION News*, YouTube video, 15 February 2024, (00:00-06:38). (~6 min)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2.

Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-17: AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (AFRICOM)

A. Session Overview

The African continent plays a critical role in international security. Its vast territory can harbor instability, with weak states vulnerable to terrorism, criminal networks, and violent extremism. Violent extremist groups like Boko Haram and al-Shabaab destabilize entire regions, while transnational crimes like drug trafficking and piracy threaten coastal areas. Weak governance and competition for resources exacerbate tensions, and the growing youth population strains already limited opportunities. Further complicating matters, climate change fuels competition for water and land, while the involvement of external actors with varying agendas adds another layer of complexity to finding solutions. These threats can then spill over borders, impacting international security and the achievement of U.S. national security objectives. The U.S. combatant command responsible for this region (minus Egypt) is U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Conversely, a stable and prosperous Africa contributes to a more secure world. Africa's vast resources, from minerals to fertile land, make it a key player on the world stage. This wealth, however, is often overshadowed by challenges. The continent grapples with internal conflicts, poverty, and corruption. Meanwhile, major powers vie for influence, offering investment and sometimes military aid in exchange for access to resources. This complex web of interests makes Africa a continent of both immense potential and intricate geopolitical maneuvering. By addressing these challenges through partnerships and promoting good governance, African states and the West can foster a more secure Africa and a safer world for all.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the major security challenges facing African states in the 21st century.
 - Identify emerging trends and potential future challenges to the security of Africa (e.g., climate change, water scarcity, demographic shifts).
 - Evaluate the role of international cooperation in addressing African security challenges.
 - Understand the influence of non-state actors (e.g., terrorist organizations, militias) on security in Africa.
 - Evaluate the effectiveness of different strategies for promoting peace and security in Africa (e.g., diplomacy, sanctions, nation-building).
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.

- Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How can African states address the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty and lack of opportunity, while also combating violent extremist (CVE) groups? What role should external powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, play in these CVE efforts?
2. What are the most effective strategies for mediating and resolving internal conflicts in Africa? Does the United States have a clear vision to support peace efforts within Africa?
3. How can the international community better balance security assistance with development aid to address the root causes of conflict in Africa?
4. How can the United States and regional organizations like the African Union (AU) discourage coups and promote democratic transitions?
5. With growing populations and an increasing demand for resources, how can African states manage resource extraction and prevent conflict? What role can international actors play in promoting transparency and good governance in the resource sector?

D. Student Preparation (45 pp; ~35 min of video)

1. Video: “U.S. Africa Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 07 March 2024, (31:12-34:13, 36:45-38:57). (~5 min)
2. The White House. “U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa,” Washington DC: *The White House*, 08 August 2022. (11 pp)
3. Usman, Zainab. “The New U.S. Africa Strategy Breaks from the Status Quo – With Some Perplexing Stumbles,” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 11 August 2022. (3 pp)
4. The White House. “Fact Sheet: Accelerating the U.S. – Africa Partnership After the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit,” Washington DC: *The White House*, 13 December 2023. (6 pp)
5. Video: “The Debrief Episode 8: Africa,” *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 11 January 2024, (00:00-14:40). (~15 min)
6. Barrios, Ricardo, Caitlin Campbell, Nicolas Cook, and Michael D. Sutherland. “China and Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Congressional Research Service*, 08 January 2024. (2 pp)
7. Salmon. Kinley. “Of Chaos and Coups,” *The Economist: The World Ahead 2024*, 11 November 2023. (1 pp)
8. Klassen, Lisa. “A New Battleground: Russia’s “Grey Zone” Warfare in the Sahel,” *Oxford University Politics Blog*, 27 March 2023. (2 pp)

9. Avoulete, Komlan. “What America Can Learn from France’s Mistakes in Africa,” *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 21 April 2023. (3 pp)
10. *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. “Mapping Disinformation in Africa,” 26 April 2022. (2 pp)
11. *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. “Documented Disinformation Campaigns in Africa,” 26 April 2022. (7 pp)
12. *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*. “Deaths Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa Continue to Spiral,” 29 January 2024. (6 pp)
13. Video: “Gen Michael Langley on DMA Center Stage,” *U.S. Africa Command*, YouTube video, 25 August 2023, (00:00-12:30). (~12 min)
14. Video: “Geopolitics and Governance in North Africa.” *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, YouTube video, 01 May 2023, (00:00-02:57). (~3 min)
15. Lu, Christina. “Washington Wants to Revive a Critical Minerals Mega-Railway Through Africa,” *Foreign Policy*, 28 February 2024. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-18: LATIN AMERICA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (SOUTHCOM)

A. Session Overview

Although often overlooked on the international stage, Latin America holds a significant position in international security for a multitude of reasons. The region is “generally understood to consist of the entire continent of South America in addition to Mexico, Central America, and the islands of the Caribbean whose inhabitants...shared the experience of conquest and colonization by the Spaniards and Portuguese from the late 15th through the 18th century as well as movements of independence from Spain and Portugal in the early 19th century.”²

The region grapples with transnational threats like drug trafficking and gang violence that spill over borders, impacting global security. Additionally, its proximity to the United States makes instability in Latin America a concern for US national security; the U.S. combatant command responsible for this region is U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Furthermore, Latin America boasts abundant natural resources, making it a vital economic player and a potential target for external influence that could disrupt global markets. Additionally, the region's commitment (or lack thereof) to international law and its democratic trajectory hold weight in the global balance of power.

Currently, the geopolitical landscape of Latin America is in flux. While the region boasts abundant natural resources and economic potential, challenges abound. Internal political polarization and a shift towards pragmatism in foreign policy are redefining alliances. The influence of the United States has somewhat waned in the region as China increases its presence and engagement with states in Latin America. As a result, regional cooperation faces hurdles due to ideological divides. These dynamics play out against a backdrop of social issues and economic anxieties, making Latin America a complex and evolving region in the global order.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the major 21st century security challenges facing Latin American states.
 - Explain the influence of the United States on security issues in Latin America.
 - Assess the growing role of China, Russia, and other external actors in Latin America's security dynamics.
 - Identify emerging trends and potential future challenges to security to Latin America (e.g., climate change, water scarcity, demographic shifts).

² <https://www.britannica.com/place/Latin-America>

- Understand the influence of non-state actors (e.g., terrorist organizations, militias, transnational criminal organizations) on security in Latin America.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the biggest security challenges and opportunities facing Latin America in the coming decades?
2. Should the United States maintain its traditional role as a security guarantor in Latin America, or should it cede more ground to regional organizations?
3. How is the growing influence of China and Russia impacting security in Latin America, and what are the implications for the United States?
4. Should the definition of security in Latin America be expanded to include non-traditional threats like poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation?
5. How are transnational threats evolving in Latin America, and how can the region cooperate with international partners to combat them more effectively?
6. How is climate change impacting security in Latin America, and how can the region build resilience to these threats?

D. Student Preparation (58 pp; ~17 min of video)

1. Video: “U.S. Southern Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 14 March 2024, (19:18-21:12, 32:16-37:37). (~7 min)
2. Sullivan, Mark, P., et al. “Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress,” *Congressional Research Service*, 29 December 2022, pp 1-16 (13 pp)
3. Malamud, Carlos, Jose Ruia, and Ernesto Talvi (Eds.). “Why Does Latin America Matter?” *Elcano Royal Institute*, June 2023, pp 7-14. (7 pp)
4. Berg, Ryan, C. “Insulate, Curtail, and Compete: Sketching a U.S. Grand Strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 11 May 2023. (19 pp)
5. The Americas, Bello. “Latin America and Europe Have Much to Gain from Closer Ties,” *The Economist*, 25 July 2019. (2 pp)

6. Seelke, Clare Ribando. “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy,” *Congressional Research Service*, 26 January 2024. (2 pp)
7. Barrios, Ricardo, and Karla I. Rios. “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean,” *Congressional Research Service*, 23 June 2023. (2 pp)
8. Villarreal, M. Angeles. “U.S.-Mexico Trade Relations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 01 September 2023. (2 pp)
9. French, Howard, W. “Mexico Is America’s Answer to China’s Belt and Road,” *Foreign Policy*, 09 February 2024. (2 pp)
10. O’Neil, Shannon, K. “The United States’ Missed Opportunity in Latin America,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2024. (9 pp)
11. Video: “We need to build a new geopolitical order: Restored Relations at South America Summit,” *DW News*, YouTube video, 30 May 2023, (00:00-09:50). (~10 min)

E. Student Deliverables

For FA 3, students will be assigned to one of four regionally-focused groups—the Atlantic Ocean Region, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. Each regionally focused group will be tasked to present a 10-12 minute PowerPoint briefing on a regionally significant security interest approved by the Professor and addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 and 2. Presentations will take place in the corresponding regional sessions at the beginning of IS-14, IS-16, IS-17, and IS-18. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance and approval provided by the Professor.

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-19: EMERGING DOMAINS: CYBER AND SPACE (CYBERCOM / SPACECOM)

A. Session Overview

A constant theme that emerges when examining the international security environment is the dynamic nature of the environment. As such the rapid advancement of technology is creating a new landscape of security concerns and challenges which states are being forced to address. This session examines two specific aspects of the advance of technology and their impact on the international security environment: cyber and space.

Increasingly cyberattacks are a major concern for the United States and all states within the international community due to an increasing reliance on digital infrastructure which makes all sectors of society more vulnerable to data breaches, disruption of critical services, and manipulation by malicious actors. States and non-state actors alike are developing more sophisticated tools to disrupt critical services, steal sensitive data, and manipulate information. This raises concerns about potential attacks on power grids, financial institutions, health institutions and even democratic processes. The interconnectedness of the internet makes it difficult to pinpoint the origin of attacks, further complicating international efforts to establish norms and hold perpetrators accountable. The U.S. combatant command responsible for the cyber domain is U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM).

International security in outer space is also facing new threats. The increasing number of satellites orbiting Earth creates a congested environment, with debris from collisions or anti-satellite tests posing a risk to critical infrastructure. Additionally, military powers are developing capabilities to disrupt or destroy satellites, threatening communication and navigation systems relied upon globally. Furthermore, the aforementioned advent of cyberattacks are emerging as a related concern, with states and non-state actors targeting ground stations and satellites themselves. The newest CCMD, U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), is responsible for the space domain. Overall, these issues highlight the need for international cooperation to establish norms and regulations for responsible behavior in both cyber and space, ensuring their continued use for peaceful purposes.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand how cyber threats can impact international peace and stability, the role of cyberspace in geopolitical competition, and the challenges of international cooperation in cyberspace.
 - Analyze how cyberattacks can disrupt critical infrastructure, economies, and political systems.
 - Analyze the potential for cyberwarfare and its implications for international relations.
 - Understand emerging challenges in cyberspace, such as the weaponization of artificial intelligence and the rise of cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns.

- Understand the critical role space-based technologies play in modern military operations and U.S. national security.
- Evaluate the challenges of maintaining peaceful uses of outer space in an era of increasing competition.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 1: Understand the impact the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a national security professional have on decision making.
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How can the United States establish international norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace?
2. What are the challenges of enforcing international law and norms in cyberspace, given its borderless nature?
3. The digital divide leaves some states more vulnerable to cyberattacks. How can international efforts bridge this gap and improve global cybersecurity?
4. What role do non-state actors play in cyberattacks, and how can they be held accountable?
5. With the increasing number of states and private companies with spacefaring capabilities, how can international cooperation be fostered to ensure a peaceful and sustainable space environment?
6. What are the biggest challenges posed by the weaponization of space, and how can existing treaties be strengthened or new ones created to prevent an arms race?
7. As reliance on space-based infrastructure (e.g., GPS, communication satellites) grows, how can U.S. vulnerabilities to cyberattacks and physical disruptions be addressed on an international level?
8. Should there be a ban on developing space-based weapons? If so, how can such a ban be enforced?
9. How can we differentiate between legitimate space exploration and potential military activities?
10. What is the role of space assets in modern warfare, and how might it change in the future?

D. Student Preparation (57 pp; ~47 min of video)

1. Video: “U.S. Cyber Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 10 April 2024, (19:15-24:18, 36:45-41:30). (~10 min)
2. Theohary, Catherine, A. “Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations,” *Congressional Research Service*, 14 December 2023. (2 pp)
3. Video: Zegart, Amy. “Cyberwar,” *TEDxStanford*, YouTube video, 29 June 2015, (00:00-16:53). (~17 min)
4. Seebeck, Lesley. “It’s Still Early Days for Cyber,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, 29 July 2022. (1 pp)
5. U.S. Department of Defense. Summary 2023 Cyber Strategy of the Department of Defense. Washington DC: *U.S. Department of Defense*, 12 September 2023. (12 pp)
6. Rollins, Sharon. “Defensive Cyber Warfare Lessons from Inside Ukraine,” *Proceedings*, Vol 149/6/1444, June 2023. (3 pp)
7. Video: “U.S. Space Command posture statement,” *Senate Armed Services Committee*, 07 March 2024, (24:43-33:43). (~9 min)
8. “War in Space is No Longer Science Fiction,” *The Economist*, 31 January 2024. (5 pp)
9. Galbreath, Charles. “Securing Cislunar Space and the First Island Off the Coast of Earth,” *Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies*, Slide presentation, 17 January 2024. (16 slides)
10. U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Space Strategy Summary. Washington DC: *U.S. Department of Defense*, 17 June 2020. (8 pp)
11. The White House. United States Space Priorities Framework. Washington DC: *The White House*, 01 December 2021. (5 pp)
12. Video: “Final Frontier: Space Strategy for the Future,” The Aspen Institute, YouTube video, 19 July 2023, (00:00-11:30). (~11 min)
13. Ignatius, David. “China is Serious About Winning the New Space Race,” *Washington Post*, 20 July 2023. (2 pp)
14. Knutson, Jacob. “Russia Vetoes UN Resolution Denouncing use of Nuclear Weapons in Space,” *Axios*, 24 April 2024. (2 pp)
15. Optional Video: “The Debrief Episode 14 - Always Above: Space Force and the New Frontiers,” *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 03 April 2024, (00:00-25:54). (~26 min)

E. Student Deliverables

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-20: EMERGING DOMAINS: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

A. Session Overview

This session serves as a companion to the topics of cyber and space discussed in IS-19 and continues to explore how advances in technology influence national and theater strategies, decision making, and force design. It is an imperative that national security professionals have an understanding that, as former CJCS Gen Mark A. Milley, USA, stated in July 2023, “Geostrategic competition and rapidly advancing technology are driving fundamental changes to the character of war. Our opportunity to ensure that we maintain an enduring competitive advantage is fleeting.” Although there are many areas we could cover on the topic of technology, three of the most consequential are the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI), unmanned systems, and hypersonic weapons are the topics on which this session will focus.

The rapid development of AI has brought a new layer of complexity to international security. Concerns range from autonomous weapons making decisions on life and death to AI being used to spread dis/misinformation and manipulate populations. Biases in AI systems could exacerbate existing tensions, while the potential for theft of sensitive data or manipulation of algorithms by hostile actors raises the specter of major cyberattacks. The United States and other like-minded states are grappling with how to ensure responsible development and use of AI to prevent conflict and maintain stability.

The rise of unmanned military systems, like aerial drones or unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), is creating another new set of international security challenges. In the maritime domain the use of both unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles are growing exponentially. Concerns in this area include the proliferation of these weapons to non-state actors and the potential for accidental or unauthorized use leading to civilian casualties. Additionally, the blurring of lines between military and commercial drones makes attribution for attacks difficult, raising questions about how and when to retaliate. These powerful technologies are constantly evolving, and as with AI, the United States, other like-minded states, and IGOs such as the United Nations and the European Union are scrambling to develop regulations and norms to prevent their destabilization of international security.

Finally, hypersonic missiles are at the cutting edge of weaponry, traveling at mind-boggling speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. This extreme velocity allows them to cover vast distances in a fraction of the time compared to traditional missiles, making them difficult to intercept, potentially destabilizing the balance of power between states and raising the risk of regional conflicts escalating. Additionally, the speed of these weapons could compress decision making times in a crisis, increasing the chances of miscalculation. Currently, the United States, Russia, and China are in a race to develop and deploy these powerful weapons, raising concerns about their impact on international security.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives

- Analyze the risks and challenges posed by AI in the international security environment.
- Understand how unmanned systems are changing the nature of warfare.
- Analyze the implications of unmanned systems for force structure and decision making.
- Analyze how hypersonic weapons could destabilize the balance of power between states.
- Analyze the challenges hypersonic weapons pose to deterrence strategies.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 1: Understand the impact the moral, ethical, and professional responsibilities and challenges associated with being a national security professional have on decision making.
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the long-term geopolitical ramifications of a world where some states have a significant advantage in AI capabilities?
2. How can we ensure that AI development benefits all states and contributes to global stability?
3. How will AI-powered autonomous weapons systems change the nature of warfare?
4. How can the United States avoid an AI arms race between competing powers?
5. How is the easy accessibility and affordability of unmanned systems impacting U.S. national security interests?
6. How will the increasing autonomy of unmanned systems impact decision making and accountability in warfare?
7. How might hypersonic weapons affect existing deterrence strategies and the balance of power between states?

D. Student Preparation (33 pp; ~40 min of video)

1. “A New Era of High-Tech War Has Begun,” *The Economist*, 06 July 2023. (2 pp)

2. Sayler, Kelley, M. "Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies," *Congressional Research Service*, 30 January 2024. (2 pp)
3. Flournoy, Michele, A. "AI is Already at War: How Artificial Intelligence Will Transform the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, 24 October 2023. (8 pp)
4. Video: "AI in the Military: Gen Milley on the Future of Warfare." *60 Minutes Overtime*, YouTube video, 08 October 2023, (00:00-04:07). (~4 min)
5. Lamparth, Max, and Jacquelyn Schneider. "Why the Military Can't Trust AI," *Foreign Affairs*, 29 April 2024. (4 pp)
6. "The War in Ukraine Shows How Technology is Changing the Battlefield," *The Economist*, 03 July 2023. (4 pp)
7. Video: "The Future of War," *The Economist*, YouTube video, 04 July 2023, (00:00-16:38). (~17 min)
8. "The Growing Role of Fighting Robots on the Ground in Ukraine," *The Economist*, 19 April 2024. (1 pp)
9. "How Oceans Became New Technological Battlefields," *The Economist*, 03 July 2023. (3 pp)
10. Sayler, Kelley, M. "DOD Replicator Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service*, 13 March 2024. (2 pp)
11. Tucker, Patrick. "Navy Envisions 'Hundreds of Thousands' of Drones in the Pacific to Deter China," *Defense One*, 16 February 2024. (2 pp)
12. Shelbourne, Mallory, and Sam Lagrone. "Navy Will Stand Up Lethal Drone Unit Later this Year, First Replicator USVs Picked," *U.S. Naval Institute*, 14 February 2024. (2 pp)
13. Ackerman, Elliot, and James Stavridis. "Drone Swarms Are About to Change the Balance of Military Power," *Wall Street Journal*, 16 March 2024. (1 pp)
14. Video: "How Ukraine's Boat Drones Sank a THIRD of the Black Sea Fleet and Changed Naval Warfare Forever," *Daily Mail*, 15 March 2024, (00:00-13:12). (~13 min)
15. Sayler, Kelley, M. "Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons," *Congressional Research Service*, 22 March 2024. (2 pp)
16. Video: "The Race to Build Hypersonic Missiles," *Wall Street Journal*, YouTube video, 31 May 2022, (00:00-07:21). (~7 min)
17. Optional Video: The Debrief Episode 12: The Rise of the Machines? Implications of New Tech On and Off the Battlefield," *U.S. Naval War College*, YouTube video, 26 February 2024, (00:00-19:33). (~19 min)

E. Student Deliverables

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM’s CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-21: THE LOGIC OF FORCE PLANNING

A. Session Overview

The DoD force design process is truly a collaborative effort. While each military service (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force) conducts its own internal assessments and proposes adjustments to its structure and capabilities in accordance with their man, train, and equip responsibilities per Title 10 USC, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) plays a central role. The OSD oversees the entire process, ensuring alignment with the NDS and coordinating between the Services to identify potential overlaps and gaps. As you will later learn within the Foreign Policy Analysis sessions, Congress provides critical oversight and approval for major force design decisions and resource allocation. This multi-layered approach ensures a comprehensive and balanced military force that is intended and designed to achieve the United States' national security objectives.

At its most basic, force planning revolves around building the most lethal and combat ready military instrument of national power that can effectively achieve a state's security objectives across the competition continuum. Planners assess potential threats, along with the military's strengths and weaknesses. They then design a force structure with the right skills, manpower, equipment, and training to address those threats. This involves determining the right end strength of the Services, balancing different Services' capabilities, and what equipment is currently (and in the future) required to achieve operational missions in pursuit of U.S. national security objectives. The end product of this process is that the U.S. military can deploy, operate, and interact efficiently as a Joint force. It's a complex dance between strategic vision and practical considerations. Balancing these elements while factoring in resource limitations and the human cost of conflict makes military force planning a continual process demanding strategic foresight and adaptability.

The DoD's Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is a critical body for ensuring the U.S. military gets the equipment and capabilities it needs. Chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JROC reviews and validates programs to meet national defense objectives as outlined in the NDS and NMS. They focus on high-priority programs and ensure requirements are balanced against factors like cost and development timelines. By overseeing the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, the JROC helps guarantee the U.S. armed forces are equipped to address current and future threats to U.S. national security.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the roles of the various DoD organizations involved in force planning.
 - Understand the connection between force planning and achieving U.S. national security objectives now and in the future.
 - Understand how threat assessment and desired capabilities influence force planning.

- Analyze how force planning adapts to changing geopolitical situations and the challenges associated with technological advancements.
- Understand the role of existing military resources and capabilities in shaping force structure.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How effectively does force planning anticipate future threats and adapt to evolving geopolitical landscapes?
2. Does the current force structure adequately address the balance between conventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and potential peer-to-peer conflicts?
3. Does the current force planning process adequately consider the trade-offs between maintaining large standing armies and building a more agile, adaptable force?
4. How does force planning integrate intelligence gathering and threat assessments to ensure a realistic understanding of potential adversaries?
5. How does force planning consider the role of alliances and partnerships in deterring conflict and achieving strategic objectives?

D. Student Preparation (55 pp; ~32 min video)

1. Video: “NWC Talks: The Logic of Force Planning with Jim Cook,” U.S. Naval War College, YouTube video, 19 August 2019, (00:00-13:20). (~13 min)
2. O’Rourke, Ronald. “Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design,” Congressional Research Service, 30 January 2024. (2 pp)
3. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Implementing Joint Force Development and Design. CJCS Instruction 3030.01A. Washington, DC: *CJCS*, 3 October 2022, A1-A8. (8 pp)
4. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. CJCS Instruction 5123.01I. Washington, DC: *CJCS*, 30 October 2021, A1-A7. (6 pp)

5. U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. JCIDS Manual. Washington, DC: *Joint Staff J-8*, 30 October 2021, A1-A4. (4 pp)
6. Owens, Mackubin, T. "Force Planning: The Crossroads of Strategy and the Political Process," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 25 May 2015, 411-420. (10 pp)
7. Brands, Hal and Evan Braden Montgomery. "One War is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great Power Competition." *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020), 81-92. (9 pp)
8. Cancian, Mark, F. "Force Structure in the National Defense Strategy: Highly Capable but Smaller and Less Global," *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 31 October 2022. (4 pp)
9. U.S. Marine Corps. A Concept for Stand-In Forces. Washington, DC: *Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps*, December 2021, Forward and pp 1-5. (6 pp)
10. Video: "You Have to Move Fast with Force Design 2030 with General Eric Smith, USMC". *Defense News video*, 07 September 2022, (00:25-9:06). (~9 min)
11. Macander, Michael, and Grace Hwang. Marine Corps Force Design 2030: Examining the Capabilities and Critiques. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 22 July 2022. (4 pp)
12. Video: "Do We Have the Right Naval Force Structure to Execute the Nation's Strategy?" Defense Forum Washington, *U.S. Naval Institute*, YouTube video, 07 December 2023, (11:30-21:28). (~10 min)
13. Clark, Bryan, and Dan Patt. "Use 'Hedge Forces' to Break the Pentagon's Force Structure Death Spiral," *Defense One*, 21 March 2024. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

No later than the beginning of IS-21 in Week 13, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-2—an analytic research paper addressing TSDM's CLO 1 and 2. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY-22: THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A. Session Overview

This final session of the IS portion of the TSDM course serves as an opportunity to reflect back on the myriad elements that constitute the international security environment and discuss the possible challenges and opportunities to international security that are emerging in the coming decades of the 21st century.

As illustrated via the material and topics covered over the course of the previous IS sessions, the evolving international security environment presents a complex landscape of challenges and opportunities. Traditional threats like interstate conflict, geopolitical competition and nuclear proliferation persist, while issues like “gray zone” operations by U.S. adversaries, resource scarcity due to climate change, the race for control of the Arctic / Antarctica and the weaponization of emerging technologies loom large.

However, these very challenges also open doors for cooperation. Increased global interconnectedness necessitates international collaboration to address transnational threats. Technological advancements, if harnessed for good, can create tools for conflict prevention, communication, and disaster response. The ability of the United States to navigate this complex environment, foster diplomacy, and prioritize collective security will be paramount to achieving U.S. national security objectives and in shaping a more stable future.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand how states engage across the competition continuum to advance their interests in both the contemporary and future international security environment.
 - Understand the risks and challenges climate change will present to U.S. national security interests in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
 - Comprehend the implications to U.S. national security of the cooperative efforts between authoritarian powers.
 - Understand the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) to U.S. national security.
 - Understand the challenges of gray zone operations.
 - Comprehend the implications of the growing geopolitical competition for control of the Arctic Ocean Region.
 - Understand the potential benefits of emerging technology to advance international security and stability.

- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO 2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - Supports NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLO) 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Do the conflicting visions of the international order between the United States (and its allies) and the rising tide of authoritarian powers (i.e., China, Russia) mean that future global conflict is inevitable? Why or why not?
2. What are the implications of the expansion of NATO to international security?
3. Is the future of the Arctic Ocean Region going to be determined by the parameters of the U.S.-China-Russia strategic competition?
4. How is climate change affecting geopolitics and security interests in the Indo-Pacific? What risks and challenges does it present and how can regional states best predict, prevent, and mitigate those challenges?
5. What challenges do expanding “gray zone” operations by China and Russia present to international security?
6. What factors affect relations across the Taiwan Strait and, particularly, the likelihood of conflict? How do concepts like the security dilemma, deterrence, diversionary theory, audience costs, economic integration, and identity help us understand these issues? How are these factors likely to change in the coming years and what do they imply for U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan?
7. Projecting forward into the coming decades of the 21st century, how do you foresee the role of emerging technologies impacting international security?

D. Student Preparation (53 pp; ~48 min of video)

1. Brands, Hal. “The Next Global War,” *Foreign Affairs*, 26 January 2024. (5 pp)
2. Kotkin, Stephen. “The Five Futures of Russia,” *Foreign Affairs*, 18 April 2024. (12 pp)
3. Bekkevold, Jo Inge. “NATO’s Remarkable Revival,” *Foreign Policy*, 11 September 2023. (3 pp)
4. Erickson, Andrew, S., Gabriel B. Collins, and Matt Pottinger. “The Taiwan Catastrophe: What America—and the World—Would Lose If China Took the Island,” *Foreign Affairs*, 16 February 2024. (15 pp)

5. Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Next Tripartite Pact? China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last,” *Foreign Affairs*, 19 February 2024. (9 pp)
6. Video: “Research Frontiers Forum 2023: Admiral Jim Stavridis Keynote Address,” *Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory*, YouTube video, 13 June 2023. (00:00-32:00) (~32 min)
7. Video: “Understanding Gray Zones,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, YouTube video, 07 December 2018. (00:00-04:17). (~4 min)
8. Video: “The race for the Arctic is ramping up. Here’s why,” *DW News*, YouTube video, 25 November 2022, (00:00-13:50). (~14 min)
9. Carlstrom, Gregg. “The Power Vacuum in Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs*, 06 March 2024. (4 pp)
10. U.N. Secretary General. “Use Science, Technology to Bolster World’s Collective Security, Secretary-General Says at Round Table,” *United Nations*, 23 March 2018. (3 pp)
11. Tan, Ming. “Tech for Good: What it Means and How We Can Deliver on it,” *Tech for Good Institute*, 21 March 2023. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

None.

ANNEX D
TSDM – FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)
STUDY GUIDE

1. Overview

The Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) sessions provide students with an understanding of the domestic and international influences on national security policy at the theater level. An understanding of the complexity of this environment and the sometimes-cumbersome nature of the policy-making process is vital to any national security professional. Military officers or civilian national security professionals advancing in their careers from the tactical to the operational and strategic levels of leadership must have a firm grasp of the policy process – how policy is made and the domestic and international influences on the decision making environment. Therefore, students can benefit from understanding how to:

- Analyze complex, multidisciplinary national security policy issues by examining the domestic and international policy actors and forces that influence the policy-making process.
 - Understand the context and decision making environment of national security issues and their impact across several organizational levels: internal to an organization (e.g., an agency or Service), a cabinet-level department (e.g., the Department of Defense), the United States (U.S.) Government as a whole, and up to the international level.
- a. *Division I: Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis* lays the foundation for FPA sessions by introducing students to the basic theory underlying policy analysis and briefly reviewing some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to the nation's policymakers, as well as providing a notional framework used for analyzing complex foreign policy case studies. The division then examines a seminal foreign policy analysis case: The Cuban Missile Crisis, considering the myriad factors influencing decision makers during thirteen days in October 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis case serves as the first in a series of case studies aimed at challenging students to apply analytical tools and critical thinking to enhance understanding of U.S. foreign policy decision making
- b. *Division II: The U.S. National Security Environment* comprises the majority of the FPA sessions. It examines how national- and theater-level security policy is devised and implemented within the U.S. government. Constitutional authorities, along with important reforms such as the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, will help inform the discussions in these sessions. Students will gain a better and deeper understanding of the various analytical perspectives in the academic field of FPA, as well as the role played by the presidency, the national security council, interagency partners, Congress and its committees/sub-committees, the media, lobbyists, think tanks, and so on within the policymaking process. In addition, students will be expected to gain a broad understanding of the complex world of force planning, including the realities of force planning, and will revisit some of the formal processes that help translate strategies into defense priorities and action.

- c. *Division III: International Influences on National Security Policy* examines the forces, actors, and influencers in the global/international community that affect the decision making process and the development of policy. National security professionals, at some point in their careers, will be confronted with international political, cultural, religious, and ideological issues, all of which can influence U.S. national security policy and its implementation. Students will examine all these issues in seminar culminating with a complex case study requiring the application of all concepts covered throughout the FPA sessions.
- d. *Division IV: FPA Synthesis* provides a synthesis case study, course review, future foreign policy challenge, and summative assessment review. The synthesis case study will provide the opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply analytical tools and concepts from FPA sessions to a complex and contemporary national security case study. Using the tools, techniques, and concepts presented in FPA, students will analyze a national and/or theater security issue and identify relevant factors in both the domestic-internal (staff/organization), domestic-external (etc. think tanks/media/public opinion), as well as the international (or external) environment, including U.S. and global elements. Students will also apply these tools and concepts in a future-oriented foreign policy scenario in an effort to prepare for an environment where they must anticipate foreign policy decisions.

2. Focus

FPA is designed to enhance the professional competence of students who will serve as practitioners in the national security environment—such as a combatant command staff, a Service staff, or when in command. FPA sessions will increase comprehension of the role of the national security professional through understanding:

- The range of domestic and international actors and influences that can affect the decision making process and formulation of national security and defense policy.
- The formal (and informal) processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made and how decisions can shape and/or alter theater security policy.

3. Guidance

The FPA study guide (Annex D) is the primary planning document for FPA sessions. For each session, it provides a session overview, the objectives and learning outcomes covered in that session, general guidance for seminar preparation, the required student preparation (readings, videos, podcasts, etc.), and outlines any student deliverables and their associated suspense. Student preparation materials should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid.

4. Student Deliverables

Students are expected to complete all preparation materials prior to each session. The major graded deliverable (Summative Assessment 2) requires students to conduct a rigorous analysis of a complex foreign policy case.

ANNEX D
TSDM – FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)
STUDY GUIDE

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FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-1: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PRACTITIONERS

A. Session Overview

This session serves as the first of two sessions in *Division I: Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis* which lays the foundation and introduces the basic theories underlying foreign policy analysis (FPA). This session also briefly reviews some of the constitutional and statutory authorities granted to national security policy-makers. These formal authorities are vital elements of the policy-making process, but they only tell part of the story in that various informal actors and elements also play a critical role in the process. FPA is designed to increase student appreciation of these international, domestic, and bureaucratic forces that profoundly influence every organization involved with national security. This introductory lesson is designed to familiarize all national security professionals, especially those at the combatant command level, with the increasingly diverse and demanding elements that can influence future policy.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Describe the general requirements and content of FPA sessions.
 - Identify the key domestic, international, and theater-level actors, as well as the bureaucratic processes that profoundly impact national security affairs.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Foreign policy decisions may be less about what a president or other leaders want and more about what options are possible given political and systemic constraints. What are some of those constraints? How might they affect a foreign policy decision?
2. This session looks at concepts like “two-level games” and “levels of analysis” in greater depth throughout the course – and they will be recurring themes. For now, what do you see as the basic concepts behind these terms? In broad terms, how might they explain how international and domestic political systems interact to influence policy-making?
3. Should military officers study policy analysis? If so, why? If not, why? Why might it be important for national security professionals to dissect policy decisions?

4. Decision makers inevitably must act with incomplete information. Foreign policy analysts face similar informational challenges. What information would be especially important in a foreign policy context, and what data are easiest to come by, harder to come by, and nearly impossible to come by? What tools and methods can analysts use to understand foreign policy actions and their consequences?

D. Student Preparation (52 pp; ~33 min video)

1. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "Understanding Foreign Policy Analysis," Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, October 2023. (16 pp)
2. Knott, Stephen F., Andrew Stigler, and Nikolas K. Gvosdev. "Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education, Summer 2023. (20 pp)
3. Video: "The Debrief Episode 1: Analytic Perspectives of Foreign Policy Decision-Making." National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 27 September 2023, (00:00 – 33:18).
4. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?" *Joint Forces Quarterly*, 76, (1st Qtr, 2015): 30-34. (4 pp)
5. Blankshain, Jessica D. and Andrew L. Stigler, "Applying Method to Madness: A User's Guide to Causal Inference in Policy Analysis," *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 3 (2020): 76-89. (12 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-2: CASE STUDY: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

A. Session Overview

The principal objective of the FPA sessions is to examine the United States' national security decision making processes. An understanding of the complex and, at times, cumbersome nature of this process is vital to any national security professional. For 13 days in October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union moved inexorably to the brink of nuclear war. At the center of the conflict were Cuba-based Soviet missiles that could deliver nuclear payloads to most of the United States. In a haze of uncertainty, tensions, and a maelstrom of often conflicting advice, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy sought to achieve their respective geostrategic and political objectives while avoiding war. Long presented as a model of presidential decision making, a study of the crisis provides a much more complicated and nuanced understanding of how U.S. leaders dealt with the crisis and how narrowly nuclear war was averted. FPA presents this as the first in a series of case studies that will require an increasingly sophisticated understanding of analytical tools, critical thinking, and the ability to provide explanatory power in dealing with U.S. foreign policy decision making.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze and explain the influential factors in a complex national security case.
 - Identify the various actors and factors in the Cuban Missile Crisis that impacted U.S. decision making.
 - Assess how different analytical perspectives can be used to provide a more complete understanding of forces active in foreign policy decision making.
 - Assess how such an understanding might be useful in determining probable outcomes of ongoing national security decisions.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Consider how both the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the crisis. Why did the Soviet Union attempt to place offensive missiles in Cuba in the first place?
2. Why did the U.S. choose to respond to the Soviet missile emplacement with a quarantine of Cuba? Why not make an alternative decision? Why respond at all?

3. Why did the Soviet Union decide to withdraw the missiles?
4. How might the Cuban Missile Crisis help in understanding the potential for nuclear confrontation today?

D. Student Preparation (44 pp; ~68 min of video)

1. Allison, Graham. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," in *Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases*, 3rd edition. Edited by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, and Tim Dunne. Oxford University Press, 2016, 256-272. (15 pp)
2. Video: "The Cuban Missile Crisis: At the Brink." *PBS*, 1992, (00:00 – 54:45).
3. Video: Phizicky, Stephen, and Terence McKenna. "Voices from the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis." New York, NY: Filmmakers Library, 2003, (00:00 – 23:38).
4. Radchenko, Sergey, and Vladislav Zubok, "Blundering on the Brink: The Secret History and Unlearned Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 3 April 2023. (20 pp)
5. Allison, Graham, "Putin's Doomsday Threat: How to Prevent a Repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, 5 April 2022. (9 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-3: TWO-LEVEL GAMES: SOURCES OF INFLUENCE IN POLICY MAKING

A. Session Overview

This session serves as the start of *Division II: The U.S. National Security Environment*, which comprises the majority of the FPA sessions. The goal of the sessions in Division II is to examine how national- and theater-level security policy is devised and implemented within the U.S. government. This session builds on FPA-2 and moves beyond the proverbial “black box” of the rational actor model to explore how a state's foreign policy is influenced by both domestic and international actors. To do so, this session formally introduces the concept of “two-level games,” a concept that students will be familiar with, even if not by name, from their dissection of the Cuban Missile Crisis case in FPA-2. First introduced by political scientist Robert Putnam, this paradigm integrates explanations across the levels of analysis, examines the linkages between international (Putnam's Level 1) and domestic (Putnam's Level 2) politics, and addresses foreign policymaking. To illustrate the two-level game concept directly and to more fully understand how these dynamics work in the “real world,” this session uses a case study of the Iran nuclear negotiations from 2009 to 2015 leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and also considers how contemporary relations between U.S.-Taiwan may fit in the two-level game model.

B. Session Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Examine “two-level games” as a foreign policy decision making framework.
 - Understand the importance of other states’ foreign policy decision making processes.
 - Apply the two-level game framework to a case study to evaluate a U.S. foreign policy decision.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is the “two-level games” framework? How does it help to explain how international and domestic political systems interact to influence U.S. national security policymaking?
2. Why is it important to understand the motivations and domestic political systems of other states when conducting foreign policy analysis?
3. How can FPA tools be adapted to better understand decisions outside the U.S. context?

4. What domestic actors were influential in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and how? What international actors/influencers were impactful, and how?
5. How does the Taiwan issue fit into the two-level game framework? Who are the influential players, both domestically and internationally?

D. Student Preparation (60 pp; ~8 min video)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper, "Domestic Politics," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 9: 284-296. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. (12 pp)
2. Video: Blankshain, Jessica D., "Two-level Games," U.S. Naval War College, 21 August 2020, (00:00 – 7:54).
3. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper, "Other Countries," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 10: 334-345, 360-367. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. (18 pp)
4. Hurst, Steven. "The Iranian Nuclear Negotiations as a Two-Level Game: The Importance of Domestic Politics." *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (2016): 545–567. (16 pp)
5. Blanchette, Jude, and Ryan Hass, "The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution is No Solution," *Foreign Affairs*, 20 December 2022. (14 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-4: UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS

A. Session Overview

Military and civilian staff organizations are essential components of the U.S. national security enterprise. These staff exist for a multitude of purposes and perform a wide range of tasks. To some degree, this makes every staff unique. However, any major staff, military or civilian, is an organization and organizations tend to follow certain patterns of behavior and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TPPs). These patterns allow the observant practitioner to anticipate potential actions and reactions in the policymaking process. For example, the very structure of the organization will affect the manner in which the staff acquires and processes information, assigns work, makes decisions, and implements policy. Over time, organizations also develop their own cultures, which in turn significantly influence their behavior. National security professionals who work on a major staff need to understand the impact of these factors in order to enhance their performance as well as limit the degree of personal frustration they might experience over organizational factors beyond their control. National security professionals who understand the impact of organizational behavior will likely find their jobs far easier to master and are far more likely to make positive contributions to their organizations and to understand the ways in which their organizational context shapes their own behavior.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify the behavioral characteristics and limitations of organizations, such as a major staff, in formulating and implementing effective policies.
 - Identify the behavioral characteristics of and competing cultures inside different types of military and civilian organizations.
 - Examine the possible cascading and reinforcing effects of organizational behavior on mission accomplishment.
 - Apply the organizational process perspective to a case study to better understand a U.S. foreign policy
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How is the organizational process perspective distinct from the unitary state perspective?
2. Every government organization—whether a department, agency, Service, or staff—develops its own culture. How do different cultures and sub-cultures impact the way in which organizations operate internally and externally? Can you think of examples in your own career of instances where organizational behavior affected decision making, processes, or practices?
3. How might national security professionals operating in the national security policy arena navigate the dynamics of organizational processes to assure mission success?
4. How does the organizational process perspective help explain/understand the 2007 Minot-Barksdale Bent Spear incident?
5. How does the organizational process perspective help explain/understand challenges related to security force assistance and building partner capacity?

D. Student Preparation (50 pp; ~13 min video)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper. "Organizational Process Perspective," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 10: 125-161. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. (34 pp)
2. Video: Blankshain, Jessica. "The Organizational Process Perspective," U.S. Naval War College, 17 August 2020, (00:00 – 12:58).
3. Grier, Peter. "Misplaced Nukes," *Air and Space Forces Magazine*, 26 June 2017. (8 pp)
4. Tecott, Rachel. "Why America Can't Build Allied Armies: Afghanistan is Just the Latest Failure," *Foreign Affairs*, 26 August 2021. (4 pp)
5. Brown, Zachery T., and Kathleen McInnis. "The Pentagon's Office Culture is Stuck in 1968," *Foreign Policy*, 25 October 2021. (4 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-5: THE PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Session Overview

As outlined in Article II of the Constitution, the President is vested with executive power and is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. While many observers argue that the Constitution created an “invitation to struggle” between Congress and the President for control of the nation’s foreign and defense policies, during the last two centuries, wars and other national emergencies have increased the power of the presidency relative to the Legislative Branch. Various technological developments, from the rise of radio and television to the advent of nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence, have also enhanced the power of the presidency, with some critics arguing that this led to the creation of an “imperial presidency.” This session examines the power of the presidency in national security affairs, addresses some of the more troubling aspects of this power of executive actions, and some of the limitations of that power using examples from recent presidential administrations.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze the Constitutional powers vested in the executive and identify the tools available in shaping and implementing foreign policy.
 - Understand the role of, and tools available to, presidents in shaping and implementing the national security agenda.
 - Analyze how the interpretation of the executive power of the President in the Constitution often leads to disagreement in and with the Legislative Branch in areas related to theater and national security.
 - Examine how an individual decision maker can be affected by their experiences, expertise, biases, heuristics, emotions, and belief systems.
 - Identify the role of risk and uncertainty in cognitive processes that impact decision making in policymaking.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What Constitutional powers are reserved for the president? What powers are not explicitly directed, and how has executive authority developed and evolved?

2. Are personal qualities important in understanding how presidents perform their duties, as the readings suggest? How might their approaches have impacted their ability to accomplish U.S. national security objectives?
3. How have presidents shaped or utilized their administrations to help them make decisions? The president's inner circle has unique access to the president. How do presidents organize and integrate advisors into policy decisions? What are common trends, and what are the outliers?
4. Presidents bring a wide variety of experiences and influences with them into the office. How do those shape their foreign policy agendas and their decision making?
5. What cognitive paradigms (reflexes, habits, intuition, synthesis, leadership traits) have presidents relied upon in the past?

D. Student Preparation (63 pp; ~17 min video)

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article II. (2 pp)
2. Video: Knott, Stephen. "NWC Talks, Presidential Power and National Security," U.S. Naval War College, 2019, (00:00 – 17:15).
3. Brattebo, Douglas M. and Tom Lansford. "The Presidency and Decision-making," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reviron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, 97–110. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. (13 pp)
4. Dickerson, John. "The Hardest Job in the World. What if the Problem Isn't the President—it's the Presidency?" *The Atlantic*, 321, no. 4 (2018): 47-63. (16 pp)
5. Gvosdev, Nikolas K., Jessica D. Blankshain and David A. Cooper. "Cognitive Perspective," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 4: 88-124. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. (32 pp)
6. Raul, Alan Charles, and Alexandra Mushka. "The U.S. Plans to 'Lead the Way' on Global AI Policy," *Lawfare*, 13 February 2024. (8 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-6: THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS, NSC, AND PALACE POLITICS

A. Session Overview

The interagency decision making process, at both the national and the theater levels, develops policy and coordinates the entire range of agencies and departments charged with U.S. national security. While interagency coordination in national security affairs occurs at the national level through the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC Staff assigned to support it or through interagency working groups, similar coordinating efforts occur at the theater level as well. Gabriel Marcella of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute observes, "The interagency decision making process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. The process also reflects the constant tension between the reality of global commitments and the constraints imposed by America's lofty values and its imperfect institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers and enshrined in the system of checks and balances." A large number of departments and agencies beyond the State and Defense Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and, as a result, are active participants in the interagency process. Even policy decisions that are primarily military can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the interagency process can help increase effectiveness as a national security professional and is essential to understanding how foreign and security policy is developed within the Executive Branch.

This session focuses directly on the NSC, how it was created, how it is generally organized, how it has changed with each president, and how it helps the president (ideally) make better, more well-informed policies and decisions. It also considers the variety of top-level officials involved in decision making, the formal/informal relationships, internal rivalries, and palace intrigue that impact policy decision making. Understanding how these individuals relate, gain access, and interact with the president can help understand the ultimate policy or decision that results. At the theater level, the session considers the interagency process designed to advise combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors. From an interagency vantage, these leaders are supported by country teams within U.S. embassies and a combatant commander staff element known as the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or JIACG.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Assess the role of the NSC and NSC Staff in facilitating the interagency process.
 - Analyze the general structure of the interagency process at the national and theater levels.
 - Assess the competing missions of the agencies participating in national security policy development.
 - Identify the challenges in promoting coordination of national security policy across the various agencies and departments of government.

- Analyze how the interagency process at both the national and theater levels work to prevent or minimize contradictions in U.S. policy.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Why is this perspective termed "palace politics," and how does it help in analyzing foreign policy decision making? What examples stand out from the readings to illustrate the palace politics approach? What are other cases where similar dynamics may be at work?
2. How has the NSC changed over time, and what has led to these changes? What issues should the NSC primarily address? How does the NSC facilitate interagency interaction, and what challenges may be brought about by the NSC?
3. Compare and contrast the different individuals selected to serve as National Security Advisors (NSA). Were there common themes across administrations?
4. What are some of the main challenges with interagency coordination at the theater-level? How might these challenges imperil national security?

D. Student Preparation (60 pp; ~20 min video)

1. Schake, Kori. "The National Security Process," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 7: 123-132. (9 pp)
2. Chollet, Derek. "The National Security Council: Is it Effective or Is it Broken?" in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud. New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 6: 111-121. (9 pp)
3. Gates, Robert M. "Chapter 5: Beyond Iraq: A Complicated World," in *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, 171-177. 2014. New York: Alfred Knopf. (6 pp)
4. Gvosdev, Nicholas, Jessica Blankshain, and David Cooper. "Palace Politics Perspective," in *Decision-Making in American Foreign Policy: Translating Theory into Practice*, Ch. 7: 192-223. 2019. New York: Cambridge University Press. (30 pp)
5. Carter, Alexander. "Improving Joint Interagency Coordination: Changing Mindsets," *NDU Press*, 1 October 2015. (6 pp)

6. Video: “The Debrief Episode 10: The Interagency and the Indo-Pacific,” National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 2 February 2024, (00:00 – 20:10).

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-7: CONGRESS' ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Session Overview

As the constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin once famously observed, the Constitution is an “invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” Although many scholars and casual observers argue that the Executive Branch dominates when it comes to national security policymaking, the Legislative Branch does have the ability to significantly influence national security policy. Article I of the Constitution grants Congress certain powers regarding national security: to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, make rules for regulating the land and naval forces, and organize the militia, calling it into federal service when necessary.

This session examines Congress' roles and responsibilities in crafting legislation dealing with national security and in providing oversight of Executive Branch departments and agencies, including the military establishment. Student preparation materials highlight the interplay between military officers and other national security professionals with elements of the Legislative Branch with the intent of lessening what Admiral William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), described as an understanding gap: “Congress does not understand the military well, and the converse is also true.” Students should also gain insight into the influence of outside actors (e.g., interest groups, lobbyists, and think tanks) on the congressional agenda. These actors will be discussed in greater detail in follow-on sessions.

One of the most visible interactions between DoD and Congress involves the annual budget. National leaders develop a strategy, determine what capabilities are required to implement its objectives, and articulate how military forces are expected to be employed in the service of national strategy. However, given that resources are not unlimited, the DoD must balance different and competing priorities and allocate available resources. In turn, both the White House—which is charged with preparing the overall budget of the federal government—and Congress—which, per the Constitution, holds the power of the purse—must assess the DoD's budget submission and come to a final resolution regarding priorities and funding. This session introduces the importance of the power of the purse while FPA-9 unpacks Congress' role in authorizing and appropriating.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze the structure of Congress and its role in passing laws, appropriating funds, and conducting oversight of the Executive Branch, as well as the processes that the Legislative Branch employs to influence policy.
 - Examine how military officers and other national security professionals interact with the Legislative Branch.
 - Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.

- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What powers does Congress have in creating, shaping, and influencing national security policies?
2. What limitations exist that prevent Congress from fully exercising its authority in the realm of national security?
3. How and why has Congress delegated its authority to the Executive Branch? How might Congress reclaim its Constitutional authority in the realm of national security?
4. How do military professionals interact with Congress, and how do these interactions impact national security?

D. Student Preparation (68 pp; ~44 min of video/podcast)

1. The Constitution of the United States, Article I. (4 pp)
2. Serafino, Nina M., and Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou. "Congress and National Security," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 9: 151-182. (27 pp)
3. Video: "The Debrief Episode 4: Congress: Your Partner in National Security," National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 9 November 2023, (00:00 – 18:09).
4. Podcast: "How is Congress Involved in Foreign Policy (with Jordan Tama)," *The American Enterprise Institute: Understanding Congress Podcast*, Episode 39, 2 October 2023, (00:00 – 26:40).
5. Tama, Jordan. "The Surprising Bipartisanship of U.S. Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, 6 July 2023. (8 pp)
6. U.S Naval War College Faculty. "Congress and the Creation of USSOCOM," faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, May 2013, 1-13. (11 pp)
7. Guenov, Tressa, and Tommy Ross. "At a Crossroads, Part I: How Congress Can Find Its Way Back to Effective Defense Oversight." *War on the Rocks*, 9 March 2018. (10 pp)
8. Murphy, Chris. "National Security is Stronger When Congress is Involved. Here's How We Get Back to the Table." *War on the Rocks*, 20 July 2021. (5 pp)

9. Beavers, Elizabeth. "Congress Needs to Do More than Just Exercise Its War Powers." *War on the Rocks*, 19 March 2024. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-8: CASE STUDY: INTERVENTION IN BEIRUT (1982-1983)

A. Session Overview

The Reagan administration's decision to deploy Marines in response to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s is an example of decision making in a highly complex international environment. This decision was influenced by a range of domestic U.S. factors, front-line military and diplomatic organizations, and Congress, as well as the interpersonal dynamics that shaped the first term of the Reagan presidency. This case study has enduring relevance in the study of foreign policy and helps illustrate how the concepts used in FPA highlight the spectrum of influences at work in President Reagan's decision making process. Case studies such as this offer the opportunity to appreciate the full breadth of the policy environment and gain a better understanding of how and why decisions are made.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze and explain the influential factors in a complex national security case.
 - Analyze the domestic and international influences on both senior policymakers and national security organizations in the assessment and prioritization of national security threats and challenges.
 - Analyze how Congress works with the Executive Branch, especially the Department of Defense, to establish effective national security policies, institutions, and processes.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Based on the information in the case study and video, what were the international and domestic factors that influenced the President's initial decision to deploy Marines in Lebanon to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters from Beirut? Which would you identify as most influential on policy decision makers?
2. How did the deliberations and arguments change in the debate over returning the Marines to Beirut in the wake of the massacres at Sabra and Shatila?

3. How accurately did decision makers in Washington perceive the influences—both domestic and international—that ultimately had an impact in determining the success of their policy?
4. What role did Congress play in exercising oversight of the Executive Branch? Was it in line with their Constitutional authority? Was their oversight sufficient? Why or why not?
5. National security professionals must consider political, social, military, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors. What are the necessary and relevant factors when making strategic and operational recommendations?

D. Student Preparation (25 pp; ~55 min video)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Case Study: Lebanon Revisited,” in *Navigating the Theater Security Enterprise*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2017, Ch.10: 219-246. (25 pp)
2. Video: “Retreat from Beirut,” *Frontline*, 26 February 1985, (00:00 – 54:35).

E. Student Deliverables

Prior to the start of FPA-7 in Week 18, students are required to successfully complete FA-4 addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-9: FUNDING FOREIGN POLICY: AUTHORIZING, APPROPRIATING, AND DOD RELATIONS

A. Session Overview

As Kay King, former Vice President of the Washington Program at the Council on Foreign Relations noted in a 2010 report, “When Congress fails to perform, national security suffers, thanks to ill-considered policies, delayed or inadequate resources, and insufficient personnel. Without Congressional guidance, allies and adversaries alike devalue U.S. policies because they lack the support of the American people that is provided through their representatives in Congress.”

Earlier sessions have illustrated the importance of Congress in the realm of national security, highlighting friction between the Legislative and Executive Branches. This session continues that conversation by focusing on two essential questions: how do policy-makers decide what and how much to spend on defense, and what role(s) does Congress play in these decisions? Decisions on defense spending result from interactive Executive and Legislative Branch decision making systems and processes. This session will outline the national security decision making processes and dynamics that result in annual defense bills and address their long-term, strategic implications for national defense in an era of strategic change.

Force planners cannot ignore the impact that strategy, resources, and domestic politics play in meeting the needs of our nation’s warfighters, the combatant commands, and the Joint forces they employ in support of our national interests. Budgetary constraints and political influences result in planning and programming decisions that have associated risks to mission execution within both the current and future security environment. Congress is not only empowered with the ‘power of the purse’ but also congressional oversight on the annual defense budget process. DoD leaders interact with those committees regularly and are often required to provide testimony and reports on requested resources. Taken together, this session provides an introduction and overview of that interaction.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the role of Congress in the annual defense budgetary process.
 - Understand the policy decision making and lawmaking systems and processes that drive U.S. defense spending.
 - Consider a variety of policy factors that impact defense spending decisions, both internal to the DoD and from external actors, interests, and influences.
 - Analyze the trade-offs that are often involved in defense spending decisions and consider how these trade-offs might impact long-term force planning.
 - Identify the oversight role of congressional committees and sub-committees, particularly those involved in the annual congressional defense budget process.

- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Why is the budget cycle designed the way it is? Is it effective (why or why not)? What is the impact of time on the budget cycle, and is there any way to shorten the multi-year process?
2. How do the Services and combatant commands communicate with Congress? How does this impact defense authorizations and appropriations?
3. Why do you suppose that members of Congress – including members of the President’s party – tend to substantially increase the administration’s defense budget requests?
4. What are the challenges with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process? What, if anything, can be done to address these challenges?

D. Student Preparation (64 pp; ~2:30 min video)

1. Congressional Research Service. “Defense Primer: The National Defense Authorization Act Process,” and “Defense Primer: Defense Appropriations Process,” with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty, April 2020. (10 pp)
2. Video: “Congressional Appropriations Process.” *University of Maryland, School of Public Policy*, 18 September, 2020, (00:00 – 2:33).
3. Brose, Christian. “Bureaucracy Does its Thing,” in *The Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of High Tech Warfare*, 206–224. New York: Hachette Books, 2020. (20 pp)
4. Zielinski, Rosella Cappella, and Samuel Gerstle. “Paying the Defense Bill: Financing American and Chinese Geostrategic Competition,” *Texas National Security Review*, 6, no. 2, 2023, 57-78. (19 pp)
5. Sharp, Travis. “Chapter 2: Hardwired for Hardware: Congressional Adjustments to the Administration’s Defense Budget Requests, FY 2016 to FY 2023,” *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis*, 2023, 11-33. (15 pp)
6. SCAN: “Defense Resourcing for the Future. Final Report from the Commission on PPBE Reform.” *Commission on PPBE Reform*, March 2024, 1-11. (10 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-10: THE REALITIES OF FORCE PLANNING: THE PENTAGON, JCS, AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

A. Session Overview

This session focuses on the DoD and how it influences policymaking at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels. It also examines the role that the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and combatant commanders play in decision making, reflects on how the military has changed over time, and identifies the roles the Services play in influencing or executing policy. Critically, this session also examines the important role of combatant commanders in the force planning construct and assesses the realities of force planning in a resource-constrained environment.

Combatant commanders execute missions and tasks assigned by Title 10 of the U.S. Code and guidance as outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). In performing these missions, they provide a key interface between national strategy, U.S. policy, and the current operational environment. This session builds upon concepts from FPA-9 and examines how each of the combatant commanders is empowered to influence force-planning processes and the warfighting capabilities they need. The session also considers the relationship between the combatant commander and Congress within the force planning process and in expressing Joint Force requirements.

Despite shifts in global power, the return to strategic competition, and contemporary challenges to national security, the United States remains the preeminent global military power, making the DoD front and center in foreign policy. Combatant commanders continue to wield extensive power in their regions and are responsible for activities far beyond warfighting.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the structure, hierarchy, and functions of the Defense Department and subordinate organizations in U.S. national and theater security decision making and policy processes.
 - Understand the role that DoD components play in developing and implementing national defense and military policy.
 - Examine how various defense establishment components sometimes arrive at different conclusions during foreign policy deliberations.
 - Comprehend the role of the combat commanders in force planning and their role in identifying resource needs.
 - Consider the opportunities and challenges of force planning that impact the combatant commanders.

- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-4: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does the DoD structure affect the formulation of defense policy? How does DoD culture differ from other agencies?
2. How do individual Service cultures affect policy formation at the JCS level?
3. Where are the friction points among the Secretary of Defense, JCS, combatant commanders, and Service Secretaries?
4. What are the DoD's bureaucratic interests, and how does the organization protect those interests in the political bargaining and compromise at the executive level?
5. What are the cascading effects on the DoD from internal changes or surprising events around the globe that have strategic impact? How do decisions at the Joint Staff level impact combatant commands?
6. How has the DoD changed over time, why, and what implications are these changes likely to have in the future?

D. Student Preparation (80 pp)

1. McInnis, Kathleen J. "Defense Primer: The Department of Defense," *Congressional Research Service*, updated 8 November 2022. (2 pp)
2. Pratt, Michael W. "The Unified Command Plan," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, January 2021. Revised Summer 2024. (10 pp)
3. McMillan, Joseph and Franklin C. Miller. "The Office of the Secretary of Defense," in *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, edited by Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2nd edition, 2017, Ch. 6: 120-135. (14 pp)
4. O'Hanlon, Michael E. "Defense Budgeting and Resource Allocation." In *Defense 101: Understanding the Military of Today and Tomorrow*. Ithaca [New York]: Cornell University Press, 2021. (Read only: Chapter Introduction 44-46; "The Big Picture: Broad Definitions and Processes," 46-52; "Breakdowns of the U.S. Department of Defense Budget," 52-55; "The Acquisitions Budget," 56-58; and "Conclusion: Defense Budgeting and Grand Strategy," 81-84). (15 pp)

5. Rumsfeld, Donald. "Memorandum for Combatant Commanders. Subject: Integrated Priority Lists," 31 August 2004, with additional commentary by Naval War College faculty. Revised for the College of Distance Education, April 2020. (6 pp)
6. Naval War College Faculty. "Combatant Commanders' Role in Force Planning," Faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2015. Revised for the College of Distance Education, April 2020. (10 pp)
7. Sapien, Joaquin. "The Inside Story of How the Navy Spent Billions on the "Little Crappy Ship," *ProPublica*, 7 September 2023. (18 pp)
8. Lipton, Eric. "Faced With Evolving Threats, U.S. Navy Struggles to Change," *The New York Times*, 4 September 2023. (5 pp)
9. (Review from IS-10) Eaglen, Mackenzie, "Putting Combatant Commands on a Demand Signal Diet," *War on the Rocks*, 9 November 2020. (6 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-11: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. Session Overview

Civil-military relations is the study of the relationships among the military, the civilian government, and the civilian population. In FPA, analysts are particularly concerned with how interactions between civilian policymakers and military officers influence policy formation and implementation, as well as how the public's perception of the military might affect the viability of various policy options. This session provides an opportunity to reflect on the status of U.S. civil-military relations, as well as how the actions of military officers, politicians, civil servants, and citizens shape these key relationships.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the relationships among the U.S. military, American society at large, and the nation's civilian leadership.
 - Define civilian control of the military and why it is important in a democratic society.
 - Analyze the factors that affect U.S. senior military and civilian leadership's perspectives on force planning and the use of force and how this can influence foreign policy.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is the role of the military in a democracy?
2. What does it mean for civilians to control the military? Is military professionalism sufficient to ensure civilian control, or are "external" control methods also necessary?
3. What role does military advice play in policy-making? What are the sources of civil-military friction in policy-making?
4. Do members of the military view themselves as superior to civilian policymakers? Is it a problem if they do? What policy or other changes might alter this perception?

5. Are civilians responsible for understanding the military? What are the consequences if they do or do not?
6. What are the key challenges for contemporary U.S. civil-military relations?

D. Student Preparation (60 pp; ~29 min of video)

1. “To Support and Defend: Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations,” *War on the Rocks*, 6 September 2022. (5 pp).
2. Davidson, Janine, “The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision-making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2013): 129 – 45. (16 pp)
3. Video: “The Role of the Military in a Democracy,” *George Washington’s Mount Vernon*, November 10, 2023, (00:00 – 17:54 and 41:40 – 52:55).
4. Karlin, Mara E. “The Military’s Relationship with Its Overseers: The Crisis of Meaningful Civilian Control,” in *The Inheritance*, Ch. 4: 49-80. United States: Brookings Institution Press, 2021. (30 pp)
5. Schmidt, Tood. “Civilian Control of the Military: A Useful Fiction?” *Military Review*, January-February 2023. (5 pp)
6. Crosbie, Thomas, and Anders Klitmoller. “Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military in Politics.” *Real Clear Defense*, 20 December 2023. (4 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-12: CASE STUDY: DECIDING THE IRAQ WAR (2003)

A. Session Overview

On March 20, 2003, a United States-led coalition launched the invasion of Iraq, an initiative that ultimately led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government. This session examines the events, dynamics, procedures, and perspectives that played a role in what was arguably the most consequential U.S. military initiative of the post-Cold War era. Students will be offered an opportunity to assess the extent to which Iraqi actions and misperceptions may have contributed to the likelihood of war. U.S. perceptions played a role as well. Congressional dynamics included legislators who offered reservations but ultimately authorized the use of military force (AUMF). Former Senior Intelligence Officer Paul Pillar stated, "9/11 made it politically possible for the first time to persuade the American people to break a tradition of not launching offensive wars."

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze and explain the influential factors in a complex national security case.
 - Comprehend the range of factors that led to the decision to invade Iraq militarily.
 - Assess the role of perceptions, calculations, ethics, and beliefs in the processes that led to this decision.
 - Examine the role of the U.S. Congress in authorizing the conflict.
 - Analyze both the American and Iraqi perspectives on the unfolding diplomatic, and ultimately military, confrontation.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What motivated the United States to take offensive action against Iraq? What are the factors and events that drove this decision? Was there dissent?
2. What Iraqi actions, both in the years prior and in the weeks and months immediately preceding the invasion, played a role in the decision process?

3. What were the U.S. assumptions and beliefs that motivated this decision? Was the decision the product of a rational process? Did cognitive factors impact the development of the policy of confronting Saddam Hussein?
4. How did the broader Bush Administration approach the threat from Iraq? Were certain individuals more influential? How was influence exercised?
5. George W. Bush stated that he "had tried to address the threat from Saddam Hussein without war." Was the war in Iraq something that could have been avoided?

D. Student Preparation (74 pp)

1. Stieb, Joseph. *The Regime Change Consensus: Iraq in American Politics, 1990-2003*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021: 189-247 (Read only: "Bush's Case for War" 192–214). (22 pp)
2. Woods, Kevin, James Lacey, and Williamson Murray. "Saddam's Delusions: A View from the Inside," *Foreign Affairs*, 85, no. 3, 2006, 2-26. (23 pp)
3. Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010, 223-253. (29 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-13: DIPLOMACY: THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT

A. Session Overview

Diplomacy is the foremost instrument of statecraft to manage foreign relations, minimize external threats, defuse regional crises, and advance U.S. security and prosperity in the global arena. Put simply, diplomacy may be thought of as the art of managing interactions with friends and foes alike to find common ground and advance national interests. Diplomatic success is often measured by crises resolved or conflicts avoided, while diplomatic failures can lead to war or loss of influence. Diplomats represent U.S. citizens and the president in remote outposts, warzones, and bustling capitals, building enduring relationships that allow the U.S. to manage global challenges, provide unique understanding and insights to policymakers on emerging threats and opportunities, and protect American citizens abroad. This session will identify and analyze the key players, processes, and dynamics involved in using diplomacy as an instrument of national power and the influence that diplomatic tools and institutions can have on U.S. foreign policy decision making.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand how the Department of State (DoS), through its embassies and consulates, conducts foreign policy overseas.
 - Understand the nature, conduct, and challenges of diplomacy.
 - Explore the various actors involved in diplomacy, and how they might approach diplomacy differently.
 - Analyze the potential advantages of diplomatic interaction, as well as the challenges and obstacles that can thwart diplomatic initiatives.
 - Examine a case of successful diplomacy.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is a country team, and how does it function? What challenges do country teams face in competing with strategic rivals? How do combatant commanders work with and through country teams?

2. In a world full of organizations and bureaucracies, what examples can you identify where one-on-one diplomacy made a difference?
3. Is diplomacy the United States' biggest weakness, as the student preparation materials suggest? If so, how? If not, what is, and why?
4. Where and in what ways has diplomacy been influential and/or successful in U.S. foreign policy?

D. Student Preparation (63 pp; ~35 min of video)

1. Cloud, John A. and Damian Leader, "Diplomacy, the State Department, and National Security," in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 10: 185-195. (8 pp)
2. Video: "The Debrief: Diplomacy and the State Department." National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 9 November 2023, (00:00 – 29:00).
3. Hutchings, Robert. "American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War in Europe," in *Foreign Policy Breakthroughs: Cases in Successful Diplomacy*, edited by Robert Hutchings and Jeremi Suri, 148-172. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015. (20 pp)
4. Toosi, Nahal. "Frustrated and Powerless: In Fight with China for Global Influence, Diplomacy is America's Biggest Weakness," *Politico*, 22 October 2022. (15 pp)
5. Murray, Shoon and Anthony Quainton. "Combatant Commanders, Ambassadorial Authority, and the Conduct of Diplomacy," in *Mission Creep: The Militarization of Foreign Policy*, edited by Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, 166–191. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014. (20 pp)
6. Video: "This is the Defense Attaché Service," *Defense Intelligence Agency*, 1 June 2023, (00:00 – 06:44).

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-14: ECONOMICS: INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POWER AND WARFARE

A. Session Overview

The United States is a world leader in large measure through its ability to project enormous economic power and influence beyond its borders. Crafting economic policy as a critical component of foreign policy is a complex, interdisciplinary effort involving the Executive and Legislative Branches of government, a variety of monetary and financial institutions with global reach, and the indisputable role of the private sector. This session examines the agents of economic power and the range of foreign policy tools available, including coercive tools such as quotas, tariffs, sanctions, and export controls, along with positive incentives such as trade, security assistance, and economic development. It poses the questions: How is the economic instrument of national power used generally, and how can economic tools best be used to pursue and influence foreign policy and national security goals?

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify and differentiate the multiple actors involved in economic statecraft.
 - Distinguish the primary tools of economic statecraft and analyze them in deterrent, coercive, and friendly scenarios.
 - Evaluate the limitations of economic statecraft – where it is most likely to succeed and where it frequently fails.
 - Explore the role of the interagency process in foreign economic policymaking.
 - Consider the challenges and trade-offs the United States faces when confronted with the dilemma of protecting national security but also retaining its lead in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other cutting-edge technologies.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is the purpose of economic statecraft, and what is the track record of its success in the United States? What are the obstacles and limitations?
2. What considerations should policymakers give to the use of coercive economic tools, and what are the domestic costs?

3. How does the United States use economic “carrots” such as trade, loans, and economic assistance, and how effective have these tools been?
4. How have economic tools been used to make war more difficult for strategic competitors?

D. Student Preparation (63 pp; ~8 min podcast)

1. Cloud, John and Nikolas Gvosdev. “How U.S. Economic Policymaking is Distinct from its National Security Counterpart,” in *A Policy Analysis Reader*, National Security Affairs Department, U.S. Naval War College, 2018. Revised by Professor Andrea Cameron, 2024. (16 pp)
2. Harris, Jennifer, and Robert Kahn. “Understanding and Improving U.S. Financial Sanctions,” in *The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security*, edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John Cloud, New York: NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, Ch. 12: 229-248. (14 pp)
3. Barry Eichengreen. “What Money Can’t Buy: The Limits of Economic Power,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2022. (9 pp)
4. Podcast: “Sec. Gina Raimondo on the Role of Commerce in Supporting National Security.” *NPR – All Things Considered*, 1 December 2023. (8 min)
5. Allen, Edward. “Why the U.S. Trade Office No Longer Runs Trade.” *Foreign Policy*, 7 March 2023. (4 pp)
6. Brown, Chad. “The Return of Export Controls,” *Foreign Affairs*, 24 January 2023. (5 pp)
7. Mackinnon, Amy. “Russia’s War Machine Runs on Western Parts,” *Foreign Policy*, 22 February 2024. (9 pp)
8. Miscik, Jami, Peter Orszag, and Theodore Bunzel. “Geopolitics in the C-Suite.” *Foreign Affairs*, 11 March 2024. (6 pp).

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-15: INFORMATION: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE

A. Session Overview

This session identifies and analyzes the key players, processes, and dynamics involved in using the informational instrument of national power. It focuses particularly on concepts of strategic communication/narrative, the collection and processing of intelligence, how emerging technologies and private sector actors can and have affected the strategic use of information, and how adversaries are competing with their own (mis/dis) information. This session builds on an understanding of the Executive Branch and the domestic political system and encourages forward-looking application of FPA course concepts.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the importance of strategic narrative/communication and how “shaping the narrative” is an important instrument of national power.
 - Evaluate how emerging tech and open-source information can shape the intelligence process.
 - Assess the United States government’s use of information through various cases.
 - Consider if/how intelligence can influence policy decision makers.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the fora for U.S. national security decision makers to coordinate on strategic messaging? What obstacles does such coordination face?
2. What are the challenges and opportunities for the U.S. government in using information in a networked world both as intelligence and as a messaging tool/narrative?
3. Does the U.S. government’s use of information differ from that of authoritarian governments? How? Why?
4. Do authoritarian regimes have advantages in strategic messaging? If so, how could this influence U.S. foreign policy decision making?

D. Student Preparation (62 pp; ~5 min video)

1. Simpson, Emile. "Strategic Narrative," in *War from The Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics*, 179–185. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. (6 pp)
2. Video: "Behind the Scenes of the President's Daily Brief," *Office of the Director of National Intelligence*, 26 July, 2023, (00:00 – 05:21).
3. Zegart, Amy. "Open Secrets: Ukraine and the Next Intelligence Revolution." *Foreign Affairs*, 20 September 2022. (10 pp)
4. Calabresi, Massimo. "Inside the White House Program to Share America's Secrets," *Time*, 29 February 2024. (14 pp)
5. Lin-Greenberg, Erik and Theo Milonopoulos. "Boots on the Ground, Eyes in the Sky: How Commercial Satellites Are Upending Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, 30 May 2022. (4 pp)
6. Marrin, Stephen. "Why Strategic Intelligence Analysis Has Limited Influence on American Foreign Policy." *Intelligence and National Security* 32, no. 6 (2017): 725–42. (13 pp)
7. Gates, Robert. "Opinion: The U.S. Needs to Relearn How to Tell Its Story to the World." *Washington Post*, 16 April 2023. (2 pp)
8. Stradner, Ivana and Anthony Ruggiero. "America is Still Losing the Information War." *Foreign Policy*, 10 March 2023. (5 pp).
9. Goldenziel, Jill and Daniel Grant. "Information Resilience: Countering Disinformation and Its Threat to the U.S. Alliance System." *War on the Rocks*, 15 November 2023. (8 pp)
10. "Fact Sheet: How the People's Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment." *Global Engagement Center, U.S. Department of State*, 28 September 2023. (2 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-16: LOBBYISTS, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THINK TANKS

A. Session Overview

This session provides additional information on and insights into the often-obscure world of foreign policy and national security think tanks, lobbyists, and consultants. This networked community of non-governmental actors has grown significantly in size, scope, and influence over the past half-century and is being replicated in various foreign capitals. National security professionals should understand what types of power and influence these non-governmental actors possess, how they access decision makers, how they seek to influence lawmakers and policymakers, and ultimately, what influence this can have on policy decisions.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify the missions and roles of think tanks, lobbyists, and consultants in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
 - Comprehend how these institutions (and individuals) function, why they function the way(s) they do, what stakes and interests they have in policy decision making processes, what influence they might or might not have on decisions, and the implications for policymakers.
 - Assess the potential influence of think tanks, lobbyists, and other non-state actors or non-governmental organizations in the formation of policy.
 - Assess how and why both domestic U.S. actors and non-U.S. interests (including other governments) might seek to lobby the U.S. government.
 - Develop the ability to critically assess the sources of support, information, analysis, and products these institutions use and generate, as well as the networks they employ to try to influence policy decisions.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Consider the argument, “most people...come to the subject [of interest groups and lobbying] predisposed to disliking them.” Do you agree? Why/Why not? Where does this disposition come from?

2. Why are special interest and lobby groups formed? How and why do they express their policy preferences, and to what extent do they influence the policy decision making process?
3. What are think tanks, why do they exist, and what, if anything, makes them influential? What impact might they have on national security affairs, particularly at the theater level?
4. What are the arguments, if any, for including lobbyists in the legislative process?
5. How do foreign policy-oriented think tanks compete for space in the realm of ideas, and how can they influence U.S. policymakers?

D. Student Preparation (57 pp; ~13 min video)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. “Deploying Influence and Expertise: Think Tanks, Interest Groups and Lobbyists in the Theater Security Enterprise,” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, 2012. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Spring 2023. (28 pp)
2. Video: “How the Pentagon falls victim to price gouging by military contractors,” *CBS News: 60 Minutes*, 21 May 2023, (00:00 – 13:25).
3. Levinson, Chad. “Think Tanks and American Interventionism,” *War on the Rocks*, 24 November 2021. (9 pp)
4. Whitlock, Craig and Nate Jones. “Retired U.S. Generals, Admirals Take Top Jobs with Saudi Crown Prince,” *The Washington Post*, 18 October 2022. (13 pp)
5. Huang, Reyko. “Armed Rebel Groups Lobby in DC, Just Like Governments. How Does that Influence U.S. Policy?” *The Washington Post*, 6 February 2020. (3 pp)
6. Freeman, Ben. “The Ukraine Lobby Two Years Into War,” *Responsible Statecraft*, 22 February 2024. (4 pp)
7. Optional Video: “Interview with Professor Nickolas Gvosdev on Influencing Defense Policy: The Role of Think Tanks, Lobbyists, and Interest Groups in National Security,” U.S. Naval War College, Spring 2023, (00:00 – 39:00).

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-17: THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

A. Session Overview

This session will focus on the impact of the media and public opinion on the national security environment. Former National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Colin Powell observed that while the media cannot create policy, “it does create the environment in which the policy is made.” The media can support or undermine the messages being sent out by governments and militaries, substantiate or challenge their claims, and enhance or tear down their credibility. Media influence can affect public opinion, international opinion, and elite opinion and can, in turn, constrain and embolden U.S. policymakers.

Modern media technology has created new opportunities for public opinion to shape policy debates, often in short order. At the same time, the American public is often inattentive to national security issues, allowing presidents something close to a free hand. This session provides an opportunity to explore the role played by public opinion and how public opinion can be shaped.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Critically assess the role of the media in influencing policy and legislative decisions in the defense and national security realms.
 - Comprehend how various media institutions and outlets function, what stakes and interests they have in policy decisions, and what impact they might or might not have on decisions.
 - Examine how media coverage affects national security decision making.
 - Analyze the motivations and consequences of leaking on national security.
 - Analyze the role of public opinion in democratic policy-making and what influences can affect it.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How would you characterize the relationship between the U.S. military and American news media outlets?
2. How does the media influence public opinion and vice versa? How do both public opinion and the media influence decision makers? Does "the media" constitute an interest group with an independent agenda?
3. How does public opinion constrain foreign policy decision making? How responsive should national security leaders be to public opinion? Why does the U.S. military care about its public image?
4. Why is the U.S. military so trusted compared to other public institutions? What are the implications of that trust -- are there potential downsides (for the military or the nation)?
5. Think about today's media ecosystem. How does the political fragmentation and polarization of news sources and the rise of social media as a main information source for many people in the U.S., affect foreign policy making? What new challenge for national security might it pose?

D. Student Preparation (47 pp; ~32 min podcast)

1. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "Woodward's Dilemma: Leaking, Spinning and Reporting the News," Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, 2013, 1-10. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2024. (9 pp)
2. Faulkner, Christopher. "Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, Newport, RI, March 2023. (9 pp)
3. Aday, Sean. "The U.S. Media, Foreign Policy, and Public Support for War," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, edited by Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 2018, Ch. 23: 315-326. (10 pp)
4. Baum, Matthew, and Phillip Potter. "Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy in the Age of Social Media." *The Journal of Politics*, 81 no. 2, (2019): 747-756. (Read only sections: "The World as it Was," 748-749; "What Has Changed?" 749-751; "Conclusion," 755). (4 pp).
5. Philbrick, Ian Prasad. "If Biden Wanted to Ease U.S.-China Tensions, Would Americans Let Him?" *The New York Times*, 27 June 2023. (2 pp)
6. Cohen, Raphael, et al. "Combatting Foreign Disinformation on Social Media." *RAND*, 2021. Read only: "Summary" (ix-xii). (3 pp)
7. Walcott, John. "Why the Press Failed on Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, 29 March 2023. (10 pp)

8. Podcast: “Foreign Policy Versus Public Opinion.” *A Better Peace: The War Room Podcast*, U.S. Army War College, 19 January 2024, (00:00 – 32:21).

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-18: STATES AND NON-STATE ACTORS

A. Session Overview

This session is the first of three sessions within *Division III: International Influences on National Security Policy*. Division III sessions examine the forces in the global community that affect the decision making process and the development of policy. The international system is an increasingly complex environment as discussed throughout the IS sessions. The dynamic nature of the international security environment means that both military and national security professionals are facing a continued and growing demand for knowledge and, with it, are increasingly in positions where they are tasked with unpacking the complexities of the system. While states are still considered the principal actors in the modern international system, other impactful actors yield significant influence in the policy development and decision making process. Non-state actors like armed resistance groups (e.g., ISIS, Hamas) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., Human Rights Watch, SpaceX), to name a few, are just some of the important actors that can influence policy options and decisions.

The nature, goals, and actions of these actors and elements can have substantial implications for U.S. national security and defense-related policy. Professionals who understand the nature and impact of these global actors and concepts, including the dynamic and complex web of the international system, can contribute more effectively to Joint military policy development and execution.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Explain the nature of the modern international system and the distinction between sovereign states and nations and why an appreciation of those distinctions is relevant to mid-career national security professionals.
 - Understand current trends reinforcing or weakening state sovereignty.
 - Identify the range of non-state actors (MNCs, violent extremist organizations, transnational criminal organizations, NGOs, and foundations) that can affect national security and defense policies.
 - Assess how non-state actors reinforce or weaken the sovereignty of states.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Why or why aren't states still the primary actors in the modern international system? How has this changed over time, if at all?
2. How do different types of states (i.e., weak, strong, autocratic, democratic) impact U.S. foreign policy decision making?
3. How do non-state actors, particularly non-state armed groups, impact U.S. policy decision makers? How has past experience in addressing various non-state armed groups influenced our future policy debates?
4. In what ways do super-empowered individuals influence national security decision makers and the policymaking process?

D. Student Preparation (51 pp; 23 min of video/podcast)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Global Influences on Policy Decision-Making: States and Non-State Actors," Faculty Paper, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, Newport, RI, 2020. Revised by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2024. (10 pp)
2. Bajoghli, Narges and Vali Nasr. "How the War in Gaza Revived the Axis of Resistance." *Foreign Affairs*, 17 January 2024. (9 pp)
3. Video: "Inside Look at U.S. Navy Response to Houthi Red Sea Attacks." *CBS News: 60 Minutes*, 18 February 2018, (00:00 – 13:09).
4. Walt, Stephen. "The United States Has Less Leverage Over Israel Than You Think." *Foreign Policy*, 21 March 2024. (3 pp)
5. Hudson, John. "Ukraine's Attacks on Russian Oil Refineries Deepen Tensions with U.S." *The Washington Post*, 15 April 2024. (3 pp)
6. O'Donnell, Lynne. "Al Qaeda is Back – and Thriving – In Afghanistan." *Foreign Policy*, 22 March 2024. (4 pp)
7. Clarke, Colin. "The Islamic State Never Went Away." *Foreign Policy*, 10 April 2024. (4 pp)
8. Decker, Audrey. "The Pentagon is Increasingly Relying on Billionaires' Rockets. And It's Ok with That," *Defense One*, 20 April 2023. (2 pp)
9. Satariano, Adam, Scott Reinhard, Cade Metz, Sheera Frenkel, and Malika Khurana. "Elon Musk's Unmatched Power in the Stars," *New York Times*, 28 July 2023. (10 pp)
10. Podcast: "How Musk's Starlink Became a Security Liability for the U.S.," *Marketplace Tech*, 14 September 2023. (10 min)

11. Powers-Riggs, Aidan. "Taipei Fears Washington is Weakening Its Silicon Shield," *Foreign Policy*, 17 February 2023. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-19: INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: INSTITUTIONS AND ALLIANCES

A. Session Overview

As defined by Harvard Law School, Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are entities “created by treaty, involving two or more nations, to work in good faith, on issues of common interest. In the absence of a treaty an IGO does not exist in the legal sense.” IGOs have become increasingly visible – and arguably more important – actors in international politics. The nature, goals, and actions of these entities can have substantial implications for U.S. national security and defense-related policy.

This session focuses specifically on the role and influence of international organizations and alliances on U.S. foreign policy decision making, considering the way such institutions can shape global norms, facilitate multilateral agreements, serve as platforms for information exchange and policy coordination, and/or constrain decision makers. Through participation in various IGOs, the United States often aims to set and influence international norms/trends, gain insights and perspectives from allies and adversaries, adjust policies to align with global standards, and leverage resources and expertise that these organizations can provide. Engagement in IGOs can also influence the United States in other ways, increasing the ability of the United States to exercise soft power and diplomacy, build alliances, and advocate for its vital interests on the global stage. Pressure from IGOs and their accountability mechanisms can also influence U.S. foreign policy decision making by encouraging compliance with international norms and agreements. Overall, IGOs can serve as crucial arenas that shape the direction of U.S. foreign policy through dialogue, competition, cooperation, and collective action with other member states.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the role and significance of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like NATO or the UN, in the international system.
 - Identify key IGOs relevant to U.S. foreign policy and their respective areas of influence.
 - Consider how participation in IGOs shapes U.S. foreign policy priorities, strategies, and decision making processes.
 - Evaluate the benefits and challenges of multilateralism in the context of U.S. foreign policy, considering IGO engagement.
 - Explore case studies illustrating how IGOs have influenced specific U.S. foreign policy decisions or initiatives.
 - Reflect on the role of IGOs in shaping global governance and the implications for U.S. leadership and influence. Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs)

- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How do various international institutions (i.e., the UN or WHO) influence policy decision makers, if at all?
2. How might distinct intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) shape and influence U.S. foreign policy priorities and strategies?
3. What are the benefits and challenges of engaging with IGOs in advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives? What are the consequences if/when the United States does not work through IGOs?
4. Consider U.S. alliances, both formal and informal. How do these security relationships influence national security decision making and policy? How might an analyst know?

D. Student Preparation (62 pp; ~13 min video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Global Influences on Policy Decision-Making: States and Non-State Actors,” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, June 2020. Revised by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2024. (10 pp)
2. Raustiala, Kal and Viva Iemanja Jeromnim. “Why the UN Still Matters,” *Foreign Affairs*, 7 June 2023. (9 pp.)
3. Brands, Hal and Peter D. Fever. “What are America’s Alliances Good For?” *Parameters*, 47, no. 2, 2017, 15-30. (15 pp)
4. Radin, Andrew. “Reconsidering U.S. Decision-making Within NATO After the Fall of Kabul,” *War on the Rocks*, 25 October 2021. (8 pp).
5. Video: “National Security Leaders Worry About U.S. Failure to Ratify Law of Sea Treaty,” *CBS News: 60 Minutes*, 24 March 2024, (00:00 – 13:02).
6. Lu, Christina. “Washington Wants in on the Deep-Sea Mining Game,” *Foreign Policy*. 29 March 2024. (3 pp)
7. Cohen, Jared and Ian Bremmer. “The Global Credibility Gap,” *Foreign Affairs*, 6 December 2023. (17 pp)

8. SCAN: “The United Nations System: Frequently Asked Questions,” *Congressional Research Service*, 22 September 2023. (Read only: “Summary”; 1-3; 8-10; 15-18). (9 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-20: SOURCES OF INFLUENCE: CULTURE, RELIGION, AND IDEOLOGY

A. Session Overview

Culture might be thought of as the portion of human behavior that is learned rather than innate. This can include conscious belief systems, such as ideologies, religions, or customs. Culture can also play an important role in political legitimacy, encouraging deference to political authority, helping forge societal consensus around the role and purpose of politics, and fostering homogeneity. Various components of culture can be powerful drivers of human behavior. These include ideology—an intellectual “blueprint” as to how society should best be ordered; nationalism—the belief that a people or nation have a right to self-determination (i.e., their governance structure, either in their own territory or with significant autonomy within another state’s territory); and religion—a set of beliefs about the nature of reality that includes some concept of the spiritual/supernatural world and humans’ relationship with that world.

In this session, the focus is on how these elements work to legitimize or de-legitimize policy and how they can either lead to conflict or decrease its possibility. Of note, this session includes a case study on U.S. foreign policy in post-2003 Iraq which emphasizes the importance of ideological, cultural, and religious understanding and the subsequent implications within a theater security context.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Examine how ideology, religion, and culture motivate people to act, particularly those in policy-making positions.
 - Understand and assess where and under what conditions religion emerges as a source of legitimacy for policy.
 - Understand ways in which a national security professional needs to consider religion, ideology, nationalism, and culture as factors in planning and executing policies, particularly the impact on the success or failure of operations.
 - Analyze and explain the influential factors in a complex national security case.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How are culture, ideology, religion, and nationalism relevant for a national security professional to consider in setting and executing policy?
2. Has the U.S. effectively understood and responded to the cultures of countries in which it has operated such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.? How might culture matter for future foreign policy challenges, if at all?
3. In what ways does religion impact foreign policy decision making? Do domestic debates over religion and nationalism influence policymakers?
4. Why did the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) persist in its showdown with Sistani? What lessons can be learned from this experience in Iraq that could translate to other theaters?

D. Student Preparation (53 pp; ~6 min video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “The Role of Religion, Ideology, and Culture on U.S. Foreign Policymaking,” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, Aug 2021. Revised by Professor Christopher Faulkner, Summer 2024. (20 pp).
2. Acemoglu, Daron. “Understanding the New Nationalism.” *Project Syndicate*, 8 June 2022. (2 pp)
3. Gvosdev, Nikolas, K. “The Ayatollah Versus the Ambassador: The Influence of Religion on Politics in Post-Saddam Iraq,” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, 2010. (15 pp)
4. Graff, Garrett. “Orders of Disorder: Who Disbanded Iraq’s Army and De-Baathified Its Bureaucracy?” *Foreign Affairs*, 5 May 2023. (13 pp)
5. Video: “The Latest: Three Things to Know About Religious Engagement in U.S. Foreign Policy,” *United States Institute of Peace*, 3 May 2023, (00:00 – 6:05).
6. Fayette, Ed. “Cultural Awareness as a Weapon: Leveraging Regional Expertise for Overseas Success,” *NCO Journal*, September 2023. (3 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM’s CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM’s CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-21: SYNTHESIS CASE STUDY

A. Session Overview

This session is the first of two sessions in *Division IV: FPA Synthesis*. One of the readings from the first FPA session (FPA-1) observed, “It has never been more important for a national security professional to understand the range of international and domestic actors and influences that can impact theater security.” This session provides an opportunity to comprehensively exercise and apply concepts from FPA sessions to a contemporary policy case study. It will allow students to use course concepts to engage in the policy analysis of a theater security issue, to understand the organizational dynamics that may impact policy, as well as the interactions among the different components that make up the U.S. national security system, and the influences of both the domestic (U.S.) environment and the global (international) environment.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Using the tools, techniques, and concepts presented in FPA sessions, analyze a contemporary national- and theater-level security issue and identify relevant factors in both the internal (domestic) environment as well as the external (international) environment, including U.S. and global elements.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. FPA sessions were designed to provide an in-depth examination of “the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision making, and the broader context in which ... policy choices are formulated.” How can FPA concepts be used to analyze this case?
2. One of the first readings at the beginning of the FPA sessions quoted Richard Kugler’s observation, “Any good policy analysis must start with a rich conceptualization of the key variables and their relationships.” What are the key variables and their relationships in this case?
3. The very first reading in FPA-1 noted that principal themes in FPA “come together to demonstrate the diversity of institutional and structural influences on how and why decisions are made and how state action is shaped.” Which actors/factors were most influential in shaping the decision making process discussed in this case?

D. Student Preparation

1. Case study materials will be distributed by the faculty prior to this session.

E. Student Deliverables

For FPA-21 in Week 25, students are required to successfully complete FA-5, an in-class case analysis and presentation addressing TSDM's CLO-3. Specific guidance for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS-22: FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

A. Session Overview

This session exercises students' FPA skills as applied to a future-oriented national security decision making challenge. The objective of this session is to determine analytically what actors, factors, dynamics, powers, and influences in the policymaking ecosystem are likely to affect a future policy decision, providing insights into how U.S. policy might be decided in such a circumstance. Having a detailed understanding of the U.S. foreign policymaking apparatus and dynamics will provide students with strategic foresight essential to the military and national security professional.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend and analyze the range of policy actors, factors, dynamics, and influences that could affect U.S. policy regarding a critical national security concern.
 - Apply FPA concepts and tools to determine the art of the possible in a hypothetical future-oriented policymaking situation.
- Learning Outcomes (CLOs)
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - Supports NWC PLO 2.

C. Guidance Questions

1. The fictional (but realistic) scenario involves a surprise invasion by the People's Republic of China (PRC) of Taiwan-administered islands (Quemoy and Matsu) that lie just offshore from the PRC mainland. What, if anything, would the U.S. government be likely to do in response?
2. The required readings provide insights into how U.S., PRC, and Taiwanese officials reacted to past crises, particularly related to the three Taiwan Straits Crises (1954–55, 1958, and 1995–6). How did myriad domestic and international dynamics and pressures affect policymakers? How has Beijing perceived and responded to past crises involving the United States?

D. Student Preparation (50 pp)

1. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. "The Taiwan Straits Crises: 1954–55 and 1958." In *Milestones: 1953–60*. Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State. (2 pp)

2. Mann, Jim. "Crisis Over Taiwan," in *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton*, 315–338. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999. (23 pp)
3. Wu, Xinbo. "Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace Between China and the United States," *United States Institute of Peace*, 2008. (Read only: 7–10; 23–37). (17 pp)
4. Gordon, Susan, and Michael Mullen. "Introduction," in *US-Taiwan Relations in a New Era: Responding to a More Assertive China*. Independent Task Force Report No. 81, New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2023. (3 pp)
5. Chien, Amy Chiang, John Liu, and Paul Mozur. "Fight or Surrender: Taiwan's Generational Divide on China's Threats," *The New York Times*, 5 August 2022. (5 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

No later than 48 hours after FPA-22 in Week 25, students are required to submit and successfully complete SA-3—a case study analysis addressing TSDM's CLOs 1 - 3. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ANNEX E

ASSESS – DECIDE – IMPLEMENT – ASSURE (ADIA) FOUNDATIONS FOR THE CAPSTONE EXERCISE

STUDY GUIDE

1. Scope

In the TSDM sessions students examined critical thinking, the various ways decisions are made, and the challenges associated with effective decision making. The IS sessions provided an overview of the international strategic context for the United States to consider while trying to advance U.S. interests. The FPA sessions analyzed myriad actors, factors, and processes that must be considered in establishing national security policy in each of the organizational, domestic, and international environments. All of this takes place via individuals who are guided and mentored by a leader. That leader's views on ethics and professionalism, their experiences, their ability to think critically, and their education in such matters can have a profound effect on their decision making process. These factors ultimately impact the course of action they choose, both for themselves and their organization.

As illustrated in the IS and FPA sessions, the complexity and challenges facing today's military commanders, even at the O-4 and O-5 level, can have national and international security implications. They must take a wider view beyond just their "tactical-level" organization and consider factors such as external stakeholder expectations, alignment with the theater/strategic mission, how to effectively identify the best way forward from multiple courses of action, how best to implement change, and a host of other issues. Additionally, effective staff officers must consider the issues weighing on their ultimate "boss," be it a Joint task force commander, combatant commander, or other high-level official, in order to effectively provide the best inputs. The ADIA sessions incorporate the concepts and themes examined in the TSDM, IS, and FPA sessions and synthesize them onto the real-world decision making environment. This synthesis provides students an invaluable opportunity to think more deeply about these challenges and may allow them to serve more effectively in command and staff assignments while considering "the larger picture" as it relates to theater-level national security.

Additionally, the ADIA sessions set the foundation for the TSDM Capstone Exercise (CX) which allows students to further examine and create theater military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments. The ADIA sessions achieve this by highlighting the need for a thorough strategic assessment of the operating environment; coming up with innovative ideas designed to achieve a desired end state; examining possible courses of action and the criteria which distinguish good strategy from better strategy; the ability to develop a detailed implementation plan for the chosen strategy; and the ability to identify performance measurements that determine whether the implemented strategy is achieving its desired objectives.

TSDM-2 explored the skills necessary to be an active critical thinker and effectively convey such thinking into clear, concise, and specific communications that are actionable. TSDM-3 and 4 examined decision making concepts, theories, and models while also reviewing the various pitfalls that can impede good decision making. TSDM-5 considered the personal and professional ethics

associated with decision making, while TSDM-6 examined professionalism, especially as it relates to being a member of the profession of arms. FPA-11 (Civil-Military Relations) discussed the complex relationship between those serving in the profession of arms and the government and people whom they serve. Notice that collectively these concepts help in answering the questions “*Who Am I?*” (as a leader) and “*Who Are We?*” (as an organization). These sessions helped students define themselves as a leader and decision maker while also providing insights into their profession and other individual decision makers in the national security environment.


The ADIA sessions build on the TSDM, IS, and FPA sessions covered to this point by considering a decision making framework for applied leadership and the decision making process. This framework contains four distinct yet interrelated phases: *ASSESS*, *DECIDE*, *IMPLEMENT*, *ASSURE* (ADIA).



The goal of the ADIA framework is allows leaders to formulate a strategy in the ASSESS and DECIDE phases and subsequently execute that strategy in the IMPLEMENT and ASSURE phases. The four distinct phases of ADIA consider several simple sub-questions that add clarity:

- ASSESS: Where are we?
- DECIDE: Where should we go?
- IMPLEMENT: How do we get there?
- ASSURE: Are we getting there?

Notice that conceptually, this framework can (and should) be used at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of any organization, regardless of size or mission.



2. Focus

The focus areas for the ADIA sessions are multifold. As discussed above, it provides students an opportunity to reflect personal leadership and decision making attributes as a key element of an integrated understanding of theater security. It enables students to become acquainted with and apply ideas and concepts about leadership in a theater and national security context as well as the prospect of becoming better acquainted with and applying ideas and concepts regarding individual decision making and decision making within organizations. ADIA sessions will also offer students a chance to analyze and understand various tools and techniques that are critical to the effective development, implementation, and assurance of strategies and policies. The concepts discussed in the ADIA sessions are intended to refine, deepen, and improve the student's personal leadership skills, decision making skills, and readiness to serve in command or major staff assignments in support of the national security enterprise.

3. Guidance

The ADIA study guide is the student's primary planning document describing how the sessions are structured. It is important to note that each of the seven ADIA session builds on the previous sessions and requires students to be able to synthesize all sessions together. The ADIA framework is not linear in nature, but understanding the key relationships between each phase

of the decision making process is necessary. The ability to build upon each phase of the ADIA process and synthesize each phase with the other is essential to successfully completing the CX.

4. Student Deliverables

There is one FA for the ADIA sessions which will be a presentation in ADIA-7. The FA will give students the opportunity to demonstrate their understanding of the sessions' concepts and TSDM CLOs. The ADIA sessions are also establishing the foundational skills necessary for the CX, which is the third and final summative assessment.

ANNEX E

ASSESS – DECIDE – IMPLEMENT – ASSURE (ADIA) FOUNDATIONS FOR CAPSTONE EXERCISE (CX)

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ADIA-1: ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE (A: ASSESS)

A. Session Overview

The first letter of ADIA represents ASSESS. This session called *Assessing the Strategic Landscape* is no more complicated than answering the first two questions of the ADIA framework, “*Who are we?*” (as an organization) and “*Where are we?*” (as an organization). This session also serves as a foundation for a structured assessment which will be further defined and discussed in ADIA-2, *Application of Strategic Assessment*, which discusses assessing an organizations strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT).

Successful leaders constantly evaluate their organizations and ask the following types of questions: Is the organization meeting its performance goals and accomplishing the mission? Is the organization well-prepared for future challenges? What problems or shortcomings must the organization confront to improve its performance? Upon which strengths or core competencies can the organization rely? These and other questions can only be answered effectively through a comprehensive and thoughtful assessment. The focus of this session is on the characteristics of an effective organizational assessment and how leadership affects the assessment process.

In conducting an organizational assessment, where do the ideas about what to assess or look at come from? This session explores various images and mental models people have about what organizations are, what they are like, and how they function. In a Joint or coalition environment, people are apt to have divergent views and organizational perspectives on these matters. Such differences can lead to conflict or, if processed productively, ensure a more holistic and robust assessment.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Analyze the fundamentals of assessment, its key elements, and critical factors.
 - Understand what is and is not important to assess as part of an organizational assessment.
 - Recognize how leaders’ mental models of organizations determine how they think the organization should be assessed, led, and managed.
 - Discuss different organizational images.
 - Discuss the critical dimensions of the military’s missions, functions, and tasks as well as those of other national security organizations.
 - Using a case study, identify and discuss characteristics or variables that should be considered in an organizational assessment.

- Using a case study, consider the difficulty of working in a Joint environment in which different organizations are seen to operate in competing and complementary ways.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What is important to assess in an organizational assessment? Why? Are there any parts of an organization that are not worth assessing? What are they, and why?
2. What is the relationship between a leader's mental model of their organization and how they assess, lead, and manage their organization?
3. What are the different organizational images and what are their underlying assumptions? What aspects of each were present in your previous commands?
4. What are the critical dimensions of military and other national security organizations? Why are they critical and how do they impact decision making?
5. What aspects of the case study are important to understanding the culture, climate, perspectives, and complexities of the organizational assessment process?

D. Student Preparation (44 pp)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Assessment," Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (9 pp)
2. DiBella, A. J. "Organizational Theories: Perspectives on Changing National Security Organizations," *Joint Forces Quarterly* 69, 2nd Quarter, 2013. (6 pp)
3. Von Bergen, C.W, and Martin S. Bressler. "Active Waiting as Business Strategy: Learning from the Serengeti Plains," *Journal of Business Strategies* 32 (1): 2015. 21–35. (15 pp)

4. McGue, Thomas, E. and Albert J. Shimkus, Jr. "Interagency Cooperation and Collaboration?" Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (14 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-2: APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT (A: ASSESS)

A. Session Overview

This session continues the question, “*Where are we?*” In answering “where are we?” students will discuss the advantages of using a structured assessment tool prior to making decisions that will strategically impact the organization. A structured assessment provides a proven framework for acquiring and categorizing information and data. One of the most flexible and frequently used structured assessment methodologies is titled “SWOT” for short (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats). If competently applied, the SWOT assessment tool is practical and powerful. However, without knowledgeable leadership and intellectual rigor, SWOT will likely produce a superficial and misleading foundation for the subsequent decision process. This session carries forward the organizational images discussion from the previous session.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Describe the advantages of assessing a situation from the perspective of the four SWOT categories: (internal) strengths and weaknesses, (external) opportunities and threats.
 - Discuss the delineation of internal and external assessment factors.
 - Identify and explain the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment. Examples of these factors include: mission, performance level, adversary capabilities, core competencies, public opinion, stakeholder expectations, processes, technology, resources, and culture.
 - Comprehend the linkage between assessment integrity and decision quality.
 - Discuss the leader’s role and stewardship responsibilities when conducting a SWOT or other type of structured assessment.
 - Apply SWOT analysis to a case study.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.

- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How does the SWOT process help to assess a specific situation from an organizational perspective?
2. What are the internal assessment factors and what do they help you identify? What are the external assessment factors and what do they help you identify?
3. What are the critical factors included in a SWOT assessment and what is critical about each? How do these factors vary in criticality with the environment?
4. Why is it important to have an accurate and unbiased assessment of the strategic environment when making a decision?
5. How can the leader influence the process and product of an organizational analysis?
6. In the assigned case study, what are the critical factors influencing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats? What supports your conclusions?

D. Student Preparation (55 pp; ~18 mins of video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "SWOT and Structured Assessment," Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, April 2010. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (13 pp)
2. Video: "How to Perform a SWOT Analysis," *On Strategy*. October 19, 2016, (0:00-7:02). (~7 min) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_6AVRGLXGA
3. Video: "Tesla SWOT Analysis," *365 Financial Analyst*, November 13, 2018, (0:00-11:08). (~11 min) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7CT8Ox_Gcg
4. Current USINDOPACOM Posture Statement. In order to ensure the most current document, this reading will be made available to students by the Professor as soon as it becomes available. CCDR testimony to the House/Senate Arms Services Committees typically occurs in February – April timeframe each year. (~42 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-3: DECIDING STRATEGY (D: DECIDE)

A. Session Overview

The second letter of ADIA represents the DECIDE phase. Once a thorough organizational assessment is completed, it's time to ask the fundamental question, "*where should we go?*" This session analyzes the decision making environment within which the leader renders decisions. The ASSESS phase of ADIA informs the DECIDE phase. Prior to a decision and during the ASSESS phase, the leader develops a description of the decision making environment. This description includes a self-assessment from their own capabilities (as discussed in TSDM-2 through TSDM-6) and an organizational assessment of the leader's organization from the "Who are we?" segment. Additionally, the leader assesses stakeholders and their respective stakes and interests in the external environment.

As discussed in ADIA-2, the leader may identify organizational strengths that enhance the organization's execution of tasks and functions in the performance of the organization's mission. The leader may also identify organizational weaknesses which may require action to eliminate the weakness or diminish its impact within the organization. Also, the leader can identify *external* opportunities for the organization or institutional threats. The ASSESS phase may develop a list of critical gaps, issues, and challenges for the organization to consider. The leader then must select and prioritize which critical gaps to close, issues to address, and challenges to overcome.

In the DECIDE phase of ADIA, the leader investigates potential actions that can address the list of prioritized critical gaps, issues, and challenges. The leader can evaluate potential *internal* actions that can address organizational weaknesses and strengths. In the *external* environment, the leader can also evaluate potential actions that take advantage of existing opportunities or address potential threats. During the DECIDE phase, the leader can revise the organization's vision and mission as guidance in decision making. Once the leader identifies which priorities will be addressed by organizational actions, the leader engages a decision making process.

Organizations often develop formalized decision making processes that are designed to exhibit characteristics of rational decision making (as discussed in TSDM-3). As a reminder, the characteristics of rational decision making include a defined end-state or outcome and consideration of a series of alternatives that are evaluated against established criteria and the likelihood that the action taken will produce the desired outcome. Criteria provide the means to evaluate alternatives, environmental cause and effect relationships, and the likelihood of the intended outcome of the action. Additionally, leaders consider risk and apply risk calculations in rational decision making. In the decision making process, risk is identified, factored, and either accepted, mitigated, transferred, or eliminated as part of the decision making process. The result is a decision by the leader on a course of action (COA) that has the greatest likelihood of success, within acceptable risk, and as defined by the selected criteria and end-state.

The DECIDE phase culminates with a decision. Following the decision, the leader and the organization develop an implementation plan that includes a series of actions that help to

implement the decision. The execution of the decision occurs in the IMPLEMENT phase, which is the next step in the ADIA decision making framework and discussed in ADIA-5.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand the leadership and organizational considerations in deciding “*Where should we go?*”
 - Define the strategic decision making environment and apply its relevant characteristics to a decision.
 - Examine: What are criteria? What are efficiency and effectiveness and how are they different? And, why does risk matter in decision making?
 - Comprehend the ways and means of establishing, measuring, and comparing sets of alternatives to arrive at the best course of action to pursue to achieve desired objectives.
 - Understand risk identification, calculation, acceptance, and mitigation on a decision.
 - Understand rational decision making and explain and apply a rational decision making process.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What types of considerations influence leaders of organizations in deciding “*Where should we go?*” Who is involved and who is impacted by these decisions?
2. What is the decision environment and how does this impact the leader's decision making process?

3. How do you identify relevant criteria for defining efficiency and effectiveness, and risk inherent in different courses of action?
4. How do you use effectiveness, efficiency and risk criteria to measure and compare alternatives?
5. What are the options for addressing identified risks, and how do you decide between these options?
6. What tools help you to apply rational decision making rather than succumbing to the biases discussed earlier in the course?

D. Student Preparation (14 pp; ~21 min of video)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. “Decision Elements.” Faculty paper U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, May 2011. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (14 pp)
2. Video: “What is Strategy? It’s a Lot Simpler Than You Think,” *Harvard Business Review*, February 23, 2022, (0:00-9:31). (~9 min)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o7Ik1OB4TaE>
3. Video: “A Plan is Not a Strategy,” *Harvard Business Review*, June 29, 2022, (0:00-09:31). (~9 min) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iuYlGRnC7J8>
4. Video: “The Steps of the Strategic Planning Process in Under 15 Minutes,” *SME Strategy*, March 24, 2017, (0:00-11:04). (~11 min)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQ6348u6o08>

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM’s CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-4: CASE STUDY: STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND DECIDING STRATEGY

A. Session Overview

In ADIA sessions 1-3, students examined two critical questions in developing an organizational strategy. The first question required performing a strategic assessment to determine “*Where are we?*” as an organization. Once completing a thorough structured assessment, leaders examine the strategic direction desired for the organization by answering “*Where should we go?*” The purpose of this session is to bring together the concepts considered in the ASSESS and DECIDE phases. The case study, “The Least Worst Place,” centers on the creation of Joint Task Force 160 and its Deputy Commander in early 2002. More specifically, the decision to create the Joint Task Force, its impact on Naval Base, Guantanamo, and more broadly its impact on the United States and the world. Also to be considered is the potential impact that a few U.S. Navy O-6’s could have on the national security of the United States. It’s worth noting that the two O-6’s discussed in the case are not only the case’s authors but also served as professors for the Naval War College.

The case also highlights that, over time, organizations evolve due to their own internal experiences or in response to external forces. An organizational assessment conducted at one point in time is likely to differ considerably from one conducted at some later date. In this case, the assessment made in October of 2001 was markedly different than one that might have been conducted in March of 2002.

While this case study occurred over 20 years ago, it is still used as a seminal contribution to understanding the initial phases in the ADIA process and how significant real-world events are relevant for JPME students, especially in preparation for future assignments. The mission at Naval Base, Guantanamo was not high on the priority list of the Navy nor leaders inside the Pentagon, Congress, or the White House. However, that quickly changed with the events of September 11th 2001. This case study is an enduring example of both how and why the ADIA process can be pivotal in such situations.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the requirement for regular assessments and how organizations can change over time.
 - Realize that understanding a variety of decision making perspectives and the judicious application of specialized decision making methods and tools are integral components of building strategy, mission, and vision.
 - Discuss the ability of mid-level staff officers to be organizational leaders.
 - Discuss the role of staff personnel in assessment and organizational decision making.
 - Apply the concepts of the ASSESS and DECIDE phases to a case study.

- **Learning Outcomes**

- CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
- CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. How and why do organizations change? How frequently should they be assessed?
2. How did the mission for Naval Base Guantanamo change? Did this new mission require a new organizational assessment? Why or why not?
3. What is the function of the staff in preparing the leader to make organizational decisions?
4. Once the mission for Naval Base Guantanamo changed, what was the most significant critical gap that needed to be addressed? Why? Were there other critical gaps that needed to be addressed but were of a lesser priority? If so, what were they in prioritized order.
5. For the most significant critical gap that needs to be addressed, what is the desired end state or objective that needs to be met? Why, and how will this positively impact the new mission?
6. Given the desired end state or objective for the most significant critical gap, what are several (3-4) courses of action (COAs) that would allow the desired end state or objective to be achieved? What criteria will be used to determine the most effective COA? How will these criteria be applied to the various COAs? How will risk be factored into determining the most effective COA.
7. Can you come up with a clear, concise and specific narrative to communicate the selected COA, why it is important to the overall mission, and how it is going to make an impact on the overall mission?

D. Student Preparation (18 pp)

1. “Guantanamo Bay Naval Base Historical Background,” Guantanamo Bay official website. (3 pp)

2. Buehn, Robert and Albert Shimkus, Jr. "The Least Worst Place," Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, July 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (15 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-5: IMPLEMENTATING STRATEGY (I: IMPLEMENT)

A. Session Overview

The third letter of ADIA represents the IMPLEMENT phase. The previous ADIA sessions examined the questions “*Who are we?*” and “*Where are we?*” in the ASSESS phase. This was achieved through an organizational assessment and a SWOT analysis. Then (based on that assessment) the question “*Where do we want to go?*” as an organization was addressed during the DECIDE phase. This session now focuses on the next question addressed in the IMPLEMENT phase, “*How do we get there?*” Once the leader of an organization has decided what they must (or want) to do, those decisions must be turned into actions. Put differently, once a leader answers “*Where are we?*” and “*Where should we go?*” they must then answer the arguably more challenging question—“*How do we get there?*” Previous ADIA sessions examined what should be considered during the ASSESS phase. They also addressed the process of making the critical choices during the DECIDE phase to determine what will and will not be done to achieve the desired objectives and goals. This session looks at the challenges leaders face when *implementing* their decisions and associated strategy.

Traditional views on leadership often place a premium on visionary leaders who decisively lead their organizations to success through periods of significant change. However, in an increasingly dynamic and complex world, leaders (and the organizations they lead) must often adapt to frequent and unexpected changes in their environments (as examined in the Guantanamo case study). Effective leaders must not only be able to recognize the need for deliberate change and lead such change efforts, but they must also be flexible in adapting to changing conditions. This session introduces a variety of concepts about leading change and challenges students to consider how best to apply them in today’s rapidly changing environments. This session is also intended to help leaders understand the importance of technological, structural, human capital, and policy elements as they seek to implement ideas and strategies that will result in change.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Understand strategies for leading change and discuss how to apply them in context.
 - Examine how strategic guidance is implemented.
 - Comprehend the challenges and issues that make turning decisions into effective actions and results so difficult.
 - Understand and discuss key factors that leaders should take into account when considering change.
 - Examine ways that decisions are communicated downward into the organization and translated into execution plans that, in turn, cause organizational activity and action.

- Analyze and explore the elements of structure, policy, technology, and human capital in terms of: What? Who? When? Where? Why? and how? (W5H).
- Identify key organizational systems and functions potentially affected by the introduction of new technology or a change to human capital policy in a large, complex organization.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. What are the skills a leader needs in order to implement change?
2. What is friction and resistance? Provide examples of friction and resistance and how a leader might mitigate such disruptions to implementing change?
3. What are the key factors to consider when planning for change? Why are each of these important?
4. How does the method, process and message used to communicate decisions impact the execution/implementation of the decision?
5. What strategies are prevalent in leading change and in what contexts might one be more effective than another?
6. How does implementation of strategic guidance differ from implementation of lower-level decisions?
7. How does the W5H framework relate to objectives and actions up and down the layers of leadership?
8. When have you seen unintended consequences of a policy decision undermine the decision? How can you ensure key organizational systems and functions are considered prior to implementing decisions?

9. For the assigned case what factors are critical to the implementation of the decision, and how can disruptive factors be mitigated?

D. Student Preparation (60 pp)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Implementation - The Art of Execution." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College Newport, RI, April 2011. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (13 pp)
2. Kotter, John P, and Leonard A Schlesinger. 2008. "Choosing Strategies for Change." *Harvard Business Review* 86 (7-8). (21 pp)
3. Miller, Billy and Ken Turner. "Leading Organizational Change: A Leader's Role," faculty paper, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 2013. (8 pp)
4. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Domains of Implementation." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College Newport, RI, May 2010. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael Pratt, July 2024. (10 pp)
5. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Hard Choices in the East China Sea." Faculty paper U.S. Naval War College, National Security Affairs Department, Newport, RI, May 2014. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael W. Pratt, July 2024. (8 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-6: ASSURING STRATEGIC GOALS (A: ASSURE)

A. Session Overview

The final phase of ADIA is the ASSURE phase. The organization has undergone a strategic *assessment*, a deliberate strategy has been *decided* upon to achieve a specific end state, and the strategy is being *implemented* with the expectation of achieving the desired end state. But how does a leader then determine if the chosen strategy is actually achieving its intended objectives and ultimately the desired end state? In essence, the leader must ask one more vital question, “*Are we getting there?*” One of the hardest challenges facing a leader is determining whether the actions taken by his or her organization are leading to effective mission accomplishment. This session will address the final question posed in the ADIA framework, “*Are we getting there?*” To answer this question the leader will use a variety of performance measurement systems. Such systems drive behavior and, accordingly, require careful consideration of what is measured, how it is measured and, most important of all, how those measurements are used. Too often performance measurement systems focus on the wrong things which lead to misdirected effort or ill-chosen command attention. Thus, it is essential that leaders at all levels understand why and how they are measuring as well as what they have chosen to measure.

This session will also introduce to the concept of “levers of control.” These levers of control help to balance the natural tension that exists in organizations between creation (value) and control (managing and measuring value).

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Examine the purposes of measurement and understand its potentially positive and dysfunctional effects.
 - Understand the differences between a measurement and a metric and how each can be used effectively to achieve desired results.
 - Understand key performance indicators (KPIs) and how to use them to determine if goals are being achieved.
 - Identify and evaluate the metrics that should be used to measure performance in a current case and explain why those metrics were selected.
 - Understand the rationale and application (the “why” and the “how”) of four diverse control systems that can be used by leaders to assist in assuring excellent performance.
 - Apply Simons’ four levers of control to a case study.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.

- CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3.

C. Guidance Questions

1. Why is measurement of an implementation plan important? How important is what is measured and how it is measured?
2. How are measures and metrics related, and how does each help to track implementation of a decision and progress toward the desired outcome?
3. What are key performance indicators (KPIs) and how can they indicate progress toward an outcome?
4. For the assigned case, what measures, metrics, and KPIs would you select to track progress, and why are they important?
5. What are the four control systems? Why are these systems relevant for their designed purpose, and how would these controls be implemented?
6. For the assigned case what are the levers of control that you would choose to include in your implementation plane, and why?

D. Student Preparation (68 pp)

1. National Security Affairs Faculty. "Assuring Organizational Excellence." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, May 2012. Revised for the College of Distance Education by Professor Michael W. Pratt, July 2024. (13 pp)
2. Daddis, GA. "The Problem with Metrics: Assessing Progress and Effectiveness in the Vietnam War," *War in History*, 2012; 19 (1): 79-38. (27 pp)
3. Pratt, Michael W. "Counting What Counts." Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, Newport, RI, July 2024. (10 pp)
4. Simons, R. "Control in an Age of Empowerment." *Harvard Business Review*. 1995; 73 (2): 80-88. (6 pp)

5. Pratt, Michael W. "Return to Glory: The Fall and Rise of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2024. Adapted from the National Security Affairs faculty paper by National Security faculty paper, April 2014. (12 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ADIA-7: CASE STUDY: ADIA AND STRATEGY SYNTHESIS

A. Session Overview

This session will examine a case study holistically to apply the four phases of ADIA—ASSESS, DECIDE, IMPLEMENT, and ASSURE. It will also provide students the opportunity to synthesize the tools, concepts, and techniques introduced throughout the ADIA sessions. The ability to examine a case study and effectively apply the course concepts covered throughout TSDM will be essential during the development and presentation of the Capstone Exercise.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Synthesize and apply the ASSESS, DECIDE, IMPLEMENT, and ASSURE phases of the ADIA framework to a complex national security case study. Be able to empirically support and defend each of the ADIA concepts that enable
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 2 and 3

C. Guidance Questions

1. Apply the ADIA framework to a case study, what are the results and implications for each stage of the process and how does it impact the next stage in the process. What is your ultimate recommendation along with measures, metrics and controls?

D. Student Preparation

1. Pratt, Michael W. “Application of ADIA.” Faculty paper, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, Newport, RI, July 2024. (~25 pp)

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of ADIA-7 in Week 30, students are required to successfully complete FA-6 addressing TSDM's CLO-4. Specific instructions for this deliverable can be found on Blackboard with additional guidance provided by the Professor.

ANNEX F
TSDM - CAPSTONE EXERCISE (CX)
STUDY GUIDE


1. Capstone Exercise Overview

The Capstone Exercise (CX) is the synthesizing event for TSDM. As the course's final summative assessment, the CX provides students an opportunity to exercise concepts learned throughout the year while also demonstrating proficiency on each CLO. The CX is oriented on the INDOPACOM AOR, and students will simulate being part of an INDOPACOM Joint Planning Group (JPG) tasked to report to the Joint Plans Validation Board (JPVB), chaired by the J5. The JPG is tasked with producing and delivering an executive-level presentation with five specific areas of focus:

- 1) A strategic estimate of the USINDOPACOM AOR future security environment over the next eight years.
- 2) A theater strategic vision and associated strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests within the INDOPACOM AOR.
- 3) A rank-ordered Integrated Priority List (IPL) of five new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the stated strategy.
- 4) Specific details and subsequent timeline of the implementation plan for the top proposed IPL capability.
- 5) Detailed performance measures to ensure the implementation of the top proposed IPL capability is meeting its intended timeline and objectives.

These five areas of focus will be organized and presented in a PowerPoint brief, not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length. This **UNCLASSIFIED** exercise will be guided by the figure below. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting TSDM concepts, with the five deliverables depicted in the boxes across the center. Professor-led discussions and consultation will occur throughout the process.

TSDM CX Methodology



2. Objectives

- CX Objectives

- Exercise TSDM course concepts through the development of **theater strategic guidance** that describes the critical driving forces in the INDOPACOM security environment, outlines a theater vision to include objectives and concepts in support of national strategic guidance, outlines a strategy to attain that vision, presents a prioritized list of new or refined capabilities, offers an implementation caselet of the top IPL item, and briefs performance measures that identify appropriate metrics and objectives to evaluate progress toward successful implementation.
- Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a senior-level PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which will be delivered by a minimum of three (3) briefers and outlines the proposed **theater strategic guidance**.

- Learning Outcomes

- CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
- CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.

- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3. Guidance

1. The JPG is not writing an actual theater strategy or a theater security cooperation plan. Instead, they are providing a brief that could facilitate development of actual theater products. Capabilities should represent the important Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) capabilities that are necessary to advance the strategy. As appropriate, the JPG should identify and discuss individual programs and forces while offering specific solutions to meet capability needs. The CX is not a budget exercise, but the JPG must recognize the reality of resource constraints. Within those constraints, the JPG is required to propose five (5) new or refined capabilities (as discussed in the FPA sessions) as part of their IPL.
2. How the JPG chooses to organize, manage time and knowledge, and handle group dynamics is crucial to success. The JPG will seven (7) 90-minute sessions of in-seminar time to work in-person with other students and get guidance from the Professor. Because there are no student preparation (readings) requirements for the CX sessions, it is expected that students will work and collaborate with one another outside of the classroom for six (6) or more hours each week. The Professor should be kept fully involved and aware of all outside work that is completed—to include having full access to shared forums.
3. This graduate-level project requires the JPG to leverage internal expertise, draw upon the content and work done across the academic year, and conduct research and collaboration outside of regularly scheduled seminar meeting times. In the past, International Security analytic research papers have been invaluable in providing additional background and knowledge.

4. Student Deliverables

The CX deliverable is a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing that encapsulates the five (5) components outlined above, presented to the Professor and/or a senior-leader panel. Although there is a requirement for a minimum of three formal briefers, all students are expected to contribute to the strategic conversation with the panel during the 15-minute question and answer (Q&A) session that follows the briefing.

The size of the JPG will depend in part on seminar size, but in no case will a JPG contain less than six students or be larger than 12 students.

The deliverable should follow the best practices as learned throughout TSDM and succinctly outline the theater security assessment, vision, strategy, IPL, implementation caselet, and performance measures. There is no specific format or template for the briefing; The JPG determines how best to communicate their proposals with the assistance of the Professor. Since the deliverable may be shared with senior members of the INDOPACOM staff, the JPG should

develop a product that is both suitable for a senior leader and able to stand alone in conveying key ideas and concepts. A more detailed breakout of key briefing components follows below.

- *Theater Strategic Estimate* for an eight-year period. The JPG should:
 - Identify states, groups, organizations, and key trends in the security environment that may challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region over the next eight (8) years, from today through 2033.
 - Identify the major strategic and operational challenges the Commander, USINDOPACOM will face over the next eight years.
 - Identify known or anticipated opportunities the Commander, USINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
 - Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment and how they will be addressed, as discussed in the ADIA sessions.
- *Theater Strategic Vision and Strategy*. The JPG should:
 - Based on the above Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a strategic vision that includes an end state that the Commander, USINDOPACOM seeks to accomplish in the AOR and an outline of a theater strategy to attain that vision.
 - Identify strategic objectives that must be achieved in order to support the strategic vision.
 - Explain the opportunities as well as challenges, issues, risks, or problems associated with achieving the vision.
 - Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the NSS, NDS, NMS, and the U.S maritime strategy.
 - Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by the Commander, USINDOPACOM to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power, etc.
 - Identify the critical gaps that challenge the Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to perform the command's mission.
 - Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by USINDOPACOM activities and actions to achieve theater strategic objectives.
- *Integrated Priority List (IPL)*. The JPG should:

- Present—in priority order—a list of five (5) IPL capabilities required by the Commander, USINDOPACOM over the next eight years needed to achieve the identified theater strategic objectives. Special attention should be given to FPA sessions which discussed exactly what constitutes an IPL *capability* and the process and purpose for which the CCDR brings it to the Secretary of Defense.
- *Implementation Caselet.* The JPG should:
 - Using the top IPL priority, outline when and how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet will reflect a key requirement and be discussed in 4-6 slides.
 - Address all Service, Joint, U.S. government, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
 - Include a timeline for the implementation of the capability, and necessary milestones to identify progress for full implementation and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
 - Consider the types of risk involved and possible mitigating actions.
- *Performance Measures.* The JPG should:
 - To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL capability, outline possible avenues or actions to measure / assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved. Special emphasis should be given to ADIA-6 which discussed performance measures and exactly how metrics are used in determining if objectives are being met.
- *Presentation.* The JPG should:
 - Brief and defend a PowerPoint presentation, with a minimum of three (3) briefers, not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length, to the Professor and/or senior-leader panel. Although this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of analysis, rationale, and conclusions, the JPG should be prepared to respond to questions during a 15-minute Q&A period that will follow the presentation. To help the Professor/panel evaluate the decisions and rationale, the JPG will provide black-and-white paper ‘read-ahead’ copies (2 slides per page) of the brief to the member(s) of the panel one day prior to the start of the presentation.
 - Electronically submit via email the PowerPoint briefing to the Professor prior to the presentation in CX-10.

ANNEX F

TSDM – CAPSTONE EXERCISE (CX) STUDY GUIDE

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CX-1: INTRODUCTION TO CAPSTONE EXERCISE

A. Session Overview

The TSDM CX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined across the entire TSDM course and provides the JPG with an opportunity to integrate that knowledge into a complex, group-focused exercise. The CX also requires the JPG to leverage internal expertise, additional research, and collaboration outside of regularly scheduled seminar times to successfully develop the products in the time allotted. As part of this requirement, this session also addresses two key skill areas—work and communication skills—that are as fundamental for success in the CX as they are in all future command and staff assignments.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Comprehend the CX scenario, process, and products.
 - Organize as a planning JPG to develop and present the required CX products.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. In addition to outlining all requirements, during the opening portion of this session, the Professor will discuss topics focusing on the CX process including organization, group behavior and decision making, group dynamics, and knowledge management. Students will gain an appreciation for all CX requirements.
2. Following the introduction, the Professor will assign a JPG Leader. The JPG should identify any additional positions they may feel are necessary for the overall success of their JPG. Experience suggests that a JPG, as a minimum, will also need a PowerPoint lead. The JPG Leader ensures the group makes steady progress on each week's deliverables while the PowerPoint lead captures group discussions to facilitate development of the briefing

materials. Some JPGs have found it useful to develop J2, J5, J8 and/or other positions or specific task-organized sub-groups to facilitate product development. Given the inter-related nature of the overall CX task, however, close coordination is required; JPG members cannot work in isolation. Regardless of how a JPG chooses to organize, the Professor must be included in all decisions and kept abreast of each student's assigned roles and tasks.

D. Student Preparation (26 pp)

1. Theater Security Decision Making (TSDM) Syllabus, Academic Year 2024-2025, read all of Annex F. (26 pp)
2. Video: Pratt, Michael W. "TSDM Capstone Exercise", July 2024.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-3 in week 30, each student JPG is required to deliver FA-7—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's strategic estimate for the INDOPACOM AOR over the next eight years. Once completed, the Professor will offer constructive feedback and guidance to ensure each JPG is on track. The FA-7 briefing should:

- Identify states, groups, organizations, and key trends in the security environment that may challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region over the next eight (8) years.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges Commander, USINDOPACOM will face over the next eight years.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities Commander, USINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment and how they will be addressed.

CX-2: ASSESSMENT METHODS AND STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

A. Session Overview

TSDM has provided several personal, organizational, and process assessment methods to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for a combatant commander to advance and defend U.S. interests. This session provides the JPG an opportunity to build a theater strategic estimate, which will then inform development of the theater strategic vision. The estimate should cover the next eight years, today through spring 2033.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Identify states, groups, and organizations in the security environment that may challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
 - Identify known and anticipated opportunities Commander, USINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, and organizations that could potentially assist the CDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
 - Identify the major strategic and operational challenges facing Commander, USINDOPACOM.
 - Broadly assess the risks inherent in the JPG's depiction of the security environment.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. To develop their own approach to assessing the region, The JPG should consider the applicability of assessment methods presented in ADIA-1 and -2.

2. The JPG should also consider the material and regional discussions in IS, and influences explored in FPA.
3. The JPG should begin coalescing around key concepts and ideas as a basis for a strategic vision for the theater eight years in the future. That vision should be informed by national-level guidance and resources.

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-3 in week 30, each student JPG is required to deliver FA-7—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's strategic estimate for the INDOPACOM AOR over the next eight years. Once completed, the Professor will offer constructive feedback and guidance to ensure each JPG is on track. The FA-7 briefing should:

- Identify states, groups, organizations, and key trends in the security environment that may challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region over the next eight (8) years.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges Commander, USINDOPACOM will face over the next eight years.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities Commander, USINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment and how they will be addressed.

CX-3: THEATER STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

A. Session Overview

After delivering FA-7, this session provides time for developing required CX deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the strategic JPG's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. This session begins with the Professor receiving FA-7, the strategic estimate briefing from each JPG. The intent of this briefing is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback to students.
2. Following Professor feedback, The JPG should continue crafting findings and conclusions as they work toward their final deliverables.

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-3 in week 30, each student JPG is required to deliver FA-7—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the group's strategic estimate for the INDOPACOM AOR over the next eight years. Once completed, the Professor will offer

constructive feedback and guidance to ensure each JPG is on track. The FA-7 briefing should:

- Identify states, groups, organizations, and key trends in the security environment that may challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region over the next eight (8) years.
- Identify the major strategic and operational challenges Commander, USINDOPACOM will face over the next eight years.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities Commander, USINDOPACOM could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist the CCDR to advance and defend U.S. interests in the region.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in the depiction of the security environment and how they will be addressed.

At the beginning of CX-4 in week 31, each JPG is required to deliver FA-8—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's theater vision and strategy based on their theater strategic assessment as outlined in FA-7. The JPG should:

- Based on their Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a strategic vision that includes an end state that the USINDOPACOM Commander seeks to accomplish in the AOR and an outline of a Theater Strategy to attain that vision.
- Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision.
- Explain the opportunities as well as challenges, issues, risks, or problems associated with achieving the vision.
- Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the NSS, NDS, NMS, and the National Maritime Strategy.
- Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by the Commander, USINDOPACOM to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power, etc.
- Identify the critical gaps that challenge the Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to perform the command mission.
- Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by USINDOPACOM activities and actions to achieve theater strategic objectives.

CX-4: THEATER VISION AND STRATEGY

A. Session Overview

Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, when considering national security, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, strategy constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Using national-level strategic documents (NSS, NDS, NMS and U.S. maritime strategy) as guides, combatant commanders develop theater strategies (as discussed in IS-10), which are defined in joint doctrine as “concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.” To start this process, the combatant command should have a firm understanding of U.S. interests in the region and then develop ways to advance and defend those interests.

Based on the theater security environment assessment presented in FA-7, the JPG should craft a tailored theater-specific strategic vision and the supporting strategy to achieve objectives (ends) and applying concepts (ways) to achieve regionally-oriented effects in support of national objectives. The vision provides the basis for operational and security cooperation planning. It also generates an ability to compare necessary capabilities, operational concepts, and forces (means) to achieve the vision against existing capabilities and forces. Any gaps in required capabilities are communicated to the Secretary of Defense and CJCS in the form of the CDR's IPL, the focus of FA-9, which is due at the start of CX-6.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Outline Commander, USINDOPACOM's strategic vision that supports U.S. goals and objectives as derived from the NSS, NDS, NMS, and U.S. maritime strategy.
 - Identify and discuss the general methods to achieve those objectives to include strategic communication, pertinent economic tools, and diplomacy in achieving Commander, USINDOPACOM's vision.
 - Identify and discuss the appropriate strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of national power.
 - Consider the implications for the current USINDOPACOM organization and recommend appropriate changes.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.

- CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
- Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. This session begins with the Professor receiving FA-8, the theater strategic vision and strategy briefing, from each JPG. The intent of this briefing is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback to students.
2. Based on their assessment of the security environment presented in FA-7, the JPG should craft a theater vision and enabling strategy that supports the advancement of U.S. interests in the INDOPACOM AOR.
3. In determining a recommended strategy, the JPG should focus on the military aspects of the strategy while also including guidance and/or recommendations for interagency coordination and multinational/nongovernmental organization cooperation. The JPG should also consider how to achieve “unity of effort” in the pursuit of theater objectives in the absence of unity of command.
4. The JPG should then identify capabilities needed to advance their strategy. For the capability gap analysis, they should principally consider Department of Defense/Joint capabilities in their analysis. Hard and soft power options and potential organizational solutions deserve equal attention.

E. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-4 in week 31, each JPG is required to deliver FA-8—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG’s theater vision and strategy based on their theater strategic assessment as outlined in FA-7. The JPG should:

- Based on their Theater Strategic Estimate, formulate an outline of a strategic vision that includes an end state that Commander, USINDOPACOM seeks to accomplish in the AOR and an outline of a Theater Strategy to attain that vision.
- Identify strategic objectives that support the strategic vision.

- Explain the opportunities as well as challenges, issues, risks, or problems associated with achieving the vision.
- Consider alignment with national strategic direction from the NSS, NDS, NMS, and the U.S. maritime strategy.
- Describe and discuss the concepts and activities employed by Commander, USINDOPACOM to achieve the strategic objectives, such as: theater security cooperation, partnerships, strategic and operational concepts for the military instrument of power, etc.
- Identify the critical gaps that challenge Commander, USINDOPACOM's ability to perform the command mission.
- Understand the expectations of key stakeholders impacted by USINDOPACOM activities and actions to achieve theater strategic objectives.

At the beginning of CX-6 in week 32, each JPG is required to deliver FA-9—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's rank-ordered list of five (5) IPL capabilities required by Commander, USINDOPACOM over the next eight years to achieve theater strategic objectives as outlined in the theater strategy (FA-8). Special attention should be given to FPA sessions which discussed exactly what constitutes an IPL *capability* and the process and purpose for which the CDR brings it to the Secretary of Defense.

CX-5: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Session Overview

This session provides seminar time to continue development of CX deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Effectively organize, develop, and communicate a presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the JPG's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance.

This session continues the preparation phase of CX. The JPG should continue crafting findings and conclusions as they work toward their final deliverables, by specifically identifying five capabilities required by Commander, USINDOPACOM over the next eight years to achieve theater strategic objectives.

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-6 in week 32, each student JPG is required to deliver FA-9—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's rank-ordered list of five (5) IPL capabilities required by Commander, USINDOPACOM over the next eight years to achieve theater strategic objectives as outlined in the theater strategy (FA-8). Special attention should be given to FPA sessions which discussed exactly what constitutes an IPL *capability* and the process and purpose for which the CDR brings it to the Secretary of Defense.

CX-6: IPL: CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE THEATER STRATEGY

A. Session Overview

It is important to remember that an IPL is the CCDR's demand signal to the Secretary of Defense on capabilities that they do not currently possess but that are needed in order to achieve the theater strategy and advance U.S. interests. An IPL does not include capabilities already under the purview of the CCDR.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Describe how IPL capabilities support the theater strategy and vision.
 - Describe how Commander, USINDOPACOM would determine the top IPL item.
 - Continue working to effectively organize, develop, and communicate the JPG proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - LO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. This session begins with the Professor receiving the FA-9 brief, the CCDR's IPL capabilities necessary to implement the theater strategy as outlined in FA-8. The intent is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback and ensure alignment between each part of the overall CX briefing. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the JPG's strategic estimate, vision and strategy, but focus on its rank-ordered IPL capabilities, why they are needed, and how they will be utilized. Students should present the material in approximately ten minutes, using quality slides.
2. Does the Integrated Priority List (IPL) of capabilities adequately address implementation of the proposed vision? Do the IPLs link to and support the CCDR in executing the strategy? To what extent is a "golden thread" clear in linking the security assessment,

proposed Commander, USINDOPACOM vision and strategy, and the required capabilities?

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-6 in week 32, each student JPG is required to deliver FA-9—a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's rank-ordered list of five (5) IPL capabilities required by Commander, USINDOPACOM over the next eight years to achieve theater strategic objectives as outlined in the theater strategy (FA-8). Special attention should be given to FPA sessions which discussed exactly what constitutes an IPL *capability* and the process and purpose for which the CCDR brings it to the Secretary of Defense.

At the beginning of CX-8 in week 33, each JPG is required to deliver FA-10, a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's implementation plan and associated performance measures for the top-ranked IPL capability. The JPG should:

- Using the top IPL priority, outline how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet would reflect a key innovation and be discussed in 4-6 slides.
- Address all Service, Joint, U.S. government, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
- Include a timeline and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
- Consider the types of risk involved and possible mitigating actions.
- To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL capability, outline possible avenues or actions to measure / assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved. Special emphasis should be given to ADIA-6 which discussed performance measures and exactly how metrics are used in determining if objectives are being met.

CX-7: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Session Overview

As discussed in ADIA-5, the execution of strategy is arguably more challenging than strategy formulation. Alignment among objectives and the various actions is critical. Once implementation plans are set in motion, an organization must take deliberate steps to ensure it is moving smartly and effectively toward desired goals on a specified timeline. Establishing performance measures is essential in that regard.

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Confirm continuing alignment of all material briefed to date.
 - Develop an implementation plan and associated performance measures to guide Commander, USINDOPACOM toward successful implementation of the needed capability.
 - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance.

1. This session continues the preparation phase of CX. The JPG should continue crafting findings and conclusions for inclusion in their formal presentation.
2. Using the highest priority capability on the proposed IPL, the JPG should develop an implementation plan and associated performance measures to guide Commander,

USINDOPACOM toward successful implementation of the needed capability. A thorough understanding of performance measures, as discussed in ADIA-6, should be understood so that performance measures are being utilized effectively to determine if desired objectives are being met.

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-8 in week 33, each JPG is required to deliver FA-10, a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's implementation plan and associated performance measures for the top-ranked IPL capability. The JPG should:

- Using the top IPL priority, outline how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet would reflect a key innovation and be discussed in 4-6 slides.
- Address all Service, Joint, U.S. government, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
- Include a timeline and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
- Consider the types of risk involved and possible mitigating actions.
- To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL capability, outline possible avenues or actions to measure / assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved. Special emphasis should be given to ADIA-6 which discussed performance measures and exactly how metrics are used in determining if objectives are being met.

CX-8: IPL CASELET IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES

A. Session Overview

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
 - Outline the implementation plan and performance measures associated with the highest priority IPL capability.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. This session begins with the Professor receiving the FA-10 brief, the JPG's implementation plan and associated performance measures. The intent is for the Professor to provide incremental feedback and ensure alignment between each part of the overall CX briefing. As a rule of thumb, the brief should quickly recap the JPG's vision, strategy, and IPL, but focus on the specific elements of its implementation plan and specific performance measures. Students should present the material in approximately ten minutes, using quality slides.
2. Following the FA-10 brief and Professor feedback, the JPG will have seminar time to refine their overall CX effort. To what extent is a "golden thread" clear in linking the security assessment, proposed Commander, USINDOPACOM vision and strategy, and the required capabilities? Where are any misalignments? Where are there required adjustments?

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-8 in week 33, each JPG is required to deliver FA-10, a PowerPoint briefing not to exceed 10-12 minutes on the JPG's implementation plan and associated performance measures for the top-ranked IPL capability. The JPG should:

- Using the top IPL priority, outline how to implement this capability. It is expected that the caselet would reflect a key innovation and be discussed in 4-6 slides.
- Address all Service, Joint, U.S. government, non-governmental, and international stakeholders along with their respective interests.
- Include a timeline and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments.
- Consider the types of risk involved and possible mitigating actions.
- To facilitate future evaluation of the proposed IPL capability, outline possible avenues or actions to measure / assess the progress by which theater goals will be achieved. Special emphasis should be given to ADIA-6 which discussed performance measures and exactly how metrics are used in determining if objectives are being met.

CX-9: SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

A. Session Overview

This session provides time for developing required deliverables.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Effectively organize, develop and communicate a formal presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, which outlines the seminar's proposed theater strategic guidance.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance.

This session continues and completes the preparation phase of CX.

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-10 in week 34, each JPG is required to deliver SA-4, a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing presenting its executive-level theater strategic guidance, consisting of: 1) the future security environment over the next eight years; 2) a theater strategic vision and strategy that advance and defend U.S. national interests across the INDOPACOM AOR; 3) a rank-ordered IPL of five (5) new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; 4) a detailed implementation caselet (to include a timeline) discussing how to implement the top rated IPL capability; and 5) performance measures assuring that the implementation of the IPL capability is on track and meeting its intended objectives. The JPG should:

- Brief and defend a PowerPoint presentation, with a minimum of three (3) briefers not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length, to the Professor and/or senior-leader panel. Although this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of analysis, rationale, and conclusions, The JPG should prepare to respond to questions during a 15-minute Q&A period that will follow the presentation.
- To help the Professor/senior-leader panel members evaluate the decisions and rationale, The JPG will provide black-and-white paper 'read-ahead' copies (2 slides per page) of the brief to the member(s) of the panel at least one day prior to the start of the presentation.

CX-10: CX GROUP PRESENTATIONS (SA-4)

A. Session Overview

The JPG will present their CX briefings during this session.

B. Objectives

- Session Objectives
 - Effectively communicate a PowerPoint presentation, not to exceed forty minutes in length, addressing the proposed theater strategic guidance.
 - Clearly, articulately and completely answer questions asked by the panel.
- Learning Outcomes
 - CLO-1: Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
 - CLO-2: Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
 - CLO-3: Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
 - CLO-4: Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.
 - Supports NWC PLOs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Guidance

1. The Professor will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of CX-10, including specific time and location. To support the Professor(s) and/or senior leader preparation, students should anticipate providing a read ahead copy of the presentation 24-48 hours prior to the presentation. After completion of each brief, a fifteen-minute Q&A period during which the Professor/senior leader panel will more deeply explore JPG reasoning and potential alternative perspectives. All JPG members are expected to engage during the Q&A period.
2. After all seminar JPGs have briefed, the Professor and/or senior leader panel will provide CX feedback to the seminar at large, as well as offer insights they may have on the future INDOPACOM or broader military operating environment over the next eight years, as well as general insights from a senior leader perspective.
3. The following criteria will be used when assigning grades:

- Is the strategic estimate, strategic vision, and new or refined concepts/capabilities reasonable and in alignment?
- Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion?
- Does the brief present a reasonably complete, broad overview of the INDOPACOM AOR including significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the CCDR over the coming eight years?
- Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way resulting in a sufficient understanding of the challenges, threats, and opportunities facing Commander, USINDOPACOM?
- Does the brief clearly articulate the recommended Commander, USINDOPACOM priorities, including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the evolving security environment?
- Does the brief articulate not only what the CCDR's priorities are, but how the CCDR broadly intends to address the challenges in the security environment?
- Does the proposed CCDR's guidance address the issues identified in the security assessment?
- Does the Integrated Priority List (IPL) of capabilities adequately address implementation of the proposed vision?
- Do the IPLs link to and support the CCDR in the effort to execute the strategy?
- To what extent is a "golden thread" clear in linking the security assessment, proposed Commander, USINDOPACOM vision and strategy, and the supporting capabilities?
- To what extent does the presentation provide innovative and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges or take advantage of opportunities anticipated over the next eight years?
- How well does the JPG develop one aspect of the brief to understand implementation details?
- How well did the JPG consider Service, Joint or USG requirements; the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; a recommended timeline; and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments?
- Is the implementation plan realistic?
- Are performance measures sufficiently developed to allow the CCDR to know if the implementation plan is meeting intended benchmarks and allow for future evaluation of the theater strategic guidance?

- Did the JPG utilize at least three (3) separate briefers during the presentation?
- How well did the entire JPG interact with the panel during Q&A?

D. Student Preparation

None.

E. Student Deliverables

At the beginning of CX-10 in week 34, each JPG is required to deliver SA-4, a forty-minute PowerPoint briefing presenting its executive-level theater strategic guidance, consisting of: 1) the future security environment over the next eight years; 2) a theater strategic vision and strategy that advance and defend U.S. national interests across the INDOPACOM AOR; 3) a rank-ordered IPL of five (5) new or improved capabilities necessary to advance the strategy; 4) a detailed implementation caselet (to include a timeline) discussing how to implement the top rated IPL capability; and 5) performance measures assuring that the implementation of the IPL capability is on track and meeting its intended objectives. The JPG should:

- Brief and defend a PowerPoint presentation, with a minimum of three (3) briefers not to exceed forty (40) minutes in length, to the Professor and/or senior-leader panel. Although this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of analysis, rationale, and conclusions, The JPG should prepare to respond to questions during a 15-minute Q&A period that will follow the presentation.
- To help the Professor/senior-leader panel members evaluate the decisions and rationale, The JPG will provide black-and-white paper 'read-ahead' copies (2 slides per page) of the brief to the member(s) of the panel at least one day prior to the start of the presentation.

ANNEX G

THEATER SECURITY DECISION MAKING (TSDM) COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (CLOs)

- CLO-1** Understand the professional and ethical responsibilities and challenges associated with decision making as a national security professional.
- CLO-2** Analyze the global security environment and how U.S. national security interests influence the development of U.S. security strategies.
- CLO-3** Analyze the factors that influence national security decision making and the relationships between the institutions responsible for U.S. national security.
- CLO-4** Examine the processes used to formulate strategies to achieve desired end states and how they are implemented to ensure intended outcomes.

ANNEX H
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
JPME-I PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

- PLO-1** Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition.
- PLO-2** Create theater and national military strategies designed for contemporary and future security environments.
- PLO-3** Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to decision-making in theater-level, Joint and multinational operations.
- PLO-4** Apply theory, doctrine, and seapower through critical, structured thought in professional, written communication.

ANNEX I

OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY (OPMEP) (CJCSI 1800.01G, 15 APRIL 2024) SERVICE INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL COLLEGE (ILC) JOINT LEARNING AREAS (JLA)

JLA 1 - Strategic Thinking and Communication. Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

JLA 2 - The Profession of Arms. Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

JLA 3 - The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War. Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument across the full spectrum of conflict to achieve national security objectives.

JLA 4 - The Security Environment. Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate interdisciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

JLA 5 - Strategy and Joint Planning. Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans across the spectrum of conflict. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives across the full spectrum of conflict.

JLA 6 - Globally Integrated Operations. Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.

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