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Fleet Seminar Program & NWC-at-NPS Program

College of Naval Command and Staff

JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS

Academic Year 2026-2027 Syllabus




JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS SYLLABUS AND STUDY GUIDE

**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION (CDE)
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE
ACADEMIC YEAR 2026-2027 SYLLABUS**

FOREWORD

This syllabus provides a comprehensive overview and detailed description of the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course. Prepared for the College of Distance Education, for use in the Fleet Seminar Program (FSP) and Naval War College-at-Naval Postgraduate School (NWC-at-NPS) Program to assist the student in weekly seminar preparation and the development of a personal plan of study. Administrative information is also included.


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
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
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JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS COURSE DESCRIPTION

1. **Mission.**

In keeping with the Naval War College (NWC) Mission, the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course is designed to educate mid-career leaders for service at the operational and theater-strategic levels of war. These leaders will be capable of meaningfully contributing to staff actions necessary for the linkage of ends, ways, and means in the attainment of strategic and operational objectives in both peace and war.

2. **Course Overview.**

The Joint Maritime Operations course focuses on high-tactical and operational-levels of war throughout the competition continuum and is designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders, or staff officers at the operational level of war. The emphasis in this course is on applying operational art and naval/joint warfare theories to develop creative solutions to unstructured or ill-structured military problems. Although maritime operations and sea service contributions are emphasized, the capabilities of all services are studied with ultimate focus on planning and execution of joint/combined operations at the joint/combined task force and maritime/naval component commander levels. The academic year will flow from the historic and theoretical to the modern and practical application of warfare, and will end with a final planning exercise intended to allow students to display their comprehension of the syllabus material and to demonstrate critical and creative thinking skills.

Via extensive study of numerous case studies, the JMO student is challenged with four enduring questions from the perspective of maritime and joint force commanders and their staff planners:

- What are the objectives and desired end state? (*Ends*)
- What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and end state? (*Ways*)
- What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (*Means*)
- What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (*Risk*)

The ability to answer these questions, and create sound ways to achieve ends, is the essence of the Joint Maritime Operations course.

3. **Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Officer Professional Military Education Policy.**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction CJCSI 1800.01 sets the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for Joint Professional Military Education (JPME). It directs the services and service colleges to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting the outcomes it defines. The Officer JPME outcomes are designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders or staff officers at the operational level of war.

The OPMEP Service Intermediate-Level College (ILC) Joint Learning Area (JLA) objectives are presented in Appendix A to highlight the linkage between them, the NWC Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) in Appendix B, and the CDE JMO Course Learning Outcomes

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(CLOs) in Appendix C. Each syllabus session also lists supporting learning objectives to be addressed in that session.

4. NWC Program Learning Outcomes.

Graduates of the CDE FSP and NWC-at-NPS Programs will achieve JPME, Phase I certification and will have demonstrated the following Naval War College Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs):

PLO 1: Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition. JLAs: 3, 5, 6.

PLO 2: Create theater military strategies designed for contemporary security environments. JLAs: 4, 5.

PLO 3: Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to operational decision making. JLAs: 2.

PLO 4: Apply theory, history, doctrine, and sea power through critical, strategic thought in professional communication. JLAs: 1, 3, 4.

5. CDE JMO Course Learning Outcomes.

The CDE JMO learning and assessment methodology is based on outcomes aligned with officer OPMEP JPME objectives and Naval War College desired student educational outcomes. Students who successfully complete the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course will be competent in the four JMO Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs):

CLO 1: Apply critical thinking, creative thinking, and problem-solving skills to support decision-making in joint maritime operations.

CLO 2: Apply operational art to operational and high-tactical objectives in the maritime environment.

CLO 3: Apply the principles of naval warfare theory to joint maritime objectives across the spectrum of conflict.

CLO 4: Apply the Joint/Navy Planning Process to communicate how to employ maritime power to achieve military objectives.

Outcomes are further subdivided into associated elements to provide greater resolution of student proficiency and to allow for flexibility in assessment methods. See Appendix C.

6. Course Organization.

The Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course introduces the student to subject matter organized into five blocks. Each block is further subdivided into sessions. The course is sequenced to build upon previous sessions, ending with the application of the Navy/Joint Planning Process (NPP/JPP) in a realistic scenario. Each block in the Joint Maritime Operations course is designed to build upon the next, from building a sound foundation of maritime and joint warfare theory, to appreciating the challenges of the current operating environment, understanding current joint/service doctrine and capabilities, and finally grasping

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the logic of the planning processes. An overview of the five blocks follows:

Block 1—“Course Introduction and Naval Warfare Theory” This block first introduces the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) course, and places emphasis on the roles of critical and creative thinking in military problem solving and decision making. Following this introduction, students will be exposed to the theory and objectives of naval warfare, to include an in-depth look at naval tactics, naval combined arms warfare, and naval command & control.

Block 2—“Joint Operational Warfare Theory (Operational Art)” This block encompasses the theory and practical application of Operational Art (Op Art). In these seminar sessions students are introduced to the fundamental themes of Op Art as a body of warfare theory. These themes of joint warfare theory, along with those of maritime theory from the previous block, are subsequently woven throughout the rest of the course. The enduring value of Op Art in planning and military decision making is thoroughly illustrated using historical case studies such as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, and current operations.

Block 3—“Modern Operations Across the Competition Continuum” This block examines the wide variety of activities and mission sets which may be executed or supported by the military throughout the modern competition continuum. The block begins with an overview of the concepts of the competition continuum, great power competition, and the global security environment. It then presents the aspects of operational law and ethics most relevant to modern joint operations, followed by sessions covering the many varied missions and considerations along the continuum including engagement, deterrence, crisis response, and limited contingency operations. The block concludes with analysis of modern domain considerations (specifically cyberspace) and unconventional statecraft. Throughout the block, case studies will be used to enable students to fully comprehend military and interagency operations in support of strategies designed to address these very complex types of operations.

Block 4—“Modern Joint Operational Warfare” This block analyzes modern warfare from the perspective of a Joint Task Force (JTF), and initially analyzes its Command and Control (C2) organization into national, service, and functional components. The block then explores operational level planning considerations in employing and synchronizing the capabilities of the military services (U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Space Force) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). These capabilities are also considered in the context of the doctrinal responsibilities of each of the JTF functional component commanders. Complementary sessions follow on operational logistics, sustainment, deployment, and intelligence.

Block 5—“Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise” This block begins with an introduction to the Joint Strategic Planning System, and a session presenting the JPP. Following this introduction students are presented with the fictional Borneo scenario, and directed to respond to Presidential and Commander INDOPACOM direction to organize as a JTF Joint Planning Group (JPG) and execute the JPP to provide Courses of Action (COAs) and a recommendation to the Commander. This exercise gives students the opportunity to apply the JPP along with all the theory, doctrine, and historical knowledge gained thus far by tasking them to develop an operational level solution (JTF COA/order) to a modern joint military problem.

The exercise sessions are intended to be both an introduction to joint planning as well as an opportunity for students to appreciate the integral role of Operational Art,

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naval/joint/combined operations, service capabilities, joint/service doctrine, and contemporary operational issues in a realistic, complex practical planning exercise. The exercise simulates the dynamics of superior-subordinate operational staffs in a hypothetical, complex scenario that requires integrated operational level planning decisions on the use of military force in a maritime/joint/coalition/multinational environment.

7. Syllabus Organization.

The syllabus establishes the basis for required course work and serves as an intellectual roadmap for the academic year. In each session, the *Focus* specifies the general context of the topic in the course flow. Next, the *Objectives* provide specific session goals and an intellectual line of departure for the readings. The *Background* section helps introduce the main concepts in each session, and provides their significance. The *Questions* section is designed to focus the student's mind as he or she proceeds through the assigned readings, and should inspire critical thinking. The questions provided will serve as a foundation for seminar discussion and therefore should always be referenced to ensure a student is prepared for seminar discussions. The *Required Media* and *Required Readings* sections provide the requirements for student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic. The *Supplementary Readings* section is provided for those who want to enhance their preparation or go into more depth about a session topic.

The Joint Maritime Operations course fulfills many of the officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I requirements established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in the OPMEP guidance. The outcomes identified in the Appendices, and the objectives in each class session, reflect these requirements. The remaining JPME Phase I requirements are fulfilled in the Theater Security Decision Making and Strategy & War courses.

8. “Active Learning” Methods of Instruction.

The Socratic Method. The seminar is the fundamental learning forum for this course, with student expertise being a significant part of the learning process. For a seminar to succeed, there must be open and candid sharing of ideas and experiences, engaged through civil discourse. Students will find that even the most unconventional idea may have some merit. Successful seminars—that is, seminars whose members leave with the greatest knowledge and personal satisfaction—are those made up of students who come to each session equipped with questions, observations, and insights based on thorough preparation. These insights build upon the assigned questions and are generated through a combination of reading, experience and thinking through the material. Most students leave the seminar with new insights or even more thought-provoking questions. Student preparation, free and open discussion, and the open-minded consideration of other students' ideas, all contribute to a valuable seminar experience. The “one-third” rule is the keystone of the seminar approach. The first third is a well-constructed, relevant curriculum. The second third is a high quality CDE JMO faculty to present the material and guide the discussion, and the most important third is the participation and contribution of the individual students. Only by thoroughly preparing for seminar sessions can students become active catalysts who generate positive and proactive seminar interaction and refine critical and creative thinking skills.

The Case Study Method. This method of instruction is used to provide intellectual stimulation for students and is designed to develop student abilities to analyze and solve problems using the knowledge, concepts, and skills honed during the academic year. A concomitant benefit of

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the case study is to deepen the experiential pool in students through analysis of past great captains of war or to expand the knowledge of a specific geographic area. Some of the cases and problems stress individual effort and planning, while others require a team or staff approach. Cases may consist of historical events, analyzed for tactical, operational and theater strategic lessons, or postulated crisis situations that demonstrate the application of concepts such as presence, deterrence, international law, rules of engagement, and self-defense. Case studies sometimes will be narrowly focused to illustrate a specific force and its capabilities and limitations or to highlight explicit concepts involving an aspect of tactical, operational, or theater-strategic warfare. Seminars are often split into smaller groups or teams to prepare solutions and responses. The case study method of instruction allows students to achieve a higher level of learning while providing students with many more data points relevant to problem solving in the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment in which we operate. Students will be tasked with analyzing the case study material, synthesizing information, and evaluating recommended courses of action that they create.

The Lecture-Seminar Method. To share the vast experience of some of the Naval War College faculty members and guest speakers, lectures are often provided. Recordings of these lectures are typically provided on Blackboard/Sakai as indicated in the *Required Media* section of a particular seminar session. Students are encouraged to critically analyze the information presented by speakers. JMO lectures are intended to generate questions that the students may discuss in seminar and are not intended as merely the transmission of knowledge.

The Practical Exercise/Wargame Method. Exercises task students to *apply* information presented in the curriculum, thus demonstrating course outcomes. Practical exercises and wargames allow students time to analyze information critically in order to develop viable solutions to military problems. Wargames may be used in class to test student solutions against a thinking opponent.

9. Media and Readings.

JMO sessions are supported by various media and readings. The purpose of the media and readings is to assist in understanding the many aspects of the topics being presented, and often, to provide divergent points of view on the same topic. For the most part, the readings and media are intended to convey to the student basic information, the mastery of which will facilitate in-class discussions. Many of the readings provide point-counterpoint and are intended to foster discussion. Students are reminded, however, that as critical thinkers, all readings should be questioned concerning their relationship to the topic, to other readings, and to the personal experience of the student. While the vast majority of assigned readings and media have been loaded onto Blackboard (FSP) or Sakai (NWC-at-NPS), we may issue some books and readings, due to their value as reference material (students must return books to Newport or Monterey/NPS, as appropriate, at the end of the course). Each session lists categories of media and readings. The categories are as follows:

- ***Required Media*** include videotaped lectures, service briefs, interactive exercises and exercise background and should be treated the same as any *Required Reading*. They must be viewed prior to the session. All serve to enhance the learning experience by providing critical background for certain blocks or for specific sessions. They are provided on Blackboard and on Sakai.
- ***Required Readings*** are those that must be read prior to the session. Often professors will

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offer additional guidance on the priority of the readings based on the special needs of the individual seminar or recommend students scan a particular reading for broad content or as a refresher. These readings are provided on Blackboard and on Sakai. *Supplementary Readings* are those relevant to a session topic which may be useful to a student seeking more information in order to gain insight beyond that provided by the *Required Readings*; this includes additional background material on case studies and exercises. The *Supplementary Readings* listed in the syllabus are not issued but may be found in most libraries or on-line.

Included in these readings' categories are case studies, problem sets, books, manuals, and excerpts from manuals. There will be no classified material issued to students. The college provides materials to meet the course objectives. Students may refer to other materials available from local commands, libraries, or websites during the course. Extra materials can supplement, but will not substitute for, the provided materials. Policies and procedures for issue and return of course materials will be discussed at the first session.

The vast majority of required readings and various other media will be provided on Blackboard (FSP) or Sakai (NPS). Blackboard and Sakai are set up with the syllabus loaded and all of the readings and media presented as hyperlinks. Simply locate the session in the syllabus, go to the *Required Media* or *Required Readings*, and select the hyperlink for the reading you want to review.

The amount of preparatory reading required for each session depends on a variety of factors, including topic complexity, session objectives, and course schedule. This syllabus is a powerful tool in that it allows students to develop a personal plan of study that leads to better time management and a deeper understanding of the syllabus material. *It is recommended that students review the session requirements at least a week ahead of time in order to regressively and accurately plan preparation time.*

10. Requirements.

- 10.1. **Student Responsibilities.** FSP and NWC-at-NPS students are expected to prepare for each seminar and to participate in classroom discussions and exercises. A questioning attitude and a willingness to enter a rigorous but disciplined discussion are central to the success of the course. An officer's ability to engage positively and productively in deliberations and formulate advice is integral to sound operational decision making. Professors evaluate student contributions with regard to one's skill in persuading peers and seniors, because that persuasive leadership is critical to an officer's continued success. Professors evaluate written products because they represent one's ability to synthesize and organize information in a coherent manner, applying analytical frameworks and critical and creative thinking. Seminar work and written products also demonstrate the level of mastery achieved by individual students. Students are expected to improve both their written and verbal skills throughout their NWC experience.
- 10.2. **Workload.** The structure of the study requirements generally provides for an even workload throughout the academic year/quarter. Some peaks will naturally occur. Students should discuss any perceived overloads with the faculty. Advanced planning and careful allocation of time will help mitigate these peak workloads. *Student surveys show that the course requirements involve an average workload of eight to ten*

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hours per week. Assessments (explained below) may require additional time.

10.3. **Assessments.** Faculty will assess student learning using three means: formative assessments, summative assessments, and student contribution assessments. Assessments focus on student progress toward desired educational outcomes. Assessments also serve as a means for feedback and interaction between faculty and members of the seminar, providing the student some measure of how he or she is doing at that point in the course. Criteria for the grades of these assessments can be found in the “Grading Criteria” section of the syllabus.

- a. **Formative assessments (FAs)** are relatively short assignments (e.g., fill-in-the-blank, point paper, short answer, intermediate planning products) designed to evaluate student proficiency of individual learning objectives and outcomes addressed by sessions in each block. FAs are graded pass/fail and are used to monitor ongoing student learning, to help students identify any weaknesses or areas that need work, and to help professors recognize when students are struggling so they can address problems immediately. Although FAs are not assigned a numeric grade a student must demonstrate a passing level of the concepts being assessed (comparative to 80%). Students that fail to demonstrate the required level of understanding shall be provided feedback and remedial instruction, and within 48 hours shall re-accomplish the deficient portions of the FA. Those not passing on the second attempt will be considered for removal from the course. Successful completion of all FAs in a block is a prerequisite for completing the overall block requirements and for taking the next summative assessment.
- b. **Summative assessments (SAs)** are relatively long, more comprehensive assignments (e.g., essays, written analysis, highly detailed final planning products) designed to evaluate student mastery of *all learning objectives and outcomes addressed to that point in the course, and ensure students have achieved the CDE JMO CLOs prior to course completion*. Students will receive detailed feedback addressing both the strengths and shortcomings of their written work along with a numeric and corresponding letter grade. Receiving a grade of less than 80% means a student has not demonstrated the required level of mastery of the outcomes being evaluated. These students will receive remedial instruction and be reassessed once the remedial work is completed. The time between the receipt of the initial grade and the resubmission will not exceed one week. The student’s second attempt will be evaluated to the same standard as the initial submission. If the student then demonstrates the required level of mastery of the outcomes being evaluated, he/she will be assigned a grade of 80% for the assessment and permitted to continue the course of study. Students who fail to demonstrate the required level of mastery of the learning outcomes being evaluated on their second submission will be considered for removal from the course. Late submissions shall be handled in accordance with guidance in paragraph 12.3.
- c. **Student contribution assessments** are completed by the professor(s) with a numeric and corresponding letter grade at the end of each block (FSP) or quarter (NPS). Students will be evaluated on criteria such as their level of preparation for each class, the quantity and thoughtfulness of written and verbal contributions to class discussions, and their performance as a team member or leader. Contribution below expected

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standards shall be handled in accordance with guidance in paragraph 11.2.

10.4. Weight of Assessments.

The following is a composite listing of JMO course requirements, type of effort, basis of evaluation, time due and their relative weight. The requirements for the NWC-at-NPS JMO course are slightly different due to the lesser time available and because it is taught in two separate quarters, JMO-1 (NW-3275) and JMO-2 (NW-3276). NWC-at-NPS course requirements are reflected below in parenthesis.

FSP (and NWC-at-NPS) JMO Course Requirements

REQUIREMENT	TYPE EFFORT	BASIS OF EVALUATION	DUE	WEIGHT
Formative Assessments	Individual	Various formats may be used. Students will receive specific instructions from their professor.	Per Course Calendar	Evaluated for competency, pass/fail.
Student Contribution	Individual, but may be in a group setting	Quality of individual contribution to seminar discussion and course active learning events.	End of Block, 6% each (NPS 15% per qtr)	30%
Summative Assessment 1	Individual	Written response demonstrating mastery of applicable learning outcomes.	Block 2 (NPS JMO 1 end-qtr)	35%
Summative Assessment 2	Individual	Written response demonstrating mastery of applicable learning outcomes.	Block 4 / 5 (NPS JMO 2 end-qtr)	35%

10.5. Fleet Seminar Location Assignment.

Ideally, seminar groups provide a balanced distribution between Services, agencies and functional expertise. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are provided via separate correspondence before the start of the academic year from the CDE FSP Manager.

10.6. Fleet Seminar/NWC-at-NPS Schedules.

The JMO Course Calendar for both FSP and NWC-at-NPS is included later in the syllabus.

Fleet Seminar Program seminars generally meet for three hours each week either on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday evenings depending on location. Meeting places and times may change occasionally to adapt to visiting Naval War College faculty from Newport, visiting professors from colleges, universities or government organizations around the country, facility limitations, or local events or weather conditions.

NWC-at-NPS seminars meet for two hours twice a week during regular academic quarters.

11. Guidance for Assignments.

All Naval War College courses encourage a free and open exchange of ideas. Students are exposed to a broad spectrum of opinions to encourage individual analysis rather than learning

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preconceived doctrine. Two things about this methodology are worth noting. First, the views expressed by the faculty are their own and not necessarily related to an official Navy position. Second, the course provides few clear-cut answers to the issues addressed. This approach may be frustrating to some especially when being assessed, but it more accurately represents the complex and uncertain nature of issues students will grapple with in their profession and is considered a more effective method to develop the ability to analyze, draw conclusions, and make sound decisions. While there may be no single right answer to a question there are still weaker and stronger arguments based on their logic and premises, or more-sound and less-sound solutions based on the theories, doctrine, and historical cases offered throughout the course.

11.1. Writing Standards.

Written work submitted for grade should be formal, comprehensive, and in an academically acceptable style. The quality of work required is graduate school level. The Joint Military Operations Department's *Guidance for Written Solutions for the College of Distance Education (CDE) Students* is provided on Blackboard/Sakai to assist you in regard to the format and content of written work. When applicable, written work should begin with a clear statement that identifies the student's position on the issue or question and the methodology that will be used to argue the position. Arguments should be coherent and persuasive and should lead to conclusions consistent with the line of reasoning developed. Derivative information will have sources identified using an accepted format, preferably by adding basic parenthetical or in-text citations, including author and page number. Formal footnotes/endnotes and/or bibliographies are not normally required in JMO, unless it is specifically directed by the professor. Students should refer to a recognized style manual or writing guide for guidance on correct usage and acceptable convention. Once again, manuals for this purpose include, but are not limited to, the *Guidance for Written Solutions for College of Distance Education (CDE) Students*.

11.2. **Format.** Written work will normally be submitted electronically per instructions.

- a. **Formative Assessments** usually simply require entering responses directly into a text window in the Learning Management System (LMS).
- b. **Summative Assessments** will be submitted as a Word document in the following format:
 - First and Last Name in header for each page
 - Include the prompt/question exactly as it appears in the assessment
 - Times New Roman, size 12 font, double-spaced, left justified, 1" margins on all sides
 - Number all pages consecutively. Note: Minimum page limits encourage depth of analysis, while maximum limits encourage disciplined thinking and require the student to reduce their arguments to the essential points for greater impact. Do not include graphics, notes, bibliography, or title pages when counting pages.
 - Necessary citations for external reference material using parenthetical citations. Footnotes, endnotes, or a bibliography only required when directed.
- c. **Point Papers.** Point papers are short *one- or two-page* informative responses to a question. Point papers have a multipurpose nature on staffs; in this course they are typically assigned to make up an absence by summarizing the most important material of the missed session. *Guidance for Written Solutions for College of Distance Education*

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(CDE) *Students* provides a point paper format that will help students capture on one or two pages the relevant issues, facts, analysis and recommendations.

11.3. Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI).

GAI is a powerful emerging technology which students should learn to use, but it must be used responsibly. It should not be exploited as a substitute for individual critical thinking, analysis, and original thought. Military officers and other students of this program should not assume that they will have digital tools such as GAI available when communicating military advice or orders. Using GAI as a research aid is acceptable when cited. GAI shall not be used to compose written graded submissions.

The CDE JMO policy for use of GAI abides by NAVWARCOLINST 5230.1A dated 4 May 2026, which specifies permissible and restricted GAI uses while emphasizing a student's responsibility to verify the accuracy, quality, and reliability of any AI-generated content used and its source material. Additionally, students are reminded to follow appropriate operational security practices whether using military or non-military GAI tools.

Permissible Uses of GAI: May use GAI for research assistance with disclosure. *GAI tools may be used to assist with research tasks such as generating search terms, identifying key themes, summarizing secondary sources, or organizing bibliographic information. All uses of GAI for research assistance must be briefly disclosed in a note at the end of the assignment.*

Students should cite or disclose GAI use when A) content from GAI is quoted, paraphrased, or summarized or B) GAI offers interpretations, frameworks, or ideas that are incorporated into academic work. Reference Chicago Manual of Style or the below examples for format.

Students do not need to cite or disclose when GAI is used for A) grammar or spell checking, B) rewording for clarity or conciseness, C) translation of text, or D) evaluating sources.

GAI Disclosure Example: GAI tools (ChatGPT, OpenAI, May 2025) were used to help identify relevant literature and summarize key concepts during the research phase. All writing and analysis are the student's own.

GAI Footnote example: OpenAI, *ChatGPT*, response to "List and summarize the most widely accepted sources describing the strategic benefits of forward naval presence." May 24, 2025, <https://chat.openai.com/>.

Failure to disclose permissible GAI use, like failing to cite external sources, may be treated as academic dishonesty.

GAI Use Restrictions: May not use GAI to write academic submissions. *GAI may not be used to generate final content or analysis in academic submissions. Use of GAI tools in this manner may be treated as academic dishonesty.*

11.4. Late or Unsatisfactory Assessments.

Each formative and summative assessment will have a specific due date for submission. Unexcused tardy student work—that is, work turned in past the deadline without previous notification of the professor—will receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). On a case-by-case basis, work submitted more than 14 days late without the prior knowledge of the professor may result in the student's removal from the course. In any case, when written work is submitted

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more than 30 days overdue, a numeric grade of zero will be assigned and the Department Chair and Program Manager shall be notified with dis-enrollment the likely outcome. Faculty members are available to assist students with course material, to review a student's progress, and to provide counseling as required. Unsatisfactory assessments will be handled in accordance with paragraph 10.3b of this guide. Students with individual concerns are encouraged to discuss them as early as possible so professors can render timely assistance.

11.5. Grade Appeals.

a. Formative Assessments: Formative Assessments are tools of various types used by the student and the professor to measure a student's progress toward mastery of course learning outcomes. They are not graded events per se and, as such, are not subject to appeal.

b. Summative Assessments: Following remediation, students receiving a grade of ***less than B- / 80 on their second attempt may appeal within 72 hours after receipt of the grade*** in order to continue in the course of study. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the CDE Joint Military Operations Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. If this review results in a grade of B- / 80 or above, the student will receive a grade of B- / 80 for the assignment and proceed with the course of study. If the initially assigned grade is sustained or lowered, the student may further contest the newly assigned grade by submitting, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final. During the appellate process for a Summative Assessment grade, the student must satisfactorily complete follow-on coursework and graded assignments, if any, in order to remain in the course pending resolution of their appeal. ***Students may appeal a graded event for which they receive a grade of B- / 80 or above within fifteen (15) days*** after receipt of the grade. Contested grades shall be appealed first to the faculty member who assigned the grade, and then, if unresolved, to the CDE Joint Military Operations Department Chair. An additional grader will be assigned who will grade the submission in the blind (i.e., without specific knowledge of the initially assigned grade). This review may sustain, lower, or raise the assigned grade. In the event that this grade is subsequently contested, the student must submit, in writing and within 48 hours of receipt of the grade, a request that his/her appeal be taken to the Dean, CDE. The determination of the Dean, CDE is final.

c. Contribution Grades: Students may only appeal contribution grades to the faculty member who assigned the grade. That faculty member will consider the appeal, make a final determination, and present the situation and final determination to the Department Chair.

d. Final Course Grades: A final course grade is not subject to review except for computational accuracy.

12. Grading Criteria.

A course grade will be assigned based on grades for the **summative assessments** and for **student contribution**. All work in the prescribed curricula for the intermediate program will be graded using the standards below. *Fleet Seminar Program (FSP) and NWC-at-NPS students must*

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complete each of the three core courses (including JMO) with a B- or better grade to earn JPME Phase I certification. A B- or better is also required for the NWC Graduate Degree Program.¹

Grading rubrics help in the determination of grades, and are provided in this syllabus so that students will understand general graduate level performance criteria for summative assessments and student contribution. For reference, the NWC Faculty Handbook also states the following regarding statistical grade distribution: “Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35–45 percent As and 55–65 percent Bs and below is commonly achieved by the overall NWC student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it will rarely reach an overall A to B-and-below ratio of greater than or equal to an even fifty-fifty distribution.”

Student final course grades will be posted after students complete the end-of-course questionnaire. Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average of the weighted course segments, to two decimal places, along with the corresponding letter grade.

12.1. Summative Assessments. In addition to the substantive criteria specified below, the written response must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, syntax, format, etc.). Written work should conform to the *Guidance for Written Solutions for College of Distance Education (CDE) Students*.

- | | |
|-------------|---|
| A+ (97-100) | Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic. Demonstrates total mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |
| A (94-<97) | Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written. Demonstrates strong mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |
| A- (90-<94) | Above the average expected of graduate work. Demonstrates an exceptionally good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner. Demonstrates mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |
| B+ (87-<90) | Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis. Demonstrates mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |
| B (84-<87) | Average graduate performance. A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued. Demonstrates limited but acceptable level of mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |
| B- (80-<84) | Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity. Demonstrates minimally acceptable level of mastery of all learning outcomes evaluated. |

¹ NWC-at-NPS students are not eligible for the NWC Graduate Degree Program (GDP).

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- C+ (77-<80) Demonstrates some grasp of topic but provides insufficient rationale for response and misses major elements or concepts. Does not merit graduate credit. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the learning outcomes evaluated.
- C (74-<77) Demonstrates poor understanding of the topic. Provides marginal support for response. Misses major elements or concepts. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the learning outcomes evaluated.
- C- (70-<74) Addresses the question but does not provide sufficient discussion to demonstrate adequate understanding of the topic. Fails to demonstrate the required mastery of one or more of the learning outcomes evaluated.
- D (60-<70) Considerably below graduate-level performance and lacking in any evidence of effort or understanding of the subject matter. In some measures, fails to address the entire question.
- F (0-<60) Unsatisfactory work. Fails to address the questions, or paper displays evidence of plagiarism, cheating.

12.2. Student Contribution. The student contribution grades are determined by professor evaluation of the quality of a student's contributions to seminar discussions, projects, exercises and other course activities. The evaluation will consider a student's critical & creative thinking as demonstrated in oral or written communication when contributing to seminar activities. All students are expected to attend and contribute to each seminar session, and to listen and respond respectfully when seminar-mates or professors offer their ideas. This overall expectation underlies all criteria described below. Interruptive, discourteous, disrespectful, or unprofessional conduct or attitude detracts from the overall learning experience for the seminar and will negatively affect the contribution grade.

When a student's contribution grade falls below a B- (or is in danger of it) the Professor will intervene and ensure that the student understands that a contribution grade of B- or better is required for successful completion of each block. The student will be provided the opportunity to increase his contribution grade through remediation provided by the Professor. Remediation must be determined by the Professor to be of high quality to warrant an increase in the student's contribution grade. A final contribution grade below a B- in any block will result in a recommendation for disenrollment from the course.

The contribution grade for Block 5 (Joint / Navy Planning Exercise) is determined by the professor's evaluation of the student's contributions to exercise preparation, planning, and execution play. It is recognized that many students will participate in areas for which they have no prior expertise. Additionally, some positions have greater visibility. Consequently, each student will be evaluated on his/her preparation and contribution in each given role, taking into consideration the above factors.

- A+ (97-100) Peerless demonstration of wholly thorough preparation for individual sessions. Consistently involved, and contributes original and highly insightful thought. Exceptional team player and leader.
- A (94-<97) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for individual sessions.

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- Consistently involved, and frequently offers original and well thought-out insights. Routinely takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- A- (90-<94) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Regularly involved, and contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of sessions. Often takes the lead to accomplish team projects.
- B+ (87-<90) Above-average graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Involved and occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights. Obvious team player who sometimes takes the lead for team projects.
- B (84-<87) **Average graduate level preparation** for individual sessions. Participates and occasionally contributes original and insightful thought. Acceptable team player who takes effective lead on team projects when assigned.
- B- (80-<84) Minimally acceptable graduate level preparation for individual sessions. Infrequently participates or contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes speak out without having thought through an issue. Requires prodding to take lead on team projects.
- C+ (77-<80) Generally prepared, but not to minimum acceptable graduate level. Requires encouragement to participate or contribute; contributions do not include original thinking or insights. Routinely allows others to take the lead in team projects.
- C (74-<77) Preparation for individual sessions is only displayed when student is called upon to contribute. Elicited contributions reflect at best a basic understanding of session material. Consistently requires encouragement or prodding to take on fair share of team project workload. Only occasionally engages in seminar dialogue with peers and moderators.
- C- (70-<74) Barely acceptable preparation to continue. Contributions are extremely limited, rarely voluntary, and reflect minimal grasp of session material. Displays little interest in contributing to team projects.
- D (60-<70) Considerably below graduate-level performance in preparation and engagement, lacking in any evidence of voluntary effort or understanding of the subject matter.
- F (0-<60) Unacceptable preparation. Displays no interest in contributing to team projects; cannot be relied on to accomplish assigned project work. At times may be seen by peers as disruptive.

12.3. Diploma Requirements and Transcripts. Each student is responsible for ensuring all eligibility and academic requirements of the Fleet Seminar/NWC-at-NPS Programs are met and policies adhered to. The Naval War College CDE website (<https://usnwc.edu/college-of-distance-education>) contains policies and procedures for satisfying diploma and graduation requirements and providing official transcripts.

12.4. Academic Honor Code. The Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma or degree requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is

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prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author's original thought. Plagiarism, cheating, and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the "Exemplary Conduct Standards" delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis, or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and will be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- The verbatim use of others' words without citation;
- The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation;
- Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, course materials, lecture notes, films, etc., without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed written submission may lack the originality, creativity or critical thought expected of graduate-level work and may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. Cheating includes the following:

- Gaining unauthorized access to formative or summative assessments.
- Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of formative or summative assessments, unless specifically permitted.
- Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during formative or summative assessments.
- Using generative artificial intelligence (GAI) tools to generate final content or analysis in academic submissions of discussion board posts, formative assessments, or summative assessments.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper (written response for a formative or summative assessment) for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one course at the Naval War College without advance permission of the professor.
- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the Naval War College without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

Action in case of suspected violation:

If a student's submitted written work appears to violate this code of conduct, the following

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procedures shall be followed:

The Deputy Dean, CDE will be notified by the CDE JMO Department Chair and will initiate an investigation. The student will be informed of the investigation and be allowed to submit information on his/her behalf. Results of the investigation will be given to the Dean, CDE.

- The Dean, CDE will forward the results of the investigation and a disposition recommendation to the Provost. The Provost will review the case and determine whether it should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).
- The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.
- If the case is forwarded to the AIRC, the AIRC will review the case, inviting the student to participate by remote means such as phone-conference or tele-conference if feasible and desired; and/or accept any further written student information. The AIRC will make findings of fact and recommend appropriate action to the President, NWC. This action may include any or all of the following:
 - o Lowering of the grades on the affected work (this will be a letter grade of “F” and a numerical grade of between 0 and 59) or on the entire course of instruction.
 - o Inclusion of remarks in Fitness Reports.
 - o Letter to appropriate branches of Service, agencies, offices, or governments.
 - o Dismissal from NWC.
 - o Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or for appropriate action under rules governing civilian personnel.

Violations discovered after graduation will be processed similarly and may result in referral of the matter to the current command or office of the individual concerned and, if appropriate, revocation of the NWC diploma, master’s degree, and JPME credit.

13. End of Course Questionnaire.

Students’ anonymous constructive comments ensure the course improves in subsequent years. The principal objective of this course is to provide a useful professional educational experience. Please report achievement or non-achievement of this objective via the survey. Mutual respect and a common goal — student educational advancement — are the basis for the student and faculty relationship. *Release of a student’s final course grade and course completion letter is contingent upon completion of the course critique.*

14. Attendance.

14.1. Fleet Seminar Program (FSP): Students are expected to attend all seminars. Attendance is defined as the student's *physical presence* in a Fleet Seminar Program seminar (whether it is the home seminar or at another FSP location). Attendance is not achieved by “dialing-in” by phone, nor by connecting virtually via video conference *except* for A) in designated virtual-only seminars or B) by exception, in a professor’s directed virtual seminar day. *Isolated singular absences* are handled in accordance with the “Absences and Make-up Work” paragraph below. There is no distinction between “excused” and “unexcused” absences. A student who is *absent from four or more seminar meetings* (whether lecture or discussion class) in any single course may not be eligible, by accreditation standards, for the

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M.A. degree. Upon a fourth absence, or when a fourth absence is anticipated, the specifics of the situation shall be reported by the seminar Professor to the Department Chair and Program Manager in Newport, and a case-specific determination regarding eligibility for the NWC M.A. degree will be made by the Dean, College of Distance Education (CDE). Students who are subsequently ***absent from five or more events*** in any single course shall be reported to the course Department Chair and Program Manager upon the fifth absence, and a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for a Naval War College Diploma and JPME-I certification will be made by the Dean, CDE.

- a. **Visiting Other Fleet Seminar Sites.** Because of common schedules throughout the Fleet Seminar Program, students who must travel and might otherwise miss a session may be able to attend a JMO seminar at their temporary duty location if it hosts another Fleet Seminar. FSP JMO Locations and Availability can be found at <https://usnwc.edu/college-of-distance-education/Fleet-Seminar-Program/Locations-and-Availability.html>. Students who anticipate absences due to travel are expected to 1) proactively notify their home professor of all anticipated absences as far in advance as possible, 2) reference the above linked locations list and determine if they can attend another seminar while traveling, and 3) if a seminar is available then request the home professor's permission to attend the other location's seminar. The home professor will email the hosting professor to coordinate the visit. Students who attend a seminar at another location are given full credit for attendance once the hosting professor confirms the student's attendance and performance with the home professor.
- b. **Request for Visiting Attendance in a Virtual Seminar.** Requests for attendance in a virtual seminar must be for operational reasons (student on official travel where an in-person seminar is not available), or when a student is SIQ (sick in quarters). In these cases, a student may request to attend one of the two JMO virtual seminars, if space is available. The student must make this request in writing through their home Professor, who will then forward the request to the virtual seminar professor for approval. If the virtual seminar professor has not exceeded max capacity, and has not begun Block 5 exercise then he/she may approve attendance and should forward preparation guidance and a virtual link to the requesting student. Following the student's attendance in the virtual seminar, the Professor of the virtual seminar will advise the Professor at the home seminar of the student's actual attendance and level of preparation and contribution.
- c. **Attendance Requirements in Virtual Seminars.** In order to earn credit for attendance in a virtual seminar—whether permanently assigned or visiting—students must have and maintain the ability to project and receive both audio and video so that they may be full participants in the seminar experience. Students must also be in a quiet and private location where their full participation can be expected without any distractions for themselves or classmates. If full audio and video capabilities are not available, or a student is in an inappropriate or distracting location (e.g., airport, moving vehicle, restaurant) they will be asked to leave the virtual seminar and will not earn attendance credit.
- d. **Transfer to Other Fleet Seminar Site.** Students who receive permanent change of duty station orders or extended temporary-duty orders during the academic year should contact their professor and the Fleet Seminar Program Manager to either transfer between seminars (if possible) or arrange to complete the course by another means. In some circumstances professors with students temporarily visiting for three weeks or less may ask the Program

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Manager to enroll the student in an auditing status to provide them access to Blackboard.

- e. **Absences and Make-up Work.** Duty, work, or personal emergencies occasionally may necessitate missed classes. Students who miss a class are required to complete make-up work as directed by their professor. For example, missing a single FSP seminar will typically require submitting a Point Paper summarizing the major concepts covered during the missed sessions, due no later than the beginning of the next seminar. Make-up work does not erase the recorded absence for the session(s) missed, but it does count toward sustaining the minimum acceptable level of contribution.

14.2. NWC-at-NPS Program: Students are required to fulfill all academic requirements and attend all scheduled class sessions. Attendance is defined as a student's physical presence in seminar sessions or lectures for the course in which the student is enrolled in any given quarter. An absence shall be assessed to any student who does not attend a seminar session or lecture for any scheduled class period. There is no distinction made between "excused" and "unexcused" absences.

- a. Routine appointments (e.g., medical/dental) should be scheduled so as to avoid missing classes as stipulated in the published NPS attendance policy. For longer absences involving the granting of leave by NPS, notification is also required in advance, or when feasible in the case of emergency leave. For extended absences greater than three class sessions, including approved thesis research away from the NPS campus, students will be required to withdraw from the course, and reschedule it for another quarter. If a student is unable to attend a seminar session or lecture for any reason, the student must advise the Professor in advance via email that he or she will miss class for that period.
- b. When a student in the NWC-at-NPS program is absent from two sessions in any one quarter, the seminar Professor shall immediately report it to the Associate Dean, NWC-at-NPS. Upon the third absence, or when a third absence is anticipated, a case-specific determination regarding continuation in the course and eligibility for a Naval War College Diploma and JPME-I credit will then be made by the Dean, CDE in Newport.
- c. The NWC-at-NPS program is structured such that any student who cannot be physically present in the normally-assigned seminar on any given day or days, but who is able to attend another NWC-at-NPS seminar for that day or those days, is given full credit for attendance. Students are responsible for advising their professor in advance of an anticipated absence, as well as for coordinating participation with another NWC-at-NPS seminar professor if possible. Such coordination will include email advisories to both professors documenting their attendance. If a student is unable to attend any NWC-at-NPS seminar for a given day or days, the student must submit a point paper responding to one of the discussion questions within the syllabus for the session(s) missed. This submission will not erase the recorded absence for the session(s) missed. This written work shall be submitted at the beginning of the next seminar session. The quality of this written submission will be considered in the overall student contribution grade.

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15. Key Personnel.

If you require additional course information, or if problems develop that you cannot resolve locally with your site professor, contact one of the below individuals.

NEWPORT, RI

Chair, Joint Military Operations Department

Prof. Edmund Hernandez, CAPT USN (Ret)
(401) 856-5553
[edmund.hernandez@usnwc.edu]

FSP JMO Course Director

Prof. Adrian Schuettke, Col USAF (Ret)
(401) 856-5539 [adrian.schuettke@usnwc.edu]

Prof. Derrill Goldizen, Ph.D., Lt Col USAF
(Ret) (401) 856-5548
[derrill.goldizen@usnwc.edu]

Prof. Darren McClurg, CDR USN (Ret)
(401) 856-5555 [darren.mcclurg@usnwc.edu]

Prof. Jane Stokes, LtCol USMC (Ret)
(401) 856-5547 [jane.stokes@usnwc.edu]

CDE Director Nonresident Programs

Prof. Ron Oard
(401) 856-5542 [oardr@usnwc.edu]

CDE Fleet Seminar Program Manager

Mr. Thomas G. Alex
(401) 856-5542 [thomas.alex@usnwc.edu]

CDE Graduate Degree Program Manager

Prof. David Kelly
(401) 856-5541 [david.kelly@usnwc.edu]

MONTEREY, CA

Associate Dean, NWC-at-NPS

Prof. Keith Carter, Ph.D., LTC USA (Ret)
(831) 656-2286 [keith.carter@nps.edu]

NWC-at-NPS JMO Course Director

Prof. Greg Reilly, COL USA (Ret)
(831) 656-3300 [gdreilly@nps.edu]

Prof. James Adams, COL USA (Ret)
(831) 656-1924 [james.adams@nps.edu]

Prof. Richard Grahlman, CDR USN (Ret)
(831) 656-3540 [rgrahlman@nps.edu]

Prof. Gregory Larson, Ph.D., COL USAR
(831) 656-2286 [gregory.larson@nps.edu]

Prof. Dayne Nix, Ph.D., CDR CHC USN (Ret)
(831) 656-3141 [denix@nps.edu]

Prof. David Overton, LtCol USMC (Ret)
(831) 656-3020 [dfoverto@nps.edu]

Address official USNWC correspondence to:

President

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Naval War College

686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207

Facsimile: Newport (401) 841-2457 / Monterey (831) 656-7637

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16. Academic Year (AY) 2026-2027 Schedule.

CALENDAR NOTES: Professors may make adjustments. <u>FSP</u> Dates indicate beginning of week; class day varies by site. <u>NPS</u> Session numbers indicate a representative two quarter schedule, with no wargames in Block 2.				
Session	Topic	FSP Week	NPS Session	Assessments
BLOCK 1 - COURSE INTRODUCTION AND NAVAL WARFARE THEORY		2026	NPS QTR 1 NW3275 JMO I	
1.1	Course Introduction	7-Sep	1	
1.2	Military Decision Making and Commander's Estimate of the Situation	14-Sep	2	
1.3	The Joint Force: Service Introductions	"	3	
1.4	Naval Warfare Theory and Objectives	21-Sep	2	FA1 OUT
1.5	Naval Tactics	"	4	
1.6	Naval Capabilities: Platforms, Sensors, and Weapons	28-Sep	4	FA1 DUE
1.7	Naval Combined Arms: Air, Surface, and Subsurface Warfare	5-Oct	5	
1.8	Tabletop Exercise: Organizing Naval Forces	12-Oct	6	
BLOCK 2 - JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE THEORY (OPERATIONAL ART)				
2.1	Introduction to Operational Art	19-Oct	7	
2.2	Military Objectives and the Levels of War	"	7	
2.3	Operational Factors	"	8	
2.4	Theater Structure and Geometry	26-Oct	8	
2.5	Operational Functions	"	9	
2.6	Elements of Major Operations/Campaigns (Discussion, Plan Wargame)	2-Nov	10	FA2 OUT
2.7	Operational Design: Battle of Leyte Gulf (Execute Wargame, or Op Design Discussion)	9-Nov	11	FA2 DUE
2.7 cont'd	Operational Design: Battle of Leyte Gulf (Execute/Debrief Wargame, or Op Design Discussion)	16-Nov	11	
<i>FSP Thanksgiving Break 23 Nov - 29 Nov 2026</i>				
2.8	Operational Design: Falklands/Malvinas (Analyze, Plan Wargame)	30-Nov	12	
2.8 cont'd	Operational Design: Falklands/Malvinas (Execute Wargame, or Op Design Discussion)	7-Dec	12	SA1 (FSP)
2.8 cont'd	Operational Design: Falklands/Malvinas (Execute/Debrief Wargame, or Op Design Discussion)	14-Dec	12	
2.9	Operational Leadership	"	13	SA1 (NPS)
<i>FSP Holiday Break 21 December 2026 - 3 January 2027</i>				

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BLOCK 3 - MODERN OPERATIONS ACROSS THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM		2027		
Session	Topic	FSP Week	NPS Session	Assessments
3.1	The Competition Continuum	4-Jan	14	
3.2	The Military Role in Foreign Policy	"	14	
3.3	Operational Law and Ethics	11-Jan	15	
3.4	Engagement Across the Competition Continuum	18-Jan	16	
3.5	Limited Contingency Operations and Insurgency	25-Jan	17	
3.6	All Domain Warfare	1-Feb	18	FA3 OUT
3.7	Unconventional Statecraft	"	19-20	
BLOCK 4 - MODERN JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE			NPS QTR 2 NW3276 JMO II	
4.1	Joint Command and Control	8-Feb	21	FA3 DUE
4.2	USN, USCG, and the JFMCC	15-Feb	22	
4.3	USA, USMC, and the JFLCC	22-Feb	23	
4.4	USAF, USSF, and the JFACC	1-Mar	24	
4.5	U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), SOCOM, and the JFSOCC	"	24	FA4 OUT
4.6	Joint Logistics and Sustainment	8-Mar	25	FA4 DUE
4.7	Joint Deployment	"	25	
4.8	Joint Intelligence	15-Mar	26	SA2 (FSP)
BLOCK 5 - JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP) EXERCISE				
5.1	Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)	22-Mar	27	
5.2	Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise Introduction	"	28	
5.3	JPP Exercise - Planning Initiation and Mission Analysis	29-Mar	29-30	
	JPP Exercise - Mission Analysis - Continued	5-Apr	31	FA5 - MA
	JPP Exercise - COA Development	12-Apr	32-33	
	JPP Exercise - COA Development - Continued	19-Apr	34	FA6 - COA SA2 (NPS)
	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming	26-Apr	35	
	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming - Continued	3-May	35	FA7 - REC
	JPP Exercise - COA Comparison, Recommendation, and Approval	10-May	36	
	JPP Exercise - Order Development (WARNORD)	17-May	37-39	
5.4	Course Retrospective and Critique	"	40	

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SESSION STUDY GUIDES

BLOCK 1 – COURSE INTRODUCTION AND NAVAL WARFARE THEORY

Focus:

The focus of this block is on first previewing the entirety of the JMO course, and next beginning it by exploring the topic of Naval Warfare Theory.

JMO 1.1 COURSE INTRODUCTION

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of the objectives and requirements of the Joint Maritime Operations Course. Students will learn about the structure of the course and their particular seminar, preview their workload in order to plan academic time into their personal and professional lives, and begin conversing with each other about war by discussing a familiar topic (Principles of War) from a different perspective (allied, historical).

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the requirements and objectives of the course.
- Comprehend guidelines for administrative matters, classroom conduct, and assessments.
- Know the background and expertise of the faculty and student members of the seminar.

C. Background:

For the foreseeable future, the use of military power, together with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power, will be essential to achieving national strategic objectives. During this course you will study how to effectively wield the military instrument of power in concert with the other instruments to achieve operational and theater-strategic objectives.

While many students arrive in seminar flush with tactical knowledge and expertise, we will now open the intellectual aperture and examine higher levels of war, in this case the operational and theater-strategic levels. The focus therefore will be upon operations at the Joint Force Commander and Component levels (Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, Joint Task Force Commander, and Combatant Commander).

The first two readings ensure all students are informed of the course's structure, schedule, expectations, and policies. The last reading, by Michael Shurkin, is intended to spark critical thinking on a familiar topic: The Principles of War and their use in military decision making.

D. Questions:

- 1) What are the expectations and objectives of JMO, and how can students best prepare for the course each week, and over the upcoming year?
- 2) What are the Principles of War, and why should we use them?
- 3) What are the "right" and "wrong" ways of applying the Principles of War?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings: (27 pages)

College of Distance Education. *Fleet Seminar Program & NWC-at-NPS Program - Joint Maritime Operations Academic Year 2026-2027 Syllabus*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2026. Read pp. 1-21. (Government)

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College of Distance Education. *Guidance for Written Solutions for College of Distance Education (CDE) Students*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2017. Scan for eventual use later on assessments and point papers as required. (CDE 2062C) (Government)

Shurkin, Michael. "Modern War for Romantics: Ferdinand Foch and the Principles of War." War on the Rocks, July 8, 2020. Accessed 6 June 2023, <https://warontherocks.com/2020/07/modern-war-for-romantics-ferdinand-foch-and-the-principles-of-war/>.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Chicago Manual of Style Online. Accessed on 12 May 2026. <http://chicagomanualofstyle.org>

Hacker, Diana and Nancy Sommers. *A Writer's Reference*. 10th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford / St. Martin's, 2022.

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. 9th ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2018.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. A-1 to A-5 "Principles of Joint Operations." (JP 3-0) (Government)

JMO 1.2 MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND THE COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES)

We set out to answer a specific question: When can you trust an experienced professional who claims to have an intuition? It was obvious that Klein would be more disposed to be trusting, and I would be more skeptical. But could we agree on principles for answering the general question?

—Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking Fast and Slow*

A. Focus:

Graduate level courses often start with an emphasis on critical thinking, and JMO is no different in this respect. JMO is ultimately about enrolled officers developing into better military decision makers, and this arguably cannot occur without developing the skill and habit of critical thinking. This specific session introduces the decision-making framework of the *Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES)* as a foundational concept incorporating critical thinking, logic, and several bodies of warfare theory to arrive at sound military decisions. These foundational concepts set the groundwork for applying the CES throughout the course, and onward in any leadership position.

B. Objectives:

- Understand what critical thinking is, and why it is important to a military leader.
- Understand how critical thinking and logical reasoning are employed in the development of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation, and in military decision making.

C. Background:

The “estimate of the situation” is foundational to *any* decision-making process, whether it be for personal, professional, business, or military missions. Given a problem one must collect all the facts of the situation, determine the obstacles, and consider the options. Options are then weighed against obstacles, resulting in a decision of the best way forward. Operating off of falsehoods, invalid assumptions, or misidentified cause-effect relationships can spell disaster for any decision.

The *Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES)* is a logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the factors affecting a military situation to determine the best available method of accomplishing a given mission. As will be seen through the readings, the CES is structured using *logical reasoning and critical thinking*, and so an understanding of these topics can help military professionals better employ the CES as a decision-making tool.

In the first reading, U.S. Army TRADOC provides a primer on what critical thinking is, why it's so important, and how it can become derailed in a group setting. This knowledge will then be expanded and applied in the Vego reading, where he illustrates the logical structures embedded in the CES. This basic framework of military decision-making will be repeatedly considered as the JMO course proceeds.

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D. Questions:

- 1) What is critical thinking, and why is it so necessary for military leaders to be good at it?
- 2) Describe the relationship between logical reasoning (e.g., evaluating the validity of an argument, or the soundness of a conclusion) and critical thinking.
- 3) Describe some typical barriers that may hinder a group's ability to critically think.
- 4) Why is the CES described as a "logical process of reasoning?"
- 5) How do the elements of a commander's estimate of the situation interact?
- 6) Referencing Vego's description of the Commander's Estimate, describe in your own words how logical reasoning relates to the depicted CES, and sound military decision making?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings: (Approx. 25 pages)

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. "*The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook*." UFMCS, Ft Leavenworth, KS. January 2015 (superseded version but still applicable). Read: 43-56.

Vego, Milan. "*Logic of the Commander's Estimate of the Situation*." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2016, updated 2024 (with CES diagram). Read pp. 1-13. (NWC 2158A).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Allen, Charles D. and Stephen J. Gerras. "*Developing Creative and Critical Thinkers*." *Military Review* (November December 2009): 77-83.

Buell, Thomas B. "*Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and the Naval Planner's 'Holy Scripture': Sound Military Decision*." *Naval War College Review* 26, no. 3 (1973): 31-41.

Hartig, William J. "[*Introduction to Problem Solving*](#)" *lecture*, Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2010. Accessed 12 May 2026.

Hartig, William J. "*Problem Solving and the Military Professional*." Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2010. (NWC 1029) (Government)

King, Charles. "*How to Think*." Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service and Department of Government. 1999. Approx. 10 pages.

Vego, Milan. "*The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process*." *Joint Force Quarterly* 88, 1st Quarter 2018.

JMO 1.3 THE JOINT FORCE: SERVICE INTRODUCTIONS

For the infantry to seize and hold the island, ships had to control the sea. For a fleet to control the sea, the pilots had to fly from the island's airfield. For the pilots to fly from the airfield, the infantry had to hold the island. That tripod stood only by the strength of all three legs.

—James D. Hornfischer, *Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal*

A. Focus:

All service components contribute distinct capabilities to the joint force, and approach warfare grounded in their respective warfare theories. Each theory is tailored to the domain of warfare fought in, however it is their interdependence that is critical to creating overall joint effectiveness. This interconnectedness is not a given; service capabilities must be consciously integrated as parochialism and bias remain real obstacles based on years, even centuries, of single-service operational experience. This session focuses on the way each service approaches warfare, and is intended to increase understanding of the commonality and friction that can exist between these forces.

B. Objectives:

- Understand the differences in underlying warfare cultures and goals of each military service.
- Comprehend the commonality and friction that can exist between services, and the importance of “jointness.”

C. Background:

The armed forces of the United States acknowledge “jointness” as the fundamental organizing construct and ideal method of employing force. This cross-service combination of capabilities is understood to be synergistic, with the joint force sum greater than its service component parts. Properly organized, a high degree of interoperability reduces technical, doctrinal, and culture barriers that limit the ability of Joint Force Commanders (JFC) to achieve objectives.

The first reading by Marqis et al discusses the extent to which the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986 resulted in true jointness during Desert Storm. The second reading by Zimmerman et al discusses how the historical roots of each service influence how they approach their roles and missions for the Nation, and how each Service brings both a warfighting culture and capabilities to the joint fight. It is incumbent on the military and security professional to understand these key attributes of each service in order to better plan, and fight, alongside them.

D. Questions:

1. What is “jointness” and why do you think we study it?
2. What are the roles of each Service and SOF in supporting national defense and security.
3. What are the missions of each service, and where is there overlap between them? How

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does such overlap translate into Service competitiveness, both operationally and in relation to limited national resources?

4. To what extent does warfighting culture influence how a Service integrates into a joint force?

E. Required Media:

None. *Please see note under Supplementary Readings for students who are new to the topic of military services and forces (e.g., civil servants, inter-agency partners, etc).*

F. Required Readings: (Approx. 17 pages)

Marqis, Christopher G., Denton Dye, and Ross S. Kinkead. “*The Advent of Jointness During the Gulf War. A 25 Year Retrospective.*” Joint Force Quarterly 85, 2nd Quarter 2017. Read: 76-83. (NWC 4210).

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, Kimberly Jackson, Natasha Lander, Colin Roberts, Dan Madden, and Rebeca Orrie. “*Movement and Maneuver: Culture and the Competition for Influence Among the U.S. Military Services.*” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. Read: xi-xxi. (NWC 4211).

G. Supplementary Readings:

******As with all “Supplementary Readings” in this syllabus, the following document and complementary videos are ***not required reading*** for this specific session, but they are highly recommended for students less familiar with the military services. These are intended to provide a baseline understanding of what the services do, and how they operate. This material offers ~5 pages and ~60 minutes of video on each service, and will be revisited in Block 4. ******

[U.S. Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department. "Introduction to Service Capabilities." Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2022. Read: 1-37. \(NWC 4245\).](#)

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Service Briefs (Accessed 12 May 2026):

[U.S. Navy Briefing 2026. 00:36:00](#)

[U.S. Coast Guard Briefing 2026. 00:29:00](#)

[U.S. Marine Corps Briefing 2026. 00:47:00](#)

[U.S. Army Briefing 2026. 00:31:40](#)

[U.S. Air Force Briefing 2026. 00:41:30](#)

[U.S. Space Force Briefing 2025. 00:31:43](#)

[Special Operations Forces \(SOF\) Briefing \(dated, but applicable\). 01:02:47](#)

JMO 1.4 NAVAL WARFARE THEORY AND OBJECTIVES

He who commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will.

—Francis Bacon, 1561-1626

A. Focus:

This session addresses the utility of navies, the common objectives they pursue, and key aspects of naval warfare. It will explore the differences between war on land and at sea, and between war on the open ocean and in the littorals, because these distinctions often prove relevant in joint operational planning. Yet the main objectives of maritime warfare, especially sea control and denial, remain fairly constant.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the nature and character of naval warfare.
- Comprehend in strategic terms why nations build and maintain navies.
- Comprehend the primary objectives of naval warfare.
- Comprehend the main methods of obtaining, maintaining, and exploiting sea control and the conditions for denying and disputing sea control.

C. Background:

While any navy is likely to focus on its enemy counterpart, its efforts in the maritime domain will usually support larger objectives on land, because that's where people live and politics prevail. But maritime warfare differs significantly from land warfare, and this session aims to develop a basic understanding sea power and its employment by applying theory to the analysis of historical cases. We'll consider the nature and common objectives as well as maritime warfare's relationship to other domains and to technology.

The U.S. Navy has not engaged in fleet-on-fleet action since 1945, and the last ship-on-ship tactical action occurred in 1988 in the Arabian Gulf. Since "practice" is limited, theory, historical precedent, and assumptions about the future must inform how the Navy fights. The first reading by Uhlig will propose the idea of timeless "constants" of naval warfare to consider. Readings by Vego (classic) and Till (post-modern) will facilitate a sound, basic understanding of naval warfare principles, which students will then use to analyze the current U.S. tri-service maritime strategy document: Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. Finally, a short video on the Battle of Midway offers a chance to consider application of the concepts of naval objectives, specifically the contest over sea control and its exploitation.

D. Questions:

1. In general terms describe why nations build, employ, and maintain navies.
2. When considering the role of a nation's military forces, how does the maritime domain differ from the land and air domains (consider interface between land and sea, ocean transit

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routes, political/legal, military, social, economic and environmental)?

3. When considering Till's four historic attributes of the sea (resource, medium for transportation and exchange, medium for information and the spread of ideas, medium for dominion), how should these attributes be considered in planning maritime operations?
4. What are the principal objectives of naval warfare?
5. Describe the mutual relationship between war on land and at sea.
6. What are the main differences in conducting a war on the open ocean and in the littorals?
7. What is sea control and why does one obtain it? Can sea control exist in peacetime?
8. How are the terms 'sea control' and 'sea denial' related? How do these two, modern terms relate to the historical Command of the Seas?
9. What is meant by the term 'Choke Point Control'? How does this relate to Sea Control?
10. How can other services (air and ground forces) be employed in support of naval air to obtain, maintain and exercise control of the air/surface or deny that control?
11. How do the objectives of naval warfare relate to the overall objectives of the conflict itself?

E. Required Media (Approx. 0:15:05):

"Battle of Midway Tactical Overview – World War II History." YouTube, uploaded by The HISTORY Channel, 1 June 2018. Accessed on 26 March 2025. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kipF5zoCGAk>.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 71 pages):

Uhlig, Frank Jr. "The Constants of Naval Warfare." *Naval War College Review* 50 (Spring 1997): 92-105. (NWC 1238).

Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. Read: "Defining Seapower" pp. 23-26; "Missions of the Modern & Post-Modern Navy" pp. 32-41; "Operational Art and Modern Maritime Theory" pp. 79-82; "Command of the Sea and Sea Control" pp. 150-154; "Exploiting Command of the Sea" pp. 184-189. (Issued)

Vego, Milan. *Objectives of Naval Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2015. Read: pp. 1-15. (NWC 1102) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Obtaining and Maintaining Sea Control*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2015. Read: 1-5; scan the body noting the methods in bold; then read "Conclusion" pp. 33-36. (NWC 1108) (Government)

U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Navy. *Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power*. Commandant USCG, Commandant USMC, CNO, December 2020. Read: Foreword and pp. 1-8. (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Kraska, James. "How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015." *Orbis* 54, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 35-45.

JMO 1.5 NAVAL TACTICS

Forces at sea are not broken by encirclement; they are broken by destruction.

—Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. USN (Ret), *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat*, 2nd edition, 2000

A. Focus:

As an operational commander/planner, understanding the fundamentals of employing naval tactical actions is critical to developing accurate estimates of the situation, devising effective courses of action, and making sound decisions during the execution phase.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the fundamental principles for tactical employment of naval forces.
- Comprehend the relationship between naval tactics, operations, and strategy.
- Comprehend the mutual relationship between the development of naval technology and the evolution of naval tactics.

C. Background:

While operational commanders try to place forces in advantageous positions to achieve objectives, tactical commanders must bring combat power to bear on the enemy. As the October 2000 terrorist attack on USS Cole, the 1987 missile attack on USS Stark, and the 1982 sinking of Argentina's ARA Belgrano demonstrated, tactical failure at sea can have a profound impact on operations, strategy, and even the national mood. Understanding broad tactical principles ("cornerstones" as Hughes describes them) allows planners to determine how best to employ naval forces to accomplish operational and strategic objectives.

In generic terms, naval tactics can be defined as the theory and practice of planning and employing naval tactical actions aimed to accomplish a tactical objective. The main methods of tactical actions in increasing scale are: attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and battles. "Attacking effectively first" is of paramount importance in maritime warfare, because attack tends to be stronger than defense and often confers decisive advantage.

Hughes describes firepower (fires), scouting (ISR), and Command & Control (C2) as key naval tactical functions necessary to achieve the first effective attack. They are opposed by counterforce, anti-scouts (counter-ISR), and C2 countermeasure systems. The previously studied Battle of Midway is a good example of this characteristic maritime imperative to find and strike the enemy first. Had Spruance's attack proved ineffective (which it nearly did) or had the Japanese found and struck Spruance's carriers first, the battle's outcome would likely have been very different. Our study of the Battle of Savo Island will reemphasize these points.

D. Questions:

1. Why is understanding naval tactics important to the naval operational commander?
2. Describe Hughes' six cornerstones of naval tactics. Which seems most relevant to modern

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navies today? Which seems least relevant?

3. Describe the relationship between naval tactics and maritime strategy.
4. Why is there a mutual relationship between emerging technologies and naval tactics?
5. What are naval tactical actions?
6. How are naval tactical actions different from tactical actions on land or in the air?
7. How can a leader effectively apply Hughes' first cornerstone (Sailors Matter Most)?

E. Required Media (Approx. 1:03:57):

"Battle of Savo Island 1942: America's Worst Naval Defeat." YouTube, uploaded by Montemayor, 14 June 2021, www.youtube.com/watch?v=IICRQPIduFc. Accessed 12 May 2026.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 56 pages):

Hornfischer, James D. *Neptune's Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal*. New York: Bantam, 2012. Read: Prologue, pp. xvii-xx. (CDE 8172)

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Robert P. Girrier, *Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations*. 3rd ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Read: "Six Cornerstones", pp. 9-34; "The Great Trends", pp. 163-170; "The Great Constants", pp. 210-213. (Issued)

Stille, Mark. *The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013. Read: "Opposing Fleets" pp. 19-30, "Savo Island" pp. 38-45. (Issued)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cares, Jeffrey R. "Distributed Combat Power: The Application of Salvo Theory to Unmanned Systems." In *Operations Research for Unmanned Vehicle Operations*, edited by Jeffrey R. Cares and John Q. Dickmann. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016.

Hone, Trent. "The Evolution of Fleet Tactical Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1922-1941." *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 4 (October 2003): 1107-1148.

Lautenschlaeger, Karl. "Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare." *International Security* 8, no. 2 (Fall 1983): 3-51.

Swartz, Peter. M. *American Naval Policy, Strategy, Plans and Operations in the Second Decade of the Twenty-first Century*. Center for Naval Analyses (January 2017). <https://www.cna.org/analyses/2017/american-naval-policy-in-the-second-decade> Accessed 12 May 2026.

U.S. Department of the Navy. *How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 2015.

Vego, Milan. *On Naval Tactics*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, September 2015. (NWC 2148)

Vego, Milan. *Naval Tactical Actions*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, August 2015. (NWC 2155)

JMO 1.6 NAVAL CAPABILITIES: PLATFORMS, SENSORS, AND WEAPONS

Sea Fighting is pure common sense. The first of all its necessities is SPEED, so as to be able to fight WHEN you like, WHERE you like and HOW you like!

—Admiral Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, 1904

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of the major USN platforms, sensors, and weapons. Good tacticians must know the capabilities and limitations of the platforms from which they fight. Good operational planners must have a general understanding of naval capabilities in order to effectively employ them in joint warfare.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the capabilities, limitations, and interactions of typical naval platforms, sensors, and weapons.
- Comprehend the influence of the physical environment on each of these three components of naval forces.

C. Background:

In each domain forces move, see, and shoot differently. The maritime domain poses unique challenges to the operational commander, since it actually includes three physical domains (air, surface, subsurface), each requiring different sensors, weapons, and tactics. This in turn drives development of complicated ships, subs, and aircraft, the crews of which require extensive training to operate them effectively. Irrespective of any enemy, the maritime environment is a fundamentally hostile one. A disabled ship or aircraft is often immediately in extremis and far from help. “Halsey’s typhoon” in 1944 sank three destroyers, killed 790 sailors, damaged nine other warships and swept dozens of aircraft overboard. Shallow waters are full of rocks, reefs, and other hazards to navigation. Even the water itself is highly corrosive and very hard on equipment; whatever does not corrode is often flammable.

For these reasons, maritime warfare is fundamentally platform-centric. The successful employment of a maritime strategy is reliant upon effective development and employment of platforms, sensors, and weapons in the maritime environment. Throughout the Battle of the Atlantic in WWII radar, radar detectors, sonar, high-frequency direction finding, aerial reconnaissance, and cryptology each played a role in the struggle to detect or avoid detection. Weapons such as acoustic homing torpedoes, hedgehogs (forward thrown anti-submarine weapon), mines, rockets, and aerial depth charges conferred varying advantages in tactical engagements. On the allied side, the convoy system and escort tactics evolved with experience and improving technology. German U-boats employed surface attacks at night with specialized optics and target computers, while communications enabled wolfpack tactics. Such innovations happen at speed under the pressure of wartime, but they continue between conflicts as seen during the Cold War and continuing during the current competition between the U.S. and China, compressing decision making time for the maritime commander.

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D. Questions:

1. What type of sensors and weapon systems are commonly found on air, surface and subsurface combatants?
2. Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one's naval air forces.
3. Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one's naval surface forces.
4. Describe the tactical advantages and disadvantages in the combat employment of one's submarine forces.
5. Describe the relationship between platform, sensor, and weapon systems and naval tactics.
6. How have technological innovations in these capabilities influenced naval warfare tactics?
7. To what extent might advanced anti-ship missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, unmanned or remotely piloted vehicles, artificial intelligence, or new information warfare capabilities change naval warfare tactics in the future?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 97 pages):

Vego, Milan (edited by College of Distance Education). Extracts from *Fundamentals of Surface Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College. May 2016. Read: pp. 1-9. (Government)

Leighton, Bruce G. "The Relation of Aircraft to Sea-Power." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 54, no. 9 (September 1928): 728-745. (NWC 4109)

Lautenschlager, Karl. "The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001." *International Security* 11, no. 3 (Winter 1986-1987). Read: 94-111. (NWC 4077)

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., Robert P. Girrier, *Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations*. 3rd ed. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. Read: "Missiles in Maritime Warfare", pp. 144-151. (Issued)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Read: pp. 9-26. (NWC 3153T) (Government)

Stille, Mark. *The Naval Battles for Guadalcanal 1942*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013. Read: First and Second Battle of Guadalcanal pp. 58-84. Review: "Opposing Fleets" pp. 19-30. (Issued)

Pye, W.S. President, United States Naval War College to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. "Comments on the Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 11-15, 1942." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 5 June 1943. Read: pp. 4-11. (NWC 1167) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

JMO 1.7 NAVAL COMBINED ARMS: AIR, SURFACE, AND SUBSURFACE WARFARE

Knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other and not to be attended to at idle times and on the by . . .

—Pericles, 460 BC

A. Focus:

This session will introduce students to the employment of naval forces synchronized across multiple domains to achieve tactical objectives. Using naval tactical theory and knowledge of naval capabilities from earlier sessions, students will explore how navies employ forces in practice as a cohesive whole using combined arms concepts.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the main principles and methods of countering threats in the air, on the surface, and in the subsurface of the maritime domain.
- Comprehend how a naval force commands, controls, and coordinates submarines, surface ships, and aircraft along with their sensors and weapons to achieve naval objectives.
- Comprehend the influence of the littorals on the employment of naval forces.

C. Background:

Rapid technological changes in the late 19th, throughout the 20th, and into the 21st century led to the invention of submarines, airplanes, improved forms of naval propulsion, increasingly powerful and sophisticated weapons, and pervasive information related technology linking all of these together. This changed naval warfare from one encompassing primarily a single domain (the surface) to one where multiple domains were in play simultaneously. Navies had to develop platforms, sensors and weapons to compete in all three. As the 20th century progressed, the advantages of synchronizing capabilities across multiple domains to defeat enemy forces on, under, over, or adjacent to the sea became clear. Thus was born combined arms at sea.

Modern naval combined arms concepts can be broken down into the major warfare areas: Amphibious Warfare (AMW), Surface Warfare (SUW), Undersea Warfare (USW), Air Warfare/Air and Missile Defense (AW/AMD), Strike Warfare (STW), and Information Warfare (IW). While there are other missions and tasks undertaken by navies, these best encapsulate how they employ combat power to achieve tactical objectives. SUW, the oldest form of naval warfare, is conducted against ships. The purpose of USW is to defeat enemy submarines and mines. AW/AMD protects naval forces from air and missile attacks, which have arguably dominated war at sea since World War II. STW attacks targets ashore while at sea, while Expeditionary Warfare employs capabilities that typically maneuver onto land from the sea (e.g. amphibious operations). Last, but not least, the increasing importance of information related technologies led navies to recognize IW as a new warfighting function.

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Integrating platforms, sensors, and weapons, to achieve effects within each of these warfare areas, and then weaving them into a cohesive whole, is a significant command and control challenge. In modern times, this task has only increased in complexity because warfare at sea tends to be a joint fight, and frequently a combined (coalition) one. Additionally, while dispersed forces may be more survivable their C2 becomes more challenging and dependent on long-range communications, which tend to be more vulnerable to interception, interruption, and bandwidth limitations. Mastering this complexity, effectively employing multi-domain maritime, joint, and combined forces, may not be necessary for defending one's own waters. But projecting power far from home against capable opposition, at acceptable cost, is likely to require it.

D. Questions:

1. What does 'naval combined arms' mean? What is the purpose in fighting in this manner?
2. How can a naval force best organize its warfare capabilities when it typically must concern itself with offense and defense in the air, surface, and subsurface simultaneously?
3. What are the advantages and challenges found in each warfare area?
4. How does the physical environment affect the execution of each warfare area?
5. How do navies integrate or synchronize platforms, sensors and weapons across warfare areas to achieve tactical objectives?
6. How do Hughes' elements and processes of combat (theory) and F2T2EA ("Find Fix Track Target Engage Assess", doctrine) compare? Which is better and why?
7. How might continuing advances in technology change the way navies execute combined arms warfare at sea in the future?
8. How might joint or combined forces contribute to combined arms warfare at sea, and what are some of the advantages and challenges in integrating these capabilities?

E. Required Media (Approx. 00:08:00):

Kristof, Nick. "*Why the CWC Concept?*" (April 2020).

<https://usnwc.hosted.panopto.com/Panopto/Pages/Viewer.aspx?id=6da3f768-173a-4027-87d8-aecb01225a4f>

Please see optional videos under Supplementary Readings for students who are new to the topic of the Navy's warfare areas (e.g. non-Navy students, civil servants, inter-agency partners, etc).

F. Required Readings (Approx. 109 pages):

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: V-83 to V-86, "Major Naval Operations in War." (CDE 8166) [AMW] (Government)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Read: "Navy CWC Concept" pp. 197-204. (Government) (NWC 3153T) [Platforms]

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Filipoff, Dmitry. “*Fighting DMO, Pt. 1: Defining Distributed Maritime Operations and the Future of Naval Warfare.*” Center for International Maritime Security, 20 February 2023. [ASUW]

Clancy, Tom. *The Hunt for Red October*. Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984. Read: 51-54 and 57-67. (CDE 8177) [ASW]

Toti, William J. “The Hunt for Full-Spectrum ASW.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 140, no. 6 (June 2014): 38-43. (NWC 3219) [ASW]

Vego, Milan. *Fundamentals of Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2016. Read: 1-16. (NWC 1081A) (Government) [ASW]

Holmes, James M. *The Counterair Companion: A Short Guide to Air Superiority for Joint Force Commanders*. Research Paper, School of Advanced Airpower Studies. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, April 1995. Read: 35-40 and 60-61. Scan the rest. (NWC 4149) [AMD] (Government)

O’Neil, William D. “Naval Anti-Air Warfare.” *National Defense* LXV, no. 365 (February 1981). Read: pp. 1-6. (NWC 1137) [AMD]

Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2013. Read: Chapter 8, “Exploiting Command of the Sea”, pp. 189-201 and Chapter 11, “Expeditionary Operations”, pp. 252-280. (Issued) [AMW]

G. Supplementary Readings:

Not required, but based on student familiarity with the Navy’s warfare areas the following six videos are available for optional viewing:

[Surface Warfare](#) (CDE 8038Mc)

[Strike Warfare](#) (CDE 8038Mf)

[Amphibious Warfare](#) (CDE 8038Md)

[Submarine and Anti-Submarine Warfare](#) (CDE 8038Ma)

[Mine Warfare](#) (CDE 8038Mb)

Kline, Jeffrey. “*A Tactical Doctrine for Distributed Lethality.*” Center for International Maritime Security, 22 February 2016. Accessed on 12 May 2026. <http://cimsec.org/tactical-doctrine-distributed-lethality/22286>.

Vego, Milan. *Fundamentals of Surface Warfare (ASW)*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, June 2016. (NWC 1164A) [ASUW]

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JMO 1.8 TABLETOP EXERCISE: ORGANIZING NAVAL FORCES

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that “the things we did on the basis of well-tried and proven formations worked, and the ad-hoc arrangements turned out much less happily.

– Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This session furthers understanding of maritime tactical warfare through the time-honored practice of wargaming. Using concepts covered in previous sessions, students will organize and employ modern naval forces in a hypothetical scenario characterized by multi-domain threats.

B. Objectives:

- Apply critical and creative thinking skills and knowledge of naval power in task organizing a naval force based on objective, threat, environment, and capabilities.
- Apply the broad capabilities of the United States Navy’s principal weapons, platforms, and sensors.
- Comprehend the contrasting influence of the physical environment on the combat employment of surface forces 1) on the open ocean and 2) in the littorals.
- Comprehend the main methods in the employment of naval forces of obtaining / maintaining control of the surface/subsurface and air environments.

C. Background:

Wargaming has been a valuable military educational tool at least since the ancient Indians devised the game of chaturanga (chess) to teach military strategy in the 6th century A.D. Command Post Exercises (CPX), training trips, tactical talks, and sand-table exercises are common, contemporary descendants of ancient ‘war games.’ Like their predecessors, such practices allow us to hone intuition, practice critical thinking and creativity, test concepts and theories, and refine planning in ways that cost little in blood or treasure. While wargaming cannot replace live training, it has proven a valuable – even an essential – augmentation to it. In this session, students will exercise their growing understanding of maritime tactical warfare in a wargame based on a possible future contingency.

Leveraging concepts and capabilities covered in recent sessions, students will apply critical analysis and problem-solving skills to organize naval forces based on the objective, consideration of enemy and friendly capabilities, and the environment. Students will then concisely present and justify their chosen approach.

D. Questions:

1. Describe the utility of war gaming as a training and educational tool.
2. Develop, propose, and support your potential solution(s) to the given problem regarding the aggregation of naval power.

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E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 27 pages):

Hoffman, Rudolf M., General, with Generals Franz Halder, Friedrich Fangor, and Field Marshal Wilhelm List. *A Synopsis of War Games*. U.S. Army Historical Division, 1952. Read: pp. 1-4. (NWC 4143) (Government)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Tabletop Exercise #1 Scenario and Forces Assigned*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2015. Read: pp. 1-11. (NWC 4144) (Government)

U.S. Navy. *The People's Liberation Army Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century*. Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2015. Read: Chapter 2, "PLA(N) Equipment – Building a Modern Navy", pp. 13-25. (NWC 5032A) (Government)

Joint Military Operations Department. *U.S. Joint and PLA Tactical Capabilities*. Slide pack, Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2025. Reference as required for platform, sensor, and weapons capabilities. (NWC 2164I) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Nofi, Albert A. *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems: 1923-1940*. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010.

Vego, Milan. "The False Promise of Metrics." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 137, no. 10 (October 2011).

BLOCK 2 – JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE THEORY (OPERATIONAL ART)

Focus:

The focus of this block is on understanding and applying Joint Operational Warfare Theory, specifically the body of knowledge known as Operational Art.

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JMO 2.1 INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ART

Successful strategy achieves national and alliance political aims at the lowest possible cost in lives and treasure. Operational Art translates those aims into effective military operations and campaigns.

—Colonel Harry G. Summers, U.S. Army (Ret.),
On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, 1992

A. Focus:

This session introduces the historical roots of operational art, the term of reference commonly used to refer to the analytical approach bridging tactics and strategy. As you will see in later sessions, the concepts (or “tools”) making up operational art are suffused throughout the rest of the course, particularly in Block 5, where students are required to apply their understanding of operational art across the steps of the Joint Planning Process (JPP).

JMO “wargaming seminars” will plan, execute, and debrief two wargames using the Leyte and Falklands/Malvinas scenarios in Block 2, as part of Sessions 2.7 and 2.8. A limited number of non-wargaming seminars may instead complete group analysis and discussion of these two cases during those sessions. Professors will provide specific seminar schedules.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the meaning and historical origins of the term Operational Art.
- Comprehend the relationship between Operational Art, strategy, and tactics.
- Comprehend the importance of applying Operational Art during planning.
- Comprehend the historical setting of WW II major operations and campaigns in the Pacific.

C. Background:

Not surprisingly, operational art finds its roots in military history – the recorded experience of soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the past, particularly the Russian and German experiences prior to and during World War II. Over the past two centuries, as technology advanced and the scope and scale of war expanded, successful war planning required a way to ensure that attacks, raids, strikes, engagements, and battles – tactical actions, in other words – cumulatively accomplished larger objectives on the way to “winning” strategically– hence the birth of “operational art”. Hints at its influence (though not its formal recognition) can be found in our own American history, beginning with successful Union planning during the Civil War and especially in the planning done prior to World War II (the “Rainbow” plans).

Earlier sessions have already introduced the influence of operational art on modern maritime theory and major naval operations, most notably during World War II in the maritime Pacific, as evidenced in the storied naval battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: Why were the Allied naval task forces sent to those particular locations, at those precise times? What were the larger objectives military leaders hoped to achieve? How did they envision achieving them – what

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sequence of tactical actions at sea, in the air, and on land cumulatively might achieve those larger aims? These and other important questions find their answers through the application of operational art to the historical record surrounding these events. More importantly for the purposes of this course, an understanding of operational art in its historical context allows one to contemplate its application to hypothetical scenarios, which will be done on several occasions but especially during the Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise (a.k.a. the “Borneo Scenario”) at the end of the course.

D. Questions:

1. What is Operational Art?
2. How has technology influenced both Operational Art and how practitioners and theoreticians view the conduct of war?
3. How does Operational Art relate to theory, doctrine, and practice?
4. How does Operational Art link the strategic and tactical levels of war?
5. How does Operational Art assist commanders in making sound military decisions?
6. How might comprehension of Operational Art assist commanders in non-traditional warfare? What problems might arise in applying it this way?
7. Articulate why Operational Art begins with the objective.

E. Required Media (Approx. 1:06:00):

“War in the Pacific” Lecture. (CDE 8122M)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 48 pages):

Menning, Bruce W. “Operational Art's Origins.” *Military Review* 77 (1997): 32-47. (NWC 1110) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: I-3 to I-11, “On Operational Art” and I-15 to I-29, “Evolution of Operational Warfare.” (CDE 8090) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. Read: II-3 to II-8 (JP 3-0) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Read: III-1 to III-6. (JP 5-0) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Matheny, Michael R. “*The Roots of Modern American Operational Art*.” Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, Department of Strategy, Planning, and Operations. https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/modern_operations1.pdf Accessed 12 May 2026

Vego, Milan. *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

JMO 2.2 MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND THE LEVELS OF WAR

Pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination—a maxim which should take first place among all causes of victory.

— Carl von Clausewitz, *Principles of War*, 1812

A. Focus:

This session introduces two key concepts, and more importantly the relationship between the two, which create the very structure that military actions are predominantly executed under: objectives and levels of war. In order to illustrate the significance of these concepts, and many more to follow under the framework of Operational Art, the session also introduces The Leyte Gulf Case Study (WW II U.S. and Allied invasion of the Philippines against the Japanese).

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the relationship between the desired end state and objectives at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Comprehend the principal methods of combat force employment: campaigns, major operations, and tactical actions.
- Comprehend the concept of regressive planning.
- Comprehend how consideration of the four key questions of ends, ways, means, and risk can help in achieving objectives.

C. Background:

National leaders and strategists develop strategies to achieve national security by broadly questioning four inter-related things (four “strategic questions”): the *ends* (or objectives), the *ways* (or methods of combat force employment), the *means* (forces and capabilities, addressed later in the course) and the *risks* (imbalances between objectives, methods, resources, and capabilities).

Although war is not an inevitable part of a security strategy, preparation for war arguably is. If war is necessary for national security, civilian and military leaders must appreciate that it is deadly and costly. In order for those costs to have value all military operations must be purposeful, and to ensure purpose all planning must begin with a carefully selected *objective*. Military efforts that do not contribute toward an objective are wasted, and waste contributes to the exhaustion of a force (culmination). For these reasons, the concept of the objective is presented in this session.

The previous session outlining the origins of Operational Art illustrates an additional important consideration. Given the modern scope and scale of war a single leader cannot direct all the detailed actions required to defeat an enemy and achieve strategic objectives. Therefore modern military objectives should be “nested,” or logically arrayed such that larger, higher level objectives can be achieved by accomplishing a number of smaller, lower level, related objectives. In order to consider the possibility of war in multiple theaters, this course considers the national-strategic, theater-strategic (when applicable), operational, and tactical levels.

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D. Questions:

1. What is the desired end state and what are its main characteristics?
2. What is the relationship between the desired end state and the strategic objective?
3. How do U.S. military commanders derive military objectives from strategic direction?
4. What are the distinctions among tactical, operational, and strategic physical objectives? Why is it important to properly comprehend these distinctions?
5. How do the “methods of combat force employment” relate to the levels of war?
6. What is the relationship between a military objective and its constituent tasks?
7. Some theorists claim that technology has compressed the levels of war to the point that the differences are no longer significant. Do you agree? Why or why not?

Leyte Case Study (answer from your sides’ perspective, Allies vs Japan)

8. What were the national strategic, theater-strategic, and operational objectives in the Leyte operation? Were they good or bad? Explain your response.
9. Was the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte aimed to accomplish an operational or a strategic objective? Explain.
10. What were some of the major tactical objectives of each side in the Leyte Operation? Were they well or poorly nested under the operational objective(s)?
11. Who were the Operational level commanders for this operation? Did any of them play a role the theater-strategic or tactical level? How might this affect the operation?
12. How did the levels of objectives relate to the levels of command?

E. Required Media: None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 54 pages):

Hime, Douglas N. *The Leyte Gulf Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 2013. Read: 1-23. (NWC 1196) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Read: III-19 to III-20 “Primary Considerations for Operational Design, Elements of Operational Design: Objective.” (JP 5-0) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: II-3 to II-20, “Military Objectives and the Levels of War.” (CDE 8092) (Government)

_____. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Read: V-3, “Methods of Combat Force Employment”; V-5-V-10, “Campaigns”; V-33-V-36, “Major Operations.” (CDE 8166) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings: None.

JMO 2.3 OPERATIONAL FACTORS

The combinations of space, time, and strength, which require to be looked into as elements of this theory of defense, make the subject somewhat complicated, so that it is not easy to gain a sure point from which to commence. The following is the result at which everyone will arrive on full consideration.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* 1832

A. Focus:

This session addresses the components of operational art that, on the surface, represent the fundamental physics of a military problem: the operational factors of *space, time, and force*. Again, students will build off of analysis from previous sessions. A strong understanding of the factors from a theoretical perspective (including the non-physical aspects of them) will serve as a foundation for analysis of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and the U.S. and Japanese factor-balancing-decisions that were made (or should have been made) to achieve the objective.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the individual operational factors of space, time and force.
- Comprehend the interrelationship between the operational factors.
- Analyze the process by which an operational commander balances operational factors in order to expose opportunities and risks towards achievement of the objective.

C. Background:

In concert with the identification of the objective, military problem solving should begin with a consideration of the factors space, time, and force. Commanders and planners should have a full comprehension of the factors of space, time, and force and an ability to balance them toward achieving the objective in order to succeed in war.

Analysis of operational factors must begin with identification of the objective, since without consideration of the objective any factor analysis will lack focus. Critical aspects of information from both the enemy and friendly sides must be included in this analysis as often warfare represents a competition among the factors. Managing aspects of all three of these factors allows the commander to shape the operational environment to his or her advantage and mitigate operational and tactical risks.

Initially during the session operational factors will be considered separately to help students understand these concepts, but the true value of factor analysis will emerge when analysis of the *interplay/relationships* between the factors, and between friendly and enemy forces, reveals key decisions that can be made to mitigate disadvantages, exploit advantages, and improve your chances of achieving the objective.

D. Questions:

1. What are the key features of factor space? How do factor space and factor force relate?

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2. What are the main aspects of factor time? What is the relationship between factor time and the factors of space and force?
3. Why is a precise assessment of factor of force so difficult? Describe the theoretical difference between combat potential and combat power.
4. What are the theoretical relationships between the operational factors space/time, space/force, and time/force?
5. How might an operational commander balance the relationships between factors to achieve objectives?
6. What major considerations must be made to balance the physical environment with respect to factors time, space and force, and how does the maritime commander use these to his or her operational advantage?

Leyte Case Study (answer from your sides' perspective, Allies vs Japan)

7. Given the operational objective identified in the previous session, what were the key elements of factor space to consider while devising the plan?
8. How did factor time and factor force affect planning?
9. What advantages or disadvantages existed among the factors?
10. How did commanders and planners mitigate disadvantages, exploit advantages, or otherwise balance the operational factors of *space*, *time* and *force* at Leyte Gulf?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 83 pages):

Potter, E. B. "Return to the Philippines." Extracts from *Nimitz*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Read: 321–345. (NWC 2039)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: III-3 to III-63 on "Operational Factors" and "The Factors of Space, Time and Force." (CDE 8095) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Review: III-19 to III-20 "Primary Considerations for Operational Design, Elements of Operational Design: Objective." (JP 5-0) (Government)

Hime, Douglas N. *The Leyte Gulf Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 2013. Review 1-23. (NWC 1196) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Anderson, Charles Robert. "Leyte" in *U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*. Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1994.

Vego, Milan. *The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

JMO 2.4 THEATER STRUCTURE AND GEOMETRY

War is the business of positions.

– Napoleon I

A. Focus:

This session explores the meaning of two interrelated concepts: theater structure and theater geometry. These concepts have some overlap with the previously discussed factor space, but are worthy of distinct discussion as they represent a large collection of decisions that need to be made when planning an operation. In this session the objective, method of combat force employment, and factors will be analyzed to help inform the geometry and structure of an operational design.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the meaning and importance of the key terms pertaining to theater geometry (bases, positions, objectives, decisive points, lines of communication, lines of operation).
- Comprehend the relationship between the objective and scheme of an operation, the physical geometry of the theater, and the organizational structure of a theater.
- Comprehend the considerations that may inform and influence theater structure.

C. Background:

Warfare theory holds that a theater should be militarily organized to ensure the most favorable conditions for the employment of one's forces across the conflict continuum. A well-organized theater structure enables the smoothly synchronized movement, maneuvers, sustainment, and employment of forces at all levels throughout the theater. Therefore, a planner should consider the assigned military objectives, the methods of combat force employment, the physical environment, and the command organization of the force in deciding how to divide the theater into geographically and/or functionally based areas.

Additionally, all theaters contain natural and artificial features called "theater elements" or "theater geometry" such as bases, lines of operation, or decisive points - any of which may have tactical, operational, and strategic significance - that should also affect the planning and execution of military operations.

When made thoughtfully, theater organization and geometry decisions can result in an improvement in the chances of achieving the objective (observe how the two adjacent US theaters of war in the Pacific resulted in Japan being largely reactive and defensive for the latter portions of the war). When made carelessly, these same decisions can result in harmful C2 seams (consider the same US organization resulting in Halsey's ambiguous orders to both support SWPA but also prioritize destruction of the IJN) or an imbalance in the factors (such as space-force and the impossible expectation of support between the IJN's Northern Force and the Carrier Striking Force during the Japanese Midway-Aleutians operation).

D. Questions:

1. What considerations should affect the structure of a theater?

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2. How should theater geometry affect planning for a major operation or campaign?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the central and exterior positions?
4. What is the meaning and significance of the Jominian concept of “decisive point?”
5. Of what value is the analysis of the geometry of base locations, lines of communication, and lines of operation? Is it different for land, air, or sea? Explain.

Leyte Case Study (answer from your sides’ perspective, Allies vs Japan)

6. What was the declared (or undeclared) theater structure in the Leyte operation? Was it logical and/or sound?
7. What were advantages or disadvantages of the positions and lines of operation in the employment of naval forces? Did commanders recognize and react to them? How?
8. What were the advantages and disadvantages of the positions and lines of operations in the employment of ground forces and land-based aircraft?
9. What were the operational decisive points? Did commanders recognize the importance of them? What mistakes in selecting or omitting decisive points were made, if any?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 55 pages):

Hime, Douglas N. *The Leyte Gulf Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 2013. Review: 9-18, Read: 23-32. (NWC 1196) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Read: IV-49 to IV-78, “Theater Geometry”. (CDE 8098) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Read: IV-3 to IV-10, “The Theater and Its Structure.” (CDE 8097) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. Read: IV-19 to IV-27 “Organizing Operational Areas.” (JP 3-0) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

HQ, Dept. of the Army. *Military Symbols*. Army Field Manual (FM) 1-02.2. Washington, D.C: January 2025 Chg 1 August 2025. Accessed on 12 May 2026. [FM 1-02.2.pdf \(army.mil\)](https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44621-FM_1-02.2-001-WEB-3.pdf)
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44621-FM_1-02.2-001-WEB-3.pdf

JMO 2.5 OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

I don't know what the hell this "logistics" is that Marshall is always talking about, but I want some of it.

—Admiral Ernest J. King,

Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 1942-1945

A. Focus:

The significance of the current Joint Functions in doctrine – movement & maneuver, command & control, fires, logistics and sustainment, intelligence, protection, and information – is underwritten by a long history of the accomplishment of key actions in support of success in war. These theoretical Operational Functions, when properly synchronized, allow the joint force commander to convert combat potential into actual combat power through time and space against an adversary. This consideration and synchronization of the functions is measured against the effectiveness of them in improving a force's ability to achieve the objective. As the Leyte Gulf case study illustrates both the Allied and Japanese planners did this, although with varied results.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the role and importance of operational functions during major operations and campaigns.
- Comprehend how to synchronize operational functions during planning and execution in order to achieve an objective.

C. Background:

Operational functions are those collective capabilities or activities of the individual services and DoD agencies that are made available to an operational (joint) force commander and that must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose in order to maximize the combat power of the forces under their control when engaging an adversary at the decisive place and time.

As in the previous sessions, continue to consider the October 1944 "Battle of Leyte Gulf" (Allied operation KING II), the first major operation in the campaign to reclaim the Philippines during World War II. By this point in the war the Allied commanders were particularly adept at carrying out each of the operational functions, but so were the battle-hardened Japanese commanders. Beyond considering the functions in isolation, synchronizing the operational functions in time, space, and purpose results in synergy. Examples abound in this case study regarding the employment and synchronization of each of the functions, so students should be on a lookout for these illustrations. Recognizing these examples is a step toward being able to employ and synchronize the operational functions planner or decision maker in the joint force.

D. Questions:

1. What is the relationship between operational factors and operational functions?
2. Combatant Commanders establish, maintain, and protect operational functions for routine

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peacetime activities as well as for war. What risks does the commander assume in an immature theater in which the functions have not yet been (fully) established?

Leyte Case Study (answer from your sides' perspective, Allies vs Japan)

3. **Operational Command Organization**—How did command structures affect operations? What flaws existed that contributed to the successes or failures of either side?
4. **Operational Information / Command and Control Warfare**—How did either side use operational security, military deception, or psychological operations during the operation?
5. **Operational Movement and Maneuver**—What is the difference between movement and maneuver? How did the opposing forces plan and employ movement and maneuver at Leyte?
6. **Operational Intelligence**—Which side employed Operational Intelligence better? What evidence shows this?
7. **Operational Fires**—How were Allied operational fires used to support the Leyte Gulf operation? To what extent were they effective and why?
8. **Operational Protection**—To what extent did either of the opposing forces at Leyte consider and plan for the use of operational protection?
9. **Operational Logistics**—What were the most significant logistics challenges of each side? To what extent, and how, did they address them?

E. Required Media:

["The Russian Way of War" JMO Lecture, USNWC Professor Noel Foster, 14 April 2026. \(1:20:13\)](#)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 106 pages):

Goodrich, David M. *The Leyte Operations: A Book of Readings*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2001. Read: 131-133, "Forgotten Mission: Land-Based Air Operational Fires in Support of the Leyte Gulf Invasion." (CDE 8164) (Government)

Hime, Douglas N. *The Leyte Gulf Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 2013. Review: 1-32. (NWC 1196) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. Read: Executive Summary xiv-xix, "Joint Functions." (JP 3-0) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: Part VIII, "Operational Functions", pp. VIII-3 to VIII-100. (CDE 8102) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Cannon, M. Hamlin. "The Strategic Plan," "The Nature of the Target," "Plans Are Made and Forces Are Readied". In *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1954. Accessed 12 May 2026. <http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-P-Return>

JMO 2.6 ELEMENTS OF MAJOR OPERATIONS/CAMPAIGNS

What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

A. Focus:

This session, in conjunction with the following one on Operational Design, analyzes the main elements considered when assembling major operations and campaigns with a focus on the concepts of the *center of gravity* and *culmination*. *Critical factors analysis* will be used to first deduce, and second analyze, the center of gravity (COG) for a given objective. Analysis deconstructs the COG into those components that allow it to function. Defeating the adversary COG by neutralizing those elements hastens culmination and defeat of the adversary. Obviously then, one must protect one's own COG. The Leyte Gulf case study provides the context to investigate these important concepts.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend what the elements of major operations/campaigns are, and how they are used to arrange operations.
- Comprehend the concept of culmination and identify potential indications of friendly and enemy culmination.
- Comprehend the meanings and relationships of the terms “center of gravity,” “critical capability,” “critical requirement,” and “critical vulnerability.”
- Comprehend the utility of deducing and analyzing the center of gravity when approaching military problems.
- Apply processes for deducing and analyzing the center of gravity.

C. Background:

This session will introduce several elements important to the planning of major operations and campaigns, but there is perhaps no theoretical concept of operational art that generates as much debate as that of *center of gravity* (COG). Originally coined by Carl von Clausewitz in his magnum opus, *On War*, analysis of the concept of COG has become an integral part of how U.S. planners and commanders analyze an adversary's threat systems.

The process of deducing and analyzing a COG begins with the objective, followed by a consideration of the critical factors. Critical factors are those forces, resources, or conditions that are essential to achieve an objective — termed by Vego as *critical strengths* if sufficient, or *critical weaknesses* if deficient. From the list of critical strengths, *the most central strength for achieving the stated objective is then identified as the COG*. Joint Doctrine uses the terms *critical capabilities* “CCs” (abilities needed to accomplish an objective) and *critical*

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requirements "CRs" (resources needed to satisfy or fulfill the critical requirements) and the COG is identified as the CR that is optimally suited or situated for accomplishing an objective. Different COGs exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Operations are designed to defeat enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs. Enemy COGs may be defeated directly if friendly COGs are sufficiently positioned or resourced to overwhelm enemy COGs. Otherwise, an indirect method is used to avoid costly attritional warfare by attacking enemy CRs associated with an enemy COG that are identified as vulnerable to attack. These are identified in Joint Doctrine as *critical vulnerabilities* "CVs". If done well, this indirect method of attacking the enemy COG may hasten enemy culmination, when the adversary can no longer continue offensive operations (offensive culmination) or even defend itself (defensive culmination), making the adversary objective unobtainable with the forces at hand. For obvious reasons then, one must also protect one's own COGs while actively working to weaken, mitigate, or destroy enemy COGs.

The following readings provide an in-depth look into the many elements of major operations and campaigns and will specifically strengthen the reader's understanding of the center of gravity concept, as well as the processes used to deduce and analyze COGs. During this session, students will develop a working definition of Center of Gravity, identify Japanese and Allied operational objectives, and deduce enemy and friendly operational COGs. Once the COGs have been identified, students will be tasked to deconstruct the main enemy operational COG. This deconstruction, along with an understanding of friendly and likely enemy objectives, and an analysis of the theater geometry, friendly and enemy operational factors, and operational functions, all set the stage for assembling all the elements together into a coherent and sound operational design in the subsequent session.

D. Questions:

1. Beyond the concepts discussed thus far in the course, what other elements of operational art must be considered in order to assemble a complete, sound operation?
2. How does a planner or commander deduce an enemy center of gravity? Explain the linkage between the objective and center of gravity.
3. How can the concept of culmination be integrated into planning of an operation? What key factors cause culmination? How is it detected? How do you avoid culmination?
4. How are the concepts of Center of Gravity and culmination related?

Leyte Case Study

5. What were the critical strengths and weaknesses on the Japanese side in the operation? On the Allied side?
6. What were the operational centers of gravity for both the Japanese and Allied sides? Justify your response.
7. What were the indications of culmination on the Japanese side during the Battle for Leyte Gulf?
8. Of the major naval commanders in the Leyte Gulf battle, who demonstrated a deeper comprehension of the concept of center of gravity? Of culmination? Explain.

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E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 82 pages):

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Review: V-35, “Elements.” (CDE 8166) (Government)

Hime, Douglas N. *The Leyte Gulf Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, December 2013. Read: 40-55 (Appendices A through F). (NWC 1196) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Read: III-24 to III-30 “COG, Culmination.” (JP 5-0) (Government)

Kornatz, Steven D. “The Primacy of COG in Planning.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 82 (3rd Quarter 2016): 91-97. (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Read: VII-13–VII-33, “Concept of Critical Factors and Center of Gravity.” (CDE 8100) (Government)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Joint Planning Process Workbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2021. Read: D-1 to D-12. Optional read: COG examples D-12 to D-22. (NWC 4111K) (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2009. Read: VII-73–VII-91, “Concept of Culminating Point.” (CDE 8101) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Barfoed, Jacob. “A COG Concept for Winning More Than Just Battles.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 88 (1st Quarter 2018): 116-123.

Butler, James P. “Godzilla Methodology.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 72 (1st Quarter 2014): 26-30.

Hecht, Eado, “Defeat Mechanisms: The Rationale Behind the Strategy,” *Infinity Journal*, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (Fall 2014): pp. 24-30. Accessed on 12 May 2026. <https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/defeat-mechanisms-the-rationale-behind-the-strategy/>

Strange, Joseph L., and Richard Iron. “Center of Gravity: What Clausewitz Really Meant.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 35 (October 2004): 20–27.

Strange, Joseph L., and Richard Iron. “*Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Part 2: the CG-CC-CR-CV Construct*.” Air University. Accessed on 12 May 2026. https://theforge.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/adfwtc04_centres_of_gravity_and_critical_vulnerabilities_by_strange_and_iron.pdf

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JMO 2.7 OPERATIONAL DESIGN: BATTLE OF LEYTE GULF

No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end.

—Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke 1871

A. Focus:

This session serves as a synthesis of all previously discussed operational art concepts. Having already completed the identification of friendly and enemy objectives, and analysis of the many elements, students (and planners) are ready to synthesize them toward an understanding of the overall operational idea and design. This session presents students with the concepts of the operational idea and operational design, using the Leyte Operation as the context for analysis.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the various elements that can comprise an operational idea/scheme.
- Comprehend how to develop an operational idea and operational design.
- Comprehend the relationship between operational and theater-strategic objectives and operational and theater-strategic centers of gravity.
- Comprehend the relationship between objectives, factors, functions, and COGs in an operational design.
- Using the Leyte Gulf case study, evaluate the performance of opposing commanders with respect to the operational designs developed by the opposing sides.

C. Background:

No *detailed* plan should be developed without an overarching sound *concept* for it to follow, otherwise the many detailed tasks and actions may not contribute toward achieving the objective. The basis of any operational *plan* should be a sound *operational design* (or concept of operations) developed by the commander. The operational design is in turn based on the *operational idea* that is formed from the commander's initial estimate of the situation—shaped by a rational analysis of many things such as the objective, enemy strengths, factors, functions, and theater geometry.

Warfare, by its nature, is often a question of trade-offs. Commanders and staffs must continuously balance competing demands for scarce resources while still accomplishing assigned objectives and avoiding culmination. Taking a commander's idea and turning it into a sound operational design is not a simple job; it requires time, creativity, detailed calculations, and above all rational thinking on the part of the commander and staff. Skilled employment of Operational Art enables planners to accomplish this critical task, turning exhaustive planning efforts into coherent ones.

No operational design, however, is immutable. As Clausewitz has written, "Friction is the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper." (Clausewitz, *On War*, Book I, Chapter 7) As we have read, real war consists of often hard-to-explain events and decisions. Consider the Battle of Leyte Gulf—specifically, Japan's SHO-1

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Plan. On paper it should never have had a chance; the Americans were too strong, the plan too brittle. Operation KING II's scheme, on paper, was relatively simple and should have gone like clockwork. Yet the Japanese *almost* succeeded; why? This session uses the elements of operational design to more holistically understand the outcomes of these opposing designs.

D. Questions:

1. What are the elements of the operational idea (scheme)? How are the concepts of operational idea and operational design related?
2. What are the general components of an operational design? How do commanders and staffs conceive of an operational design?
3. How does the process of identifying “critical factors and center of gravity” aid in designing a major operation?
4. Explain the concepts of operational sequencing and synchronization. How are operational objectives, tasks, and the factor of time related?
5. How are intermediate objectives selected?
6. Explain the concept of branches and sequels.

Leyte Case Study

7. Identify and describe the major elements of the American operational design for the landing on and seizure of Leyte Island. Given the outcome, critique the operational design developed by the U.S. Based on what they knew at the time, what should they have done differently?
8. Identify and describe the major elements of the Japanese operational design for the defense of Leyte Island and the defeat of the U.S. invasion fleet. Given the outcome, critique the operational design developed by Japan. Based on what they knew at the time, what should they have done differently?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 59 pages):

Vego, Milan. *Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice*, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. Read: 126-150 "Operational Design" and beginning of "Operational Idea."

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Read: III-20 to III-24 "Transitions," III-30 to III-36 "Organizing the Operation," III-36 to III-41 "Time: Arranging Operations," and III-41 to III-44 "Forces: Defeat and Stabilization Mechanisms." (JP 5-0) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. Read: A-1 to A-5 "Principles of Joint Operations." (JP 3-0) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings: None.

JMO 2.8 OPERATIONAL DESIGN: FALKLANDS/MALVINAS CONFLICT

A senior officer said after the war that it had proved that 'the things we did on the basis of well-trying and proven formation worked, and the ad hoc arrangements turned out much less happily'. Joint-service liaison and staff work left much to be desired.

—Hastings and Jenkins, *The Battle for the Falklands*

A. Focus:

This session serves as the final synthesis event using all the components of operational art, which will prepare students for the upcoming **Summative Assessment**. Students will accomplish a full operational art analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas, evaluate the decisions of operational level commanders, and describe to what extent the two sides applied operational art theory effectively.

B. Objectives:

- Analyze and apply the components of operational art and naval warfare theory.
- Evaluate how commanders and their staffs applied operational art and naval warfare theory toward creating and executing an operational design in a historical case study.
- Analyze operational lessons valid for the employment of modern joint forces.

C. Background:

This case study starts with a video lecture on the historical/strategic background to the conflict. The second component of learning is the case study on the conflict for the JMO course, written by Doug Hime specifically for use in the course. These first two components will be conducted as homework. The third component involves student-led analysis and discussions of assigned questions in seminar.

This session is designed to reinforce the aspects of operational art and design studied and discussed in preceding sessions. Historical examples provide an excellent opportunity for illustrating the complexities of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns, and the reasons why certain military actions either succeeded or failed. This particular case is used because it is rich with examples of the application, lack of application, misapplication, or inability to apply the concepts associated with operational art.

The goal of this session is to provide in-depth discussion and analysis of major aspects of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982 from an operational and theater-strategic perspective. As the major synthesis event for the operational art portion of the syllabus, the motivations, planning and actions of both sides in the conflict will be examined in some detail. Seminar professors will assign specific responsibilities for student discussion of the case.

D. Questions (applied to both the United Kingdom and Argentina):

Objectives

1. Was there a theater strategic objective? If so, what was it/should it have been?

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2. What was/were each side's operational objective(s)? What should it (they) have been?

Operational Factors - Space, Time, Force (based on the Operational Objective)

3. How did each side balance the factors of space-time-force in trying to accomplish their operational objective(s)?
4. How were deficiencies in a factor(s) offset by advantages in a function or vice-versa?

Operational Functions

5. How effective was each side's C2 organization? How would you have organized the C2?
6. How did each side's plan for operational sustainment affect operational success? What could have been done to ameliorate any sustainment deficiencies?
7. How did each side employ operational fires? How would you have employed operational fires?
8. How effectively was operational intelligence employed by both sides?
9. How did they employ operational protection? What could they have done better?
10. How effectively did each side employ operational movement and maneuver (M2)? How would you have employed M2?
11. How were the functions addressed above properly synchronized to accomplish the objective?

Levels of War and the Theater

12. How did each side classify the theater of operations and did it support accomplishment of their operational objective? What constraints and restraints were placed on each side by strategic leadership?
13. What was the impact of the MEZ/TEZ on operations?

Methods of Combat Force Employment

14. Was this a campaign or major operation? Why does it matter? Justify your response.
15. What would you have done differently from how each side used theater geometry (LOO, LOCs, bases, decisive points, etc.) to employ forces effectively for this operation?
16. If you were a planner, how would you have organized the battle space?

Elements of Operational Warfare

17. What were the critical factors?
18. What were each side's operational and strategic COGs and how did they affect each other?
19. How did each side protect its operational COG?
20. What did each side perceive as the enemy's operational COG?
21. Did each side employ a direct or indirect approach?
22. What were the potential culminating points and were they reached?

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23. How well did each side phase and synchronize their operation/campaign? How would you have done it?

Naval Warfare Theory

24. To what extent did the opposing operational commanders relate the need for sea control or sea denial to achievement of their operational objectives? When and where did they strive for these conditions, and to what extent did they design a sound naval plan?
25. Identify two examples where the application (or lack thereof) of Hughes' cornerstones affected achievement of the naval tactical and joint operational objectives.

Operational Planning

26. How well did each side use the concepts of operational design (operational scheme) in developing their plan?
27. How would you have designed the plan now, understanding the strategic/operational objectives?

Operational Art & Design Synthesis Question

28. Based on your analysis above, to what extent did each side demonstrate an understanding of operational art and operational design?

E. Required Media (Approx. 1:18:00):

“Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982” Lecture (2019). (CDE 8160M)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 47 pages):

Hime, Douglas N. *The 1982 Falklands-Malvinas Case Study*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2010. Read: 1-47. Scan: 66-74 (Order of Battle). (NWC 1036) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Instituto Geográfico Militar. *Conflicto Malvinas, Official Report of the Argentine Army, Vol. II*. Translated by Robert Rubel. Instituto Geográfico Militar: Buenos Aires, 1983. (NWC 1038)

Thompson, Julian. “Amphibious Logistics-Falklands 1982.” Extract from Chap. 8 in *The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflicts*. (NWC 1086)

Woodward, Sandy. *One Hundred Days—The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.

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JMO 2.9 OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

I am not afraid of an army of lions led by a sheep; I am afraid of an army of sheep led by a lion.

—Alexander the Great

A. Focus:

This session explores both the characteristics and the elements of military thinking and leadership at the operational level of command and assesses the impact of command decisions on the outcome of military operations. It also introduces students to the concepts of mission command and of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs).

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the concepts of operational thinking and operational vision.
- Comprehend why operational commanders need an operational perspective and how this perspective is achieved.
- Comprehend the tenets of mission command.
- Comprehend common military leadership characteristics and attributes of successful commanders at the operational level of command.

C. Background:

Leadership is one of the most critical aspects of warfare and has had an immeasurable effect on military operations throughout history. Commanders throughout history have shaped the course of operations, campaigns, and conflicts, leaving behind legacies for others to emulate or reject. At the operational level of war, effective commanders require a broad perspective of all the elements in their area of operations in order to understand how their actions may impact the achievement of strategic objectives. This broader operational-level perspective, which requires an understanding of operational art and the challenges of joint operations, renders decision-making processes more complex and challenging than at the tactical level.

In contrast to their subordinate counterparts, operational commanders must focus on military objectives beyond immediate tactical actions. Instead of concentrating on fighting battles and engagements, the operational commander plans and conducts major operations and campaigns. In doing so, the operational commander must place trust in subordinate commanders and resist the temptation to become pre-occupied with the tactical level of war.

Successful operational commanders possess certain character traits and professional knowledge and experience that set them apart from their peers. Integrity, intellectual capacity, creativity, and boldness are just a few of the many traits that have allowed commanders to make critical decisions that have shaped the course of an operation, campaign, or even conflict. Operational thinking, or the ability to have a broad vision beyond the tactical perspective, can be developed through a synthesis of practical experience in war, exercises and maneuvers in peacetime, operational and strategic war gaming, professional education, and the systematic

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self-study of history, geography, international relations, economics, nationalism, society, and culture. The study of past wars, major operations, and campaigns in particular, can help a commander acquire an operational perspective. It is the practical application of operational thinking in planning, preparing, and executing a major operation or campaign that allows the commander to anticipate and foresee the effects of his actions on the enemy and then take timely and proper counteractions.

Operational vision is the commander's ability to envision the military conditions that will exist after the mission is accomplished. In essence, operational vision is the combination of a commander's personality traits, professional education, and experience that is applied to ambiguous and uncertain situations. Imagination, anticipation, intuition, *coup d'oeil* (the innate ability to evaluate a situation quickly), and inner and historical perspective are critical leadership elements necessary to envision all phases of an operation or campaign in support of the political leadership's decision to terminate hostilities, or to be able to operate effectively in the absence of perfect information. Without proper operational vision, the commander cannot translate the strategic objective assigned by the top political and military leadership into a military-strategic or theater-strategic objective.

On 3 April 2012, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey released a White Paper entitled *Mission Command*, in which he outlined the requirement to "pursue, instill, and foster mission command" throughout the U.S. military. This concept, a notion based on decentralization of effort and speed of execution based on the commander's intent, will also be discussed in seminar. The commander's intent (one of the principal elements of the Commanders Estimate) is a key link between operational vision and the successful employment of mission command. The Chairman issued a second memorandum on 28 June 2013 entitled *Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020*, in which he approved a set of Desired Leader Attributes (DLAs) "as guideposts for joint officer leader development" to aid in efforts to "institutionalize the essential knowledge, skills, attributes, and behaviors that define our profession." Milan Vego's own writing on Leadership serves to complement the above Joint guidance.

D. Questions:

1. What are some of the differences between operational thinking and operational vision?
2. How does the study and application of operational art aid in developing a leader's ability to "think operationally"?
3. Is mission command new? Explain the role and reciprocal nature of "trust" in the concept of mission command.
4. Has technology influenced the role of an operational commander?
5. What common characteristics and attributes do successful and unsuccessful operational commanders exhibit? Which, in your assessment, are the most important? How are they different than those of successful tactical level commanders?
6. The Buell reading highlights the friction that often develops between the operational staff and tactical commanders. What can be done to minimize this friction and thereby promote unity of effort?

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7. How did the operational leaders at Leyte demonstrate the tenets of operational leadership and application of “operational thinking/vision”? How did this affect mission accomplishment for each side?

Admiral Spruance

8. Which of Admiral Spruance’s operational leader attributes were most significant during planning and execution of the operation at Midway, and why?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 62 pages):

Buell, Thomas B. *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Read: Chapters 10 and 11, 36 pages. (Buell’s account of Spruance’s relationship with the staff he inherited from Halsey just prior to the Battle of Midway, in particular with the Chief of Staff, CAPT Miles Browning.) (CDE 8015)

U.S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Mission Command*. White Paper. Washington, DC: CJCS, 2012. Read: 1-6. (NWC 1193) (Government)

_____. “Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020.” CJCS Memorandum, CM-0166-13, 28 June 2013. Read: 1-2. (NWC 1194 (Government)

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice*. 20 September 2007. Reprint, Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: Part X, “Operational Leadership”, pp. X-19 to X-28 (excerpt on “Operational Command and Control”). (CDE 8102) (Government)

Vego, Milan. “On Operational Leadership.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 77 (2nd Quarter 2015): 60-69. (CDE 8168) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Gompert, David C. and Richard L. Kugler. “Lee’s Mistake: Learning from the Decision to Order Pickett’s Charge.” *Defense Horizons*, August 2006.

Halsey, William F. *Admiral Halsey’s Story*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947, 108–135.

Hughes, Captain Wayne P., Jr. “Clear Purpose, Comprehensive Execution: Raymond Ames Spruance (1886-1969).” *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009): 117-130.

Potter, E. B. *Nimitz*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976. Chapters 6 and 7, 31 pages. (An account of the work done by the staff of CINCPACFLT during the weeks preceding the Battle of Midway as well as its role during the battle.) (NWC 1038)

U.S. Naval War College. *Sound Military Decision*. 2nd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1942. (NWC 6047). Read: Part One, Chapter I, “Command and its Problems” and Chapter II, “Mental Processes and Human Tendencies”.

Vermillion, John M. “The Pillars of Generalship.” *Parameters* 17, no. 2 (Summer 1987). (NWC 4192)

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JMO 2.10 SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 1

“The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through others’ experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final... Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been addressed (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead...”

Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun.”

– James Mattis, 2003 letter to a junior officer

A. Focus:

This writing requirement is intended to measure a student’s mastery of naval warfare theory and operational art.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate the ability to analyze historical military situations using naval warfare theory and operational art, and use this analysis to contribute to sound military decision making.
- Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking to operational problems.
- Demonstrate the ability to apply clear and precise written communication.
- Demonstrate comprehension of operational leadership concepts & challenges.

C. Background:

As naval warfare theory and operational art permeate virtually all other sessions that follow, it is reasonable to expect that students must carry forward a basic level of proficiency in analyzing and applying these principles and concepts. This summative assessment is designed to determine the level of mastery among the members of the seminar and to reveal to the students those concepts that may need reinforcing.

Students will be expected to prepare complete responses to questions and problems presented by the faculty. The assignment will not require students to recall mundane, specific facts, but rather to integrate and apply major principles, ideas, and concepts covered in the block.

The basis for evaluation will be:

- Complete, logical, and well-supported responses to all questions or problems presented.
- Correct comprehension and application of appropriate course concepts.
- Clear and concise articulation of ideas.

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D. Questions:

Assignment questions and instructions will be provided by the professors.

E. Required Media:

TBD.

F. Required Readings:

TBD.

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

BLOCK 3 – MODERN OPERATIONS ACROSS THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

Focus:

The focus of this block is on the unique challenges that modern operations present to commanders and their staffs given the current security environment and the great range of missions all across the competition continuum.

Block 3 begins in session 3.1 by presenting the concept of the *competition continuum* to use as a lens through which to view modern military missions below the threshold of conventional combat. An analysis of the global security environment will be framed by the nature and impacts of fragile and failed states and great power competition. This first session will be supplemented by a follow-on discussion in session 3.2 regarding the role of the military in the many non-combat missions that are executed in support of foreign policy. In session 3.3 the topic of Operational Law will be studied, which will add a significant additional layer to student understanding of the context of modern operations.

After setting the stage of the modern environment, sessions 3.4 and 3.5 will focus on various types of military activities along the competition continuum and several unique considerations required for these missions to be successful. These activities may include engagement, deterrence, crisis response, limited contingency operations, or support for insurgency or counterinsurgency. A common thread throughout all these activities, and a strong focal point of these sessions, is the *need to coordinate military action with that of civilian organizations both inside and outside the U.S. government*.

Finally, sessions 3.6 and 3.7 will explore two additional challenging aspects of modern operations. Session 3.6 will analyze the impact of technology and the overlapping of physical, technical, and cognitive domains by discussing the impact of the accelerated use of the information environment, information operations, cyberspace operation, artificial intelligence, and space operations. The block will close with a session analyzing Unconventional Statecraft, a term coined to describe the many unconventional or irregular methods of warfare that adversaries are employing short of armed conflict and in an ambiguous “gray zone.” Officers and decision makers would do well to consider how to sharpen their ability to make sound decisions in an often-ambiguous modern conflict environment.

It is expected that a consideration of the topics in this block will collectively better prepare joint officers and graduates of the course for the modern security environment framed by the topics discussed.

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JMO 3.1 THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

We're going to find more and more throughout a section of the world that runs from North Africa to the Philippines, from Central Asia to Central Africa; that we have got an entire region of the world that is chaotic and in turmoil, and we have just seen the beginnings of it. For decades more, we're going to be dealing with this problem. You're going to be fighting terrorists; you're going to be fighting against failed or incapable states that are sanctuaries for problems. You're going to try to rebuild nations. You're going to deal with crises and threats that threaten our people and our property. And it's all going to be mixed into one big bag.

—General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) (2003)

Like it or not, most of you will find yourselves in a place you never heard of, doing things you never wanted to do.

—General John M. Shalikashvili, CJCS (1993–1997), Addressing U.S. Troops, Spring 1994

A. Focus:

The U.S. is engaged in strategic competition with its adversaries every day, requiring the use and integration of all instruments of national power. This session focuses on the myriad activities an operational commander may be tasked to perform across the *competition continuum*, under the enduring pressure of strategic competition and constant lower intensity threats to security. In particular, commanders must be prepared to make difficult decisions in ambiguous and ill-defined situations. This is particularly true for situations involving failing states – the “fragile states” phenomenon – where military intervention can present a host of challenges beyond those typically encountered in major combat operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the concept of fragile and failed states and its operational implications.
- Comprehend the military and non-military consequences of state failure and what those consequences imply for operational planners in globally integrated operations in the security environment.
- Comprehend the challenges of restoring stability and peace in failed / failing states by U.S. and coalition forces working in coordination with other organizations (such as the UN).
- Comprehend the full range of military operations required across the competition continuum during strategic competition.

C. Background:

Historically U.S. military organizations, training, and equipment has been optimized for large-scale conventional warfare against similar opponents where objectives are relatively clear and where war itself is relatively short. Despite this fact U.S. military forces throughout their history have found themselves conducting operations short of conventional war, and U.S. forces will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, for example, comprised *only several weeks* of conventional combat operations preceded by *ten*

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years of coercive diplomacy and deterrence, then followed by *nearly twenty years (and counting)* of belligerent occupation, stability, counterinsurgency, and engagement. Decades after *quickly* routing the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States and its allies conducting significant lower-intensity but long duration operations of several kinds there before withdrawing military forces. Operation INHERENT RESOLVE is a related exemplar where a mix of coalition SOF and conventional forces confronted a violent extremist insurgent group that had managed to carve out a de facto “caliphate” effectively occupying portions of Syria and Iraq, years after the U.S. may have thought the war was won. Most recently the U.S. finds itself supporting Ukraine’s defense from Russia in many ways short of direct armed conflict.

Current joint doctrine examines the character of violent conflict and the military’s role in attaining national security goals, along a continuum from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through large-scale combat operations. The competition continuum concept eliminates the traditional boundary between conventional and other military operations, such as stability and reconstruction. The wide spectrum of interactions between peace and war represents the way the military presently thinks about the likely problems it might be expected to encounter. Within this strategic environment, the United States must be able to effectively employ its military forces to accomplish assigned objectives. The competition continuum concept assumes that conventional military forces can at any time successfully conduct operations across a spectrum of operations so wide that there may be little in common between operations at one end of the spectrum and those at the other. Planning military operations across this wide spectrum is not necessarily as straightforward as planning for just one method of combat, especially in an era of strategic competition. This is especially true in the current strategic environment, where the fragile-states phenomenon coupled with an epidemic of formidable violent extremist organizations would suggest the nation-state concept itself may be in serious trouble.

Strategic competition and fragile states are often, though not always, connected and the competition between the more powerful countries can have significant effects. The European colonial powers began shedding their colonies after World War II. Many of the newly independent states experienced significant political, economic and military upheavals as they tried to merge their native customs and culture with the Western model of the state system. Some managed better than others; some descended into long periods of internal disorder. In some, insurgencies or civil wars left both physical and political wreckage.

The Cold War created additional problems for these emerging states. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) cared primarily that their client states embraced their respective causes and were willing to offer basing and other support. Simultaneously, Western aid, based on a faulty understanding of the processes of political and economic development, further dislocated indigenous institutions without producing genuine improvements.

The Soviet Union’s collapse generated new candidates for state failure. It eliminated the decades-old subsidies to client states that had been crucial for maintaining their stability. As well, new states created from the debris of the Soviet empire continue to experience problems analogous to those of the states created during post-WW II decolonization.

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Regardless of whether such states are considered “fragile,” “failed,” “recovering,” or “vulnerable”, they all have issues that demand the attention of the international community including spill-over violence, proxy conflict, violent extremism safe-havens, piracy, and globally significant trade routes and resources. Powers with global interests and expeditionary forces often find themselves involved in these conflicted communities. Such interventions may be relatively benign, or at least may begin that way, but can rapidly become exceptionally complex. “Simple” operations such as noncombatant evacuation or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief can easily expand to include foreign internal defense and assorted flavors of peace or counterinsurgency operations. These operations will probably be conducted in large geographic areas with immature infrastructure where cultural norms are in wide variance with Western values. Such is the character of modern competition, conflict, and war.

D. Questions:

1. Describe in your own words what the concept of a competition continuum should mean to a military officer.
2. How do political objectives vary across the competition continuum? What effect do different political objectives have on the selection of military objectives?
3. What are the characteristics or warnings of a “fragile” or “failed” state?
4. Why should the Geographic Combatant Commanders be concerned about state failure? How can GCCs apply military resources most effectively in such scenarios?
5. What other non-military organizations are likely to be involved? What are the implications for their participation for the military?
6. To what extent should strategic competition (short of war) matter to military officers? Where in the world do you see GPC most evident, and what is the military’s role?
7. To what extent does strategic competition affect fragile/failed states? Provide examples.

E. Required Media (Approx. 2:31:00):

“Fragile States” Lecture. (CDE 8007M)

“Naval Operations Other Than Combat” Lecture. (CDE 8163M)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 74 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Concept for Competing*. Joint Concept. Washington, DC 10 Feb 2023. Read i-ix (Foreword and Executive Summary). (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. Read: V-1 to V-8, “The Competition Continuum.” (JP 3-0) (Government)

Brock, Lothar, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Sorensen and Michael Stohl. “Fragile States and Violence: The Limits of External Assistance.” *Global Dialogue* 13, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2011): 46-56. (NWC 7031) <https://search.proquest.com/docview/883389240?accountid=322> (PURL)

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Fund for Peace. “*Fragile States Index Annual Report 2022.*” Read pp. 40-50. (“Indicators”) <https://fragilestatesindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/22-FSI-Report-Final.pdf> Accessed 14 June 2023

Stokes, Jane. “*Yemen: A Case Study in Regional Conflict, Irregular Warfare, and Strategic Competition.*” Draft manuscript, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, Naval War College. Forthcoming (2026). Read: Ch.1 and 2, approx. 30 pages.

G. Supplementary Readings:

Boot, Max. *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. Basic, 2003.

Chase, Robert, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy. “Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs* 75, No 1 (Jan/Feb 1996): 33-51. (CDE 8159)

Fishel, John T. “Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night.” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement* 4 (Winter 1995): 372–398. (NWC 3077)

Menkhaus, Kenneth J. “State Fragility as a Wicked Problem.” *PRISM* 1, no. 2. (March 2010): 85-100. (NWC 3085) (Government)

Office of The President of the United States. *United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security*. Washington, DC: The White House. June 2019. (“The Strategic Challenge” and “The Theory of Change” four lines of effort) (Government)

United States Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual*. With an Introduction by Ronald Schaffer. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1996 [Originally Published 1940].

JMO 3.2 THE MILITARY ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Perhaps no country ever experienced more sudden and remarkable advantages from any measure of policy than we have derived from the arming for our maritime protection and defense.

— John Adams, *State of the Union Address*, December 8, 1798

A. Focus:

After considering the wide range of challenges across the competition continuum, this session will specifically analyze the use of military forces in support of national foreign policy. Naturally all services play complementary roles; at the Naval War College the focus of this discussion is placed on the methods of naval diplomacy, the use of naval forces in conflict prevention and management, and advantages/disadvantages in the employment of military forces as a tool of foreign policy.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the diplomatic value of military power.
- Comprehend the similarities and differences between coercive forms of naval diplomacy and collaborative forms of naval diplomacy.
- Know the main methods in applying coercive and/or collaborative forms of naval diplomacy.
- Know the advantages and disadvantages of using naval forces in support of foreign policy.

C. Background:

Military forces have been used in support of foreign policy by major powers throughout history. Naval forces can be employed in support of a country's diplomatic initiatives in peacetime and time of crisis. Naval diplomacy is defined as the employment of naval forces to further foreign policy objectives by influencing foreign decision-makers' thoughts and actions. Naval diplomacy functions on a cooperative to coercive spectrum: supporting allies and deterring adversaries or compelling them to change policies. The two readings for this session provide important context for planners and commanders.

D. Questions:

1. Naval ships are specifically designed for naval warfare. Why is there value in employing naval power in a diplomatic role? Why are there disadvantages?
2. Compare coercive forms of naval diplomacy with collaborative forms of naval diplomacy.
3. What are the fundamental principles that underpin the employment of naval forces for diplomatic tasks?

E. Required Media:

None.

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F. Required Readings (Approx. 34 pages):

Ebitz, Amy. "The use of military diplomacy in great power competition - Lessons learned from the Marshall Plan." The Brookings Institution. February 12. 2019. Read: Approx. 4 pages. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/> Accessed 14 June 2023.

Till, Geoffrey. *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. Read: Chapter 10, "Naval diplomacy", pp. 221-251. (Issued)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Alily, George. *Naval Diplomacy: A Critical Component of National Power*. Princeton, NJ: Sungai Books, 2001.

Booth, Ken. *Navies and Foreign Policy*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Cable, James. *Gunboat Diplomacy, 1919-1991: Political Applications of Limited Force*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2nd ed., 1981.

Forbes, Andrew, ed. *Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection*. Proceedings of the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, 2013. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2014.

Hendrix, Henry J. *Theodore Roosevelt's Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009.

Holmes, James R. "Why Hold an International Fleet Review? Insights from Ken Booth." *Naval Diplomacy and Maritime Power Projection*. Proceedings of the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference, 2013. Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2016. pp. 53-65. (NWC 3209) (USNWC Prof – Free Use)

Le Mière, Christian. *Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Drivers and Challengers*. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

Lerner, Michael B. *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2002.

Mandel, Robert. "Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy." *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (March 1986).

Rowlands, Kevin. "Decided Preponderance at Sea." *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 89-105.

Vego, Milan. *Naval Support of Foreign Policy*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, May 2016. (NWC 1132) (Government)

Widen, J.J. "Naval Diplomacy – A Theoretical Approach." *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 22, No. 4. Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, 2011: 715-733. (CDE 8188) (PURL)

JMO 3.3 OPERATIONAL LAW AND ETHICS

Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the UN until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

— UN Charter, Article 51

Don't fire 'til you see the whites of their eyes.

—General Israel Putnam or Colonel William Prescott, Bunker Hill, 1775

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is primarily operational law in a maritime context: specifically, the domestic and international legal frameworks governing U.S. military operations at and from the sea, and rules of engagement/rules for the use of force. Authorities for conducting military operations and the ethics in conflict engagement will also be discussed. Additionally, since military officers are part of a profession and every profession has a set of professional ethics, the overlapping topic of ethical guidelines is discussed to complement those of legal guidelines.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the effect of international law on the planning and execution of military operations.
- Comprehend the basic principles of the law of armed conflict for land, air, and naval warfare.
- Analyze the operational and legal challenges in the maritime commons.
- Comprehend the basic principles underlying the use of force in self-defense.
- Comprehend the role of political, legal, and military personnel in the formulation, execution, and changing nature of the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- Comprehend the ethical dimension of leadership at the operational level of war.

C. Background:

Operational law is a broad term encompassing those facets of international law, U.S. domestic law, U.S. military regulations and the domestic law of other nations impacting military planning and operations. When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that governs (1) the location of hostilities/extraterritoriality, (2) the legal basis for nations to use force and (3) levels of lethality. The Use of Force video lecture introduces both the *jus ad bellum* (a nation's right to use force—or go to war) and the *jus in bello* (the law of armed conflict during land, air, and naval warfare); however, the video focuses on the former. Additionally, the video touches on legal issues arising from modern use of force against non-state actors, in drone/UAV/RPV strikes, and in cyber operations among others. When planning and conducting military operations, commanders and their subordinates must comply with the international law that

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governs the legal basis for nations to use force and lethality as well as the law that governs the conduct of hostilities extraterritorially.

The Maritime Operational Law video lecture focuses on the law of the sea and the law affecting military operations in the maritime environment. The general features of the maritime environment, what is called the Maritime Domain will be discussed from a legal perspective. Legal classifications or regimes of the ocean and airspace directly affect maritime operations by determining the degree of control a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct and activities of foreign merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating in those areas. This video discusses not only constraints maritime operational law might impose on military operations but also, how the operational commander can use the law, what some now call “lawfare,” to achieve success in both conflict and non-conflict missions.

International, domestic, and customary law are not the only limiting constructs that commanders should blend in order to arrive at sound decisions. Ethics has always been a core element of the profession of arms; periodically it becomes a headline matter as well. This session incorporates such topics as the commander’s responsibilities toward civilians; the laws of war; codes of honor; compartmentalizing; terrorism (and its differences from the legal use of force); operational leadership; and the nature and practices of the military profession. The goal is to explore the problematic aspects of leadership and ethics, not to present established answers. To illustrate all the topics above students will analyze and discuss a brief video on the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, along with the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq Tankers Wars.

D. Questions:

1. Why do nations care about international law when deciding whether or not to use force? What motivates them to comply with its provisions?
2. Describe the role of the UN Security Council (UNSC) regarding the use of force against a nation or non-state actors.
3. What are the requirements to be a lawful combatant; to be a non-combatant/civilian? What is an unlawful (or unprivileged) combatant?
4. To what extent does the law of armed conflict apply across the spectrum of conflict? Across this spectrum of conflict, are criminals, unlawful combatants, or violent extremist organizations (VEOs) subject to the same or different treatment?
5. How has the law of armed conflict changed, if at all, during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is it different for combating ISIL?
6. What sovereign rights does a nation have in its land territory, territorial sea and national airspace? How does this affect the operations of foreign military forces in these zones?
7. What are the distinctions between innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea-lane passage, and high seas freedom of navigation? How, if at all, are military planning and operations affected by the various legal regimes of oceans and airspace?
8. Who has a role in crafting ROE for a particular mission and why?
9. In asymmetric warfare what, if any, proactive measures can forces take to assist in determining hostile intent at sea and on the ground?

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10. What considerations impact a commander's actions when he/she becomes aware of potential violations of the ROE and/or the Law of Armed Conflict?
11. What are military ethics?
12. Should those who serve in the military be held to a higher moral standard than their civilian counterparts – and if so, why?
13. When can a lawful order from a superior command be questioned on ethical grounds?
14. Are terrorists criminals or enemy combatants?

E. Required Media (Approx. 3:08:00):

“International Law and the Use of Force” Lecture. (CDE 8189M)

“Maritime Operational Law” Lecture. (CDE 8161M)

“Srebrenica” video. (CDE 8116M)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 101 pages):

Harvison, Melissa. *Operational Law Primer*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2020. Read: Preface, 1-14, 25-77. (NWC 2147A) (Government)

Schmitt, Michael. “Ukraine Symposium – Attacking Power Infrastructure Under International Humanitarian Law.” Leiber Institute, West Point. October 20, 2022. Read: Approx. 5 pages. <https://lieber.westpoint.edu/attacking-power-infrastructure-under-international-humanitarian-law/> Accessed 14 June 2023.

Joint Military Operations Department. “*The South China Sea Dispute Background & Arbitration Case*.” Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2016. Read: 2-11. (NWC 1103) (Government)

Walker, George K. Selected Readings from *The Tanker War, 1980–88, Law and Policy*. Naval War College International Law Studies, Volume 74 (2000), Edited by CDR Dan Crouch. Read: Approx. 12 pages. (NWC 3004B) (Government)

Ficarrotta, J. Carl. “Are Military Professionals Bound by a ‘Higher’ Moral Standard?” *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 1 (Fall 1997). Read: Approx. 8 pages. (CDE 8084) (PURL)

Joint Military Operations Department. “*CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces*” and “*Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces*.” Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 13 June 2005. Scan. (NWC 1062A) (Government)

U.S. Navy. *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, March 2022. Scan, reference only. (NWP 1-14M) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

BBC video, “*Shooting down of Iran Air 655*.” Accessed on 14 June 2023. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IRJnumxuHwY>

Grunawalt, Richard J. “*USS Vincennes (CG 49) and the shoot-down of Iranian Airbus Flt 655*.” NWC Internal Memorandum (1992). (NWC 1156)

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Guangqian, Major General (Ret), People's Liberation Army. "China's Maritime Rights and Interests," in *Military Activities in the EEZ, A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons*, Vol. 7. Newport, RI: Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute (December 2010): 15-22. (NWC 1150)

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). *Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers*, (June 2 2009). (NWC 3072)

International Institute of Humanitarian Law. "*Rules of Engagement Handbook*" (November 2009). (Scan examples of mission specific supplemental ROE.) (NWC 3091)

Pedrozo, Raul "Pete." "The Bull in the China Shop and Rising Tensions in the Asia Pacific Region." *Naval War College, International Law Studies*, 90 66 (2014). (NWC 1205)

Schmitt, Michael N. "Extraterritorial Lethal Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 52, Issue 2 (2013): 77- 112. (NWC 1206)

U.S. Congress. Joint Resolution, *Authorization for Use of Military Force* [AUMF] Public Law. 107-40 [S.J. RES. 23], September 18, 2001. (NWC 1198)

U.S. Department of Defense. General Counsel. *DoD Law of Warfare Manual*, 2015. Chapter XIII, "Naval Warfare." (NWC 1208)

Walzer, Michael. "Responsibility and Proportionality in State and Non-State Wars." *Parameters* 39, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 40-52. (CDE 8085) (Government)

White House Fact Sheet: *U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities*, May 23, 2013. (NWC 1085)

JMO 3.4 ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

You must understand that few of the problems of our time have been solved by military power alone.

— John F. Kennedy

A. Focus:

Many civilian “actors” both inside and outside the U.S. government influence military operations especially those at the lower conflict end of the competition continuum. This presents both challenges and opportunities to the joint force commander. Many of the challenges when accommodating civilian efforts result from a fundamental characteristic of civilian organizations: civilian participants are not necessarily required (or inclined) to subordinate their efforts under a military-style chain of command. Consequently, cooperation rather than unity of command is the guiding principle when striving for unity of effort with civilian and international counterparts. To ensure unified action, operational commanders must understand and account for this and other aspects of civil-military interaction when planning and executing operations across the competition continuum. Through the use of a Yemen Case Study, these concepts will be explored to help explain the complex and nuanced nature of U.S. interagency and nongovernment organization coordination in an operational environment.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the organizations and approaches a Joint Force Commander (JFC) should use to coordinate with civilian organizations, both inside and outside the U.S. government, in order to enhance success across a range of military missions such as engagement, security cooperation, FHA/DR, or peace operations.
- Comprehend the JFC’s responsibility to execute Civil-Military Operations (CMO).
- **USG:**
 - Comprehend interagency coordination processes at the national and theater levels.
 - Comprehend the role of a U.S. Ambassador, and the functions of an embassy team.
 - Comprehend the role of U.S. military forces when operating in support of a different U.S. government lead federal agency during FHA/DR operations.
- **Non-USG:**
 - Comprehend how the United Nations and other international governmental organizations (IGOs) maintain international peace and security, including by the use of peace operations.
 - Comprehend how the U.S. military works with foreign governments, and develops foreign partnerships, to conduct operations across the competition continuum.
 - Comprehend the cultural differences between military and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and how military forces can work with them.

C. Background:

At the highest levels of national-strategic decision-making, the National Security Council deliberates the use of military force in concert with other national elements of power in response to a crisis. In turn, NSC-formulated policy directs the activities of other (non-DoD) members of the interagency community – in particular, the Department of State – in a “whole-of-government” response. Additionally, the role of international organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union are also often a major factor in overseas operations – and not just at the national level, but also at the combatant command, joint task force, functional component, and even lower (tactical) levels of command. For these reasons, at the theater-strategic level, geographic combatant commanders must work hand-in-hand with many civilian organizations notably both inside and outside the U.S. government requiring different approaches.

Examples of organizations that must be worked with inside the U.S. government include U.S. ambassadors and their country teams in the AOR, who ensure unity of effort across mutually-supportive lines of operation, or other State Department organizations with a focus on long term international development and/or short term humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Cooperative partnerships extend to other members of the interagency community with an overseas presence, such as the Departments of Justice (FBI), Transportation (FAA), and Homeland Security (U.S. Coast Guard, Immigrations & Customs Enforcement, Customs & Border Patrol and others). The national intelligence community, with operations spanning the globe, is clearly a significant player in any AOR. A Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or similar organization in the CCDR’s headquarters often structurally formalizes these partnerships.

Operationally, Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) often deal with not only U.S. organizations but also those of the United Nations or other international organizations found in the joint operations area. In addition, civilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a nearly ubiquitous presence in the operational environment; frequently sharing similar “ends,” their “ways” and “means” can be at odds with those of the JFC. And though the JFC may establish Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) at the scene to coordinate with and render support to civilian efforts, civilian actors are not necessarily obliged to participate.

Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is the doctrinal term of art for the ways in which a commander deals with the aforementioned civilian aspects of military operations at the operational level of war. While CMO is ultimately the Joint Force Commander’s responsibility, it is the role of Civil Affairs personnel to help orchestrate CMO. With little in the way of organic capability, CA relies upon the other components of the joint force to provide the necessary resources to carry out CMO. Consequently, civil-military interaction is a significant consideration for the JFC, potentially affecting the selection of military objectives, forces, and resources, as well as the execution of operational functions; early planning for CMO across all phases of a major operation or campaign is paramount.

An additional mission type that will likely rely on civil-mil coordination is peace operations. When executing peace operations many would say the UN is successfully performing the mission given to it by the drafters of the UN Charter – “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” but the commitment of U.S. forces to peace operations has proven

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controversial. One side of this policy debate favors a broader use of U.S. forces in many roles, while the other wishes to reserve use of the U.S. military for war fighting. Regardless, given the large number of long-simmering intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the world today and the increasing interconnectedness of economic and security issues across states and regions, it is highly probable that the U.S. military will find itself planning and executing peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in the near future.

It is important to note in this lesson the U.S. military's engagement with foreign partners. Along with the U.S. Embassy and U.S. policy makers, the U.S. military communicates, coordinates, and cultivates military partnerships and relationship to achieve military objectives. This may include operating bilaterally with one foreign country and their military, or working in a multinational capacity, with numerous partners at once.

The Yemen case study offers the student a 'perspective taking' opportunity to explore the above lesson themes in a situation where the U.S. military and U.S. interagency organizations must work together with NGOs and the Yemeni government in order to successfully provide humanitarian aid to Yemenis during the Yemeni civil war. This fictional case study allows students to explore how these different organizations must cooperate together through unity of effort to achieve their objective.

D. Questions:

1. What military missions would you expect to require a high level of coordination with civilian agencies? Why? Give examples.
2. When does planning for civil-military operations begin and who does this planning?
3. What is the difference between the responsibilities of and operations of a CMOC, a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), and a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)?
4. How does the interagency community coordinate efforts at the national and theater levels?
5. How can a Joint Force Commander (JFC) plan for successful interagency operations?
6. What are the responsibilities of a U.S. Ambassador and a country team? How might they coordinate with a JFC?
7. What civilians might be present in the battle space and how might the JFC effectively work with these organizations?
8. How can the JFC effectively coordinate, cooperate, and communicate with International Organizations to accommodate their requirements and capabilities early in an operation?
9. How can the JFC reconcile his/her mission and objectives with those of an NGO?
10. What military tasks might be particularly useful in FHA/DR?
11. How does the U.S. military coordinate with a foreign military partner?
12. What role does the United Nations play in international peacekeeping?
13. Who is typically in charge of a peace operation, for whom do military commanders work?
14. What is the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement? What special

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considerations are required when planning for these missions?

15. How are the fundamentals of peace ops different than the principles of joint operations?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 52 pages):

Joint Military Operations Department, CDE. “*Civil Military Interaction: A Primer.*” Newport, RI: Naval War College, April 2017. Read: 1-4. (CDE 8184) (Government)

Oliver, George. “*Evolution of International and UN Peacekeeping.*” Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2015. Read: 1-23. (NWC 3008E) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “*Interorganizational Cooperation, Fifth Edition of the Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper.*” Deployable Training Division (DTD), Joint Staff J7, released by the J7 Deputy Director of Joint Training, April 2018. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/fp/interorgan_coop_fp.pdf Accessed 14 June 2023. (Government)

Stokes, Jane. “*Yemen: A Case Study in Regional Conflict, Irregular Warfare, and Strategic Competition.*” Draft manuscript, Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, Naval War College. Forthcoming (2026). Read: OPT Operational Design exercise. Approx. 10 pages

G. Supplementary Readings:

Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight. “*Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach.*” *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 92-96. (NWC 3001)

de Montclos, Marc-Antoine Perouse. “The (de) Militarization of Humanitarian Aid: A Historical Perspective.” *Humanities*, no. 3 (2014): 232-243. (NWC 3193)

Naland, John K. “*Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq.*” Special Report 290. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, Oct 2011. (NWC 3196)

Oakley, Robert B. and Michael Casey, Jr. “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 146-154. (NWC 5029) (Government)

Shaw, Eric. J. “*Operation Unified Assistance: 2004 Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami Humanitarian Relief.*” Newport, RI: Naval War College, May 2013. (NWC 6050)

van der Lijn, Jair. “If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peace-Building Operations.” *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 13, Issue 1-2 (2009). Read: 63-71. (CDE 8078) (PURL)

Whittaker, Alan G., Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune. “*The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System.*” 15 August 2011, pp. 12-26 (NSC Organization), 26-45 (NSC Policy Process). (NWC 3026D)

JMO 3.5 LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND INSURGENCIES

By definition, guerillas and terrorists are weak. By definition, their opponents are much stronger. Contrary to the accepted wisdom...most guerillas and terrorists won their struggles precisely because they were weak.

—Martin van Creveld, *The Changing Face of War*, 2008

On the other side—the side of the counterrevolutionaries—the crucial question concerns the relative importance of violence and persuasion, in effect the choice between war and politics. How far is a revolutionary movement dependent upon popular political support, and thus how vulnerable is it to political action designed to undermine popular support? This is the recurring question for the opponents of revolution.

— John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,”
Makers of Modern Strategy, 1986

A. Focus:

This session generally focuses on limited contingency operations and more specifically on the fundamental characteristics and types of insurgencies. By framing the operational environment to distill the root causes of insurgency, students will better understand the challenge of designing counterinsurgency operations. Students will first gain the capability to analyze the environment and structure of an insurgency. This will enable them to devise effective operational plans for countering an insurgency.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend U.S. military roles and approaches to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.
- Comprehend the role of violence in revolutionary warfare.
- Comprehend the common causes and fundamental structure of insurgencies through study of theory, doctrine, and historical case studies.
- Comprehend the fundamental elements of planning for and conducting COIN operations.
- Apply analytical frameworks in order to develop counterinsurgency operational approaches.
- Analyze the relative effectiveness of military power compared to the other instruments of national power in COIN, using theory, doctrine, and analysis of historical case studies.

C. Background:

Although historically the U.S. military has participated in numerous conflicts against insurgent opponents, it has been far more enthusiastic about fighting at the upper end of the conflict spectrum. Conflicts involving one (or more) insurgencies drag on for years, are rife with political/strategic/operational challenges, and are the least likely to respond to the conventional application of purely military force. We may safely assume that insurgencies will continue,

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although their environment, specific forms, and tactics may change. Military officers and members of relevant civilian agencies must understand how to operate in politically uncertain and ambiguous environments against “weak” foes that play by very different rules.

To fight an insurgency successfully, one needs to understand the causes, levels of support, grievances, and other factors that sustain the insurgency. This is difficult because although insurgencies share certain fundamental characteristics, they remain unique. Historical, cultural, political, and economic factors must be recognized as integral to any meaningful analysis. A design methodology may be of particular use in identifying the complex, adaptive nature of the environment, the root causes of the conflict, possible objectives, and possible operational approaches.

The employment of naval forces in the insurgency/counterinsurgency environment requires a theoretical understanding of insurgency, operational art, sea control/sea denial principles and planning. Historical analysis demonstrates naval forces have been used effectively (and ineffectively) by both insurgents and those attempting to fight them. As in the land domain, an understanding of the environment is critical to success.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency are covered together in order to make connections and draw conclusions on the application of operational art theory to the contemporary environment. The first part is devoted to the theory and analysis of insurgency. The second part focuses on both understanding and fighting insurgencies through the continued examination of historical case studies, with an emphasis on the employment of Naval Forces in one case study.

D. Questions:

1. Historically, insurgency has been the resort of the “weak.” What does this mean?
2. Explain how environmental factors determine the nature of the insurgency.
3. Describe the factors that must be present for an insurgency to develop and possibly succeed. Which are the most important? Why?
4. Explain how the political/social/cyber environment can be used by an insurgent to accomplish their objectives.
5. Some argue that in the future, insurgencies will increase in frequency while incidents of conventional warfare will recede. Do you agree with this outlook? Why or why not?
6. How has the rise of insurgent movements with global reach differed from earlier insurgencies (or do they differ)?
7. Explain the relationship between the existence of an insurgency and the perceived legitimacy of a host nation or occupying government. How can a government establish legitimacy?
8. Explain the relationship of the operational factors of time, space, and force with an objective involving COIN operations.
9. Analyze the factors that are commonly found in historical and contemporary insurgencies. Which are the most important? Why?
10. Explain how environmental factors determine counterinsurgent objectives, approaches,

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and access to resources.

11. Explain the unique considerations for employment of Naval Forces in an insurgency environment. How might Sea Control/Sea Denial theory assist Joint Planners?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (68 pages using Sri Lanka, 85 pages using Philippines):

Fall, Bernard B. "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency." *Naval War College Review* (Winter 1998): 46-57. [Originally published in the April 1965 NWCR from a lecture delivered at the Naval War College on December 10, 1964.] (NWC 3097) (Government)

Waghelstein, John, and Donald Chisholm. "Analyzing Insurgency." Newport RI: Naval War College, 2006. Read: pp. 1-12. (NWC 3099) (Government)

U.S. Office of the CJCS. *Counterinsurgency*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-24. Washington, DC: CJCS, 25 April 2018. Validated 30 April 2021. Scan: Chapter 3 III-1 to III-36. Note *indicators of legitimacy* on page III-3, and *tenets of counterinsurgency* III-7 to III-15. (Government)

U.S. Office of the CJCS. *Joint Stabilization Activities*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07. Washington, DC: CJCS, 11 Feb 2022. Read: I-26 to I-27, Figure I-2 (Stability Functions). (Government)

Case Studies (Professors shall assign one of the following two cases):

Greenberg, Lawrence M. Extract from "The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955." Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. Read: pp. 1-62. (NWC 3102A)

Povlock, Paul A. *A Guerilla War at Sea: The Sri Lankan Civil War*. Small Wars Foundation, 2011. Read pp. 2-47. (NWC 3189) (USNWC Professor – Free Use)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. "How the Weak Win Wars." *International Security* 26 (Summer 2001): 93–128.

Cassidy, Robert M. "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency." *Parameters* (Summer 2006): 47-62.

Fall, Bernard B. Chapter 1, "Indochina 1946-1954." USMA HM 381, *Revolutionary Warfare*, 1968. Ed. J.W. Woodmansee, Jr. (NWC 3184)

Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices of Counterinsurgency." *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 8-12. (NWC 3119) (Government)

Waghelstein, John. USNWC 2006 "Insurgency" Lecture. (CDE 8053M)

Waghelstein, John. "Military-to-Military Contacts: Personal Observations—the El Salvador Case." Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2005. (NWC 3038)

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JMO 3.6 ALL DOMAIN WARFARE

All-Domain Operations are “the biggest key to the future of the entire budget... because if we figure that out, we’ll have a significant advantage over everybody in the world for a long time, because it’s the ability to integrate and effectively command and control all domains in a conflict or in a crisis seamlessly — and we don’t know how to do that. Nobody knows how to do that.”

—General John Hyten, Vice-Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

A. Focus:

The focus of this session is to understand the challenges of all domain warfare, and how they are unlike those of traditional air, ground, and sea domain-centered warfare. For the purpose of this session the term “all domain warfare” is loosely defined as the way war is made using information, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, space, and other emerging domains and technologies in pursuit of a military objective and political ends. This session highlights all domain warfare from a broad and general viewpoint, as the Joint Force seeks the best all domain principles to act upon.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend key considerations when employing all domain warfare in contemporary operations, specifically when integrating information, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and space capabilities.

C. Background:

Current doctrinal warfighting domains include maritime (air, surface and subsurface), land, air, space, and cyberspace. For the U.S. to maintain a competitive advantage, U.S. military strategists argue that the future of joint warfighting depends on U.S. armed forces’ ability to operate well in all domains simultaneously and in concert with one another. In this session students will read examples and discussions covering information, space, AI, and cyberspace concepts.

With the emergence of information as key terrain in modern warfare, a key element of modern warfare is how the U.S. might use the information environment (IE) and its contemporary subset cyberspace to inform, persuade, and influence decision makers. Effectively using information operations (IO) and cyberspace operations (CO) in support of objectives and ends will be crucial enablers in future conflict. Many of our current and potential adversaries clearly appreciate the powers of IO and CO, and the potential asymmetries offered to level the playing field against the United States. Modern military operations are also increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence, and are reliant on the space domain, especially so when considering information and cyberspace operations.

D. Questions:

1. Can modern conflicts be won by the use of lethal operations alone? Explain your answer.
2. Identify how joint force commanders can use information to inform, persuade, and

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influence decision makers across the spectrum of conflict.

3. Can cyberspace be controlled? If so, what impact does that control, or lack of control, have on operations in the traditional domains of war?
4. Explain what impact artificial intelligence might have on the conduct of war. How might the U.S. military prepare for this impact?
5. How might our view of space as a warfighting domain shape future conflict?
6. Why is information considered an element of national power? How is this different than thinking of information as a joint function?
7. What changes need to occur to enable the U.S. to fight effectively in an all-domain war?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 98 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Fundamentals of Joint All-Domain Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Appendix D. Washington, DC: CJCS, 10 Sept 2024. Read 1-18.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Information in Joint Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-04. Washington, DC: CJCS, 14 Sep 2022. Read: vii - xvii. (Government)

Stokes, Jane. “*Yemen: A Case Study in Regional Conflict, Irregular Warfare, and Strategic Competition*.” Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, Naval War College. Draft publication, forthcoming 2026. (Ch.3, ~Approx. 15 pages)

Crowell, Richard. *War in the Information Age: A Primer for Information Operations and Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, Jan 2019. Read: pp. 1-44. (NWC 2021E) (Government)

Temple-Raston, Dina. “*How the US Hacked ISIS*,” National Public Radio, 26 September 2019. <https://www.npr.org/2019/09/26/763545811/how-the-u-s-hackedisis>. Read: Approx. 9 pages, or listen to 00:49:00 audio. (NWC 4219). Accessed 16 June 2023.

Spears, W. “*A Sailor’s Take on Multi-Domain Operations*.” War on the Rocks, 20 May 2019. Read: Approx. 6 pages. <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/a-sailors-take-on-multi-domain-operations/> Accessed 16 June 2023.

Brown, Brian. “*The Challenge of Joint Space Operations*.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 150, January 2024. Read: Approx. 6 pages. Accessed 29 May 2024. <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/january/challenge-joint-space-operations>

G. Supplementary Readings: None.

JMO 3.7 UNCONVENTIONAL STATECRAFT

“It is not a matter of what is true that counts, but a matter of what is perceived to be true.

— Henry Kissinger

If the war [between Israel and Hezbollah] showed anything, it was how insidious the effect of “professional” lingo can be. How does one distinguish “strategic intelligence superiority” from “operational-tactical intelligence dominance” ... so thick was the nonsense, and such the resulting verbal confusion, that the need to reform officer training and education ... became one of the cardinal lessons to emerge from the conflict.

—Martin van Creveld, The Changing Face of War, 2008

A. Focus:

This session’s thought-provoking title is intended to cause students to ponder the significance of employing the military in support of non-military activities, and in support of other agencies and instruments of national power. This session examines several of many concepts including hybrid, asymmetric, unconventional, unrestricted, and irregular warfare. By doing so we hope to better understand the challenges of determining the patterns of conflict in the contemporary environment, as well as the challenges of shaping an effective operational approach for seemingly incomprehensible (and therefore unsolvable) conflicts. While the nature of warfare arguably remains unchanged, its character, or how warfare is waged, changes on an evolutionary (and sometimes revolutionary) scale. This session will examine this changing character of warfare where diplomatic, informational and economic applications of power appear to take priority over the employment of military power in attaining operational objectives.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend evolving trends in warfare and the implications of these for operational planning and execution.
- Comprehend contemporary notions of hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, unrestricted warfare and irregular warfare, and their effect on joint doctrine.
- Evaluate the effectiveness of contemporary state and non-state actors in achieving their objectives through use of hybrid, asymmetric, unrestricted and irregular warfare operational approaches.

C. Background:

Military leaders are often challenged by evolving patterns of modern conflict. For example, strategists and military experts struggle to categorize the current conflict in eastern Ukraine, or those in Syria, Northwestern Iraq, or Gaza. While the former example could be a state (Russia) fomenting instability in another state (Ukraine) through irregular means, the latter includes a chaotic mix of insurgent groups vying for political control of Syria; internationally recognized terrorist groups with opaque agendas; and non-state actors that are seeking to establish regional

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political control irrespective of the international borders of several states. In the past, conflicts such as these may not have figured largely in U.S. strategic calculations. In today's global security environment, where second and third order effects are not limited by geography, this is no longer true. Non-state actors and terrorist organizations actively recruit and procure resources using information networks that span the globe and easily cross language, culture, ethnic, and religious boundaries. Insurgent groups have a far greater access to successfully co-opt external military and diplomatic support in order to negate the traditional advantages possessed by adversarial government regular forces. Weaker states increasingly are turning to the cyber domain in order to find asymmetric ways to compete with stronger military and economic powers. Strong regional powers are using unconventional warfare and proxy forces to pursue strategic objectives while avoiding diplomatic and economic condemnation by the international community. While history may provide comparable examples, most would agree that the exponential growth of computer networking over the last 20 years has afforded new and innovative opportunities for armed groups and organizations to pursue successfully their objectives while avoiding the debilitating blows by strong, professional military forces such as the U.S. military.

Naval Forces are not exempt from this seemingly evolving and increasingly prevalent character of warfare. In fact, Naval Forces—military, para-military and non-state—are becoming central in such environments. Conflict and competition ongoing in the South China Sea and East China Sea already exhibit asymmetric, hybrid and irregular warfare characteristics. Operational Law and the perception of legitimacy are components of this environment, and opponents appear to target the vulnerabilities of an American Way of War to achieve national or organizational objectives.

The term, “American Way of War” has historically suggested an ‘on/off’ switch indicating whether the nation is at war or at peace. Other cultures embrace a tradition where the nation (or an organization) is always at war, and the application of power is determined by conditions, opportunities and the adversary's strategic vulnerabilities. Unconventional Statecraft—the application of the nation's power towards objectives in an environment not dominated by military forces—seeks to address this dichotomy. The term may be useful in determining how best to plan operations in an environment where combatants and competitors seek to gain objectives through hybrid, asymmetric or irregular means; in other words, achieving objectives without flipping the American war-switch to ‘on’.

D. Questions:

1. Are emerging trends in warfare new, or do they represent a return to historical ways of prosecuting war?
2. Discuss the common threads in the concepts of conventional, irregular, hybrid, asymmetric, political, and unrestricted warfare. How do these concepts differ?
3. How do irregular forces use Land, Sea, Air, and Cyber domains asymmetrically against a state that employs traditional regular military forces?
4. How can the United States counter states that are engaging in these types of warfare? How does the concept of Unconventional Statecraft fit?
5. What complexities do hybrid warfare and irregular warfare present to the joint force

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commander and staff when conceptualizing military operations? Are existing planning processes adequate for addressing these challenges?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 39 pages):

Mazarr, Michael. "Understanding Deterrence." Rand Corporation. 2018. Read: pp. 1-11. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE295/RAND_PE295.pdf Accessed 14 June 2023.

Hoffman, Frank. *Examining complex forms of conflict: Gray Zone and hybrid challenges*. PRISM National Defense University. November 8, 2018. <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1983462/examining-complex-forms-of-conflict-gray-zone-and-hybrid-challenges/> Accessed 25 July 2024.

Votel, Joseph L. et al. 2016. "Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone", *Joint Forces Quarterly* 80. Read: pp. 101-109. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf Accessed 19 July 2023.

Stokes, Jane. "Yemen: A Case Study in Regional Conflict, Irregular Warfare, and Strategic Competition." Center on Irregular Warfare and Armed Groups, Naval War College. Draft publication, forthcoming 2026. (Ch.4, ~Approx. 15 pages)

G. Supplementary Readings:

French, Howard W. "The South China Sea Could Become a Dangerous Contest of Military Might." *Foreign Policy*, 5 June 2015. (NWC 3120)

Gray, Colin. *Another Bloody Century, Future Warfare*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006.

Hoffman, Frank G. "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges." *Joint Force Quarterly* 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 34-39. (NWC 7008) (Government)

Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House (February 1999): Chapter 7 pages 179-203 (24 pages). (NWC 3254)

_____. *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*. Peking: Natraj Publishers, 2007. (NWC 6021)

Mattis, James N. "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 131 (November 2005): 18-19.

Watt, Louise. "Pressure and pineapple wars: Taiwan fears quieter Chinese threat as U.S. warns of invasion." NBCNews.com, <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taiwan-fears-quieter-chinese-threat-u-s-warns-invasion-n1266216> Accessed on 5 May 2021.

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BLOCK 4 – MODERN JOINT OPERATIONAL WARFARE

Focus:

The focus of Block 4 is upon the proper organization and employment of service capabilities at the “high-tactical” level of war, and of joint capabilities at the operational level of war.

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JMO 4.1 JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL

The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower

A. Focus:

This session examines Joint Command and Control and addresses the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) authorities, the command relationships and organizational options when establishing a joint force. It will introduce the functions and responsibilities of the subordinate service and functional component commanders. This session will also introduce the critical aspects of multinational command and control and the related challenges of intelligence sharing, rules of engagement, capabilities gaps, and logistics. Finally, in order to illustrate the many concepts about to be presented throughout this Block, a fictional future PRC-Taiwan vignette is provided for consideration near the end of each session. This vignette should offer an opportunity to apply knowledge and understanding of naval and joint force employment considerations, while considering an operational design of a modern joint operation. It is not intended to be a planning exercise but rather a realistic backdrop to facilitate professional discussion.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the range of considerations that influence command structures for Joint and/or Multinational operations and campaigns.
- Comprehend the authorities inherent in the various joint force command relationships (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, support, ADCON, DIRLAUTH) and understand the circumstances when each should be used.
- Comprehend the responsibilities of service and functional component commands.
- Comprehend how possible “seams” in responsibilities can complicate command and control.
- Comprehend how boards, centers, cells, and working groups, etc. enhance cross-functional collaboration on the joint force staff.
- Comprehend the value, challenges, and risks of multinational operations, and how proper C2 considerations can mitigate them.

C. Background:

To command and control forces, the JFC relies on a headquarters (HQ) staff to provide timely and accurate information and recommendations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters along with Pat Sweeney's *A Primer for the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)* describe how to establish and sustain the JFC's HQ. Some of the

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considerations regarding how to structure a HQ will be analyzed including staff support to decision making, the joint force mission, available personnel, domestic and multinational forces, and interagency involvement. An efficient and effective Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ organization assists the commander in setting conditions that lead to subordinate success.

The United States has rarely conducted military operations unilaterally and operations in the future will likely be no different. Accordingly, we can expect that the U.S. military will work with other militaries from around the world when conducting major military operations. While alliances have a lasting C2 structure and a shared doctrine (e.g. NATO) which can ease integration, since the end of the Cold War the United States has instead needed to establish numerous coalitions, and has worked with coalition partners in most operations from Operation DESERT STORM (Persian Gulf War 1990-1991) to more recent Operations INHERENT RESOLVE (against ISIS in Syria and Iraq) and RESOLUTE SUPPORT (Afghanistan). Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 Multinational Operations discusses the conduct of multinational operations and associated challenges for operational commanders to include: command and control, intelligence sharing, logistics and rules of engagement, liaison officers, and the legal architecture associated with sharing information, providing equipment, and logistics.

D. Questions:

1. It has been said that command and control is one of the most unforgiving of the joint functions if you do not get it right at the beginning. Why?
2. Under what circumstances would a JFC choose to conduct operations through either service or functional component commands?
3. What seams exist between the various service and functional components, and what measures could the JFC use to minimize confusion?
4. How do boards, centers, cells, and working groups, etc. facilitate vertical and horizontal communication in the joint force headquarters?
5. How can a JFC ensure a well-balanced staff representative of the joint force?
6. Is there a difference between an alliance formed for wartime efforts and a coalition of the willing? What are the advantages and disadvantages of alliances?
7. What are the most significant challenges to multi-national military operations and how can an effective C2 organization help to mitigate these problems?
8. When might the U.S. place forces under command of another nation's commander?
9. What are the challenges to logistics when working with military forces from other nations?
10. What is the impact of technology and platform differences between United States forces and other nations' forces?
11. How can the United States share intelligence with other nations? What must we protect, and what concerns are there?
12. How does the commander work out rules of engagement among coalitions?

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E. Required Media:

[“The Chinese Way of War: Inside a Taiwan Invasion Scenario” lecture, NWC CMSI Professor Ian Easton, 7 May 2026. \(1:16:10\)](#)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 76 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Force Headquarters*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, DC: CJCS, 9 June 2022 Incorporating Change 1 12 July 2024. Read: II-14, II-18 to II-23, III-1 to III-5 (JTF organization). (JP 3-33) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Joint Force*, Joint Publication 1, Volume 2. 19 June 2020. Washington, DC: CJCS. Read: “Command Relationships” IV-1 to IV-14, and “Command and Control Fundamentals” IV-17 to IV-21. (JP 1) (Government)

Sweeney, Patrick C. “A Primer for the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC).” Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 9 February 2015. Read: 3-9. (NWC 2003D) (Government)

Pudas, Terry. “Preparing Future Coalition Commanders.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 3 (Winter 1993-1994): 40-46. (NWC 2102) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Multinational Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16. Washington, DC: CJCS, 01 March 2019 Incorporating Change 1 17 June 2024. Read: II-1 to II-17 note Multinational C2 examples. (JP 3-16) (Government)

U.S. Navy. *The People’s Liberation Army Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century*. Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2015. Read: Chapter 5, “Maritime Claims – Securing China’s ‘Blue Territory’”, pp. 41-46. Accessed 12 May 2026. https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081058-483 (NWC 5032A) (Government)

Joint Military Operations Department. *PRC-Taiwan Vignette*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 26 April 2018. (NWC 4027F) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Berry, Charles T. “Understanding OPCON.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 57 (2nd Quarter 2010): 63-65. (NWC 2106)

Ghez, Jeremy. “Alliances in the 21st Century: Implications for the U.S.-European Partnership.” *RAND Occasional Paper Series*. Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2011. Read: 6-10. (CDE 8185) https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP340.pdf Accessed 9 June 2023.

Weitz, Richard. “Jointness and Desert Storm: A Retrospective.” *Defense & Security Analysis* 20, no. 2 (June 2004): 133-152.

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JMO 4.2 U.S. NAVY, U.S. COAST GUARD, AND THE JFMCC

I would say that he (Chinese CNO, Wu) doesn't want to build a navy that's equivalent to the U.S. He wants to build a navy that surpasses the U.S.

—Admiral Gary Roughead (USN, Ret.)

Former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations

A. Focus:

This session is the first of three sessions seeking to understand and compare the capabilities of the military services and the responsibilities of the service and functional component commanders of a typical JTF. The previous sessions on naval tactics, platforms, sensors, and weapons introduced many U.S. Navy capabilities. Those sessions are supplemented here by an in-depth look at U.S. Navy and Maritime component C2, a close look at the capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard, and an overview of the responsibilities of the JFMCC.

Although the USMC is often commanded and employed by the JFMCC, for the sake of session balance its capabilities are addressed in the following session alongside the U.S. Army and JFLCC.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Navy along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Navy forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Coast Guard along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Coast Guard forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the responsibilities, command organization, and key planning considerations of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).

C. Background:

Many of the U.S. Navy capabilities have been discussed in earlier sessions in the course, but command and control (C2) and organization of maritime forces is worthy of further discussion as it is shaped by the characteristics and complexity of the maritime domain as well as the traditions and independent culture of the naval service. Mark MacManus outlines Navy C2 concisely in his article *United States Navy Command and Control Organization* starting with the Fleet Commands, through the JFMCC and down to the Warfare Commander which includes the Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept.

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The United States Coast Guard, a part of the Department of Homeland Security, operates in today's joint environment. U.S. Coast Guard Publication (USCG Pub) 1 *Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard* and their 2023 *Posture Statement* outline their organization, capabilities, and missions. The Coast Guard is an armed service that has participated in every American war since its inception. Although multi-mission in nature and charged with significant responsibilities in such diverse areas as maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, pollution response and maintaining aids to navigation, Coast Guard forces also provide military capabilities in support of the national military strategy. In recent combat operations, Coast Guard forces have provided to Joint Force Commanders maritime interception operations, port operations and security, coastal sea control and other mission sets where the smallest U.S. service's expertise can add value.

Finally, the capabilities of both of the services must be integrated in support of the Joint Force, so the session ends with a discussion of the responsibilities and challenges of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.

D. Questions:

1. As a refresher from previous sessions in the course, what would you say the core capabilities of the U.S. Navy are?
2. Given the dynamic nature of the maritime environment, what is the preferred method of C2 for Joint Maritime Operations and why?
3. How is a JFMCC staff organized? What are its responsibilities?
4. Describe the MOC concept, its organization, and how the MOC construct differs from traditional naval structures.
5. How does the CWC concept seek to minimize seams between various functional areas?
6. Discuss the roles of the USCG in today's strategic environment. What are the Service's strengths and weaknesses in the joint environment? How is it organized?
7. How are deployed forces from the USCG used to support geographic combatant commander (GCC) theater objectives?
8. How might the Coast Guard's unique authorities and capabilities be leveraged in support of joint military or interagency operations? How can they support naval or maritime objectives?
9. What are some important considerations for the JFMCC during joint / multinational participation in Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS) and Maritime Homeland Defense (MHL) missions?
10. Describe the key considerations for the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander when employing Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps forces together in support of the Joint Force Commander and other functional components (Land, Air, etc).

E. Required Media:

[Joint and Maritime Command and Control](#). (CDE 8038Me). 00:19:47

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F. Required Readings (Approx. 92 pages):

Joint Military Operations Department. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Read: pp. 1-9 on Navy organization, review 9-26 on forces. (NWC 3153T)

McManus, Mark. *United States Navy Command and Control Organization*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, October 2011. Read: 1-13 on organization. (NWC 5050) (Government)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Maritime Operations Center*. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-32.1. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, September 2017. Read: EX-5 to EX-16 on the MOC. (NTTP 3-32.1) (Government) Note: This document is superseded but still informative. Current version is available in the Navy Warfare Library, but it is now CUI and requires CAC to access.

U.S. Coast Guard. Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard. *U.S. Coast Guard Publication (USCG Pub 1)*, February 2014. Read: pp. 5-26, 61-72 on doctrinal capabilities and ethos (Chapters 1 & 3). (USCG Pub 1) (Government) Accessed on 11 May 2026. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002049081/-1/-1/0/CGPUB_1-0_DOCTRINE.PDF

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. United States Coast Guard. [2024 Posture Statement](#). Read: pp. 22-25 on maritime security and defense operations. Accessed on 12 May 2026. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/documents/budget/2024/Coast_Guard_FY2024_Posture_Statement_FINAL.pdf. (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Maritime Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-32. Washington, DC: CJCS, 04 December 2023. Read: I-4 to I-7, II-1 to II-16 on sea control, sea denial, JFMCC responsibilities/organization. (JP 3-32) (Government)

Vego, Milan. "China's Naval Challenge." *Proceedings* 137, no. 4 (April 2011): 36-40. <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011/april/chinas-naval-challenge> Accessed 11 July 2024. (NWC 4121)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Naval War College, JMO Department. *Service Briefs*. U.S. Navy Briefing. (CDE 8039Mc)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Maritime Operations at the Tactical Level of Warfare*. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, January 2024.

Vego, Milan. *Joint Operational Warfare, Theory and Practice*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009. Read: "Operational Command and Control", pp. X-19 to X-28.

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Service Briefs:

U.S. Navy Briefing 2026. 00:36:00

U.S. Coast Guard Briefing 2026. 00:29:00

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JMO 4.3 U.S. ARMY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AND THE JFLCC

[Y]ou may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life—but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

—T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*

Every Marine has an individual responsibility to study the profession of arms. A leader without either interest in or knowledge of the history and theory of warfare—the intellectual content of the military profession—is a leader in appearance only. Self-directed study in the art and science of war is at least equal in importance to maintaining physical condition and should receive at least equal time. This is particularly true among officers; after all, the mind is an officer's principal weapon.

— *Warfighting*, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1

A. Focus:

This session continues to focus on service capabilities by covering the organization and employment of both Army and Marine Corps forces at the high-tactical and operational levels of war. Highlights include roles, missions, core competencies, operational concepts, doctrine, and considerations for employing Army and Marine Corps forces in a joint environment. Additionally this session will broaden comprehension of joint force employment of land forces by covering the responsibilities of the Joint Force Land Component Commander.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Army along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Army forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Marine Corps along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Marine Corps forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the responsibilities, command organization, and key planning considerations of the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

C. Background:

This seminar is the first focused opportunity for students to examine the capabilities and employment considerations of U.S. land forces. This examination will begin with a close look at the U.S. Army's three capstone doctrinal publications: Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army*; Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), 3-0 *Operations*; and TRADOC PAM 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept (AOC)*. The Army has long prided itself as the

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organization that fights and wins its nation's wars. ADP 1 highlights that "as part of the joint force, the United States Army ensures mission accomplishment, guarantees national security interests, compels adversaries, prosecutes military campaigns, and delivers lasting strategic results." These publications will help frame the capabilities of U.S. Army forces, and increase understanding of the best ways to employ Army forces.

Originally charged with security for naval stations and ships-of-the-line, the Marine Corps evolved and grew to contribute major land formations during WW I, and throughout World War II conducting amphibious operations in the Pacific. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1) and the Marine Corps Operating Concept describe how the Marine Corps is organized, and their "philosophy of warfighting". Today, Marine forces are organized around a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), a scalable task-organized unit consisting of ground, aviation, combat service support, and command elements. Although MAGTFs are all organized around a standardized structure, these organizations also provide a force that can be easily tailored to a variety of situations.

Ultimately, the Army and Marine Corps operating forces offer the JFC various options in conducting, sustaining, and shaping decisive operations. This will often be done via accomplishment of the many responsibilities of the Joint Force Land Component Commander as outlined in the final reading, JP 3-31 *Joint Land Operations*.

D. Questions:

1. What is the role of the Army in today's Joint Force? What does Army doctrine say it is?
2. Explain the operational advantages (and challenges) of employing the Army in a Joint Maritime Operation. How can Army capabilities support naval or maritime objectives?
3. What are the Army's primary formations at the operational and tactical levels of war? Are these formations still relevant to today's operational environment? Why or why not?
4. Why does the Army believe that the effect of technologies on land are often not as great as in other domains? Do you agree or disagree?
5. How does Mission Command work within the Army?
6. Describe the roles, organization, and missions of the United States Marine Corps.
7. What unique capabilities do Marine forces provide to the JFC? How can those capabilities support naval or maritime objectives?
8. Discuss the versatility, flexibility, scalability, combined arms capability, types, deployment/ employment considerations, and limitations of MAGTFs.
9. What are the differences between an Army "Modular" Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and a USMC scalable MAGTF?
10. Describe how Mission Command, commonly referred to by Marines as mission tactics or mission orders, works within the Marine Corps.
11. Describe the key considerations for the Joint Force Land Component Commander when employing Army and Marine Corps forces together in support of the Joint Force Commander and other functional components (Maritime, Air, etc).

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E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 104 pages):

U.S. Army. *The Army*. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 31 July 2019. Read: 1-1 to 1-5. (ADP 1) (Government)

_____. *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations*. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 6 December 2018. Read: Executive Summary, pp. vi-xii. (CDE 8156) (Government)

_____. *Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations*. Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 21 March 2025. Read: pp. x (FM 3-0 Logic Chart); pp. 1-6 (Army Operations), 19 (Land domain),); 36-45 (Army Posture, echelons). (Government)

Amos, James F. “An Amphibious Force for Emerging Demands.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 193, no.11 (November 2013). Read: pp. 2-10. <https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013/november/amphibious-force-emerging-demands>. Accessed 11 July 2024.

U.S. Marine Corps. *39th Commandant's Planning Guidance*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, August 2024. Read: pp. 1-20. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Mar/14/2003667169/-1/-1/0/39TH_COMMANDANTS_PLANNING_GUIDANCE-AUGUST_2024.PDF. Accessed 26 Mar 2025. (Government)

_____. *Marine Corps Operating Concept. How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, September 2016. Read: pp. 2-7. (NWC 4048A) (Government)

_____. *Warfighting*. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP 1). Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997. Read: 53-58, 71-90, and 93-96. (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Land Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-31. Washington, DC: CJCS, 3 October 2019 Incorporating Change 2, 31 March 2023. Read: II-1 to II-15. (JP 3-31) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Military Operations Department. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Scan: Marine Corps and Army sections. (NWC 3153T)

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Service Briefs:

[U.S. Marine Corps Briefing 2026. 00:47:00](#)

[U.S. Army Briefing 2026. 00:31:40](#)

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JMO 4.4 U.S. AIR FORCE, U.S. SPACE FORCE, AND THE JFACC

If you want to go anywhere in modern war, in the air, on the sea, on the land, you must have command of the air.

— Fleet Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey, USN. Testimony to Congress following WW II

If we are not able to gain and maintain air superiority – which is not a given and it’s not easy – if we were unable to do that in a future conflict . . . then everything about the way the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps fight on the ground would have to change. What they buy, how they train, maybe even who they recruit. This is a foundational element of the use of airpower and of joint warfighting.

—General Mark A. Welsh III, Former Air Force Chief of Staff

A. Focus:

This session will focus on the organization and employment of United States Air Force (USAF) forces at the high-tactical and operational levels of war and introduces the newly-established United States Space Force (USSF), also under the Department of the Air Force. Highlights include roles, missions, core competencies, operational concepts, doctrine, and considerations for employing U.S. Air Force/U.S. Space forces in a joint environment. Additionally, this session will explore the challenges of employing forces in the heavily used and heavily shared domain of the air, and discuss the responsibilities of the Joint Force Air Component Commander.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Air Force along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Air Force forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of the U.S. Space Force along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how U.S. Space Force forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the responsibilities, command organization, and key planning considerations of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Director of Space Forces (DIRSPACEFOR).

C. Background:

This session is the first opportunity in the course for the students to examine the specific capabilities and organization of the U.S. Air Force. This session opens by providing some baseline knowledge of Air Force capabilities and doctrine, informing students about what the USAF contributes to operations throughout the spectrum of conflict.

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The USAF has been an integrated air and space force commanding a domain that stretches from the earth's surface to the outer reaches of space in a seamless operational continuum. With the standup of the USSF, they jointly employ their assets globally to achieve strategic, operational and tactical objectives. Most air and space assets can perform multiple functions to achieve the desired objectives for the joint force, and most of the joint force relies on the use of the air and space domains. This inherent versatility of flexible assets is just one of the strengths the USAF and USSF bring to the operational planning table to ensure the joint force commander dominates adversaries.

Mark A. General Mark Welsh's *Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America* outlines the enduring importance of Air Power and the capabilities the Air Force brings to the joint fight. Air Force Doctrine Document 1 serves as the capstone document for the Air Force and provides the underlying core knowledge for the use of air power. The nascent U.S. Space Force's capstone publication describes the relevance and place of space forces in the joint force. Richard Kuglar's "Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle." along with Phil Haun and Colin Jackson's article *Breaker of Armies* illustrate the opportunities and challenges of integrating air forces with ground forces across the range of military operations, thus opening an opportunity to discuss the responsibilities of the Joint Force Air Component Commander in unifying efforts in the domain.

D. Questions:

1. What are the core capabilities of the USAF? How do they relate to the Operational Functions?
2. What are the roles and responsibilities of a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and the Joint Air Component Coordination Element (JACCE)?
3. Why does the Air Component often recommend retaining OPCON of air forces at the theater level in support of JTFs, vice placing them under the direct command of a JTF?
4. What is the role of the Air Operations Center (AOC)?
5. How can deployed USAF forces support geographic combatant commander (GCC) theater objectives? How can they support naval or maritime objectives?
6. Describe the key considerations for the Joint Force Air Component Commander (acting as the Area Air Defense Commander, AADC) when employing Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces together in support of the Joint Force Commander and other functional components (Maritime, Land, etc).
7. What are the core capabilities of the USSF? How might USSF/USSPACECOM capabilities be coordinated with operations at the CCDR or JTF level?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 84 pages):

Welsh III, Mark A. General. "Global Vigilance, Global Reach, Global Power for America." *Air & Space Power Journal* 31, no. 2 (April 2014): 4-10. (NWC 4102) (Government)

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U.S. Air Force. *Air Force Doctrine Publication 1, The Air Force* (AFDP 1). Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, 10 March 2021. Read: pp. 6-10. (AFDP 1) (Government)

U.S. Air Force. *Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations* (AFDP 3-0). Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, 22 Jan 2025. Read: Chapter 5 “Presenting AF Forces” pp. 37-46. (AFDP 3-0) (Government)

Haun, Phil and Colin Jackson. “Breaker of Armies.” *International Security* 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015-16): 139-178. Read: 139-142 and 173-178. (NWC 4157) (PURL)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Introduction to Service Capabilities*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, February 2022. Read: pp. 28-32 Space Force section. (NWC 4245)

U.S. Space Force. *Space Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, U.S. Space Force, July 2023. Read pp. 13-23, 31-38. (SDP 3-0) (Government)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War*. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32. October 2008. With Change 1, Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, August 2010. Read: A-1 to A-7 on maritime counterair command relationships, and the JFMCC/JFACC seam. (NWP 3-32) (Government)

Kugler, Richard. “Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle.” *Case Studies in Defense Transformation Number 5*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2007. Read: pp. 1-21. (NWC 4214).

G. Supplementary Readings:

Barrett, Mark and Mace Carpenter. *Survivability in the Digital Age: The Imperative for Stealth*. Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, July 2017.

Bender, William J. *The Cyber Edge: Posturing the US Air Force for the Information Age*. Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Arlington, VA: Air Force Association, August 2017.

Joint Military Operations Department. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Scan: Air Force and Space Force sections. (NWC 3153T)

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Service Briefs:

[U.S. Air Force Briefing 2026. 00:41:30](#)

[U.S. Space Force Briefing 2025. 00:31:43](#)

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JMO 4.5 U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF), SOCOM, AND THE JFSOCC

The environment in which we find ourselves has changed. Instead of traditional nation-state conflict, both USSOCOM's and USSOF's assigned missions are predominantly focused on addressing the non-state or transnational violent extremist threat.

— Admiral Eric Olson, USN Former Commander, USSOCOM

A. Focus:

This session emphasizes how the Special Operations Forces (SOF) contribute to the Joint Force. This seminar will focus on the organization and employment of SOF to include roles, missions, core competencies, operational concepts, and considerations for employing SOF in a joint environment at the high-tactical and operational levels of war. This session, along with the other Service-specific sessions, will broaden comprehension of joint force employment across the range of military operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the doctrinal capabilities and employment concepts of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) along the competition continuum at the high-tactical and operational levels of war.
- Comprehend how SOCOM forces are organized to plan, execute, and sustain operations as part of a Joint Force.
- Comprehend the responsibilities, command organization, and key planning considerations of the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).

C. Background:

The session provides a foundational understanding of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and doctrine that will inform future planners of the potential contributions of SOF in future operational contingencies. SOF are small, specially organized units manned by people carefully selected and trained to operate under physically demanding and psychologically stressful conditions. They accomplish missions using modified equipment and the unconventional applications of tactics against strategic and operational objectives in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments. Their aim is to achieve military, diplomatic, informational and or economic objectives that otherwise would be out of reach, by employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. In *To Serve the Nation-U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict*, Michele Malvesti discusses that SOF will need to continue to evolve to meet future strategic threats.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 and the USSCOM Fact Book provide an overview of how SOF is organized, their core activities, and how they employ command and control. Since the establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 1987, all services' SOF have been under the combatant command (COCOM) of one unified commander and have been trained and equipped to conduct unilateral, joint and combined special operations across

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the competition continuum. Each military service has established a major command to serve as the service component of USSOCOM. SOF can support the geographic combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, and other government agencies.

D. Questions:

1. Describe the role of SOF. How are SOF organized? What are some of the future challenges that SOF faces?
2. What capabilities do SOF provide national decision makers? What are some limitations of SOF? In what ways can operational planners employ SOF to achieve GCC objectives? How can SOF support naval or maritime objectives?
3. U.S. Special Operations Command propounds five 'SOF Truths'. Discuss the relevance and applicability of these 'truths,' particularly the fifth one (i.e. most special operations require non-SOF assistance).
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages to employing SOF as compared to conventional forces?
5. How does Mission Command work within SOF?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 50 pages):

Malvesti, Michele. [To Serve the Nation-U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/117307/CNAS_To%20Serve%20the%20Nation_Malvesti.pdf). Center for a New American Security, June 2010. Read: 4-11. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/117307/CNAS_To%20Serve%20the%20Nation_Malvesti.pdf Accessed 9 June 2023.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05. Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 May 2025. Read: Chapter I, "Overview of Special Operations" (I-1 to I-17); Chapter 2, "Special Operations Core Activities" (II-1 to II-22); Figure III-2 "Notional Theater Command Structure" (III-7) and Figure III-3 "Special Operations Forces Command and Control Options" (III-9). (JP 3-05) (Government)

U.S. Special Operations Command. [USSOCOM Latest Fact Book](https://www.socom.mil/latest-factbook). MacDill AFB, Tampa, FL: Headquarters USSOCOM. Read: pp. 8-11, scan 12-38. Accessed on 12 May 2026. <https://www.socom.mil/latest-factbook> (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Joint Military Operations Department. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. Scan: SOF section. (NWC 3153T)

U.S. Naval War College, JMO Service Briefs:

Special Operations Forces (SOF) Briefing (dated, but applicable). 01:02:47

JMO 4.6 JOINT LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT

... A sound logistics plan is the foundation upon which a war operation should be based. If the necessary minimum of logistics support cannot be given to the combatant forces involved, the operation may fail, or at best be only partially successful.

—Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, Commander Fifth Fleet, 1946

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of logistics and sustainment at the operational level of war. It addresses logistics principles and planning considerations for the JTF and JFMCC commanders, and offers historical lessons to learn from events in North Africa during WW II.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the relationship among the elements of strategic, operational, and tactical logistics and understand the implications of operational factors on naval, joint, and multinational logistics.
- Comprehend the importance of the Logistics Estimate, to include specific logistics issues that must be addressed when developing a logistics staff estimate for a joint operation and how to apply them in the planning process.
- Evaluate the operational concept of logistics support to achieve operational objectives.
- Comprehend OCS capabilities, options, and considerations of the joint force.

C. Background:

Logistics and sustainment are disciplines that all warfighters must understand. Commanders and staff officers must have a clear comprehension of the capabilities and limitations of operational logistics for without it combat forces will be at risk of eroding combat power quickly, and approaching culmination well before the mission is complete. This session opens with the Crevelld reading where he offers a description of events in North Africa during WW II, specifically the challenges posed to German commanders, providing clear lessons to be learned on the topic.

As illustrated in the doctrinal readings assigned, providing logistics to forces throughout the world requires a great deal of synchronization by both supported and supporting commands, from the national strategic down to the tactical levels, throughout the joint force. Sustainment planning requires an understanding of the operating environment, commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, forces available, force flow requirements, host nation capabilities and limitations, time, space, risk tolerance, etc. Every operation is unique, and it is at the operational level in particular where logisticians must apply both creative and critical thinking in order to connect strategic resources to tactical forces in an *efficient and effective* manner. As part of this balancing, a reading on Operational Contract Support (OCS) illustrates how contracted specialties can mitigate force or skill shortages within the uniformed Services, but how they also have significantly different command and control considerations worthy of study.

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D. Questions:

1. Are logistics/sustainment the same/different? When should logistics be considered during the planning process and why?
2. What tools are available to the combatant commander to balance joint logistics efficiently and effectively? What are the advantages and disadvantages associated with those options?
3. How do commanders plan and manage contracted support to meet operational missions? What risks does the operational force assume by relying on contracted capabilities and how can these risks be mitigated?
4. How does the “logistics estimate” serve as a tool to facilitate critical logistics planning during the joint planning process? What are some of the logistics issues that must be properly addressed?
5. What were some of the logistics challenges that Rommel faced? Evaluate how the commander reacted to these challenges, and recommend any changes you think would have been more sound.
6. Considering the challenges in North Africa during WW II, which of them still exist today? How might operational commanders overcome them?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 86 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Logistics*. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 20 July 2023, Incorporating Change 1 22 May 2025. Read: pages x–xiii (“Principles of Logistics” and “Core Logistics Functions”), III-15 to III-23 (“Logistics Authorities” and “Logistics Control Options”), and IV-1 to IV-17 (“Joint Logistics Planning”). (29 pages). (JP 4-0) (Government)

Crevel, Martin Van. *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. 2nd Edition. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Read: pp. 181-201 “Sirte to Alamein”.

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Navy Planning, Logistics*. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 5-01.4. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, April 2015. Scan: Chapters 1 & 2. Read: Chapters 3 & 4, Appendices A & B. (NTTP 5-01.4) (Government)

U.S. Department of Defense. *Command and Staff Guide to Operational Contract Support*, Version 1.0. Washington, DC: DOD, 26 October 2016. (NWC 2174) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

CANF SWPA OPLAN 13-44, *MUSKETEER KING II*, Annex K Logistics, Base Development and Medical Plans. (NWC 4169) Accessed on 9 June 2023.
<https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/OpPlan/13-44-K.html>

JMO 4.7 JOINT DEPLOYMENT

Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demand well developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriate sequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldier and unit versatility. Such missions will require leaders and units that can operate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piece thinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur in a joint or combined environment.

— General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., U.S.A. Commander VII Corps, Gulf War Aug '89 - Jun '91

A. Focus:

This session provides an overview of the national deployment system (strategic triad) through an examination of the mission of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), its subordinate component commands, and their role deploying joint forces in support of global contingencies.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the elements of the strategic deployment triad, including benefits and challenges of each.
- Comprehend the steps of the deployment process.

C. Background:

In order to maneuver joint forces to achieve an operation's objectives, joint force commanders and staffs must first effectively deploy those forces from wherever they are to where they are needed. This session exposes students to the inherent advantages and limitations for each Services' deployment methods; challenges with balancing critical requirements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities to plan and execute deployment operations; and discloses the complex and critical aspects for deploying large/multi-service forces over long distances as related to the strategic mobility triad. Deployment encompasses the transportation of people, equipment, supplies, and other commodities by land, sea, and air, to enable military force projection. This includes efforts for scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to support the higher joint task force commander's operational concept.

While the Joint Staff J3 serves as the DOD Joint Deployment Process Owner, USTRANSCOM serves as DOD's Mobility Joint Force Provider, Single Manager for Defense Transportation and Single Manager for Patient Movement. The Strategic Deployment Video outlines each component of USTRANSCOM, the Strategic Mobility Triad, and the process for projecting the Joint Force. The Strategic Mobility Triad consists of pre-positioned material, sealift and airlift where the actual movement is executed by USTRANSCOM's component commands: Military Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC—Army), Military Sealift Command (MSC—Navy), and Air Mobility Command (AMC—Air Force).

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Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 will discuss the Joint Deployment and Redeployment processes, how forces are prepared and assembled for both deployment and redeployment, and the process of Movement itself.

Joint Publication (JP) 4-0 covers the core Logistics functions that include Operational Contracting Support and provides an overview of the Defense Transportation System and the Strategic Mobility Triad.

D. Questions:

1. How do supported joint force commanders (JFC) get forces from wherever they are in the world to the JFC's area of operations?
2. How do key deployment commands and entities support the deployment process?
3. Why does each leg of the strategic mobility triad affect the JFC's deployment process?
4. How should planners consider operational requirements, capabilities, and vulnerabilities when conducting deployment planning?

E. Required Media (Approx. 0:27:00):

Strategic Deployment Video. (CDE 8065M) 27 mins.

F. Required Readings (Approx. 27 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-35. Washington, DC: CJCS, 31 March 2022. Read: Chapters I and III. Scan: Chapters IV and V. (JP 3-35) (Government)

_____. *Joint Logistics*. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 20 July 2023, Incorporating Change 1 22 May 2025. Read: II-1 to II-3 ("Deployment and Distribution") (JP 4-0) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The Defense Transportation System*. Joint Publication (JP) 4-01. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 July 2017.

JMO 4.8 JOINT INTELLIGENCE

By 'intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

A. Focus:

This seminar focuses on the nature and principles of intelligence, the responsibilities of both the joint force and maritime commander and the duties of the staff intelligence officer/J2/N2, primarily at the operational level. In particular, this seminar will explore the critical nature of the commander's relationship with the intelligence officer, the importance of the Intelligence Estimate and Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), and the challenges of intelligence production and dissemination in multinational operations.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend how the intelligence process generates an understanding of the adversary and the operational environment, and thus supports better military decision-making.
- Comprehend the challenges of synchronizing intelligence in a multi-national coalition.
- Comprehend the roles and responsibilities of the commander and the intelligence officer in the intelligence process at the operational level.
- Comprehend intelligence organizations and operational-level integration.
- Comprehend Joint and Navy doctrinal terminology relating to intelligence, including the intelligence process and associated intelligence functions.

C. Background:

The field of Operational Intelligence has had its share of successes and failures. Of particular note intelligence inaccuracies or gaps have had detrimental effects on national policy decisions and military operations. Even when intelligence is accurate, timely, and predictive it has sometimes been poorly appreciated or even disregarded, with corresponding ill effects on operations. It is therefore of utmost importance commanders and staff planners understand the challenges of the field in order to ensure understanding of the adversary and the operational environment before committing forces and people to combat.

This session's readings begin with L.E. Jacoby offering lessons learned in the context of the Cold War and points out that there are some truths as applicable today as they were 50 years ago. Joint Publication (JP) JP 2-0 reviews the principles of joint intelligence along with roles and responsibilities in order to describe the characteristics of "good" intelligence that planners and commanders should be mindful of. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 2-0, further explores the responsibilities of intelligence, fundamentals of naval intelligence, and its production. Finally, two readings (JP 3-33 and Schawacker's "Multinational Intelligence Issues" article) cover a particularly important topic when working in coalitions: intelligence

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sharing in the multinational arena. According to Schawacker, “The willingness or ability to share intelligence is a critical factor affecting the cohesion and stability of coalitions and greatly impacts unity of effort during multinational operations.”

D. Questions:

1. What is operational intelligence? How does it differ from strategic or tactical intelligence?
2. How is the intelligence process synchronized to support operational decision-making, as well as joint and navy planning?
3. How does the intelligence officer at the operational level leverage the capabilities of the wider intelligence community for military operations and tactical actions?
4. How does a commander ensure limited resources are applied against the most critical intelligence needs? What are the characteristics of a *critical consumer* of intelligence?
5. What are some of the intelligence challenges associated with multinational operations?

E. Required Media (Approx. 0:57:00):

“Intelligence Support to Operational Planning” Lecture. (CDE 8060M)

F. Required Readings (Approx. 60 pages):

Jacoby, L. E. “Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War.” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 125, no. 9 (Sep 1999): 102-104. (NWC 4139)

U.S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Intelligence*. Joint Publication (JP) 2-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 26 May 2022 Incorporating Change 1 5 July 2024. Read: I-4 to I-15 Responsibilities and Principles, II-33 to II-35 Multinational Intel Principles. Scan: II-11, II-26 to II-29 on intel support organizations. (JP 2-0) (Government)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Naval Intelligence*. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 2-0. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, March 2014. Read: 1-7 to 1-15, 3-5 to 3-35, 4-1 to 4-4 on IPOE process, J-1 to J-5 on intel annex development. (NWP 2-0) (Government)

Schawacker, Keith R. “*Multinational Intelligence Issues: What the Operational Commander Can Do to Mitigate Them*.” Research paper. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2013. Scan. (NWC 3056) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Force Headquarters*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-33. Washington, DC: CJCS, 9 June 2022 Incorporating Change 1 12 July 2024. Read: VI-8 to VI-9 on Multinational Intelligence. (JP 3-33) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings:

Shuster, Richard. *Intelligence, Leadership, and Decisive Victory at Midway*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, Joint Military Operations Department, 2011. (NWC 2080)

JMO 4.9 SUMMATIVE ASSESSMENT 2

In the absence of orders, go find something and kill it.

—General Erwin Rommel

A. Focus:

This summative assessment is primarily intended to measure a student's mastery of Block 3 and/or Block 4 content in conjunction with the Block 5 JPP Exercise, given a modern (real or hypothetical) situation requiring military responses in concert with other agencies, organizations, and instruments of national power. Timing of this assessment may vary between FSP and NWC-at-NPS; refer to calendar and professor guidance as needed.

B. Objectives:

- Demonstrate the ability to analyze modern military situations using theory and doctrine, and use this analysis to contribute to sound decision-making.
- Demonstrate the ability to apply naval, joint and multinational capabilities to modern joint operations and campaigns across the competition continuum.
- Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking to operational problems.
- Demonstrate the ability to apply clear and precise written communication.

C. Background:

In order to become JPME qualified officers, planners, and commanders students must demonstrate proficiency in applying military capabilities to modern operational problems. This requires the application of naval, joint, interagency and multinational capabilities across the full range of military operations, anywhere on the conflict continuum, and in an environment that is volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and fraught with operational-leadership quandaries. This assignment is meant to ascertain the level of mastery of these concepts and to revisit as necessary those aspects that may need reinforcing.

Students will be expected to prepare a complete response to the question(s) assigned. The assignment may also implicitly require students to apply major principles, ideas, and concepts covered in previous blocks.

The basis for evaluation of the written response will be:

- Complete, logical, and well-supported responses to all questions or problems presented.
- Correct comprehension and application of appropriate course concepts.
- Clear and concise articulation of ideas.

D. Questions:

The assigned question(s) and instructions will be provided by FSP/NPS professors.

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E. Required Media:

Review as necessary.

F. Required Readings:

Review as necessary. This assignment is an individual effort; collaboration is NOT permitted.

G. Supplementary Readings:

None.

BLOCK 5 – JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP) EXERCISE

Focus:

Block 5 presents the topics and processes necessary to synthesize and apply the understanding of joint military operations learned thus far in the course, and address today's national security challenges.

Students will first be introduced to the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the concept of Global Integrated Planning. In this context they will then learn about the Joint Planning Process (JPP), and apply it to a fictional military scenario as members of a Joint Planning Group (JPG). This will be done by engaging in a multi-week crisis planning exercise resulting in multiple proposed Courses of Action (COA), a recommendation and decision, and finally order development. The scope and complexity of the exercise is intended to broaden understanding of the intricacies of joint planning and the importance of operational design, being especially mindful of the need first to establish and then to maintain sea control in the applicable zones of the joint operations area.

The detailed, interactive planning exercise will use the Joint Planning Process (JPP) as outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. The JPP Workbook (NWC 4111) provides students an outline of the joint planning process and formats to analyze the situation, conduct mission analysis, develop courses of action (COAs), analyze and compare developed COAs, and ultimately recommend one COA for further development. Following this, students will carry their approved COA forward and address development of the JTF Order to complete the course.

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JMO 5.1 JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)

In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.

—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA

A. Focus:

The session begins with an overview of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the roles of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the service chiefs in translating national policy objectives into definitive planning guidance. This session also discusses how Joint Planning is supposed to offer the ability to develop options, update, or change a plan rapidly based on changes in the operational and strategic environment, such as changes in policy guidance or objectives, resources and available forces, threat assessments, and posture. Currently, planning guidance for combatant commanders and their staffs can be found in the *National Military Strategy (NMS)*, *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*, *Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*, and the *Global Force Management and Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)*.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the purpose of the JSPS.
- Comprehend how the NMS, CPG, JSCP, and GFMIG drive the planning cycle and frame planning requirements for the combatant commander.
- Comprehend how Joint Planning provides flexible options to strategic decision makers.

C. Background:

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are pivotal in translating national security objectives into definitive planning guidance for the combatant commanders, as mandated by Title 10 USC. The combatant commanders are responsible for the actual development and production of JSCP-directed campaign plans but are dependent on support from the services, other combatant commanders, and the combat support agencies during the planning and execution process. This is all done via the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), and through the various strategic guidance processes and documents described in this session.

The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 113. The Secretary of Defense, with the approval from the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans.

The JSCP provides guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Joint Chiefs of Staff to accomplish assigned planning tasks. The JSCP includes regional objectives and planning assumptions; specifies the type of plan for each task; and apportions major combat and strategic lift forces to the combatant commanders for their planning. The JSCP also provides the combatant commanders with a framework for the scope of their plans, plan formats, and the amount of detailed planning that is required.

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The GFMIG is a critical source document for force planning and execution. The Secretary of Defense is required to balance global demand for steady-state and current operations against the needs of the services (e.g., training and testing), while also maintaining a surge capability against contingencies. This SecDef-approved document establishes guidance for assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces in support of the GFM framework.

Contingency (or deliberate) planning is a complex and lengthy process, particularly when the combatant commanders are required to develop Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) and a derived Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL). Plans developed in support of the JSCP are integral to the combatant commander's campaign plan (CCP).

Joint Planning is the system used by combatant commanders to produce directed contingency and deliberate plans. It is a set of ideas unifying efforts across people, processes, products, and technology. It is designed to speed up the contingency planning process—to make contingency plans more relevant, more usable. It provides for increased flexibility at the Theater Strategic and Operational levels or war, enabling a shared understanding of problems, threats, and options.

D. Questions:

1. What is the value of this enormous effort we expend on contingency planning?
2. What do the CPG, JSCP, and GFMIG provide planners?
3. Joint Planning is designed to “preserve the best characteristics of present-day contingency planning and crisis planning with a common process.” How does it meet this challenge?
4. What is a Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP) and what purpose does it serve?
5. Considering the structure of military planning, do you agree with Milan Vego's concerns of the bureaucratization of the decision-making process? What can be done about it?

E. Required Media:

None.

F. Required Reading (Approx. 58 pages):

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Scan through Chapters 1, 2; read JSPS section II-1 to II-5 and Figure II-1. Note JMO course concepts. (JP 5-0) (Government)

Vego, Milan. “The Bureaucratization of the U.S. Military Decisionmaking Process.” *Joint Force Quarterly* 88, 1st Quarter 2018. Read: 34-35, and 42-45 (“A Possible Solution”).

G. Supplementary Readings:

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Strategic Planning System*. CJCSI 3100.01F. Washington, DC: CJCS, 29 January 2024. Encl A to E, Note Figures 1, 2.

JMO 5.2 JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP) EXERCISE INTRODUCTION

Plans must be simple and flexible. Actually, they only form a datum plane from which you build as necessity directs or opportunity offers. They should be made by the people who are going to execute them . . .

—General George S. Patton, USA

A. Focus:

This session introduces the Joint Planning Process (JPP). Each service may apply slight differences to their decision making or planning processes, but the underlying logic and thinking are similar in nature. By learning and applying the JPP students will be prepared to apply any number of similar processes to successfully address modern military problems.

B. Objectives:

- Comprehend the inputs, outputs, and purpose of each step in the JPP.
- Comprehend how the concepts of logical reasoning, critical thinking, creative thinking, military decision making are applied during the Joint Planning Process.
- Comprehend the JPP Exercise Scenario.

C. Background:

Military commanders must continually make decisions, often under unfavorable conditions. Thoughtful adversaries who are dedicated to the defeat of U.S. and allied forces will compound these unfavorable conditions by executing well designed plans of their own. As well, the physical environment, climate, and weather can significantly interfere with the joint force mission accomplishment. The JPP is designed to guide staff officers and commanders to ensure that no matter of importance is omitted while they are contemplating the best course of action to achieve mission success.

D. Questions:

1. How is a Joint Planning Group (JPG) organized, and what are the key roles involved in executing JPP?
2. How does a Commander help frame problems for planning groups? What are the typical elements of Commander's Intent and Commander's Planning Guidance?
3. How does the JPP help us plan? What are its advantages and disadvantages?
4. Discuss the steps, and how each one is logically connected to the next.
5. How can a JPG effectively leverage different service, component, multinational and interagency perspectives when planning?
6. How does the COA generated as a result of the planning process become codified for action?
7. How does a commander provide updates to an Order once issued?

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E. Required Media (Approx. 0:54:00):

“Operation Pacific Teak” Interactive (3 videos). (CDE 8068): [Introduction](#), [Background Data](#), and [Situation Assessment](#).

Exercise Calendar: Note FAs in Block 5 are completed using group products, and brief individual reflection. SAs are individual assessments. Flow may be modified by Professor.

BLOCK 5 - JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP) EXERCISE				
Session	Topic	FSP Week	NPS Session	Assessments
5.1	Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)	Week 26	27	
5.2	Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise Introduction	"	28	
5.3	JPP Exercise - Planning Initiation and Mission Analysis	Week 27	29-30	
	JPP Exercise - Mission Analysis - Continued	Week 28	31	
	JPP Exercise - COA Development	Week 29	32-33	FA5 - MA
	JPP Exercise - COA Development - Continued	Week 30	34	SA2 (NPS)
	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming	Week 31	35	FA6 - COA
	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming - Continued	Week 32	35	
	JPP Exercise - COA Comparison, Recommendation, and Approval	Week 33	36	
	JPP Exercise - Order Development (WARNORD)	Week 34	37-39	FA7 - REC
5.4	Course Retrospective and Critique	"	40	

F. Required Readings (Approx. 44 pages):

CDE Joint Military Operations Department. *Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise Borneo Scenario*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 31 July 2024. Read: “Introduction” (v-vi) and Chapter 1 “Situation” (1-19). Scan: Enemy Order of Battle (21-29). Scan: Table of Contents for familiarity and later use. (Government) (Issued)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Joint Planning Process (JPP) Workbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College. January 2022. Read: Table of Contents and “Part II: The Joint Planning Process” pp. 24-40. (NWC 4111K) (Government) (Issued)

College of Maritime Operational Warfare. *Maritime Staff Reference Guide*. Newport, RI: Naval War College. January 2024. For reference, scan Table of Contents for familiarity. (Government) (Issued)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. For reference, primarily Chapter IV (Joint Planning Process). (JP 5-0) (Government)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Navy Planning*. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, May 2021 with Erratum 1 April 2025. For reference, scan Table of Contents for familiarity. (NWP 5-01) (Government)

G. Supplementary Readings: None.

JMO 5.3 JOINT PLANNING PROCESS (JPP) EXERCISE

My belief is that we have to stay focused on the military that is so lethal that on the battlefield, it is the enemy's longest day and worst day when they run into that force...

~ General James N. Mattis (USMC (Ret)) Senate Confirmation Hearing, 2017

A. Focus:

This multi-week exercise provides a fictional scenario in which students are tasked to respond to higher guidance by applying the Joint Planning Process (JPP). The *Joint Planning Process Workbook* (NWC 4111) will be used as an instructional tool and a guide as work towards a military solution to the scenario. Students, using the *Joint Planning Process (JPP) Exercise Borneo Scenario* and acting as the Joint Planning Group (JPG) on a Joint Task Force staff, will conduct each of the key steps of the process to arrive at a Course of Action (COA) recommendation. Following this, students will then use the selected COA to develop and write a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) within an Operation Order or Warning Order (OPORD or WARNORD) for the Joint Task Force.

B. Objectives:

- Apply course concepts while executing the JPP in the context of a realistic contemporary military problem, and in response to higher tasking.
- Analyze a mission then create, analyze, compare, and recommend a sound COA.
- Comprehend planning considerations associated with the employment of joint forces in a contested environment.
- Comprehend the organizational dynamics and challenges that a member of a joint, multinational, interagency planning effort must overcome.
- Comprehend the Orders Development Process, the contents of an Operation Plan / Order, and the standard format used for Operation Plans / Orders.
- Comprehend the importance of orders reconciliation / crosswalk prior to issuing the order.

C. Background:

Preceding sessions have provided the theoretical concepts of Operational Art and Naval Warfare Theory. Additionally, the course has presented a range of military operations available to confront our adversaries across the modern competition continuum. Finally the course has addressed practical planning considerations for the joint employment of each Service and the application of joint functions. This exercise builds upon all this instruction and offers planners an opportunity to synthesize and apply these various considerations to support a sound military decision.

The main purpose of the JPP, the NPP, or any other planning framework, is to provide a logical sequence of actions that support analysis of a military problem, development of valid courses of action, and a recommendation of the soundest option to achieve the mission. Given the exercise scenario (problem) and the JPP Workbook (process), the student-led JPG will

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complete each step in JPP in order to develop valid COAs which exploit and employ the many useful concepts learned throughout the JMO course (solutions).

An important aspect of this planning exercise is careful consideration of how decisions made at the Joint Task Force level influence subsequent planning by subordinate echelons – notably the JFMCC or Naval Component Command (NCC) in its efforts to establish, maintain and exploit sea control in the maritime zones of the Joint Operations Area. In order to ensure this careful consideration, JPP members should incorporate role-play elements of differing service and component perspectives coupled with interagency views in order to add depth and soundness to each seminar's proposed course of action.

After valid COAs have been compared and one has been recommended/selected, students will then develop the order. Orders communicate the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form understandable by those executing the order and writing them is a common task that all commanders and staff officers should understand. Even the best plan may fail if the order is not written and communicated accurately and completely to those executing the mission. Orders development includes an essential two-step quality control approach during the writing phase of the order or plan. Reconciliation is an *internal* review that the staff conducts of the entire order. It identifies gaps and discrepancies in the order. Specifically, the staff compares the Commander's Intent, the mission, and Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR(s)) against the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and supporting concepts. The Crosswalk is an *external* review of higher and adjacent orders to ensure unity of effort and to ensure the Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Commander's Intent is met.

D. **Questions:** None.

E. **Required Media:** None.

F. **Required Readings: (Specific Weekly Reading and Homework Assignments on next page)**

CDE Joint Military Operations Department. *JPP Exercise Borneo Scenario*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 5 Feb 2024 (Incorporating Change 1 31 July 2024). (Government) (Issued)

Joint Military Operations Department. *Joint Planning Process (JPP) Workbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2022. (NWC 4111K) (Government) (Issued)

Exercise Schedule and Guidance: *In addition to completing the assigned reading for each step, students should individually fill in the JPP Worksheet (provided by Professors) with a few of their own thoughts on each respective planning item in advance of group planning. The ideas recorded on these worksheets will then serve as the basis for student contribution during group work.* Key student group outputs are noted as Formative Assessments (FAs) under the Assessments column. Although individual professors may modify the following guidance, the requirements of the **FAs** in Block 5 will typically be met by students individually contributing, then by the planning group leader submitting a group planning product for evaluation and feedback (e.g. the Mission Analysis briefing products, COA Development products, and COA Recommendation briefing products). Additionally students may be required to individually submit a short statement reflecting on their contributions.

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5.2	JPP Exercise - Introduction	Week 26	28	
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - <u>Read (22 pgs)</u>: Read: "Introduction" (v-vi) and Chapter 1 "Situation" (1-20). Scan: Enemy Order of Battle (21-29). Scan: Table of Contents for familiarity and later use. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (16 pgs)</u>: Table of Contents and "Part II: The Joint Planning Process" pp. 24-40. Scan "Appendix C: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)" (pp. C-1 to C-28) <u>Complete JIPOE worksheets</u>.				
5.3	JPP Exercise - Planning Initiation and Mission Analysis	Week 27	29-30	SA2 (FSP)
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - <u>Read (25 pgs)</u>: Chapter 2 Higher Authority Guidance and Friendly Forces (31-56). <i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (26 pgs)</u>: "STEP 1: PLANNING INITIATION" (pp. 1-1 to 1-3) and "STEP 2: MISSION ANALYSIS" (pp. 2-1 to 2-23). <u>Complete MA worksheets</u>.				
"	JPP Exercise - Mission Analysis - Continued	Week 28	31	
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - Review. Pay particular attention to Presidential Guidance and Warning Orders, and contrasting available forces with tasks. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - Submit group MA output (e.g. JIPOE and MA Worksheet info, Proposed Mission Statement). Begin COA Dev Worksheets if able.				
"	JPP Exercise - COA Development	Week 29	32-33	FA5 (MA)
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - Review. Particularly relevant are the Warning Orders, Friendly/Enemy Force Lists, and Logistic details in Chapter 3. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (32 pgs)</u>: "STEP 3: COA Development" (pp. 3-1 to 3-26), and "Appendix I: Sample Synchronization Matrix" (pp. I-1 to I-6). Complete COA Dev Worksheets.				
"	JPP Exercise - COA Development - Continued	Week 30	34	SA2 (NPS)
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - Review. Still relevant this week are the Warning Orders, Force Lists, and Logistic details. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (17 pgs)</u>: "STEP 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming" (pp. 4-1 to 4-17). Submit Group Complete/Validated COA products.				
"	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming	Week 31	35	FA6 (COA)
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - Review as needed, particularly comparing relative combat power during each phase, and in each area/zone of expected combat. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - Complete Wargaming Worksheets. Prepare to setup and run COA wargaming.				
"	JPP Exercise - COA Analysis and Wargaming - Continued	Week 32	35	
<i>Borneo Scenario</i> - Review as needed. <i>JPP Workbook</i> - Complete COA wargaming.				
"	JPP Exercise - COA Comparison, Recommendation, and Approval	Week 33	36	
<i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (9 pgs)</u>: "STEP 5: COA Comparison" (5-1 to 5-4) and "STEP 6: COA Approval" (6-1 to 6-5). Complete COA Comparison, COA Recommendation Worksheets. Submit group COA Recommendation Brief.				
"	JPP Exercise - Order Development (WARNORD)	Week 34	37-39	FA7 (REC)
<i>JPP Workbook</i> - <u>Read (12 pgs)</u>: "STEP 7: Plan or Order Development" (7-1 to 7-12). Develop and submit group WARNORD if directed.				
5.4	Course Retrospective and Critique	"	40	
Session 5.4: The final session is dedicated to completing unfinished planning products, reflecting on the JPP exercise, and considering the CLOs and PLOs in light of what has been learned. Students should have completed the end-of-course survey by this time.				

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G. Supplementary Readings:

Depending on student roles, some may need to refer to these “Supplementary Readings” to complete each week’s planning assignment.

Joint Military Operations Department. “CJCS Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces” and “Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces.” Extracts from CJCS Instruction 3121.01B. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 13 June 2005. (NWC 1062A) (Government)

_____. *Selected U.S. Navy and PLA (N) Tactical Capability Handbook*. Slide pack, Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2022. (NWC 2164E) (Government)

_____. *Reference Guide, Forces/Capabilities Handbook*. Newport, RI: Naval War College, January 2023. (NWC 3153T) (Government)

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*. Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3. Washington, DC: CJCS, 21 May 2014. (JP 2-01.3) (Government)

_____. *Joint Campaigns and Operations*. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 18 June 2022. (JP 3-0) (Government)

_____. *Joint Planning*. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0. Washington, DC: CJCS, 1 July 2025. Reference. (JP 5-0) (Government)

_____. *Universal Joint Task List*. Washington DC: CJCS. Accessed on 12 May 2026. Available at: <http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL/>. (UJTL) (Government)

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *Navy Planning*. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 5-01. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, May 2021 with Erratum 1, April 2025. Chapters 1-5. (NWP 5-01) (Government)

_____. *The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*. Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-14M. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, March 2022. (NWP 1-14M) (Government)

_____. *Universal Naval Task List (UNTL)*. OPNAVINST 3500.38C. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, CNO, 25 April 2022. (UNTL) (Government)

JMO 5.4 COURSE RETROSPECTIVE AND CRITIQUE

Focus:

This session is a final opportunity to close-out the JPP Exercise, synthesize and reflect on the course concepts, and consider student capabilities to apply the course learning outcomes (CLOs, Appendix C) and program learning outcomes (PLOs, Appendix B) for JMO and NWC JPME I respectively. Students should complete the anonymous JMO Course Critique linked in Blackboard, and discuss in an open forum their thoughts on course content, structure, graded events, and so forth with the goal of providing constructive criticism to improve the course.

A. Objectives:

- Reflect on your individual capability to accomplish the course and program learning outcomes listed in Appendix B and C.
- Provide constructive feedback to help improve the course for future Fleet Seminar Program and NWC-at-NPS students.

C. Background:

By the end of the course, students should be able to comprehend and apply all course concepts as described in CLOs 1-4, and PLOs 1 and 4.

D. Questions:

1. Consider each Course Learning Outcome in Appendix C; to what extent do you believe you can accomplish these outcomes and where might you apply these skills in the future?
2. Consider Program Learning Outcome 1 and Program Learning Outcome 4 in Appendix B; again, to what extent do you believe you can accomplish these outcomes and where might you apply these skills in the future?
3. What were the most beneficial aspects of the JMO Course?
4. Given the expectations in the learning outcomes, what recommendations for improvement might you offer for the JMO Course?

E. Required Media: Review course videos as necessary.

F. Required Readings: Read Syllabus Appendices B and C (2 pages). Review other material as necessary.

G. Supplementary Readings: None.

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APPENDIX A OPMEP JOINT LEARNING AREAS (JLAs)

OPMEP CJCSI 1800.01G, 15 APRIL 2024

JLA 1 – Strategic Thinking and Communication. Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

JLA 2 – The Profession of Arms. Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

JLA 3 – The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War. Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument to achieve national security objectives.

JLA 4 – The Security Environment. Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate interdisciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

JLA 5 – Strategy and Joint Planning. Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives.

JLA 6 – Globally Integrated Operations. Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.

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APPENDIX B PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES (PLOs)

Graduates of the CDE FSP and NWC-at-NPS Programs will achieve JPME Phase I certification and will have demonstrated the following Naval War College PLOs (current as of 13 May 2026):

PLO 1: Demonstrate joint planning and joint warfighting ability in military operations and campaigns across the continuum of competition. JLAs: 3, 5, 6.

PLO 2: Create theater military strategies designed for contemporary security environments. JLAs: 4, 5.

PLO 3: Apply the organizational and ethical concepts integral to the profession of arms to operational decision making. JLAs: 2.

PLO 4: Apply theory, history, doctrine, and sea power through critical, strategic thought in professional communication. JLAs: 1, 3, 4.

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APPENDIX C COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (CLOs)

Students who successfully complete the Joint Maritime Operations (JMO) Course will be able to demonstrate the following CLOs, as illustrated by the examples provided after each one.

CLO 1: Apply critical thinking, creative thinking, and problem-solving skills to support decision-making in joint maritime operations.

- An overarching competency for the entire course which is demonstrated during every formative and summative assessment.

CLO 2: Apply operational art to operational and high-tactical objectives in the maritime environment. Examples of this outcome include:

- Identify objectives at different levels of war for a maritime operation or campaign, or
- Explain the space-time-force relationships that apply to a maritime operation / campaign, or
- Sequence & synchronize the operational functions for a maritime operation / campaign, or
- Identify Centers-of-Gravity for a maritime operation / campaign.

CLO 3: Apply the principles of naval warfare theory to joint maritime objectives across the spectrum of conflict. Examples of this outcome include:

- Explain the roles & missions of naval forces in the current security environment, or
- Describe naval/joint capabilities in the current security environment, or
- Employ naval, joint, and maritime capabilities to accomplish operational tasks, or
- Employ command & control options for a maritime operation / campaign.

CLO 4: Apply the Joint/Navy Planning Process to communicate how to employ maritime power to achieve military objectives. Examples of this outcome include:

- Describe the operational environment for a maritime operation / campaign, or
- Write a restated Mission Statement for a maritime operation / campaign, or
- Sketch a Course-of-Action (COA) to accomplish a Mission and associated tasks for a maritime operation / campaign, or
- Write a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a selected COA to accomplish a Mission for a maritime operation / campaign.

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