



UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COLLEGE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF ONLINE PROGRAM
COURSE SYLLABUS:
FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGY, Version 3.0




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Foreword

This syllabus provides a general overview of the U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education Naval Command and Staff Program and a comprehensive overview of the Fundamentals of Strategy Course. It addresses all pertinent administrative policies and provides students with session-by-session guidance. The course curriculum is produced by the College of Distance Education's Strategy and Policy Department.

SUBMITTED:

APPROVED:



Daniel J. Lynch
Chair, Strategy and Policy Department
College of Distance Education



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Dean and Professor
College of Distance Education

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SECTION ONE: PROGRAM OVERVIEW, COURSE ORGANIZATION & ADMINISTRATION

Mission

In keeping with the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) mission, the online Naval Command and Staff (NC&S) Program is designed to educate mid-career leaders for service at the operational and high-tactical levels of war. These leaders will be capable of meaningfully contributing to staff actions necessary for the linkage of ends, ways, and means in the attainment of strategic and operational objectives in both peace and war. The Program focuses on and meets Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I and Navy Professional Military Education requirements.

Program Overview

The Naval Command and Staff (NC&S) Program spans the strategic, operational, and high-tactical levels of war. It is designed to engage students in the challenges and complexities of the national security and theater security environments to facilitate critical thinking. Students who successfully complete the Program will comprehend the fundamentals of U.S. national security policy, military strategy, and the relationship between them. They will have learned to plan and conduct military operations to achieve national-level goals and objectives. Additionally, the Program introduces students to the roles of both political and military leaders in policy formulation, joint and combined military planning, and the conduct of war.

The NC&S Program is divided into three core courses: Fundamentals of Strategy, Theater Security Decision Making, and Joint Military Operations. The courses are designed to be completed sequentially (i.e., Fundamentals of Strategy first, then Theater Security Decision Making, and then Joint Military Operations). If a student does not successfully complete an earlier course, they will be dropped from the Program and will not be permitted to enroll in a follow-on course.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Officer Professional Military Education Policy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 1800.01G, sets the policies, procedures, objectives, and responsibilities for both officer Professional Military Education (PME) and JPME. It directs the Services and Service schools to comply with the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) by meeting the Joint Learning Areas (JLAs). The OPMEP JLAs are designed to produce officers fully capable of serving as leaders and staff officers at the operational level of war. See Appendix A for a complete listing of JLAs.

Learning Methodology

The Naval Command and Staff Program is based on an Outcomes-Based Education methodology centered on the CJCS OPMEP JPME I learning areas, service objectives, NWC Course Learning Objectives (see Appendix B), and individual session objectives.

Each session description in this syllabus lists the CLOs and session objectives to be addressed in that session.

Fundamentals of Strategy Course Organization

The Fundamentals of Strategy course introduces the student to subject matter organized into three sessions.

Session Organization

This syllabus establishes the basis for required work for the Fundamentals of Strategy course. Each session within the course is organized as follows:

- A. **Session Overview.** Specifies the general context of the session, its purpose, and how it fits into the overall course. In addition, it provides a framework for session material, questions to ponder, and focus areas. Specific details for each session will be delineated by the professor.
- B. **Objectives.** Identifies the session goals and provides an intellectual line of departure for the readings. Provides the desired Navy Service outcomes and associated Course Learning Outcomes (CLOs) for the session.
- C. **Student Preparation.** Includes media, lectures and readings which focus student preparation and enhance understanding of the topic. Students are expected to complete all required media, lectures, and readings (except those annotated as “Scan”). These materials are vital to the development of course concepts and to the quality of the learning experience. There is no classified material issued or required for the completion of this course and all student submissions must be UNCLASSIFIED. Readings contained in this section are those that must be read prior to the session—they provide a basis for the session and the course as a whole. Program readings may be in the format of .pdf readings (readings that are NWC owned, copyright procured, or open-source), E-Reserve readings (reserved by the NWC library), or Persistent URL (PURL) readings. All readings are provided via the Leganto readings management system, integrated into Blackboard and the USNWC Library.
- D. **Student Deliverables.** Session requirements are identified in the section. Details will be provided in Blackboard and via the professor.

Course Requirements

Fundamentals of Strategy is designed to be completed in 10 weeks in a faculty-led environment. Students must complete each session and submit all deliverables in accordance with the posted schedule. Any personal or professional commitments that might preclude completion of the course within these limits should be made known to the professor as soon as possible. The student's ability to continue in the program will be reviewed on an individual basis.

Access requirements for Fundamentals of Strategy: Access to a computer or tablet with internet and e-mail capability is required

Connectivity to the Internet is required to access *Blackboard Ultra* located at <http://navalwarcollege.blackboard.com/>. Students should contact the professor for any required assistance. A USERID and PASSWORD are sent to each student upon enrollment in the Program. Blackboard Ultra, the Learning Management System (LMS) used in the Program, supports multiple computer systems and internet browsers. However, Blackboard is optimized for Google Chrome, and as such, Blackboard may not provide the best experience if Chrome is not used. Note: Internet Explorer is no longer supported by Blackboard.

Workload

Fundamentals of Strategy requires an average weekly workload of eight to ten hours of study and preparation for most students. The structure of the study requirements generally provides for an even workload throughout the course although some peak periods will occur. Advanced planning and careful allocation of resources and time will help mitigate these peak workloads. There is very little leeway with the schedule, particularly when assessments are scheduled.

Blackboard Collaborate Sessions

Professors may elect to hold "office hours" using Blackboard's Collaborate feature to address student questions. If held, student participation in these sessions is completely voluntary. Student participation or non-participation in "office hours," in and of itself, will not influence course grading in any way.

Assessments Description

Assessments provide the opportunity for students to demonstrate mastery of the course and Program outcomes. Assessments also serve as a means for feedback and interaction between the professor and students, providing students with some measure of how they are doing at that point in the course.

Discussion Board Forums

Discussion Board Forums provide an opportunity to interact with the professor and fellow students as well as an opportunity to demonstrate understanding and application of course

material. Discussion Board Forum interaction is part of the overall requirements and is evaluated by the professor as part of the student's contribution grade. The "primary" post in the Discussion Board Forum (i.e., the student's initial post) will be evaluated as a "Formative Assessment" (see below). "Secondary" posts (i.e., response posts) will be evaluated for a student's contribution grade (a Summative Assessment: see below).

Formative Assessments

At several places within the course, checkpoints or "Formative Assessments" are required. Students must meet a standard that demonstrates a clear mastery of the outcomes being evaluated. Successful completion of all Formative Assessments is a course requirement and a prerequisite for being allowed to submit the subsequent "Summative Assessment." While Formative Assessments are not assigned a numeric grade, they are assessed as "Meets Expectations" or "Not Yet." Any student work assessed as "Not Yet" on the first attempt must be remediated with the professor to ensure the student demonstrates a clear mastery of the material to continue with the course and Program.

Remediation may take multiple forms including a retake (or partial retake) of the assessment, verbal assessment of the material, or other assessment techniques provided by the professor. Remediation must be accomplished within 48 hours of a Formative Assessment that is evaluated as "Not Yet." While remediation takes place, the student must keep up with ongoing course material and activities. A student who fails to reach the "Meets Expectations" standard after their second submission of a Formative Assessment will be recommended for disenrollment from the course. Specific Formative Assessment details and requirements are clearly outlined within Blackboard.

Summative Assessments

Summative Assessments are graded requirements in the course. Students will receive comprehensive feedback that delineates the specific strengths and weaknesses of the submission. The assessment will be returned with a numeric and corresponding letter grade within seven days of the published due date. Summative Assessments may evaluate student proficiency in any or all Outcomes (Appendix B) addressed to that point in the course. Receiving an assessment of "Not Yet," which by definition is a final grade of less than B- (80%), means a student has not demonstrated the required level of proficiency in the Outcomes being evaluated. Those students will receive remedial instruction and be reassessed once the remedial work is completed.

The time between the receipt of the initial grade and the resubmission must not exceed one week. The student's second attempt must be evaluated to the same standard, using the same rubric as the initial assessment. Once it has been determined that the student has demonstrated the required level of mastery of the outcome(s) being evaluated, they will be assigned a grade of B- (80%) for the assessment and permitted to continue in the course. Students who fail to

demonstrate the required level of mastery of the outcome(s) being evaluated on their second submission will be considered for disenrollment from the course and, therefore, the Program. The final decision on disenrollment will be made by the Course Director in conjunction with the Program Manager (see below for contact information).

Student Contribution Assessment

Student Contribution will be evaluated throughout the course. The student will be evaluated on how well they apply applicable course concepts and engage with their fellow students in their responses in the Discussion Board Forum (DBF) topics.

Specific Assessment requirements and deliverables will be specified within the Blackboard structure and by the professor.

Assessment

An overall grade for the Fundamentals of Strategy course will be assigned based on the grades received on the requirements listed in the table below. Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average of the weighted course segments delineated below. To successfully complete the course, students must complete all the below requirements.

Type:	Weight:
Summative Assessment #1: Essay	30%
Summative Assessment #2: Essay	30%
Summative Assessment #3: Contribution	40%

The overall grade for the Online NC&S Program will be calculated using the grades for each individual course weighted as appropriate for the credit hours for each course.

Summative Assessments Grade Criteria

In addition to the substantive criteria specified below, the summative assessment must be editorially correct (spelling, punctuation, grammar, and format). An essay requires a thesis statement, which should be clearly expressed. If in doubt, ask the professor.

- A+ (97-100) **Work of truly superior quality.** Organized, coherent and well-written response. Completely addresses the question. Covers all applicable major and key minor points. Demonstrates total grasp and comprehension of the topic.

- A (94-<97) **Work of exceptional quality.** Demonstrates an excellent grasp of the topic, addressing all major issues and key minor points. Organized, coherent, and well-written.
- A- (90-<94) **Work of very high quality and well above average.** Demonstrates a very good grasp of the topic. Addresses all major and at least some minor points in a clear, coherent manner.
- B+ (87-<90) **Solid work and slightly above average.** Well-crafted answer that discusses all relevant important concepts with supporting rationale for analysis.
- B (84-<87) **Average performance expected of the student.** A successful consideration of the topic overall, but either lacking depth or containing statements for which the supporting rationale is not sufficiently argued.
- B- (80-<84) **Acceptable, but below average work.** Addresses the question and demonstrates a fair understanding of the topic, but does not address all key concepts and is weak in rationale and clarity.
- <B- (<80) **Below Program standards.** Grades below a B- require remediation, as discussed above. .

Student Contribution Assessment

All students are required to actively participate in the DBFs or other requirements, as delineated in the syllabus and by the professor. Failure to participate fully may lead to a “Not Yet” in seminar contribution which is grounds for disenrollment from the course. **Each student is expected to be fully engaged throughout the program. When a student’s contribution grade falls below a B- (or is in danger of reaching that point) the professor will intervene and ensure that the student understands that a contribution grade of B- or better is required for successful completion of the course.** The student will be provided with the opportunity to increase their contribution grade through remediation provided by the professor. Remediation must be determined by the professor to be of high quality to warrant an increase in the student’s contribution grade. A final contribution grade below a B- in the course will result in a recommendation for disenrollment. Contribution will be evaluated using the following criteria:

- A+ (97-100) Peerless demonstration of thorough preparation for cohort sessions. Consistently contributes original and highly insightful thought.
- A (94-<97) Superior demonstration of complete preparation for cohort sessions. Frequently offers original and well-thought-out insights.
- A- (90-<94) Excellent demonstration of preparation for individual sessions. Contributes original, well-developed insights in the majority of sessions.
- B+ (87-<90) Above average preparation for cohort sessions. Occasionally contributes original and well-developed insights.

- B (84-<87) Average preparation for cohort sessions. Occasionally contributes original and insightful thought.
- B- (80-<84) Minimally acceptable preparation for cohort sessions. Infrequently contributes well-developed insights; may sometimes post without having thought through an issue.
- <B- (<80) Grades below a B- require remediation.

Assessment(s) Due Dates and Late Submissions

Each assessment will have a specific due date for submission. Unexcused tardy student work is defined as: work turned in past the original deadline without prior coordination with the professor. **Prior coordination means a *written* request from the student to the professor (*prior* to the due date) and a written response from the professor back to the student authorizing the delay (again, *prior* to the due date). If approved, the professor will establish a new due date for the assignment. Any work turned in past the established deadline without previous written notification and approval from the professor must receive a grade of not greater than a B- (80). On a case-by-case basis, late work submitted without prior coordination with the professor may result in a lowered grade or the student’s disenrollment from the course.** Professors are available to assist students with course material, to review a student’s progress, and to provide counseling as required. A student with individual concerns is encouraged to discuss them as early as possible, so that their professor can render assistance in a timely manner.

Collaboration/Team efforts

All assessments within the Fundamentals of Strategy course are open book and open notes. The student may consult any of the readings, lectures, or course resources while completing the assessment. Collaboration between students on assessments is NOT permitted unless specifically authorized or required by the professor. The use of commercially produced computer software for proofreading a student's work prior to submission is authorized. Students are also permitted to have another student or person proofread their work for them; however, this assistance cannot encompass more than the same grammar and spelling issues addressed by the software programs.

Academic Honor Code

The U.S. Naval War College diligently enforces a strict academic code requiring authors to credit properly the source of materials directly cited in any written work submitted in fulfillment of diploma requirements. Simply put: plagiarism is prohibited. Likewise, this academic code prohibits cheating, and the misrepresentation of a paper as an author’s original thought. Plagiarism, cheating and misrepresentation are inconsistent with the professional standards required of all military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct clearly violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards”

delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

Definitions

Plagiarism is the use of someone else's work without giving proper credit to the author or creator of the work. It is passing off as one's own another's words, ideas, analysis or other products. Whether intentional or unintentional, plagiarism is a serious violation of academic integrity and must be treated as such by the command. Plagiarism includes but is not limited to the following actions:

- The verbatim use of others' words without citation.
- The paraphrasing of others' words or ideas without citation.
- Any use of others' work (other than facts that are widely accepted as common knowledge) found in books, journals, newspapers, websites, interviews, government documents, Program materials, lecture notes, films, and so forth without giving credit.

Authors are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when utilizing another's words or ideas. Such utilization, with proper attribution, is not prohibited by this code. However, a substantially borrowed but attributed paper may lack the originality expected of graduate-level work; submission of such a paper may merit a low or failing grade, but is not plagiarism.

Cheating is defined as the giving, receiving, or using of unauthorized aid in support of one's own efforts, or the efforts of another student. (Note: NWC Reference Librarians are an authorized source of aid in the preparation of class assignments). Cheating includes the following:

- Gaining unauthorized access to assessments.
- Assisting or receiving assistance from other students or other individuals in the preparation of written assignments or assessments unless specifically permitted.
- Utilizing unauthorized materials (notes, texts, crib sheets, and the like, in paper or electronic form) during assessments.
- The use of artificial intelligence (AI) computer programs to compose, or aid in the composition of, discussion board posts, formative assessments, or summative assessments.

Misrepresentation is defined as reusing a single paper for more than one purpose without permission or acknowledgement. Misrepresentation includes the following:

- Submitting a single paper or substantially the same paper for more than one Program/course at the NWC without permission of the professors.
- Submitting a paper or substantially the same paper previously prepared for some other purpose outside the NWC without acknowledging that it is an earlier work.

Action in case of suspected violation

If a student's submitted written work appears to violate this code of conduct, the following procedures must be followed:

- The Deputy Dean, CDE will be notified by the appropriate Department Chair, and will initiate an investigation. The student will be informed of the nature of the case, and be allowed to submit information on their behalf. The results of the investigation will be delivered to the Dean, CDE.
- The Dean, CDE will review the case and recommend to the Provost whether it should be referred to the Academic Integrity Review Committee (AIRC).
- The Provost may elect to have the case settled by the Dean, CDE; or refer it to the AIRC, in which case the President, NWC will be notified of the pending action.
- The AIRC will review the case, inviting the student to participate by remote means such as phone-conference or teleconference if feasible and desired; and/or accept any further written student information. The AIRC will make findings of fact and recommend appropriate action to the President, NWC. That action may include any or all of the following:
 - Lowering of grades on the affected work, or on the entire Program, to a letter grade of "F" with a numerical equivalent between 0 and 59.
 - Inclusion of remarks in Fitness Reports.
 - Letters to appropriate branches of the Service, agencies, offices, or governments.
 - Dismissal from the NWC/CDE.
 - Referral for disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or for appropriate action under rules governing civilian personnel.
- If the violation is discovered after graduation, the matter may be referred to the individual's current command or office, and if appropriate, the NWC diploma, and JPME I credit may be revoked.

Guidance for Written Submissions

All U.S. Naval War College programs encourage a free and open exchange of ideas. Students are exposed to a broad spectrum of opinions to encourage individual analysis rather than learning preconceived doctrine. Two things about this methodology are worth noting: First, the views expressed by the faculty are their own and not necessarily related to an official Navy position. Second, the Fundamentals of Strategy course provides few clear-cut answers to the issues addressed. This approach may be frustrating to some, but it more accurately represents the complex and uncertain nature of issues students will face in their profession and is

considered a more effective method to develop the ability to analyze, draw conclusions, and make sound decisions. While there may be no single right answer to a question, there are still good and bad submissions. Written work should be formal, comprehensive, and in an academically acceptable style. Guidance for each submission will be delineated in the instructions for each assignment in Blackboard.

Submitting Assessments

Assessments for the Fundamentals of Strategy course must be submitted via Blackboard. The following procedures must be adhered to in order to receive credit for the submission:

Assignment requirements are delineated within Blackboard. Students must submit their Microsoft Word-formatted assessments through Blackboard. Each assessment must be saved as “.doc,” or “.docx” using the following naming convention:

Last name, First name_FoS_FA or SA #_Question #
(e.g., Jones_John_FoS_FA1_Q3).

End-Of-Course Questionnaire

The completion of an End-of-Course questionnaire is required for the successful completion of the course. Constructive student comments ensure the course will improve in subsequent years. Students must complete their questionnaire in accordance with the instructions provided within Blackboard or by email, and it must be completed for the final grade to count towards program completion. If there are any questions or difficulties completing the questionnaire contact CDE at: onlineadmin@usnwc.edu.

Course Disenrollment

If a student determines they cannot continue to actively participate in the Fundamentals of Strategy course, they must contact the professor who will advise the student of the procedures and ramifications of disenrollment.

Program Disenrollment

A student who has successfully completed an entire course will retain credit for that work. No credit is awarded for a partially completed course. A student who has been involuntarily disenrolled, from any prior CDE online program will only receive one additional attempt to successfully complete a program. A second disenrollment, whether voluntary or involuntary, will result in the student being placed at the bottom of the waitlist for enrollment in a future program. They will be reconsidered for enrollment on a case-by-case basis after receipt of a request by email to the Program Manager stating the solution to the circumstance(s) that caused the previous disenrollment(s). While there are no specific time limits on rejoining the Program and retaining credit, significant changes to the Program curriculum occur over time, which may result in the need for a student to complete a previously completed course.

Contact with the Naval War College

If a student requires additional course or Program information or if interpersonal problems develop that the student cannot resolve locally with the professor, contact one of the following individuals:

ACADEMIC ISSUES—CDE Professors

Online Program:

Fundamentals of Strategy

Prof. Andrew T. Zwilling, NWC/CDE/S&P

(401) 856-5549 [andrew.zwilling@usnwc.edu]

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES—Online Program Manager/Administrative Assistant

Program Manager

Laura Cavallaro, NWC/CDE

(401) 856-5363

[Laura.Cavallaro@usnwc.edu]

Administrative Assistant

onlineadmin@usnwc.edu

Facsimile

(401) 841-2457

Address official correspondence to:

President, U.S. Naval War College

686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207

Attn: 1G College of Distance Education

CURRENCY CAVEAT: The U.S. Naval War College attempts to keep the Naval Command and Staff Program as current as possible, but due to administrative constraints, some subject matter may fall out of date. Should a student encounter any such information, the College welcomes all suggestions for improvement. Please provide your observation to one of the contacts listed above or:

Electronically – Send recommended updates to the appropriate Course Point of Contact (see above)

Mail—U.S. Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207.

Attn: 1G: College of Distance Education

SECTION TWO: COURSE SPECIFICS

FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGY

Fundamentals of Strategy (FoS) teaches students to think strategically. Strategy is the mechanism that establishes the conditions whereby an entity, whether empire, nation-state, or sub-national group, can accomplish its policy objectives. It is, in essence, the way in which the policy objectives will be achieved, and determines the nature of the resultant operations and campaigns. It is thus the bridge between policy and operations.

The aim of the Fundamentals of Strategy is to sharpen the student's ability to assess how alternative operational courses of action best achieve overall strategic and national objectives. Students are asked to think in a disciplined, critical, and original manner about the international strategic environment, a range of potential strategies, and the strategic effects of joint, interagency, and multinational operations.

The task for strategists and planners in translating operational outcomes into enduring strategic results is never easy or straightforward. The Fundamentals of Strategy course examines how the overall strategic environment shapes operational choices and outcomes. The course also examines the strategic effects of operations, exploring how battlefield outcomes change the strategic environment. Operational success in war, for example, might open up new strategic opportunities. Operational failures might close off promising strategic courses of action.

This interaction between the operational use of military force and strategic outcomes can lead to unanticipated results. The history of warfare provides many examples of lopsided military victories that were largely unforeseen by planners. The commitment of large numbers of forces and huge resources, however, cannot ensure strategic success. Unanticipated second- and third-order effects time and again frustrate planners, who seek to dominate the battlefield and the course of operations.

Of course, in war, the enemy always seeks to frustrate the best-laid plans and impose high risks and costs on operations. The Fundamentals of Strategy course emphasizes that a war's outcome is contingent upon the actions taken by *both* sides engaged in the fighting. It is an interactive process. A skillful adversary seeks to exploit strategic vulnerabilities and operational missteps. Further, an enemy's capabilities might prove difficult to overcome. Asymmetric strategies and capabilities can create an operational environment that frustrates planners seeking decisive outcomes. Skilled strategists and war planners understand that the enemy has a vote in determining the war's outcome. The course pays critical attention to how an enemy's actions form part of the dynamic violent interaction that is war.

The Fundamentals of Strategy course integrates the disciplines of history, political science, and international relations, along with military factors from the profession of arms – such as doctrine, weaponry, training, technology, and logistics – into a coherent approach that provides students with a conceptual frame of reference to analyze, in a systematic way, complex strategic problems

and formulate military strategies to address them. Critical strategic thinking serves as the hallmark of the Fundamentals of Strategy course.

The curriculum combines strategic theory with historical case studies. Strategic theory concepts are viewed through the lens of four prominent military theorists (Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan, Corbett), and gives students a range of analytical tools. The historical case studies provide a means to utilize those tools to evaluate and discuss the ways in which strategic planners and military leaders in the real world have successfully (or unsuccessfully) addressed the problems associated with the use of force to attain policy objectives. The historical case studies highlight different types of war and cover a range of strategies and operations. This in-depth analysis of wide-ranging case studies involving the use of force prepares students to think not only about current strategic and operational problems but also about those that might emerge in the future.

Strategic leadership and operational command in wartime figure prominently in the Fundamentals of Strategy course as it examines the leadership and actions of strategic and operational leaders and decision-makers. Studying major historical figures provides insight into the recurrent problems that confront senior military leaders and planners in crafting strategies and carrying out operations in wartime.

The effects of enemy operations shape the range of strategic and operational courses of action open to those holding command in wartime. Success in wartime requires that leaders and planners overcome the problems of uncertainty and friction that hinder the execution of operations. Successful leadership at the strategic and operational levels of war requires an understanding of the dynamic interaction of politics and strategy with operational realities.

COURSE THEMES

The Strategy and Policy Department has incorporated nine themes for use in the Fundamentals of Strategy course. These themes represent neither a checklist of things to do nor a set of “school solutions” or conventional wisdom. The conduct of war can never be reduced to formulas or algorithms. The themes supply sets of questions to provoke thought and discussion. They illuminate the reasons for military effectiveness and ineffectiveness in contemporary war. The themes are not designed to provide answers. Rather, they furnish overarching context for analysis and decision-making. These themes constitute a starting point for undertaking critical strategic thinking and fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the **process of matching strategy and operations** and those concerning the **environment in which that process takes place**.

S&W COURSE THEMES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS - THE PROCESS:

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS
2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS
3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS
5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION
6. WAR TERMINATION

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS - THE ENVIRONMENT:

7. MULTINATIONAL ARENA
8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS – THE PROCESS

1. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLICY, STRATEGY, AND OPERATIONS

Did the belligerents understand and spell out political objectives? How much did each participant in the conflict value its political objectives? Did political and military leaders use the value of the object to determine the magnitude and duration of the effort, and to reconsider the effort if it became too costly? Did leaders anticipate and manage costs and risks? Were the benefits of war worth its likely costs and risks? How well did the belligerents build support for their aims and strategy at home and abroad?

Did the political leadership provide the military with strategic guidance? Did such guidance restrict the use of force, and, if so, with what impact on chances for success? Did the belligerents adopt strategies that supported their policies? What was the relationship between each belligerent's political and military objectives? What assumptions did political and military leaders make about how attaining military objectives would contribute to attaining political objectives?

How did each belligerent believe its operations would support its strategy and ultimately its policy? To what extent did campaigns and operations support the strategies of each belligerent? Did political and military leaders think carefully about how the other side would respond militarily and politically?

2. INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSMENT, AND PLANS

How reliable, complete, and accurately interpreted was the intelligence collected before and during the war? How available was intelligence to leaders who needed it? Was a serious effort made to analyze the lessons of previous wars, and, if so, how did it affect strategic and operational planning? How successful were each belligerent's efforts to shape enemy perceptions? Was intelligence collection and assessment shaped by social, ideological, or racial biases?

How accurately did civilian and military leaders foresee the character of the war on which they were embarking? How well did each belligerent know itself, its allies and partners, its enemy, and third parties capable of affecting the outcome? Did each belligerent consider the possibility that the enemy might act unpredictably or less than rationally, resort to asymmetric warfare, or use weapons of mass destruction?

Did each belligerent use a formal, flexible, and thorough planning process? Did it include allies in that process, and, if so, with what results? Did the plans correctly identify the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities? Were strategic and operational plans informed by the relationship between political ends and military means? To what extent did plans rely upon intelligence, deception, surprise, psychological operations, and strategic communication? Did planning allow for the fog, friction, uncertainty, and chance of war? What assumptions did planners make about how diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power could help achieve the political objectives? To what degree did preconceived ideas about the adversary distort intelligence and planning? Did the initial plans consider problems of war termination?

3. THE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR

Did political and military leaders understand the strategic and operational capabilities, effects, and limitations of the forms of military power at their disposal? Did military leaders consider operational, logistical, or other constraints on the deployment and employment of instruments of war?

Did military leadership integrate different forms of power for maximum operational and strategic effectiveness? Did those in command of the different instruments of war share common assumptions about how force would translate into the fulfillment of political objectives? What limitations hindered integration of different forms of military power?

How did the belligerents exploit opportunities created by technological innovation? Did they turn asymmetries in technology to strategic advantage? Was there a revolution in military affairs prior to or during the war, and, if so, did its tactical and operational consequences produce strategic results? Did any military or political disadvantages result from technological innovation or changes in information technology? What role did influence operations and strategic communications play?

4. THE DESIGN, EXECUTION, AND EFFECTS OF OPERATIONS

Was each belligerent's operational design informed by a vision of the desired end-state, an accurate assessment, and understanding of political and military risk? Did each belligerent concentrate effort against the enemy's centers of gravity while protecting its own? Did the operational design synchronize, sequence, and phase operations for strategic effect, and did it aim at producing chiefly kinetic or chiefly psychological effects? Did the design of operations try to deceive or surprise while anticipating possible enemy responses?

Did operational leaders keep the ultimate strategic and political purposes in view while prosecuting operations? How coherent, agile, and effective was each belligerent's system of command and control, and did forces execute operations according to the commander's intent? Were operations joint and combined? Did operational leaders exploit opportunities, parry or counter enemy operations, or control the tempo of the war? Did either side try to delay a decision, and why? Did either side make a transition from offense to defense or from defense to offense? Did operations receive the logistical support necessary for success?

How did campaigns and operations affect the enemy's capabilities, command structure, and will to fight? Did the mix of operations maximize the campaign's strategic effects? Did operational leaders foresee and try to bring about these effects, or did they benefit from good fortune or enemy missteps? How important were joint and combined operations to the campaign? Did a belligerent rely too much on military force? To what degree did information operations and strategic communications affect the outcome of the campaigns?

5. INTERACTION, REASSESSMENT, AND ADAPTATION

How well did the belligerents foresee the consequences of interaction with their enemies? Did unexpected enemy action disrupt prewar plans? How did interaction with the enemy affect the character of the war? Was interaction among the belligerents asymmetric, and, if so, in what sense and with what consequences? Was one side able to make its enemies fight on its own terms? How well did strategists and commanders adapt to enemy actions? How did belligerents react to enemy operations and adjust to fog and friction? How did information operations affect the process of reassessment and adaptation?

If a belligerent chose to open a new theater, did its decision signify a new policy objective, a new strategy, an extension of previous operations, a response to failure or stalemate in the original theater, or an effort to seize a new opportunity created during the war? Did it make sense to open the new theater, and, if so, did the belligerent open it at the correct time? Did the environment in the new theater favor operational success? How did the new theater influence the larger war? What role did maritime power play in opening the theater, supporting operations, and closing the theater?

How did the outcome of key operations induce the belligerents to adjust their strategic and political goals? If an additional state or party intervened in the conflict, did the intervention compel either side to reshape its policy or strategy? If there were changes in policy or strategy, were they based on a rational reassessment of political objectives and the military means available?

6. WAR TERMINATION

Did either belligerent squander opportunities to bring an end to the war? If a belligerent was committed to removing an enemy's political leadership, did its effort at regime change result in a longer war or heavier casualties? If negotiations began before the end of hostilities, how well did each side's operations and diplomacy support its policy?

Did the victor consider how far to go militarily to end the war? Did any antagonist overstep the culminating point of victory or attack to maintain pressure on its adversary? Alternatively, did the winner do too little militarily to give the political result of the war a reasonable chance to endure? Did the victor consider what to demand from the enemy to fulfill its political objectives? How and why did the vanquished stop fighting? Was there a truce, and, if so, to what extent did its terms shape the postwar settlement? Did the postwar settlement meet the victor's political objectives? Did the closing operations of the war leave the victor in a strong position to enforce the peace? To what degree was the defeated state reincorporated into the international system?

To what extent did the relationship among the political and military leaders contribute to the stability or instability of the settlement? Did the character of the war affect the durability of the settlement? How did the populations of the victor and the defeated affect the peace settlement? Did the victor maintain sufficient strength and resolve to enforce the peace?

MATCHING STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS - THE ENVIRONMENT:

7. THE MULTINATIONAL ARENA

Did political and military leaders seize opportunities to isolate their adversaries from allies? How successful were these efforts, and why? Did belligerents attempt to create coalitions? If so, what common interests and policies unified the coalition partners? Did coalition partners coordinate strategy and operations while sharing burdens, and what were the consequences if not? How did coalition members share information, intelligence, and material resources?

Did the coalition's strategies and operations solidify or degrade the coalition? To what extent did coalition partners support, restrain, or control one another? If a coalition disintegrated, did its demise result from internal stress, external pressure, or both? Did coalition dynamics work for or against efforts to match operations to strategy, and strategy to policy? How did the actions of allies contribute to operational success or failure? What impact did coalition dynamics have on war termination? Did the winning coalition endure past the end of the war?

8. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

How were each belligerent's military forces organized? Did their organizations facilitate planning, training for, and executing joint and combined operations? Did a process exist to coordinate military power with the employment of other instruments of national power to attain political objectives? If so, how effective was that process? How well did military and civil agencies share information and coordinate activities? If there was rivalry among military services, how did it affect the design and execution of operations and strategy?

How did civil-military relations contribute to strategic success or failure? Were relations among military and political leaders functional or dysfunctional, and with what consequences? How did the lack of clarity or constancy in political aims affect the civil-military relationship? How did political and military leadership respond if the military could not achieve the objective? Were political restraints on the use of force excessive?

How did military leaders respond if political leaders insisted on operations that promised significant political gain but at high military cost? How did the civilian leadership react if military leaders proposed operations that promised significant military rewards but at significant political risk? How attuned were military leaders to managing risk? Did the actions of civil and military leaders result in the erosion of the institutions that underpinned their political system?

9. CULTURES AND SOCIETIES

How did the cultures, ideologies, values, social arrangements, and political systems of the belligerents influence strategy, operations, and military organization? Did a contender display a “strategic culture,” or way of war? If so, did its adversary exploit its cultural traits? How did ideology affect the war’s course and outcome? If the war involved competition for political allegiance, did culture or values give either belligerent a clear advantage? How did social divisions affect force structure and military operations?

Was the relationship among a belligerent’s government, people, and military able to withstand battlefield reverses or the strain of protracted war? If the war was protracted, how successful was the victor at weakening its adversary from within? Did a belligerent conduct information operations, and were they founded on the psychology and culture of target audiences? Did each belligerent’s military strategy deliver sufficient incremental dividends— periodic successes—to maintain support among its populace? Alternatively, did military strategy and operations undermine popular support for the war? Was either side able to exploit social divisions in the opposing population?

Did the belligerents attempt to mobilize and manage public opinion, and, if so, with what success? Did the passions or indifference of the people affect the leadership’s effort to develop and maintain an effective policy-strategy match?

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

In this course, precise definitions are important. Several are provided below:

Doctrine - Military doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces. Doctrine is authoritative but not directive. Though neither policy nor strategy, doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends.

Fabian Strategy - A strategy of wearing down the enemy by limiting combat to harassing attacks while simultaneously avoiding any decisive engagement.

The term derives from Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (agnomen, Cunctator, which means “the delayer”), a Roman military leader who employed this strategy against Hannibal and the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War. Many Romans, desirous of a full-scale battle, opposed Fabius' strategy. When he stepped down as dictator in 216 B.C., the policy was discarded, resulting

in the Romans' disastrous defeat at Cannae. The Romans then returned to Fabius' strategy, which laid the foundation for Rome's eventual victory.

Clausewitz discusses Fabian strategy: "All campaigns that are known for their temporizing, like those of the famous Fabius Cunctator, were calculated primarily to destroy the enemy by making him exhaust himself."¹

Alexander Hamilton also discusses the Americans' use of a Fabian strategy during the American Revolution: "I know the comments that some people will make on our Fabian conduct. It will be imputed either to cowardice or weakness: But the more discerning, I trust, will not find it difficult to conceive that ... we should not play a desperate game ... of a single cast of the die. The loss of one general engagement may effectually ruin us, and it would certainly be folly to hazard it..."²

Information Operations - The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. This includes electronic warfare, military deception, operations security, and military information support operations.

National Goals, Objectives, and Interests - The combination of resources, conditions, and elements of national power and prestige that determine the viability of a nation and its relative status among nations. Please note that goals and objectives can be very distinct from interests, as aims can be much broader than interests; interests should relate directly to the viability of a nation.

Net Assessment - A structured analysis of the elements and resources available to a nation in the pursuit of national goals, objectives, and interests. The interactive comparison of belligerents' goals; degree of commitment of personnel, material and temporal resources; military capability; public support for the conflict; and, the identification of one's own and opponent's center(s) of gravity. The purpose of a net assessment is to gain knowledge of one's own side, as well as that of all other belligerents in a war (Sun Tzu's famous dictum, "...know the enemy and know yourself...") with the intent of protecting one's own side and increasing the vulnerability of the enemy side.³

Operational Art - The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the Joint Force Commander's strategy into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war.

Policy - The articulation of national goals, objectives, and interests as related to the international environment and the manner to be pursued. In the S&W course, the terms unlimited objective and

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1989), 385.

² Harold G. Syrett ed., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 14-15.

³ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.


limited objective (or aim/goal) must be used in a specific manner; this usage will be discussed in a subsequent section entitled “Political Objectives and Military Means.”

Political Objectives and Military Means - In this course, the terms “policy” and “political objective/goal/aim” refer only to the political aim that a belligerent wants to achieve by military force. There are two types of aims: unlimited and limited. An unlimited objective is one in which a belligerent seeks to overthrow an opponent’s political authority/government and replace it with an alternate form of government (i.e., “regime change”). A limited objective (goal/aim) is anything less than that, such as trading rights, taking control of a certain piece of territory, or gaining access to water.

In this course, the terms “means” or “level of effort (LOE)” will be used to refer to the amount of effort that a belligerent exerts to achieve a political goal. When describing “means” or LOE, students should use the terms “partial” or “minimal” to express the lower end of the “means” scale, and the term “maximal” to describe the upper end of the scale. Accordingly, students should avoid using the term “total” or “total war” to describe effort, because that term is used frequently to include assumptions about both the political goal and the means exerted to achieve a political goal. Thus, using this specific terminology will help ensure clarity of meaning with regard to political goals and the level of effort to achieve them.

It is helpful to place the relative importance that nations attach to political objectives in war on a continuum as well as the likely level of national commitment or means to achievement of those objectives. One should place both one’s own and enemy objectives and means on a continuum to evaluate the relative importance of a military objective and the portion of a nation’s resources and time that it is likely to expend to get it. Always remember that warfare is an interactive process and the level of commitment that each side in a conflict is willing to expend is as much a matter of perception as of reality. Some unlimited objectives can be won quickly and with little expenditure of national means while some limited objectives are almost unobtainable against a foe that is willing to expend maximal national resources for as long as it takes to reach its objectives.

OBJECTIVES




MEANS




The below graphics demonstrate the “Problem of Perspective” in the Vietnam conflict, and as such, may prove helpful in visualizing the evaluation of contending states’ commitment to the war effort. Developing such evaluations for each of the case studies highlights implications for strategy.

By Means or Effort:



By Political Objective:



Strategy - Unless otherwise noted, the term “strategy” in S&W means the military component of strategy. Implicit in strategy is a desired end state that will result in achievement of the political objective(s) for which military force has been employed.

Tactics - The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use the full potentialities.

War Termination - The application of strategic leverage to induce an adversary to accept one’s political objectives, either by application of decisive force, or negotiation directed at concluding hostilities on mutually acceptable terms, at minimum time and cost, both to be followed by a settlement seeking enduring peace on favorable terms.

CORE THEORISTS

Although technology has revolutionized many dimensions of war, the basic principles remain unchanged. This is why Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, and Sir Julian Corbett's *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* remain important in 21st century warfare.

On War and *The Art of War* illustrate how theory and principles of war apply to the operational and strategic levels of war. *On War*, the more systematic and detailed of the two classics, breaks down wars into several different categories ranging from wars of armed observation through wars of limited objectives through wars aiming at total defeat of the enemy. Clausewitz also deals, if briefly, with popular uprisings similar to modern insurgencies. In this way, he distinguishes among the different kinds of wars and elucidates the relationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The *Art of War*, too, looks at the entire spectrum of armed force, from what we would call deterrence and operations-other-than-war at one end to the extermination of the adversary's state at the other.

Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agree that political authorities must determine the political objectives in war. They discuss at length the relationships between national objectives and the military objectives that will help secure them. At the same time, the authors recognize that the pressures faced by political elites and military commanders invariably give rise to tensions between political and military leaders regarding the best means to employ. They consider the nature of a war to be a reflection of the dynamic relationships among the political authorities, the people, the military, and the physical environment in which the conflict takes place.

These two major theorists present different approaches to the operational planning of wars. For example, intelligence and deception are of central importance to Sun Tzu at all levels of war. Clausewitz is pessimistic about the accuracy of intelligence and the utility of deception at the operational and tactical levels. In general, Clausewitz puts his trust in the application of concentrated force at a decisive place and time, while Sun Tzu advocates heavier reliance on information operations to impose surprise and uncertainty on the adversary. The Fundamentals of Strategy course includes examples of the application of these principles, allowing students to analyze, assess, and contrast their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives.

Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognize the inevitable influence of chance, probability, and irrationality on warfare, they nevertheless see war as an essentially rational political activity that they endeavor to describe with clarity and precision. Clausewitz, in particular, wants leaders to see war as a rational act. He emphasizes identifying the national interest, correlating ends and means, calculating costs and benefits, planning carefully, and assessing the opponent's objective, military potential, and probable behavior as well as one's own. A central tenet of Sun Tzu's work is that the sole purpose of the military is to secure, and ultimately enhance, the wealth and power of the state. Both authors also demonstrate that war requires the coordination of all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—and stress the critical role of strategic coordination among coalition partners or allies.

U.S. joint and service doctrines derive from concepts and definitions in Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. Current official documents such as the National Security Strategy of the United States and the

National Military Strategy of the United States restate Clausewitz's concept of the policy-strategy match. Meanwhile, other sources of strategic guidance are consistent with Sun Tzu, such as those dealing with information warfare and transformation. And while both theorists' masterworks give considerable emphasis to analyzing the relationship between policy and strategy in war, they also provide analytical tools that apply to the operational level of warfare.

This course also introduces naval theory and sea power conceptualizations through the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. Mahan wrote his famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, as a member of the faculty and president of the Naval War College. Mahan's writings confront enduring strategic issues: geopolitics, commerce, the material foundations of strategy, naval preparedness, the limits of sea power, naval concentration, calculations of when to risk the fleet, the decisiveness of naval battle, and the uses and limits of blockades.

British born Sir Julian Stafford Corbett was an historian whose theories on sea power and maritime strategy stemmed from his study of British naval history. His pivotal, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, seeks to understand the role of the navy within the larger military apparatus of the state. Consequently, Corbett was not interested in sea control for its own sake but about how it could further the larger goals of the war. His writings focus on the importance of joint-operations, commerce, sea lines of communication, and the concept of limited war.

Born only fourteen years apart, both Mahan and Corbett had the opportunity to witness and write about contemporary conflicts, in addition to historical events. While similarities exist in their writings, they offer different perspectives on the role of the navy and implementation of naval power.

All four theorists emphasized the value of education in the art of war. The authors were deeply concerned with the intellectual development of leaders in the profession of arms, whom they identified as essential to the security of the state. They expected those who followed them to learn the concepts and skills essential to rigorous critical analysis by studying theory and military history. These are resources that help prepare today's leaders to devise and evaluate alternative courses of action to achieve strategic success in the future. The theorists' expectations are the same as those of the Naval War College. Their writings constitute natural points of departure to think critically about strategy and war.

COURSE LEARNING OUTCOMES (CLOs-SEE [APPENDIX B](#)) ADDRESSED AND ASSESSED IN FoS:

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of actions within wars.
2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.

3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
5. Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.

ASSESSMENT TYPES AND OVERVIEW

Throughout this course, students will be required to successfully complete eight *Formative Assessments* (FA-1 through FA-8), two *Summative Assessments* (SA-1 and SA-2), and respond to their fellow students' formative assessment posts (together, these response posts will be used as a third *Summative Assessment* (SA-3)).

Formative Assessments (FA) are evaluated exercises designed to assess students' progress toward understanding of one or more of the CLOs. FAs will be accomplished using Discussion Board Forums (DBFs). The professor will evaluate each FA as "Meets Expectations" or "Not Yet." Students must achieve a "Meets Expectations" on each FA to proceed. Any grade of "Not Yet" on an FA will be remediated. If the remediation results in a "Meets Expectations," the student will proceed. If the remediation results in a second "Not Yet," the student will be processed for removal from the course.

Summative Assessments (SA) are graded activities used to validate students' proficiency in the session CLOs. Individual essays will be used to accomplish SA-1 and SA-2. The response posts to DBFs will be used to accomplish SA-3 (Contribution). Any SA grades below B- (80) will be remediated/resubmitted. If the remediation/resubmission results in a grade above B- (80), the grade will be an 80 and the student will proceed. If the remediation/resubmission results in a second grade below B- (80), the student will be processed for removal from the course. Grades received on the three Summative Assessments will be used in calculating the student's overall grade for the course.

FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGY SCHEDULE

Fundamentals of Strategy is divided into three sessions. The basic schedule for these three sessions, including assignments and due dates for each week, is provided below (it is also included, in calendar form, in the "Course Schedule" folder on Blackboard):

Session 1.1 : Weeks 1 & 2

- Week 1 Introductory Post Due NLT 2359 Saturday
FA-1 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday
- Week 2 FA-2 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday

Session 1.2 : Weeks 3 – 6

- Week 3 FA-3 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday
- Week 4 FA-4 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday
- Week 5 SA-1 Due NLT 2359 Thursday
- Week 6 FA-5 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday

Session 1.3 : Weeks 7 - 10

- Week 7 FA-6 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday
- Week 8 FA-7 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday
- Week 9 SA-2 Due NLT 2359 Thursday
- Week 10 FA-8 Due NLT 2359 Monday; follow up responses due NLT 2359 Wednesday

The academic week for the NC&S Online Program begins at 0001 Eastern Time (ET) on Friday and ends at 2359 ET on Thursday.

If students have any concerns about adhering to the above schedule, they should address those concerns with their professor via Blackboard message as early as possible. This is a fast-moving course and there is little room for delay.

NOTE: SA-3 (Contribution) is not shown in the above schedule but, as referenced to earlier, will be determined based on individual student contribution in the response posts in all three sessions.

Session 1.1
Introduction to Naval Theory
Weeks 1 & 2

A. Session Overview

Students will gain familiarity with the Blackboard environment, syllabus, and Discussion Board Forums (DBFs). They will post their introductions and get to know their fellow classmates. They will study naval theorists and theory, and will become accustomed to accessing course readings and lectures, and submitting DBFs.

B. Objectives

- CLOs (See [Appendix B](#))
 2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
 3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
 5. Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
 6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.
- Session Objectives
 - Gain familiarization with Blackboard and become acquainted with the professor and other students in the cohort
 - Understand the basic tenets of Mahanian and Corbettian theory
 - Contrast Corbett's and Mahan's principles
 - Connect Mahanian and Corbettian concepts to modern questions of sea power

C. Student Preparation

All required readings and lectures will be listed and available in Blackboard via the "Introduction to Naval Theory" folder.

D. Student Deliverables

Week 1: The student must post an introduction in the Discussion Board Forum (DBF). Details are shown in the folder labelled "Class Introductions." **This is due NLT 2359 Saturday.**

The student must post Formative Assessment 1 (FA-1) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student's primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students' answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Week 2: The student must post Formative Assessment 2 (FA-2) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student's primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students' answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Session 1.2
Historical Case Study #1
Weeks 3-6

A. Session Overview

Session 1.2 pairs an historical case study with a selection of strategic theorists. Students must read primary source readings from theorists, secondary source readings about the case study, and watch targeted, recorded lectures given by Naval War College professors. Details about the session and case study are available on Blackboard in the “Historical Case Study #1” folder.

B. Objectives

- CLOs (See [Appendix B](#))
 1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of actions within wars.
 2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
 3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
 4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
 5. Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
 6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.
- Session Objectives
 - Through the lens of the case study, comprehend the role and perspective of military leadership in developing various theater policies, strategies and operational plans.
 - Comprehend and apply the writings of strategic theorists to analyze the relationships between the strategic and operational levels of warfare.
 - Understand the use of war as a policy tool and comprehend the interaction between policy and military objectives. Apply these concepts to the case study.

- Understand strategic concepts including center of gravity, culminating point of victory, value of intelligence, fog and friction, value of the object, and war termination. Apply these concepts to the case study.
- Comprehend the strategic and operational effects of naval power during the case study and how these effects shaped the outcome.

C. Student Preparation

- All Required Readings and Lectures will be listed and available on Blackboard in the “Historical Case Study #1” folder.

D. Student Deliverables

Week 3: The student must post Formative Assessment 3 (FA-3) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student’s primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students’ answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Week 4: The student must post Formative Assessment 4 (FA-4) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student’s primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students’ answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Week 5: The student must submit Summative Assessment #1 (SA-1) via instructions found in the “Summative Assessment” section in Blackboard

This writing requirement measures the student’s comprehension and mastery of the session objectives covered in Sessions 1.1 and 1.2 by applying the themes, theories, and concepts in a formal, analytic essay.

All relevant readings and lectures from FoS should be consulted in the preparation of this essay. **No outside readings or other sources are permitted.** The source material provided by the program is more than sufficient to construct the assigned essay.

The student must complete an analytical essay on the topic assigned by the professor. Essay requirements, associated rubrics, and writing guidelines are delineated in the “Summative Assessments” folder of Blackboard. The assignment is an individual effort; collaboration is NOT permitted. This includes a prohibition against using any uploaded materials from any outside source or website.

Week 6: The student must post Formative Assessment 5 (FA-5) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student's primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students' answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Session 1.3
Historical Case Study #2
Weeks 7-10

A. Session Overview

Session 1.3 pairs a second historical case study with additional readings from strategic theorists. Students must read primary source readings from theorists, secondary source readings about the case study, and watch targeted, recorded lectures given by Naval War College professors. Details about the session and case study are available on Blackboard in the “Historical Case Study #2” folder.

B. Objectives

- CLOs (See Appendix B)
 1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of actions within wars.
 2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
 3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
 4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
 5. Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
 6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.
- Session Objectives
 - Through the lens of the case study, comprehend the role and perspective of military leadership in developing various theater policies, strategies and operational plans.
 - Comprehend and apply the writings of strategic theorists to analyze the relationships between the strategic and operational levels of warfare.
 - Understand the use of war as a policy tool and comprehend the interaction between policy and military objectives. Apply these concepts to the case study.

- Understand strategic concepts including center of gravity, culminating point of victory, value of intelligence, fog and friction, value of the object, and war termination. Apply these concepts to the case study.
- Comprehend the strategic and operational effects of naval power during the case study and how these effects shaped the outcome.

C. Student Preparation

- All Required Readings and Lectures will be listed and available on Blackboard in the “Historical Case Study #2” folder.

D. Student Deliverables

Week 7: The student must post Formative Assessment 6 (FA-6) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student’s primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students’ answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Week 8: The student must post Formative Assessment 7 (FA-7) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student’s primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due NLT 2359 Monday**. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students’ answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

Week 9: The student must submit Summative Assessment #2 (SA-2) via instructions found in the “Summative Assessment” section in Blackboard

This writing requirement measures the student’s comprehension and mastery of the session objectives covered in Sessions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 by applying the themes, theories, and concepts in a formal, analytic essay.

All relevant readings and lectures from FoS should be consulted in the preparation of this essay. **No outside readings or other sources are permitted.** The source material provided by the program is more than sufficient to construct the assigned essay.

The student must complete an analytical essay on the topic assigned by the professor. Essay requirements, associated rubrics, and writing guidelines are delineated in the “Summative Assessments” folder of Blackboard. The assignment is an individual effort; collaboration is NOT permitted. This includes a prohibition against using any uploaded materials from any outside source or website.

Week 10: The student must post Formative Assessment 8 (FA-8) in a Discussion Board Forum (DBF). The student’s primary DBF post **must be between 350 and 500 words** and is **due**

NLT 2359 Monday. The two mandatory follow-up posts to other students' answers **must be a minimum of 100 words** and are **due NLT 2359 Wednesday**. Details are found on Blackboard.

SECTION 3: APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY (CJCSI 1800.01G, 15 April 2024)

SERVICE INTERMEDIATE-LEVEL COLLEGE (ILC) JOINT LEARNING AREAS (JLA)

JLA 1 - Strategic Thinking and Communication. Joint officers demonstrate advanced cognitive and communications skills employing critical, creative, and systematic thought. They evaluate alternative perspectives and demonstrate the ability to distinguish reliable from unreliable information to form reasoned decisions. They persuasively communicate on behalf of their organizations with a wide range of domestic and foreign audiences. Via their communication, they synthesize all elements of their strategic thinking concisely, coherently, and comprehensively in a manner appropriate for the intended audience and environment.

JLA 2 - The Profession of Arms. Joint officers are first and foremost members of the profession of arms, sworn to support and defend the Constitution, with specialized knowledge in the art and science of war. They demonstrate joint-mindedness and possess a common understanding of the values of their chosen profession demonstrated through the exercise of sound moral judgement and the embodiment and enforcement of professional ethics, norms, and laws. They apply the principles of life-long learning and demonstrate effective joint leadership and followership.

JLA 3 - The Continuum of Competition, Conflict, and War. Joint officers are experts in the theory, principles, concepts, and history specific to sources of national power, the spectrum of conflict, and the art and science of warfighting. They apply their knowledge of the nature, character, and conduct of war and conflict, and the instruments of national power, to determine the military dimensions of challenges to U.S. national interests, evaluating the best use of the military instrument to achieve national security objectives.

JLA 4 - The Security Environment. Joint officers effectively and continuously assess the security implications of the current and future operational environment. Using appropriate interdisciplinary analytical frameworks, they evaluate historical, cultural, political, military, economic, innovative, technological, and other competitive forces to identify and evaluate potential threats, opportunities, and risks.

JLA 5 - Strategy and Joint Planning. Joint officers apply a knowledge of law, policy, doctrine, concepts, processes, and systems to design, assess, and revise or sustain risk- and resource-informed strategies and globally integrated, all-domain joint plans across the spectrum of conflict. They demonstrate broad understanding of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities and policies to inform planning. They envision requisite future capabilities and develop strategies and plans to acquire them. They use strategy and planning as primary tools to develop viable, creative options for policy makers. In so doing, they position the United States to achieve national objectives.

JLA 6 - Globally Integrated Operations. Joint officers creatively apply U.S., allied, and partner military power to conduct globally integrated, all-domain operations and campaigns. They exercise intellectual agility, demonstrate initiative, and rapidly adapt to disruptive change across all domains of competition, conflict, and war. They do so consistent with law, ethics, and the shared values of the profession of arms in furtherance of U.S. national objectives.

APPENDIX B

Fundamentals of Strategy Course Learning Outcomes

1. Evaluate, through Clausewitzian critical analysis, strategic arguments and alternative courses of actions within wars.
2. Apply creatively strategic principles, relevant theorists, and historical case studies to address complex problems of strategy and operations in war.
3. Evaluate how various actors achieve strategic effects through operations in naval and other domains.
4. Evaluate choices of theater-level commanders related to the conduct of war to achieve political aims.
5. Demonstrate the ability to apply critical and creative thinking.
6. Demonstrate the ability to communicate clearly and precisely.