Faculty Publications

There is an emergence of a calculus in which policy towards Russia must now be considered in the context of other priorities, rather than existing in an independent sphere.

Five of America's top Russia experts consider prospects for the June 16 meeting between presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva. Thomas Graham, Nikolas Gvosdev, Paul Kolbe, Olga Oliker and Angela Stent share their thoughts on stabilizing the U.S.-Russian relationship, low-hanging fruit, concrete steps to take and what can go wrong.

The hacks are a potent reminder that Moscow does not trust in the goodwill of the Biden administration, and is warning against efforts to weaponize unrest in Russia. Understanding this mindset will be important as the U.S. prepares for the Geneva summit.

Our lives are being rocked by cyber disruptions, like the one that shut down the Colonial Pipeline. Llewellyn King talks about this with John Savage, professor emeritus of computer science at Brown University, and Derek Reveron, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College.

A temporary breathing space does not portend a major shift in the relationship. The real question is whether Biden and Putin are prepared to bargain.

Biden's desire to create "a foreign policy for the middle class" is a laudable notion, but it may be at odds with history. The need for compromise and support of allies may not always coincide with the perceived needs of America's middle class, which has frequently misunderstood the work of diplomats and been suspicious of the demands of global issues.

The declaration of U.S. troop withdrawal brings a disappointing conclusion to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and raises questions about its role as a reliable security partner.

After the January 6 attack on the US Capitol, terms like extremism and terrorism, which had largely been reserved for dangerous faraway places, are now part of the American political lexicon. But the US cannot afford to treat domestic extremism the way it dealt with (or tried to deal with) extremism overseas.

Europe will always remain an important part of the world for U.S. foreign policy, but its centrality to American national and economic security is drawing to a close. How this rebalancing will happen during the 2020s will become the most critical geopolitical challenge facing the U.S. national security establishment.

As global attention and resources have shifted away from issues of extremism, conditions in many parts of the world are ripe for a resurgence of extremist violence. From former theaters of robust U.S. military engagement like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria to secularist strongholds such as France and Turkey, incentives and opportunities for extremist violence are rising.

In keeping with the assessments made by Derek Reveron and Nikolas Gvosdev in their original Orbis piece, how significantly different is this interim guidance—and does it validate their conclusion that U.S. national strategy exhibits an understated but very real degree of continuity?

How will U.S. action towards Moscow affect two more critical relationships for Washington: the ones with Berlin and Beijing?

Who Came Out On Top from the 2020 Coronavirus Year? Predictions that Russia or China would take the lead in the fight against the pandemic have not panned out. Instead, countries around the world are clamoring for forging new trade, technological, and health alliances with the United States.

If there is an upside to nuclear weapons it is extended deterrence. This term refers to the “nuclear umbrella” that the United States promises to extend over its closest allies in Asia and Europe to protect against hostile nuclear powers who otherwise might be tempted to act coercively against them. Although extended deterrence is most often associated with NATO, it is also a critical feature of the American hub-and-spoke alliance system in Asia.