Faculty Publications

On November 23, Russia mounted 70 missile and five drone attacks against Ukraine’s power infrastructure. Cities across the nation, including Kyiv, went dark. Without power, water supply and other systems providing for the population’s basic needs no longer functioned. And millions of Ukrainians found themselves unable to heat their homes in the below-freezing weather. Sadly, ten civilians died during the onslaught.

The patchwork of overlapping Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) covering much of the East China Sea represents a potential flashpoint for conflict. A brief survey of the history, purpose, and location of these zones can help frame these risks for the future.

As Russia continues to pummel electric grids and other critical infrastructure from the air, Ukraine is creatively developing methods to defend its skies. One new tool is “ePPO,” a new mobile application (“app”) that Ukrainian civilians can download on their cell phones to report the locations of incoming missiles or other air threats. It appears to be working.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has lessons each generation should study, such as the danger of nuclear powers struggling from competition to potential conflict. The Russia-Ukraine war has a similar parallel with Western powers providing weapons for Ukraine’s defense, particularly since their justifications are identical to those made by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for sending weapons to Cuba.

After withdrawing from much of the territory it occupied in Kharkov Oblast, the Russian military has turned to a new strategy of attacking civilian infrastructure, such as the power grid and dams.

The Marine Corps is faced with an intensified challenge of contested logistics as it employs its novel concept of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). EABO calls for Marines to act as Stand-in Forces using low profile, highly mobile Expeditionary Advance Bases (EAB) that will likely be within an enemy’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ).

A review of legal requirements for using Self Propelled Semi Submersibles during Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for logistics resupply within an Enemy's Weapons Engagement Zone.

The post examines the response options international law currently provides in the event of a hostile action against a satellite that stays below the level of force required to trigger the right to self-defense under the UN Charter. Such “subthreshold” activities, even if they don’t amount to a “use of force” or an “armed attack” as those terms are used in international law, can still be very harmful to those who depend upon satellite services.

As Ukraine continues to defend against Russian invasion, its armed forces are increasingly turning to deception operations to minimize their asymmetrical disadvantages with Russian forces. As part of the campaign to regain control of Kharkiv, for example, Ukraine’s forces employed mannequins strapped to trees and other cover wearing military fatigues and armed with fake rifles to “confuse attacking Russian forces.”

As the death toll in the war between Russia and Ukraine climbs, the issue of how to properly treat the remains of dead soldiers has become a recurring theme. Some media reports claim, for example, that Ukrainian forces are publishing photographs of dead Russian soldiers on social media so family members can “determine whether the images feature a missing loved one.”

Ongoing hostilities between Russia and Ukraine are placing the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which lies in Russian-occupied territory, at great risk. Damage to the facility could be so catastrophic that U.N. Secretary-General Guterres has warned, “We must tell it like it is – any potential damage to Zaporizhzhia is suicide.”

Just after daybreak on July 31, the United States killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s former deputy and the current leader of al-Qaeda. Two Hellfire missiles struck him on the balcony of his home in Kabul. Nearby residents reported a loud blast along with an impact tremor. The building, however, remained largely intact, other than the mangled balcony.

The second part to this series will examine whether Russia may lawfully target Starlink satellites as a valid military objective under international law (as international law is expressly applicable to space by Article III of the OST) and what this would mean for the United States.

As Ukraine continues to defy early predictions of how long it can resist Russia’s invading forces, Ukraine’s partners are facing a growing dilemma. Supplies of arms and munitions critical to Ukraine’s resistance are dwindling.

The new Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) will see a Navy-Marine Corps integration tighter than the days of sail. Much like the Marine sharpshooters in the topsails, the MLR and EABO concept will extend the eyes and fires of the fleet. Considering developing weapons systems, this will have a devasting effect on the strategic level—or its potential effect could be employed as strategic deterrence.