Faculty Publications

This Q&A is part of a series following the 4th Annual Stockton Center Law of Armed Conflict Conference, Russia-Ukraine: Full-Spectrum Conflict and the Law, held at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island over December 13-15, 2022 and co-sponsored by the Norwegian Defence University College and the Swedish Defence University.

This Q&A is the first in a series following the 4th Annual Stockton Center Law of Armed Conflict Conference, Russia-Ukraine: Full-Spectrum Conflict and the Law, held at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island over December 13-15, 2022 and co-sponsored by the Norwegian Defence University College and the Swedish Defence University.

Sabotage in war is nothing new, but if it occurs on the territory of a purportedly neutral NATO member supplying aid to Ukraine to fight against Russia, conflict escalation is possible.

On February 5, 2026, the NEW START Treaty, the last Nuclear Arms Control Treaty between the United States and Russia is set to expire. History shows that arms control negotiations take years if not decades to conclude, and the recent breakdown between Russian and American negotiations indicates New START is running out of time for renewal.

As part of the Articles of War “Year Ahead” series published earlier this year, Board of Advisor member Professor Gary Solis predicted that several legal issues pertaining to the law of armed conflict (LOAC) will likely see significant development soon, including drones with “more diverse battlefield functions.”

Submerged foreign submarines in a nation’s territorial sea pose a unique situation that is inconsistent with the rule of innocent passage. Under certain circumstances, their concealed presence without the consent of the coastal state could be considered a threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal state.

Aside from the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva early in the conflict, no aspect of the naval dimensions of the Russia-Ukraine war has seized the attention of defense analysts more than the events of October 29 near Sevastopol.

The lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis remain relevant today when nuclear powers struggle in crisis and do their best to avoid escalating to conflict. A review of the confrontation between the navies of the Soviet Union and the United States during the crisis may inform the Western powers supporting Ukraine in its current defense against Russia.

On November 23, Russia mounted 70 missile and five drone attacks against Ukraine’s power infrastructure. Cities across the nation, including Kyiv, went dark. Without power, water supply and other systems providing for the population’s basic needs no longer functioned. And millions of Ukrainians found themselves unable to heat their homes in the below-freezing weather. Sadly, ten civilians died during the onslaught.

The patchwork of overlapping Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) covering much of the East China Sea represents a potential flashpoint for conflict. A brief survey of the history, purpose, and location of these zones can help frame these risks for the future.

As Russia continues to pummel electric grids and other critical infrastructure from the air, Ukraine is creatively developing methods to defend its skies. One new tool is “ePPO,” a new mobile application (“app”) that Ukrainian civilians can download on their cell phones to report the locations of incoming missiles or other air threats. It appears to be working.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has lessons each generation should study, such as the danger of nuclear powers struggling from competition to potential conflict. The Russia-Ukraine war has a similar parallel with Western powers providing weapons for Ukraine’s defense, particularly since their justifications are identical to those made by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev for sending weapons to Cuba.

After withdrawing from much of the territory it occupied in Kharkov Oblast, the Russian military has turned to a new strategy of attacking civilian infrastructure, such as the power grid and dams.

The Marine Corps is faced with an intensified challenge of contested logistics as it employs its novel concept of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO). EABO calls for Marines to act as Stand-in Forces using low profile, highly mobile Expeditionary Advance Bases (EAB) that will likely be within an enemy’s Weapons Engagement Zone (WEZ).

A review of legal requirements for using Self Propelled Semi Submersibles during Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations for logistics resupply within an Enemy's Weapons Engagement Zone.