U.S. Naval War College faculty members publish their learned opinions on diverse topics and time periods in various media outlets including academic journals, online publications, scholarly texts, and popular editions.
Chinese naval and strategic planners fear, and their Western counterparts seem to believe, that a maritime blockade could interrupt or significantly impede China’s energy supplies in a limited war. But probably it could not, and thinking it could is dangerous for everyone.
Despite this ambivalence and its anemic defense budget, Taiwan has sought costly weapons systems from the United States, including PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability, third version) missile systems, P-3 maritime patrol and F-16 fighter aircraft, Kidd-class destroyers, and diesel submarines.
Newport Paper No. 29, Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron, makes an important contribution to an unfolding debate on the global role of U.S. military forces in an era of transnational terrorism, failed or failing states, and globalization. Reveron, professor of national security decision making at the Naval War College, looks beyond the current conflicts in which the United States is involved to raise fundamental...
This volume offers a comprehensive overview of international political violence by bringing together foreign policy experts on several regions who examine conflicts in the Fertile Crescent, the Balkans, the Post-Soviet Region, the Himalayas, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.
America's "Viceroys," its generals and admirals who head the nation's five geographical combatant commands, control substantial budgets that translate into military-training opportunities and enhanced security for foreign nations. Just how much influence do these commanders enjoy? This volume attempts to provide an answer.
Derek S. Reveron, "Making Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island"
Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth explores the shifting reputation of our most controversial founding father. Since the day Aaron Burr fired his fatal shot, Americans have tried to come to grips with Alexander Hamilton's legacy. Stephen Knott surveys the Hamilton image in the minds of American statesmen, scholars, literary figures, and the media, explaining why Americans are content to live in a Hamiltonian nation but reluctant to...
Today when we think of covert operations, we think of American-backed mercenaries circulating through jungle camps of Contra guerrillas, CIA agents plotting coups against governments in Chile and Libya, or the lethal cigars used in an attempt to assassinate Castro.
Throughout his career as an academic and a statesman, Henry Kissinger has been an articulate advocate of a conceptually-based approach to foreign policy.
One of the most able and controversial statesmen of the century, Henry Kissinger was nonetheless unable to achieve Atlantic unity during his years as Secretary of State. His failures, though, stem not from a lack of concern towards Europe but more from a lack of understanding of how best to approach and secure NATO unity.
Despite continued opposition within Congress and the American public at large, the Reagan administration has striven since it entered office to secure aid for the contra forces of Nicaragua. Perhaps more interesting than the sheer doggedness of the administration has been its willingness to modify its purported objectives in order to secure support for the aid requests.
In the first American military intervention since the Vietnam War, U.S. and Caribbean troops invaded Grenada in October 1983, overthrowing a Marxist military junta and restoring democratic government. The invasion provoked considerable controversy in the United States, but often forgotten or overlooked by both supporters and opponents of the action was that the decision to invade was not made unilaterally.
Inside Defense brings together scholars, policy experts and practitioners to provide a comprehensive view of the U.S. military to understand the military's role in international politics and its relationship with domestic institutions and society.
The author argues that American policymakers must take an approach based on "principled judgment" when deciding on the use of force. The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy.